Journal articles on the topic 'Sentience'

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1

Yeates, James William. "Sentience, Harmony and the Value of Nature." Animals 13, no. 1 (December 22, 2022): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani13010038.

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Concern for nature and for animal sentience are important public and political moral concerns. Using frameworks such as Harmony for Nature and One Health and the recent IPBES report on the Diverse Values of Nature, this paper considers how the two issues interrelate, in terms of our concepts of sentience and nature, and sentience-based values’ importance in relation to nature-based values. Animals’ sentience is part of nature, and part of its diversity, harmony, health and value. Sentient animals’ feelings represent animals’ evaluations of nature that go beyond valuing nature for solely for market-based and anthropocentric interests. Sentience is therefore relevant for measurement, leveraging and embedding sentience-based values in environmental concerns, including in environmental impact assessments, science-based UN policy-making, interdisciplinary and interagency collaboration, and to strengthen transformative and system-based action for nature.
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2

George, Marie I. "A Defense of the Distinction Between Plants and Animals." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 93 (2019): 349–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2021426117.

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Aristotle’s division of living things into three categories has been challenged of late as to the distinction between plants and animals on the grounds that plants too are sentient. I argue that the life activities that plants carry on go on in us without sentience and would not be carried on any better with sentience, and thus are reasonably thought to go in plants in a non-sentient manner. Complementing this expectation is the fact that research on the various movements of plants accounts for them without reference to sensation, but rather by specifying various physical causes. I also show that certain proponents of plant sentience engage in faulty reasoning, including the fallacy of the accident (e.g., the plant responds to something having a quality that a sentient being would sense; therefore it senses) and equivocation (e.g., plants sense different external cues; therefore they are sentient).
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3

Learmonth, Mark James. "The Matter of Non-Avian Reptile Sentience, and Why It “Matters” to Them: A Conceptual, Ethical and Scientific Review." Animals 10, no. 5 (May 22, 2020): 901. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani10050901.

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The concept of sentience, how it is characterised and which non-human animals possess it have long been of contention in academic and intellectual debates. Many have argued that there is no way to empirically know that animals have conscious experiences. Yet others argue that consciousness, awareness and sentience in non-human animals can be quite obvious, and can indeed be measured empirically. Most modern declarations of animal sentience from official organisations and governments now include all vertebrate animals as sentient beings, including reptiles and fish. Some declarations also include some invertebrate species. This conceptual, ethical and scientific review first focuses on conceptual components and definitions of consciousness, awareness and sentience. It then specifically discusses how cognitive, neurobiological, ethological and comparative psychological research in non-avian reptiles over the last century has evidenced many capacities that historically were denied to this class of animals. Non-avian reptiles do indeed possess all of the necessary capacities to be declared as sentient beings, at least in the small proportion of reptile species that have actually been empirically investigated so far. It is suggested that much innovative future research will continue to uncover evidence of capabilities linked to sentience within a wide range of species, including non-avian reptiles, fish and invertebrates.
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4

Hobson-West, Pru, and Ashley Davies. "Societal Sentience." Science, Technology, & Human Values 43, no. 4 (October 25, 2017): 671–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0162243917736138.

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The use of nonhuman animals as models in research and drug testing is a key route through which contemporary scientific knowledge is certified. Given ethical concerns, regulation of animal research promotes the use of less “sentient” animals. This paper draws on a documentary analysis of legal documents and qualitative interviews with Named Veterinary Surgeons and others at a commercial laboratory in the UK. Its key claim is that the concept of animal sentience is entangled with a particular imaginary of how the general public or wider society views animals. We call this imaginary societal sentience. Against a backdrop of increasing ethnographic work on care encounters in the laboratory, this concept helps to stress the wider context within which such encounters take place. We conclude that societal sentience has potential purchase beyond the animal research field, in helping to highlight the affective dimension of public imaginaries and their ethical consequences. Researching and critiquing societal sentience, we argue, may ultimately have more impact on the fate of humans and nonhumans in the laboratory than focusing wholly on ethics as situated practice.
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5

Wisniewski. "Sentience." Antioch Review 78, no. 1 (2020): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.7723/antiochreview.78.1.0155.

