Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Schematism (Philosophy)'

The paper's purpose is to offer an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason's chapter On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding. Our hypothesis is that in the doctrine of the schematism the possibility of the ontological constitution of the object as object is decided. Thus we will show that only with the transcendental schemes we find the basic ontological predicates of objectivity. This is demonstrated by establishing that only thanks to the doctrine of schematism the inner dynamism of the cooperation between sensibility and understanding gives place to objective knowledge.
El objetivo de nuestro artículo es ofrecer una interpretación del capítulo sobre El esquematismo de los conceptos puros del entendimiento de la Crítica de la razón pura de Immanuel Kant. Nuestra hipótesis es que en la doctrina del esquematismo se decide la posibilidad de la constitución ontológica del objeto como objeto. Consiguientemente, mostraremos que únicamente con los esquemas trascendentales nos encontramos con los predicados ontológicos fundamentales de la objetividad. Esto se demuestra estableciendo que solo gracias a la doctrina del esquematismo se pone de manifiesto el dinamismo interno de la cooperación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento que da lugar al conocimiento objetivo.

This thesis seeks to provide a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s project in the late twenties and of its breakdown and transformation around the turn of the decade. I argue that Heidegger develops a unified project in the late Marburg period that is constructed around the question of the unity of the concept of being in light of its regional multiplicity. Furthermore, I argue that Heidegger’s conception of the framework of this project is highly influenced by his reception of Kant in this same period. Specifically, I identify the elements of the Kantian framework that Heidegger retains and appropriates for his project, as well as those elements that he rejects. In the former case, Heidegger takes up primarily Kant’s framework of a priori transcendental conditions that are to make empirical experience possible, which Heidegger reformulates in terms of the pre-understanding of being that makes possible the apprehension of entities. In the latter case, I isolate two primary criticisms that will serve as desiderata for the execution of Heidegger’s project, namely: that the categories have an excessively subjectivistic status, and that they are based solely on logical functions of judgement. The former constitutes a problem because the location of the categories on the subject side make s difficult their applicability to the objective realm, and lead Heidegger to reject both the quid juris form of posing the question as well as the results of the transcendental deduction in general. The latter, though closely connected, points to a different set of problems, and targets not the applicability claim but the exhaustiveness claim of the metaphysical deduction. In articulating a theory of categories based on logical functions of judgments, Kant’s resulting theory of possible objects of experience is limited merely to objects of explicit judgement, roughly the objects of the natural sciences, at the expense of other kinds of objects. Paradigmatic of these ‘other kinds of objects’, for Heidegger, are ready-to-hand entities, which are neither spatio-temporally individuated, nor fit into the Kantian conditions for what it would be to count as an object of possible experience. I argue that Heidegger develops his late Marburg project as a development of the Kantian-inspired framework of pre-understanding of being in a manner that responds to the two above problems. Specifically, Heidegger seeks to ground the understanding of being in temporal schemata rather than in logical functions of judgement, which is intended to provide both a wider range of possible objects and to provide a unified backdrop against which the subject can apprehend objects. I end with an assessment of Heidegger’s project, arguing that while it is ultimately unsuccessful in its aims, it nonetheless represents a philosophically interesting and innovative post-Kantian project that sheds exegetical light both on Heidegger’s middle period as well as on his later works.

The paper’s purpose is to offer an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason’s chapter On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding”. Our hypothesis is that in the doctrine of the schematism the possibility of the ontological constitution of the object as object is decided. Thus we will show that only with the transcendental schemes we find the basic ontological predicates of objectivity. This is demonstrated by establishing that only thanks to the doctrine of schematism the inner dynamism of the cooperation between sensibility and understanding gives place to objective knowledge.
El objetivo de nuestro artículo es ofrecer una interpretación del capítulo sobre El esquematismo de los conceptos puros del entendimiento” de la Crítica de la razón pura de Immanuel Kant. Nuestra hipótesis es que en la doctrina del esquematismo se decide la posibilidad de la constitución ontológica del objeto como objeto. Consiguientemente, mostraremos que únicamente con los esquemas trascendentales nos encontramos con los predicados ontológicos fundamentales de la objetividad. Esto se demuestra estableciendo que solo gracias a la doctrina del esquematismo se pone de manifiesto el dinamismo interno de la cooperación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento que da lugar al conocimiento objetivo.

