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MacLean, Brian J. "Self-consciousness, self-awareness and pain." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/4617.
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Kwon, Hongwoo. "Self-identification and self-knowledge." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62418.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010."September 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122).
The traditional view has it that self-locating beliefs are distinctive in that they have distinctive contents. Against this, I claim that the distinctive element of self-locating beliefs should be placed outside contents. If someone believes that he himself is hungry, he not only has a propositional belief of a certain particular person that he is hungry, but also identifies himself as that particular person. The latter is not a matter of propositional belief, but a matter of taking a first personal perspective on that person's actions, beliefs and experiences. A subject takes his actions and beliefs to be "up to" himself, and regards his experiences as giving information about where he is located in the world. All these phenomena are shown to be related to the peculiar ways in which we come to know certain facts about ourselves. So self-identification is conceptually connected to self-knowledge. The three chapters discuss some parts or aspects of this reasoning. Chapter 1, "Perry's Problem and Moore's Paradox," claims that Perry's problem of the essential indexical and Moore's paradox are essentially a single problem applied to two different aspects of our rational activities, actions and beliefs, respectively. Chapter 2, "On What the Two Gods Might Not Know," defends what may be called an ability hypothesis about self-locating knowledge, drawing on David Lewis's ability hypothesis about phenomenal knowledge. What the gods might lack is best viewed as the abilities of self-knowledge. Chapter 3, "What Is the First Person Perspective?" asks what it is to take a first person perspective and view oneself as the author of one's own actions. It is a matter of taking a deliberative stance toward one's own actions, which in turn can be best understood as the special ways in which we know them.
by Hongwoo Kwon.
Ph.D.
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Smith, Rhonda Darlene. "Self-respect." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289158.
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In the last several years, a growing number of philosophers, including Thomas Hill, Jean Hampton, Neera Badhwar, and Robin Dillon, have turned their attention to the issue of self-respect. While several authors have identified a number of behaviors that are incompatible with self-respect, few have attempted an extended analysis of self-respect. Moreover, comparatively little attention has been focused on the moral importance of self-respect. In my dissertation, I build on the work of these and other philosophers. I begin by developing an analysis of self-respect. I argue that there are at least three distinct components of self-respect; specifically, a self-respecting person is true to herself, respects her interests and respects her judgment. I argue that no single component is sufficient for self-respect; for instance, a person who respects her judgment may yet fail to respect her interests. Similarly, a person who is true to herself does not necessarily fully respect either her interests or her judgment. In the remainder of my dissertation, I demonstrate why self-respect is so important for moral philosophy. Specifically, I focus on the moral issues that arise when a person who lacks self-respect interacts with others. I argue that a lack of self-respect may morally corrupt both the individual who lacks self-respect and those with whom she interacts. The danger of significant moral corruption is intensified in intimate relationships. Moreover, such corruption is not always confined to the relationship in which it was initially fostered. Exploitation is among the vices that thrive when individuals lack self-respect. In the final chapter, I demonstrate the relevance of self-respect to analyses of exploitation. For instance, Robert Goodin has argued that exploitation is impossible where all parties to a relationship have an equal stake in the relationship; this means that each party has as much to lose as any other should the relationship be terminated. I argue that persons who lack self-respect are vulnerable to exploitation even when they wield equal power in their relationships with others. That is, self-respect has an independent effect on a person's vulnerability to exploitation; a deficiency of self-respect is sufficient to render a person exploitable.
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Nath, Debajani. "The Concept of Self in Indian Philosophy." Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1456.
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Gaskin, Richard Maxwell. "Experience, agency and the self." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0b1f3fc5-bae3-4a88-b819-01dd2c8c246f.
