Journal articles: 'Second mover'

1

Gal-Or, Esther. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages." International Economic Review 26, no. 3 (October 1985): 649. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526710.

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Kopel, Michael, and Clemens Löffler. "Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage." Journal of Economics 94, no. 2 (March 14, 2008): 143–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0004-4.

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Smirnov, Vladimir, and Andrew Wait. "Preemption with a second-mover advantage." Games and Economic Behavior 129 (September 2021): 294–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.003.

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Tran, Vinh Du, David S. Sibley, and Simon Wilkie. "Second Mover Advantage and Entry Timing." Journal of Industrial Economics 60, no. 3 (September 2012): 517–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00490.x.

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Im Sun Young and Kangsik Choi. "Vertical Structure, Strategic Trade Policy, Exporting Firm’s First-mover and Second-mover Advantages." Journal of International Trade & Commerce 10, no. 6 (December 2014): 239–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.16980/jitc.10.6.201412.239.

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Hoppe, Heidrun C., and Ulrich Lehmann-Grube. "Second-Mover Advantages in Dynamic Quality Competition." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 10, no. 3 (August 1, 2001): 419–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/105864001316908008.

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Hoppe, Heidrun C., and Ulrich Lehmann-Grube. "Second-Mover Advantages in Dynamic Quality Competition." Journal of Economics Management Strategy 10, no. 3 (September 2001): 419–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00419.x.

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Choi, Kangsik, DongJoon Lee, and Seonyoung Lim. "Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure." Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 26, no. 5 (December 8, 2016): 612–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2016.1262892.

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Dluhosch, Barbara. "The Second-Mover Advantage in International Trade Negotiations." Global Economy Journal 10, no. 1 (February 19, 2010): 1850187. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1528.

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The paper explores incentives of national trade representatives (TRs) in international negotiations when trade policy basically follows a non-cooperative track with countries imposing tariffs on each other's exports due to "terms of trade cum international political economy" considerations. The paper shows that negotiations might get stuck even if a limited form of mutual trade liberalization Pareto-dominates the initial Nash-equilibrium in trade policies. The dilemma is rooted in a second-mover advantage, which adds considerable inertia to the Nash equilibrium of protectionism. The second-mover advantage arises whenever the countries' tariffs are strategic complements, with the latter, in turn, conditional on the traded goods being complements in final demand.

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Kim, Jeong-Yoo, and Joon Yeop Kwon. "Strategic delegation and second mover advantage in duopoly." Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 30, no. 1 (January 2017): 732–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2017.1311227.

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Earley, Christine E., Vicky B. Hoffman, and Jennifer R. Joe. "Reducing Management’s Influence on Auditors’ Judgments: An Experimental Investigation of SOX 404 Assessments." Accounting Review 83, no. 6 (November 1, 2008): 1461–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.6.1461.

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ABSTRACT: Auditors often receive summary information or conclusions from management about account balances or internal controls. They must then gather evidence to assess whether this information is fairly stated. In such situations, management can be considered the “first mover” and the auditor the “second mover.” When auditors are the second mover, they are vulnerable to the curse of knowledge bias—the inability to ignore previously processed information (Fischhoff 1977). Specifically, because information from management could be incorrect or biased, auditors must arrive at an independent evaluation of the item in question (e.g., year-end book values, accounting estimates, or internal controls). This study examines the general issue of auditors being “second movers” by investigating how their awareness of management’s severity classifications of internal control problems influences auditors’ initial assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) under Auditing Standard No. 2. Our experimental design allows us to determine that management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments is an unintentional cognitive effect, rather than an intentional use of management’s classifications. We further examine whether cognitively restructuring the ICFR assessment task reduces management’s influence on auditors’ judgments by asking auditors to evaluate and explicitly document the likelihood and magnitude of the effect of an ICFR problem on the financial statements. We find that cognitively restructuring the task mitigates management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments.

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Ridinger, Garret. "Intentions versus Outcomes: Cooperation and Fairness in a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma with Nature." Games 12, no. 3 (July 22, 2021): 58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12030058.

