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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Semantics (Philosophy)'
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Pelczar, Michael Walsh. "Philosophical semantics." Full text, Acrobat Reader required, 2000. http://viva.lib.virginia.edu/etd/diss/ArtsSci/Philosophy/2000/Pelczar/Pelczar.pdf.
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Bremer, Manuel. "Philosophische Semantik /." Frankfurt [u.a.] : Ontos-Verl, 2005. http://www.ontos-verlag.de/Buchreihen-LOGOS-Bremer.html.
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Carrigan, Raymond Sidney John. "General semantics." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/18080.
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McDonald, Brian Edison. "Constraint variational semantics." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2007. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3274279.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2007.Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 2977. Adviser: Anil Gupta. Title from dissertation home page (viewed Apr. 9, 2008).
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Heck, Richard Gustave. "Logic, semantics, ontology." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13940.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1991.Vita.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 195-197).
by Richard Gustave Heck, Jr.
Ph.D.
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Nivre, Joakim. "Situations, meaning, and communication a situation theoretic approach to meaning in language and communication /." Göteborg, Sweden : Dept. of Linguistics, University of Göteborg, 1992. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/31171651.html.
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Haser, Verena. "Metaphor, metonymy, and experientialist philosophy : challenging cognitive semantics /." Berlin : de Gruyter, 2005. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip054/2004029012.html.
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Csirmaz, Aniko. "Semantics and phonology in syntax." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33695.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-248).
In this thesis I argue that morphology should be allowed to interpret not only the information provided by the syntactic component, but also compositional semantic properties. This conception of grammar requires morphology to interact LF and the semantic component in addition to syntax. Applying this hypothesis, I account for the alternation between partitive and non-partitive structural case in Finnish, which is affected by the semantic property of divisibility. I argue that the property of divisibility, which is relevant for case alternation, is determined within Spell-out domains, which are interpreted immediately following Spell-out. Building on these domains as affecting case marking, I derive the differences between divisibility affecting case morphology and the property of divisibility as determined in the final semantic interpretation. I also discuss the properties of negated event predicates in detail, and argue for a specific view of the semantic import of negation on aspect. I show that in spite of the apparent semantic similarities, the effects of negation on Finnish case marking cannot be assimilated to the instances of case alternation determined by divisibility.
(cont.) I extend this conclusion and discuss the nature of divisibility licensed by negation crosslinguistically in more detail. Finally, I consider further areas where the interaction between semantics and morphology or the phonological form can be detected. I argue that while some of these interactions can be treated by assuming that the latter components are sensitive to semantic properties, not all interactions can be described this way. In general, however, permitting the interaction between semantics and morphology or phonology is desirable and leads to a more economical system, where the number of non-convergent derivations is minimized.
by Aniko Csirmaz.
Ph.D.
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Lau, Yen-fong. "Belief in semantics and psychology." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11688.
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Copley, Bridget Lynn 1974. "The semantics of the future." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8158.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 142-144).
Natural languages use a number of different methods to refer to future eventualities: among them are futurates, as in (la), and futures, as in (lb) and (c). (1) a. The Red Sox (are) play(ing) the Yankees tomorrow. b. We'll change your oil in Madera. c. We're going to change your oil in Madera. This dissertation uses evidence primarily from English, with additional data from Turkish and Indonesian, to argue that these methods all involve universal quantification over subsets of metaphysically accessible futures. One factor in determining which worlds a modal quantifies over is the temporal argument of the modal's accessibility relation. It is well-known that a higher tense affects the accessibility relation of modals. What is not well-known is that there are aspectual operators high enough to affect the accessibility relation of modals. New data presented in this dissertation reveal the presence of aspectual operators located between TP and the future modal projection. The effects of these operators on truth and assertability conditions provide substantial information about the correct characterization of future modality, and indeed of modality in general. Furthermore, the very existence of such aspectual operators raises questions about how aspect is represented in the semantics, if (as is generally assumed) aspectual operators take event arguments, which do not occur outside of the verb phrase.
by Bridget Lynn Copley.
Ph.D.
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Bale, Alan Clinton. "The universal scale and the semantics of comparison /." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=102479.
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Comparative constructions allow individuals to be compared according to different properties. Such comparisons form two classes, those that permit direct, comparisons (comparisons of measurements as in Seymour is taller than he is wide) and those that only allow indirect comparisons (comparisons of relative positions on separate scales as in Esme is more beautiful than Einstein is intelligent). Traditionally, these two types of comparisons have been associated with an ambiguity in the interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes (see, Bartsch & Vennemann, 1972; Kennedy, 1999). In this thesis, I propose that there is no such ambiguity. The interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes remain the same whether they appear in sentences that compare individuals directly or relative to two separate scales. To develop a unified account, I suggest that all comparisons involve a scale of universal degrees that are isomorphic to the rational (fractional) numbers between 0 and 1. All comparative and equative constructions are assigned an interpretation based on a comparison of such degrees. These degrees are associated with the two individuals being compared. Crucial to a unified treatment, the connection between individuals and universal degrees involves two steps. First individuals are mapped to a value on a primary scale that respects the ordering of such individuals according to the quality under consideration (whether it be height, beauty or intelligence). Second, this value on the primary scale is mapped to a universal degree that encodes the value's relative position with respect to other values. It is the ability of iv the universal degrees to encode positions on a primary scale that enables comparative and equative morphemes to either compare individuals directly or indirectly. A direct comparison results if measurements such as seven feet participate in the gradable property (as in Seven feet is tall). Such participation can sometimes result in an isomorphism between two primary scales and the ordering of measurements in a measurement system. When this occurs, comparing positions in the primary scales is equivalent to comparing measurements. If this type of isomorphism cannot be established then the sentence yields an indirect comparison.