Compilation of two papers, the first of which was accepted for publication in the South African Journal of Philosophy in the second half of 2001.
Why metaphors have no meaning : considering metaphoric meaning in Davidson. -- Bare idea of a conceptual scheme : relativism, intercultural communication and Davidson.
Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: WHY METAPHORS HAVE NO MEANING: CONSIDERING METAPHORIC MEANING IN DAVIDSON Since the publication of Donald Davidson's essay 'What Metaphors Mean' (1984c) - in which he famously asserts that metaphor has no meaning - the views expressed in it have mostly met with criticism: prominently from Mary Hesse and Max Black. This article attempts to explain Davidson's surprise-move regarding metaphor by relating it to elements in the rest of his work in semantics, such as the principle of compositionality, radical interpretation and the principle of charity. I conclude that Davidson's views on metaphor are not only consistent with his semantic theory generally, but that his semantics also depend on these insights. Eventually, the debate regarding Davidson's views on metaphor should be conducted on the level of his views on the nature of semantics, the relationship between language and the world and the possibility of there existing something like conceptual schemes.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: THE BARE IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: RELATIVISM, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND DAVIDSON Donald Davidson's paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' ('OVICS') has become famous for the refutation accomplished in it of conceptual relativism. Via an argument that, essentially, all languages are intertranslatable, Davidson rejects the notion that different conceptual schemes can inhere in the supposed 'un-translatable' languages said to exist by, for instance, Whorf and Kuhn. Critics of Davidson's position have mainly focussed on practical issues, with many holding that his arguments in 'OVICS' ignore the realities of the real intercultural communication situation. In the present paper, I address criticisms of this sort. Davidson's arguments are reconstructed, with attention being paid to their dependence on the idea of practical application in the real intercommunication situation. With the aid of practical examples, the implications of elements of Davidson's philsophy of interpretation for intercultural communication are evaluated. Finally, radical interpretation is presented as a better model for intercultural dialogue than linguistically relativist ones.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: WHY METAPHORS HAVE NO MEANING: CONSIDERING METAPHORIC MEANING IN DAVIDSON Sedert die publikasie van Donald Davidson se opstel 'What Metaphors Mean' (1984c) - waarin hy die berugte stelling maak dat metafoor geen betekenis het nie - is sy sieninge meestal begroet met kritiek, ook van prominente figure soos Mary Hesse en Max Black. Hierdie artikel poog om 'n verduideliking te vind vir Davidson se verassende skuif aangaande metafoor, deur sy sieninge hieroor te kontekstualiseer teen die agtergrond van elemente uit die res van sy werk in semantiek, soos die beginsel van komposisionaliteit, radikale interpretasie en die beginsel van rasionele akkomodasie ('charity'). Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor nie slegs naatloos aansluit by sy algemene sieninge aangaande semantiek nie, maar dat die res van sy semantiese teorie ook afhang van sy sieninge aangaande metafoor. Uiteindelik behoort die debat rakende Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor gevoer te word op die vlak van die aard van semantiek, die verhouding tussen taal en die werklikheid en die moontlike bestaan van konseptueie skemas.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: THE BARE IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: RELATIVISM, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND DAVIDSON Donald Davidson se artikel 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' het beroemdheid verwerf as teenargument vir die idee van konseptuele relativisme. By wyse van 'n argument dat alle tale in beginsel vertaalbaar is, verwerp Davidson die idee dat verskillende konseptueie skemas kan skuilgaan in die veronderstelde 'onvertaalbare' tale waarvan daar sprake is by byvoorbeeld Whorf en Kuhn. Kritici van Davidson se posisie beperk hul hoofsaaklik tot praktiese besware en 'n vername aanklag teen Davidson is dat hy die realiteite misken van werklike interkulturele gesprek. In hierdie artikel spreek ek sodanige kritiek aan. Ek herkonstrueer Davidson se argumente en voer aan dat dit deurgaans afhanklik is van die idee van toepassing in 'n praktiese situasie van interkulturele dialoog. By wyse van praktiese voorbeelde evalueer ek die implikasies van Davidson se filosofie van interpretasie vir interkulturele kommunikasie. Laastens bied ek radikale interpretasie aan as 'n beter model vir interkulturele dialoog as linguisties relativistiese modelle.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Illinois State University, 1999.