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This paper investigates the importance of concerns about intentions and outcomes in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with nature. In the game, there is a chance that the first mover’s choice is reversed. This allows the separation of intended actions from the resulting outcomes. Equilibrium predictions from theoretical models of fairness are tested experimentally by varying the chance the first mover’s choice is reversed and whether the second mover observes the first mover’s choice. The results show that second mover cooperation is higher when the first mover has little control over their choice and when the second mover is not told what the first mover chose. While subject behavior is consistent with concerns for both intentions and outcomes, the results indicate that these concerns work in ways not predicted by current theoretical models. In addition, I find that psychometric measures of empathic concern and perspective taking are correlated with second mover cooperation and provide potential explanations for the experimental results.

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Friedman, Alex. "A second-order implicit particle mover with adjustable damping." Journal of Computational Physics 90, no. 2 (October 1990): 292–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0021-9991(90)90168-z.

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Amir, Rabah, and Anna Stepanova. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly." Games and Economic Behavior 55, no. 1 (April 2006): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004.

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Shoul, Hamed, Mehran Ameri, and S. M. Hojjat Mohammadi. "Thermodynamic Investigation of Integrated Air Cycle Refrigeration Systems." International Journal of Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration 25, no. 02 (April 11, 2017): 1750016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s201013251750016x.

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An analysis of air cycle refrigeration (ACR) systems based on the first and second laws of thermodynamics has been carried out. Cooling the gas cooler outlet enhances the system efficiency, hence the use of integrated refrigeration systems (IRSs). The IRS consists of an ACR, an absorption chiller and a prime mover. The waste heat from the prime mover operates the absorption chiller, which provides additional cooling that is used to cool down the air exiting the gas cooler. LiBr-H2O and NH3-H2O are used as fluid pairs in absorption section. The prime mover can either be gas turbine or solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC). Results indicate that an IRS with NH3-H2O and two recuperators has a better first and second law efficiency compared to other considered systems. It is also concluded that the energy utilization factor and second law efficiency are higher for the system with SOFC as a prime mover.

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Weiss, Moritz. "How to become a first mover? Mechanisms of military innovation and the development of drones." European Journal of International Security 3, no. 2 (October 17, 2017): 187–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.15.

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AbstractStates generate the hardware of military power by either developing new technologies as first mover or adopting demonstrated technology as second mover. Given that military drones have arguably demonstrated effectiveness and thus proliferate, scholars have produced profound insights into today’s second mover dynamics. Yet, the preceding political process of developing this military technology remains poorly understood. The article’s objective is to explain how states become first movers of military hardware. To this end, it applies four causal mechanisms of military innovation studies to the historical trajectory of the development of drones. I argue that security threats initially formed state interests in drones. Yet, capacity was necessary for success. Politically induced transfers and cross-sector diffusion supplied technological progress. At the same time, distributional implications and legacy systems constrained the development process, but could ultimately be overcome. This mechanismic pathway results from the process-tracing analysis of two separate, but related trajectories in Israel and the United States since the 1970s. Given within-case variation, a sequencing and domain-of-application perspective allows the formulation of scope conditions of the mechanisms behind military innovation. This contributes to a historically contingent, yet generalisable, understanding of the political process of how states generate military power.

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Cahyadi, Danang D., Yoga N. Adhitama, Ikhsan Setiawan, and Agung B. S. Utomo. "Experimental Study of Resonance Frequency at Prime Mover Thermoacoustic Standing Wave." Journal of Physics: Theories and Applications 1, no. 2 (October 29, 2017): 157. http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/jphystheor-appl.v1i2.19316.

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<p class="Abstract">Thermoacoustic prime movers work by using thermal energy to produce acoustic energy in the form of sound wave through thermoacoustic effect which occurs in a porous medium called stack. This paper describes an experimental study on the relation between the order of resonance frequencies generated by a thermoacoustic prime mover and the length of the resonator and the viscous penetration depth. Extending the resonator length will decreasing the resonance frequency which result in the increasing in the viscous penetration depth. Generally, the generated sound consists of only one frequency, that is the first-order one. However, under certain conditions, the sound has only the second-order frequency or comprises two frequencies of the first-order and second-order resonance frequencies. This phenomenon can be explained by considering the comparison between the effective hydraulic radius of stack () and the viscous penetration depth (). It is found that the first-order frequency appears when , while when (with calculated by using the first-order frequency) then the second order frequency is produced so that is back to a smaller value and therefore the condition of is recovered. In addition, when of the thermoacoustic prime mover will<em> </em>generate the first and second order frequencies together.</p>

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Feng, Haiyang, Zhengrui Jiang, Minqiang Li, and Nan Feng. "First- or Second-Mover Advantage? The Case of IT-Enabled Platform Markets." MIS Quarterly 44, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 1107–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.25300/misq/2020/15273).