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Buijsman, Stefan. "Philosophy of Mathematics for the Masses : Extending the scope of the philosophy of mathematics." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-126252.
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One of the important discussions in the philosophy of mathematics, is that centered on Benacerraf’s Dilemma. Benacerraf’s dilemma challenges theorists to provide an epistemology and semantics for mathematics, based on their favourite ontology. This challenge is the point on which all philosophies of mathematics are judged, and clarifying how we might acquire mathematical knowledge is one of the main occupations of philosophers of mathematics. In this thesis I argue that this discussion has overlooked an important part of mathematics, namely mathematics as it is exercised by ordinary people (almost everyone without a mathematics degree). I do so by looking at the different theories that have been put forward in the recent debate, and showing for each of these that they are unable to account for the mathematical practices of ordinary people. In order to show that these practices do need to be accounted for, I also argue that ordinary people are (sometimes) doing mathematics, i.e. that they engage in properly mathematical practices. Because these practices are properly mathematical, they should be accounted for by any philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion of my thesis, then, is that current theories fail to do something that they should do, while remaining neutral on how well they perform when it comes to accounting for the practices of professional mathematicians.
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Kearns, Katherine Susan. "The semantics of the English progressive." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13730.
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Moracchini, Sophie Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Morphosyntax and semantics of degree constructions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124094.
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Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2019Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 183-188).
This thesis investigates the morphosyntax and the semantics of comparatives and related degree constructions through the prism of a phenomenon called evaluativity, a type of inference whereby gradable adjectives receive a context-dependent interpretation. Pursuing the view that evaluativity is contributed by an optional null operator (EVAL, Rett 2008), this dissertation achieves the following results. First, it integrates a compositional analysis of evaluativity within a non-lexical view of antonymy. Second, it argues that the observed restrictions on the distribution of these inferences follow from independently motivated conditions that regulate the presence of the EVAL operator at the interfaces. In particular, three interface conditions are identified and discussed in detail: ++ At Logical Form (LF), derivations are subject to a structural economy condition, Minimize APs!, which executes transderivational comparisons over semantically equivalent Adjectival Phrases (APs).
The inclusion of EVAL in a parse licenses derivations that would otherwise be deemed deviant by this economy condition. ++ At Phonological Form (PF), the EVAL morpheme morphophonologically interacts with its surrounding environment. Specifically, EVAL is claimed to be a zero-morpheme subject to Myers Generalization, a PF-filter on syntactic derivations which prevents further morphological operations from applying to a zeroderived form. A consequence of this claim is that EVAL is licensed in derivations only where it does not disrupt post-syntactic operations that apply within the AP. ++ The distribution of EVAL is conditioned by aspects of Information Structure. In particular, in degree constructions that license contrastive adjectives, the distribution of focus is governed by (AvoIDF) which, in turn, interacts with conditions on deletion. Ultimately, the presence of EVAL can license a surface form which would otherwise get eliminated by PF-deletion.
In essence, the grammatical account of evaluativity developed in this thesis offers a window into the word-internal structure of complex degree expressions and presents new insights into the semantic and morphosyntactic primitives of the degree domain.
by Sophie Moracchini.
Ph. D. in Linguistics
Ph.D.inLinguistics Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Delaney, Jesse. "HUSSERL'S DYADIC SEMANTICS." UKnowledge, 2014. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/4.
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Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of meaning. They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”. They then present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which all truths and other transcendent meanings depend. I offer a critical developmental study of this problem within Husserl’s semantics. I argue (1) that Husserl had reason to adopt his dyadic account of signification, (2) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (3) that Husserl’s proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate motivations, is precarious. I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context. I represent their two sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01. I then show why Husserl embraced two discordant views of meaning. I survey the 19th century sources for these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, respectively. And I present the Bolzanian arguments and Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength.
Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic reductions. I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning. And I address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts.
Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”. I consider two contrary objections to this explanation. I indicate how Husserl’s explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.
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Horton, Michael Brady. "INFLATIONARY TRUTH-THEORETIC SEMANTICS." UKnowledge, 2012. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/1.
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I argue that satisfaction and reference—and therefore, truth—are multiply realizable properties. I advocate a novel approach motivated by a commitment to the robustness and fruitfulness of truth-theoretic approaches to natural language semantics.
