To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Secret Services Intelligence.
Journal articles on the topic 'Secret Services Intelligence'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Secret Services Intelligence.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Fellows, Jamie, and Mark D. Chong. "Australian Secret Intelligence Service’s new powers: A step too far towards extraterritorial killings?" Alternative Law Journal 44, no. 4 (September 30, 2019): 302–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1037969x19873479.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines recent amendments to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ( IS Act). The amendments provide Australian Secret Intelligence Service staff and agents with additional protection from Australian criminal prosecution when using force under certain circumstances in overseas jurisdictions. The authors assert that while well-intentioned, and despite new and existing oversight provisions, the amendments allow pre-emptive use of force that could potentially be used to justify carrying out extraterritorial killings of Australians and foreign nationals, thereby breaching the lawful boundaries of Australian Secret Intelligence Service’s functions.
2
Hardy, Roger. "Israel's secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services." International Affairs 68, no. 2 (April 1992): 371. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2623301.
Full text
3
Freedman, Robert O., Ian Black, and Benny Morris. "Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services." American Historical Review 98, no. 2 (April 1993): 538. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2166941.
Full text
4
Bandi, István. "Contributions to the history of the Hungarian pontifical institute from the perspective of the Hungarian secret services during the cold war." Studia Universitatis Moldaviae. Seria Ştiinţe Umanistice, no. 10(180) (April 2024): 58–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.59295/sum10(180)2023_07.
Full textAbstract:
At the secret meeting of the secret services of the Eastern Bloc member states organized in Moscow in March 1955, the main tasks of each socialist secret service were outlined. The Hungarian services, in addition to the intelligence activities directed against the emigrant centers in the capitalist states, received a task to launch informational actions against the Vatican in the next decade. The present study examines the activity of Hungarian informational structures from the Kadar era at the objective level, that is, a concrete action carried out on Italian territory against a pontifical institution, which gained momentum starting from the mid-60s, by recruiting and integrating agents into the Hungarian Pontifical Institute operating in Rome. The analysis places special emphasis on the introduction of contemporary Hungarian intelligence methodology concepts.
5
Minkina, Mirosław. "Russian secret services in the so-called special operation in Ukraine." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 14, no. 2 (December 24, 2023): 125–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.9707.
Full textAbstract:
This article deals with the role of the Russian Federation’s secret services in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. The author explains the facts and regularities regarding the activity of the Russian secret services in this war. The research was performed from a positivist and post-positivist perspective and takes into consideration the so-called mainstream theories. For its purposes, a system analysis was included as well as references were made to the genesis of the Russian secret services, giving consideration to the space of the post-Soviet states. In addition, an in-depth study of the activity of the Russian special services, bearing in mind the key facts and methods of their operation were conducted. It confirmed the weakness of the Russian secret services. At the same time, the aftermath of this state of affairs is the increase in the importance of military intelligence.
6
Sánchez Barrilao, Juan Francisco. "Servicios de inteligencia, secreto y garantía judicial de los derechos." Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, no. 44 (November 15, 2019): 309. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/trc.44.2019.26004.
Full textAbstract:
En este trabajo se analiza el marco jurídico de la garantía judicial de los derechos con relación a la actividad de los servicios de inteligencia. En tal sentido, primero contextualizamos la inteligencia al respecto de la sociedad del riesgo y la seguridad; luego identificamos los servicios de inteligencia y presentamos el régimen jurídico del secreto; y finalmente se estudia el control judicial de la actividad de inteligencia en relación con la garantía de los derechos, así como sus déficits y su conveniente reforma.This paper analyzes the legal framework of the judicial guarantee of rights concerning the activity of intelligence services. In that sense, we first contextualize intelligence regarding the risk society and the security; then we focus on the intelligence services considering the legal framework of the secret; and finally we study the judicial control of intelligence activity in relation to the guarantee of rights, as well as its deficits and its convenient legal reform purposes.
7
Braat, Eleni. "Loyalty and Secret Intelligence: Anglo‒Dutch Cooperation during World War II." Politics and Governance 6, no. 4 (December 28, 2018): 159–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i4.1556.
Full textAbstract:
Secrecy and informal organisation produce, sustain, and reinforce feelings of loyalty within intelligence and security services. This article demonstrates that loyalty is needed for cooperation between intelligence partners as well as within and between services. Under many circumstances, loyalty plays a larger role in the level of internal and external collaboration than formal work processes along hierarchical lines. These findings are empirically based on the case study of Anglo‒Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. By demonstrating that ‘loyalty’ critically affects the work of intelligence communities, this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions.
8
Rosicki, Remigiusz. "State Security and Individual Security as Exemplified by the Recruitment of Secret Collaborators by the Polish Intelligence Service." Polish Political Science Yearbook 51 (December 31, 2022): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202255.
Full textAbstract:
The material scope of the research problem presented in the text encompasses the issues concerned with the possibilities for and limitations of recruiting secret collaborators by the Polish civilian intelligence service. The analysis of the problematics of secret collaboration focuses mainly on institutional and legal aspects, which can be seen in its inclusion in the systemic legal perspective, encompassing such dimensions as administrative and legal, criminal and legal, civil and legal, and ethical one. Next to the normative aspects, the text addresses sociological and psychological aspects of recruiting secret collaborators by special services, thereby depicting the main recruitment methods. The methodology adopted is chiefly based on the institutional and legal approach, in which use is made of, inter alia, textual, functional and systemic interpretations. The problem of possible abuse concerned with the recruitment of secret collaborators by special services is illustrated with an abstract case study and a relevant legal interpretation. Besides, to extend the analysis of psychological and sociological aspects of recruiting secret collaborators, the study uses limited open interviews with former officers of the civilian special services operating in Poland before 1990.
9
Luțai, Raluca. "European intelligence services just signed up on social media. An analysis of secret services and social media platforms." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Studia Europaea 67, no. 2 (December 30, 2022): 199–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbeuropaea.2022.2.08.