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GROENERT, VALESKA, and BEN ZISSIMOS. "Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition Over Environmental Standards and Taxes." Journal of Public Economic Theory 15, no. 5 (June 28, 2013): 700–728. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12049.

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20

Hoppe, Heidrun C. "Second-mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty." International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, no. 2 (February 2000): 315–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(98)00020-4.

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Yong, Soo Keong, and Stuart McDonald. "Emissions tax and second-mover advantage in clean technology R&D." Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 20, no. 1 (April 22, 2017): 89–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10018-017-0185-6.

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Shinkai, Tetsuya. "Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information." Journal of Economic Theory 90, no. 2 (February 2000): 293–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2608.

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23

Yoon, Young-Ro. "Endogenous timing of actions under conflict between two types of second mover advantage." International Journal of Industrial Organization 27, no. 6 (November 2009): 728–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.04.001.

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24

CARPENTER, G., and K. NAKAMOTO. "Impact of Consumer Preference Formation on Marketing Objectives and Competitive Second Mover Strategies." Journal of Consumer Psychology 5, no. 4 (1996): 325–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327663jcp0504_02.

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25

Reinganum, Jennifer F. "A two-stage model of research and development with endogenous second-mover advantages." International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, no. 3 (September 1985): 275–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(85)90024-4.

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Kwon, H. J., S. G. Kim, Y. S. Han, H. Ha, A. Seo, M. K. Kang, J. M. Chun, G. S. Yoon, and Y. J. Hwang. "Laparoscopy-assisted pylorus preserving pancreatoduodenectomy for periampullary disease: early experience of second mover." HPB 20 (September 2018): S664. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.hpb.2018.06.2306.

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DZIUBIŃSKI, MARCIN, DEBABRATA DATTA, and JAIDEEP ROY. "A LOCATION GAME ON DISJOINT CIRCLES." International Game Theory Review 11, no. 04 (December 2009): 391–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919890900239x.

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Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N > K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in the first round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.

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Ordóñez, Lucía Martínez, and Jörg Schimmelpfennig. "The War against the Taliban." International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences 6, no. 3 (July 2015): 18–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsds.2015070102.

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Operation Enduring Freedom was hampered by a chronic shortage of attack helicopters available to ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Tactical operations into Taliban-held territory were launched even though close air support capable of dealing with “danger close” situations could not be assigned in advance. It led to significant ISAF casualties if the Taliban decided to fight back rather than withdraw. Departing from a Clausewitz-style, i.e. second-mover advantage, mixed-strategy equilibrium and taking account of the “Irregular Warfare” nature of the pay-offs, the paper looks into the existence of strategic moves. In particular, as playing a mixed strategy if rotary wing air support is unavailable merely incentivises a more aggressive Taliban response to any kind of operation due to the information asymmetry, it is argued that by moving away from the mixed-strategy equilibrium ISAF casualties in properly supported operations could be reduced, thus handing a first-mover advantage to ISAF.

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Pofantis, Ermis, Erwin Neher, and Thomas Dresbach. "Regulation of a subset of release-ready vesicles by the presynaptic protein Mover." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 3 (January 11, 2021): e2022551118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022551118.

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Neurotransmitter release occurs by regulated exocytosis from synaptic vesicles (SVs). Evolutionarily conserved proteins mediate the essential aspects of this process, including the membrane fusion step and priming steps that make SVs release-competent. Unlike the proteins constituting the core fusion machinery, the SV protein Mover does not occur in all species and all synapses. Its restricted expression suggests that Mover may modulate basic aspects of transmitter release and short-term plasticity. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed synaptic transmission electrophysiologically at the mouse calyx of Held synapse in slices obtained from wild-type mice and mice lacking Mover. Spontaneous transmission was unaffected, indicating that the basic release machinery works in the absence of Mover. Evoked release and vesicular release probability were slightly reduced, and the paired pulse ratio was increased in Mover knockout mice. To explore whether Mover’s role is restricted to certain subpools of SVs, we analyzed our data in terms of two models of priming. A model assuming two SV pools in parallel showed a reduced release probability of so-called “superprimed vesicles” while “normally primed” ones were unaffected. For the second model, which holds that vesicles transit sequentially from a loosely docked state to a tightly docked state before exocytosis, we found that knocking out Mover selectively decreased the release probability of tight state vesicles. These results indicate that Mover regulates a subclass of primed SVs in the mouse calyx of Held.