DEFLATIONISM: Philosophers keen on deflating the metaphysical pretensions of truth theories claim that we need not appeal to a substantive truth-property. Recently, however, some philosophers have sought to combine deflationism about truth with the view that our concept of truth or the truth-predicate can play an important role in natural language semantics.
TRUTH-THEORETIC SEMANTICS: The goal of a formal semantic theory of a natural language is to provide both the semantic values of that language’s lexically primitive items as well as the semantically significant modes of combining those basic elements into meaningful and more complex expressions. Most approaches have in common a commitment to finite stateability and compositionality as well as a commitment to something like Davidson’s “Convention T.”
PLURALISM: Pluralists about truth argue that different areas of discourse have different truth-properties. Can pluralism successfully be combined with a commitment to truth-theoretic semantics?
OPEN SEMANTIC FUNCTIONALISM: The pluralist approaches to truth are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. The only option, I argue, is to regard truth as multiply-realizable. Specifically, we should view the set of truth’s realizers as possessing non-actual members—as being “open.” Truth is defined in the usual way in terms of reference and satisfaction, but these latter two relations are to be understood as multiply realizable but open. The property of truth can be specified using the Ramsey/Lewis method. My final view—Open Semantic Functionalism—respects compositionality and finite stateability, avoids triviality, handles plurality, and fits with robust, explanatorily significant natural language semantic theories.
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Gray, Anthony E. 1968. "The semantics and metaphysics of contingent identity." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8766.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-101).
The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter considers how we ought to understand a thesis of contingent identity if it is to accomplish the work it is proposed to accomplish while at the same time avoiding certain obvious and otherwise persuasive objections. I begin by presenting a metaphysical thesis I call the Thesis of Contingent Identity, and defending it against alternatives. I then set out the principal objection to the Thesis, the objection from modal properties, and offer a response. The chapter concludes with an appendix devoted to criticizing Allan Gibbard's and H. W. Noonan's accounts of contingent identity and their relpies to the objection from modal properties. The chief weakness in their proposals is that they concentrate on the semantical while neglecting the central metaphysical issues of contingent identity. In the process, they compromise the metaphysics they had intended to defend. The second chapter contains a discussion of some of the technical issues surrounding the Thesis of Contingent Identity. A robust version of the semantics outlined in the first chapter is presented and contrasted with competing alternatives. It has been said that semantic considerations alone cannot decide against contingent identity; I show why this is so. The chapter ends by considering in what sense the Thesis actually expresses contingent identity, and how it affects our views on which logic is the best modal logic for metaphysical necessity. The third chapter investigates and criticizes challenges to the Thesis of Contingent Identity from the transitivity of identity and the thesis that names are rigid designators. I argue that, according to the approach to contingent identity outlined in the previous chapters, the identity relation behaves normally. Claims that it violates transitivity are based on an equivocation which is exposed by paying careful attention to the notion of perspective. Similarly, I argue that the thesis that names are rigid designators is compatible with the Thesis of Contingent Identity. I review the debate between Kripke and Gibbard and criticize the weakness in the latter's approach. Moreover, I argue that close scrutiny of the influence and function of names uncovers an equivocation in certain arguments purporting to establish an incompatibility between contingent identity and rigid designation. These considerations point to the hypothesis that some names might have multiple possible referents. The chapter concludes with some elaboration and defense of this hypothesis.
by Anthony E. Gray.
Ph.D.
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Hirsch, Aron Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "An inflexible semantics for cross-categorial operators." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113782.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2017.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 305-323).
This thesis studies operators such as and and only, which occur in a broad range of environments. And, for instance, appears between sentences, intransitive verbs, quantifiers, and so forth. One line of analysis assigns and/only a "cross-categorial" semantics flexible enough to compose with different arguments. This thesis challenges that view, pursuing the "Semantic Inflexibility Hypothesis" (SIH). Regardless of the surface string, and and only uniformly operate on a meaning characteristic of a sentence -- a truth-value or proposition. The thesis presents four case studies testing a central prediction of the SIH: that when and/only appear to compose with an expression having a non-sentential meaning, there must be covert syntax underlying to furnish an appropriate scope site. Most of the cases involve object DPs: (a) apparent object DP conjunction in basic sentences (John saw every student and every professor) and (b) in pseudo-clefts (What Obama approved was this bill and that bill), along with (c) only preceding an object DP (John learned only one language). The additional case study examines coordination of questions. Novel diagnostics reveal covert syntax in each case, reconciling the data with the SIH -- and, in some cases, leading to a new perspective on the construction. In addition to showing that a range of data may be parsed with covert syntax, I present reason to question whether cross-categorial meanings are available at all. Specifically, I point out that crosscategorial analyses over-generate. First: the mechanisms which give rise to cross-categorial meanings are too powerful, and predict more operators to be cross-categorial than actually are. Second, I show that if and itself were cross-categorial, unattested scope readings would derive. If there are no crosscategorial operators, the over-generation problems resolve without new constraints.
by Aron Hirsch.
Ph. D.
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Lee, Youngjoo 1974. "The syntax and semantics of focus particles." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28835.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.Includes bibliographical references (p. 202-210).
