Journal articles on the topic 'Semantic paradoxes'

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1

WALICKI, MICHAŁ. "RESOLVING INFINITARY PARADOXES." Journal of Symbolic Logic 82, no. 2 (June 2017): 709–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jsl.2016.18.

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AbstractGraph normal form, GNF, [1], was used in [2, 3] for analyzing paradoxes in propositional discourses, with the semantics—equivalent to the classical one—defined by kernels of digraphs. The paper presents infinitary, resolution-based reasoning with GNF theories, which is refutationally complete for the classical semantics. Used for direct (not refutational) deduction it is not explosive and allows to identify in an inconsistent discourse, a maximal consistent subdiscourse with its classical consequences. Semikernels, generalizing kernels, provide the semantic interpretation.
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2

Rapaport, William J., and Richmond H. Thomason. "Paradoxes and Semantic Representation." Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, no. 2 (June 1988): 667. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274553.

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3

Wen, Lan. "Semantic paradoxes as equations." Mathematical Intelligencer 23, no. 1 (December 2001): 43–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03024517.

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4

Hanke, Miroslav. "John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes." Studia Neoaristotelica 9, no. 1 (2012): 58–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar2012913.

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5

Hanke, Miroslav. "John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes." Studia Neoaristotelica 9, no. 2 (2012): 154–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar2012927.

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6

Hanke, Miroslav. "John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes." Studia Neoaristotelica 10, no. 1 (2013): 50–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20131014.

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7

Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay. "Two paradoxes of semantic information." Synthese 192, no. 11 (March 13, 2015): 3719–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0717-1.

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8

Castaldo, Luca. "Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates." Australasian Journal of Logic 18, no. 7 (December 30, 2021): 688–723. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v18i7.6576.

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This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented below, (i) unlike the three-valued, consistent fixed-point models defined in Kripke (1975), are able to differentiate between paradoxical and pathological-but-unparadoxical sentences, and (ii) unlike the four-valued, paraconsistent fixed-point models first studied in Visser (1984) and Woodruff (1984), preserve consistency and groundedness of truth. Keywords: Semantic Paradoxes · Fixed-point semantics · Many-valued logic · Kripke’s theory oftruth
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9

Rabern, Landon, Brian Rabern, and Matthew Macauley. "Dangerous Reference Graphs and Semantic Paradoxes." Journal of Philosophical Logic 42, no. 5 (October 2, 2012): 727–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9246-2.

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10

Turner, Ray. "A theory of properties." Journal of Symbolic Logic 52, no. 2 (June 1987): 455–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274394.

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Frege's attempts to formulate a theory of properties to serve as a foundation for logic, mathematics and semantics all dissolved under the weight of the logicial paradoxes. The language of Frege's theory permitted the representation of the property which holds of everything which does not hold of itself. Minimal logic, plus Frege's principle of abstraction, leads immediately to a contradiction. The subsequent history of foundational studies was dominated by attempts to formulate theories of properties and sets which would not succumb to the Russell argument. Among such are Russell's simple theory of types and the development of various iterative conceptions of set. All of these theories ban, in one way or another, the self-reference responsible for the paradoxes; in this sense they are all “typed” theories. The semantical paradoxes, involving the concept of truth, induced similar nightmares among philosophers and logicians involved in semantic theory. The early work of Tarski demonstrated that no language that contained enough formal machinery to respresent the various versions of the Liar could contain a truth-predicate satisfying all the Tarski biconditionals. However, recent work in both disciplines has led to a re-evaluation of the limitations imposed by the paradoxes.In the foundations of set theory, the work of Gilmore [1974], Feferman [1975], [1979], [1984], and Aczel [1980] has clearly demonstrated that elegant and useful type-free theories of classes are feasible. Work on the semantic paradoxes was given new life by Kripke's contribution (Kripke [1975]). This inspired the recent work of Gupta [1982] and Herzberger [1982]. These papers demonstrate that much room is available for the development of theories of truth which meet almost all of Tarski's desiderata.
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11

Nekhaev, Andrei V. "Yablo’s Paradox: Is the Infinite Liar Lying to Us?" Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 88–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956351.