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Rasmusen, Eric, and Young-Ro Yoon. "First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets." Journal of Industrial Economics 60, no. 3 (September 2012): 374–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00487.x.

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Zhu, Wenge, and Xiaohui Eva Xu. "Second-Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective." Managerial and Decision Economics 32, no. 8 (September 29, 2011): 527–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1552.

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Nelson, H. James. "Visible IT in Credit Unions." Information Resources Management Journal 24, no. 1 (January 2011): 14–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/irmj.2011010102.

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Research indicates that rapidly evolving technology and markets do not provide a first mover strategic advantage but favor the second mover. This paper introduces a third variable: hype. In a time of rapid technology and market evolution, hype overrides the expected results and gives the first mover a strategic advantage. This study examines a homogeneous set of medium-sized information-dependent and information-intensive organizations as they implement visible information technology in two eras: during a time of intense hype and during a more normal time where technology has become commonplace. One hundred matched triples of credit unions were examined as they chose to remain offline, implement an informational website, or implement a transactional website during the highly hyped Internet expansion time of 1998 through 2002. One hundred matched pairs of credit unions were then examined during the more normal time from 2003 through 2007. Results indicate that credit unions that embraced the hyped technology gained significant strategic advantage. Second-moving credit unions that waited for the more mature technology survived, whereas the credit unions that did not adopt the technology were at a significant strategic disadvantage.

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Antler, Yair, Daniel Bird, and Santiago Oliveros. "Sequential Learning." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15, no. 1 (February 1, 2023): 399–433. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200352.

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We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fabricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project’s quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strategies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabricated and a later stage in which evidence is always authentic. Our findings shed light on the dynamics of R&D, quality assurance, and drug approval. (JEL D82, D83, L15)

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Paridaens, Richard, Smaine Kouidri, and Fathi Jebali Jerbi. "Time-averaged second-order pressure and velocity measurements in a pressurized oscillating flow prime mover." Journal of Mechanical Science and Technology 30, no. 11 (November 2016): 4971–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12206-016-0727-z.

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Kleine, Fabian, Manfred Königstein, and Balázs Rozsnyói. "Voluntary Leadership and Asymmetric Endowments in the Investment Game." Games 9, no. 3 (July 21, 2018): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030051.

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We experimentally investigate variants of the investment game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), in which one of the two players decides who are first mover and second mover. It has been shown by Kleine, Königstein, and Rozsnyói (2014) that voluntary leadership increases both investment and backtransfer. We interpret voluntary leadership as a signal of cooperation that stimulates reciprocal cooperation. If a relatively rich player takes the lead (putting himself/herself under investment risk) this should be seen as a less strong signal of cooperation than taking the lead among equally endowed players. Indeed, we show that under asymmetric endowments, voluntary leadership has a weaker effect than under symmetric endowments.

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Maaravi, Yossi, and Aharon Levy. "When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer." Judgment and Decision Making 12, no. 5 (September 2017): 420–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s193029750000646x.

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AbstractThe literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people’s initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2–4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none — it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue.

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Ramseyer, Amandine, Bernard Thierry, and Odile Petit. "Decision-making in group departures of female domestic geese." Behaviour 146, no. 3 (2009): 351–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853909x410955.

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AbstractGroup-living animals have to make trade-offs to reach consensus and travel together. We investigated the recruitment processes underpinning decision-making at departure in a group of 20 female domestic geese (Anser domesticus) kept in semi-free-range conditions. Two observers continuously videotaped the behaviours of the birds. Data were analyzed using multiple regression analyses. We found that decision-making was a continuous and distributed process. Departure was preceded by an increase in the arousal state of group members and their initial orientation influenced recruitment. Patterns of group movement could be predicted from the behaviours of individuals before departure. Individuals' locations, moves and signals could act as passive or communicative cues. A higher number of vocalisations and arousal behaviours led to a larger number of individuals recruited. Some individuals were more efficient than others in recruiting followers but any geese could initiate a movement. First movers recruited a higher number of mates when they had a greater number of neighbours. Not only the first mover but also the behaviours of the second and third movers prompted further individuals to follow. There was no evidence that geese were able to intentionally recruit others, rather they synchronized and adjusted each other's motives until reaching a consensus.