Title from title page screen, viewed July 24, 2006. Dissertation Committee: Margaret S. Steffensen (chair), Jeffrey P. Bakken, William C. Woodson, Charles B. Harris. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 214-240) and abstract. Also available in print.

Le présent travail s'initie par des entretiens directifs et des questionnaires auprès d'enseignants de collège afin de voir s'ils établissent un lien entre l'imagination et l'apprendre. Il continue par la lecture et l'analyse des textes officiels et des programmes relatifs aux mathématiques et au français. Il se poursuit avec l'interprétation de textes pédagogiques qui convoquent l'imagination. Suite au constat de la polysémie voire de la polymorphie de l’imagination, cet écrit lit et interprète certaines théories en pédagogies et en philosophie convoquant l’imagination. Cependant la recherche reste animée par la visée de comprendre si l’imagination permet d’apprendre. La centration théorique de notre thèse est le schématisme tel que le décrit Kant. Le schématisme est le produit de l’imagination présentative qui, dans la configuration de l’analogie de l’expérience, met en évidence l’attente d’un terme, d’un objet ; objet à saisir, à-prendre, afin que puisse être établi un rapport, puis soient aussi comparés deux rapports.Grâce à cette approche kantienne nous avons pu conclure que l’imagination est au cœur de l’apprendre parce que l’apprendre est le prolongement de l’analogie de l’expérience, produit de l’imagination présentative
This work opens up with directive interviews of and questionnaires for secondary school teachers in order to find out if they perceive a link between imagination and learning. It is then devoted to studying and analysing official texts and syllabuses related to Mathematics and French. It proceeds with the interpretation of pedagogic writings thar refer to imagination. Based on the observation that imagination is polysemic and even polymorphic, this work interprets some pedagogic and philosophic theories on the theme of imagination. However this research remains motivated by the aim of finding out if imagination allows one to learn.This thesis is centered on the theory of schematism as described by Kant. Schematism is produced by presentative imagination which, in the analogical configuration of experience, reveals the expectation of a term, an object ; an object to seize, ʺto ap-prehendʺ, so that a link can be established, then two links be compared. Thanks to this approach by Kant we are in a position to conclude that imagination is at the heart of learning because learning is the extension of analogical experience, the outcome of presentaive imagination

Ce travail de philosophie porte sur la logique de l'incorporation (Einverleibung) dans son rapport à l'esthétique. La thèse principale est la suivante : la précédence en droit de l'esthétique quant à l'ontologie. Il s'agit de déployer le concept d'incorporation en le liant aux concepts de « décorporation » et de « récorporation » ainsi qu'à la notion stoïcienne de crase ou krasis. L'axe directeur est le suivant : ce n'est pas le corps constitué qui incorpore, c'est le corps qui est le produit métastable d'un processus d'incorporation. Mais comment aborder l'incorporation si elle n'est pas phénoménale, traverse la phénoménalité sans s'y exhausser ? Comment décrire la genèse du sensible dans le corps (percevoir, sentir) ? Ces questions impliquent un concept d'heuristique lié à la notion humienne d'enquête et au concept nietzschéen de généalogie. Elles nécessitent ensuite de différencier le concept d'incorporation de ceux d'incarnation et d'organisme, en montrant comment l'organicité et la chair sont a priori incorporées, mais subsument en retour ce processus d'incorporation. Cela engage enfin une thèse sur le schématisme kantien : ce n'est pas le transcendantal qui est articulé par le schématisme, mais que ce sont les schèmes incorporés et le schématisme les régissant qui vont constituer la base sur laquelle le transcendantal va s'édifier. L'ensemble se compose de deux parties : la première porte sur le rapport de l'incorporation et de l'esthétique entendue comme logique de l'expérience, la seconde sur le concept d'incorporation dans son acception stoïcienne et sur le schématisme
