Relevant bibliographies by topics / Scientific anti-realism

Academic literature on the topic 'Scientific anti-realism'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 29 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Scientific anti-realism"

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Vickers, Peter. "Resisting scientific anti-realism." Metascience 29, no. 1 (January 14, 2020): 11–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00487-2.

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Psillos, Stathis. "Resisting scientific anti-realism." Metascience 29, no. 1 (January 16, 2020): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00488-1.

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Park, Seungbae. "The Anti-induction for Scientific Realism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 95, no. 3 (August 7, 2018): 329–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000044.

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In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.
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Zamora Bonilla, Jesús P. "Realism versus anti-realism: philosophical problem or scientific concern?" Synthese 196, no. 10 (December 21, 2015): 3961–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0988-6.

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Vihalemm, Rein. "Philosophy of Chemistry against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism." Philosophia Scientae, no. 19-1 (March 1, 2015): 99–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1055.

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Seager, William. "Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, no. 1 (January 1988): 181–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.1.192984.

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Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A. "Réalisme et fictionalisme chez Claude Bernard." Dialogue 38, no. 4 (1999): 719–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006685.

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ABSTRACTIan Hacking puts forward a distinction between two kinds of scientific realism. According to scientific realism about theories, scientific theories are accepted as approximately true; according to scientific realism about unobservable entities, the theoretical terms occurring in scientific theories refer to existing, real entities. This article seeks to show that Claude Bernard's philosophy of science is a realist one about scientific theories, but anti-realist about unobservable entities. The term “fictionalism” is used here to stand for this sort of anti-realism about unobservable entities.
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Wiltsche, Harald A. "What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?" Inquiry 55, no. 2 (April 2012): 105–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2012.661572.

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Seager, William E. "SCIENTIFIC ANTI-REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 2 (April 1986): 136–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1986.tb00270.x.

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Agazzi, E. "The problems of scientific realism today." Philosophy of Science and Technology 27, no. 2 (2022): 20–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-20-30.

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The article describes scientific realism and the debate around this position. It shows that initially (in the scholastic tradition) the debate between realists and antirealists was purely ontological, since it was accepted that when we know, we know the real − knowledge cannot be anything other than knowledge of the real. The question about the reality of the object of our knowledge, about whether the world beyond our representations is equal to the world we represent to ourselves, distinguishes modern philosophy from classical philosophy and arises from the claim that we know our representations and not the real. A twofold problem is formed: first, to demonstrate the existence of the world beyond our representations, and second, to demonstrate that that the knowledge we have constitutes precisely the knowledge of the world in which we live and is, in fact, actual knowledge, not chimer. Thus the problem of realism takes on an almost exclusively epistemological meaning. Nevertheless, contemporary realistic positions often confuse ontological and epistemological theses, which leads to internal contradictions. The same is true of the proponents of anti-realist views. The question of the causes of the anti-realistic tendency in the philosophy of science is raised and it is shown that the initial attitude of the modern science was realistic. It was undermined, on the one hand, by anti-realistic interpretations of the cognitive process (starting from Kant), on the other hand, by difficulties of theoretical order arisen in physics, and the main thing was that science began to deal with the unobservable, undermining the cognitive basis of radical empiricism. However, the new cognitive situation does not necessarily lead to anti-realism, another way of development relies on an understanding of the complexity and problematic relationship between theory and experience. A number of reasons in favor of scientific realism are concluded.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Scientific anti-realism"

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Richmond, Alasdair M. "Some varieties of scientific anti-realism, classical and contemporary." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1998. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU113099.