(cont.) (iii) covert operations such as reconstruction and type raising are constrained by an economy principle so that they are disallowed when not motivated.
This dissertation investigates the syntax and semantics of two focus particles in Korean with special reference to their scopal behavior. The two particles under consideration are the exclusive particle man and the additive particle to. The main empirical concern of this work is to show that despite apparent syntactic similarities between focused phrases (i.e. phrases containing focus particles) and standard QPs, the former exhibits more diverse scopal behavior than the latter. The claims that are made in the course of the discussion of the scope patterns constitute the theoretical contribution of this work. The scope of the particle man 'only' varies with the morphological marking of the man-phrase, which is puzzling under the assumption that the particle is a scope-bearing element. I argue that despite appearances, the particle is not a scope-bearing element, but an agreement morpheme, and that the quantificational meaning comes from a null head ONLY. I also claim that the position of the ONLY head can be deduced from the order of nominal affixes, thanks to the strong correlation between morphology and syntax. This new correlation between nominal affixes and the scope of focus particles supports Baker's Mirror Principle in a new area outside the verbal domain. The scopal behavior of to-phrases is also distinct from that of QPs. Three factors are identified that affect the scope of to-phrases: scrambling, the kind of function in the preceding context, and the nature of the focused phrase. I claim that (i) the anaphoric view of additive particles is superior to the existential view, (ii) both syntactic and semantic mechanisms are available for variable binding, thus the presence of a bound variable in a dislocated position does not imply syntactic reconstruction, and
by Youngjoo Lee.
Ph.D.
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Åkerman, Jonas. "Extensions in flux : an essay on vagueness and context sensitivity /." Stockholm : Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-30080.
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Viebahn, Emanuel. "Semantic pluralism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b7b744c1-0c4a-4b86-a6ff-ff5156184f76.
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This thesis defends Semantic Pluralism, the view that sentences express sets of propositions in context. It puts forward two arguments against Contextualism, the main opposing view, on which each sentence expresses exactly one proposition in context. It spells out two versions of Pluralism: Flexible Pluralism, which takes most sentences to be context-sensitive, and Strong Pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it defends Flexible Pluralism and Strong Pluralism from a number of objections.
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Ball, Brian A. "Semantics, meta-semantics, and ontology : a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6d3fbf1c-806a-4339-b16b-08560a6bbdeb.
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In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean (semantic) criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth bearers are not propositions, but rather concrete representations, either beliefs or sentences. I show, in chapter 2, that we can give sense to a truth predicate applying to sentences, given a truth operator and quantification into sentence position. I argue that this strategy does not commit us to the existence of propositions serving as truth bearers. In Part II I argue that although we must assign semantic values to sentences and/or predicates, the meaningfulness of these expressions is not thereby explained. In chapter 3 I articulate Davidson’s problem of predication and his solution, but argue that he was wrong to attribute this solution to Tarski. In chapter 4 I examine the semantics of modal languages; I conclude that although they require semantic values for predicates and/or sentences we should be instrumentalists about these theories. In Part III I consider the relationship between truth and existence. In chapter 5, I defend Pluralism about truth: in some (though not all) domains of discourse, I claim, semantic reference plays a merely instrumental role in explaining truth. In chapter 6, I show that Hume’s Principle, which is committed by the Quinean criterion to the existence of numbers, can be true even though numbers do not exist. In doing so, I appeal to meta-semantic and diachronic considerations. In the conclusion I compare my views on ontology and commitment to Jody Azzouni’s; and in the appendix I suggest how one might pursue diachronic linguistics.
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Pietroski, Paul M. "Meaning naturally--a partial defense of covariation semantics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14141.
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Sudo, Yasutada Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "On the semantics of phi features on pronouns." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/77805.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 246-260).
This thesis investigates three topics relating to the semantics of phi features on pronouns. Part I focuses on gender features on pronouns. Following previous studies (Cooper 1983, Heim & Kratzer 1998), I claim that they are presupposition triggers. Based on this assumption, I show that predicates containing bound gendered pronouns have an assertive meaning that does not entail the gender presupposition, and further point out that such predicates pose a serious challenge for existing theories of presupposition projection, especially with respect to quantified sentences. A conclusion drawn from this discussion is that the presupposition needs to be dissociated from the assertive meaning, as in Karttunen & Peters's (1979) two dimensional theory. However, such a theory is known to run into the so-called binding problem in quantified sentences. I propose a solution to the binding problem using the mechanism of cross-sentential anaphora, and show that the resulting theory nicely accounts for the projection properties of various quantificational determiners. Part II discusses the interpretation of person and number features on bound pronouns. It is known that some occurrences of phi features on bound pronoun behave as if they are semantically inert (Heim 2008b, Jacobson to appear, Kratzer 1998a, 2009, Partee 1989). One popular account of this phenomenon, the minimal pronoun account, claims that such phi features are purely morphological, and postulates a PF operation that transmits phi features of a binder onto each pronoun that it binds (Heim 2008b, Kratzer 1998a, 2009). I put forward an alternative account that dispenses with the PF operation, and instead puts most of the burden on syntax, by encoding more information in the indices than standardly assumed. As a result, all occurrences of phi features are semantically relevant. I offer both empirical and conceptual arguments for the proposed account over the minimal pronoun account. Part III deals with the phenomenon of indexical shifting where person features are systematically affected (Anand 2006, Anand & Nevins 2004, Schlenker 1999, 2003b). I discuss novel data from Uyghur and Japanese as well as data drawn from previous studies, particularly focusing on the universals and variation within and across languages.
by Yasutada Sudo.