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6

Henchman, Anna. "Sentience." Victorian Literature and Culture 46, no. 3-4 (2018): 861–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150318001043.

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7

Kabat-Zinn, Jon. "Sentience." Mindfulness 9, no. 1 (December 5, 2017): 352–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12671-017-0861-4.

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8

Kammerer, François. "Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness." Journal of Consciousness Studies 29, no. 3 (March 31, 2022): 180–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.3.180.

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Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethics without sentience.
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9

Waters, Ryan. "Animal sentience." Veterinary Record 181, no. 24 (December 2017): 659.1–659. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/vr.j5738.

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10

Bourne, Debra. "Sentience matters." Companion Animal 22, no. 12 (December 2, 2017): 697. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/coan.2017.22.12.697.

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11

Huffman, Bennett. "Advocating Sentience." Organization & Environment 15, no. 1 (March 2002): 79–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1086026602151009.

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12

Mata, Fernando, Bastian Jaeger, and Ivo Domingues. "Perceptions of Farm Animal Sentience and Suffering: Evidence from the BRIC Countries and the United States." Animals 12, no. 23 (December 4, 2022): 3416. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani12233416.

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In this study, we examined how beliefs about farm animal sentience and their suffering vary across culture and demographic characteristics. A total of N = 5027) questionnaires were administered in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the USA. Brazilians showed higher and Chinese lower levels of perceived animal sentience. In Russia and India, the perception of suffering and sentience increases with age, with similar levels to those observed in the USA. In all the countries, more people agreed than disagreed that animals are sentient. Men in India show higher levels of agreement with the relation between eating meat and animal suffering, followed by women in Brazil and China. Lower levels of agreement are observed in Americans and Chinese. Women show higher levels of compassion than men. In Russia, there is a slightly higher level of agreement between men and in the USA younger men agree more. Young American men show higher levels of agreement, while in India and China age has the opposite effect. For fair trading competition, it is important to standardize procedures and respect the demand for both animal protein and its ethical production. Overall, our results showed that perceptions of farm animal sentience and suffering vary substantially across countries and demographic groups. These differences could have important consequences for the perceived ethicality of meat production and consumption, and for global trade in animal products.
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13

Davis, N. Ann, and Bonnie Steinbock. "Interests and Sentience." Hastings Center Report 24, no. 6 (November 1994): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3563465.

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14

Lingen, Marissa. "My favourite sentience." Nature 556, no. 7702 (April 2018): 530. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-04938-z.

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15

Silverman, Jerald. "Sentience and sensation." Lab Animal 37, no. 10 (October 2008): 465–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/laban1008-465.

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16

Koch, Christof. "Intelligence without Sentience." Scientific American Mind 26, no. 4 (June 11, 2015): 26–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamericanmind0715-26.

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17

Lambert, Helen, Amelia Cornish, Angie Elwin, and Neil D’Cruze. "A Kettle of Fish: A Review of the Scientific Literature for Evidence of Fish Sentience." Animals 12, no. 9 (May 5, 2022): 1182. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani12091182.

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Fish are traded, caught, farmed, and killed in their trillions every year around the world, yet their welfare is often neglected and their sentience regularly disregarded. In this review, we have sought to (1) catalogue the extent to which fish sentience has featured over the past 31 years in the scientific literature and (2) discuss the importance of fish sentience in relation to their commercial uses. We searched the journal database Science Direct using 42 keywords that describe traits or elements of sentience to find articles that were referring to or exploring fish sentience. Our review returned 470 results for fish sentience in 142 different species and subspecies of fish, and featured 19 different sentience keywords. The top four keywords were; ‘stress’ (psychological) (n = 216, 45.9% of total results), ‘anxiety’ (n = 144, 30.6%), ‘fear’ (n = 46, 9.7%), and ‘pain’ (n = 27, 5.7%). Our findings highlight an abundance of evidence for fish sentience in the published scientific literature. We conclude that legislation governing the treatment of fish and attitudes towards their welfare require scrutiny so that their welfare can be safeguarded across the globe.
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18

Mellor, David J. "Welfare-aligned Sentience: Enhanced Capacities to Experience, Interact, Anticipate, Choose and Survive." Animals 9, no. 7 (July 13, 2019): 440. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani9070440.

