Journal articles on the topic 'Scientific anti-realism'
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Vickers, Peter. "Resisting scientific anti-realism." Metascience 29, no. 1 (January 14, 2020): 11–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00487-2.
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Psillos, Stathis. "Resisting scientific anti-realism." Metascience 29, no. 1 (January 16, 2020): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00488-1.
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Park, Seungbae. "The Anti-induction for Scientific Realism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 95, no. 3 (August 7, 2018): 329–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000044.
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In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.
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Zamora Bonilla, Jesús P. "Realism versus anti-realism: philosophical problem or scientific concern?" Synthese 196, no. 10 (December 21, 2015): 3961–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0988-6.
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Vihalemm, Rein. "Philosophy of Chemistry against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism." Philosophia Scientae, no. 19-1 (March 1, 2015): 99–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1055.
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Seager, William. "Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, no. 1 (January 1988): 181–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.1.192984.
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Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A. "Réalisme et fictionalisme chez Claude Bernard." Dialogue 38, no. 4 (1999): 719–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006685.
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ABSTRACTIan Hacking puts forward a distinction between two kinds of scientific realism. According to scientific realism about theories, scientific theories are accepted as approximately true; according to scientific realism about unobservable entities, the theoretical terms occurring in scientific theories refer to existing, real entities. This article seeks to show that Claude Bernard's philosophy of science is a realist one about scientific theories, but anti-realist about unobservable entities. The term “fictionalism” is used here to stand for this sort of anti-realism about unobservable entities.
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Wiltsche, Harald A. "What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?" Inquiry 55, no. 2 (April 2012): 105–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2012.661572.
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Seager, William E. "SCIENTIFIC ANTI-REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 2 (April 1986): 136–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1986.tb00270.x.
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Agazzi, E. "The problems of scientific realism today." Philosophy of Science and Technology 27, no. 2 (2022): 20–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-20-30.
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The article describes scientific realism and the debate around this position. It shows that initially (in the scholastic tradition) the debate between realists and antirealists was purely ontological, since it was accepted that when we know, we know the real − knowledge cannot be anything other than knowledge of the real. The question about the reality of the object of our knowledge, about whether the world beyond our representations is equal to the world we represent to ourselves, distinguishes modern philosophy from classical philosophy and arises from the claim that we know our representations and not the real. A twofold problem is formed: first, to demonstrate the existence of the world beyond our representations, and second, to demonstrate that that the knowledge we have constitutes precisely the knowledge of the world in which we live and is, in fact, actual knowledge, not chimer. Thus the problem of realism takes on an almost exclusively epistemological meaning. Nevertheless, contemporary realistic positions often confuse ontological and epistemological theses, which leads to internal contradictions. The same is true of the proponents of anti-realist views. The question of the causes of the anti-realistic tendency in the philosophy of science is raised and it is shown that the initial attitude of the modern science was realistic. It was undermined, on the one hand, by anti-realistic interpretations of the cognitive process (starting from Kant), on the other hand, by difficulties of theoretical order arisen in physics, and the main thing was that science began to deal with the unobservable, undermining the cognitive basis of radical empiricism. However, the new cognitive situation does not necessarily lead to anti-realism, another way of development relies on an understanding of the complexity and problematic relationship between theory and experience. A number of reasons in favor of scientific realism are concluded.
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McArthur, Dan. "Reconsidering Structural Realism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 4 (December 2003): 517–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716553.
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In the lengthy debate over the question of scientific realism one of the least discussed positions is structural realism. However, this position ought to attract critical attention because it purports to preserve the central insights of the best arguments for both realism and anti-realism. John Worrall has in fact described it as being ‘the best of both worlds’ that recognizes the discontinuous nature of scientific change as well as the ‘no-miracles’ argument for scientific realism. However, the validity of this claim has been called into question by Stathis Psillos. He questions its ability to correctly account for the examples of scientific change that its supporters, like Worrall (following Poincaré), claim ought to be understood in a structural realist light.In this paper I examine these arguments for and against structural realism and demonstrate that neither Worrall nor Psillos is fully correct. I agree with Psillos’ claim that realism with regards to a theory ought not to be ‘all or nothing,’ that one should not always take the whole of a theory to be true or else commit only to the belief in its directly empirical content.
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Mcarthur, Dan. "The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice." Foundations of Science 11, no. 4 (December 2006): 369–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-005-3198-8.
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Sambrotta, Mirco. "Scientific Models and Metalinguistic Negotiation." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34, no. 2 (September 25, 2019): 277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18298.
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The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility that, at least, some metaphysical debates are ‘metalinguistic negotiations’ (to employ a recent term coined by David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell). I will take the dispute between the dominant approaches of realism and the anti-realism ones (especially Fictionalism) about the ontological status of scientific models as a case-study. I will argue that such a debate may be better understood as a disagreement, at bottom normatively, motivated, insofar as a normative and non-factual question may be involved in it: how the relevant piece of language ought to be used. Even though I will generally assess the prospects for a broadly deflationist approach, I shall outline a sense in which the dispute can be recast as ‘minimally substantive’.
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Machaj, Mateusz. "Menger’s Anti-Historical Method Versus the Neoclassical Anti-Historical Method." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 57, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 65–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2019-0004.
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Abstract Due to the famous methodenstreit it is often well argued that Menger’s approach to social sciences can be seen as anti-historical, as according to him pure empirical studies are insufficient to establish a firm economic theory. By suggesting that some theorems have to precede historical studies, Menger may be seen as a representative of the a priori tradition in scientific method. The modern method in the mainstream of economic thinking is also to a large extent anti-historical and a priori, but because of its lack of realism and extensive reliance on very limiting assumptions. The main strength of the Mengerian anti-historical approach is lesser faith in imaginary constructs, implying a higher degree of realism in theorizing.
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Silva, Bruno Malavolta e. "Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?" Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, no. 2 (December 16, 2019): 175–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175.
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Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice.
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Frost-Arnold, Greg. "Can the Pessimistic Induction be Saved from Semantic Anti-Realism about Scientific Theory?" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 521–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt013.
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Arroyo, Raoni Wohnrath, and Gilson Olegario da Silva. "Taking models seriously and being a linguistic realist." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 26, no. 1 (June 7, 2022): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84309.
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Carnap’s conception of linguistic frameworks is widespread; however, it is not entirely clear nor consensual to pinpoint what is the influence in his stance within the traditional realist/anti-realist debate. In this paper, we place Carnap as a proponent of a scientific realist stance, by presenting what he called “linguistic realism”. Some possible criticisms are considered, and a case study is offered with wave function realism, a popular position in the philosophy of quantum mechanics.