Full textAbstract:
"In the last decade a large number of public institutions, including intelligence services, make extensive use of social media to communicate with citizens. Much scholarly attention is paid to the benefits of online communication and the way governmental institutions presents themselves online. However, we know little about intelligence services and their presence on social media. This paper addresses this gap in literature and analyzes what kind of social networks European intelligence services prefer. The article is based on quantitative research of the social platforms used by the intelligence services of all 27 European Union Member States. The findings indicate that intelligence services are present in the social media environment to a different extent and the social platforms they choose to use are different. Keywords: intelligence services, social media, European Union."
10
BIZADEA, George. "HMONG. THE SECRET ARMY." STRATEGIES XXI - National Defence College 1, no. 72 (July 15, 2021): 356–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2668-5094-21-25.
Full textAbstract:
This article aims to analyze the role of the Hmong population in the Indochina conflict. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered Laos a buffer state according to theDominion Theory and as such much more strategically important than Vietnam. To avoid the fall of Laos under communism and thus the spread of communism in the region, Eisenhower turned to the services of the C.I.A., because he could not intervene officially in Laos without violating the Geneva Convention.Keywords: Indochina; Laos; Vietnam; war; United States of America; Hmong, Central Intelligence Agency.
11
HAFTARCZYK, Karolina. "SECRET SERVICE AS PART OF NATIONAL SECURITY." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 161, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 194–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3063.
Full textAbstract:
Recent years mark a period of profound redefinition of threats and dangers to national security, also in Poland. The end of the Cold War, stabilization in Polish-German relations, normalization of the situation in the other neighbouring countries and an averted threat of the so- called ‘Russian military generals rebellion’ scenario – so popular with some Hollywood screenwriters in the past – finally, Poland’s accession to NATO, significantly cut the risk of an open, direct outside aggression. The term ‘intelligence services’ refers to governmental agencies involved both in the collection of confidential information and in counter-intelligence activities. Intelligence agencies are devoted to gathering and protecting information crucial to national security, both domestic and external.In democratic countries their operations occasionally raise issues of ministerial control and accountability to parliamentary procedures. Intelligence agencies carrying out national security operations abroad sometimes break local law. The intelligence agencies of totalitarian regimes and non-democratic states sometimes employ various practices and techniques prohibited by their own law, such as bribery, blackmail, treacherous assassination, illegal weapons and drugs trade.
12
Miljković, Milan. "Challenges in the work of intelligence services in the information age." Bezbednost, Beograd 62, no. 3 (2020): 143–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bezbednost2003143m.
Full textAbstract:
The collection and analytical work of modern intelligence services faces numerous challenges because the environment in which the services operate is characterized by the need for rapid data collection, analysis and decision-making, almost in real time. When we consider security work, the growing dependence on modern information technology makes the information structure of services sensitive and "vulnerable" to information attacks. Also, the application of information operations as a form of performing secret actions has been updated. Information technology has also changed the relationship between the service and users, introduced the possibility of applying the "pull" architecture for obtaining information, which, in addition to the good sides, also brings certain challenges. Due to all the above, the intelligence services are adapting to the technological, organizational and cultural changes brought about by the information revolution. The paper reviews the challenges in the work of modern intelligence services, primarily from the aspect of the impact of mass application of modern information technology on operational and analytical work, as well as the application of secret actions in the work of services. The aim of this paper is to point out the numerous challenges that the information revolution brings to modern intelligence services. A comparative analysis of the presented research material leads to the conclusion that the services encounter new tasks and ways of functioning in all their activities, which ultimately raises the sensitive issue of their reform. The conclusion reached in this paper is that the reform of intelligence services in the "information age" is in any case necessary, but that its implementation should not be revolutionary, but must be carried out evolutionarily.
13
Cauia, Alexandr, and Artur Cepuc. "Aspects of the Evolution of Cooperation Between the Intelligence Services of States." Studii Juridice Universitare, no. 1 (April 2024): 42–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.54481/sju.2023.1.03.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes some aspects of the evolution of intelligence services, in terms of identifying and analyzing the phenomenon of cooperation between them in order to achieve common objectives. Since ancient times, in addition to the forms and instruments of specific action to the secret services of the states, due to common values, interests and objectives, for a concrete period of time or principle, the intelligence services have cooperated not only on an informal level, but also based on intergovernmental agreements or treaties. The evolution of the phenomenon of cooperation between the intelligence services, some elements specific to the periods of cooperation, the necessity and importance of this kind of collaboration are analyzed in the text of this research.
14
Leșcu, Artur. "The Russian Empire’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services – General Considerations." Romanian Military Thinking 2024, no. 1 (March 30, 2024): 222–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2024.1.13.
Full textAbstract:
The Russian Empire was based, since the early years of the nineteenth century, mainly on military force, in the composition of which an important role was played by the accumulation of information on opponents and the fight against foreign espionage inside the country. Despite the central role attributed to these secret services, the Russian Empire did not have a specialized body in the field of military espionage. In this context, based on a vast and new Russian historiographical material, accumulated as a result of research by the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova, the author presents, by the method of analysis of historical documents, a perspective of the genesis, activity and results obtained by the Russian intelligence and counter-espionage services of the tsarist period.
15
Laurent, Sébastien. "The free French secret services: Intelligence and the politics of republican legitimacy." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (December 2000): 19–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432626.
Full text
16
Zhang, Lisa Lindkvist, and Prem Poddar. "Espionage, Intrigue, and Politics: Kalimpong Chung Hwa School as International Playhouse." China and Asia 3, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 35–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589465x-030103.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article examines the ways in which Kalimpong, living up to its moniker as a “nest of spies,” was a site where local and international intrigues played out, especially at the local Chinese Chung Hwa School. It examines the period between the 1940s and early 1960s, when Kalimpong, on account of its strategic location, was home to “foreign Kautilyas” of different intelligence services. The Chung Hwa School came to play a part in this game as it provided cover/camouflage for Chinese secret agents. The secret services run by the British colonial state—and later the Indian state—suspected it to be a platform for intelligence gathering. A close reading of the archives uncovers the circuit of suspicion and misgiving surrounding the school. This article analyses these narratives and the ways in which, through the enmeshment of espionage, the Indian Intelligence Bureau, the local Chinese, and “China” were constituted in Kalimpong’s (under)world. The school also emerges as tangled in transnational and international machinations epitomizing People’s Republic of China–Republic of India relations and Guomindang–Chinese Communist Party rivalry.
