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Academic literature on the topic 'Semantic paradoxes'

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Published: 4 June 2021
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Journal articles on the topic "Semantic paradoxes"

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WALICKI, MICHAŁ. "RESOLVING INFINITARY PARADOXES." Journal of Symbolic Logic 82, no. 2 (June 2017): 709–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jsl.2016.18.

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AbstractGraph normal form, GNF, [1], was used in [2, 3] for analyzing paradoxes in propositional discourses, with the semantics—equivalent to the classical one—defined by kernels of digraphs. The paper presents infinitary, resolution-based reasoning with GNF theories, which is refutationally complete for the classical semantics. Used for direct (not refutational) deduction it is not explosive and allows to identify in an inconsistent discourse, a maximal consistent subdiscourse with its classical consequences. Semikernels, generalizing kernels, provide the semantic interpretation.
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Rapaport, William J., and Richmond H. Thomason. "Paradoxes and Semantic Representation." Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, no. 2 (June 1988): 667. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274553.

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Wen, Lan. "Semantic paradoxes as equations." Mathematical Intelligencer 23, no. 1 (December 2001): 43–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03024517.

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Hanke, Miroslav. "John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes." Studia Neoaristotelica 9, no. 1 (2012): 58–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar2012913.

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Hanke, Miroslav. "John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes." Studia Neoaristotelica 9, no. 2 (2012): 154–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar2012927.

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Hanke, Miroslav. "John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes." Studia Neoaristotelica 10, no. 1 (2013): 50–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20131014.

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Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay. "Two paradoxes of semantic information." Synthese 192, no. 11 (March 13, 2015): 3719–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0717-1.

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Castaldo, Luca. "Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates." Australasian Journal of Logic 18, no. 7 (December 30, 2021): 688–723. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v18i7.6576.

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This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented below, (i) unlike the three-valued, consistent fixed-point models defined in Kripke (1975), are able to differentiate between paradoxical and pathological-but-unparadoxical sentences, and (ii) unlike the four-valued, paraconsistent fixed-point models first studied in Visser (1984) and Woodruff (1984), preserve consistency and groundedness of truth. Keywords: Semantic Paradoxes · Fixed-point semantics · Many-valued logic · Kripke’s theory oftruth
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Rabern, Landon, Brian Rabern, and Matthew Macauley. "Dangerous Reference Graphs and Semantic Paradoxes." Journal of Philosophical Logic 42, no. 5 (October 2, 2012): 727–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9246-2.

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Turner, Ray. "A theory of properties." Journal of Symbolic Logic 52, no. 2 (June 1987): 455–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274394.

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Frege's attempts to formulate a theory of properties to serve as a foundation for logic, mathematics and semantics all dissolved under the weight of the logicial paradoxes. The language of Frege's theory permitted the representation of the property which holds of everything which does not hold of itself. Minimal logic, plus Frege's principle of abstraction, leads immediately to a contradiction. The subsequent history of foundational studies was dominated by attempts to formulate theories of properties and sets which would not succumb to the Russell argument. Among such are Russell's simple theory of types and the development of various iterative conceptions of set. All of these theories ban, in one way or another, the self-reference responsible for the paradoxes; in this sense they are all “typed” theories. The semantical paradoxes, involving the concept of truth, induced similar nightmares among philosophers and logicians involved in semantic theory. The early work of Tarski demonstrated that no language that contained enough formal machinery to respresent the various versions of the Liar could contain a truth-predicate satisfying all the Tarski biconditionals. However, recent work in both disciplines has led to a re-evaluation of the limitations imposed by the paradoxes.In the foundations of set theory, the work of Gilmore [1974], Feferman [1975], [1979], [1984], and Aczel [1980] has clearly demonstrated that elegant and useful type-free theories of classes are feasible. Work on the semantic paradoxes was given new life by Kripke's contribution (Kripke [1975]). This inspired the recent work of Gupta [1982] and Herzberger [1982]. These papers demonstrate that much room is available for the development of theories of truth which meet almost all of Tarski's desiderata.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Semantic paradoxes"

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Rossi, Lorenzo. "Truth, paradoxes, and partiality : a study on semantic theories of naïve truth." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:026f12c0-8a1a-4094-8ee9-3b7405021870.

