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Journal articles on the topic 'Self-enforcing agreements'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 6 September 2023

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1

Klepac, Petra, Itamar Megiddo, Bryan T. Grenfell, and Ramanan Laxminarayan. "Self-enforcing regional vaccination agreements." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 13, no. 114 (January 2016): 20150907. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2015.0907.

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In a highly interconnected world, immunizing infections are a transboundary problem, and their control and elimination require international cooperation and coordination. In the absence of a global or regional body that can impose a universal vaccination strategy, each individual country sets its own strategy. Mobility of populations across borders can promote free-riding, because a country can benefit from the vaccination efforts of its neighbours, which can result in vaccination coverage lower than the global optimum. Here we explore whether voluntary coalitions that reward countries that join by cooperatively increasing vaccination coverage can solve this problem. We use dynamic epidemiological models embedded in a game-theoretic framework in order to identify conditions in which coalitions are self-enforcing and therefore stable, and thus successful at promoting a cooperative vaccination strategy. We find that countries can achieve significantly greater vaccination coverage at a lower cost by forming coalitions than when acting independently, provided a coalition has the tools to deter free-riding. Furthermore, when economically or epidemiologically asymmetric countries form coalitions, realized coverage is regionally more consistent than in the absence of coalitions.

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2

Barrett, Scott. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements." Oxford Economic Papers 46, Supplement_1 (October 1994): 878–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/46.supplement_1.878.

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Rubio, Santiago J., and Alistair Ulph. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited." Oxford Economic Papers 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 233–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpl002.

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Harstad, Bård, Francesco Lancia, and Alessia Russo. "Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements." Journal of the European Economic Association 17, no. 1 (January 17, 2019): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy055.

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5

Buzard, Kristy. "Self-enforcing trade agreements and lobbying." Journal of International Economics 108 (September 2017): 226–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.07.001.

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Harstad, Bård, Francesco Lancia, and Alessia Russo. "Prices vs. quantities for self-enforcing agreements." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 111 (January 2022): 102595. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102595.

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7

Ray, Debraj. "The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements." Econometrica 70, no. 2 (March 2002): 547–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00295.

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8

Scott, Robert E. "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements." Columbia Law Review 103, no. 7 (November 2003): 1641. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3593401.

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9

Dietl, Helmut, Egon Franck, and Stephan Nüesch. "Are Voluntary Salary Cap Agreements Self-Enforcing?" European Sport Management Quarterly 6, no. 1 (March 2006): 23–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16184740600799071.

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10

Eichner, Thomas, and Rüdiger Pethig. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international trade." Journal of Public Economics 102 (June 2013): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.03.006.

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11

Eichner, Thomas, and Rüdiger Pethig. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and capital mobility." Regional Science and Urban Economics 48 (September 2014): 120–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.06.002.

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12

Sauré, Philip. "Domestic policies in self-enforcing trade agreements." European Economic Review 68 (May 2014): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.02.003.

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Bond, Eric W. "Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements." Economic Theory 41, no. 1 (October 16, 2008): 85–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0417-x.

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14

Silva, Emilson C. D. "Self-enforcing agreements under unequal nationally determined contributions." International Tax and Public Finance 24, no. 4 (June 19, 2017): 705–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-017-9463-2.

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15

Kolstad, Charles D. "Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53, no. 1 (January 2007): 68–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2006.08.001.

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16

Garfinkel, Michelle R., and Constantinos Syropoulos. "Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo." Games and Economic Behavior 130 (November 2021): 148–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012.

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17

Rubio, Santiago J., and Begoña Casino. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant." Spanish Economic Review 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 89–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10108-005-0098-6.

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18

Sakamoto, Yoko. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements among Asymmetric Countries and Welfare." International Economy 20 (2017): 71–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5652/internationaleconomy.ie2017.04.ys.

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19

Bown, Chad P., and Meredith A. Crowley. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy." American Economic Review 103, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 1071–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.1071.