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Chiarotti Sardi, Gabriel. "Seria o argumento das anomalias não-observadas um problema para o antirrealismo científico?" Sofia 11, no. 2 (October 19, 2022): e11239179. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.39179.
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Neste breve ensaio viso oferecer uma apresentação à tradução do artigo “O problema das anomalias não-observadas” de Seungbae Park, publicado nesta edição da revista Sofia. No texto supracitado, Park apresenta um novo argumento contra o antirrealismo científico: o argumento das anomalias não-observadas (ou não-concebidas), que se trata de forma de indução pessimista inspirada no argumento das alternativas não-concebidas de Kyle Stanford. Argumento que, embora o argumento de Park seja engenhoso, ele não é um problema considerável ao antirrealismo, sendo, na verdade, mais problemático para o realismo científico. Abstract In this brief essay I aim to offer an introduction to the translation of the paper “The problem of unobserved anomalies” by Seungbae Park, published in this issue of Sofia journal. In the aforementioned article, Park presents a new argument against scientific anti-realism: the argument of unobserved (or unconceived) anomalies, which is a form of pessimistic induction inspired by Kyle Stanford's argument of unconceived alternatives. I argue that while Park's argument is interesting, it is not a considerable problem for anti-realism, and is, in fact, more problematic for scientific realism.
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Rouse, Joseph. "Beyond Realism and Antirealism ---At Last?" Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9, no. 1 (February 15, 2018): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26979.
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This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second consideration is that realists and antirealists undertake a mistaken, substantive commitment to a separation between mind and world, which allows them to frame the issue in terms of how epistemic “access” to the world is mediated. A third strategy for dissolving the realism question challenges its underlying commitment to the independence of meaning and truth, a strategy pursued in different ways by Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, John Haugeland, and myself. The fourth and most encompassing strategy shows that realists and antirealists are thereby committed to an objectionably antinaturalist conception of scientific understanding, in conflict with what the sciences themselves have to say about our own conceptual capacities.
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Westphal, Kenneth R. "Kant's Cognitive Semantics, Newton's Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism." Hegel Bulletin 32, no. 1-2 (2011): 27–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026352320000015x.
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Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasoncontains an original and powerful semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Here I argue that Kant's semantics directly and strongly supports Newton's Rule 4 of (natural) Philosophy in ways which support Newton's realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton's Rule 4 of Philosophy and its role in Newton's justification of realism about gravitational force (§II). Next I briefly summarize Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference (§III). I then show that the key point of Kant's cognitive semantics is embedded in and strongly supports Newton's Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (perHarper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§IV). Finally, I argue that Kant's semantics reveals a key defect in the original version of Bas van Fraassen's anti-realist ‘Constructive Empiricism’, and in many common objections to realism (§V). Fortunately, Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism; nothing I argue in this paper depends at all upon that doctrine.In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (Newton 1999: 796)
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Zachar, Peter. "The abandonment of latent variables: Philosophical considerations." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 2-3 (June 2010): 177–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000841.
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AbstractCramer et al.'s critique of latent variables implicitly advocates a type of scientific anti-realism which can be extended to many dispositional constructs in scientific psychology. However, generalizing Cramer et al.'s network model in this way raises concerns about its applicability to psychopathology. The model could be improved by articulating why a given cluster of symptoms should be considered disordered.
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BODANSKY, DANIEL. "Legal Realism and its Discontents." Leiden Journal of International Law 28, no. 2 (April 24, 2015): 267–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156515000072.
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AbstractThis article provides a brief overview of legal realism and sketches out its implications for international law, using international environmental law as an example. Although the ‘new’ legal realism is not especially new, its anti-formalist, pragmatic perspective still offers important insights about the international legal process, and serves as a useful counterpoint to a new variety of formalism, which continues to resist the social scientific study of international law. Among its distinctive elements, legal realism views international law instrumentally, is empirical in orientation, and focuses on the processes by which international law is developed, implemented, and enforced, rather than limiting itself to international law doctrine. The fear of critics is that, by de-emphasizing the internal point of view and the concept of legal validity, legal realism deprives international law of the very features that make it a distinctive enterprise.
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Guthrie, Shandon L. "How Not to Object to Demonic Realism." Religions 13, no. 7 (July 1, 2022): 610. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13070610.
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There are few academics today who actively argue against demonic realism. Much of this is perhaps due to the fact that there are comparably few defenders of such. This has created a vacuum for critics to comfortably object to the existence of demons without sophistication (for it is only in the professional exchange of ideas do bad arguments get weeded out and good arguments gain vitality). Add to this the common perception of demonology as an anti-intellectual superstition and we end up with a threshold for the success of anti-realist arguments to be set quite low. In this paper, I shall survey three of the most familiar objections to demonic realism to arise out of this skeptical intellectual environment: First, and most ambitiously, there is the impossibility of justified belief objection that proffers that belief in demons cannot even in principle be justified no matter how much (scientific) evidence there is. Alternative explanations are always to be preferred. Second, there is the demon-of-the-gaps objection (or category of objections) which insists that demonic realism is hastily posited as a pre-scientific explanation for physical, medical, and psychological mysteries. Third, there is what I call the ethical argument from scapegoating that questions the existence of demons on grounds that, if they in fact exist, such a fact would preclude moral responsibility and the possibility of retributive justice since we could never know if a bad actor was himself morally culpable for his own evils or if he was under the coercive influence of demonic agents. I argue that, despite their rhetorical appeal and kinship with the anti-supernatural sentiments of many academics today, these three arguments are not successful, for these are either based on egregious philosophical assumptions or assumptions about demonology few if any adopt.
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Lord, Timothy C. "Collingwood, Idealism, Realism, and the Possibility of Historical Knowledge." Journal of the Philosophy of History 11, no. 3 (November 7, 2017): 342–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341378.
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Abstract Collingwood argued that most theories of knowledge in English, up to his time, had been based on perception and scientific thinking; thus, if true, they made history impossible. So how is historical knowledge possible? Collingwood argued that only an idealistic philosophy can account for the possibility of historical knowledge. Consequently he integrated with his idealist theory of history a forceful and damaging critique of the “naive realism” of his day. In this paper I defend Collingwood’s idealist answer to this question, demonstrating how he hoped to broaden the scope of English epistemology through his anti-realist philosophy of history. I also analyze a recently theorized and purportedly more sophisticated form of historical realism which has been theorized by Chris Lorenz. Lorenz borrows Putnam’s notion of internal realism to argue for a historical realism which can account for knowledge of the real past. I argue that internal realism fails as historical realism. Collingwood’s idealism is a better response to relativism as well as naive realism than is internal realism. I conclude that Collingwood’s answer to the question of historical knowledge – which as I show, is Kantian in character – demanded of him, and perhaps demands of us today, a break with the dominant philosophies of perception, truth, and logic.