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Wilfrid Sellars has made familiar a distinction between manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. The manifest image is 'a sophistication and refinement of the image in terms of which man first came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world' ([2], p.18)/ and in its methodology 'limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events' (p.19). The scientific image, on the other hand, 'postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles.' (ib.) This thesis is centred on a consideration of two difficulties facing anyone who takes the manifest image seriously as an autonomous image of man. In chapter 1 I consider the connection between perception and its objects, and argue that there is a disharmony between the manifest and scientific accounts of this connection. But I also suggest that the manifest image, which incorporates a certain Cartesianism or internalism, cannot lightly be dispensed with in our understanding of the nature of experience. Chapter 2 is a companion piece to chapter 1: in it I argue that the manifest view of experience accords a certain metaphysical priority to secondary over primary qualities in the constitution of any world capable of being experienced; I also suggest that the scientific image is dependent on the manifest image/ and so cannot subvert it. In chapter 3 I turn to the other main area of difficulty: freedom. I argue that free will as the incompatibilist contrues it is constitutive of the time-order; but that it carries with it implicit internal contradictions. The conflict here lies within the manifest image; the scientific image discerns no such freedom/ and so incurs no such problems. But if I am right that freedom constitutes time/ it will not be an option for us to disembarrass ourselves of the contradictions. I also argue that there is a relation of mutual dependence between freedom/ incompatibilistically construed/ and internalism. The manifest image as a whole - deeply problematic as it is - is therefore grounded in and entailed by something quite ineluctable/ namely the reality of the time-series. This is the principal conclusion of the thesis. If I succeed here/ I provide support for the claim that our difficulties with the manifest image cannot be solved by abandoning it: the manifest image/ problems and all/ must just be lived with. The remainder of the thesis explores topics related to this main thrust. Chapter 4 is really an appendix to chapter 3; it shows how no parallel difficulties attend the constitution of experiential space/ because space is (unlike time) not transcendental. In chapter 5 I examine the commitments of the notion of the transcendental self/ whose existence was deduced in chapter 3 as a condition of freedom. In particular, I aim to show how that self inherits some of the difficulties of its parent concept of freedom; but also how a distinction between transcendental and empirical components in the self can help us with the problem of privacy.
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Christensen, Carleton B. "Self and world from analytic philosophy to phenomenology." Berlin New York, NY de Gruyter, 2008. http://d-nb.info/988967723/04.
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Clarke, Bernard. "Self-deception." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1992. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/110590/.
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There is a reflexive paradox (or set of paradoxes) associated with self-deception, and a variety of theories have been proposed in response, to explain self-deception. The study of reflexive paradoxes has been fruitful in the history of philosophy. Such a paradox may appear to be no more than a minor puzzle, which we will easily be able to mop up after having formulated solutions to more major problems. Sometimes the minor puzzle turns out to be surprisingly resistant to our "mopping up" operations; it may force us to re-think our major theories. For example the "truth-teller" paradox and other paradoxes of self-reference have been viewed initially as minor puzzles, while later on they have provoked major theories, e.g. theories of truth; in mathematics, Godel's theorem.
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McCarthy, Erin. "The spatiality of the self." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ48109.pdf.
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Osuna, Bradley J. "Self-Constitution and Mild Psychiatric Disorders." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1588339343277725.
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Gaskin, Richard M. "Experience and the self." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303564.
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Eilan, Naomi. "Self-consciousness and experience." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303500.
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Klaudat, Andre Nilo. "Kant on self-consciousness." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.299063.
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Roessler, Johannes. "Self-knowledge and belief." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320685.
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Hamilton, Thomas Haddan. "Dying to the self : self-renunciation in Wittgensteinian ethics and philosophy of religion." Thesis, Durham University, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.404324.
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Torres, Jennifer M. "Virtuous Self-Love and Moral Competition." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/981.
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At the start of NE IX.8 Aristotle says that the virtuous man acts for his friend’s sake and neglect his own interests (1168a), but only a few paragraphs later says that the virtuous self-lover will also sacrifice money, honors, and even his life, for the sake of his friend, all while he obtains what is most noble—virtuous acts (1169 a, 176). This leads us to the question: Is this really a sacrifice if the virtuous self-lover is profiting in some way? Is it possible for the virtuous friend to sacrifice her life for her friend’s sake while knowing he is ‘procuring the most noble good’ for himself at the same time? Or more generally, can the virtuous self-loving friend do things for his friend without his own interests in mind? Aristotle’s conception of self-love either a) prohibits the virtuous man for acting for his friends sake (during a moral competition), b) does not prohibit the virtuous man from acting for his friend’s sake, or c) enables him to act for his friends sake. I will discuss the following claims in Section III, where I will consider Julia Annas and Richard Krauts’ discussion on the matter.
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Brewer, Bill. "Objectivity, agency and self-location." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303509.
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Mitchell, Derek Robert. "Existential theories of the self." Thesis, University of Kent, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.242886.
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De, Villiers Tanya. "Complexity and the self." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52744.