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The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs (i) increase with imports, (ii) increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities, and (iii) decrease with the variance of imports. We find US import policy during 1997–2006 to be consistent with this theory. A one standard deviation increase in import growth, the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity, and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the US imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent, by 88 percent, and by –76 percent, respectively.

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20

Eichner, Thomas, and Rüdiger Pethig. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade: taxes versus caps." Oxford Economic Papers 67, no. 4 (May 26, 2015): 897–917. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpv037.

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21

Eichner, Thomas, and Rüdiger Pethig. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 85 (September 2017): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.004.

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22

McEvoy, David M., and John K. Stranlund. "Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance." Environmental and Resource Economics 42, no. 4 (June 29, 2008): 491–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-008-9220-1.

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23

Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough. "Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages': Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade." International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March 1986): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600434.

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24

Gil, R., and J. Marion. "Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29, no. 2 (January 17, 2012): 239–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewr026.

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25

Grundig, Frank, Jon Hovi, Arild Underdal, and Stine Aakre. "Self-Enforcing Peace and Environmental Agreements: Toward Scholarly Cross-Fertilization?1." International Studies Review 14, no. 4 (December 2012): 522–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misr.12003.

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26

Eichner, Thomas, and Rüdiger Pethig. "Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South." Ecological Economics 153 (November 2018): 43–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.06.018.

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27

Eichner, Thomas, and Rüdiger Pethig. "Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements, Trade, and Demand- and Supply-Side Mitigation Policy." Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1, no. 3 (September 2014): 419–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678517.

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FINUS, MICHAEL, M. ELENA SÁIZ, and ELIGIUS M. T. HENDRIX. "An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements." Environment and Development Economics 14, no. 1 (February 2009): 117–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x08004634.

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ABSTRACTWe consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.

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29

Libecap, G. "The self-enforcing provisions of oil and gas unit operating agreements: theory and evidence." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, no. 2 (July 1, 1999): 526–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.2.526.

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30

Srinivasan, Raji, and Thomas H. Brush. "Supplier Performance in Vertical Alliances: The Effects of Self-Enforcing Agreements and Enforceable Contracts." Organization Science 17, no. 4 (August 2006): 436–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0194.

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31

Osmani, Dritan, and Richard S. J. Tol. "The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries." Computational Economics 36, no. 2 (June 20, 2010): 93–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9232-0.

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32

Faillo, Marco, Stefania Ottone, and Lorenzo Sacconi. "The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements." Public Choice 163, no. 3-4 (March 18, 2015): 225–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y.

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33

Pavlova, Yulia, and Aart de Zeeuw. "Asymmetries in international environmental agreements." Environment and Development Economics 18, no. 1 (July 25, 2012): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x12000289.

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AbstractThis paper considers self-enforcing international environmental agreements when countries are asymmetric with respect to emission-related benefits and environmental damage. Considering these asymmetries simultaneously yields large stable coalitions, also without the option of transfers between signatories. However, these large stable coalitions are only possible if they include countries that have relatively high marginal benefits and a relatively low marginal environmental damage. This type of countries hardly contributes to the common good and the gains of cooperation from including this type of countries in the stable coalition are small. This confirms a persistent result in this literature that large stable coalitions usually go hand in hand with low gains of cooperation. Without the option of transfers it is always better to have a small stable coalition with countries that matter than a large stable coalition with countries that do not matter. Only with transfers might a large stable coalition be able to perform better.

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34

Finus, Michael, and Alaa Al Khourdajie. "Strategic Environmental Policy, International Trade and Self-enforcing Agreements: The Role of Consumers' Taste for Variety." Strategic Behavior and the Environment 7, no. 3-4 (December 2, 2018): 317–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000086.

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35

Shin, Sungwhee, and Sang-Chul Suh. "Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting." Environment and Development Economics 8, no. 2 (April 23, 2003): 247–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x0300135.

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We consider the international treaties on climate change as self-enforcing agreements. Applying non-cooperative game theory, we interpret the UN framework Convention on Climate Change as a Nash equilibrium outcome of an international abatement game where only domestic abatement is allowed. The Kyoto Protocol is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game where flexibility mechanisms are introduced. We also show that credit discounting on foreign abatement can Pareto improve the welfare of all countries.