Ph.D.
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Ulicny, Brian Edward. "Issues in the philosophical foundations of lexical semantics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12676.
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Eklund, Matti 1974. "Paradoxes and the foundations of semantics and metaphysics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8798.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2000.Includes bibliographical references (p. 175-180).
Numerous philosophical problems, otherwise quite different in character, are of the following form. Certain claims which seem not only obviously true, but even constitutive of the meanings of the expressions employed, can be shown to lead to absurdity when taken together (perhaps in conjunction with contingent facts about the world). All such problems can justly be called paradoxes. The paradoxes I examine are the liar paradox, the sorites paradox, and the personal identity paradox posed by the fission problem. I argue that, in all of the cases examined, the claims that jointly lead to absurdity really are constitutive of the meanings of the expressions employed, in the following ways. First, semantic competence with the expressions involves being disposed to accept these claims. Second, the claims are reference-determining, in that the semantic values of the expressions employed are constrained by the condition that these claims should come out true, or as nearly true as possible. If a claim or principle is constitutive of meaning in both of these ways, I call it meaning-constitutive. When the meaning-constitutive principles for some expressions of a language are inconsistent, I call the language inconsistent. This is a stipulative definition; but it accords well with what other theorists who have talked about languages being inconsistent, for example Alfred Tarski, have had in mind. In chapters one and two, I argue that our language is inconsistent. In chapter three, I relate my theses to Frank Jackson's and David Lewis's views on how reference is determined. Another problem posed by the liar paradox concerns important theses in the philosophy of language. The liar reasoning shows that under certain conditions, a natural language cannot contain a predicate satisfying the T-schema. But many theses in the philosophy of language presuppose that truth satisfies the T-schema. I resolve this conflict in a Tarskian way: by saying that truth then is expressed only in an essentially richer metalanguage. However, I argue that taking this route means having to embrace the existence of absolutely inexpressible properties - and even to embrace the conclusion that some properties of which we appear to have concepts are absolutely inexpressible. All this is dealt with in chapter four. In the fifth chapter I show that my arguments of the previous chapters have (dis)solved the liar paradox. And finally, in the sixth chapter, I discuss the philosophical significance of truth and logic, and argue that these questions are significant only if understood in a new way. In this last chapter I also discuss the implications of the liar paradox for metaphysics; more specifically, its implications for the issue of how metaphysical claims are justified.
by Matti Eklund.
Ph.D.
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Dalglish, Steven Jack William. "Accepting Defeat: A Solution to Semantic Paradox with Defeasible Principles for Truth." The Ohio State University, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1597757494987204.
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Morena, Luca. "Word or object? : a study of disagreement in ontology /." Milano : Albo versorio, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016234905&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Cowley, Joshua D. "Inferential-role semantics: A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/280685.
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Concepts are not sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. This fact has caused trouble for both psychologists and philosophers. The resultant psychological theories of concepts, which are primarily aimed at the functional role of concepts, are very specific but this specificity is at the expense of excluding some types of concepts. The resultant philosophical theories of concepts, which are primarily aimed at the content of concepts, are general but this generality is at the expense of understanding the role concepts play in the mind. My dissertation proposes a bridge between psychological and philosophical theories of concepts. This bridge has two parts: The first part is a general model of the functional role of concepts which is philosophically rigorous but can house existing psychological theories of concepts. The second part is a theory of the (narrow) content of concepts, which is informed by the mass of psychological evidence, but is general enough to encompass all concepts. The key in both parts is the role that concepts play in inference. I argue for the inferential model of concepts, which claims that the functional role of a concept is its inferential role. I also argue for inferential-role semantics which claims that the (narrow) content of a concept is determined by its inferential role. The overlooked advantage of this inferentialist position is the ability to draw on an account of reasoning to solve problems in developing a theory of concepts. My dissertation can then be seen as unifying philosophical and psychological work on concepts with philosophical and psychological work on reasoning. This is most obviously seen in the final chapter which offers an account of compositionality for inferential-role semantics.
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Dodig-Crnkovic, Gordana. "Investigations into Information Semantics and Ethics of Computing." Doctoral thesis, Västerås : Mälardalen University, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-153.
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Florio, Salvatore. "The Semantics of Plurals: A Defense of Singularism." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1281280869.
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Cai, Qinghua. "Yan yi zhi bian : Wei Jin xuan xue zhong de yan shuo wen ti tan xi /." View abstract or full-text, 2007. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202007%20CAI.
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Thibodeau, Jason Bruce. "Ordinary language philosophy a critical re-examination /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3230033.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006.Title from first page of PDF file (viewed November 17, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 196-201).