17
Pateman, Roy. "Intelligence Agencies in Africa: a Preliminary Assessment." Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 4 (December 1992): 569–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00011058.
Full textAbstract:
The ostensible purpose of intelligence collection and activity is the preservation of national security. A careful examination of what has been published in this field in recent years has convinced me that all African régimes and liberation movements have established some form of secret state-security apparatus, in many cases with considerable external assistance. As for foreign intelligence services, such as America's C.I.A., Russia's K.G.B., and Israel's Mossad, they have proved to be effective major mechanisms for influencing the internal affairs of African nations.
18
Ivanov, Andrei Alexandrovich. "British Secret Services’ Political Agency and the Intelligence Intervention in the Russian North in 1918-1919." Конфликтология / nota bene, no. 3 (March 2023): 12–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0617.2023.3.38904.
Full textAbstract:
In modern conditions the range of use of intelligence in politics is expanding. Today, experts single out intelligence operations as a separate kind of informational confrontation, on a par with the cybernetic and psychological struggle. In international conflicts, the goals are more and more often achieved not through direct military influence, but using alternative forms: sabotage, economic, diplomatic, etc. One of the widespread areas of secret services’ activity appears to be the interference into the development of the political systems of sovereign states. Thus, nowadays on a par with military interventions there are economic, diplomatic, ideological, intelligence, etc. interventions. This circumstance significantly complicates both the detection of foreign interventions and realization of countermeasures. It is especially difficult to solve these tasks in a situation of reconnaissance/intelligence intervention carried out by the secret services, whose activities are, as a rule, autonomous and entirely based on the use of unofficial methods and techniques, quite often associated with violation of the law. Moreover, as far as the choice of a interventional course by the government mostly depends on the information on the development of the situation provided by various departments, a misestimation is possible due to high level of bias in the work of intelligence-analytical services. In this perspective, studying the experience of past interventions largely reveals the most dangerous for the state forms of external interference. Account of this experience is a necessary condition for the formation of ability of society to resist disorganization and the crisis of statehood.
19
Świerczek, Marek. "Model infiltracji Jeżowa a zajęcie Krymu przez Federację Rosyjską." Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 16, no. 30 (2024): 131–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.24.005.19607.
Full textAbstract:
The author analysed the scale of betrayal among the officers and officials of the Ukrainian state during the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The main research problem was an attempt to explain the anomaly in the activities of the special services in the form of recruiting 1,400 officers of the Ukrainian SBU to the Russian FSB. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon in the practice of secret services, the author used the theory of offensive intelligence and counter-intelligence created and developed in the USSR from the early 1920s, as well as the findings of cognitive psychology regarding the phenomenon of projection as the main mechanism for explaining the behavior of other people. Thanks to the synthesis of psychology and the analysis of the theoretical achievements of the Soviet secret services, the author put forward a hypothesis about the mass recruitment of the SBU officers in the Crimea long before the annexation. According to the author, the main mechanisms of mass recruitment of agents in order to control the opponent’s organisation were broadly understood corruption and cronyism characteristic to the post-Soviet area.
20
Świerczek, Marek. "Yezhov’s infiltration model and the Russian Federation’s seizure of Crimea." Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 16, no. 30 (2024): 385–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.24.016.19618.
Full textAbstract:
The author analysed the scale of betrayal among the officers and officials of the Ukrainian state during the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The main research problem was an attempt to explain the anomaly in the activities of the special services in the form of recruiting 1,400 officers of the Ukrainian SBU to the Russian FSB. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon in the practice of secret services, the author used the theory of offensive intelligence and counter-intelligence created and developed in the USSR from the early 1920s, as well as the findings of cognitive psychology regarding the phenomenon of projection as the main mechanism for explaining the behavior of other people. Thanks to the synthesis of psychology and the analysis of the theoretical achievements of the Soviet secret services, the author put forward a hypothesis about the mass recruitment of the SBU officers in the Crimea long before the annexation. According to the author, the main mechanisms of mass recruitment of agents in order to control the opponent’s organisation were broadly understood corruption and cronyism characteristic to the post-Soviet area.
21
Revesz, Bela. "Draft for Understanding the Historical Background of Changes in the Ideological Language and Communication of Secret Services in 20th Century’s Hungary." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 33, no. 3 (August 11, 2020): 855–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09759-w.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of the secret services. A remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain “keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social environment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungarian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as MIA), the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry of Defence (hereinafter referred to as MoD), and the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This structure existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret services in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state protection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directorate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations.
22
Sadiku, MA Fisnik, and MA Besnik Lokaj. "Activities of Intelligence Services as a Synonymous of Fear and Intimidation." ILIRIA International Review 5, no. 2 (December 31, 2015): 279. http://dx.doi.org/10.21113/iir.v5i2.93.
Full textAbstract:
Intelligence services are an important factor of national security. Their main role is to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information on threats to the state and its population.Because of their “dark” activity, intelligence services for many ordinary citizens are synonymous of violence, fear and intimidation. This mostly comes out in theRepublicofKosovo, due to the murderous activities of the Serbian secret service in the past. Therefore, we will treat the work of intelligence services in democratic conditions, so that the reader can understand what is legitimate and legal of these services.In different countries of the world, security challenges continue to evolve and progress every day, and to fulfil these challenges, the state needs new ways of coordinating and developing the capability to shape the national security environment. However, the increase of intelligence in many countries has raised debates about legal and ethical issues regarding intelligence activities.Therefore, this paper will include a clear explanation of the term, meaning, process, transparency and secrecy, and the role that intelligence services have in analyzing potential threats to national security.The study is based on a wide range of print and electronic literature, including academic and scientific literature, and other documents of various intelligence agencies of developed countries.
23
Jaskułowski, Tytus. "„Praca jest czasochłonna, monotonna i nie przynosi konkretnych rezultatów” – nasłuch wywiadowczy Stasi w PRL w latach 1980–1981 na tle współpracy MSW i MfS." Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki, no. 19 (April 29, 2011): 110–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.35757/rpn.2011.19.05.