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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised. Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits posed by approaching the self as an emergent property of a complex system is elaborated upon, principally with the help of work done by Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Paul Cilliers. The aim is to develop a materialistic conception of the self that is plausible in terms of current empirical information and resists the temptation see the self as one or other metaphysical entity within the brain, without "reducing" the self to a crude materialism. The final chapter attempts to formulate a possible foil against the accusation of crude materialism by emphasising that the self is part of a greater system that includes the mental apparatus and its environment (conceived as culture). In accordance with Dawkins's theory the medium of interaction in this system is conceived of as memes and the self is then conceived of as a meme-complex, with culture as a medium for memetransference. The conclusion drawn from this is that the self should be studied through narrative, which provides an approach to the self that is material without being crudely physicalistic.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word daar aangevoer dat die relatiewe jong wetenskap van Kompleksiteitsteorie 'n nuttige bydra kan lewer tot die eeue-oue filosofiese "Probleem van die Self'. Met die oog hierop word die konseptueie kenmerke van hierdie teorie na vore gebring en opgesom. Die argument word gemaak dat die meerendeels dualistiese benadering van die Westerse filosofiese tradisie tot die self ons verstaan van die fenomeen belemmer eerder as om dit te bemiddel. Die voordele van dié nuwe benadering, wat die self sien as 'n ontluikende (emergent) eienskap van In komplekses sisteem, word bespreek met verwysing na veral die werke van Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett en Paul Cilliers. Daar word beoog om In verstaan van die self te ontwikkel wat kontemporêre empiriese insigte in ag neem en wat die versoeking weerstaan om ongeoorloofde metafisiese eienskappe aan die self toe te ken. Terselfdetyd word daar gepoog om geensins die uniekheid van die self te "reduseer" na 'n kru materialisme nie. In die finale hoofstuk word daar gepoog om 'n teenargument vir die voorsiene beswaar van kru materialisme te ontwikkel. Dit word gedoen deur te benadruk dat die self gesien word as deel van 'n groter, komplekse sisteem, wat die masjienerie van denke en die omgewing (wat as kultuur gekonseptualiseer word) insluit. Insgelyks, in die teorie van Dawkins word die medium van interaksie in hierdie sisteem gesien as "memes", waar die self dan n meme-kompleks vorm, en kultuur die medium van meme-oordrag is. Daar word tot die konklusie gekom dat die self op 'n narratiewe manier bestudeer behoort te word, wat dan 'n benadering tot die self voorsien wat materialisties is, sonder om kru fisikalisties te wees.
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Remes, Mari Paulina. "Plotinus' philosophy of the self : unity, reason and awareness." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.270930.
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Laine, Joy Elizabeth. "The concept of self (atman) in Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy." n.p, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/.
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Laine, Joy Elizabeth. "The concept of Self (ātman) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy." Thesis, Open University, 1990. http://oro.open.ac.uk/57309/.
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Nyāya, one of Hinduism's six orthodox schools of philosophy, has been of interest to western philosophers largely because of its sophisticated analysis of logical and linguistic problems. In India, the purpose of the orthodox school (or darśana - "view") has been to lead the student toward liberation (mokṣa). Hence Nyāya's preoccupation with logic should not in itself preclude a real concern with mokṣa. The broad aim of my thesis, therefore, is to determine how Nyāya functions as a complete darśana, to see if indeed the various aspects of the system stand together as a coherent mokṣamārga (way to release). Because Hindus conceive of salvation as the realization of a transcendental Self (ātman), and because the nature of such a Self has been a prime focus for Indian philosophical debate, this thesis will concentrate on the Nyāya understanding of ātman, and the logical arguments for its existence. Nyāya philosophers played a leading role in arguing against their Buddhist opponents in India who denied the existence of any such transcendental Self. The debate, which endured for many hundreds of years, culminated in the eleventh century A.D. with the works of Udayana, a leading Nyāya philosopher, and his Buddhist opponents, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, after which time the Buddhist challenge waned in India, and the Nyāya school, known in its later phase as Navya-Nyāya, became more concerned with the method rather than the substance of the arguments. In this thesis I concentrate on one particular text of Udayana, the Ātmatattvaviveka (The Discrimination of the Reality of the Self), for in this text Udayana arranged most of the major disputes that had engaged Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers in the preceding centuries in such a way as to clearly display their relevance for the debate about ātman. The main body of my thesis consists of translations from this hitherto largely untranslated work, and discussions of some of the important arguments found therein. The concluding part of my thesis uses my findings for the broader discussion of the importance of ātman in Nyāya, and the place of Nyāya within the wider spectrum of Indian soteriological thought.