This philosophical work is about the logic of incorporation (Einverleibung) related to the esthetic. The main thesis of this study is the following one : the aesthetic is above the ontology, the aesthetic logic of the body is above the logic of the be. The main purpose of this work is thus to unfold the concept of incorporation and to link it with the concepts of « decorporation » and « recorporation », and with the stoic concept of krasis which means the blend or mixing of the bodies. The first hypothesis is that this is not the body which incorporates, but that the body is « generated » by an incorporation-process. But how can we describe the incorporation if this is not a phenomenon, but a process which passes through phenomenality itself ? How can we describe the genesis of the sensibility and the sensitivity? These questions require an aesthetic heuristic between the enquiry (Hume) and the genealogy (Nietzsche). We have also to distinguish incorporation, incarnation (embodiment) and organism, to show that flesh and organs are incorporated. This involves a specific thesis about Kant's schematism : the transcendental is generated by the incorporation of schemes.This works has two parts : the first is about the incorporation and the aesthetic as logic of experience. The second one is about the stoic comprehension of incorporation

Au XXe siècle, le problème de l’illusionnisme perspectif a posé d’importantes difficultés théoriques aux historien d’arts. En effet, la compréhension de la perspective induit une conception de l’histoire de l’art. Si la perspective est conforme à la perception, alors l’art peut être objectif et son histoire participe de l’histoire des sciences. En revanche, si la perspective n’est pas conforme à la perception, alors l’art, dans son histoire, ne peut être compris comme une quête de l’objectivité. Dans ce cas, deux autres questions se posent : comment penser le rapport entre art et rationalité, et comment définir la visée de l’art? Le premier problème appelle une réflexion sur le concept de schématisme, le second une réflexion sur le rapport entre l’art et les conceptions du monde. La Perspective comme forme symbolique, d’Erwin Panofsky, est le premier texte à avoir proposé une réponse générale à ces questions. Le concept de forme symbolique, emprunté à Ernst Cassirer, lui a permis de considérer la perspective comme une forme culturelle, et de mettre au second plan la question de l’objectivité. Cette position est à l’origine d’intenses polémiques, que les débats historiographiques ne sont pas parvenus à résoudre. En confrontant les travaux de Panofsky à ceux de Philippe Descola et de Ernst Cassirer, cette thèse explicite d’abord les attendus théoriques inhérents au rapport entre forme symbolique, schématisme et conceptions du monde. Elle propose ensuite une analyse des controverses liées à la perspective et met en valeur la pensée de Robert Klein. Cette pensée travaille la phénoménologie et amène à une conception de l’histoire différente de celle proposée par Panofsky
During the 20th century, perspective illusionism caused significant theoretical issues to art historians. That is because an understanding of perspective leads to a conception of art history. If perspective is true to visual perception, then art can be objective and its history is related to the history of sciences. On the other hand, if perspective is not true to visual perception, then art, in its own historical development, cannot be understood as a quest for objectivity. In this case, two further issues arise: how to conceive the relationship between art and rationality, and how to define the purpose of art? The first problem requires a reflection on the concept of schematism, the second a reflection on the relationship between art and different worldviews. Erwin Panofsky’s essay, Perspective as a Symbolic Form, was the first text to provide a comprehensive answer to these questions. The concept of symbolic form, borrowed from Ernst Cassirer philosophy, allowed him to consider perspective mainly as a cultural form, thus overlooking the issue of objectivity. This position has led to numerous controversies, which have not been overcome by historiographical discussions. By comparing Panofsky’s work with those of Philippe Descola and Ernst Cassirer, this thesis first clarifies the theoretical prerequisites for the relationship between symbolic form, schematism and worldviews. It then provides an analysis of several historiographical controversies and underscores the thinking of Robert Klein. His approach tackles phenomenology and leads to a different conception of history than the one proposed by Panofsky to overcome the issues raised by perspective

