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Iqbal, Asep Muhamad, and asmoiq@yahoo com. "Salafism and the Internet in Contemporary Indonesia." Flinders University. Sociology, 2008. http://catalogue.flinders.edu.au./local/adt/public/adt-SFU20080722.111604.
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This study deals with the relationship between religious fundamentalism and the internet. It aims to be a critique of the conception that religion and modernization are inherently incompatible; that modernization leads to the death of religion, as advocated the secularization theorists. It argues that the notion is an inaccurate characterization and understanding of the interplay between the forces of religion and modernization; rather, both co-exist and mutually reinforce one another. It also argues that it is inappropriate to label religious fundamentalism as an anti-modern movement; it might be true that it is ideologically ultra-orthodox, but it is technologically a modern movement. The value of this study lies in its findings that the most conservative religious groups like the Salafi community not only persist in the face of modernization, but also transform realities of modernity like the internet into a new form of modern product that serves well their religious needs and interests. To support this, I analysed Salafism, a transnational Islamic fundamentalist movement, and its use of the internet within the Indonesian context to uncover how they employ the technology. I examined the ways the Salafis use the internet in accordance with their ideological purposes in the frameworks of cultured technology, localization process of global force of information technology, appropriation of global media, and spiritualizing technology. Textual analysis was mainly employed as a method to understand the Salafi web contents and uncover the ways the Salafi use the internet.
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Amin, Hira. "Salafism and Islamism in Britain, 1965-2015." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2017. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/269730.
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The thesis examines two of the arguably most contentious strands within contemporary Islam – Salafism and Islamism – in the British context from 1965 to the contemporary period. Its central argument is that by using their (multi-directional) connections, modern Muslim sects in Britain fashioned a distinct ‘Western Muslim’ consciousness, which has gradually altered their relationship with the ‘Muslim world’ at large. Rather than generating remittances to send ‘back home’, to Muslim-majority countries – Britain, and the West more broadly, came to be seen as another important Muslim space in need of resources, institutions, and unique paradigms for understanding and practicing Islam. Put differently, scholars, activists and intellectuals began carving out a self-conscious Western form of Islam, and in this process have begun to subvert their peripheral status vis-à-vis the heartlands of the Muslim world. The thesis charts the emergence of this ‘Western Muslim’ consciousness beginning from the late 1960s to the present. It demonstrates that this was neither a linear process of severing ties with Muslim-majority countries, nor one of wholly adopting Western cultural codes or modes of faith. Rather Salafis and Islamists rooted Islam in Britain, but on their own terms. It opens with a re-examination of the religious lives of the first generation pioneer migrants that arrived in the post-War period from South Asia, who were involved with either the Ahl-e-Hadith or the Jamaat-e-Islami. It examines how each faction established their mosques and organisations in the British context, making complex and sophisticated adaptions in their thoughts and practice while negotiating their changed setting. It suggests that the sharp generational divide – where the first were primarily seen in ethnic terms and the second adopted a global religious identity – has hitherto dominated accounts of Muslims in Britain, and needs to be critiqued and revised. From their inception, the struggle to recreate an ‘authentic’ Islam was pivotal in both movements. Purging Islam from adulterations and perceiving themselves as part of the global ummah were sentiments that were present, to a certain degree, in the first-generation. This is not to say that there were no generational differences, but that these differences were more fluid than has been suggested. The thesis also explores the reasons underpinning the resurgence of ‘traditional’ religious figures at the expense of ‘intellectuals’. However, in the context of individualisation, new media and the democratisation of religion, this raises important questions as to how ‘traditional’ religious authority is being transformed and adapted. It analyses the seemingly contradictory elements of the desire to wholeheartedly follow ‘authentic’ religious figures on the one hand, and still actively rationalise and determine which interpretation of Islam they ultimately follow on the other. With the advent of cyberspace, it also examines the changing contours of the ‘community’ and the relationship between offline and online networks. It argues that the internet has accelerated the development of like-minded or ideological transnational networks that span online and offline spaces. These networks increasingly take precedence over geographically close ‘communities’ decentralising, but not devaluing, the masjid.
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Østebø, Terje. "Localising Salafism : religious change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia /." Stockholm : Department of Ethnology, History of Religion and Gender Studies, Stockholm University, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-8367.
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Ainine, Bilel. "Islam politique et entrée en radicalité violente. Le cas des salafistes radicaux violents algériens." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016SACLV092/document.