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This work is an investigation into the notion of truth. More specifically, this thesis deals with how to account for the main features of truth, with the interaction between truth and fundamental linguistic elements such as connectives and quantifiers, and with the analysis and the solution of truth-theoretic paradoxes. In the introductory Chapter 1, I describe and justify the approach to truth I adopt here, giving some general coordinates to contextualize my work. In Part I, I examine some theories of truth that fall under the chosen approach. In Chapter 2, I discuss a famous theory of truth developed by Saul Kripke. Some difficulties of Kripke's theory led several authors, notably Hartry Field, to emphasize the importance of a well-behaved conditional connective in conjunction with a Kripkean treatment of truth. I articulate this idea in a research agenda, which I call Field's program, giving some conditions for its realizability. In Chapter 3, I analyze the main theory of truth proposed by Field to equip Kripke's theory with a well-behaved conditional, and I give a novel analysis of its shortcomings. Field's theory is remarkably successful but is technically and intuitively very complex, and it is unclear whether Field's conditional is a plausible candidate for a philosophically useful conditional. Moreover, Field's treatment of "determinate truth" and his handling of many kinds of paradoxes is not fully satisfactory. In Part II, I develop some new theories that capture the main aspects of the notion of truth and, at the same time, give a philosophically interesting meaning to connectives and quantifiers - in particular, they yield a strong and conceptually significant conditional. The theory proposed in Chapter 4 extends the inductive methods employed in Kripke's theory, showing how to adapt them to non-monotonic connectives as well. There, I also develop and defend a new, theoretically fruitful notion of gappiness. The theory proposed in Chapter 5 (and discussed further in Chapter 6), instead, employs some graph-theoretic intuitions and tools to provide a new model-theoretic construction. The resulting theory, I argue, provides a nice framework to account for the interaction between truth, connectives, and quantifiers, and it is flexible enough to be applicable to several interpretations of the logical vocabulary. Some new technical results are established with this theory as well, concerning the interplay between every Lukasiewicz semantics and some interpretations of the truth predicate, and concerning the handling of determinate truth. Finally, the theory developed in Chapter 5 provides articulate and telling solutions to truth-theoretical paradoxes.
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Eldridge-Smith, Peter, and peter eldridge-smith@anu edu au. "The Liar Paradox and its Relatives." The Australian National University. Faculty of Arts, 2008. http://thesis.anu.edu.au./public/adt-ANU20081016.173200.

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My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.
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Burgis, Benjamin. "Truth is a One-Player Game: A Defense of Monaletheism and Classical Logic." Scholarly Repository, 2011. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/677.

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The Liar Paradox and related semantic antinomies seem to challenge our deepest intuitions about language, truth and logic. Many philosophers believe that to solve them, we must give up either classical logic, or the expressive resources of natural language, or even the “naïve theory of truth” (according to which "P" and “it is true that 'P'” always entail each other). A particularly extreme form of radical surgery is proposed by figures like Graham Priest, who argues for “dialetheism”—the position that some contradictions are actually true—on the basis of the paradoxes. While Priest’s willingness to dispense with the Law of Non-Contradiction may be unpopular in contemporary analytic philosophy, figures as significant as Saul Kripke and Hartry Field have argued that, in light of the paradoxes, we can only save Non-Contradiction at the expense of the Law of the Excluded Middle, abandoning classical logic in favor of a “paracomplete” alternative in which P and ~P can simultaneously fail to hold. I believe that we can do better than that, and I argue for a more conservative approach, which retains not only “monaletheism” (the orthodox position that no sentence, either in natural languages or other language, can have more than one truth-value at a time), but the full inferential resources of classical logic.
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Dalglish, Steven Jack William. "Accepting Defeat: A Solution to Semantic Paradox with Defeasible Principles for Truth." The Ohio State University, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1597757494987204.

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Eklund, Matti 1974. "Paradoxes and the foundations of semantics and metaphysics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8798.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 175-180).
Numerous philosophical problems, otherwise quite different in character, are of the following form. Certain claims which seem not only obviously true, but even constitutive of the meanings of the expressions employed, can be shown to lead to absurdity when taken together (perhaps in conjunction with contingent facts about the world). All such problems can justly be called paradoxes. The paradoxes I examine are the liar paradox, the sorites paradox, and the personal identity paradox posed by the fission problem. I argue that, in all of the cases examined, the claims that jointly lead to absurdity really are constitutive of the meanings of the expressions employed, in the following ways. First, semantic competence with the expressions involves being disposed to accept these claims. Second, the claims are reference-determining, in that the semantic values of the expressions employed are constrained by the condition that these claims should come out true, or as nearly true as possible. If a claim or principle is constitutive of meaning in both of these ways, I call it meaning-constitutive. When the meaning-constitutive principles for some expressions of a language are inconsistent, I call the language inconsistent. This is a stipulative definition; but it accords well with what other theorists who have talked about languages being inconsistent, for example Alfred Tarski, have had in mind. In chapters one and two, I argue that our language is inconsistent. In chapter three, I relate my theses to Frank Jackson's and David Lewis's views on how reference is determined. Another problem posed by the liar paradox concerns important theses in the philosophy of language. The liar reasoning shows that under certain conditions, a natural language cannot contain a predicate satisfying the T-schema. But many theses in the philosophy of language presuppose that truth satisfies the T-schema. I resolve this conflict in a Tarskian way: by saying that truth then is expressed only in an essentially richer metalanguage. However, I argue that taking this route means having to embrace the existence of absolutely inexpressible properties - and even to embrace the conclusion that some properties of which we appear to have concepts are absolutely inexpressible. All this is dealt with in chapter four. In the fifth chapter I show that my arguments of the previous chapters have (dis)solved the liar paradox. And finally, in the sixth chapter, I discuss the philosophical significance of truth and logic, and argue that these questions are significant only if understood in a new way. In this last chapter I also discuss the implications of the liar paradox for metaphysics; more specifically, its implications for the issue of how metaphysical claims are justified.
by Matti Eklund.
Ph.D.
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Machado, Julio Cesar. "O paradoxo a partir da teoria dos blocos semânticos : língua, dicionário e história." Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2015. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7810.

