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Journal articles on the topic 'Self-knowledge'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 30 July 2024

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1

Stival, Stefano Domingues. "Knowledge and Self-Knowledge." Perspectiva Filosófica 50, no. 3 (February 15, 2024): 386–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2023.260719.

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This text will be generated by contraposition (in the broadest sense) of two concepts, which I will call “externalist conception of knowledge”, on one side, and “internalist conception of knowledge” (as a kind of psychologist evidentialism), on the other. Through this contrast, I try to reach some new insights into the relationship between the notions of “knowledge” and “self-knowledge”.

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2

Cholbi, Michael. "Self-knowledge." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 72 (2016): 35–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20167219.

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3

Maitra, Keya. "SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Southwest Philosophy Review 21, no. 2 (2005): 101–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20052128.

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4

Papastephanou, Marianna. "Self-Knowledge." European Legacy 19, no. 3 (April 16, 2014): 407–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2014.898956.

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5

Scarpante, Sonia. "WRITING As Care and Self-Knowledge." Clinical Research Notes 3, no. 2 (March 15, 2022): 01–02. http://dx.doi.org/10.31579/2690-8816/047.

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The concept about the “therapeutic writing” has its beginning from an autobiographic work, realized in 2003, whose title is Letters to a real interlocutor. My sense. That autobiographic writing turned out to be therapeutic because it has helped the writer to develop her sharpest sufferings, to overcome traumas and to win old guilt. The therapeutic writing, meant as inner reveal, is essential to be able to understand also the physical signals that our body often give us as a reply, aware or not, to a pain we had lived and we are still living. The individual writing becomes a shared experience working in groups, where everybody gives his own personal contribution. The epistolary approach of the “therapeutic writing” consists in a bunch of letters (written to one’s self, to one’s mother etc.) used as therapeutic tools, in order for the writer to easily recall the meaningful episodes of his own existence, from his childhood to his adult age. The epistolary way becomes then the most appropriate way to remember our own emotions, our sorrows, the sufferings and our deepest feelings. The benefits, got with the individual writing, will become wider while reading and sharing personal experiences with others. The negative moods lived again by the person who tells about himself, will lose, line after line, the characteristic of anxiety and taboo, while the positive ones, even if shyly expressed, will find in the other people’s benevolence a further reason to go through again. All these constant efforts makes the “therapeutic writing” evolving into a performative character.

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6

Smythe, Thomas W. "Self-Knowledge and the Self." Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (2001): 287–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2001_32.

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7

Ralston, Shane Jesse. "Self-knowledge and the Self." Symposium 5, no. 1 (2001): 134–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium20015112.

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8

Howell, Robert J. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no. 1 (January 2006): 44–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00490.x.

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9

KIHLSTROM, JOHN F., and STANLEY B. KLEIN. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Awareness." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 818, no. 1 Self Across P (June 1997): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1997.tb48242.x.

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10

Marcia Cavell. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Understanding." American Imago 65, no. 3 (2008): 357–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/aim.0.0019.

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11

Bransen, Jan. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Love." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 2 (March 14, 2015): 309–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9578-4.

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12

Fernández, Jordi. "Self-deception and self-knowledge." Philosophical Studies 162, no. 2 (July 27, 2011): 379–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9771-9.

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13

Dozzi, Marco D. "Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge." Sartre Studies International 29, no. 1 (June 1, 2023): 22–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2023.290103.

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This translation is of an article in the April–June 1948 issue of the Bulletin de la société française de philosophie (42, no. 3: 49–91). That article consists primarily of a lecture that Sartre had presented to La Société Française de Philosophie on 2 June 1947 in which he provided an overview of some of his main points in Being and Nothingness, with particular emphasis on its Introduction (especially its third section, ‘The Pre-Reflective Cogito and the Being of the Percipere’) as well as on the first chapter of its second part, that is, “The Immediate Structures of the For-Itself” (covering content in three of its five sub-sections: I, III and IV). The title of the lecture thus does not wholly encompass the subjects that are discussed in it, although it may well be said to reflect its central theme (even in a literal sense, as the positioning of the hypothetically demarcated ‘Section III’ in the Table of Contents above shows). In addition to the presentation, the article in the Bulletin is preceded by a brief introductory statement – seemingly written by Sartre himself1 – which functions largely as a sort of ‘extended abstract’ for the talk (although not all the points in the introduction are covered in the presentation), and is followed by a transcript of the discussion that took place after the presentation between Sartre and some of the reputable scholars who were in attendance (i.e. a ‘question and answer’ session).

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14

Urban, David V. "Slender Self-Knowledge." Renascence 73, no. 2 (2021): 127–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/renascence202173210.