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Sharma, Ramesh kumar. "Problem of self in the philosophy of Mc Taggart." Thesis, University of Delhi, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1610.
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Bove, Frank John. "SOCIAL SELF AND RELIGIOUS SELF: AN INQUIRY INTO COMPASSION AND THE SELF-OTHER DIALECTIC." [Kent, Ohio] : Kent State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=kent1195568243.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2007.Title from PDF t.p. (viewed July 3, 2008). Advisor: Jeffrey Wattles. Keywords: social self; self-other dialectic; pure experience; I-Me; I-Thou; sunyata; kenosis; basho; absolute nothingness; George H. Mead; Nishida Kitaro; Steve Odin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65).
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Hutchinson, William B. "Technology, community, and the self." Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=104334.
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But suppose now that technology were no means, how would it stand with the will to master it? Martin HeideggerMais supposez maintenant que Ia technologie ne soit pas en moyen,comment ~a se comparerait avec Ie desir de la connaitre au fond? Martin Heidegger
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Zamuner, Edoardo. "Knowledge and self-knowledge of emotions." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/2679.
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This thesis addresses two questions. One concerns the metaphysics of emotions and asks what kinds of mental states emotions are. The other asks how the metaphysics of emotions bears on first and third-personal knowledge of emotions. There are two prevailing views on the nature of emotions. They are the perception and cognitive views. The perception view argues that emotions are bodily feelings. The cognitive view, by contrast, contends that emotions are some sorts of evaluative judgments. I show that both views provide inadequate accounts of the nature of emotions. The perception view fails to do justice to the fact that emotions may not involve any bodily feeling. The cognitive view, by contrast, cannot account for the fact that emotions are states that adult humans have in common with infants and animals. On the basis of these criticisms, I put forward an alternative account of emotions. This involves five main arguments. The first is that emotions are enduring non-episodic dispositions that may or may not manifest themselves in experiential episodes such as emotional feelings and behaviour episodes such as expressions. The second argument is that emotional feelings are perceptions of specific bodily changes brought about by emotions. These feelings serve as clues as to what kinds of emotions the subject has. The third argument is that expressions are observable manifestations of emotions in virtue of which emotions can be perceived and subsequently known, directly and non-inferentially, by other people. The fourth argument is that when someone has an emotion without feeling it, she can still come to know it by believing true ascriptions that other people make about the emotion they perceive in her expression. The fifth argument is that full knowledge of emotions requires knowledge of the emotion objects.
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Bailey, Christopher Michael. "Self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures." Thesis, University of Kent, 2015. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/50853/.
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Traditional approaches in access control rely on immutable criteria in which to decide and award access. These approaches are limited, notably when handling changes in an organisation’s protected resources, resulting in the inability to accommodate the dynamic aspects of risk at runtime. An example of such risk is a user abusing their privileged access to perform insider attacks. This thesis proposes self-adaptive authorisation, an approach that enables dynamic access control. A framework for developing self-adaptive authorisation is defined, where autonomic controllers are deployed within legacy based authorisation infrastructures to enable the runtime management of access control. Essential to the approach is the use of models and model driven engineering (MDE). Models enable a controller to abstract from the authorisation infrastructure it seeks to control, reason about state, and provide assurances over change to access. For example, a modelled state of access may represent an active access control policy. Given the diverse nature in implementations of authorisation infrastructures, MDE enables the creation and transformation of such models, whereby assets (e.g., policies) can be automatically generated and deployed at runtime. A prototype of the framework was developed, whereby management of access control is focused on the mitigation of abuse of access rights. The prototype implements a feedback loop to monitor an authorisation infrastructure in terms of modelling the state of access control and user behaviour, analyse potential solutions for handling malicious behaviour, and act upon the infrastructure to control future access control decisions. The framework was evaluated against mitigation of simulated insider attacks, involving the abuse of access rights governed by access control methodologies. In addition, to investigate the framework’s approach in a diverse and unpredictable environment, a live experiment was conducted. This evaluated the mitigation of abuse performed by real users as well as demonstrating the consequence of self-adaptation through observation of user response.
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Ninan, Dilip. "Imagination, content, and the self." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45621.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-113).