Full textAbstract:
The text attempts to analyse the GDR Ministry of State Security’s offensive operations using the instruments of radio-electronic intelligence against the PPR in 1981. The situation in Poland, the emergence of Solidarność and possible, uncontrolled spreading of a wave of democratisation onto the East Germany’s territory as well, drove the leaders of the latter state to undertake actions aimed at ensuring it access to information on the on-going situation in the PRP. Apart from the data obtained officially, they also intended to resort to independent methods for its acquisition, most of all by employing the secret services. The author focuses on just one aspects of such operations, that is, radio-electronic intelligence. Apart from describing the structure and the working methods of the MfS’ III Directorate responsible for this type of reconnaissance, he presents the guidelines received by this organisation, its modus operandi and forms of work both on the territory of the GDR and the PPR, as well as on that of the other states. He also points to the effects and all the problems resulting from implementing intelligence operations, including those in the context of official co-operation between the secret services of the PPR and GDR. According to the author, the manner of carrying out offensive MfS operations by radio-electronic intelligence allows for a certain scepticism with regard to the thesis that the GDR services had unlimited opportunities to work in Poland. Based on the available archive sources, the observation that the MfS found it difficult to process and apply information obtained as a result of the services’ operations, is warranted. The shortage of competent staff can be clearly seen and not all the available technical instruments could perform their role. What was also important was the lack of understanding at the MfS of the different philosophy of life in the PPR, which determined the reception of its image obtained from the monitoring in place. Moreover, archive searches provide circumstantial evidence indicating that the Polish counter-intelligence was aware of what type of operations were being carried out by the GDR against Poland. The need for co-operation between the MfS and the MSW in the context of the radio-electronic intelligence against other states, as well as the awareness of the risk related to the possible discovery of illegal radio-electronic operations, led to their closing down. This failed, however, to change the belief that the fundamental operating principles of the secret services are to distrust one’s partners and to protect one’s own interests.
24
Domínguez Llosá, Santiago. "Consulados y servicios secretos aliados en Melilla durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial." Aldaba, no. 43 (March 7, 2019): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/aldaba.43.2018.23978.
Full textAbstract:
El objeto de este trabajo es hacer una aproximación a la presencia en Melilla de representaciones diplomáticas de los aliados en la II Guerra Mundial, así como la actuación en la zona de sus servicios secretos, el Intelligence Service inglés y la Office Special Services norteamericana.The topic of this essay is an aproximation to the presence in Melilla for alied diplomatic representations in the II World War, as well as the intervention in the área of their secret services, English Intellicence Service and American Office Special Services.
25
ALDRICH, RICHARD J. "Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War." Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 1 (February 1998): 179–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x9800290x.
Full textAbstract:
The past twenty years have seen the rapid growth of a new branch of international history, the serious academic study of secret services or ‘intelligence history’ with its attendant specialist conferences and journals. Two main causes for this development can be identified. The first was conceptual, namely the increasing recognition that the study of international history was greatly impoverished by the reluctance of academic historians to address a subject which appeared capable of shedding considerable light upon the conduct of international affairs. Two leading historians underlined this during 1982 in a path-breaking collection of essays on the subject, suggesting that intelligence was the ‘missing dimension’ of most international history. The second development was a more practical one, the introduction of the Thirty Year Rule during the 1970s, bringing with it an avalanche of new documentation, which, within a few years, was recognized as containing a great deal of intelligence material. In the 1980s historians had begun to turn their attention in increasing numbers to the intelligence history of the mid-twentieth century. They were further assisted in their endeavours by the appearance of the first volumes of the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War.
26
Vlasenko, V. M., and Е. А. Murashko. "COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICE (based on Hnat Porokhivsky’s archive-investigative case materials)." Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), no. 56 (2020): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2020.56.2.
Full textAbstract:
The lack of the scientific literature concerning the Intelligence Service of Romania (Special Information Service) is stated. Only some references to the activities of the Intelligence Service of Romania on the territory of Ukraine are mentioned in the isolated publications. The authors used the documents and materials from Hnat Porokhivsky’s archive-investigative case which is kept in the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine. The materials mentioned above are representative and fill the gap in the issue concerning the structure of the Special Information Service of Romania and provide a certain indication about its composition. The fact that Hnat Porokhivsky was a colonel of the UNR Army and the leader of the Ukrainian military emigration in Romania is mentioned. Hnat Porokhivsky’s main biographical milestones, his socio-political and military activities are covered. His organizational skills, professional knowledge in the sphere of secret service, and counterespionage were used by the Intelligence Service of Romania. Not being a citizen of Romania, he made a valuable contribution to the process of the Romanian secret service development. The Special Information Service had a complicated multi-stage structure with the an extensive network of intelligence centers, sub-centers, rezidenturas, agents, and support divisions on the territories of both Romania and the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II. Different intelligence units of the Special Information Service of Romania operated on the occupied territories of Ukraine from 1941 to 1944. The central authorities and regional offices heads’ and staff members’ surnames (sometimes pseudonyms) are specified. From the authors’ point of view, the most promising studies are those ones of the Intelligence Service of Romania espionage, counterespionage and propagandistic activities, Ukrainian and Russian immigrants’ participation in this process, and Special Information Service cooperation with secret services of Germany and Japan. Keywords: intelligence (secret) service, Hnat Porokhivsky, rezidentura, Romania, Special Information Service, Ukrainian emigration, center.
27
Chapman, John W. M. "Tricycle recycled: Collaboration among the secret intelligence services of the Axis states, 1940–41." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (July 1992): 268–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432168.
Full text
28
Ratz, Sergey V. "Secret services of the USSR in Spain and their role in the military and political conflict of 1936–1939." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies 36, no. 2 (2020): 356–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2020.212.