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The focus of this opinion is on the key features of sentience in animals which can experience different states of welfare, encapsulated by the new term ‘welfare-aligned sentience’. This term is intended to exclude potential forms of sentience that do not enable animals in some taxa to have the subjective experiences which underlie different welfare states. As the scientific understanding of key features of sentience has increased markedly during the last 10 to 15 years, a major purpose here is to provide up-to-date information regarding those features. Eleven interconnected statements about sentience-associated body functions and behaviour are therefore presented and explained briefly. These statements are sequenced to provide progressively more information about key scientifically-supported attributes of welfare-aligned sentience, leading, in their entirety, to a more comprehensive understanding of those attributes. They are as follows: (1) Internal structure–function interactions and integration are the foundations of sentience; (2) animals posess a capacity to respond behaviourally to a range of sensory inputs; (3) the more sophisticated nervous systems can generate subjective experiences, that is, affects; (4) sentience means that animals perceive or experience different affects consciously; (5) within a species, the stage of neurobiological development is significant; (6) during development the onset of cortically-based consciousness is accompanied by cognitively-enhanced capacities to respond behaviourally to unpredictable postnatal environments; (7) sentience includes capacities to communicate with others and to interact with the environment; (8) sentience incorporates experiences of negative and positive affects; (9) negative and positive affective experiences ‘matter’ to animals for various reasons; (10) acknowledged obstacles inherent in anthropomorphism are largely circumvented by new scientific knowledge, but caution is still required; and (11) there is increasing evidence for sentience among a wider range of invertebrates. The science-based explanations of these statements provide the foundation for a brief definition of ‘welfare-aligned sentience’, which is offered for consideration. Finally, it is recommended that when assessing key features of sentience the same emphasis should be given to positive and negative affective experiences in the context of their roles in, or potential impacts on, animal welfare.
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19

Yeates, James William. "Ascribing Sentience: Evidential and Ethical Considerations in Policymaking." Animals 12, no. 15 (July 25, 2022): 1893. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani12151893.

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Deciding which animals are sentient is an important precursor for decisions about the application of animal welfare legislation, and the wider assessment of the impacts of policies on animal suffering. We ascribe sentience in order to inform decisions about how animals should be treated, and how their treatment should be regulated. This ascription is both an ethical and an evidential process, and what evidence to use and require are ethical questions. Policymakers, therefore, cannot simply rely on scientific evidence in an ethically neutral way, but must be conscious of the ethical assumptions and positions underlying the process of ascription and its application in policy and law. As such, ethical principles that apply to policymaking apply to the ascription of sentience. This paper considers the implications of the Nolan principles for public service on the ascription of animals.
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20

Brunet, T. D. P., and Marta Halina. "Minds, Machines, and Molecules." Philosophical Topics 48, no. 1 (2020): 221–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202048111.

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Recent debates about the biological and evolutionary conditions for sentience have generated a renewed interest in fine-grained functionalism. According to one such account advanced by Peter Godfrey-Smith, sentience depends on the fine-grained activities characteristic of living organisms. Specifically, the scale, context and stochasticity of these fine-grained activities. One implication of this view is that contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) is a poor candidate for sentience. Insofar as current AI lacks the ability to engage in such living activities it will lack sentience, no matter what its coarse-grained functions. In this paper, we review the case for fine-grained functionalism and show that there are contemporary machines that fulfil the fine-grained functional criteria identified by Godfrey-Smith, and thus are candidates for sentience. Molecular machines such as Brownian computers are analogous to metabolic activity in their scale, context and stochasticity, and can serve as the basis of AI. Molecular computation is a promising candidate for artificial sentience according to contemporary philosophical accounts of sentience.
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21

Short, Ellen L. "Group relations love: sentience and group relations work - Part I." Organisational and Social Dynamics 19, no. 2 (November 1, 2019): 186–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.33212/osd.v19n2.2019.186.