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In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the classical ≪Liar≫ paradox. It questioned the traditional notion of self-reference as the basic structure for semantic paradoxes. The article considers the arguments underlying two different approaches to analysis of proposals of the ≪Infinite Liar≫ and understanding of the genuine sources for semantic paradoxes. The first approach (V. Valpola, G.-H. von Wright, T. Bolander, etc.) imposes responsibility for the emergence of semantic paradoxes on the negation of the truth predicate. It deprives the ≪Infinite Liar≫ sentences of consistent truth values. The second approach is based on a modified version of anaphoric prosententialism (D. Grover, R. Brandom, etc.). The concepts of truth and falsehood are treated as special anaphoric operators. Logical constructs similar to the ≪Infinite Liar≫ do not attribute any definite truth values to sentences from which they are composed, but only state certain types of relations between the semantic content of such sentences.
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12

Ladov, Vsevolod. "Is the Liar Paradox a semantic paradox?" ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 1 (2019): 285–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-1-285-293.

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The Liar Paradox has been widely discussed from the ancient times and preserved its importance in contemporary philosophy of logic and mathematics. At the beginning of the 20th century, F.P. Ramsey asserted that the Liar Paradox is different from pure logical paradoxes such as Russell’s paradox. The Liar Paradox is connected with language and can be considered a semantic paradox. Ramsey's point of view has become widespread in the logic of the 20th century. The author of the article questions this view. It is argued that the Liar Paradox cannot be unequivocally attributed to the semantic paradoxes and therefore Ramsey's point of view should be revised.
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13

Garola, Claudio, and Luigi Solombrino. "Semantic realism versus EPR-Like paradoxes: The Furry, Bohm-Aharonov, and Bell paradoxes." Foundations of Physics 26, no. 10 (October 1996): 1329–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02058272.

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14

Landini, Gregory. "Russell's Separation of the Logical and Semantic Paradoxes." Revue internationale de philosophie 229, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 257–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rip.229.0257.

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15

Field, Hartry. "A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes." Journal of Philosophical Logic 32, no. 2 (April 2003): 139–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1023027808400.

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16

BERINGER, TIMO, and THOMAS SCHINDLER. "A GRAPH-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEMANTIC PARADOXES." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 23, no. 4 (December 2017): 442–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bsl.2017.37.

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AbstractWe introduce a framework for a graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes. Similar frameworks have been recently developed for infinitary propositional languages by Cook [5, 6] and Rabern, Rabern, and Macauley [16]. Our focus, however, will be on the language of first-order arithmetic augmented with a primitive truth predicate. Using Leitgeb’s [14] notion of semantic dependence, we assign reference graphs (rfgs) to the sentences of this language and define a notion of paradoxicality in terms of acceptable decorations of rfgs with truth values. It is shown that this notion of paradoxicality coincides with that of Kripke [13]. In order to track down the structural components of an rfg that are responsible for paradoxicality, we show that any decoration can be obtained in a three-stage process: first, the rfg is unfolded into a tree, second, the tree is decorated with truth values (yielding a dependence tree in the sense of Yablo [21]), and third, the decorated tree is re-collapsed onto the rfg. We show that paradoxicality enters the picture only at stage three. Due to this we can isolate two basic patterns necessary for paradoxicality. Moreover, we conjecture a solution to the characterization problem for dangerous rfgs that amounts to the claim that basically the Liar- and the Yablo graph are the only paradoxical rfgs. Furthermore, we develop signed rfgs that allow us to distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reference and obtain more fine-grained versions of our results for unsigned rfgs.
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17

Oms, Sergi. "Articulation and Liars." Disputatio 9, no. 46 (November 27, 2017): 383–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0011.

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Abstract Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.
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18

Yanofsky, Noson S. "A Universal Approach to Self-Referential Paradoxes, Incompleteness and Fixed Points." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 3 (September 2003): 362–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1058448677.

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AbstractFollowing F. William Lawvere, we show that many self-referential paradoxes, incompleteness theorems and fixed point theorems fall out of the same simple scheme. We demonstrate these similarities by showing how this simple scheme encompasses the semantic paradoxes, and how they arise as diagonal arguments and fixed point theorems in logic, computability theory, complexity theory and formal language theory.
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19

Shigeta, Ken. "Exposition of two forms of semantic skepticism: Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following and Kripke’s semantic paradox." Filozofija i drustvo 25, no. 1 (2014): 127–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1401127s.