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This essay argues that King Lear’s tragedy is largely brought about by Lear’s lack of self-knowledge, a character defect that long precedes the foolish decisions he makes in King Lear’s opening scene and which precipitates his own death and the deaths of those he loves. Lear’s lack of self-knowledge encourages Shakespeare’s audience to have sympathy for Goneril and Regan and to recognize that Lear’s beautiful progress of redemption is mitigated by his failure to ever recognize his longstanding wrongdoing against his elder daughters. By contrast, in Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth Bennet’s humble choice to learn and be humbled by Darcy’s letter empowers Elizabeth to achieve self-knowledge at a youthful age even as it brings happiness and numerous redemptive benefits to herself and to those whom she loves.

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15

Sawyer, Sarah. "Contrastive Self-knowledge." Social Epistemology 28, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.782586.

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16

Scodel, Ruth. "SOPHOCLEAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Classical Review 53, no. 2 (October 2003): 284–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.2.284.

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17

Doyle, Casey. "Aiding self-knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 8 (2019): 1104–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2019.1584937.

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AbstractSome self-knowledge must be arrived at by the subject herself, rather than being transmitted by another’s testimony. Yet in many cases the subject interacts with an expert in part because she is likely to have the relevant knowledge of their mind. This raises a question: what is the expert’s knowledge like that there are barriers to simply transmitting it by testimony? I argue that the expert’s knowledge is, in some circumstances, proleptic, referring to attitudes the subject would hold were she to reflect in certain ways. The expert’s knowledge cannot be transmitted by testimony because self-knowledge cannot be proleptic.

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18

Coliva, Annalisa. "PEACOCKE'S SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Ratio 21, no. 1 (January 24, 2008): 13–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00381.x.

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19

Khan, M. A. Muqtedar. "Self and Knowledge." American Journal of Islam and Society 16, no. 1 (April 1, 1999): v—xi. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v16i1.2131.

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The contempomy intellectual revival of Muslim societies proposes aprofound but problematic relationship between identity and epistemology,and between self and knowledge. I propose to elucidate this relationshipand its implications by making a fundamental distinction between self andidentity, and showing how there can be many identities but only one self. Ibegin by inquiring into the meaning of identity symbols such as “Islam” or“Muslim” prior to knowledge. For example, what is the meaning and relationshipbetween identity and knowledge in Islamization of knowledge orIslamic Philosophy? In both types of knowledge, identity is prior to knowledgein an epistemological, as well as an ontological sense.Ontologically we are suggesting that the existence of Islamic psychologyor Islamic philosophy is contingent on the being of an agency such as Islamor Muslims. Epistemologically we are arguing that Islam includes a theoryof knowledge, and Islamic principles constitute paradigmatic values fromwhich Islamic psychology or Islamic philosophy can be derived. Cleqly,the prefix Islamic gives an identity to knowledge. In other words, there arecertain truth claims which derive their legitimacy not because their truth isself-evident or rationally deducible or empirically verifiable, but becausethey satisfy certain criteria which establishes their identity as Islamic.The issue of criteria that determine what constitutes knowledge (epistemology)is indeed crucial. The first thing that needs to be resolved iswhether these criteria are universally intelligible or are functions of culturehdentityand value systems. I would like to posit that in the realms ofsocially meaningful practices it is possible to have relativistic criteria fordetermining the validity of social truths. Knowledge about answers to questionssuch as Is polygyny or homosexuality acceptable? or Are religiousrights more important than economic rights? may be determined based oncriteria that are located within the corpus of tradition and ethos of a givencultural milieu This is accomodation of cultural p l d s m . But in therealms of science and philosophy, reasoning and empirical evidence alone ...

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20

Wikforss, Åsa Maria. "Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38, no. 3 (September 2008): 399–424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0024.

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The question of content externalism's compatibility with a plausible account of self-knowledge has been the subject of much debate in recent years. If the very content of my thoughts depends on external factors beyond me, factors that can only be known a posteriori, what happens to the traditional assumption that we know our own thoughts directly, without having to rely on any empirical investigations of the environment?Two decades ago, Tyler Burge presented what has become the standard compatibilist reply to this challenge. Burge focused on a certain class of judgments, what he calls ‘basic self-knowledge,’ such as I think (with this very thought) that water is wet. Exploiting the fact that reflexive judgments of this sort reemploy the content of the first-order thought, such that no ‘content mistakes’ are possible, Burge argued that externalism is perfectly compatible with the traditional view that we know our own thoughts directly and authoritatively.

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21

McAleer, Sean. "Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Retaliation." Film and Philosophy 12 (2008): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/filmphil20081210.

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22

Nielsen, M. E. "Self-complemented perspective of self-knowledge." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 7 (February 24, 1998): 71–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/1998.7.144.