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Ney, Alyssa L. "The metaphysics of unified science /." View online version; access limited to Brown University users, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3174649.
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Lee, Jin-soo. "Brandom's normative deontic theory of language." Thesis, Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2010. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B44046996.
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Roberts, Lesley. "Towards a probabilistic semantics for natural language /." [St. Lucia, Qld.], 2003. http://www.library.uq.edu.au/pdfserve.php?image=thesisabs/absthe18482.pdf.
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Kanterian, Edward. "Descriptive names : a contribution to the semantics of referring expressions." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:885ec416-df87-4bf2-b3ab-4c2173f53804.
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A theory of descriptive names is developed and defended against several objections. Descriptive names pose an interesting challenge to any theory of reference, since they possess both features of proper names and definite descriptions, i.e. of expressions which are often considered to be radically different. These features are referentiality and descriptive sense. The thesis takes as its point of departure Gareth Evans's theory of descriptive names, improves upon it and discusses several other authors and related theories along the way. Chapter I provides an brief introduction to the topic and an abstract of the main lines of argument. Chapter 2 argues that descriptive names possess both referential status and descriptive sense, and that these qualities constitute the two most basic elements of the notion of descriptive reference (which is contrasted with Russellian reference). It is demonstrated that not all names introduced by description are descriptive names, a claim which is given additional substance by a comparison between Evans's and Kripke's accounts of such names. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with two major challenges to the possibility of descriptive names. Chapter 3 explores the possibility of a truth-conditional theory of meaning for descriptive names, but it is shown that if we follow Evans's suggestion that the semantic value of a descriptive name is to be construed according to model theory - namely, as an entity distinct from the referent (a set) - such a theory will result in treating descriptive names as predicates, and thus eliminate then qua referring expressions. Similar accounts given by other authors are also examined and found to be problematic. I conclude by rejecting the model-theoretic notion of semantic value. Chapter 4 addresses a second challenge, posed by the fact that if a descriptive name has a descriptive sense, then given a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, descriptive names must be quantifier phrases, and thus, again, non-referring expressions. It is argued that if this is true, then the use of negative free logic is unnecessary. Using the idea of rigidified descriptions, it is shown that Evans's arguments, based on modality and simplicity considerations, fail to save both the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names while semantically dissociating them from descriptions. I show that descriptive names can be treated as shorthand for rigidified descriptions and thus semantically on a par with the latter, which, as I demonstrate, is still consistent with Evans's own (convincing) solution of the puzzle of the contingent a priori. Nevertheless, this still does not guarantee the referentiality of descriptive names. Chapter 5 presents in detail the argument that we can only save the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names if we treat definite descriptions as referring expressions. Several negative arguments undermining the most influential defences of the Russellianism are given and three positive accounts of referring descriptions, Wettstein's, Sainbury's and Strawson's, are critically discussed, finally settling, with some proviso, for Strawson's. Finally, the principles of a 'Fregean' free logic for Strawsonian semantics are sketched, and I suggest ways in which a truth theory could be expressed by means of these principles. Chapter 6 summarises the achievements, sketches possible research concerning descriptive names and concludes that the analysis of descriptive names is useful in at least three ways: it provides us with means to, first, solve problems that arise from the introduction of artificial expressions such as descriptive names (e.g. the problem of the contingent a priori), second, to better understand our natural language and its relation to formal theories of meaning, and, last but not least, to give a strong rationale for a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Chapter 7 includes the bibliography and Chapter 8 a list of axioms and formulas.
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Nefdt, Ryan. "The metaphysics of time investigations in tense-logic and a B-series semantics." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/3669.
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83).The view that time flows from the future to the present and then recedes into the past is both natural and deeply problematic. So called 'A-theories' about time claim that this is the fundamental nature of temporality. This is not the view which will be defended in this paper. Rather I shall argue for what is known as a 'B-theory' analysis of time and language, one in which the relations of 'earlier than' and 'later than' are necessary and sufficient for any analysis of time. The structure of this paper is tripartite. The first part will address the philosophical and metaphysical tenets of both the A and B-theories of time. In this section, McTaggart's 1908 argument for the unreality of time will be presented along with some objections to it. I will show that some seemingly convincing arguments against 'McTaggart's paradox' are unsuccessful and his paradox does indeed call the A-series into question. This section will lay the groundwork for further discussions relating to other disciplines which are concerned with this debate by describing the issues and points of tension.
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Greenhall, Owen F. R. "The semantics/pragmatics distinction : a defence of Grice." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:00db9bdd-143d-4900-b564-3af9d002f1ea.