I begin with a discussion of two ways of imagining something: 'from the inside' and 'from the outside'. My interest in this topic is two-fold: First, I want to see what studying this topic can teach us about the nature of mental content -- in particular, about the content of de se and de re thoughts. Second, I want to formulate an account of this distinction which will help us understand the role these two types of imagining play in philosophical thought experiments about personal identity over time. The first three chapters of this dissertation focus on the first set of issues, issues of imagination and content. Chapter 4 extends and applies some of these insights to a puzzle about personal identity over time.
by Dilip Ninan.
Ph.D.
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Ekstrom, Laura Waddell. "Freedom, coherence, and the self." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186278.
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A plausible theory of human freedom must give some account of both alternate possibilities and self-determination. Debate over the correct interpretation of the first feature gives rise to the metaphysical problem of whether or not freedom is compatible with the thesis of determinism, according to which, given the actual past and the actual laws of nature, there is at any time only one physically possible future. It is my view that persons act freely only if the thesis of determinism is false. But since a distinction must be made between a free act and a random event, the incompatibilist who affirms the existence of freedom must say more about a free act than that it is indeterministically caused. A free act is one's own: it is authorized by the self. In this dissertation, I propose a conception of the self and a coherence theory of autonomous or self-determined action, modeled after Keith Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge. I defend the consequence argument for incompatibilism and argue that the compatibilist understanding of freedom is unsatisfactory. Hence, drawing on the coherence account of autonomy, I develop a coherentist libertarian theory of freedom. I respond to challenges to that account and consider, finally, reasons for thinking that we sometimes act and will freely.
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Shukla, Rajesh Chandra. "Friendship: Bridging the gap between self and other." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29314.
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Friendship is a significant aspect of our lives. We make friends, engage in activities with them, and share an emotional bond with them. However, despite its familiarity and prevalence, there is no common agreement regarding what constitutes friendship and what its proper role in our lives is. Some people consider it an intrinsically good relationship and prioritize it in their lives and conduct, and others view it as a valuable relationship, alongside other relationships, having no primacy or priority of its own. My purpose in this dissertation is to critically examine friendship and to determine its proper nature, content and value in our lives.
I discuss the above issues with specific reference to three major moral-political traditions. These are virtue ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism. I focus on a leading representative of each tradition, namely, Aristotle, Kant and Mill. Both deontology and utilitarianism, Kant and Mill, construe friendship in terms of certain abstract universal moral principles. They contend that, as a moral person, one must accord equal considerations to both friends as well as non-friends. That is, one must act impartially in friendship.
Against Kant and Mill, Aristotle holds that a friendship is a personal relationship, and that it is inherently incompatible with impartiality. He argues that friendship either is virtue or necessitates virtue, and as such, it is an essential constituent of a good life and flourishing existence. Aristotle's view that a good friendship and a good life require effective moral co-operation with others in society has generated interest in the present times. On the one hand, it is argued that Aristotle provides us with a fulfilling account of friendship and a good life. On the other hand, it is claimed that Aristotle's view is in disagreement with an individual's freedom of choice, and inconsistent with the central tenets of present-day liberalism.
In this thesis, I argue that Aristotle provides us with an enriching account of friendship, and that his view of friendship and the good life is fully compatible with an individual's free choice and moral autonomy. I further argue that Aristotle's view complements liberalism; hence, it is a mistake to see these views as adversaries.
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Dainton, Barry Francis. "The nature and identity of the self." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303581.
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McFall, Michael Thomas. "Self-respect and family egalitarianism." Related electronic resource:, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1407687641&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=3739&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Ayers, David Steven. "Wyndham Lewis and the self." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.236344.
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Whittingham, Matthew. "The self and social relations." Thesis, University of Kent, 2014. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/47434/.