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In general, the idea of this work is to investigate the paradox, our object, by a linguistic and argumentative way, from the Theory of Semantic blocks (TBS). And specifically, for this, we adopted as main methods, two gestures: the relationship between linguistic elements as analysis condition, on the one hand, and the interdependence of its structure and significance, on the other hand, both in the non- use (language) and the use of language (enunciation). This second method of interdependence, when applied to our object, the paradox, becomes our first central hypothesis, the possibility of semantic paradox: the strange and difficult linguisticargumentative consideration of opposite significances, but in the interdependent state. And in this context we will also develop a second central hypothesis: the argumentative cube, while theoretical actualization of the argumentative square (the basic theoretical framework of our theory). Organizationally, the resourcefulness of this work will be carrying out in several specific strands, distributed throughout the chapters, namely: theory / paradox (divided into "Argumentation in the Language" / paradox, at first, and "Theory of Semantic Blocks "/ paradox, in a second stage); discours / paradox; dictionaries / paradox; "Historic Semantics of Enunciation" / paradox; relationship between languages / paradox and anteriority / paradox. In addition to these relational axes established to better observe our object, the paradox, and defend our hypothesis, the semantic paradox, we elected as central corpora, a group of dictionaries in which we can catch "which is said to be" a paradox and "as they say "a paradox to ponder" which means "a paradox. These dictionaries are divided into main corpus: Dictionnaire Historique de langue francaise, and and secondary corpora : Enciclopédia e Dicionário ilustrado, Kokugo Ziten e Dicionário Houaiss da Língua Portuguesa, among others.
L'idée de ce travail est d'étudier le paradoxe d’une façon linguistique et argumentatif, à partir de la Théorie des Blocs Sémantiques (TBS). Et précisément pour cela, nous prenderons comme principales méthodologies deux gestes : la relation entre des éléments linguistiques comme condition d'analyse, et l'interdépendance entre la structure et sa significance, à partir tant par le champ du non-usage (langue), comme du champ d’usage de la langue (l'énonciation). Cette seconde méthode d'interdépendance, lorsqu'elle est appliquée à notre objet (le paradoxe) constitue mon premier hypothèse centrale : la possibilité du paradoxe sémantique : la considération linguistique-argumentative de signifiances opposées, mais dans un état d’interdépendance. Et dans ce contexte nous allons développer aussi une deuxième hipothèse centrale: le cube argumentatif, tandis que une atualization théorique du carré argumentatif (le construct théorique base dans notre théorie). Sur le plan organisationnel, l'ingéniosité de ce travail sera effectuer dans plusieurs axes spécifiques, répartis sur plusieurs chapitres: la théorie/paradoxe (premièrement «Argumentation dans la langue»/paradoxe, et deuxièmement «Théorie des blocs sémantiques»/paradoxe); discours/paradoxe; dictionnaires/paradoxe; «Sémantique Historiques de l'Énonciation» / paradoxe; relation entre des langues / paradoxe et antétriorité / paradoxe. En plus de ces axes relationnels mis en place pour mieux observer notre objet (le paradoxe) et de défendre mon hypothèse du paradoxe sémantique, je formerai un corpus à partir d’un groupe de dictionnaires dans lesquels appairassent « ce qui ce dit être » un paradoxe et « comment est-ce qu’» un paradoxe ce dit, afin de reflechir sur ce « que signifie un paradoxe ». Les dictionnaires sont divisés en corpus principal: Dictionnaire Historique de langue francaise, et corpora secondaire: Enciclopédia e Dicionário ilustrado, Kokugo Ziten e Dicionário Houaiss da Língua Portuguesa, parmi d’autres.
De modo geral, a ideia deste trabalho é investigar o paradoxo, nosso objeto, de modo linguístico e argumentativo, a partir da Teoria dos Blocos Semânticos (TBS). E de modo específico, para isto, adotamos enquanto principais metodologias, dois gestos: a relação entre elementos linguísticos enquanto condição de análises, por um lado, e a interdependência entre a estrutura e suas significâncias, por outro lado, tanto no âmbito do não-uso (língua) quanto do uso da língua (enunciação). Este segundo método da interdependência, quando aplicado ao nosso objeto, o paradoxo, constitui a nossa primeira hipótese central, a possibilidade do paradoxo semântico: a estranha e difícil consideração linguístico-argumentativa de significâncias opostas, mas em estado de interdependência. E neste contexto desenvolveremos também uma segunda hipótese central: o cubo argumentativo, enquanto atualização teórica do quadrado argumentativo (o construto teórico basilar de nossa teoria). Organizacionalmente, a desenvoltura deste trabalho efetivar-se-á em vários eixos específicos, distribuídos ao longo dos capítulos, a saber: teoria/paradoxo (dividido em “Argumentação na Língua”/paradoxo, em um primeiro momento, e “Teoria dos Blocos Semânticos”/paradoxo, em um segundo momento); discurso/paradoxo; dicionários/paradoxo; “Semântica Histórica da Enunciação”/paradoxo; relação entre línguas/paradoxo e anterioridade/paradoxo. Além destes eixos relacionais estabelecidos para melhor observar nosso objeto, o paradoxo, e defender nossa hipótese, o paradoxo semântico, elegemos enquanto corpus central, um grupo de dicionários nos quais possamos flagrar “o que se diz ser” um paradoxo e “como se diz” um paradoxo, para ponderar “o que significa” um paradoxo. Estes dicionários estão divididos em corpus principal: Dictionnaire Historique de langue francaise, e corpus secundário: Enciclopédia e Dicionário ilustrado, Kokugo Ziten e Dicionário Houaiss da Língua Portuguesa, dentre outros.
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Bacon, Andrew Jonathan. "Indeterminacy : an investigation into the Soritical and semantical paradoxes." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b4490a8c-0089-4c77-8d24-1ab1ca5baaf0.