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Part I of this article will focus on the relationship between sentience and group relations conference work. Literature concerning group relations work and sentience will be explored. Sentience will be explored structurally and externally through the lens of task and group, with a focus on systems, organisational transformation, as well as the history, philosophy, and design of group relations conferences. Group relations work and sentience will also be focused on in relation to inquiry of why one does the work, embodying an internal perspective regarding the complexities of the consultant role and relationship to the group. The construct of group relations love will be introduced in connection with aspects of sentience in group work.
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22

Yolles, Maurice. "Consciousness, Sapience and Sentience—A Metacybernetic View." Systems 10, no. 6 (December 13, 2022): 254. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems10060254.

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Living systems are complex dynamic information processing energy consuming entities with properties of consciousness, intelligence, sapience, and sentience. Sapience and sentience are autonomous attributes of consciousness. While sapience has been well studied over the years, that of sentience is relatively rare. The nature of sapience and sentience will be considered, and a metacybernetic framework using structural information will be adopted to explore the metaphysics of consciousness. Metacybernetics delivers a cyberintrinsic model that is cybernetic in nature, but also uses the theory of structural information arising from Frieden’s work with Fisher information. This will be used to model sapience and sentience and their relationship. Since living systems are energy-consuming entities, it is also natural for thermodynamic metaphysical models to arise, and most of the theoretical studies of sentience have been set within a thermodynamic framework. Hence, a thermodynamic approach will also be introduced and connected to cyberintrinsic theory. In metaphysical contexts, thermodynamics uses free-energy, which plays the same role in cyberintrinsic modelling as intrinsic structural information. Since living systems exist at the dynamical interface of information and thermodynamics, the overall purpose of this paper is to explore sentience from the alternative cyberintrinsic perspective of metacybernetics.
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23

Cornish, Amelia, Bethany Wilson, David Raubenheimer, and Paul McGreevy. "Demographics Regarding Belief in Non-Human Animal Sentience and Emotional Empathy with Animals: A Pilot Study among Attendees of an Animal Welfare Symposium." Animals 8, no. 10 (October 4, 2018): 174. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani8100174.

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Attitudes to animals are linked to beliefs about their ability to experience pain and suffering, their cognition, and their sentience. Education and awareness-raising play a pivotal role in increasing society’s consideration of non-human animal welfare. The current pilot study explores the attitudes towards animal welfare among a unique population of people who attended an animal welfare symposium at the University of Sydney. It involved administration of a validated questionnaire that assessed attitudes to animals; specifically exploring participants’ (n = 41) beliefs about the sentience of animals and their emotional empathy with animals. The resultant data revealed significant associations between participants’ beliefs in animal sentience and their demographic variables (age, sex and occupation). Female attendees showed stronger beliefs in sentience than male attendees did. Concerning sentience in cows, pigs and cats, older attendees showed stronger beliefs than younger people in sentience relating to hunger and pain. Also, with regard to questions about sentience in dogs, older attendees showed stronger beliefs than younger people in pain-related sentience in dogs. When exploring emotional empathy with animals, the participants’ statements could be assigned to three clusters characterised by the internal emotional lives of animals and the treatment of animals by humans (Cluster 1), human interactions with animals (Cluster 2) and the keeping of companion and zoo animals (Cluster 3). To the authors’ knowledge, this pilot study is the first of its kind to investigate the attitudes towards animal welfare of an important group of people who work, study or have a special interest within the animal care and welfare domain.
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24

Williams, Meredith. "A Theory of Sentience." International Philosophical Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2002): 113–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200242175.

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25

Siegel, Susanna, and Austen Clark. "A Theory of Sentience." Philosophical Review 111, no. 1 (January 2002): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3182583.

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26

Fox, Michael W. "Recognising sentience in animals." Veterinary Record 189, no. 6 (September 2021): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/vetr.1003.

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27

van Bogaert, Louis-Jacques. "Sentience and Moral Standing." South African Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 3 (January 2004): 292–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v23i3.31399.

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28

Sneddon, Lynne U. "Sentience and animal welfare." Animal Behaviour 118 (August 2016): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.05.023.

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29

Siegel, S. "A THEORY OF SENTIENCE." Philosophical Review 111, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 135–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-135.

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30

Bağrıaçık, Metin. "Representing discourse in clausal syntax." Journal of Greek Linguistics 17, no. 2 (2017): 141–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15699846-01702001.