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I suggest a description of the theory that I find applicable to understanding self-knowledge. The theory of its own complexity focuses on the structure of individual thoughts about themselves. Own complexity concerns two features of a person's self-determination: the number of social roles that a person has, and the ability of a person to differentiate among these roles. For example, I would be considered a weak bearer of the idea of my own complexity if I considered myself as the bearer of a relatively small number of roles and I would describe existing roles as similar to those that I carry out. I would have a greater degree of my own complexity if I looked at the number of roles I increased and made more distinctions between them.

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23

Boucher, Helen C. "Self-knowledge defenses to self-threats." Journal of Research in Personality 45, no. 2 (April 2011): 165–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2010.12.006.

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24

Scott-Kakures, Dion. "Self-knowledge, akrasia, and self-criticism." Philosophia 25, no. 1-4 (April 1997): 267–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380035.

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25

Hubbs, Graham. "SELF-DECEPTIVE RESISTANCE TO SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, no. 2 (May 7, 2019): 25–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059498ar.

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Philosophical accounts of self-deception have tended to focus on what is necessary for one to be in a state of self-deception or how one might arrive at such a state. Less attention has been paid to explaining why, so often, self-deceived individuals resist the proper explanation of their condition. This resistance may not be necessary for self-deception, but it is common enough to be a proper explanandum of any adequate account of the phenomenon. The goals of this essay are to analyze this resistance, to argue for its importance to theories of self-deception, and to offer a view of self-deception that adequately accounts for it. The view’s key idea is that, in at least some familiar cases, self-deceived individuals maintain their condition by confusing a nonepistemic satisfaction they take in their self-deceived beliefs for the epistemic satisfaction that is characteristic of warranted beliefs. Appealing to this confusion can explain both why these self-deceived individuals maintain their unwarranted belief and why they resist the proper explanation of their condition. If successful, the essay will illuminate the nature of belief by examining the limits of the believable.

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26

Sesemann, Vasily, and Dalius Jonkus. "Self-knowledge, self-consciousness and objectification." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 1 (March 30, 2023): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-1-52-61.

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The manuscript “Self-knowledge, self-consciousness and objectification” is the text of Sesemann’s manuscript collection, Vilnius University (F122-102). The manuscript in the notebook dates from the third quarter of 1954 (Krasnokamsk). The notes were made in ink, some in pencil. The text was written during Sesemann's stay in a labor camp in Taishet (Irkutsk region) in 1950-1955. Due to the limited volume of publications in the journal, only part of Sesemann's text is given.

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27

Hennig, Boris. "Self‐Knowledge as Knowledge of the Good: Hugh of St. Victor on Self‐Knowledge." Dialectica 73, no. 1-2 (March 2019): 211–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12268.

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28

Brown, Rachel. "The Emplotted Self: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge." Philosophical Papers 32, no. 3 (November 2003): 279–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640309485128.

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29

Sakaki, Michiko. "Semantic self-knowledge and episodic self-knowledge: Independent or interrelated representations?" Memory 15, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658210601055750.

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30

Schneider, Johann F. "Relations among Self-Talk, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge." Psychological Reports 91, no. 3 (December 2002): 807–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.2002.91.3.807.

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The aim of this study was to examine the relations among self-talk, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge through an exploratory principal component analysis and to test the hypothesis that only the functional and reflective aspects of self-consciousness contribute to self-knowledge. A self-report questionnaire including 6 scales assessing different aspects of self-talk, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge was administered to 203 German undergraduate university students. A principal component analysis of the scales yielded a two-factor solution, supporting the distinction between functional and dysfunctional self-consciousness. In a stepwise multiple regression analysis, only functional self-consciousness was a significant predictor of self-knowledge. Limitations of the present measures of inner speech are addressed.

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31

SCHNEIDER, JOHANN F. "RELATIONS AMONG SELF-TALK, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Psychological Reports 91, no. 7 (2002): 807. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.91.7.807-812.

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32

Higgins, E. Tory. "The "self digest": Self-knowledge serving self-regulatory functions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 6 (December 1996): 1062–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.6.1062.

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33

Jacobsen, Rockney. "Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression." Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 182 (January 1996): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2956302.

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34

Macdonald, Cynthia. "Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Authoritative Self-Knowledge." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 108, no. 1pt3 (October 2008): 319–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00248.x.

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35

Golob, Sacha. "XIII—Self-Knowledge, Transparency, and Self-Authorship." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115, no. 3 pt 3 (December 1, 2015): 235–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00393.x.

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36

Winokur, Benjamin. "Inference and Self-Knowledge." Logos & Episteme 12, no. 1 (2021): 77–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20211214.