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Dusek, Val. "Ihde’s Instrumental Realism and the Marxist Account of Technology in Experimental Science." Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 12, no. 2 (2008): 105–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/techne20081227.
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Edgar Zilsel offers a Marxist account of the rise of experimental science avoiding both crude determinism and the anti-scientific bias of much “Western Marxism.” This account supplements Don Ihde’s instrumental realism with a social account of the systematic extension of perception by instrumentation. The social contact of non-literate craftspeople with purely intellectual scholars forged the social basis of what became technoscience.
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Little, Daniel. "Social Ontology De-dramatized." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51, no. 1 (May 12, 2020): 13–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393120916145.
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The article responds to Richard Lauer’s (2019) “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” The article concurs that “social ontology matters” for the conduct of research and theory in social science. It argues, however, that neither of the interpretations of the status of social ontology offered by Lauer is satisfactory (either apriori philosophical realism or pragmatist anti-realism). The article argues for a naturalized, fallibilist, and realist interpretation of the claims of social ontology and presents the field of social ontology as the most abstract edge of social-science theorizing, subject to broad empirical constraints. The approach taken is anti-foundationalist in both epistemology and metaphysics. Ontological theorizing is part of the extended scientific enterprise of understanding the social world. Claims about the nature of the social world are not different in kind from more specific sociological claims about social class or individual rationality, to be justified ultimately by the coherence and explanatory success of the theories they help to create. At the same time, it is justified to treat the claims of social ontology as provisionally true, which supports a realist interpretation of the findings of social ontology.
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Niiniluoto, Ilkka. "Explanation by Idealized Theories." Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 20, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 43–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kjps-2018-0003.
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AbstractThe use of idealized scientific theories in explanations of empirical facts and regularities is problematic in two ways: they don’t satisfy the condition that the explanans is true, and they may fail to entail the explanandum. An attempt to deal with the latter problem was proposed by Hempel and Popper with their notion of approximate explanation. A more systematic perspective on idealized explanations was developed with the method of idealization and concretization by the Poznan school (Nowak, Krajewski) in the 1970s. If idealizational laws are treated as counterfactual conditionals, they can be true or truthlike, and the concretizations of such laws may increase their degree of truthlikeness. By replacing Hempel’s truth requirement with the condition that an explanatory theory is truthlike one can distinguish several important types of approximate, corrective, and contrastive explanations by idealized theories. The conclusions have important consequences for the debates about scientific realism and anti-realism.
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Wan, Poe Yu-ze. "(Re-)Problematizing the Luhmannian constructivist systems approach: A Bungean intervention." Current Sociology 59, no. 6 (October 20, 2011): 696–716. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011392111419756.
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In the field of sociological theory, after the decline of Parsons’ version of structural functionalism, Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory came to be seen as the major representative of systems thinking. While Luhmann’s autopoietic systems ontology is sophisticated and deserves serious consideration, the author argues that the prevailing identification of Luhmann’s constructivist-oriented approach with the systems approach itself is problematic mainly for two reasons. First, as the works of the Argentinian-Canadian systems theorist Mario Bunge demonstrate, the systems approach can be fruitfully based on (some version of) scientific realism. Second, the adherents to Luhmann’s constructivist epistemology in sociology seldom engage in a detailed examination of the various critiques of anti-realism offered by scientific and critical realists. Drawing on the literature on philosophy of science, especially the writings of Bunge and a few leading critical realists, the author suggests that a serious Luhmannian sociologist is obligated to provide more cogent and detailed discussions on philosophy of (social) science before taking an opinionated position on epistemology.
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Froese, Tom. "Scientific Observation Is Socio-Materially Augmented Perception: Toward a Participatory Realism." Philosophies 7, no. 2 (March 30, 2022): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7020037.
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There is an overlooked similarity between three classic accounts of the conditions of object experience from three distinct disciplines. (1) Sociology: the “inversion” that accompanies discovery in the natural sciences, as local causes of effects are reattributed to an observed object. (2) Psychology: the “externalization” that accompanies mastery of a visual–tactile sensory substitution interface, as tactile sensations of the proximal interface are transformed into vision-like experience of a distal object. (3) Biology: the “projection” that brings forth an animal’s Umwelt, as impressions on its body’s sensory surfaces are reconfigured into perception of an external object. This similarity between the effects of scientific practice and interface-use on the one hand, and of sensorimotor interaction on the other, becomes intelligible once we accept that skillful engagement with instruments and interfaces constitutes a socio-material augmentation of our basic perceptual capacity. This enactive interpretation stands in contrast to anti-realism about science associated with constructivist interpretations of these three phenomena, which are motivated by viewing them as the internal mental construction of the experienced object. Instead, it favors a participatory realism: the sensorimotor basis of perceptual experience loops not only through our body, but also through the external world. This allows us to conceive of object experience in relational terms, i.e., as one or more subjects directly engaging with the world. Consequently, we can appreciate scientific observation in its full complexity: it is a socio-materially augmented process of becoming acquainted with the observed object that—like tool-use and perceiving more generally—is irreducibly self, other-, and world-involving.
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Yarmolitska, Nataliia, and Maryna Moskalchuk. "SOCIALISTIC HUMANISM AND REALISTIC TRENDS IN THE ART IN THE SCIENTIFIC HERITAGE VOLODYMYR ANTONENKO." Sophia. Human and Religious Studies Bulletin 15, no. 1 (2020): 49–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/sophia.2020.15.12.
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In the article is considered the ideas of ukrainian philosophy of soviet period V. Antonenko, and so the influence of the ideology of that time on the formation of the scientific worldview of the scientist is analyzed. Theoretical reconstruction of V. Antonenko's views on socialist humanism is carried out, principles of which he shows as the highest form of humanism, contrasting the anti-humanist essence of Christian preaching "love of neighbor" and depicts socialist reality as a practical embodiment of true humanistic ideas. Analyzed of views V. Antonenko on art the socialistic realism, which is presented as the highest stage in the development of progressive world art. The scientist traces the origin of art, explains how it was brought to life, what contribution religion has made to its best achievements. V. Antonenko explores the anti-religious and anti-church orientation of the works of many representatives of fine arts. He is analyzing the views of idealist aesthetics and theologians on art. V. Antonenko thoroughly researches the stages of development of humanism, traces its social and cultural movement, which arose in the XIV century. in Italy; studies the humanistic ideas of the leading figures of the Renaissance, who found their further development in the works of the ideological predecessors of the French Revolution of the XVIII century; explores the humanistic ideas of the utopian socialists of the nineteenth century; studies the period of development of Ukrainian and Russian art in the period of radical destruction of old traditions and the influence of religious ideology on their formation; considers a whole galaxy of outstanding artists of the second half of the nineteenth century, who glorified culture and began to speak a new about art as a higher product of human genius, about the principles of realism in art. V. Antonenko's research on the relationship between art and other forms of social consciousness, which are related to the problems of forming norms and principles of communist morality, is analyzed.
