Books on the topic 'Sensorimotor experience'
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1
Schillaci, Guido, Verena V. Hafner, and Bruno Lara, eds. Re-Enacting Sensorimotor Experience for Cognition. Frontiers Media SA, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/978-2-88945-148-7.
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Di Paolo, Ezequiel, Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier Barandiaran. Sensorimotor Life. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.001.0001.
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This book elaborates a series of contributions to a non–representational theory of action and perception. It is based on current theoretical developments in the enactive approach to life and mind. These enactive ideas are applied and extended to provide a theoretically rich, naturalistic account of sensorimotor meaning and agency. This account supplies non–representational extensions to the sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience based on the notion of the living body as a self–organizing dynamic system in coupling with the environment. The enactive perspective entails the use of world–involving explanations, in which processes external to an agent co–constitute mental phenomena in ways that cannot be reduced to the supply of information for internal processing. These contributions to sensorimotor theories are a dynamical–systems description of different types of sensorimotor regularities or sensorimotor contingencies, a dynamical interpretation of Piaget's theory of equilibration to ground the concept of sensorimotor mastery, and a theory of agency as organized networks of sensorimotor schemes, with its implications for sensorimotor subjectivity. New tools are provided for examining the organization, development, and operation of networks of sensorimotor schemes that compose regional activities and genres of action with their own situated norms. This permits the exploration of new explanations for the phenomenology of agency experience that are favorably contrasted with traditional computational approaches and lead to new empirical predictions. From these proposals, capabilities once beyond the reach of enactive explanations, such as the possibility of virtual actions and the adoption of socially mediated abstract perceptual attitudes, can be addressed.
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Precup, Doina, Joseph Modayil, and Satinder Singh. Lifelong Learning from Sensorimotor Experience: Papers from the AAAI Workshop. AAAI Press, 2011.
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Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran. The sense of agency. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0007.
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It has been recognized that the sensorimotor approach needs to be extended to account for not only the pragmatic aspects of perception but also the subjective phenomenology that characterizes experiences of the world and the self. In this chapter, the notion is proposed that sensorimotor agency can serve as the basis for a non-representational, world-involving theory of how agents perceive themselves as being the authors and in control of their actions. Both intentional and movement-related aspects in the phenomenology of agency experience are linked to processes of sensorimotor scheme selection and enactment in a self-sustaining network of interdependent sensorimotor schemes. The proposal is contrasted with traditional computational models in the context of various cases of pathological agency experience, and the ontological status of the sense of agency it implies is clarified in comparison with philosophical alternatives that deny its distinct experiential character.
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Loenhoff, Jens. Intercorporeality as a Foundational Dimension of Human Communication. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190210465.003.0002.
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This article contributes to embodied communication theory in the way it takes into account the sensorimotor a priori of meaning production in interaction. The idea that intentionality is founded in the experience of movement and sensorimotor feedback loops as functional principles of action originated in the 1920–1940s in phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, and gestalt theory. Using that as a point of departure, this essay will analyze the interwovenness of bodily operations as communicatively effective entities. In this context the intimate connections among embodiment, implicit knowledge, and the normativity of sensorimotor practices should become apparent. Following this, a few suggestions regarding the differentiation of the concept of intercorporeality will be made by identifying some sources of variance which determine the form and intensity of intercorporeality, including forms of communication connected with it.
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Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0001.
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For the last two decades, research in cognitive science has increasingly turned toward notions of embodiment and situatedness. Some approaches also foreground the relevance of personal experience and embodied action in forming the basis of sense-making. In particular, “enactivist” perspectives have started to make a profound change in the way we conceive our minds as animate and embodied, as opposed to brain-bound information processing architectures. Braiding phenomenology, cognitive science, and dynamical systems theory, enactivism offers a series of proposals for understanding the sensorimotor basis of cognition, and introduces the concept of sensorimotor life. This chapter presents the broad motivations for these proposals and situates them within their broader scientific and philosophical contexts.
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Kind, Amy. Imaginative Presence. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0007.
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When looking at an object, we perceive only its facing surface, yet we nonetheless perceptually experience the object as a three-dimensional whole. This gives us what Alva Noë has called the problem of perceptual presence, i.e. the problem of accounting for the features of our perceptual experience that are present as absent. Although he proposes that we can best solve this problem by adopting an enactive view of perception, one according to which perceptual presence is to be explained in terms of the exercise of our sensorimotor capacities, this chapter argues that this is a mistake. Rather, we can best account for presence in absence in terms of the exercise of our imaginative capacities.
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Banks, Kathryn. ‘Look Again’, ‘Listen, Listen’, ‘Keep Looking’. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794776.003.0008.