Il arrive que l’architecture soit critiquée pour les usages qu’elle a « produits » ou ceux qu’elle a « interdits » (un certain désaveu des grands ensembles en est symptomatique). Parfois, la critique porte justement sur le décalage entre l’intention d’origine et l’effet réellement produit (les grands ensembles étaient à l’époque pétris d’humanisme). Mais la connaissance de cette intention fait défaut, et engage donc à un travail de recherche.Les théories de la conception ont pour objet une certaine intelligibilité de la conception. Mais il semble que l’activité de conception explicitée par ces théories, se concentre essentiellement sur l’artefact architectural pris dans ses dimensions tangibles et matérielles. S’intéressant au contraire à la « réception » imaginée par l’architecte, la question se pose de savoir si nous sommes en mesure de connaître la conception de modes de vie, l’invention d’usages et d’expériences… L’ancrage dans les sciences de la conception nous engage à nous détacher d’approches telles que celle de la sociologie des usages, puisque nous nous intéressons à des récepteurs qui n’existent pas encore et ne sont que représentés ou anticipés. Le concept de « conception de la réception » construit dans ce travail signifie cette appropriation de la réalité de la réception par la cognition des concepteurs. En effet, le phénomène dont l’explicitation est visée est un processus de pensée, une capacité mentale.Ce travail définit deux corpus imbriqués. D’une part l’architecturologie qui constitue un cas de théorie de la conception dont il est possible de faire l’étude épistémologique critique. D’autre part, les projets de Bernard Tschumi et de Rem Koolhaas pour le parc de La Villette en 1982 qui constituent des cas de processus de conception et un terrain d’application pour une étude architecturologique.— L’architecturologie est choisie comme cas de théorie de la conception pour les raisons qu’elle prend en compte la spécificité de l’architecture et qu’elle est caractérisée par une construction formelle, un potentiel de généralisation et une forte capacité modélisatrice. Elle constitue ainsi un terrain d’étude privilégié pour étudier la capacité d’une théorie à énoncer quelque chose de la « conception de la réception » architecturale. Toutefois, la méthode, construite d’une manière générique, est à même d’étudier d’autres théories de la conception.— Les parcs de la Villette de Bernard Tschumi et de Rem Koolhaas s’offrent comme une matière pertinente à l’étude, parce qu’ils proposent tout deux des usages particulièrement singuliers et répondent à un programme d’innovation sociétale.Le dispositif expérimental consiste alors à observer la théorie en la mettant en action sur ces cas de conception particuliers. La modélisation résultante permet d’évaluer la capacité de la théorie à décrire la « conception de la réception ». Le résultat de cette mise à l’épreuve ouvre ensuite à un travail de consolidation théorique
Architecture happens to be criticized for the uses it « produced » or it « forbid » (the general disapproval of the French « Grands ensembles » being one typical case). Sometimes the critic focuses fittingly on the gap between original intentions and the real effect (the « Grands Ensembles » were at their time supported by a humanistic enthusiasm). But the knowledge of such an intention is lacking and compels to lead this research.Design theories aim a certain intelligibility of the design process. However, it appears that the design explained by those theories is the one that designs the architectural artifact in its tangible and material aspects. But, taking interest in the “reception” of that artifact, the question to ask is whether we are able to know the design of ways of life, the inventions of uses and experiences… The frame of design sciences (H. A. Simon) imply to withdraw from approaches like usage studies and sociological points of view, since we focus on users that do not exist yet but are represented or anticipated. The concept of “conception of the reception” elaborated in this work means this uptake of the reality of the reception by designers’ cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon we aim to elucidate is a thinking process, a mind ability.This work defines two nested researches’ bodies: one being the French theory, “architecturology” (Ph. Boudon, Ph. Deshayes, C.Lecourtois), a case of a design theory which will be epistemologically and critically analyzed; the other one, the projects of Bernard Tschumi and Rem Koolhaas at for the La Villette park comptetition in 1982 which are cases of design processes. These design cases are the field where an architecturological study is applied.