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Methodology: to offer a dissertation in two halves; the first of which being a taxonomic account of essential doctrines from four of the most characteristic empiricist scientific anti-realists. Locke and Berkeley represent classical empiricism, and Bas van Fraassen and Nancy Cartwright represent the moderns. The taxonomy addresses primarily three sets of issues, namely causation, theoretical entities and inference to the best explanation, stressing the plurality of concerns and approaches possible within an anti-realist framework. The second half then applies some of the lessons learned from the study of earlier forms of anti-realism and offers a critique of inference to the best explanation and its role in science. The aim is to set up a form of empiricist anti-realism which is heedful of the anti-metaphysical programme of positivism, but which is more accommodating to inferences to theoretical entities and less absolutist in its strictures on representation and reference. Part Two addresses various topics within empiricist responses to science, ranging from a critique of uses of epistemic privilege in the justification of inference to the best explanation, to an attempt to apply ideas from artificial life-style emergent simulations of living behaviour as a model of the inference to theoretical entities. Finally, the thesis concludes with an attempt (inspired by van Fraassen's 'Gentle Polemics'), to relate (and thereby criticise), the realist's demand for an explanation of the success of science to anthropic arguments of similar form used to explain the simplicity of nature.
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Ozer, Husnu. "Scientific Realism Debate In The Philosophy Of Science." Master's thesis, METU, 2010. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/12611579/index.pdf.

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The primary concern of this piece of work is to reconsider scientific realism debate in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the overall aim is to come up with the clues of a viable scientific realist attitude in the face of anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. To accomplish this aim, I make use of two modified versions of scientific realism, that is, &lsquo
epistemic structural realism&rsquo
and &lsquo
entity realism&rsquo
. Epistemic structural realism is a realist position of which proponents claim that the only knowable part of the reality is the structure of it which is expressed by the mathematical equations of our best scientific theories. On the other hand, according to entity realism, the only assured knowledge obtained from scientific theories is the existence of theoretical entities posited by these theories. I argue that a combination of the properly construed versions of these two positions might fulfill the afore-mentioned aim of this thesis.
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Coleman, Mark. "Realist and anti-realist approaches in philosophy of science: perspective and representational pluralism in scientific discovery." Thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/103722.

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This work traces a thread from what might be called a standard account of scientific realism and anti-realism, through Bas van Fraassen’s influential alternative anti-realist accounts of his constructive empiricism and later empiricist structuralism, expressed in his writings that have stimulated vigorous and extended reactions over many years. Via an examination of structural realism, the thread has lead me away from the focus on microphysics, so prevalent in much of the writing in this debate, to a consideration of the problem of complexity in the special sciences, a response from the point of view of biology in particular, where I assert that the complexity of this discipline is incompatible with the idea that biological representation can be usefully mathematized, up to isomorphic description, one of the central tenets of van Fraassen’s structuralist thesis. I argue that understanding scientific models only in terms of mathematical structures is too restrictive and is inappropriate for understanding the diverse phenomenal models prevalent in biology. I discuss alternative, less constrained, more pluralistic ways of matching representation to the world, and separately consider the difficulties of dealing with the ‘disorder of nature’ including the problem of definition of natural kinds, and the associated implications for realism, ending with the question ‘realism about what?’ I conclude with a tentative advocacy for a moderate, perspectival, epistemic realism, similar to Giere’s constructive realism or a species of entity realism, consonant with Paul Churchland’s suggestion that our best grasp on the real resides in the representations provided by our best scientific theories.
Thesis (M.Phil.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2016.
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Books on the topic "Scientific anti-realism"

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Okasha, Samir. 4. Realism and anti‐realism. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192802835.003.0004.

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‘Realism and anti-realism’ is concerned with the debate between scientific realism and its converse, anti-realism or instrumentalism. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that it is to provide a true description of the ‘observable’ part of the world. The ‘no miracles’ argument, one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, is shown to be a plausibility argument — an inference to the best explanation. Central to the debate between realism and anti-realism is the observable/unobservable distinction and the views of realist Grover Maxwell and anti-realist Bas van Fraassen are described. The underdetermination argument is also explained.
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Rowbottom, Darrell P. Instrument of Science: Scientific Anti-Realism Revitalised. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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Rowbottom, Darrell P. Instrument of Science: Scientific Anti-Realism Revitalised. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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Rowbottom, Darrell P. Instrument of Science: Scientific Anti-Realism Revitalised. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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Rowbottom, Darrell P. Instrument of Science: Scientific Anti-Realism Revitalised. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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Bueno, Otávio, Ruey-Lin Chen, and Melinda Bonnie Fagan, eds. Individuation, Process, and Scientific Practices. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190636814.001.0001.