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HAUSKEN, KJELL. "ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETERRENCE IN SEQUENTIAL COLONEL BLOTTO GAMES." International Game Theory Review 14, no. 02 (June 2012): 1250011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500119.

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A sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with fixed and variable resources is analyzed. With fixed resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we show for the common ratio form contest success function that the second mover is never deterred. This stands in contrast to Powell's (Games and Economic Behavior67(2), 611–615) finding where the second mover can be deterred. With variable resources both players exert efforts in both sequential and simultaneous games, whereas fixed resources cause characteristics of all battlefields or rents to impact efforts for each battlefield. With variable resources only characteristics of a given battlefield impact efforts are to win that battlefield because of independence across battlefields. Fixed resources impact efforts and hence differences in unit effort costs are less important. In contrast, variable resources cause differences in unit effort costs to be important. The societal implication is that resource constrained opponents can be expected to engage in warfare, whereas an advantaged player with no resource constraints can prevent warfare.

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Leseure, Michel, Dawn Robins, Graham Wall, and Dylan Jones. "Making the most out of renewable energy opportunities." International Journal of Energy Sector Management 13, no. 1 (April 1, 2019): 212–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijesm-02-2017-0011.

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Purpose Offshore renewable energy technologies provide many new opportunities for coastal regions around the world, and although the energy policy literature has documented the success stories of many “first mover” regions, there is little guidance for “second mover” or “follower” regions. This paper aims to investigate the strategic challenges faced by coastal regions in the Channel area that are not first movers. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a multiple case study approach to analyse the behaviour of regional stakeholders when planning and assessing their participation in the renewable energy sector. Findings The paper reveals the tendency of regional planners to idealise investments in renewable energy. The negative consequences of idealisation are inadequate strategic visions. Research limitations/implications The findings are only relevant in the context of the regions that are part of the case study. Practical implications The paper illustrates how idealisation of technology or strategy is created and how it impacts strategic decision-making. It also discusses how to address idealisation. Social implications Although much of the energy policy literature discusses the challenge of social acceptance, this paper documents an opposite phenomenon, idealisation. There is a need in the energy sector to find a middle ground between these two extremes. Originality/value The paper provides evidence and a theoretical analysis of a decision-making bias, idealisation, which is not discussed in the literature.

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Abraham, Martin, and Natascha Nisic. "A simple mobility game for couples’ migration decisions and some quasi-experimental evidence." Rationality and Society 24, no. 2 (May 2012): 168–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463112440684.

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This paper develops a new theoretical model for couples’ migration decisions, called the mobility game. The model describes migration decisions as reliant on the strategic interdependence of two partners. The important implications of this model are as follows: first, under complete information, a household move is the ‘natural’ solution for stable couples; second, incomplete information allows the tied mover to ‘blackmail’ the partner and thus to avoid the household move; and third, the decision to commute will depend mostly on the preferences of the potential commuter. The hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework are empirically testable, although the necessary information is difficult to measure. The hypotheses are tested employing a quasi-experimental design known as factorial survey, which allows one to vary systematically the incentives for moving. The empirical results confirm the importance of both strategic reasoning and mechanisms for solving problems of cooperation within the partnership.

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LIPSCY, PHILLIP Y., and HIROFUMI TAKINAMI. "The Politics of Financial Crisis Response in Japan and the United States." Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, no. 3 (August 13, 2013): 321–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109913000133.

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AbstractWe examine the politics of financial crisis response in Japan and the United States. Many existing accounts of Japan's ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s have emphasized Japan-specific factors, such as structural problems, policy errors, and political dysfunction. We argue that Japan may have been subject to a form offirst-mover disadvantage. Like innovation in the private sector, developing effective solutions to novel policy problems requires a messy process of discovery, experimentation, and repeated failure. Much as late-industrializing countries adapted the methods and technologies of early developers, second-movers can apply effective policies demonstrated by first-movers in a more targeted, efficient, and rapid manner. We show that the behavior of Japan and the United States during their respective financial crises is broadly consistent with this theory. In addition, policy adoption in the United States most clearly reflected lessons from Japan in areas where the lessons were considered clear and implementation was less politicized.