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Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke?s argument (Kripke 1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with Kripke?s view have directly contrasted his understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein?s own perspective (LW) in or after Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters.
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20

TOURVILLE, NICHOLAS, and ROY T. COOK. "EMBRACING THE TECHNICALITIES: EXPRESSIVE COMPLETENESS AND REVENGE." Review of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 2 (April 11, 2016): 325–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s175502031600006x.

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AbstractThe Revenge Problem threatens every approach to the semantic paradoxes that proceeds by introducing nonclassical semantic values. Given any such collection Δ of additional semantic values, one can construct a Revenge sentence:This sentence is either false or has a value in Δ.TheEmbracing Revengeview, developed independently by Roy T. Cook and Phlippe Schlenker, addresses this problem by suggesting that the class of nonclassical semantic values is indefinitely extensible, with each successive Revenge sentence introducing a new ‘pathological’ semantic value into the discourse. The view is explicitly motivated in terms of the idea that every notion thatseemsto be expressible (e.g., “has a value in Δ”, for any definite collection of semantic values Δ) should, if at all possible,beexpressible. Extant work on the Embracing Revenge view has failed to live up to this promise, since the formal languages developed within such work are expressively impoverished. We rectify this here by developing a much richer formal language, and semantics for that language, and we then prove an extremely powerful expressive completeness result for the system in question.
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21

WELCH, P. D. "ULTIMATE TRUTH VIS-À-VIS STABLE TRUTH." Review of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 1 (June 2008): 126–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020308080118.

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We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: \Delta _3^1-CA0 (second-order number theory with a \Delta _3^1-comprehension axiom scheme) is insufficient. We briefly consider his claim to have produced a ‘revenge-immune’ solution to the semantic paradoxes by introducing this conditional. We remark that the notion of a ‘determinately true’ operator can be introduced in other settings.
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22

Picollo, Lavinia. "Truth in a Logic of Formal Inconsistency: How classical can it get?" Logic Journal of the IGPL 28, no. 5 (November 29, 2018): 771–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzy059.

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AbstractWeakening classical logic is one of the most popular ways of dealing with semantic paradoxes. Their advocates often claim that such weakening does not affect non-semantic reasoning. Recently, however, Halbach and Horsten (2006) have shown that this is actually not the case for Kripke’s fixed-point theory based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme. Feferman’s axiomatization $\textsf{KF}$ in classical logic is much stronger than its paracomplete counterpart $\textsf{PKF}$, not only in terms of semantic but also in arithmetical content. This paper compares the proof-theoretic strength of an axiomatization of Kripke’s construction based on the paraconsistent evaluation scheme of $\textsf{LP}$, formulated in classical logic with that of an axiomatization directly formulated in $\textsf{LP}$, extended with a consistency operator. The ultimate goal is to find out whether paraconsistent solutions to the paradoxes that employ consistency operators fare better in this respect than paracomplete ones.
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23

Efimov, Innokenty P., and Vsevolod A. Ladov. "Ripley's inferentialist approach to the solution of semantic paradoxes." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 46 (December 1, 2018): 14–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/46/2.

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24

Yi, Byeong-Uk. "Descending Chains and the Contextualist Approach to Semantic Paradoxes." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40, no. 4 (October 1999): 554–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1012429719.

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25

Garola, Claudio. "Semantic incompleteness of quantum physics and EPR-like paradoxes." International Journal of Theoretical Physics 32, no. 10 (October 1993): 1863–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00979507.

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26

Gilmore, Paul C. "Natural deduction based set theories: a new resolution of the old paradoxes." Journal of Symbolic Logic 51, no. 2 (June 1986): 393–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022481200031261.

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AbstractThe comprehension principle of set theory asserts that a set can be formed from the objects satisfying any given property. The principle leads to immediate contradictions if it is formalized as an axiom scheme within classical first order logic. A resolution of the set paradoxes results if the principle is formalized instead as two rules of deduction in a natural deduction presentation of logic. This presentation of the comprehension principle for sets as semantic rules, instead of as a comprehension axiom scheme, can be viewed as an extension of classical logic, in contrast to the assertion of extra-logical axioms expressing truths about a pre-existing or constructed universe of sets. The paradoxes are disarmed in the extended classical semantics because truth values are only assigned to those sentences that can be grounded in atomic sentences.
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27

ZARDINI, ELIA. "NAIVE TRUTH AND NAIVE LOGICAL PROPERTIES." Review of Symbolic Logic 7, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 351–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000045.