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The central subject of this thesis is the nature of the self. I argue against an atomistic conception which takes the human self to exist self-sufficiently and prior to social relations, and in favour of a holistic conception which takes the self to be constitutively dependent on social relations. I defend this view against criticisms that a holistic account undermines the need for what I call 'critical distance' between subjects and their communities. This involves answering the charges that such constitutive dependence: 1) removes the possibility for individuals to determine themselves freely apart from the communities in which they engage; and 2) deprives us of an external standard with which to engage critically with those constitutive communities. I argue that the above criticisms are encouraged by reliance on a certain epistemological picture. This picture involves a foundationalist construal of knowledge that ultimately depends on a notion of an immediately given epistemic content that can serve to give us an absolute conception of an objective reality with which we can do away with partial or relative conceptions of ourselves and the world we inhabit. It is this that leads the critic to demand a standard external to communities, which in turn encourages a notion of the self and freedom that can ultimately be grounded apart from the "distortions" of social practice. I directly attack the notion of an immediately given epistemic content through a series of transcendental arguments, showing that the condition of possibility for our forming any conception of ourselves or the world is participation in social forms of life. I further argue that properly human identities are essentially shaped by the self-conceptions these forms of life make available to us. Since freedom can no longer depend on radical detachment, I offer a new account of freedom as a social achievement, based on a notion of rational progress which allows us to develop ourselves and our social world critically, drawing only on those standards available within our practices. With the notion of an immediately given epistemic content undermined, I have shown not only that freedom and rational progress are consistent with a holistic account, but that in fact they depend on such a holistic account.
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Jodry, David L. "Is Ephesians 5:28-29 the theological basis for the current philosophy of self-esteem?" Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1986. http://www.tren.com.
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Abapo, Lorivie. "The Authentic Self and Advertising : The Effects Advertising has on the Formation of the Authentic Self." UNF Digital Commons, 2012. https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/392.
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In a world bombarded with advertisements, it may be difficult for the development of an authentic self. Authenticity is a mode of existence in which there is ownership in the sense of self, while at the same time being able to present this sense of self to others. To be authentic is to act and live in a way that expresses a genuine concern for the self in which projects and goals pursued. The sense of self is the feeling of genuineness of the self and representing this self requires actions that correlate to these feelings. Advertisements act as communication to the public in an attempt to persuade people to purchase products. The tactics that advertising agencies use cause people and society to internalize these messages, in effect, influencing the way people experience the world. Thus, advertising can have a harmful effect on an individual by hindering the development of an authentic self. I will first explain the concept of authenticity, following a discussion of how people organize experience by means of George Mead’s concept of the ‘I’ and the ‘me.’ I will then provide a description of Martin Heidegger’s account on authenticity in juxtaposition with Sartre’s contrasting forms of inauthenticity by means of bad faith. Finally, I will discuss the damaging effects that advertising has to authenticity, and suggest ways to successfully exist in a world full of these advertisements.
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Cyr, Yolande. "Self-disclosure by marital therapists and consequent spouse responses." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5152.
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Flockemann, Richard. "Externalism, self-knowledge and explanation." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060.
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In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible.KMBT_363
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Garcia, Joseph Amos. "Toward an anarchist theory of self wilderness, actualization and authority /." Click here to access dissertation, 2008. http://www.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/archive/spring2008/joseph_a_garcia/Garcia_Joseph_A_200801_ms.pdf.
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Thesis (M.S.)--Georgia Southern University, 2008."A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science." Under the direction of Willliam D. McIntosh. ETD. Electronic version approved: May 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-51).
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Matthews, Vincent Craig. "The true self-knower : central themes in Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1998. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-true-selfknower--central-themes-in-iris-murdochs-moral-philosophy(f1e1abcd-e381-4c57-b88f-2b36bfc4d6b4).html.
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Wellman, Christopher Heath. "Liberalism, self-determination, and secession." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186640.
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This dissertation provides a systematic analysis of when an individual or group has a right to secede that is grounded in self-determination. Since the primary question in a secessionist conflict concerns the territory being contested, any analysis of the right to secede must provide an account of what grounds the existing state's claim to political jurisdiction over its territory. With this in mind, I examine consent and teleological justifications for the state and find both inadequate. The consent account posits that a political state is justified just in case it has the consent of its citizens. I reject the consent approach for its unacceptable implication that unlimited secession is permissible from all existing states. I then suggest that our disinclination to allow unlimited secession is instructive since it indicates not only that we believe a consentual justification is morally unnecessary, but also that a state is justified in virtue of the peace it secures and the rights it protects. This teleological justification ultimately proves inadequate as well, however, because it both restricts secessionist movements that seem permissible and allows coercive annexations that appear clearly unjustified. As an alternative to these extremes, I propose a hybrid model of political legitimacy. According to my theory, while individuals and small groups may not secede, a larger group may, provided it is of sufficient size to satisfactorily perform the functions that are necessary for a state to ground its claim to territory. Thus I conclude a political state should limit political liberty in a manner analogous to the way it legitimately limits the liberty to drive a car. Specifically, since many people would be harmed if there were no legal restrictions on who could drive, states institute age and health requirements limiting who may drive. Citizens not eliminated by these standards must also demonstrate a minimum threshold of competence by passing tests. In similar fashion, a state may initially restrict the right to secede to groups of a specific size, and then further require that interested parties demonstrate their ability and willingness to govern in a stable, efficient, and liberal manner.