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Song, Peijian, Cheng Zhang, Yunjie Xu, Ling Xue, Ke Wang, and Chenghong Zhang. "Asymmetric Interaction in Competitive Internet Technology Diffusion." Journal of Global Information Management 19, no. 3 (July 2011): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jgim.2011070103.

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This paper explores the diffusion of competitive Internet technology products in the context of competition between local and multinational corporations as well as how the diffusive interactions between technologies affect their dominance in electronic markets. Drawing on existing theories of innovation diffusion, and competitive dynamics, the authors adopted a new diffusion model that incorporates the influence of one technology’s adoption on the diffusion of other technology. The authors then validated the model using longitudinal field data of the two pairs of Internet technology products in Chinese electronic markets. The findings of this investigation suggest that Internet product diffusion can be better predicted by a competitive dynamic model than by an independent-diffusion-process model. Further, results indicate that the diffusive interaction between local and multinational corporations’ technologies can be a two-way asymmetric interaction. Such a pattern supports a conclusion of significant second-mover advantage for local online vendors in fast-growing emerging markets. The authors also examine the policy implications of these results, specifically with respect to how asymmetric interaction effects can help domestic online vendors gain second-mover advantage facing the entry of multinational corporations.

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Suzuki, Yutaka. "Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance: A Contract Theory Analysis." International Journal of Economics and Finance 10, no. 3 (February 3, 2018): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v10n3p93.

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This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of eurozone financial governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n Ministries of Finance as the first movers and the European Central Bank as the second mover, we show that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government spending, but that this will increase inflation, resulting in a decrease in the value of the euro. As these effects are shared equally by eurozone countries (cost sharing), an incentive to free-ride at the expense of other countries is present. We then analyze a penalty-based solution to the free-rider problem and derive a second-best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. The optimal solution shows that “limited sovereignty,” that is, substantially constrained fiscal sovereignty, should be imposed as a high marginal cost for the issuance of public debt. Finally, we close the paper by discussing the possibility of Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union).

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Holler, Manfred J. "The Two–dimensional Model of Jury Decision Making." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 28, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569210x15665367279354.

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Abstract This paper discusses a two-dimensional jury model. It combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model assumes a first mover, the plaintiff, and a second-mover, the counsel of the defendant. Typically, these agents represent parties that have conflicting interests. Here they face a jury that consists of three groups of voters such that no single group has a majority of votes. Each group is characterized by homogeneous preferences on three alternatives that describe the possible outcomes. The outcome is selected by a simple majority of the jury members. The agents are interested in both gaining the support of a majority of jury members and seeing their preferred alternative selected as outcome. It will be demonstrated that equilibrium decision making can be derived for this model.

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Moradian, Mohammadreza, Jafar Soltani, Gholam Reza Arab Markadeh, Hossein Shahinzadeh, and Yassine Amirat. "A New Grid-Connected Constant Frequency Three-Phase Induction Generator System under Unbalanced-Voltage Conditions." Electronics 10, no. 8 (April 14, 2021): 938. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics10080938.

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This paper presents a new constant frequency, direct grid-connected wind-based induction generator system (IGS). The proposed system includes a six-phase cage rotor with two separate three-phase balanced stator windings and a three-phase SV-PWM inverter which is used as a STATCOM. The first stator winding is connected to the STATCOM and is used to excite the machine. The main frequency of the STATCOM is considered to be constant and equal to the main grid frequency. In the second stator winding, the frequency of the induced emf is equal to the constant frequency, so the generator output frequency is independent of the load power demand and its prime mover speed. The second stator winding is directly connected to the main grid without an intermediate back-to-back converter. In order to regulate the IGS output active and reactive power components, a sliding mode control (SMC) is designed. Assuming unbalanced three-phase voltages for the main grid, a second SMC is developed to remove the machine output’s negative sequence currents. Moreover, a conventional PI controller is used to force the average exchanging active power between the machine and STATCOM to zero. This PI controller generates the reference value of the rotor angular speed. An adjustable speed pitch angle-controlled wind turbine is used as the IGS’s prime mover. The effectiveness and capability of the proposed control scheme have been supported by the simulation results.