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VASILYEVA, NATALIA S. "Legal Validity as a Psychological Fact: Uppsala School in an Intellectual Context of the Continental Legal Realism." Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS 14, no. 4 (October 9, 2019): 47–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.35427/2073-4522-2019-14-4-vasilyeva.
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There are two traditions of determining the foundation of legal validity — metaphysical and anti-metaphysical. At the beginning of the 20th century the anti-metaphysical tradition was supplemented by psychological realism, which was developed in the framework of the Uppsala School and the psychological school of Leon Petrażycki. It is possible to trace the common line of reasoning on the problem of legal validity within Continental or psychological legal realism: from Petrażycki (and his students) and Axel Hägerström (and his students, including Alf Ross) to Enrico Pattaro. Psychological legal realism is an approach to law that can be characterized by 1) an orientation toward the study of law in the context of facts of psychophysical reality; 2) the idea of the psychological nature of law; 3) recognition of the authoritative-mystical nature and objectification of legal experiences; 4) the irreducibility of law to the behavioral aspect; etc.The term "Uppsala School of Legal Realism" denotes the theoretical legal position of scholars from Uppsala — Hagerström and his most faithful students, Anders Vilhelm Lundstedt and Karl Olivekrona — within the framework of a broader Scandinavian legal realism as part of the continental realistic tradition. The philosophical foundations of the Uppsala School of Legal Realism include: rejection of subjectivism and metaphysics, naturalism, non-cognitivism. This school paid special attention to questions on the possibility of scientific knowledge about law, the construction of a value-neutral theory, and the search for reliable methodological foundations for the science of law. The revolt against subjectivism and metaphysics led to the assertion that there is — and can be the subject of scientific knowledge — only one reality, namely spatio-temporal, psychophysical. Since legal concepts do not directly correspond to the facts of such a reality, they are considered as illusions and even magical formulas, which, however, are based on actual psychological facts and have an effect on people’s consciousness.In the framework of the Uppsala School from a realistic point of view law appears as a machinery of coercion, as a factual order based on the organized social force. Within that order the rules of law are independent imperatives and motives of behavior, which have a suggestive, binding effect on the consciousness and behavior of people. The validity of law is determined by the power of organized social coercion and is regarded as a complex phenomenon of the people’s inner world. As a complex psychical fact, legal validity is considered a psychological self-binding engendered by the physical coercion machinery in action and the influence of cultural, social and even biological factors.
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Supelli, Karlina. "Bingkai Kurus Realisme Struktural Epistemik." DISKURSUS - JURNAL FILSAFAT DAN TEOLOGI STF DRIYARKARA 12, no. 2 (October 14, 2013): 153–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.36383/diskursus.v12i2.102.
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Abstrak: Di tengah-tengah perdebatan panjang antara realisme dan anti realisme dalam filsafat ilmu, realisme struktural (RS) diajukan sebagai gagasan yang terbaik dari keduanya. Versi epistemik RS (RSE) berpendapat bahwa kita memiliki alasan yang baik untuk percaya bahwa teori memiliki struktur yang tepat, yaitu bahwa wujud dan struktur yang dipostulatkan oleh teori betul-betul ada. Namun demikian, RSE tidak mengajukan dakuan epistemik menyangkut hakikat wujud yang melandasi struktur. Semua pengetahuan mengenai dunia fisis adalah pengetahuan tentang struktur. Dalam tulisan ini penulis memberi tinjauan tentang RSE dan beberapa argumen yang menolak RSE. Belajar dari sejarah fisika zarah, penulis akan memperlihatkan bahwa struktur menunjuk ke sifat-sifat mendasar yang dimiliki oleh komponen-komponennya dan dengan demikian menyediakan jalur epistemik bagi wujud yang relasi-relasinya mendefinisikan struktur. Meski demikian, struktur matematis sebuah teori hanya memungkinkan kita membangun pengetahuan tentang wujud-wujud yang tidak teramati sebagai “objek” dan bukan objek-objek partikular.
Kata-kata Kunci: Realisme, anti-realisme, realisme struktural epistemik, argumen tanpa keajaiban, meta-induksi pesimistik, wujud takteramati.
Abstract: In the lengthy debate between antirealism and realism in the philosophy of science, structural realism (SR) has been suggested as “the best of both worlds.” The epistemic version of SR (ESR) holds that we have good reason to believe that our most successful scientific theories are structurally correct—that the entities and structures postulated by a theory actually exist, and yet it makes no epistemic claim about the nature of the underlying entities. All that we can know is the structure of the physical world. In this article I present an overview of ESR and a number of arguments that have been brought up against it. Drawing lessons from the history of contemporary physics, I will show that “structure” points to the fundamental properties of its constituents and thus provides an epistemic access to the nature of those entities whose relations define structure in the first place. Nevertheless, the mathematical structure of a theory enables us only to construe knowledge of an unobservable entity as “object,” and not this or that particular object.
Keywords: Realism, anti-realism, epistemic structural realism, no miracle argument, pesimistic meta-induction, unobservable entity.
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Norris, Christopher. "Deconstruction, Science, and the Logic of Enquiry." Derrida Today 3, no. 2 (November 2010): 178–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/drt.2010.0203.
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In this essay I set out to place Derrida's work – especially his earlier (pre-1980) books and essays – in the context of related or contrasting developments in analytic philosophy of science over the past half-century. Along the way I challenge the various misconceptions that have grown up around that work, not only amongst its routine detractors in the analytic camp but also amongst some of its less philosophically informed disciples. In particular I focus on the interlinked issues of realism versus anti-realism and the scope and limits of classical (bivalent) logic, both of which receive a detailed, rigorous and sustained treatment in his deconstructive readings of Husserl, Austin and others. Contrary to Derrida's reputation as a exponent of anti-realism in its far-gone ‘textualist’ form and as one who merely plays perverse though ingenious games with logic I show that those readings presuppose both a basically realist conception of their subject-matter and a strong commitment to the protocols of bivalent logic. These he applies with the utmost care and precision right up to the point – unreachable except by way of that procedure – where they encounter certain problems or anomalies that cannot be resolved except by switching to a different (non-bivalent, deviant, paraconsistent, ‘supplementary’, or ‘parergonal’) logic. Philosophy of science in the analytic mainstream might benefit greatly from a closer acquaintance with Derrida's thinking on these topics, as it might from a knowledge of his likewise rigorous thinking-through of the antinomy between structure and genesis as it bears upon issues in the history of scientific thought.