— The reason why architecturology is chosen, is that it takes the specificity of architecture into account, and that it is characterized by a formal construction, a generalization potential and a strong modelling capacity. Therefor it is taken as an advantageous field to study the capacity of a theory to state something about the architectural “conception of the reception”. Whatever, the methods is built in a generic way and could study other theories.— The park of La Villette projects are relevant to study as they both suggested particularly unexpected usages and met a social innovation program.The experimental device consists then in observing the theory by putting it in action on particular study cases. The modelling result of it allows evaluating the capacity of a theory to describe the “conception of the reception”. The result of this theoretical probation may open afterwards to a theoretical consolidation work
A volte l'architettura viene criticata per gli usi che ha "prodotto" o per quelli che ha "proibito" (un certo disconoscimento dei "grands ensembles" del dopo guerra francese è sintomatico). La critica riguarda spesso il divario tra l'intenzione originale e l'effetto realmente prodotto (i "grands ensembles" erano considerati all'epoca carichi di valori umanisti). La conoscenza diquesta intenzione è carente e richiede un lavoro di ricerca.Le teorie del design hanno lo scopo di fornire una certa intelligibilità del design stesso. Sembra però che l'attività progettuale spiegata da queste teorie si concentri essenzialmente sul prodotto architettonico nelle sue dimensioni tangibili e materiali. Quando invece ci si interessa alla Ŗricezioneŗ, è legittimo chiedersi se siamo in grado di conoscere la concezione degli stili di vita, l'invenzione degli usi e delle esperienze.... Il radicamento nelle scienze della progettazione (H. A. Simon) ci impone di distaccarci da approcci come la sociologia degli usi, poiché ci interessiamo a dei riceventi (o destinatari) che non esistono ancora e sono solo rappresentati o suggeriti. La nozione di "design della ricezione", elaborata in questo lavoro di ricerca, mette in luce la capacità dei progettisti di pensare la ricezione prima che accade. Il fenomeno che si cerca di spiegare è un processo del pensiero, una capacità mentale.Questo lavoro identifica due corpus intrecciati: da un lato, l' "architetturologia" (cf. Ph. Boudon, Ph. Deshayes, C. Lecourtois), un caso di teoria del design, di cui è possibile condurre uno studio epistemologico critico. Dall'altro, i progetti di Bernard Tschumi e Rem Koolhaas per il parco della Villette del 1982, inquanto esempi del processo di progettazione.Questi due esempi costituiscono un campo di applicazione per un'indagine architetturologica.- La scelta dell'architetturologia come esempio di teoria del design è motivata dal fatto che essa tiene conto delle specificità dell'architettura ed è caratterizzata da una costruzione formale, un potenziale di generalizzazione e una forte capacità di modellizzazione. Per queste caratteristiche essa ci offre la possibilità di studiare come una teoria possa esprimersi inmateria di "concezione architettonica della ricezione". Inoltre il metodo ha valore generale, tanto da permattere di analizzare altre teorie del design.- I parchi de La Villette di Bernard Tschumi e Rem Koolhaas sono rilevanti per lo studio poiché entrambi propongono funzioni singolari e rispondono a un programma di innovazione sociale.Il piano sperimentale consiste quindi nell'osservare la teoria, applicandola a dei casi particolari. Il modello che ne risulta viene utilizzata per valutare la capacità della teoria di descrivere il "design della ricezione". Il risultato di questo test apre quindi la strada a un lavoro di consolidamento teorico
Manchmal wird die Architektur für die Nutzungen kritisiert, die sie "produziert" oder "verboten" hat (eine gewisse Geringschätzung der "grands ensembles" der französischen Nachkriegszeit ist dafür symptomatisch). Manchmal geht es bei der Kritik gerade um die Kluft zwischen der ursprünglichen Absicht und der tatsächlich erzeugten Wirkung (die"grands ensembles" waren damals vom Humanismus inspiriert). Aber eine tiefere Erkenntnis dieser Zielsetzung fehlt und erfordert daher Forschungsarbeit.Gestaltungstheorien zielen darauf ab, eine gewisse Verständlichkeit des Entwurfprozess zu vermitteln. Aber es scheint, dass sich die durch diese Theorien erklärte Entwurfstätigkeit im Wesentlichen auf das architektonische Objekt in seinen