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Bohnet, Iris, Bruno S. Frey, and Steffen Huck. "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding." American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 131–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401000211.

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Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. “More law,” it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation and find that economic incentives have a nonmonotonic effect on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities: Trustworthiness is “crowded in” with weak and “crowded out” with medium enforcement. In a laboratory experiment we test our model’s implications and find support for the crowding prediction. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly Communist countries.

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Thangjai, Warisa, Sa-Aat Niwitpong, and Suparat Niwitpong. "Bayesian Confidence Intervals for Coefficients of Variation of PM10 Dispersion." Emerging Science Journal 5, no. 2 (April 1, 2021): 139–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.28991/esj-2021-01264.

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Herein, we propose the Bayesian approach for constructing the confidence intervals for both the coefficient of variation of a log-normal distribution and the difference between the coefficients of variation of two log-normal distributions. For the first case, the Bayesian approach was compared with large-sample, Chi-squared, and approximate fiducial approaches via Monte Carlo simulation. For the second case, the Bayesian approach was compared with the method of variance estimates recovery (MOVER), modified MOVER, and approximate fiducial approaches using Monte Carlo simulation. The results show that the Bayesian approach provided the best approach for constructing the confidence intervals for both the coefficient of variation of a log-normal distribution and the difference between the coefficients of variation of two log-normal distributions. To illustrate the performances of the confidence limit construction approaches with real data, they were applied to analyze real PM10 datasets from the Nan and Chiang Mai provinces in Thailand, the results of which are in agreement with the simulation results. Doi: 10.28991/esj-2021-01264 Full Text: PDF

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Yan, Ruixia, Liangui Peng, Yanxi Xie, and Xiaoli Wang. "Rough Set-Game Theory Information Mining Model Considering Opponents’ Information." Electronics 11, no. 2 (January 13, 2022): 244. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics11020244.

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In multi-strategy games, the increase in the number of strategies makes it difficult to make a solution. To maintain the competition advantage and obtain maximal profits, one side of the game hopes to predict the opponent’s behavior. Building a model to predict an opponent’s behavior is helpful. In this paper, we propose a rough set-game theory model (RS-GT) considering uncertain information and the opponent’s decision rules. The uncertainty of strategies is obtained based on the rough set method, and an accurate solution is obtained based on game theory from the rough set-game theory model. The players obtain their competitors’ decision rules to predict the opponents’ behavior by mining the information from repeated games in the past. The players determine their strategy to obtain maximum profits by predicting the opponent’s actions, i.e., adopting a first-mover or second-mover strategy to build a favorable situation. The result suggests that the rough set-game theory model helps enterprises avoid unnecessary losses and allows them to obtain greater profits.

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BUISSON, BERNARD, and PHILIPPE SILBERZAHN. "BLUE OCEAN OR FAST-SECOND INNOVATION? A FOUR-BREAKTHROUGH MODEL TO EXPLAIN SUCCESSFUL MARKET DOMINATION." International Journal of Innovation Management 14, no. 03 (June 2010): 359–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1363919610002684.

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Innovation is widely recognized as a major driver of long-term corporate growth. Successful innovators who manage to dominate new markets enjoy Schumpeterian rents for their inventions. How then can a firm dominate a new market? Two streams of literature have proposed opposite answers to this question. The First Mover approach indicates that by setting up a strong differentiation strategy, companies are supposed to create a new area where profits abound. This approach is supported especially by Kim and Mauborgne (2004) who coined the term Blue Ocean to describe it. The Fast Second approach, defended by Markides and Geroski (2005), contends, on the contrary, that companies should not try to become pioneers, but should target the newly created market in second position, and colonize it. But neither Blue Ocean nor Fast Second are able to convincingly explain successful market domination. Our study of 24 innovation cases suggests that innovation which leads to market domination is instead achieved by using four kinds of breakthroughs, separately of simultaneously.

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van der Weele, Joël J., Julija Kulisa, Michael Kosfeld, and Guido Friebel. "Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior?" American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 3 (August 1, 2014): 256–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.3.256.

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We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior. (JEL C72, D64, Z13)

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Journal articles on the topic 'Second mover'

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