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According to orthodoxy the study of the Soritical and semantical paradoxes belongs to the domain of the philosophy of language. To solve these paradoxes we need to investigate the nature of words like `heap' and `true.' In this thesis I criticise linguistic explanations of the state of ignorance we find ourselves in when confronted with indeterminate cases and develop a classical non-linguistic theory of indeterminacy in its stead. The view places the study of vagueness and indeterminacy squarely in epistemological terms, situating it within a theory of rational propositional attitudes. The resulting view is applied to a number of problems in the philosophy of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes.
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Bette, Karl-Heinrich. "Körperspuren : zur Semantik und Paradoxie moderner Körperlichkeit /." Bielefeld : Transcript-Verl, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/bs/toc/501094601.pdf.

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Hassman, Benjamin John. "Semantic objects and paradox: a study of Yablo's omega-liar." Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1228.

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To borrow a colorful phrase from Kant, this dissertation offers a prolegomenon to any future semantic theory. The dissertation investigates Yablo's omega-liar paradox and draws the following consequence. Any semantic theory that accepts the existence of semantic objects must face Yablo's paradox. The dissertation endeavors to position Yablo's omega-liar in a role analogous to that which Russell's paradox has for the foundations of mathematics. Russell's paradox showed that if we wed mathematics to sets, then because of the many different possible restrictions available for blocking the paradox, mathematics fractionates. There would be different mathematics. This is intolerable. It is similarly intolerable to have restrictions on the `objects' of Intentionality. Hence, in the light of Yablo's omega-liar, Intentionality cannot be wed to any theory of semantic objects. We ought, therefore, to think of Yablo's paradox as a natural language paradox, and as such we must accept its implications for the semantics of natural language, namely that those entities which are `meanings' (natural or otherwise) must not be construed as objects. To establish our result, Yablo's paradox is examined in light of the criticisms of Priest (and his followers). Priest maintains that Yablo's original omega-liar is flawed in its employment of a Tarski-style T-schema for its truth-predicate. Priest argues that the paradox is not formulable unless it employs a "satisfaction" predicate in place of its truth-predicate. Priest is mistaken. However, it will be shown that the omega-liar paradox depends essentially on the assumption of semantic objects. No formulation of the paradox is possible without this assumption. Given this, the dissertation looks at three different sorts of theories of propositions, and argues that two fail to specify a complete syntax for the Yablo sentences. Purely intensional propositions, however, are able to complete the syntax and thus generate the paradox. In the end, however, the restrictions normally associated with purely intensional propositions begin to look surprisingly like the hierarchies that Yablo sought to avoid with his paradox. The result is that while Yablo's paradox is syntactically formable within systems with formal hierarchies, it is not semantically so.
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Wulf, Douglas J. "The imperfective paradox in the English progressive and other semantic course corrections /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8368.