konkreten und materiellen Dimensionen konzentriert. Wenn wir uns dagegen für die "Rezeption" interessieren, stellt sichdie Frage, ob wir den Entwurf von Lebensstilen sowie zukünftige Nutzungs - und Erfahrungsausgestaltungen erkennen können.... Die Verankerung in den Wwissenschaften vom Entwerfen (H. A. Simon) verpflichtet uns, uns von Ansätzen wie der Soziologie der Nutzungen zu lösen, da wir uns für Rezipienten interessieren, die noch nicht existieren und nur vorgestellt oder antizipiert werden. Das in dieser Arbeit entwickelte Konzept des "Entwurfs der Rezeption" bedeutet, dass sich die Architekten kognitiv die Realität der Rezeption zu eigen machen. In der Tat ist das Phänomen, das hier beleuchtet werden soll, ein Denkprozess, eine geistige Fähigkeit.Diese Arbeit definiert daher zwei miteinander verflochtene Korpusse: Einerseits ist die ŖArchitekturologieŗ (Ph. Boudon, Ph. Deshayes, C.Lecourtois) ein Fall der Gestaltungstheorie, die man einer kritischen epistemologischen Studie unterziehen kann. Andererseits sind Bernard Tschumis und Rem Koolhaas' Projekte für den Park von La Villette aus dem Jahr 1982 Beispiele für Entwurfsprozesse. Diese Entwurfsbeispiele sind ein Anwendungsgebiet für eine « Architekturologie-Studie ».- Die « Architekturologie » wird als Fallstudie in der Gestaltungstheorie gewählt, weil sie die Spezifität der Architektur berücksichtigt und sich durch eine formale Konstruktion, ein Verallgemeinerungspotential und eine starke Modellierungsfähigkeit auszeichnet. Sie stellt deshalb einen besonders geeigneten Studiengegenstand dar, um zu untersuchen, inwieweit eine Theorie in der Lage ist, etwas von dem architekturalen "Entwurf der Rezeption" zu vermitteln. Allerdings ist die Methode auf eine so allgemeine Weise konstruiert, dass man auch andere Gestaltungstheorien damit untersuchen kann. - Bernard Tschumis und Rem Koolhaasř Entwürfe für den Park von La Villette sind für die Studie relevant, da sie beide besonders originelle Nutzungsmöglichkeiten bieten und einem gesellschaftlichen Innovationsauftrag Rechnung tragen.Das experimentelle Design besteht dann darin, die Theorie zu beobachten, indem es sie auf bestimmte Entwurfsbeispiele anwendet. Die daraus resultierende Modellierung ermöglicht es zu beurteilen, inwieweit die Theorie den "Entwurf der Rezeption" beschreiben kann. Das Ergebnis dieser Prüfung öffnet dann den Weg zu einer theoretischen Konsolidierungsarbeit

When it comes to the notion of creativity, both R. Dawkins and D. Dennett argue that creativity is a matter of random mutation, in the same way that genes randomly mutate. Neither Dennett nor Dawkins see anything else in the mimetic theory of creativity than a process of Darwinian evolution. However, this complete reliance upon the extension of evolution for understanding creativity needs to be supplemented by combining it with other ideas such as those of "schema theory," because creativity always occurs within a structured context and is not simply a matter of random mutation of ideas. Schema theory comes largely from the works of E.H Gombrich, who argued that "schemas" play a crucial role in how it is that we are able to be creative. He defines schemas as structure and traditions in society that help to convey the meaning of our creative efforts. Just as semantics needs syntax within language in order to formulate and convey meaning, so by analogy memes need schemas for the creation and expression of new ideas. Rather than being the antithesis of creativity, existing forms of expression and traditions are important for the creation of new ideas. This needs to be factored into any theory of creativity in order to account for the effect of the social context on creative endeavours in addition to a Darwinian account of memes. The unconscious processes at work within the brain that are involved in the generation of ideas and other creative products can be understood using the notion of a "generator", as originally conceived by D. Dennett. This notion goes beyond mere concrete Skinnerian behavioural trial and error. Within this generator, there appear to be at work processes such as those of bisociation and association, as discussed by A. Koestler, as well as processes such as the role of language, memory, generate-and-test and intentionality that must be acknowledged in addition to the syntactic operations of schemas and the replicating contents of memes. The operation of all of these ingredients within the generator, when understood together, can be seen as responsible for our ability to be creative.