Full textAbstract:
The article is dedicated to the activities of the Soviet intelligence agencies in Spain during the Civil War of 1936–1939. By June 1936, diplomatic relations between USSR and Spain were absent. Due to the putschist revolt and the appeal of the legitimate government of Spain to the USSR, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) made a decision to establish diplomatic, military, and trade delegations in Spain. The intelligence agencies of the USSR planned operation ‘X’ for military assistance to Spain. As part of this operation, a Soviet advisory staff concerning military and foreign intelligence was formed. The author brings to light the goals of the secret service authorities of the Soviet Union, including such particular ones as the removal of Spain’s gold reserve and the creation of the 14th Partisan Corps. The article analyses the activities of the advisory staff, their role in the development of the largest military operations during the Spanish Civil War, and traces the fate of the conflict’s most active participants. Based on the analysis of new data introduced into the historical discourse in recent years, the author concludes that the secret services of the USSR played a large role in this conflict. The Soviet advisors and specialists obtained unique experiences, including conducting large-scale operations; military equipment was tested in actual battle activities; intelligence specialists enlisted information sources with great potential. Many military specialists tried and trained in Spain in 1936–1939 later played an invaluable role in the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.
29
TURCHETTI, SIMONE. "Atomic secrets and governmental lies: nuclear science, politics and security in the Pontecorvo case." British Journal for the History of Science 36, no. 4 (December 2003): 389–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007087403005120.
Full textAbstract:
This paper focuses on the defection of nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo from Britain to the USSR in 1950 in an attempt to understand how government and intelligence services assess threats deriving from the unwanted spread of secret scientific information. It questions whether contingent agendas play a role in these assessments, as new evidence suggests that this is exactly what happened in the Pontecorvo case. British diplomatic personnel involved in negotiations with their US counterparts considered playing down the case. Meanwhile, the press decided to play it up, claiming that Pontecorvo was an atom spy. Finally, the British secret services had evidence showing that this was a fabrication, but they did not disclose it. If all these manipulations served various purposes, then they certainly were not aimed at assessing if there was a threat and what this threat really was.
30
Altenhöner, Florian. "Tajny Wywiad Zagraniczny Abwehry w latach 1919–1933." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 22, no. 4 (2021): 164–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2021.4(278).0006.
Full textAbstract:
The article analyzes the role of the Abwehr’s secret intelligence service during the Weimar Republic. General information concerning the structure of the Abwehr and its activitiesis is provided alongside the confrontation of the myths about the “Versal regulations” and nonexistence of the Abwehr. The author presents the structure of the Abwehr, and its most important sources of information are presented (agential and technical) and its cooperation with foreign intelligence services. The analysis carried out leads to the conclusion that the Abwehr were a small but appreciated organization which provided the Reichswehr with important information.
31
Ivanov, A. A. "British Special Services in Interdepartmental Contradictions in the Beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century." Vestnik NSU. Series: History and Philology 22, no. 1 (January 14, 2023): 20–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1818-7919-2023-22-1-20-32.
Full textAbstract:
In modern conditions, the problem of the objectivity of decisions taken by politicians is acute, due to the fact that responsible persons often lack reliable information. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the receipt and interpretation of this information has been within the competence of intelligence agencies, therefore, the success of military-political operations often depends on the effectiveness of their work and the quality of their interaction with other departments. The hypothesis of the study is that, under certain conditions, the ability of special services to influence the politicaldecision-making process is often associated not only with the effectiveness of analytical work, but more with the ability to overcome the resistance of other government agencies seeking to monopolize information channels in the government. The example of the secret services of the British Empire in this respect is valuable as far as the victory in the Great War made the apparatus of this state an object of interest of some other countries, which wanted to bring the level of efficiency and working principles of their security structures in line with the British. Accordingly, not only the advantages of the British secret services, but also their shortcomings, manifested, among other things, in the bias of assessments and distortion of the content of intelligence reports, became widespread in the world.
32
Kolaszyński, Mateusz. "Cywilna kontrola nad służbami specjalnymi w Polsce z perspektywy trzech dekad funkcjonowania." Politeja 18, no. 6(75) (December 16, 2021): 307–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.18.2021.75.15.
Full textAbstract:
Civilian Control Over Secret Services in Poland from the Perspective of Three Decades of Their Operation The article aims to analyze the current status of civilian control over intelligence services. The years 1990-1991 marked the beginning of a comprehensive transformation of this area of state activity. The article analyses the following issues: how hev the critical problems of civilian control over intelligence services been resolved across the three decades of their operation and to what extent the political system has been transformed in this area? The article consists of four main parts. The first discusses the concept of “special services” which signify specific institutional solutions in Poland. The following parts are organized according to the basic types of civilian control, i.e., executive control, parliamentary oversight, and independent oversight. The considerations focus on the institutional dimension of security. The article is analytical. It is prepared based on the available sources and literature.
33
Slusarchuck, Ivan. "Disinformation in interstate relations: the role of special services." Information Security of the Person, Society, State. 2022. № 1–3 (34–36), no. 34-36 (December 12, 2022): 54–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.51369/2707-7276-2022-(1-3)-7.
Full textAbstract:
Today, disinformation in interstate relations can create real and potential threats to national security of Ukraine and stability in society. The real threat to Ukraine is disinformation carried out by the russian federation, in particular via propaganda. It uses huge amounts of disinformation that is quickly presented and constantly repeated, there is no logic. Disinformation is especially active in the military-political and international relations, as well as in the spheres of economics, science, etc. As a subversive activity of foreign special services, it is a threat to the territorial integrity, economic, scientific, technical and defense potential of Ukraine. Dividing intelligence activities into four main types: 1) the creation of intelligence positions; 2) intelligence and information activities; 3) beneficial secret influence; 4) direct undermining, or subversion, we focus on the two latter, since the beneficial secret influence is nothing more than special information operations and actions carried out by a wide range of public and private bodies. Subversive activity – actions aimed at the illegal change of the established public order, state system and / or existing bodies of power and society. They are used as a tool to achieve political goals, as a means of less risk and cost compared to open hostilities. They can be carried out applying various methods, such as: propaganda, provocations, financial fraud, violence, etc. The subject of disinformation in the field of international relations is the state represented by its governmental bodies which are authorized to carry out activities in this area. These are subdivisions and institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including embassies, consulates), other ministries and departments whose activities are related to the implementation of functions related to the resolution of issues related to disinformation, special services of foreign states, etc. Disinformation may involve non-governmental organizations, political and public organizations, mass media, institutions engaged in financial, economic, entrepreneurial activities, etc. This activity can be organized and coordinated by special bodies under the leadership of the state, such as the National Security and Defense Council, or special services, or this work can be carried out jointly. Special services may also be assigned the role of engaging in disinformation activities of various structures whose activities are not officially related to the performance of such tasks. Key words: disinformation, interstate relations, threat, national security of Ukraine, subversive activity, foreign special services, propaganda, fake, special information operations.