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36

Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 829–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193619.

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International institutions that include an escape clause generate more durable and stable cooperative international regimes and are easier to achieve ex ante. The escape clause is endogenous in a model of repeated trade-barrier setting in the presence of symmetric, two-sided, political uncertainty. They permit, along the equilibrium path, countries to temporarily deviate from their obligations in periods of excessive, unexpected political pressure at some prenegotiated cost. The architects of international agreements optimally choose a cost so that escape clauses are neither too cheap to use (encouraging frequent recourse, effectively reducing the benefits of cooperation) nor too expensive (making their use rare and increasing the chance of systemic breakdown). The international institution's crucial role is to provide information, verifying that the self-enforcing penalty has been paid (voluntarily), rather than to coerce payment. Escape clauses also make agreements easier to reach initially. Their flexibility reassures states that the division of the long-term gains from the agreement is not immutable.

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37

Degefu, Dagmawi Mulugeta, Weijun He, and Jian Hua Zhao. "Transboundary water allocation under water scarce and uncertain conditions: a stochastic bankruptcy approach." Water Policy 19, no. 3 (December 28, 2016): 479–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2016.031.

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Designing a feasible and stable water sharing mechanism for transboundary river basins is a big challenge. The stochastic and uncertain characteristics of water flow in these rivers is among the main reasons which make the formation of cooperative coalitions with feasible water allocations and self-enforceable allocation agreements difficult. When the water in these river basins is scarce the task becomes even more challenging. This article focuses on the application of stochastic game theoretic extension of the bankruptcy concept to transboundary water resource sharing under water scarce and uncertain conditions. Among the water allocation vectors obtained from stochastic bankruptcy rules only the ones from the stochastic constrained equal awards rule were self-enforcing under uncertainty. Furthermore, the authors also proposed an allocation rule that can be used under a stochastic setting. The proposed rule provides water allocations that are self-enforcing in the absence of uncertainty. Generally, the application of the stochastic bankruptcy approach could be a source of important strategic information which can serve for the sustainable sharing and management of these vital sources of fresh water, particularly during water scarcity.

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38

Franke, Marcel, and Bernhard K. J. Neumärker. "A Climate Alliance through Transfer: Transfer Design in an Economic Conflict Model." World 3, no. 1 (February 17, 2022): 112–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/world3010006.

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For decades, combating climate change has been a global challenge, which requires jointly coordinated efforts by numerous, international actors. However, it has been shown time and again that agreeing on globally binding agreements without a global government proves difficult. To this end, this paper examines the possibility of a tolerance premium. This means a transfer payment in exchange for accepting and complying with the associated agreement. The provider of this tolerance premium determines the conditions of its payment to set desired incentives. Thus, collective decision making can also be self-enforced without a higher authority. This scenario is studied analytically based on Dixit’s conflict model. The study shows that the optimal tolerance premium depends only on the value of the prize to the transferee and that this can result in a stalling of the conflict. The implications of this model shed light on the design of global climate agreements that are self-enforcing without the need for a global government. For this purpose, the upfront payment of funds and their reimbursement as a tolerance premium serve as an incentive to comply with collectively agreed rules in climate policy.

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BAHN, O., and A. HAURIE. "A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS." International Game Theory Review 10, no. 04 (December 2008): 337–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001984.

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This paper deals with the design of equilibrium solutions with coupled constraints in dynamic games of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions abatement. Self enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEA) among different groups of countries call for Nash equilibrium solutions when the abatement strategies of the countries are defined. In this paper we study the effect of having another party, like e.g. the United Nations which would impose to all players a coupled constraint on the total emissions allowed over the 21st century, or on the concentration of carbon reached at the end of the century. We show, using different formulations of environmental game, that the normalized equilibria obtained under a coupled constraint on emissions or concentration is close to Pareto optimality. This gives a clue on the way the post Kyoto negotiations could yield an agreement which could be close to efficiency.