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A growing cohort of philosophers argue that inference, understood as an agent-level psychological process or event, is subject to a “Taking Condition.” The Taking Condition states, roughly, that drawing an inference requires one to take one’s premise(s) to epistemically support one’s conclusion, where “takings” are some sort of higher-order attitude, thought, intuition, or act. My question is not about the nature of takings, but about their contents. I examine the prospects for “minimal” and “robust” views of the contents of takings. On the minimal view, taking one’s premise(s) to support one’s conclusion only requires focusing on propositional contents and putative epistemic support relations between them. On the robust view, taking one’s premise(s) to support one’s conclusion also requires knowledge (or being in a position to have knowledge) of the attitudes one holds toward those contents. I argue that arguments for the Taking Condition do not entail or sufficiently motivate the robust view. Accordingly, contra several philosophers, the Taking Condition does not illuminate a deep relationship between inference and self-knowledge.

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37

Fricke, Martin F. "Reasoning and Self-Knowledge." Análisis Filosófico 38, no. 1 (December 1, 2019): 33–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2018.282.

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What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (2005), claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses to both objections.

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38

Joham, Carmen, and Mike Metcalfe. "SELF-ORGANISING CREATIVE KNOWLEDGE." Journal of International Management Studies 13, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 37–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.18374/jims-13-2.3.

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39

Pauley, John. "Art and Self-knowledge." International Journal of the Arts in Society: Annual Review 12, no. 1 (2018): 31–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1833-1866/cgp/v12i01/31-45.

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40

Ahlskog, Jonas. "History as Self-Knowledge." História da Historiografia: International Journal of Theory and History of Historiography 12, no. 31 (December 22, 2019): 82–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.15848/hh.v12i31.1501.

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This essay explores the existential and ethical dimension of the historical past from two different perspectives. In the first part, the essay approaches the issue by examining the personal dimension of the historical past from the perspective of the individual subject. This examination elaborates the individual’s perspective by literary illustrations from W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz. In the second part, the essay approaches the issue from a conceptual perspective in order to articulate the ways in which the idea of a historical past connects with the concept of history as self-knowledge. The essay engages with R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history to show that there are significant ethical and existential aspects of the concept of historical past. In conclusion, the essay argues that, from both the perspective of the individual and conceptually, there is an important personal dimension residing within and not only beyond the historical past.

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41

Tiller, Glenn A. "Self-Knowledge and Psychology." Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society 19, no. 19 (2001): 8–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/200119193.

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42

Buckley, Joseph, and Lisa Hall. "SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND EMBODIMENT." Southwest Philosophy Review 15, no. 1 (1999): 185–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview199915134.

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43

Jackman, Henry. "DEFERENCE AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Southwest Philosophy Review 16, no. 1 (2000): 171–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200016144.

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44

Boghossian, Paul A. "Content and Self-Knowledge." Philosophical Topics 17, no. 1 (1989): 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198917110.

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45

Burge, Tyler. "Individualism and Self-knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 11 (1988): 649–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil1988851112.

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46

Rennie, Bryan. "Heterophenomenology as Self-Knowledge." Bulletin for the Study of Religion 41, no. 3 (October 9, 2012): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/bsor.v41i3.6.

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This article argues that, far from being an ideal and unverifiable action of "eidetic vision" the phenomenology of religion, or, more accurately, the heterophenomenology which is its proper end, is a communicative event that is well within the bounds of rational discourse. This has certain potential implications for the pedagogy of religious studies. One possible way of teaching is to employ the means of understanding the other via the phenomenology of religion as ultimately a means of understanding the self.

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47

Beisecker, Dave. "Grief and Self-Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 4, no. 1 (September 30, 2022): 27–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.5.

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In Grief: A Philosophical Guide, Michael Cholbi characterizes grief as a “questioning attitude”; it calls attention to and prompts questions about the significance of the departed specifically to the griever. Accordingly, Cholbi assigns grief a largely self-directed cognitive purpose: grief’s goodness is that it leads—when things go well—to greater self-knowledge. In this paper, I question this claim. Calling upon an ordinary episode of grief, I argue that there are at least a few cases of grief in which greater self-knowledge is neither likely nor reasonably expected.

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48

Warfield, Ted A. "Tyler Burge's Self-Knowledge." Grazer Philosophische Studien 70, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 169–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-070001008.

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The question of whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access is a question of ongoing concern within philosophy of mind. Some philosophers think that Tyler Burge's early work on what he calls "basic self-knowledge" shows that externalism and privileged access are compatible. I critically assess this claim, arguing that Burge's work does not establish the compatbility thesis.

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49

Schick,, Theodore W. "Computers and Self-Knowledge." Thought 64, no. 2 (1989): 137–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought198964235.

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50

Roessler, Johannes. "Self-knowledge and communication." Philosophical Explorations 18, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 153–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2015.1032326.

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