34
Strechie, Mădălina. "The Praetorian Guard, Rome’s Intelligence Service." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 27, no. 1 (June 1, 2021): 136–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2021-0022.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Rome was a kingdom, then a republic, and culminated in a militaristic empire. For this, the city of Mars invented, perfected and organized efficient institutions to carry out its plans, which extended it from the Italic Peninsula throughout the world on which Rome had a say. One of the most efficient institutions, the essence of the Roman executive power, was not the Princeps, but the Praetorian Guard, a military and police institution, at the same time political, economic, but especially with the powers of a secret service, being one of the forerunners of European secret services, surpassing all that had existed until its functioning, not being matched to this day in terms of efficiency and impact in the life of a civilization. When founding the Principate, the Praetorian Guard was the one which transformed the imperial dream of Rome into a historical reality. The “wings of the Roman eagle” that spread over the world conquered by the Romans were Praetorian, if we consider that this institution was coordinated by ordo equester, the tagma of Rome’s career officers, its headquarters, but also the government of Rome, the praetorian prefect also fulfilling the function which today we would call prime minister, the second man in the hierarchy of the Roman state, of course after the princeps (the first of the citizens).Although as a military structure, the Praetorian Guard appeared with the professional Roman army, it reached its peak with the Principate, initially having a guard function for the Roman military commander, it became in time the most effective secret service of classical Antiquity. This success was due to the fact that the Romans were inspired by the Spartans (especially the Ephorian magistrates), but also by the Persians (from the administrative organization of the satrapies, the 10,000 immortals, and especially the royal postal service of Persia), the Roman creation being the most complete, therefore the etymology of the word “information” is Latin.From a military perspective, the Praetorian Guard was organized at all levels of a global society, such as Rome, covering informatively, politically, militarily, economically, but also diplomatically all Roman interests in the world controlled by Rome, being a true intelligence service. It was the first informative outpost in non-Roman territories, which had to be transformed into Roman territories, as was the case of Dacia.
35
Gandaloev, Ruslan, Taimuraz Kallagov, Artur Mironov, Badma Sangadzhiev, and Marat Shaikhullin. "The history of domestic intelligence in the Russian empire: the 18th-19th centuries." LAPLAGE EM REVISTA 7, no. 3B (September 23, 2021): 324–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.24115/s2446-6220202173b1557p.324-330.
Full textAbstract:
The article aims at studying the historical formation and functioning of military and police units in the Russian Empire of the 18th-19th centuries, as well as determining some historical and legal patterns in the development of the institution of domestic intelligence. The main research method was the historical to study some historical stages, the historical and legal nature, the role of domestic intelligence and military-police units in the system of the Russian state power in the 18th-19th centuries. The scientific article also used the method of systemic analysis, deduction, induction, etc. The article concludes that the main secret services were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1880 to 1917, i.e. the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stood between the supreme ruler (the emperor) and the heads of special services.
36
Stan, Lavinia, and Marian Zulean. "Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: A Scorecard." Surveillance & Society 16, no. 3 (October 12, 2018): 298–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.24908/ss.v16i3.6880.
Full textAbstract:
Since 1989, reforms have sought to align the Romanian post-communist intelligence community with its counterparts in established democracies. Enacted reluctantly and belatedly at the pressure of civil society actors eager to curb the mass surveillance of communist times and international partners wishing to rein in Romania’s foreign espionage and cut its ties to intelligence services of non-NATO countries, these reforms have revamped legislation on state security, retrained secret agents, and allowed for participation in NATO operations, but paid less attention to oversight and respect for human rights. Drawing on democratization, transitional justice, and security studies, this article evaluates the capacity of the Romanian post-communist intelligence reforms to break with communist security practices of unchecked surveillance and repression and to adopt democratic values of oversight and respect for human rights. We discuss the presence of communist traits after 1989 (seen as continuity) and their absence (seen as discontinuity) by offering a wealth of examples. The article is the first to evaluate security reforms in post-communist Romania in terms of their capacity to not only overhaul the personnel and operations inherited from the Securitate and strengthen oversight by elected officials, but also make intelligence services respectful of basic human rights.
37
Świerczek, Marek. "Working methods of the Russian secret services in the light of the Oleg Kulinich case." Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 15, no. 29 (December 6, 2023): 291–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.031.18773.
Full textAbstract:
The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.
38
Johnston-White, Iain. "Nazi Secret Warfare in occupied Persia (Iran): the failure of the German intelligence services, 1939–45." Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 2 (December 8, 2017): 303–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1411235.
Full text
39
Bare, Duncan, and Siegfried Beer. "Being a “Solomon” in Washington: Evaluating and Processing OSS and SSU Intelligence from Austria, 1945–1946." Journal of Austrian-American History 7, no. 2 (October 2023): 169–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaustamerhist.7.2.0169.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article discusses the processing, reporting, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence from Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Strategic Services Unit (SSU) missions in Austria both locally and in Washington, DC. We begin by briefly reviewing the organization of OSS Austria after which the question of who was evaluating intelligence from Austria locally and in Washington is addressed. Then, we compare the roles of the Secret Intelligence (SI) Reports (or Reporting) Board and, until October 1945, OSS Research and Analysis (R&A) both in Austria and Washington. This leads to our first major postulation, namely, that it was not R&A that evaluated field intelligence but, rather, the SI Reports Board. Coupled with their training, competence, and knowledge, when R&A was transferred to the State Department at the end of September 1945, it did not have a noticeable impact upon either Austrian-based reporting or its quality. Using both internal and external assessments, we instead suggest that the quality of intelligence from Austria improved after R&A and SSU parted in October 1945. Finally, we examine some of the external customer requests OSS/SSU Austria received, how these were acted upon, and what reaction(s) they generated.