仲輝.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-164)
Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web.
Abstracts in Chinese and English.
Zhong Hui.

Cette analyse porte sur le schématisme des concepts purs de l’entendement, tel que présenté par Emmanuel Kant dans la Critique de la raison pure et interprété par Martin Heidegger. La lecture proposée par Heidegger est critiquée par un bon nombre de commentateurs dans la mesure où ils considèrent que son interprétation ne lui sert qu’à faire valoir ses propres théories philosophiques au sujet du Dasein et de l’ontologie fondamentale. Notre approche se distingue de la leur dans la mesure où nous tentons de comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé Heidegger à défendre l’interprétation du schématisme qui est la sienne. Notre étude s’attarde au texte de Kant de manière à en souligner les éléments qui ont permis à Heidegger d’établir sa lecture, telle qu’il la présente dans son ouvrage de 1929, ayant pour titre Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. La méthode utilisée est comparative, car notre but est de démontrer la valeur de l’interprétation heideggérienne contre celle des commentateurs qui le critiquent pour des raisons insuffisantes. Bref, le thème du schématisme kantien est analysé de long en large et la conclusion à laquelle nous parvenons est que Heidegger a permis des avancées philosophiques considérables par son herméneutique de la Critique et qu’il est nécessaire de leur accorder l’attention qui leur est due.
The subject of this analysis is the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding, as presented by Emmanuel Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason and interpreted by Martin Heidegger. The reading proposed by Heidegger is criticized by a large number of commentators because they consider that his interpretation only serves to give value to his own philosophical theories on Dasein and on fundamental ontology. Our approach is different from theirs in that we are trying to understand the reasons that justify Heidegger in his interpretation of schematism. Our study dwells on Kant's text in order to extract the elements that allowed Heidegger to build up his thoughts, as he presented them in 1929 in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The method used is comparative, since our goal is to demonstrate the relevance of Heidegger's interpretation against the commentators who have insufficient reasons to criticize him. In short, the theme of Kant's schematism is analyzed thoroughly and the conclusion we come to is that Heidegger allowed for considerable philosophical progress with his hermeneutics of the Critique and that it is necessary to give them the attention they deserve.

In this thesis it is argued that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his doctrine of the imagination, and that by understanding the role of imagination as symbolic rather than schematic, the resources are provided to show that his critical philosophy has more radical possibilities than those of his post-Kantian critics. To display this, it is first pointed out that the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's Copernican turn is not fully developed in his first Critique. Next, it is argued that Kant's doctrine of the imagination is not fully realized until the third Critique in which Kant radicalizes his notion of constructivism by introducing a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments. Finally, it is suggested that while Hegel believes that Kant?s idealism is not dynamic enough to support a full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when Kant?s mature doctrine of the imagination is taken into account, this is no longer the case because Kant believes that our particular experiences of the world unfold artistically and creatively according to the work of the imagination. It is suggested, therefore, that in many ways Kant anticipates the developments of thinkers such as Hegel and other post- Kantians and may even continue to lie beyond them.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
This research project proposes to try to isolate and measure the influence of “regime fatigue” on gubernatorial elections and senatorial elections in the United States where there is no incumbent running. The research begins with a review of the negativity effect and its potential influence on schema-based impression forming by voters. Applicable literature on the topics of social clustering and homophily is then highlighted as it provides the vehicle through which the negativity effect disseminates across collections of socially-clustered individuals and ultimately contributes to changing tides of public opinion despite the fact that the political party identification can remain relatively fixed in the aggregate.