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This book concerns a classic philosophical question: “What things count as individuals?” Rather than addressing it from the perspective of analytic metaphysics, this volume proposes to reformulate and answer it from the perspective of scientific practices. So reformulated, the new question is: “How do scientists individuate the things they investigate and thus count them as individuals?” More precisely, our reformulated approach involves three themes: experimental practice, process, and pluralism. The three themes together comprise a unique approach to the classic problem of individuality, and exhibit the strengths of a practice-based philosophy of science. On the approach taken in this volume, insights about criteria of individuality emerge from piecemeal investigation of the problems and questions on individuation. Importantly, results of these investigations are based on individuation as that process is discovered in scientific practice, rather than on a single dominant theory or more abstract metaphysical speculations. Collectively, the investigations of various contributors to this volume tend to support the metaphysical view of individuals as processes. This volume consists of a long introductory chapter and twelve contributed chapters. These chapters examine the individuation of scientific entities, explore different aspects of individuation, highlight individuation in experimental practices, and extend the issue of individuation to wider contexts. These chapters are arranged into three parts: Part I, aspects of individuation: metaphysical and processual; Part II, experimental practices of individuation; and Part III, individuation in philosophical approaches to science: realism, anti-realism, environmentalism.
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Bird, Alexander. Knowing Science. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199606658.001.0001.

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Abstract Knowing Science presents an epistemology of science that rejects empiricism and gives a central place to the concept of knowledge. Science aims at knowledge and progresses when it adds to the stock of knowledge. That knowledge is social knowing—it is known by the scientific community as a whole. Evidence is that from which knowledge can be obtained by inference. From which it follows that evidence is knowledge. Evidence is not limited to perception, nor to observation. Observation supplies evidence that is basic relative to a field of enquiry and can be highly non-perceptual. Theoretical knowledge is typically gained by inference to the only explanation, in which competing plausible hypotheses are falsified by the evidence. In cases where not all competing hypotheses are refuted, scientific hypotheses are not known but possess varying degrees of plausibility. Plausibilities in the light of the evidence are probabilities and link eliminative explanationism to Bayesian conditionalization. Scientific realism and anti-realism are considered as metascientific claims. Such global metascientific claims are rejected—track records give us only local metascientific claims.
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Hawthorne, James. A Logic of Comparative Support: Qualitative Conditional Probability Relations Representable by Popper Functions. Edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher Hitchcock. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.13.

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Revising classical logic—to deal with the paradoxes of self-reference, or vague propositions, for the purposes of scientific theory or of metaphysical anti-realism—requires the revision of probability theory. This chapter reviews the connection between classical logic and classical probability, clarifies nonclassical logic, giving simple examples, explores modifications of probability theory, using formal analogies to the classical setting, and provides two foundational justifications for these ‘nonclassical probabilities’. There follows an examination of extensions of the nonclassical framework: to conditionalization and decision theory in particular, before a final review of open questions and alternative approaches, and an evaluation of current progress.
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Book chapters on the topic "Scientific anti-realism"

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McCain, Kevin. "Anti-realism About Science." In The Nature of Scientific Knowledge, 219–34. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33405-9_14.

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"Realism and Anti-Realism, Underdetermination." In The Nature of Scientific Theory, 205–386. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315051963-7.

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"ANTI-NOMINALISTIC SCIENTIFIC REALISM: A DEFENCE." In Properties, Powers and Structures, 73–90. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203124482-12.

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Healey, Richard. "Pragmatist Quantum Realism." In Scientific Realism and the Quantum, 123–46. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198814979.003.0007.

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Realism comes in many varieties, in science and elsewhere. Van Fraassen’s influential formulation took scientific realism to include the view that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like. So understood, a quantum realist takes quantum theory to aim at correctly representing the world: many would add that its success justifies believing this representation is more or less correct. But quantum realism has been understood both more narrowly and more broadly. A pragmatist considers use prior to representation and this has prompted some to dub pragmatist views anti-realist, including the view of quantum theory that the author has been developing recently. But whether a pragmatist view of quantum theory should be labeled anti-realist depends not only on its ingredients but also on how that label should be applied. Pragmatism offers a healthy diet of quantum realism.
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Saatsi, Juha. "Truth vs. Progress Realism about Spin." In Scientific Realism and the Quantum, 35–54. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198814979.003.0003.