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This chapter offers a way of understanding the effects of poetic images (metaphorical or literal). It employs and extends the notion of ‘emergent properties’, as well as relevance theory’s account of how communicative acts can ‘show’ as much as they mean. The images examined are from poems by Mary Oliver (‘Wings’, ‘Wild Geese’, and ‘Mindful’). The chapter suggests that such poetry is particularly in need of a new theoretical approach capable of engaging with its focus on embodied experience and ‘merging’ with nature. It shows how ‘emergent properties’—for example, a complex sense of what continuity with nature might feel like—can result from engaging in a range of imaginary sensorimotor experiences. The final section of the chapter turns to an abstract painting by Natalia Wróbel which dialogues with Oliver’s poetry, and fleshes out the relevance theory account of communicative showing to articulate differences between artistic genres and media.
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Butz, Martin V., and Esther F. Kutter. Embodied Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739692.003.0001.
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While “Embodied Cognitive Science” has significantly developed over the last 20 years or so, it remains unclear what it actually implies. We emphasize that embodied cognitive science particularly implies that abstract thought, such as our ability to understand and produce a large variety of metaphors, must develop from our gathered sensorimotor experiences about our world. While we experience our body and the environment, and actively explore it, our mind produces particular neural structures to improve these bodily and environmental interactions. Vice versa, the more versatile and flexible neural structures are available, the more intricate and versatile environmental interactions become possible. Our minds then manage to detach thought from the here and now, opening the possibility to think, for example, about the past and future, about social interactions with the environment including other humans, and about explanations for unexplainable observations. A more detailed book overview concludes the chapter.
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Glannon, Walter. Behavior Control, Meaning, and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0009.
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Neuroscience challenges our beliefs about agency and autonomy because it seems to imply that we have no control of our behavior: most brain processes are not transparent to us, we have no direct access to the efferent system, and we only experience the sensorimotor consequences of our unconscious motor plans. In this chapter, Walter Glannon argues that although unconscious processes drive many of our actions, this does not imply that conscious mental states have no causal role in our behavior and that we have no control over it. He argues that some degree of unconscious neural constraint on conscious mental states is necessary to modulate thought and action and promote flexible behavior and adaptability to environmental demands. He maintains that a nonreductive materialist account of the mind–brain relation makes it plausible to claim that mental states can cause changes in physical states of the brain.
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Montgomery, Erwin B. Approach to DBS in the Vicinity of the Globus Pallidus Interna. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780190259600.003.0012.
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The regional anatomy around the DBS lead in the globus pallidus interna (GPi) determines efficacy and adverse effects. Understanding the regional anatomy allows the programmer to adjust the stimulation to provide optimal benefit and the absence of adverse effects. Just ventral to the sensorimotor region of the GPi is the optic tract. Spread of stimulation to the optic tract can produce phosphenes (the experience of seeing light without light actually entering the eye). The internal capsule lies just posterior to the globus pallidus, and stimulation there can cause tonic muscle contractions. Anteriorly lies the non-motor region, and stimulation of this region could cause changes in cognition and personality, although the incidences of these problems is much less that with STN DBS. This chapter discusses the regional anatomy of the GPi segment, adverse effects from malpositioning of DBS leads, approaches to GPi DBS for Parkinson’s, treating dystonia with DBS of the GPi, and treating hyperkinetic disorders.
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Shaver, Stephen R. Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197580806.001.0001.
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One of the most challenging questions for Christian ecumenical theology is how the relationship between the eucharistic bread and wine and Jesus Christ’s body and blood can be appropriately described. This book takes a new approach to controverted questions of eucharistic presence by drawing on cognitive linguistics. Arguing that human cognition is grounded in sensorimotor experience and that phenomena such as metaphor and conceptual blending are basic building blocks of thought, the book proposes that inherited models of eucharistic presence are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can serve as complementary members of a shared ecumenical repertoire. The central element of this repertoire is the motif of identity, grounded in the Synoptic and Pauline institution narratives. The book argues that the statement “The eucharistic bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ” can be understood both as figurative and as true in the proper sense, thus resolving a church-dividing dichotomy. The identity motif is complemented by four major non-scriptural motifs: representation, change, containment, and conduit. Each motif with its entailments is explored in depth, and suggestions for ecumenical reconciliation in both doctrine and practices are offered. The book also provides an introduction to cognitive linguistics and offers suggestions for further reading in that field.
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Wallmark, Zachary. Nothing but Noise. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190495107.001.0001.
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This book explores how timbre shapes musical affect and meaning. Integrating perspectives from musicology with the cognitive sciences, it advances a novel model of timbre interpretation that takes into account the bodily, sensorimotor dynamics of sound production and perception. The contribution of timbre to musical experience is clearest in drastic situations where meaning is itself contested—that is, in polarizing contexts of reception, where the evaluation of “musical” timbre by some listeners collides headlong into a competing claim that it is just “noise.” Taking this commonplace reaction as a starting point, the book explores affect, reception, and timbre semantics through diverse cultural-historical case studies that frustrate the acoustic and perceptual boundary between musical sound and noise. It includes chapters on the racial and gender politics in the reception of free jazz saxophone “screaming” in the late 1960s; an analysis of contested timbral ideals in the performance practices of the Japanese shakuhachi flute; and an historical examination of the overlooked role of “brutal” timbres in the moral panic over heavy metal in the 1980s and 1990s. The book closes with a discussion of the slippery social fault lines that separate perceptions of musical sound from perceptions of noise and the ethical stakes of encountering another’s “aural face.”