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Gueguen, Marie, and Stathis Psillos. "Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem’s Philosophy of Science." Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science, no. 2 (June 28, 2017): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.06.
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Duhem’s philosophy of science is difficult to classify according to more contemporary categories like instrumentalism and realism. On the one hand, he presents an account of scientific methodology which renders theories as mere instruments. On the other hand, he acknowledges that theories with particular theoretical virtues (e.g., unity, simplicity, novel predictions) offer a classification of experimental laws that “corresponds to real affinities among the things themselves.” In this paper, we argue that Duhem’s philosophy of science was motivated by an anti-sceptical tendency, according to which we can confidently assert that our theories reveal truths about nature while, at the same time, admitting that anti-scepticism should be moderated by epistemic humility. Understanding Duhem’s epistemological position, which was unique amongst French philosophers of science in the beginning of the 20th century, requires a careful examination of his accounts of representation, explanation, and of their interrelation.
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Amaris, Vanesa. "A Critical Humanist Intervention: Agency, Structure and Values." International Journal of Science and Society 3, no. 1 (March 5, 2021): 293–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.54783/ijsoc.v3i1.297.
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The main aim of the article is to suggest what and how a contemporary, revised version of humanism, inflected with critical realism and Marxism, can contribute to sociology. I focus primarily on two areas in which sociology is often found lacking today: theorizing the relationship between structure and agency, and deciding what to do with moral evaluations in sociological analyses. I argue that the solution to both lies in attempting to finally transcend the traditionally hostile and mutually exclusive paradigms of “humanist” or “cultural” Marxism on the one side and “anti-humanist” or “scientific” Marxism on the other. This enables us to carefully reinstate the agency of human subjects and the moral dimension, both of which were and still are dismissed by anti- or post-humanist social science, without neglecting the objective and causally relevant existence of social structures at the same time.
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Msimang, Phila Mfundo. "Medicine, anti-realism and ideology: Variation in medical genetics does not show that race is biologically real." SATS 20, no. 2 (July 28, 2020): 117–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sats-2020-2003.
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AbstractLee McIntyre’s Respecting Truth chronicles the contemporary challenges regarding the relationship amongst evidence, belief formation and ideology. The discussion in his book focusses on the ‘politicisation of knowledge’ and the purportedly growing public (and sometimes academic) tendency to choose to believe what is determined by prior ideological commitments rather than what is determined by evidence-based reasoning. In considering these issues, McIntyre posits that the claim “race is a myth” is founded on a political ideology rather than on support from scientific evidence. He contrasts this view with the argument that racially correlated biomedical outcomes for self-identified racial groups suggest that biological races are real. I explore how McIntyre’s framing of the claim “race is a myth” as fundamentally ideological results in him failing to engage with the arguments and evidence many constructionists and biological anti-realists put forward in support of their views. I also show how the biomedical evidence he thinks supports biological realism is unconvincing.
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Gava, Alessio. "Kusch and van Fraassen on Microscopic Experience." REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFÍA 45, no. 1 (May 30, 2019): 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/rlf2019156.
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Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
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Patalano, Rosario. "FERDINANDO GALIANI’S NEWTONIAN SOCIAL MATHEMATICS." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 42, no. 3 (June 30, 2020): 357–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837219000348.
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The evolution of Ferdinando Galiani’s thought toward social mathematic has been neglected by scholars, and his attempt to establish political arguments on the analytical basis remains unexplored. The non-systematic nature of Galiani’s intuitions, due to his laziness, largely justifies this underestimation of his scientific program. This paper intends to show that the mature abbé Galiani follows an intellectual itinerary autonomous and parallel to that followed by Marquis de Condorcet in the same years. The anti-Physiocratique querelle represents Galiani’s methodological maturation. In contrast with Physiocratic economic doctrine, based on the primacy of deductive methodology, Galiani claims for economic science the realism of circumstance against aprioristic axiomatic hypotheses and rationalist generalizations. Galiani’s project, substantially similar to Marquis de Condorcet’s approach to social science, can be defined as Newtonian social mathematics opposed to Physiocratic Cartesian social mathematics.
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Berghofer, Philipp. "Transcendental Phenomenology and Unobservable Entities." Perspectives 7, no. 1 (June 28, 2018): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pipjp-2017-0001.
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Abstract Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism. More precisely, the focus is on the question of whether there are basic epistemological principles phenomenologists are committed to that have anti-realist consequences with respect to unobservable entities. This question is relevant since Husserl’s basic epistemological principles, such as the “principle of all principles,” seem to suggest that epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if an object cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that this object exists. It is the main aim of this paper to show (i) that interpretative reasons exist for not reading Husserl in such a way and (ii) that systematic reasons exist as to why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities.
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Flatscher, Matthias, and Sergej Seitz. "Latour, foucault, and post-truth : the role and function of critique in the era of the truth crisis." Soft Power 6, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 130–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.14718/softpower.2019.6.2.8.
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This paper, first published in German in Le Foucaldien 4(1) 2018 and in English in Le Foucaldien 6(1) 2020, explores Bruno Latour’s critique of contemporary critical theory. According to Latour, poststructuralist conceptions of critical inquiry are becoming increasingly outdated. In our “post-factual” era, attempting to expose facts as results of power-laden processes of social construction plays into the hands of anti-scientific obscurantists. This is not to say, however, that one ought to opt for some reductionist notion of objectivity. Instead, Latour proposes a new form of critical realism. While we agree with Latour about the necessity of widening our epistemological paradigm, we deem his critique of poststructuralism unfair and exaggerated. Moreover, we argue that he fails to account for the relationship between epistemology, power, and subjectivity. Since Foucault, on the other hand, succeeds where Latour falls short and probes into this very relationship, his is a form of critique that remains crucial to tackling the current crisis of truth.
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Supelli, Karlina. "Ernst Mach Dan Ekonomi Pikiran." DISKURSUS - JURNAL FILSAFAT DAN TEOLOGI STF DRIYARKARA 11, no. 1 (April 16, 2012): 20–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.36383/diskursus.v11i1.154.
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Abstract: Ernst Mach stands as a representative figure of the positivist philosophy of science at the turn of the twentieth century, yet he is by far the most misunderstood scientist-philosopher. The misunderstanding is largely caused by his epistemological rejection of the use of hypothetical entities that are ordinarily posited by scientists. He also argued against the mechanistic worldview which dominated scientific investigations in the nineteenth century. This essay will demonstrate that Mach’s positivism differs from the earlier positivism of August Comte. His anti metaphysical stance is deeply-rooted in his physical phenomenology, guided by the economy of thought in pursuit of the unity of science. In Mach’s view, scientific theories are merely biological tools for organizing experience by means of the fewest possible concepts, and all metaphysical elements are to be eliminated from science as methodologically and epistemologically superfluous. But Mach’s thesis of the unification of science does not share the common concern of the logical positivists to reduce various scientific statements to physical language. While Mach’s philosophy of science clearly exhibits a miscalculation of the strength of scientific conceptual tools, his physical phenomenology serves as a bridge between theory and experiment which has proved to be fruitful.