40
Krasnozhenova, E. E., and S. V. Kulinok. "On the Question of Using the Civilian Population of the USSR by German Intelligence in 1941–1944." Modern History of Russia 10, no. 3 (2020): 609–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2020.304.
Full textAbstract:
During 1941–1944 the German occupation and intelligence services created an extensive network of training centers (schools and courses) in the occupied territories of the USSR. Mostly Soviet prisoners of war were involved in reconnaissance and sabotage work, although a significant number of agents were recruited from the civilian (non-military) population. First, people who were in active or passive opposition to the Soviet regime were attracted: former emigrants, those repressed or dispossessed, ideological opponents, criminals, and others. At the same time, a significant number of agents were recruited from the civilian population who remained in the occupied territories, especially from its most vulnerable categories (women and children). The recruited agents were used to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage missions, both in the rear of the USSR and in parts of the Red Army, and against the resistance movement. On the territory of the BSSR occupied by the Germans, sixteen training centers were opened where saboteur children were trained, and more than twenty were opened to train “agents in skirts”. Similar schools and courses were opened in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. The Soviet secret services and partisan counterintelligence bodies were well informed about such work of the German secret organs. The performance of agents trained from among the civilian population was low. There were some tactical successes and actions by enemy agents (especially on the eve and during the period of punitive operations), but strategically this work by the Germans actually failed.
41
Mitić, Ivana. "Internal control and disciplinary accountability of security and intelligence service members and police officers in the Republic of Serbia." Bezbednost, Beograd 65, no. 1 (2023): 162–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bezbednost2301162m.
Full textAbstract:
With the legal authority to apply special measures and the procedure of secret information collection, the data security services have a certain "power" and any power, if not controlled, can be abused. In addition to control by the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as well as by independent bodies and the public, internal control of the security services and disciplinary responsibility of their members are of great importance. Internal control is designed as the closest level of control and is intended to initially prevent and sanction the commission of abuses within the security services. The closeness and close connection with those over whom control is exerted raise a logical question of bias and objectivity. Internal control mechanisms are primarily required to be "out of the system" while monitoring and undertaking their work activities, which is not easily sustainable in practice.
42
Zverev, V. O., and O. G. Polovnikov. "Secret Agents of the Russian Gendarmerie in the Fight against Espionage at the Beginning of the First World War." Modern History of Russia 10, no. 4 (2020): 892–901. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2020.405.
Full textAbstract:
The article discusses the limited intelligence capabilities of the gendarmerie departments of the Warsaw Governor General (Lomzinska, Warsaw, Kielce, Lublin, and Radom provinces) in the fight against German and Austrian spies in the second half of 1914 and the first half of 1915. One reason for the secret police’s lack of readiness is the reluctance of the gendarmerie-police authorities to organize counter-response work on an appropriate basis. The rare, fragmentary, and not always valuable information received by agents of the investigating authorities did not allow the gendarmes to organize full-scale and successful operational work on a subordinate territory to identify hidden enemies of the state. The low potential, and, in some cases, the complete uselessness of secret service personnel for the interests of the military wanted list led to the fact that most politically disloyal persons were accidentally identified by other special services. In most cases, spies were detected either due to information from army intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, or due to the vigilance of military personnel of the advanced units of the Russian army. The authors conclude that the gendarmerie departments were unable to organize a systematic operational escort of military personnel of the Russian armies deployed in the Warsaw Military District. Despite the fact that the duty of the gendarmerie police included not only criminal procedures, but also operational searches, there was no qualified identification of spies with the help of secret officers.
43
Suponitskaya, Irina. "Spies or Heroes? Soviet Intelligence in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 3 (2022): 230. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640020246-8.
Full textAbstract:
The article focuses on the most successful period in the history of Soviet intelligence in the United States, namely the 1930s and 1940s. The reasons for this success are analysed, first and foremost being the worldwide enthusiasm for the ideas of communism and the achievements of the USSR in building a new socialist society, to which the propaganda of the Stalinist regime had contributed in no small measure. The author examines the activities of the Soviet secret services, which established an extensive covert network in the United States during those years. Members of the underground were collecting information, primarily in the field of the latest military technologies, including the secrets of the production of the atomic bomb. While the history of intelligence professionals has been sufficiently studied, the work of their American voluntary agents is less known. There were many communists and sympathisers among them; a significant proportion were Russian immigrants. The aim of the article is to explore their views, behavioural motives, and subsequent fate. The study draws on records from American and Russian archives opened to researchers in the 1990s: previously classified Soviet diplomatic correspondence, which, after being decrypted by the Venona project, was recognised as a communication channel between intelligence in the United States and the centre in Moscow; it was supplemented by the so-called “Vassiliev Notebooks”, containing documents from the archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service (formerly the First Directorate of the KGB) as well as records from the Comintern archive at the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI). New sources offer a more comprehensive picture of the scale and methods of Soviet intelligence work, the activities of American agents, and allow to answer a number of questions that have caused controversy among historians, including the guilt of the Rosenbergs in the theft of nuclear secrets and whether Alger Hiss, a high-ranking US State Department official, was a Soviet intelligence agent.
44
MONTERO FERNÁNDEZ, JUAN. "Intercesores, refugiados, política, dinero y espías: Expediente Mouse. FEBRERO-AGOSTO 1945." Minius, no. 28 (February 20, 2024): 135–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.35869/mns.v0i28.4705.