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BAYRAMOGLU, BASAK, and JEAN-FRANÇOIS JACQUES. "The role of fixed cost in international environmental negotiations." Environment and Development Economics 16, no. 2 (February 3, 2011): 221–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x10000501.

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ABSTRACTWe investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are examined: the Nash bargaining solution, involving two countries, and the coalition formation framework, involving numerous countries and emphasizing self-enforcing agreements. In the former, in terms of welfare, strictly identical countries may wish to reduce their emissions in a non-uniform way under the differentiated agreement. For this result to hold, the fixed cost of investment in abatement technology must be sufficiently high. The nature of the threat point of negotiations, however, also plays a crucial role. As concerns global abatement, the two countries abate more under the uniform agreement than under the differentiated one. In terms of coalition formation when numerous countries are involved, a grand coalition could emerge under a differentiated agreement.

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ROSENDORFF, B. PETER. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure." American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 389–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055405051737.

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The increased “legalization” embodied in the revised Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shown to be an institutional innovation that increases the opportunities for states to temporarily suspend their obligations in periods of unexpected, but heightened, domestic political pressure for protection. This increased flexibility in the system reduces per-period cooperation among states but also reduces the possibility that the regime may break down entirely. There is shown to be a trade-off between rigidity and stability in international institutional design in the face of unforeseen, but occasionally intense, domestic political pressure. In a model with a WTO that serves both an informational and adjudicatory role, it is established that agreements with DSPs are self-enforcing, are more stable, and are more acceptable to a wider variety of countries than agreements without DSPs. Evidence drawn from data on preferential trading agreements supports the key hypotheses.

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42

Greif, Avner. "On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries." Journal of Economic History 54, no. 2 (June 1994): 271–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700014479.

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Although the late medieval Commercial Revolution is considered to be a watershed in the economic history of Europe, the analysis of the interrelationship between political and economic systems in bringing about this period of economic growth has been neglected. This article conducts such an analysis with respect to the city of Genoa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Viewing political institutions as self-enforcing agreements rather than as exogenous rules, I present and analyze the nature and evolution of Genoa's political systems and the relations between these systems and economic growth.

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43

BERCOVITZ, JANET E. L. "THE OPTION TO EXPAND: THE USE OF MULTI-UNIT OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS IN FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS." Academy of Management Proceedings 2002, no. 1 (August 2002): Y1—Y6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/apbpp.2002.7516556.

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44

Defeuilley, Christophe. "Holdups and Non-standard Breach Remedies in Delegation Contracts." Recherches économiques de Louvain 65, no. 3 (1999): 349–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800009933.

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SummaryA vast literature is devoted to assess the Transactional Approach in several empirical fields. Common to all these studies is the testing of transactional approach conjectures from the standpoint of private contractual relationships. The aim of this paper is to explore the relevance of Transaction Cost Theory in the French administrative legal context. The paper examines the delegation contracts used to manage the provision of urban services in France. The paper shows that (1) these delegation contracts can be considered as self-enforcing agreements (2) they do not operate in “the shadow of the law ” (3) they feature strong adaptive capabilities. A distinction is made between non-standard contractual arrangements and hybrid governance modes.

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45

Green, Michael Z. "Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions." Texas Wesleyan Law Review 10, no. 1 (October 2003): 77–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/twlr.v10.i1.5.

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In this Article, I focus on how employees can respond and address excessive bargaining power issues when employers require individual employees to agree to arbitrate employment disputes as a condition of employment. My thesis is that individual employees can and should seek self-help through collective action to level the playing field for bargaining about arbitration. Furthermore, I contend that the best collective action would be for unions to play a major role in how individual employee disputes, including the various statutory and tortbased exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, are negotiated and resolved in arbitration. Section II of this Article reviews the Supreme Court's analysis of mandatory arbitration agreements involving statutory employment discrimination claims and its lack of concern for bargaining power in enforcing these agreements. Section III addresses the underlying concerns that led employers to excess when seeking mandatory arbitration agreements, and why that response now appears so insidious to many employee advocates. Section IV offers a solution to the dilemma of bargaining power excess engaged in by employers through mandatory arbitration-the use of collective employee activity with the assistance of unions. Finally, this Article concludes that creative uses of unions as assistants to groups of employees can chill employer excess and ultimately level the bargaining playing field with respect to decisions to arbitrate employment disputes.