Keywords: The economy of thought, evolution, element, physical phenomenology, the unity of science, instrumentalism, emphirical realism.
Abstrak: Ernst Mach tampil sebagai tokoh representatif dari Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan positivis pada peralihan menuju abad ke-20, sekaligus sebagai ilmuwan-filsuf yang paling disalahpahami. Kesalahpahaman tersebut sebagian besar disebabkan oleh penolakan epitemologisnya terhadap penggunaan wujud-wujud hipotetis yang kerap diajukan oleh para ilmuwan. Ia juga melawan cara pandang mekanistis yang mendominasi penyelidikan ilmiah pada abad ke-19. Artikel ini memperlihatkan bahwa positivisme Mach berbeda dengan positivisme August Comte yang mendahuluinya. Pandangan anti-metafisis Mach berakar sangat dalam pada fisika fenomenologi yang dipandu oleh ekonomi pikiran untuk mencapai sains terpadu. Dalam pandangan Mach, teori-teori ilmiah semata-mata sarana biologis untuk menata pengalaman dengan memanfaatkan sesedikit mungkin konsep, dan semua elemen metafisika perlu disingkirkan dari sains karena secara metodologis dan epistemologis tidak bermanfaat. Namun, tesis Mach tentang sains terpadu tidak sejalan dengan gagasan para positivis logis yang mereduksi berbagai macam pernyataan ilmiah ke dalam bahasa fisika. Sementara Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan Mach jelas-jelas keliru dalam memperhitungkan kekuatan piranti-piranti konseptual sains, fisika fenomenologi yang menjembatani teori dan eksperimen telah terbukti sangat bermanfaat.
Kata-kata kunci: Ekonomi pikiran, evolusi, elemen, fisika fenomenologi, sains terpadu, instrumentalisme, realisme empiris.
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Lyubimova, Tatyana B. "Uniformity vs. Unity." Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62, no. 7 (October 10, 2019): 54–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-7-54-72.
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The question of whether it is possible to philosophize outside the categories of rationalist philosophy is not limited to methodology. It has ideological overtones. Namely, the rationalism that has developed in philosophy in modern times, after Descartes, is inevitably supplemented by mechanics. The world is seen as a machine, the living is reduced to mechanisms. Rationalism becomes a machine of mentality. Taking it as a model of normal thinking, giving it a universal value, we thereby impose Western way of thinking on other cultures with a different mentality. The question, therefore, is not about the method of scientific knowledge but about the power realized through the transformation of mentality. Scientific knowledge conquers space. Philosophy produces a transformation of mentality. New rationalism, according to G. Bachelard, is in dialectical relation with the usual realism of the natural Sciences. In this process, there is the implementation of new schemes developed in the complex interaction of “ratio” and experiment. Modern science is the collective creation of a new reality. This is the reality of the “picture of the world.” There is another view of science, rationalism and modern philosophy. According to him, rationalism is dualism, atomism and social individualism. These features reveal the anti-traditional and anti-metaphysical spirit of modern Western civilization. The traditional approach is non-duality, unity provided by metaphysical principles. The new rationalism in science is characterized by the belief in the infinite progress of knowledge. But knowledge itself, from the point of view of tradition, is devoid of great value. Philosophy uses categories of ancient Greek philosophy or German classical philosophy, but they cannot be considered universal. They corresponded not only to the time and place, the conditions in which they arose, but also to the characteristic mentality of the peoples and individuals who created them. They are not suitable for understanding the metaphysical doctrines of traditional cultures. The language of traditional cultures is symbolic and synthetic in contrast to the analytical language of Western science and philosophy.
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Leroy, Fabrice. "Joann Sfar Conjures Marc Chagall." European Comic Art 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/eca.2011.4.
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The five episodes of Joann Sfar's The Rabbi's Cat (2002-2006), recently published in English translation in two volumes (2007-2008), and particularly the latest instalment of the series, Africa's Jerusalem, are rich in meta-narrative and meta-iconic elements. By staging various theological arguments about aniconism in Abrahamic religions, Sfar uses the comics medium to reflect on the prohibition of graphic representation in Judaism and Islam (following the Jyllands-Posten Danish cartoons controversy and the trial of the French satirical magazine Charlie-Hebdo ). He also distances his work from the usual Western stance on realistic mimesis and its pseudo-scientific epistemology by criticising the European constructs of race and exoticism. Between the anti-iconic prohibition of the East and the false iconicity of the West, Sfar finds a middle ground in the anonymous character of a Russian painter travelling through Africa in the 1930s, whose physical appearance and biographical background recall that of famous Franco-Russian Jewish painter, Marc Chagall. This article will explore how the painter's cultural hybridity and artistic idiosyncrasy allow Sfar to negotiate a perspective on graphic representation which resolves the problem of simulacrum as it is framed in this binary opposition. It will also discuss the manners in which Sfar borrows from Chagall's aesthetics and magic realism in the process, thus creating a new kind of image in the realm of comics.
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Martynov, Andriy. "US-Germany Relations Development Trends Under the Presidency of Donald Trump." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 9 (2020): 24–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2020.09.2.
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The influence of internal political processes in the USA and Germany on the evolution of US-German relations is analyzed in the article. The crisis of the mono-polar system of international relations was synchronized with changes in the global order. It affected relations between the US and Germany. The scientific literature has been dominated by the view that President Trump’s conservative-moderate foreign policy strategy is contrary to the traditions of liberal-democratic multilateral diplomacy. D. Trump’s views on the international positioning of the United States can be considered as a variant of foreign policy realism, in contrast to classical republican neo-conservatism or democratic liberal interventionism. The German foreign policy course in the time of the Bundes Chancellor A. Merkel is a manifestation of liberal-democratic globalism. Under President Obama and Chancellor A. Merkel, German-American relations remained at a high allied level. President Trump abolishes talks on Transatlantic Free Trade Area. German elites see the populist and nationalist policies of D. Trump as a challenge to European integration. They consider US European policy an attempt to split the European Union. In the domestic political dimension, German liberals consider the Alternative to Germany party as Trump’s ideological counterparts. The American liberal political elite accused A. Merkel of failing to prevent the spread of anti-American sentiment in Germany. Political sentiment in the US and Germany after the pandemic is unpredictable. A noticeable trend was the aggravation of the crisis of liberal globalization. This outlines the tendency for further political polarization of American and German societies.