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Echano, Mario Ramos. "Motivating influences on self-deception :philosophical considerations." Thesis, University of Macau, 2018. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b3953565.
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Riley, Mary K. "THE EMERGENT SELF: RESONATING THEMES IN CONFUCIAN AND MEADEAN CONCEPTS OF SELF." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1302117989.
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Stinchcombe, Norman. "Understanding ourselves : character and self-knowledge in Conrad and Shopenhauer." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1343/.
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That Conrad was familiar with Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been proposed by literary scholars and seconded, in passing, by philosophers. This has resulted in one-way studies of literary influence. This thesis is instead a two-way study in the philosophy of literature. It shows how Schopenhauer’s philosophy can illuminate Conrad’s fiction and how the fiction can become an analytical tool for exploring the philosophy. There are two strands in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. One is uncompromisingly concerned with salvation and will-denial. The second focuses on self-knowledge and character, which leads to self-fulfilment and accommodation with the world. It is the latter strand, with character at its core, where the interests of the philosopher and creative writer coincide. My methodology is different from previous studies in that I propose Conrad’s direct source for Schopenhauer was not The World as Will and Idea but his essays, which are directed more towards the worldly strand of his philosophy. I argue that the use by literary scholars of Schopenhauer’s magnum opus as Conrad’s direct source has diverted them from his main area of interest in the philosophy, namely its approach to self-knowledge and character, and that this misplaced focus has tended to distort interpretations of his fiction.
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Alam, Justin Shumon. "Radical evil, freedom and moral self-development in Kant's practical philosophy." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1983/6c58e2dd-faba-4621-81f3-075413e508dd.
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Kant remains an important resource in moral philosophy but the absence of an adequate account of moral self-development constitutes a serious gap in his wider moral theory. This study therefore seeks to illuminate the process through which an agent could develop his moral character within a Kantian framework. Firstly, I reject two interpretations of Kant's account of rational agency each of which, if true, would in its own way render moral development impossible. I also outline the interpretation of Kantian rational agency which I take to be correct and which allows development. Kant thinks development should address our radical evil - an attitude to choice which rejects the demands of the moral law. However, there are tensions in the doctrine of evil which seem to preclude an evil agent's initiating his moral development. I adopt Seiriol Morgan's rational reconstruction of evil which addresses these difficulties. In Morgan's model, the will's freedom gives it overriding reason to choose morality, as this affords it its true freedom and it knows this. This means the will which chooses evil must wilfully accept a false conception of freedom - it must be self-deceived at the most fundamental level of reason-giving. However, self-deception is prima facie paradoxical. This is addressed by applying Jean-Paul Sartre's model of bad faith, an account which can dissolve the paradoxes. What emerges is a picture of evil as a mutually supporting complex of elements involving selfishness, self-conceit and a refusal to acknowledge its own misguided attitude. This is the opponent for morality. Development involves undoing this structure through consciousness of true freedom and pursuing the ends of development such as the purification of motives, whilst remaining vigilant against further deception. In this way, the free will can acquire a character apt to express its full freedom
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Hung, Tsz Wan Andrew. "The idea of theistic communitarian self in Charles Taylor's political philosophy." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2009. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/989.
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Bishop, Geoff. "The diminished subject : an exploration into the aporia of the condition of the possibility of change as represented in twentieth century philosophy and contemporary literature /." Access via Murdoch University Theses Project, 2007. http://wwwlib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/browse/view/adt-MU20080131.155325.
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Myers, Eric C. D. "Self-Ownership, Equality, and Socialism." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2006.