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AbstractA unified answer is offered to two distinct fundamental questions: whether a nonclassical solution to the semantic paradoxes should be extended to other apparently similar paradoxes (in particular, to the paradoxes of logical properties) and whether a nonclassical logic should be expressed in a nonclassical metalanguage. The paper starts by reviewing a budget of paradoxes involving the logical properties of validity, inconsistency, and compatibility. The author’s favored substructural approach to naive truth is then presented and it is explained how that approach can be extended in a very natural way so as to solve a certain paradox of validity. However, three individually decisive reasons are later provided for thinking that no approach adopting a classical metalanguage can adequately account for all the features involved in the paradoxes of logical properties. Consequently, the paper undertakes the task to do better, and, building on the system already developed, introduces a theory in a nonclassical metalanguage that expresses an adequate logic of naive truth and of some naive logical properties.
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28

DEAN, WALTER. "INCOMPLETENESS VIA PARADOX AND COMPLETENESS." Review of Symbolic Logic 13, no. 3 (May 23, 2019): 541–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020319000212.

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AbstractThis paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth.
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29

St Quinton, John. "Semantic Category theory and Semantic Intertwine: the anathema of mathematics." Kybernetes 43, no. 8 (August 26, 2014): 1183–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-07-2014-0141.

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Purpose – The recent scientific observation that human information processing involves four independent data types, has pinpointed a source of fallacious arguments within many domains of human thought. The species-unique ability to assign observable characteristics to purely conceptual entities has created beautiful poetry and literature. However, this ability to generate “Semantic Intertwine” has also created the most incomprehensible paradoxes and conundrums. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – Semantic Intertwine can be created between, or within, Semantic Categories; and in either case it then lies at the heart of fallacious, yet often very persuasive, reasoning. Findings – This paper describes how to detect mathematically related Semantic Intertwine in erroneous arguments involving: operands (VIII), mathematical induction (VIIA), orthogonal axiom sets (VIIB), continuous functions (VIIA), exclusive disjunction (VIIA), propositional calculus (VI) and the hitherto thorny problems arising from ambiguous intra-category use of “infinity” (VIIB). Originality/value – The applications of Semantic Category Analysis (SCA) are manifold. Determine the Semantic Categories involved in an argument and their modes of combination, and any Semantic Intertwine revealed pinpoints erroneous reasoning. SCA can be applied to any domain of human thought.
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30

Hanke, Miroslav. "Jan Dullaert of Ghent on the Foundations of Propositional Logic." Vivarium 55, no. 4 (November 22, 2017): 273–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341348.

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Abstract Jan Dullaert (1480-1513) was a direct student of John Mair and a teacher of Gaspar Lax, Juan de Celaya, and Juan Luis Vives. His commentary on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias addresses the foundations of propositional logic, including a detailed analysis of conditionals (following Paul of Venice’s Logica magna) and the semantics of logical connectives (conjunction, disjunction, and implication). Dullaert’s propositional logic is limited to the immediate implications of the semantics of these connectives, i.e., their introduction and elimination rules. In the same context, he discusses several alternative treatments of semantic paradoxes, paying most attention to the approaches derived from Martin Le Maistre (based on the idea that sentential meaning is closed under entailment) and John Mair (based on the idea that self-falsifying sentences are false).
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31

Stern, Johannes. "Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication and Truth By Keith Simmons." Analysis 80, no. 3 (July 1, 2020): 601–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa034.

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32

Pradivlyannaya, Lydmila. "PARADOXES OF SURREALISM AND THEIR LANGUAGE REALIZATION (BASED ON B. POPLAVSKY’S POETRY)." Годишник на Шуменския университет. Факултет по Хуманитарни науки XXXIIIA, no. 1 (November 10, 2022): 295–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.46687/vrzn3213.