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Devaykin, Igor. "On the Concept of Correlationism: Meillassoux Q., Harman G., Brassier R." Ideas and Ideals 14, no. 1-1 (March 25, 2022): 82–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.1.1-82-99.
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Speculative realism is often associated with a group of thinkers who have consciously united around the idea of fighting a common enemy – correlationism. The article substantiates the thesis that there is no agreement among speculative realists both about correlationism and the ways to overcome it. Based on the works of Meillassoux, Harman and Brassier, the author demonstrates that their interpretations of correlationism and programs for its refutation are incompatible. It is suggested that the result of such incongruence of the concept of correlationism is the conviction of the philosophers of this direction in correlationism of each other. The author considers Meillassoux’s concept of the “Era of Correlation”. From the point of view of Brassier, Meillassoux fails to substantiate the anti-correlationist thesis that human thinking is capable of cognizing non-subjective being. Rather, on the contrary, Meillassoux once again subordinates this being to thinking, and therefore remains a correlationist. Harman also accuses Meillassoux of correlationism for anthropocentrism. The author also clarifies Harman’s concept of the “philosophy of access”. It is established that the concepts of correlationism in the interpretation of Harman and Meillassoux cannot be completely compatible. It is revealed that Harman remains a philosopher of the era of correlation for Meillassoux, because, firstly, he illegitimately attributes human characteristics to non-human beings. Secondly, it does not accept the correlationist argument of the circle and preserves the Kantian metaphysical dichotomy of the noumenal/phenomenal. Brassier also considers Harman a correlationist, since he ontologically equates natural science knowledge and scientific rationality with other types of knowledge. The paper reveals the main features of correlationism in the interpretation of Brassier. It is established that for Meillassoux, the Brassier approach is correlationist on the same basis as the Harman approach. Harman, in turn, considers Brassier as a correlationist, since the latter postulates various ontological taxonomies, the most obvious among which are the priority of scientific rationality and anthropocentrism. According to the results of the work done, it is once again emphasized that speculative realists are by no means united in their understanding of correlationism and ways to overthrow this philosophical program.
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Yu.F., Velychkovska. "ANTI-COLONIAL PROBLEMS OF HRYHORIY KVITKA-OSNOVIANENKO’S SOCIAL-HOUSEHOLD COMEDIES." South archive (philological sciences), no. 84 (December 23, 2020): 8–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.32999/ksu2663-2691/2020-84-1.
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Purpose. The task of this article is to study the specifics of the formation and development of anti-colonial problems in the national literature of the first half of the XIX century, embodied in the social-household comedies of Hrygoriy Kvitka-Osnovyanenko “A visitor from the capital, or the Bustle in the county town”, “Noble elections”, “Shelmenko – volost clerk”, “Clairvoyant” and “Shelmenko – batman”.Methods. The research is based on general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, observation, selection and systematization of material. Elements of the historical and literary approach contributed to the study of the colonial policy of the imperial government in Ukraine, that impressed the formation of the artist's life views, as well as the development of social comedy as a genre in national literature. Problem-thematic, philosophical, figurative and psychoanalytic approaches were used in the study of the author's reflected anti-colonial problems in the content of social-household comediesResults. The article analyzes the special approach of G. Kvitka-Osnovyanenko to the creation of social-household comedies, which was based on the ambiguity of the artist’s worldview. The playwright's worldview is characterized by a combination of patriarchal ideas with enlightenment realism, which is addressed to christian humanism. The analysis of genre and stylistic features of dramatic works, the worldview of the author, helped to clarify the ideological and problematic content of comedies. It is proved that the traditions of classicist satire (Moliere and Nicolas Boileau) and the principles of artistic generalization of symbolic images were used by the author to show the formation of the Ukrainian elite, which, formed under the influence of the empire colonial policy of the time of Catherine II, turned into a new social class, called the “new nobles”. Realism in a satirical image has become a unifying element of the artist's social-household comedies. The bilingual play presented the author's appeal to his compatriots to understand Moscow's colonial influence to their lives for the sake of future fixes their own “lost national consciousness” and sharpening their focus on destructive colonial means.Conclusions. A systematic analysis of Hryhoriy Kvitka-Osnovyanenko’s social-household comedies made it possible to detect both individual and authorial views to the colonization of Ukraine (loss of human dignity by new nobles, their corruption, meanness and superstition) and trends in the development of anti-colonial ideas in the national drama (connection of romanticism with enlightenment and humanistic ideas of Moliere, Nicolas Boileau, J.-J. Rousseau) of the first half of the XIX century.Key words: colonial system, enlightenment, humanism, bilingualism, anecdote, new nobles. Мета. Метою розвідки є дослідження специфіки формування та розвитку антиколоніальних проблем у національній літе-ратурі у першій половині ХІХ століття, втілених у соціально-побутових комедіях Григорія Квітки-Основ’яненка «Приезжий из столицы, или Суматоха в уездном городе», «Дворянские выборы», «Шельменко – волостной писарь», «Ясновидящая» та «Шельменко – денщик».Методи. Дослідження ґрунтується на загальнонаукових методах аналізу, синтезу, спостереження, добору та систематизації матеріалу. Елементи історико-літературного підходу сприяли дослідженню колоніальної політики імперського уряду в Украї-ні, що спричинила вплив на формування життєвих поглядів митця, а також особливості розвитку соціально-побутової комедії як жанру в національній літературі. Проблемно-тематичний, філософський та психоаналітичний підходи були використані у дослідженні відображених автором антиколоніальних проблем у змісті соціально-побутових комедій.Результати. У статті проаналізовано особистий підхід Г. Квітки-Основ’яненка до творення соціально-побутових комедій, що ґрунтувався на неоднозначності світосприйняття митця. Світогляд драматурга характеризується поєднанням патріархаль-них ідей із просвітницьким реалізмом, зверненим до християнського гуманізму. Аналіз жанрових і стильових особливостей драматичних творів, світосприйняття автора, сприяли з’ясуванню ідейно-проблемного змісту комедій. Доведено, що традиції класицистичної сатири (Мольєра та Нікола Буало) та принципи художнього узагальнення символічних образів були застосо-вані автором задля художнього зображення української еліти, котра, формуючись під впливом колоніальної політики імперії часів Катерини ІІ, перетворилася на новий суспільний клас, що отримав назву «нові дворяни». Сатиричне зображення реа-лістичних картин життя стало об’єднуючим елементом соціально-побутових комедій митця. Двомовність п’єс презентувала звернення автора до своїх співвітчизників з метою осмислення наслідків московського колоніального впливу на їхнє життя. Автор прагнув пробудити у «нових дворян» бажання корегувати власну «втрачену національну свідомость» через загострення їхньої уваги на руйнівних колонізаторських засобах.Висновки. Системний аналіз соціально-побутових комедій Григорія Квітки-Основ’яненка надав змогу виявити як індиві-дуально-авторські погляди на колонізацію України (втрата людської гідності новими дворянами, їхня розбещеність, підлість і забобонність), так і тенденції розвитку антиколоніальних ідей у національній драматургії (зв’язок романтизму із просвітни-цтвом та гуманістичними ідеями Мольєра, Ніколя Буало, Ж.-Ж. Руссо) першої половини ХІХ століття, що засвідчили процес розбудови антиколоніального спротиву по всій території тодішньої України.Ключові слова: колоніальна система, просвітництво, гуманізм, двомовність, анекдот, нові дворяни.