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In this paper, I have examined the political philosophy of a left-libertarian, Michael Otsuka from his book Libertarianism Without Inequality, and a libertarian socialist, Nicholas Vrousalis from his article Libertarian Socialism: A Better Reconciliation between Equality and Self-Ownership. The goal of this examination is partially to explore and present a variety of positions on distributive justice within libertarian theory as well as defend libertarian socialism as a plausible form of libertarianism. The main question motivating this defense is “Can libertarian socialism be truly libertarian in its conception of self-ownership and autonomy?”. In this examination of both left-libertarianism and libertarian socialism I compared both theories to the works of prominent right-libertarian philosophers, primarily John Locke and Robert Nozick, to determine if the theories meet the standards set by traditional libertarianism in promoting individual autonomy as well as to determine if these standards can be reconciled with substantial material equality, either in terms of opportunity or welfare.
The results of this examination showed that not only are left-libertarianism and libertarian socialism plausible theories of libertarianism, even exceeding potential for individual autonomy found in right-libertarian theory, but that they both successfully reconcile this autonomy with equality. In defending libertarian socialism, it was determined that it is a successful reconciliation of self-ownership and equality, though this comes at the expense of the potential for minor decreases in self-ownership among individuals when compared to Otsuka’s left-libertarianism. This was defended, however, as libertarian socialism seems more promising a theory for those who hold stronger commitments to equality as well as additional commitments, namely a commitment to democracy.
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Hoffman, Virginia Anne. "Antidepressants, bioenhancements, and the ethics of self-respect." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55178.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 121-124).
Antidepressants and bioenhancement technologies raise special concerns - both for those who use them and those who don't - about who we are and how we should treat ourselves. In this dissertation, I confront these concerns by asking and answering two ethical questions about different forms of self-treatment. These are: 1. Is antidepressant use morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying?, and 2. Is bioenhancement use morally problematic insofar as it undermines self-respect? (Note: by "morally problematic," I mean "possessing a wrong-making feature," not "always wrong, all things considered.") The first two chapters focus on the former question - the question of whether antidepressant use is morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying. In order to answer this, I first step back, in Chapter 1, and look at the phenomenon of self-objectification generally construed. I draw from Martha Nussbaum's and Rae Langton's work on objectification to formulate my own definition of "self-objectification." I then argue that self-objectification is indeed possible, and that it assumes a number of interesting forms. The second chapter turns to the specific bioethical question of whether antidepressant use is morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying. I argue that the answer is "yes." Although I'm not the first to voice this particular objection to antidepressant use, I extend this previous scholarship in two principal ways. First, I draw from my definition and analysis of self-objectification in Chapter 1 to characterize exactly how antidepressant use is self-objectifying, and to pinpoint the accompanying specific moral offense.
(cont.) Second, I argue in detail against Neil Levy's contention that some cases of self-objectification with antidepressants are completely permissible. In my third and final chapter, I turn to the second question: whether bioenhancement use is morally problematic insofar as it undermines self-respect. I argue that it is, while also acknowledging that there are other senses in which it, simultaneously, can promote self-respect. I offer a few options for conceptualizing this tension, and maintain that the undermining of self-respect nevertheless constitutes one reason to worry about bioenhancement technologies.
by Virginia A. Hoffman.
Ph.D.
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Jinpa, Thupten. "'Self', persons and Madhyamaka dialectics : a study of Tsongkhapa's Middle Way philosophy." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/272695.
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Levy, Lior D. "Memory in the Early Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2011. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/204811.
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PhilosophyPh.D.
Memory is a recurring theme in Jean-Paul Sartre's work. However, Sartre never formulated an explicit theory of memory. When he did discuss memory he reached two conflicting conclusions: (1) in his theory of imagination and in his early text The Transcendence of the Ego memory is presented as a mimetic power and memories are repetitions of the past; (2) in his other texts, among them Being and Nothingness, memory is portrayed as a creative force that reconstructs experience rather than repeats it. I argue that Sartre held two conflicting notions of memory since he thought that recollection as a whole--understood either in mimetic or reconstructive terms--stifles consciousness and obstructs freedom. In the dissertation I explore the ways in which memory becomes responsible, according to Sartre, for the constitution of selfhood and for the creation of a solid character with a defined history, which eventually leads to the evasion of the free agency of consciousness. Against the mimetic and reconstructive models of memory I pose the notion of "existential memory", which is not a term that Sartre himself used but which emerges from his work on human temporality. The notion of "existential memory" provides an opportunity to conceive of a possibility of relating to the past in an authentic manner, without objectifying it or losing sight of one's freedom. In response to the challenges raised by Sartre's concerns with bad faith, existential memory is a model of authenticity.
Temple University--Theses