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The article is devoted to the analysis of the linguistic ways of creating paradox in surrealistic poetry. The research is done on the material of the collection of Automatic poems by the Russian émigré poet Boris Poplavsky. The author outlines the main reasons for the prevalence of paradox in surrealist poetry, examines the ways of creating a paradox in a poetic text, and highlights its structural and semantic features. It is emphasized that the paradoxical nature of surrealistic imagery is determined by the very specifics of the surrealistic mind since the aesthetic system of surrealism is built on antinomies and their overcoming. The language in such poetry changes its function and, destroying the usual semantic connections, helps the reader to see the world in a different way.
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33

Pietarinen, Ahti. "Quantum Logic and Quantum Theory in a Game-Theoretic Perspective." Open Systems & Information Dynamics 09, no. 03 (September 2002): 273–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1019712730037.

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Extensive games of imperfect information, together with the associated semantic machinery, can be brought to bear on logical aspects of quantum-theoretic phenomena. Among other things, this kinship implies that propositional logic of informational independence is useful in understanding such quantum theoretic issues as non-locality and EPR-type paradoxes, and that quantum logic exhibits the overall game-theoretical notion of uncertainty.
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34

Englebretsen, George. "Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth, written by Simmons, K." History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23, no. 2 (October 23, 2020): 499–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-20210001.

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35

Gauker, Christopher. "Against Stepping Back: A Critique of Contextualist Approaches to the Semantic Paradoxes." Journal of Philosophical Logic 35, no. 4 (February 23, 2006): 393–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-006-9026-y.

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36

Leitgeb, Hannes. "HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic (with an Application to Semantic Paradoxes)." Journal of Philosophical Logic 48, no. 2 (July 10, 2018): 305–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9467-0.

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37

Urquhart, Alasdair. "The Unnameable." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 34 (2008): 119–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0036.

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Hans Herzberger as a philosopher and logician has shown deep interest both in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and in the topic of the inexpressible and the ineffable. In the fall of 1982, he taught at the University of Toronto, together with André Gombay, a course on Frege's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and foundations of arithmetic. Again, in the fall of 1986, he taught a seminar on the philosophy of language that dealt with ‘the limits of discursive symbolism in several domains of human experience.’ The course description continues by saying: ‘Special attention will be given to the paradoxes underlying various doctrines of the inexpressible and the tensions inherent in those paradoxes. Some doctrines of semantic, ethical and religious mysticism will be critically examined.'
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38

ROSSI, LORENZO. "A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX." Review of Symbolic Logic 12, no. 2 (February 26, 2019): 209–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020319000078.

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AbstractThe sentences employed in semantic paradoxes display a wide range of semantic behaviours. However, the main theories of truth currently available either fail to provide a theory of paradox altogether, or can only account for some paradoxical phenomena by resorting to multiple interpretations of the language, as in (Kripke, 1975). In this article, I explore the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and I develop a unified theory oftruth and paradox, that is a theory of truth that also provides a unified account of paradoxical sentences. The theory I propose here yields a threefold classification of paradoxical sentences—liar-like sentences, truth-teller–like sentences, and revenge sentences. Unlike existing treatments of semantic paradox, the theory put forward in this article yields a way of interpreting all three kinds of paradoxical sentences, as well as unparadoxical sentences, within a single model.
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39

Murzi, Julien, and Lorenzo Rossi. "Non-reflexivity and Revenge." Journal of Philosophical Logic 51, no. 1 (November 12, 2021): 201–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09625-5.

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AbstractWe present a revenge argument for non-reflexive theories of semantic notions – theories which restrict the rule of assumption, or (equivalently) initial sequents of the form φ ⊩ φ. Our strategy follows the general template articulated in Murzi and Rossi [21]: we proceed via the definition of a notion of paradoxicality for non-reflexive theories which in turn breeds paradoxes that standard non-reflexive theories are unable to block.
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40

Priest, Graham. "Gaps and Gluts: Reply to Parsons." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (March 1995): 57–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717404.

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1 IntroductionNumerous solutions have been proposed to the semantic paradoxes. Two that are frequently singled out and compared are the following. The first is that according to which paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gaps. The second is that according to which paradoxical sentences are both true and false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gluts (dialetheias). Calling the first of these a solution is, in fact, somewhat misleading: it is rather like calling an opening gambit a game of chess. For the solution runs into severe problems almost immediately, and so can be only the first of a series of (often ad hoc) moves made to defend the original weak opening. Nonetheless, the symmetry involved in the gap and glut solutions is obvious enough to make the comparison a natural one.
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41

Popovych, Mykhailo. "Les paradoxes dans l’étude du nom propre." Romanica Wratislaviensia 69 (November 28, 2022): 65–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0557-2665.69.6.