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The historical development of Morris’ tripartite distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics does not follow a smooth path. Examining definitions of the terms ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ and the phenomena they have been used to describe, provides insight into alternative approaches to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Paul Grice’s work receives particular attention and taxonomy of philosophical positions, roughly divisible into content minimalist and maximalist groups, is set up. Grice’s often neglected theory of conventional implicature is defended from objections, various tests for the presence of conventional implicature are assessed and the linguistic properties of conventional implicature defined. Once rehabilitated, the theoretical utility of conventional implicature is demonstrated via a case study of the semantic import of the gender and number of pronouns in English. The better-known theory of conversational implicature is also examined and refined. New linguistic tests for such implicatures are devised and the refined theory is applied to scalar terms. A pragmatic approach to scalar implicatures is proposed and shown to fare better than alternatives presented by Uli Sauerland, Stephen Levinson and Gennaro Chierchia. With the details of the theory conversational implicature established, the use made of Grice’s tool in the work of several philosophers is critically evaluated. Kent Bach’s minimalist approach to quantifier domain restriction is examined and criticised. Also, the linguistic evidence for semantic minimalism provided by Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore is found wanting. Finally, a content maximalist approach to quantifier domain restriction is proposed. The approach differs from other context maximalist theories, such as Jason Stanley’s, in relying on semantically unarticulated constituents. Stanley’s arguments against such theories are examined. Further applications of the approach are briefly surveyed.
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Schoubye, Anders Johan. "On describing." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2468.
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The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence. In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences. In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation. In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.
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Li, Dilin. "Can silence be a proper response to the liar paradox?" HKBU Institutional Repository, 2020. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/877.
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Many attempts at solving the liar paradox involve either rejecting some principles in classical logic so as to block the argument that leads to the contradiction or modifying the notion of truth so that the liar sentence can be classified as true in one aspect while false in another. However, the prominent approaches based the above strategies may suffer from the revenge problem. That is, while they solve the pristine liar paradox, the introduction of the solution triggers another one with the same structure. In this dissertation, three prominent approaches to the liar paradox are first introduced and examined. In particular, they are, first, the Tarskian hierarchical approach, whose main idea can be roughly characterized as that a natural language is a hierarchy of a series of languages and the liar sentence is true at one level of the hierarchy and is false at another; second, Saul Kripke's paracomplete approach, whose main idea can be roughly characterized as that the liar sentence is ungrounded and has no classical truth value at all; finally, Gupta and Belnep's revision theory of truth, the main idea of which is that truth is a circular concept and that the truth predicate is circularly defined. With a new semantics and logic for circular concept and definition, one can classify the liar sentence as not categorical. Based on two general patterns that give rise to the revenge paradox by Graham Priest, it is shown that none of the above approaches can escape the revenge paradox, at least, not satisfactorily. After the examination of three prominent approaches, I provide an initial characterization of a kind of approach which I call the silence approach. The main idea of the silence approach is that, perhaps what the liar paradox teaches us is that the semantic status of the liar sentence is eventually not classifiable, in the sense that the accepted or correct semantic theory for natural language simply does not apply to the liar sentence. There are two theoretical possibilities that can evoke the failure of classification. Either there is just no semantic category that fits the liar sentence or the necessary principles for the classification do not apply to the sentence. In either case, the silence approach suggests that although the liar sentence could have a semantic status according to the accepted or correct semantic theory, but given that we cannot classify it, we cannot know it. In this dissertation, I do not provide a detailed and well-developed theory of the silence approach. Instead, after the initial characterization of this approach, I go on to introduce and examine two current theories on the liar paradox which I think satisfy at least part of my characterization of the silence approach. The first theory is the semantic epistemicism by Paul Horwich. The second one is what I call exceptional theory, which is given by Thomas Hofweber. The result of the examination is that, both theories can indeed be interpreted as a silence approach. However, although they can block both the pristine liar paradox and the revenge paradox, they suffer severely from the problem of being ad hoc. The current conclusion of this dissertation about the silence approach thus is that, it is possible to construct a silence approach which can block the pristine liar paradox and the revenge, but it is hard to find a rationale for the solution. That is, it is hard to answer the question as to why the liar sentence is not classifiable. Finally, as an overlook to the future development of the silence approach, I suggest that even if we can solve the problem of ad hocness, there remains a question as to whether the incompleteness of classification is a symptom revealing that the accepted semantic theory is defective, or it is a symptom showing that there is just no possible semantic theory that can eventually do the job. Without answering this question, the silence approach still lacks a plausible theoretical ground
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Watson, Matthew James. "Anti-realist semantics for mathematical and natural language /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Branquinho, João Miguel Biscaia Valadas. "Direct reference, cognitive significance and Fregean sense." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9d87a630-2d56-4e0a-a437-ab8f3ad82ad8.
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This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to nonempty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in propositional-attitude contexts. The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I argue that "notational variance" claims recently advanced on both sides of the dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive significance; and hence that a framework of singular senses is Indispensable to deal with such problems in an adequate way. I also discuss the problem of Cognitive Dynamics, i.e. the issue of attitude-retention and persistence of mental content, in connection with the individuation of indexical thought. I argue that the standard Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts might be reasonably extended to the diachronic case, allowing thus the possibility of discriminating between thoughts entertained by a thinker at different times.
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Carroll, Michael Scott. "Action, authority and approach: treatiseson "Zen"/"Chan", radical interpretation, and the Linji Lu." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2007. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B38955106.
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Hately, Warren. "The discourse of conflict." Thesis, Hately, Warren (2003) The discourse of conflict. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2003. https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/467/.