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Books on the topic "Semantic paradoxes"

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Jonkersz, Ineke. Semantic interference and facilitation in word production: Explaining the semantic relatedness paradox. [Leiden]: Universiteit Leiden, 2004.

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Bette, Karl-Heinrich. Körperspuren: Zur Semantik und Paradoxie moderner Körperlichkeit. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2005.

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Bette, Karl-Heinrich. Körperspuren: Zur Semantik und Paradoxie moderner Körperlichkeit. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1989.

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There are two errors in the title of this book: A sourcebook of philosophical puzzles, problems, and paradoxes. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2002.

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Le paradoxe en langue et en discours. Paris: Harmattan, 2008.

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Wołowska, Katarzyna. Le paradoxe en langue et en discours. Paris: Harmattan, 2008.

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Nortmann, Ulrich. Deontische Logik ohne Paradoxien: Semantik und Logik des Normativen. München: Philosophia, 1989.

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Godart-Wendling, Béatrice. La vérité et le menteur: Les paradoxes sui-falsificateurs et la sémantique des langues naturelles. Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1990.

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Vaillancourt, Claude. Le paradoxe de l'écrivain: Le savoir et l'écriture. Montréal, Québec: Triptyque, 2003.

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Panzova, Violeta. Semantičkite paradoksi. Skopje: Ǵurǵa, 2001.

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Book chapters on the topic "Semantic paradoxes"

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Priest, Graham. "Semantic Paradoxes." In In Contradiction, 11–34. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3687-4_2.

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Garciadiego, Alejandro R. "The ‘Semantic Paradoxes’." In Bertrand Russell and the Origins of the Set-theoretic ‘Paradoxes’, 131–50. Basel: Birkhäuser Basel, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-7402-1_5.

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Proietti, Carlo, Davide Grossi, Sonja Smets, and Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada. "Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks, Modal Logic and Semantic Paradoxes." In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 214–29. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60292-8_16.

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Bruni, Riccardo, and Lorenzo Rossi. "A Unified Approach to Semantic and Soritical Paradoxes." In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 31–40. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88708-7_3.

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Garola, Claudio. "An Informal Presentation of Semantic Realism and Its Solution of Quantum Paradoxes." In Language, Quantum, Music, 219–30. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2043-4_20.

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Zardini, Elia. "Getting One for Two, or the Contractors’ Bad Deal. Towards a Unified Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes." In Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, 461–93. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_23.

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Ellrich, Lutz. "Semantik und Paradoxie." In Germanistik und Komparatistik, 378–98. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05561-3_21.

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Burton-Roberts, Noel. "Grelling’s paradox." In Perspectives on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse, 187–201. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pbns.90.16bur.

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Maruyama, Yoshihiro. "Categorical Harmony and Paradoxes in Proof-Theoretic Semantics." In Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics, 95–114. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_6.

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Martino, Enrico. "Russellian Type Theory and Semantical Paradoxes." In Logic, Meaning and Computation, 491–505. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0526-5_24.

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Conference papers on the topic "Semantic paradoxes"

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Dai, Li, and Ji-hua Zhang. "Analysis of the Situation Semantics Solution to Paradoxes." In 3d International Conference on Applied Social Science Research (ICASSR 2015). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icassr-15.2016.207.

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Kovačević, Miloš М. "JEZIČKE ŠKOLSKE IGRE DUŠKA TRIFUNOVIĆA." In KNjIŽEVNOST ZA DECU U NAUCI I NASTAVI. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Education in Jagodina, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/kdnn21.009k.

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Abstract:
: The paper analyzes Duško Trifunović’s poems related to school subjects, and only those whose structural-semantic dominants are “language games”. In Duško Trifunović’s “school poetry” for children, language games are based on the following seven linguistic-semantic-stylistic categories: 1) homonymy, 2) polysemy, 3) antimetabolics, 4) paradox, 5) neologisms, 6) idiomatization and/or phraseologisms, and 7) jargonisms. Duško Trifunović’s poems in which the principle of each of the linguistic and/or lexical categories dominates are singled out and analyzed.
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