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It is explicitly or implicitly stated in many scholarly works on proper names that the linguistic status of these lexical items is “odd” (étrange). Their odd nature is due to several factors, such as their functional propensity to correlate with a single referent, lack of conceptual meaning, morphological invariability, inability to be clearly differentiated from common names due to a lack of unambiguous and generally accepted criteria, etc. Therefore, the class of proper names looks, both quantitatively and qualitatively, like a very vague conceptual structure. Under the umbrella term of “proper name,” researchers include lexical units that are different in their lexical-semantic and communicative-pragmatic nature, which, in many cases, contradicts the theoretical propositions offered to explain their linguistic and speech features. Thus, quoting Gustave Guillaume, the proposed principles of theories of proper names “do not always face the facts in an antagonistic position.” This is the essence of inconsistencies in the interpretation of the linguistic status of proper names. The present study analyzes the conceptual foundations of several basic, in our opinion, paradoxes that are inherent in the linguistic studies of proper names.
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42

Суровцев, Валерий Александрович. "SELF-REFERENCE, THEORY OF TYPES, AND CATEGORIZATION IN WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE THEORY OF STATEMENTS." ΠΡΑΞΗMΑ. Journal of Visual Semiotics, no. 4(30) (October 28, 2021): 213–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.23951/2312-7899-2021-4-213-233.

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Рассматривается источник логических парадоксов, выявленных Б. Расселом в системе обоснования математики, предложенной Г. Фреге. Самореферентность выражений, предложенная Б. Расселом как объяснение возникновения парадоксов, рассматривается с точки зрения разработанной им простой и разветвленной теории типов. Обосновывается, что теория типов, предложенная Б. Расселом, основана на онтологических предпосылках. Онтологические предпосылки зависят от предпочтения семантическому перед синтаксическим подходом, который принимается Б. Расселом. Рассмотрены синтаксические подходы к логическому символизму, которые позволяют устранить парадоксы с точки зрения языка современной символической логики. Анализируется подход к решению парадоксов Л. Витгенштейна, который основан на синтаксическом подходе. Показано, что этот подход отличается от способов построения языка, принятых в современной логике. The article analyzes the source of logical paradoxes Bertrand Russell identified in the foundations of mathematics proposed by Gottlob Frege. Russell proposed self-reference of expressions as the source of paradoxes. To solve paradoxes, he developed the simple and ramified theory of types. Ontological presuppositions are well substantiated for his theory; they depend on semantic, but not syntactic, preference. Contemporary approaches in symbolical logic prefer syntactic methods. But Wittgenstein’s approach in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is more interesting, especially from the perspective of his picture theory of statements.
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43

Jerzak, Ethan. "Paradoxical Desires." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119, no. 3 (April 11, 2019): 335–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoz003.

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Abstract I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way of thinking about mental content, and rejecting those desire-satisfaction principles leads to revenge paradoxes. So the best response is a non-classical one, according to which certain desires are neither determinately satisfied nor determinately not satisfied. Thus, theorizing about paradoxical propositional attitudes helps constrain the space of possibilities for adequate solutions to semantic paradoxes more generally.
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44

Hanke, Miroslav. "Paul of Venice and Realist Developments of Roger Swyneshed's Treatment of Semantic Paradoxes." History and Philosophy of Logic 38, no. 4 (August 30, 2017): 299–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2017.1350344.

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45

Andreeva, Yu V. "Value-semantic phenomena and paradoxes of optimistically oriented pedagogy: An existential-humanistic approach." Professional education in the modern world 12, no. 3 (December 24, 2022): 521–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.20913/2618-7515-2023-1-14.