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46

Sporleder, Thomas, and Steven Wu. "Social capital and vertical ties in agrifood supply chains." Journal on Chain and Network Science 6, no. 1 (June 1, 2006): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2006.x060.

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There is increasing evidence that agrifood supply chains are evolving from transaction-based markets to alliance-based networks. The purpose of this manuscript is to explore the relationships between agrifood networks and social capital. There are some unique characteristics of agrifood chains that influence the formation of vertical ties or governance structures within the chain. The nature of interfirm dependency and product differentiation are important drivers in the type of transaction governance. Incomplete contracts are ubiquitous with supply chains and lead to distortions. The contractual distortions however can be mitigated through self-enforcing agreements. Social capital and the role of trust influence network ties. The pecuniary risks especially prevalent in agrifood chains may imply that managers prefer embedded ties and cohesive networks rather than the flexibility available from structural holes.

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47

Schmidt, Klaus M., and Axel Ockenfels. "Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 11 (March 8, 2021): e2013070118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2013070118.

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International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1, 29–49 (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto Protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced.

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48

Kulchina, Elena, and Joanne Oxley. "Relational Contracts and Managerial Delegation: Evidence from Foreign Entrepreneurs in Russia." Organization Science 31, no. 3 (May 2020): 628–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2019.1329.

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We examine the managerial delegation decisions of foreign entrepreneurs and assess how these decisions are shaped by characteristics of the local product and labor market environment. We argue that actual or perceived home bias in court proceedings leads foreign entrepreneurs to place little reliance on formal contracts in their dealings with local agent-managers. Adopting the lens of relational contract theory, we develop hypotheses linking managerial delegation decisions to market conditions associated with stable self-enforcing agreements and test the hypotheses in the context of post-Soviet Russia. Consistent with our arguments, we find that foreign entrepreneurs are more likely to hire an agent-manager in local markets where industry growth creates a substantial “shadow of the future,” where managers’ outside employment options are relatively limited, and where competition and the variability of returns are not so high as to induce defection from an informal agreement. Similar observations on a sample of Russian-owned entrepreneurial firms suggest that these delegation decisions are relatively insensitive to local market conditions but that they are influenced by the density of local reputation networks. Our study thus contributes to understanding of the distinctive features of foreign entrepreneurs’ managerial delegation decisions and reinforces the view that contracting impediments constitute one important aspect of the “liability of foreignness” for entrepreneurial firms.

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49

Bobrow, Davis B., and Robert T. Kudrle. "How Middle Powers Can Manage Resource Weakness: Japan and Energy." World Politics 39, no. 4 (July 1987): 536–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010291.

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The post-World War II world has seen the transformation of the international system from a configuration with several rival great powers into one with two superpowers and a set of lesser but still substantial powers—second-tier states with democratic politics and mixed economies. One of the recurrent concerns of the latter has been to secure supplies of natural resources. We argue that postwar conditions point to eight elements of prudent resource policy for middle-level powers. Such states should: (i) avoid military means; (2) choose trade partners whose political interests overlap with their own and who enjoy political stability; (3) seek to create in supplier and transit countries a structure of economic interests that will make supply agreements self-enforcing; (4) diversify with respect to commodity dependence, supplier share, and transit bottlenecks; (5) tailor stockpiles to the urgency of demand; (6) exploit technology to reduce dependence and enhance bargaining advantages; (7) encourage the private sector and public enterprises to become intermediaries in the international resource trade; and (8) pursue strategic interdependence among consumer nations by creating multilateral stakes in the maintenance of normal commerce in resources.

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Roháč, Dalibor. "Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 26, no. 1 (April 1, 2008): 47–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569208x15664517301896.

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Abstract:

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

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