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This dissertation deals with two problems central to contemporary philosophy: the unacknowledged bias of structuralist theory towards linguistic signs and the lack of a coherent theorisation of social conflict. In order to address these conundrums, I reconcile Saussurean and Peircean semiotics and then use Ruthrof's corporeal pragmatics to break from the verbocentric idea of language as a closed system, showing instead that verbal meanings originate from the body, its senses and its imagination, as informed by the deixis of individual communities. With the transformation of linguistic semiotics into corporeality, Foucault's notion of discourse and the neglected category of discursive practice are then reworked to show how statements based on nonverbal signs might function discursively.
The culmination of the 1970s Northern Irish prison war in the events of the 1981 hunger strikes offers a study that unites the focus upon nonverbal discourses with the examination of conflict. In exploring the ways in which republican hunger strikers struggled for legitimacy with the prison authorities, I am able to show how previous notions of conflict, especially Lyotard's differend, are thrown into disrepute by a corporeal perspective recognising the intersemiotic and heterosemiotic character of communication. The availability of diverse semiotic media such as the visual, the haptic, the proximic, etc., offers positions in which conflicts may be regulated without ending in the stalemate that Lyotard describes. The division of semio-discursive phenomena into verbal and nonverbal elements, and the tracing of the effects that these elements have upon ideational and pragmatic planes of action, also reveal a variety of strategies related to conflict that are superposable upon other instances. As a result, the thesis suggests that the role of political violence in politics and the meanings associated with the taking of life can be approached from a new angle.
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Hately, Warren. "The discourse of conflict." Murdoch University, 2003. http://wwwlib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/browse/view/adt-MU20090423.135734.
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This dissertation deals with two problems central to contemporary philosophy: the unacknowledged bias of structuralist theory towards linguistic signs and the lack of a coherent theorisation of social conflict. In order to address these conundrums, I reconcile Saussurean and Peircean semiotics and then use Ruthrofs corporeal pragmatics to break from the verbocentric idea of language as a closed system, showing instead that verbal meanings originate from the body, its senses and its imagination, as informed by the deixis of individual communities. With the transformation of linguistic semiotics into corporeality, Foucaults notion of discourse and the neglected category of discursive practice are then reworked to show how statements based on nonverbal signs might function discursively.
The culmination of the 1970s Northern Irish prison war in the events of the 1981 hunger strikes offers a study that unites the focus upon nonverbal discourses with the examination of conflict. In exploring the ways in which republican hunger strikers struggled for legitimacy with the prison authorities, I am able to show how previous notions of conflict, especially Lyotards différend, are thrown into disrepute by a corporeal perspective recognising the intersemiotic and heterosemiotic character of communication. The availability of diverse semiotic media such as the visual, the haptic, the proximic, etc., offers positions in which conflicts may be regulated without ending in the stalemate that Lyotard describes. The division of semio-discursive phenomena into verbal and nonverbal elements, and the tracing of the effects that these elements have upon ideational and pragmatic planes of action, also reveal a variety of strategies related to conflict that are superposable upon other instances. As a result, the thesis suggests that the role of political violence in politics and the meanings associated with the taking of life can be approached from a new angle.
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Cameron, Matthew Dunbar. "Taking meaning out of context : essays on the foundations of natural language semantics." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15555.
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David Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand the relation between them. Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical form. In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication.
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Turner, Sudan A. "Intrinsically semantic concepts and the intentionality of propositional attitudes /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5721.
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Fäldt, Tove. "With Worlds as Content : An investigation on Possible Worlds Semantics and its Problems." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-387428.
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Jolliffe, Christine. "After relativism : literary theory after the linguistic turn." Thesis, McGill University, 1998. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=35901.
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In this dissertation I examine the issues concerning the problematics of historical-textual relations in the wake of the linguistic turn. I begin by showing how the emphasis on the generative rather than the mimetic properties of language has led a number of critics to reject the notion of knowledge as "accurate representation" (Richard Rorty), and then go on to demonstrate how this critical position has undermined the way in which literary and intellectual historians alike have traditionally understood such concepts as causality, human agency and social determination.I show that, in the light afforded by the linguistic turn, there can be no unproblematic distinction between literature and history, text and context, but I also contest some of the more dogmatic versions of this position which make the claim that there can be no such thing as history prior to its textualization, or no such thing as human agency because individual human persons are thoroughly constrained by discursive structures. I suggest that in giving up the notion of an uninterpreted reality, we do not have to abandon the idea of the historically real, of reality, of agency, or of truth.
In doing so I examine the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and other critics who provide us with a productive way of approaching the methodological and philosophical issues that are raised by these questions, and then I examine a variety of literary texts which I believe give the questions further historical detail and relevance. In the letters which the twelfth-century abbess Heloise wrote to Abelard, in Geoffrey Chaucer's treatment of the problem of historical-textual relations, and in Brian Friel's inquiry into the linguistic embodiment of traditions in his play Translations we have a variety of testimonies to the dynamic way in which self and world, agency and structure, are related.