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Introduction. An increase in the volume of knowledge does not reveal the moral meanings of education and does not outline value orientations in education. Even changing the paradigms of education from informational to student- oriented is difficult to implement due to a number of contradictions. However, higher education as a social institution is capable of orienting a growing personality towards moral values.Purpose setting. There is an urgent need to develop such approaches and concepts that would make it possible to implement such a model of higher education focused on joy and success in learning activities. Such a model can become a situation of success if future teachers with a developed sense of love for children participate in the process of its creation. The phenomenon of "love for children" is revealed within the framework of two concepts: the philosophy of existentialism and the pedagogy of cooperation.Methods and methodology of the study. Based on the study of scientific literature and a comparative analysis of the two concepts, an idea was obtained of what methods of educational and pedagogical interaction will change in research and educational practice when the conceptual framework changes and under what conditions these concepts can enrich each other. It is shown that in both concepts, a successful condition for expressing love for children as one of the phenomena of optimistically oriented pedagogy will be the creation of a situation of success. The foregoing implies building educational and pedagogical interaction on the basis of values of the meaning of life of V. Frankl, the significant learning of C. Rogers, the joy of knowledge by V. A. Sukhomlinsky, the joy of cooperation and learning with the meaning of Sh. A. Amonashvili, the optimistic hypothesis ("tomorrow’s joy") A. S. Makarenko.Results. The phenomenon of "love for children" is presented as a pedagogical version of optimism, which implies faith in the child and his abilities. Conclusion. Based on the data obtained, conclusions are drawn regarding pedagogical approaches to children that contribute to the establishment of cooperation, assistance, care as external forms of manifestation of the phenomenon of love for children.
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46

Hansen, Chad. "Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and “Truth”." Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 3 (May 1985): 491–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2056264.

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Pre-Han philosophical tradition did not address issues for which the concept of truth was central. Classical Chinese philosophy had virtually no metaphysical theory. The theory of language was mainly pragmatic. The semantic doctrines that were developed focused on terms rather than sentences or sententials. The Chinese theory of knowledge was primarily a theory of know-how and was not based on contrast between knowledge and belief. Chinese philosophy of mind treated heart-mind as a cluster of dispositional attitudes to make distinctions and to act upon, not as a repository of cognitive content about the world. Discussions of inference and semantic paradoxes used explicitly pragmatic terms rather than semantic ones. These differences can be partially explained by features of classical Chinese language in which compositional sentencehood is not important or syntactically obvious, and in which the counterparts of propositional attitudes take terms rather than sentences as objects.
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Iqbal, Liaqat, Irfan Ullah, and Reena Khan. "Barthian Semiotics in Prince Bahram, In search of Gulandama." Global Language Review II, no. I (December 30, 2017): 67–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/glr.2017(ii-i).05.

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The paper aims at finding Ronald Barthes’ codes in the short story Prince Bahram, In Search of Gulandama. Using textual analysis, the short story was is analysed in the light of Ronald Barthes five codes. It is found that almost all of Ronald Barthes’ codes: hermeneutic, proairetic, semantic, symbolic and cultural codes are present in the short story. The story has puzzles and enigmas which inspire the readers to read the story in order to answer the unanswered questions. Like other stories, in this short story too, sequence is created through proairetic code. There are implied meanings, which bring forth the semantics code. Paradoxes, where binaries are the most import elements, are represented through symbolic codes. Lastly, there are many cultural elements, showing the cultural code. These different aspects gives a comprehensive narrative structure to the story.
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Leitgeb, Hannes. "Correction to: HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic (with an Application to Semantic Paradoxes)." Journal of Philosophical Logic 48, no. 2 (January 3, 2019): 407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-09497-2.

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49

Kastrup, Bernardo. "The Quest to Solve Problems That Don’t Exist: Thought Artifacts in Contemporary Ontology." Studia Humana 6, no. 4 (October 1, 2017): 45–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0026.

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Abstract Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the ‘hard problem of consciousness,’ whereas under microexperientialism we have the ‘subject combination problem.’ I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies.
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50

Arseneault, Madeleine, and Robert Stainton. "Holisme et homophonie." Dialogue 39, no. 1 (2000): 123–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006429.

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AbstractWe believe that, granting radical holism, a homophonie (or disquotational) definition of truth for a language achieves no progress towards guaranteeing the material equivalence of the left- and right-hand-side sentences for T-sentences. In order to avoid paradoxes such as the antinomy of the liar, Tarski requires that the metalanguage be semantically richer than the object language. For a radical holist, the difference in semantic powers of the meta- and object languages means that homophony is no guarantee of synonymy; therefore, worries about the indeterminacy of translation still apply.
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