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Okhotsky, E. V. "Post-Soviet Ukraine: the Ruling Regime in the Political Space of Ukraine, European Choice and Russophobia (Political and Legal Analysis)." Russian Journal of Legal Studies 5, no. 1 (March 15, 2018): 20–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls18345.
Full textAbstract:
This article is an attempt to understand what is happening in the system of power and public administration of modern Ukraine from the standpoint of scientific realism and socio - political objectivity. The author touches upon the problems of realization by the Ukrainian state of the interests of its people and values of the European choice, proves, in fact, the criminal essence of implementation in practice of the principles of ukrainism, nationalism and Russophobia, explores the «art» of anti-crisis management of the Maidan government and its effectiveness. The author also presents his vision of the historical lessons of the Ukrainian experience, the reasons for the impasse of many decisions of the current rigidly Pro-Western-oriented Ukrainian regime. The methodological basis of the research was made up of classical methods of scientific and legal research of relations, phenomena and processes in the sphere of modern Ukraine’s politics, public administration and its legal support. This analysis (including system-structural) and synthesis, abduction (hypotheses), induction ( from particular to General) and deduction ( from General to specif ic), history and comparativelaw, opinion polls and content analysis of documents, formal-logical method. The analysis is based on the relevant legal acts, sociological statistics, publications of government officials, scientists and publicists. The analysis shows that the conclusions and official statements of the current Ukrainian leadership in the vast majority of cases do not correspond to reality, that their strategic plans are wrong, contradictory and practically hopeless. At the same time, the Ukrainian experience teaches that even a wrong, not particularly effective and even destructive political course should remain in the field of close attention of the scientific community. The actual practice of political records should examine, assess and consider, trying to understand the essence of problems, investigate the causes of failures and deadlocks, and to draw the appropriate lessons. Objectivity of analysis, impartiality of assessments, sobriety of perception of alternative proposals are necessary in the process of state- building and the inevitable crisis stages with their numerous uncertainties, risks and legal conf licts. We need the ability to predict what difficulties and problems the country may face even in a highly developed economy and a fairly stable political and legal system. The easiest way to look for the reasons for failures on the side, shift the blame to predecessors or bad allies, blame foreign enemies or intractable opposition. It’s far harder to take responsibility, to admit to the lack of visioning and adaptability to constructive action.
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Sekerina, M. A. "SOCIO-CULTURAL PARADIGM OF THE LIFE OF THE NON-METROPOLITAN WRITERS« COMMUNITY." Siberian Philological Forum 16, no. 4 (November 30, 2021): 97–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.25146/2587-7844-2021-16-4-95.
Full textAbstract:
Statement of the problem. The research focuses on the specifics of the modern Siberian writers’ understanding of their place in the social and cultural space, the process and mechanisms of finding this place both in practical (everyday) and existential (existential) aspects. The purpose of the article is to consider the forms and methods of organizing writers’ communities in Irkutsk, discourses of self-presentations and their correlations with worldview and geography. Review of the scientific literature on the problem. Humanitarian studies of writers’ communities are few and limited both by certain chronological frames of the object under study (literary communities of the nineteenth century, the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries, the Soviet period) and methodology-wise. Modern writers’ associations, organizations specific both institutionally and ideologically, rarely fall into the prism of humanitarian studies. Methodology (materials and methods). The research is interdisciplinary, which determines the choice of its materials and methods: sociolinguistic (interviews and questionnaires, correlation analysis), discourse analysis, contextual analysis, and cognitive-discursive approach. This article is based on the materials of interviewing and surveying forty-five writers of Irkutsk and the Irkutsk region. Research results. Membership in a certain organization is used as symbolic capital due to the struggle of two discursive practices – explicit “traditionalist” and implicit “other” ones (not designated by its adherents, but, according to their opponents, “anti-traditionalist”). It is the institutional attachment, according to the conflicting parties, that determines the ways of interaction with the culturally significant concepts of “Writer’s Community”, “Reader”, “Russian Literature”, “Siberian Literature”, “Traditions”, and “Innovation”. In geographical and socio-cultural aspects, respondents, by an absolute majority, choose a “national” strategy of self-presentation, inscribing their creativity in the space of Russian literature, in such direction as realism. Conclusion. The analysis of the empirical material allows us to identify two main equivalent tools of self-actualization and self-presentation of the modern Irkutsk writer: 1. Institutional attachment to a particular writers’ community (the Union of Writers of Russia, the Union of Russian Writers, the representative office of the Union of Russian Writers, the Irkutsk Regional Writers’ Organization); 2. The concept of “Great Russian literature” and belonging to it.
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Vihalemm, Rein. "Practical Realism: Against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism." Studia Philosophica Estonica, January 20, 2013, 7–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2012.5.2.02.
Full textAbstract:
In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science which began in the author's previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical realism is opposed to standard scientific realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. Standard scientific realism is challengeable due to its abstract character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological presupposition which raises the problem of the God's Eye point of view (as it was called by Hilary Putnam). Joseph Rouse's conception of science as practice, Sami Pihlström's pragmatic realism, and even Ilkka Niiniluoto's critical scientific realism are interpreted as practical realist conceptions. Pihlström suggests that the contemporary scientific realist should be prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalized Kantian transcendental perspective on realism. It is argued, however, that this realistically naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism, as originated by Karl Marx.
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Gorham, Geoffrey. "Does Scientific Realism Beg the Question?" Informal Logic 18, no. 2 (January 1, 1996). http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v18i2.2381.
Full textAbstract:
In a series of influential articles, the anti-realist Arthur Fine has repeatedly charged that a certain very popular argument for scientific realism, that only realism can explain the instrumental success of science, begs the question. I argue that on no plausible reading ofthe fallacy does the realist argument beg the question. In fact, Fine is himself guilty of what DeMorgan called the "opponent fallacy."