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Scientific realism about spin is easily motivated. But what does it amount to? To answer this question, Chapter 3 contrasts in general terms two epistemological conceptions of realism—truth-content vs. progress realism—before problematizing truth-content realism in the context of quantum physics. After articulating the challenge faced by truth-content realism, the chapter argues that progress realism avoids it, offering a stable middle ground between anti-realism and traditional truth-content realism.
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Fraser, Doreen. "The Non-Miraculous Success of Formal Analogies in Quantum Theories." In Scientific Realism and the Quantum, 255–75. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198814979.003.0013.

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The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific (anti-)realism debate. Chapter 13 argues that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions of the ‘No Miracles’ Argument (NMA) for scientific realism: Stathis Psillos’ Refined Explanationist Defense of Realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism. The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. The chapter also suggests some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form.
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Jansson, Lina. "Can Pragmatism about Quantum Theory Handle Objectivity about Explanations?" In Scientific Realism and the Quantum, 147–67. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198814979.003.0008.

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Richard Healey’s pragmatist approach to quantum theory promises a middle road between realism and anti-realism. However, in order to capture quantum theory’s explanatory power the pragmatist approach gives up a putative truism about explanation. Namely, that explanation demands accurate representation of the target system. This threatens to undermine our ability to distinguish explanations from nonexplanations in an objective way. Chapter 8 develops a criterion internal to explanation that puts a systematic restriction on the explanatory roles of non-representational (or not adequately representing) explanatory resources. It shows that this allows the pragmatist approach to keep the realist commitment to objective explanation even while weakening the typical realist commitment to the putative truism about explanation. However, the chapter also argues that this way of tackling the problem does not allow us to have a middle road without some explanatory sacrifices. Quantum states and the Born rule can be part of explanations but no longer the explanatory initial input.
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Tulodziecki, Dana. "Virtues in Scientific Practice*." In Science, Technology, and Virtues, 200–222. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190081713.003.0012.

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This chapter relocates the debate about the theoretical virtues to the empirical level and argues that the question of whether the virtues (and what virtues, if any) have epistemic import is best answered empirically, through an examination of actual scientific theories and hypotheses in the history of science. As a concrete example of this approach, the chapter discusses a case study from the mid-nineteenth-century debate about the transmissibility of puerperal fever. It argues that this case shows that the virtues are at least sometimes epistemic, but also that neither scientific realists nor anti-realists get it quite right: the virtues, even if epistemic, are not necessarily truth-conducive, but neither are they merely pragmatic. It also argues that the discussion of puerperal fever shows that the virtue question, as it is currently featured in the scientific realism debate, ought to be reformulated. We should examine not just whether a given scientific theory has virtues or not, but rather how debates among competing theories, all of which have some virtues, get resolved.
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Dukić, Vladimir, and Marie-Eve Morin. "Introduction: Continental Realism – Picking Up the Pieces." In Continental Realism and Its Discontents. Edinburgh University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474421140.003.0001.

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This introductory chapter provides a historical overview of the emergence of new realist movements in contemporary continental philosophy, focusing in particular on speculative realism and materialism, object-oriented ontology, and transcendental nihilism. Provided also is a conceptual introduction to recent realist critiques of the correlationism of post-Kantian philosophy as well as its supposed fideism, anthropocentrism, and anti-scientific bias. This introduction also contains an overview of the volume and the included chapters.
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Braver, Lee. "Before Infinitude: A Levinasian Response to Meillassoux’s Speculative Realism." In Continental Realism and Its Discontents. Edinburgh University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474421140.003.0004.

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This chapter argues that like Meillassoux, Levinas opposes correlationism—a term encompassing both idealism and anti-realism in philosophy. However, Levinas’s attempt to overcome correlationism differs markedly from that of Meillassoux. Whereas Meillassoux argues that mathematizable, scientific discourse can determine facts about reality independent of human thought or awareness, Levinas appeals to an ethical experience of the other that remains correlated with awareness but transcend human rationality. Their attempts to overcome correlationism are thus reverse images of each other: whereas Meillassoux uses reason to transcend experience, Levinas appeals to experience to transcend reason. Taken together, these disparate approaches point to a more nuanced understanding of correlationism and its possible overcoming.
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