Full textAbstract:
Un objetivo de Inteligencia a comienzos de 1945 fue la localización e intervención de bienes y activos alemanes, ocultos bajo diversas formas en los países neutrales, así como la eliminación de cualquier organización clandestina nazi concebida para la posguerra. El Ejecutivo de Operaciones Especiales británico (Special Operations Executive-SOE) se encontraba al mismo tiempo en un proceso de cambio y adaptación, que afectaba incluso a su continuidad como servicio secreto con estatuto propio. En febrero de 1945 impulsó una misión en Suiza, que combinaba la acción clandestina y la captación de Inteligencia, en coordinación con el Servicio Secreto de Inteligencia (Secret Intelligence Services-SIS). Tuvo por finalidad investigar e infiltrarse en determinado tráfico de personas y capitales hacia Suiza, controlado por alemanes a través de conexiones suizas. La trama presentaba conexiones con las liberaciones de judíos de los campos nazis a cambio del pago de rescates. El presente trabajo revisa la participación de Jean-Marie Musy en la supuesta red, los objetivos y resultados de la operación, así como su oportunidad y conveniencia. Se ha recurrido a investigaciones y bibliografía específica comparada y al análisis de fuentes documentales provenientes de los archivos británico y estadounidense.
45
ALDRICH, RICHARD J. "Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence." Review of International Studies 35, no. 4 (October 2009): 889–902. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210509990337.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe world of intelligence has grown exponentially over the last decade. This article suggests that prevailing explanation of this expansion – the spectre of ‘new terrorism’ – reflects serious misunderstandings. Much of the emergency legislation which has extended the power of the state so remarkably was already sitting in the pending trays of officials in the late 1990s. Instead, the rise of both the ‘new terrorism’ and its supposed nemesis – the secret state – both owe more to long-term structural factors. Globalisation has accelerated a wide range of sub-military transnational threats, of which the ‘new terrorism’ is but one example. Meanwhile the long-promised engines of global governance are nowhere in sight. In their absence, the underside of a globalising world is increasingly policed by ‘vigilant states’ that resort to a mixture of military power and intelligence power in an attempt to address these problems. Yet the intelligence services cannot meet the improbable demands for omniscience made by governments, nor can they square their new enforcer role with vocal demands by global civil society for improved ethical practice.
46
Gashi, Mr Sc Bahri. "Theoretical concepts about "Intelligence" - practices and standards in democratic societies." ILIRIA International Review 3, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.21113/iir.v3i1.111.
Full textAbstract:
My thesis consists of theoretical analysis on the need for recognition of academic concepts to shape and design research field intelligence community activity, careful analysis of the terms and concepts that are strongly linked to intelligence work methodology, theoretical aspects description given practice best to regulate this specific area in our academic studies, has made the study to take proper shape with bold shades of comparative empirical analysis.My study aims to summarize, to analyze existing approaches and break the "taboo theories," floats mysteriously present new knowledge, summed up in this multidisciplinary field study, now theories only considering the nature of scientific thought for recognition theoretical concepts and legal regulation best practice intelligence services in democratic societies.emocratic societies. Treatment of this complex matter such as "intelligent services submission principle" of democracy is very difficult. Is between the concept of democracy is to be open and transparent, and intelligent service logic in the concept is to be closed and secret. Generally in "strategic studies and Peace” security for the creation of "security system" argued by the authors Buzan and Herring. Concept Intelligent based on the theory: "The essence of intelligence is the adequate response to a stimulus." Is the essence of this analysis?
47
Zaichenko, Olga. "“Russian Spy” Schweitzer: An Attempt at Biography Reconstruction. Agent of the High Military Secret Police in Warsaw (1819–1831)." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 1 (2023): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640020835-6.
Full textAbstract:
In the early 1830s, in order to wage a political and information war on Polish emigrants and the European opposition, the formation of Russian foreign intelligence as a unified state service with an extensive network of agents on the basis of the Third Section began. The head of the Russian residence in Germany from 1833 to 1839, Baron Karl Ferdinandovich von Schweitzer, was one of its founders. The structure he created, as well as the forms and methods of intelligence work he put in place, had a major impact on the subsequent development of the security services in Russia. However, little is still known about the man. Even his real name and date of birth remain unknown to scholars. He surrounded himself with secrecy already during his lifetime. This applies first and foremost to the first period of it, associated with his service with the Higher Military Secret Police in Warsaw in the 1820s. In the absence of direct evidence of his life and work, the author makes a first-ever attempt in historiography to reconstruct the circumstances of Schweitzer's biography and service in the secret police of the Viceroy of the Kingdom of Poland up to 1831, based on circumstantial evidence. Using the example of Schweitzer's undercover work, the author attempts to reconstruct the structure of the Russian foreign intelligence service, methods of conspiracy, recruitment, surveillance and analytical processing of the information obtained. The article also provides examples of the most successful operations in which the agent, who at that time bore the name of de Schwegrois, was involved. The study draws on archival documents of the Third Section and the Higher Military Secret Police in Warsaw, as well as memoirs of contemporaries and publications in the Polish émigré press.
48
Spustek, Henryk, and Witold Graca. "Rola byłych funkcjonariuszy komunistycznych służb specjalnych w cywilnym wywiadzie i kontrwywiadzie Polski i Czech w latach 1989– 2018." Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 41, no. 1 (April 17, 2019): 95–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.41.1.6.
Full textAbstract:
THE ROLE OF FORMER COMMUNIST SECRET OFFICERS IN THE CIVIL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN POLAND AND IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, 1989–2018 Czech civilian special services after 1989 were built by former officers of the communist services. In Poland and in the Czech Republic, at least at the beginning of the changes, participation in the services of members of the democratic opposition was symbolic. The officers of the communist services in both countries were gradually removed during subsequent reorganizations in the years 1990–2018. In the Czech Republic they have not been completely removed to this day. The Czech authorities deprived them of financial powers acquired in the service of a totalitarian system. The Polish authorities also deprived former security officers of the privileges acquired in service before systemic changes and additionally those already acquired at work for a democratic state. However, the financial severity of both solutions is incomparable due to differences in pension systems of uniformed services between both countries.
49
Stafford, David, and Douglas Porch. "The French Secret Services: A History of French Intelligence from the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War." Journal of Military History 60, no. 1 (January 1996): 195. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944487.
Full text
50
Christison, Kathleen. "Israel Undercover, Part II: Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. . Ian Black, Benny Morris." Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 2 (January 1992): 104–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.1992.21.2.00p0098b.
Full text