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In Pharasiot Greek, an Asia Minor Greek dialect, a certain particle copied from Turkish, ki, is employed in a number of seemingly unrelated constructions. Close scrutiny, however, reveals that in each of these constructions, ki is employed as a device geared to influencing the interlocutor’s epistemic vigilance. Based on the Cartographic Approach which defends the syntactization of the interpretive domains, I propose that this unique semantics of ki should be represented in the clause structure. Following recent work which advocates the existence of a pragmatic field—Speech Act Phrase (SAP) in particular—above the CP-layer, where discourse and pragmatic roles are mapped onto syntax, I propose that ki is the overt exponent of SA0 and is further endowed with a [+ sentience] feature indexing the speaker as the sentient mind. The apparent differences between various construction types which involve ki—hence, in which SAP projects—then reduce to whether the [+ sentience] feature on SA0 is checked by an internally or externally merging category in Spec, SAP.
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31

Mackenzie, Robin. "Sexbots: Customizing Them to Suit Us versus an Ethical Duty to Created Sentient Beings to Minimize Suffering." Robotics 7, no. 4 (November 11, 2018): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/robotics7040070.

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Sex robot scholarship typically focuses on customizable simulacra, lacking sentience and self-awareness but able to simulate and stimulate human affection. This paper argues that future humans will want more: sex robots customized to possess sentience and self-awareness [henceforth, sexbots], capable of mutuality in sexual and intimate relationships. Adopting a transdisciplinary critical methodology focused on the legal, ethical and design implications of sexbots, it assesses implications of sexbots’ non-mammalian subjectivity, balancing designed-in autonomy and control, decision-making capacity and consent, sexual preferences and desire, legal and moral status, vulnerability and contrasts between mammalian and non-mammalian moral decision-making. It explores theoretical, ethical, and pragmatic aspects of the tensions involved in creating sentient beings for utilitarian purposes, concluding that sexbots, customized manufactured humanlike entities with the capacity for thought and suffering, have a consequent claim to be considered moral and legal persons, and may become the first conscious robots. Customizing sexbots thus exemplifies many profound ethical, legal and design issues. The contradictions inherent in their inconsistent ethical and legal status as both manufactured things and sentient, self-aware entities who are customized to be our intimate partners augments existing human/animal scholars’ call for a new theoretical framework which supersedes current person/thing dichotomies governing human responsibilities to other sentient beings. The paper concludes that the ethical limits and legal implications of customizable humanlike robots must be addressed urgently, proposing a duty on humans as creators to safeguard the interests and minimize the suffering of created sentient beings before technological advances pre-empt this possibility.
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32

DEL GANDIO, JASON. "From Affectivity to Bodily Emanation: An Introduction to the Human Vibe." PhaenEx 7, no. 2 (December 16, 2012): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/p.v7i2.3554.

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This essay investigates a particular form of “affection” that has been neglected by the phenomenological tradition. This particular phenomenon is often referred to as the vibe, vibrations, or some variation thereof. This essay rearticulates “the vibe” as bodily emanation: human beings emanate feeling that is experienced by and through our bodies. My study of bodily emanation begins with Edmund Husserl’s notion of affectivity and then moves to Eugene T. Gendlin’s notion of the sentient body. This discussion enables my own argument: Our bodies do not simply respond to the world in a sentient fashion, but also solicit sentience from one another. This solicitation of sentience is the basis of bodily emanation. I explicate bodily emanation through two realms of experience: the pre-conscious and the conscious. The first realm designates the manner in which our bodies summon emanation from one another in a continuous, multilateral fashion. Such preconscious solicitation precedes our conscious control and recognition. The second realm designates our ability to project willfully and direct particular vibes for particular purposes. This latter realm is what most people think of when they refer to “the vibe.” In general, this essay provides a detailed account of a particular phenomenon that most of us experience, but which we do not fully consider.
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33

Broom, Donald M. "Concepts and Interrelationships of Awareness, Consciousness, Sentience, and Welfare." Journal of Consciousness Studies 29, no. 3 (March 31, 2022): 129–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.3.129.