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Gallese, Vittorio, and Michele Guerra. The Empathic Screen. Translated by Frances Anderson. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793533.001.0001.
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Why do people go to the movies? What does it mean to watch a movie? To what extent does our perception of the fictional nature of movies differ from our daily perception of the real world? The authors, a neuroscientist and a film theorist, propose a new multidisciplinary approach to images and film that can provide answers to these questions. According to the authors, film art, based on the interaction between spectators and the world on the screen, and often described in terms of immersion, impressions of reality, simulation, and involvement of the spectator’s body in the fictitious world he inhabits, can be reconsidered from a neuroscientific perspective, which examines the brain and its close relationship to the body. They propose a new model of perception—embodied simulation—elaborated on the basis of neuroscientific investigation, to demonstrate the role played by sensorimotor and affect-related brain circuits in cognition and film experience. Scenes from famous films, like Notorious, The Shining, Full Metal Jacket, Persona, The Silence of the Lambs, and Toy Story are described and analyzed according to this multidisciplinary approach, and used as case studies to discuss the embodied simulation model. The aim is to shed new light on the multiple resonance mechanisms that constitute one of the great secrets of cinematographic art, and to reflect on the power of moving images, which increasingly are part of our everyday life.
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de Vignemont, Frédérique. Bodily Space. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198735885.003.0005.
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Imagine that two pressures of equal intensity are applied on your cheek and on your knee inducing two tactile sensations. In what sense do these two sensations feel different? In other words, is there a specific spatial phenomenology that is constitutive of bodily sensations? If one replies negatively, then one would expect free-floating sensations but there seems to be no such thing. But if one replies positively, then one has to explain what grounds this spatial phenomenology that seems to differ on many respects from the one encountered in visual experiences. One may then suggest accounting for it in terms of dispositions to direct actions at the locations of bodily sensations. However, sensorimotor approaches to bodily awareness face major conceptual and empirical difficulties.
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Doyle, Cameron M., and Kristen A. Lindquist. Language and Emotion. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190613501.003.0022.
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Growing evidence suggests that emotion perception is psychologically constructed when processes in the mind of the perceiver, such as emotion concept knowledge, impact how visual sensations are made meaningful as instances of different emotions. In this chapter, we propose three key psychological constructionist hypotheses about facial emotion perception: (1) facial muscle movements do not automatically communicate emotion, (2) conceptual knowledge that is supported by language is used to make meaning of facial muscle movements and construct perceptions of emotion, and (3) language enables perceivers to see emotion on faces by reactivating sensorimotor representations of prior experiences that shape perception of the present sensory array in a top-down manner. We discuss growing evidence in support of these psychological constructionist hypotheses of emotion perception.
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Butz, Martin V., and Esther F. Kutter. Retrospection and future perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739692.003.0014.
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As the concluding chapter, the story of the book’s content is revisited and summarized. Essentially, our embodied minds come into being due to an evolutionary predisposed cognitive developmental process, which builds progressively more abstract, conceptual, compositional predictive encodings based on actively gathered sensorimotor experiences. The chapter also acknowledges several under-represented, but important topics in cognitive science. Finally, the matter of consciousness is addressed, emphasizing that the mind emerges from a recurrent, self-maintaining, and self-regulating system, that is, our brain–body system. Combined with developing self-referential, social, event-oriented, conceptualizing predictive encodings, self-reflective cognition becomes possible. We conclude that despite pursuing a computational approach to embodied cognitive science, cognitive models in this direction are just at their beginning. Future cognitive modeling efforts promise to shed much further light on the exact details about how our minds come into being and how we may create useful, artificial, cognitive systems in the future.
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Butz, Martin V., and Esther F. Kutter. Cognitive Development and Evolution. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739692.003.0004.
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When acknowledging that the mind is embodied, cognitive development and evolution must determine how the body and environment shape the mind. Evolution has evolved structures and computational mechanisms in the body, and the brain that predispose ontogenetic development. Starting with conception, brain, body, and mind co-develop, and shape each other. An infant first develops rudimentary bodily representation and control capabilities, and concurrently uses them to abstract from and generalize over the gathered sensorimotor experiences to develop conceptual understandings and language. Evolution, on the other hand, works on a different time scale. Evolutionary pressures towards survival-suitable cell and bodily structures have dominated much of evolutionary progression. Benefits due to social interactions and coordinated cooperation have led to the evolution of the human brain, enabling the development of human minds. Some details on genetics and on evolutionary computation shed further light on how evolution must have brought about human minds. Thereby, the evolution of suitable bodily structures, of brain modularizations, developmental pathways, adaptive behavioral capabilities, and predispositions for social interactions constitute critical components. Subsequent chapters focus on the computational mechanisms behind embodied cognitive development.