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Concept definitions applicable to human and non-human animals should be usable for both. Awareness is a state during which concepts of environment, self, and self in relation to environment result from complex brain analysis of sensory stimuli or constructs based on memory. There are several proposed categories of awareness. The widespread usage of the term conscious is 'not unconscious' so a conscious individual is an individual that has the capability to perceive and respond to sensory stimuli. It is confusing and scientifically undesirable if conscious is also used to mean aware. Hence it is proposed that conscious should be used only as above. Fully functioning and adequately developed humans and members of many other animal species are sentient. Sentience means having the capacity, the level of awareness and cognitive ability, necessary to have feelings. The welfare of an individual is its state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment. This includes feelings, which are important coping mechanisms, and health. Since feelings involve awareness, there is overlap between welfare assessment and awareness assessment. Methods for assessing awareness, consciousness, sentience, and welfare and links to morality are briefly discussed.
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34

Loeb, Josh. "Recognition for sentience at last." Veterinary Record 188, no. 10 (May 2021): 369. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/vetr.518.

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35

Mackenzie, Ella. "Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill passed." UK-Vet Equine 6, no. 3 (May 2, 2022): 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/ukve.2022.6.3.89.

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36

Taylor, Nigel. "Making strides with animal sentience." Veterinary Record 190, no. 1 (January 2022): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/vetr.1356.

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37

Bricout, John C., Bonita B. Sharma, Paul M. A. Baker, Aman Behal, and Lotzi Boloni. "Learning futures with mixed sentience." Futures 87 (March 2017): 91–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.10.001.

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38

Brown, Culum. "Fish intelligence, sentience and ethics." Animal Cognition 18, no. 1 (June 19, 2014): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-014-0761-0.

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39

Jones, Robert C. "Science, sentience, and animal welfare." Biology & Philosophy 28, no. 1 (November 20, 2012): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9351-1.

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40

Shostak, G. Seth. "Searching for sentience: SETI today." International Journal of Astrobiology 2, no. 2 (April 2003): 111–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1473550403001502.

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For more than four decades, a small group of researchers has sought to find evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence in situ, by detecting microwave signals that would betray its existence. Despite the failure to find these signals so far, there is continued and even accelerated effort to press the search. Recent advances include greater emphasis on experiments at optical wavelengths, and the construction of a new radio telescope that is deliberately designed for such reconnaissance. In addition to these instrumental improvements, several strategies have been proposed that might better the chances of ‘looking in the right place, at the right time’. This review of the current state of SETI research concludes with a speculative look at the nature of the sought-for extraterrestrials, and when it is likely we might find them.
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41

Kirk, Robert. "Sentience, causation and some robots." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 3 (September 1986): 308–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048408612342521.

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42

Bermudez, J. L. "Review: A Theory of Sentience." Mind 111, no. 443 (July 1, 2002): 653–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/111.443.653.

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43

STEINBOCK, BONNIE. "Fetal Sentience and Women's Rights." Hastings Center Report 41, no. 6 (November 12, 2011): 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1552-146x.2011.tb00158.x.

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44

Wolf, Johannes. "An Old Materialism." Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 50, no. 2 (May 1, 2020): 269–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/10829636-8219554.

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This article takes a new approach to the conflicts represented in the thirteenth- century saints’ lives of the Katherine Group. Identifying saints and idols as contrasting poles in these conflicts, it argues that the category of sentience is a key distinguisher that is consistently employed to denigrate idols and idolators. Pagan antagonists are systematically identified as nonagential and material; by contrast, the saints communicate divine truth unimpeded and resist attempts to disrupt their highly integrated performances. The category of sentience is shuttled to-and-fro between parties as various antagonists attempt to reduce the saint to the status of an object. While superficially victorious, the saints finally fall prey to the binary logic of hagiography: to triumph over interrogation, torture, and death, the saint ultimately sacrifices her own sentience. This analysis reveals the investments of a medieval theory of sentience with implications for both hagiography at large and the twenty-first-century material turn.
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45

Sebo, Jeff. "The Moral Problem of Other Minds." Harvard Review of Philosophy 25 (2018): 51–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20185913.

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In this paper I ask how we should treat other beings in cases of uncertainty about sentience. I evaluate three options: (1) an incautionary principle that permits us to treat other beings as non-sentient, (2) a precautionary principle that requires us to treat other beings as sentient, and (3) an expected value principle that requires us to multiply our subjective probability that other beings are sentient by the amount of moral value they would have if they were. I then draw three conclusions. First, the precautionary and expected value principles are more plausible than the incautionary principle. Second, if we accept a precautionary or expected value principle, then we morally ought to treat many beings as having at least partial moral status. Third, if we morally ought to treat many beings as having at least partial moral status, then morality involves more cluelessness and demandingness than we might have thought.
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46

Zuolo, Federico. "Misadventures of Sentience: Animals and the Basis of Equality." Animals 9, no. 12 (November 29, 2019): 1044. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani9121044.

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This paper aims to put in question the all-purposes function that sentience has come to play in animal ethics. In particular, I criticize the idea that sentience can provide a sound basis of equality, as has been recently proposed by Alasdair Cochrane. Sentience seems to eschew the standard problems of egalitarian accounts that are based on range properties. By analysing the nature of range properties, I will show that sentience cannot provide such a solution because it is constructed as a sui generis range property. After criticizing the approaches seeking to ground animals’ equal status, I turn to Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests. Despite its seeming non-controversiality, I argue that it cannot do without referring to the moral status of a being in order to determine the weight of a being’s interests. Moreover, it outlines a weak egalitarian basis because it relies on the presumption of equality of interests in virtue of our lack of knowledge of the weight of individuals’ interests. I conclude in a more positive tone by arguing that, irrespective of the troubles of range property egalitarianism, animal ethics can rely on other normative resources to defend the cause of animals.
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47

Webster, John Anthony. "Sentience and sentient minds." Animal Sentience 6, no. 31 (January 1, 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1702.

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48

Daly, Anya. "Sentience and the Primordial ‘We’: Contributions to Animal Ethics from Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy." Environmental Values, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3197/096327122x16452897197801.

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This paper explores the ontological bases for ethical behaviour between human animals and non-human animals drawing on phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Alongside Singer and utilitarianism, I argue that ethical behaviour regarding animals is most effectively justified and motivated by considerations of sentience. Nonetheless, utilitarianism misses crucial aspects of sentience. Buddhist ethics is from the beginning focused on all sentient beings, not solely humans. This inclusivity, and refined interrogations of suffering, means it can furnish more nuanced understandings of sentience. For phenomenology, sentience includes the capacities for self-awareness and, I will argue, a plural self-awareness; the ‘I’ belongs to a ‘we’, and the ‘we’ is constitutive of the ‘I’. This ‘primordial we’ provides the basis for rethinking the moral relations between human animals and non-human animals. I contend finally we thus have an ontological basis in ‘interanimality’ to explain why we most often do and should care about all sentient beings.
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49

Dung, Leonard. "Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed." Science and Engineering Ethics 28, no. 6 (October 28, 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00408-y.

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AbstractAccording to a common view, sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status. In other words, whether a being has intrinsic moral relevance is determined by its capacity for conscious experience. The epistemic objection derives from our profound uncertainty about sentience. According to this objection, we cannot use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in practice because we won’t know in the foreseeable future which animals and AI systems are sentient while ethical questions regarding the possession of moral status are urgent. Therefore, we need to formulate an alternative criterion. I argue that the epistemic objection is dissolved once one clearly distinguishes between the question what determines moral status and what criterion should be employed in practice to ascribe moral status. Epistemic concerns are irrelevant to the former question and—I will argue—criteria of moral status have inescapably to be based on sentience, if one concedes that sentience determines moral status. It follows that doubts about our epistemic access to sentience cannot be used to motivate an alternative criterion of moral status. If sentience turns out to be unknowable, then moral status is unknowable. However, I briefly advocate against such strong pessimism.
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50

Mason, G. J., and J. M. Lavery. "What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience." Frontiers in Veterinary Science 9 (April 27, 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2022.788289.

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Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain – or indeed anything at all – therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify “red herring” measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These “S.P.U.D. subjects” can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for “mental time travel” and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because “bullet-proof” neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.
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