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Résumé : Cette thèse s’intéresse à la question de la radicalisation violente chez les salafistes algériens. Elle tente de comprendre comment s’effectue le glissement d’un militantisme (ou d’une sympathie) en faveur d’un islam politique légal, vers un activisme clandestin versé dans l’action violente sous le seau du djihad armé. Saisir le cheminement de cette entrée en radicalité, nous amène d’abord à réfléchir sur la radicalisation de la pensée religieuse comme première étape du processus étudié. L’engagement au profit du djihad est ensuite tributaire d’une construction (ou reconstruction) identitaire fondée sur un renversement moral de l’ordre socioreligieux établi. Les représentationsqui en émanent sont le produit d’une socialisation de l’individu à une pensée radicalisée qui, lorsqu’elle est combinée à d’autres variables facilitatrices ou incitatrices, le prédispose à passer à l’acte. Ainsi, au niveau macro, les opportunités/menaces agissent comme des facteurs facilitateurs ou précipitateurs dans l’engagement armé ; la répression et la fermeture du champ politique sont à ce titre, les variables les plus redondantes dans l’explication de l’entrée en radicalité chez les salafistes algériens. Au niveau méso et micro, l’influence des réseaux préconstitués (organisations armées, réseaux de soutiens logistiques…) et des liens sociaux (amis, voisins, famille…) pèse lourdement sur le choix de l’engagement collectif et individuel. Enfin, les chocs moraux et les récits mémoriels sur la répression subie peuvent aussi nous éclairer à saisir un certain nombre de trajectoires de radicalisation violente chez les djihadistes algériensAbstract : This thesis focuses on the issue of violent radicalization among Algerian Salafists. It tries to understand how is the shift of activism (or sympathy) for a legal political Islam to a clandestine activism poured into violent action in the bucket of armed jihad. Enter the path of the entry into radicalism, leads us first to reflect on the radicalization of religious thought as a first step in the process studied. The commitment in favor of jihad is then dependent on a construction (or reconstruction) of identity based on moral overthrow of the established socio-religious order. The representations that come in are the product of socialization of the individual to a radicalized thought which, when combined with other variables or incentive-facilitators, predisposes to pass the act. Thus, at the macro level, opportunities / threats act as facilitators factors or precipitators in the armed engagement; repression and the closure of the political field as such are the most redundant variables in explaining the entry into radicalism among Algerian Salafists. At the meso and micro level, the influence of pre-made networks (armed organizations, logistic support networks ...) and social connections (friends, neighbors, family ...) weighs heavily on the choice of the individual and collective commitment. Finally, moral shocks and stories on the memorial suffered repression may also enlighten us to enter a number of violent radicalization trajectories among Algerian jihadists
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Vericat, Jose S. "The internal conversation of Hamas : Salafism and the rise of the 'Ulama'." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:05107032-07b7-416f-8689-b4a33d26764f.
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Over the last few decades and particularly since '9/11', Islamism has become a major actor in international relations with the rise of a wide variety of movements. There is however still a profound ignorance as to the differences between them and their internal dynamics. The case of the Palestinian Hamas is a particularly good example because it is one of the most renowned and influential Islamist movements globally - despite the very confined geographical space it operates in. And yet, it is little understood. This thesis is an attempt to situate Hamas in the history of Islamism and among that spectrum of Islamist organisations that exist today. It does this by tracing some of the most influential voices in the Movement and reconstructing its internal conversation around a question that is central to Islamism: the role of revelation in politics. To answer it, this thesis focuses on the use of the religious reference in Hamas. It identifies a group of Salafi 'ulama' and analyses their discourse and the function that they performed in the Movement. It argues that there are two major trends in Islamism, a modernist and a purist, and these compete over the legacy of the Salafi movement. It is the debates between them within Hamas that the argument in this thesis is structured around. Modernist Salafism is manifested in Hamas through the centrist trend, a regional movement that inherited the thought of nineteenth century Islamic reformists who tried to reconcile Islam with the Western liberal tradition. The purist Salafi trend is an offshoot of Saudi Wahhabism, and is represented in Hamas by its 'ulama'. Thus far, these two trends have been presented as competing, and only rarely has the influence of purist Salafism within the Muslim Brotherhood, or an offshoot thereof like Hamas, been discussed. This thesis is structured chronologically around a set of key moments in the history of the Movement. Although extensive and detailed interviews have been carried out, the focus is on tapping into the main debates within the organisation that are hidden from the general public and that contrast with Hamas's external discourse. For this it analyses the newspaper al-Risala, one of its main media organs, as well as other publications written primarily for an internal audience.
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Mané, Idrissa. "Les « ibadou » du Sénégal. Logiques religieuses, logiques identitaires." Thesis, Pau, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PAUU1049/document.
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Au Sénégal, l’essentiel de la population musulmane est affilié au soufisme. Quatre principales confréries soufi, dont la tajaniyya, la mouridiyya, la qadiriyya et la layiniyya, organisent la vie islamique et définissent, en partie, l’identité du musulman sénégalais. Mais, depuis la fin des années 1970, des sénégalais revendiquent d’autres façons d’être musulman hors du soufisme et de ces confréries tout en restant sunnites (il existe une petite minorité de chiites). Ils se constituent en associations et mouvements islamiques très dynamiques. Leur rigorisme les mène à catégoriser les croyances et pratiques d’islam au Sénégal en orthodoxes (les leurs) et hétérodoxes (celles des soufi). Ainsi, ils se coupent de toute filiation confrérique soufi, critiquent des croyances et pratiques soufi et affichent leur différence par des codes vestimentaires, des pratiques islamiques, des comportements sociaux, etc. Ces logiques religieuses et identitaires les font appeler d’abord « arabisants » (par opposition aux sortants de l’école français, européenne) puis « ibadou », en référence au nom choisi, pour leurs membres, par les fondateurs de l’association Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane (JIR).Dans cette thèse, nous avons essayé de montrer en quoi les « ibadou du Sénégal » nous renseignent sur les croyances et pratiques actuelles d’islam puis en quoi ils rendent compte des crises de l’islam dans ce contexte de globalisation marqué, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, par la médiatisation de l’islamisme radical et du terrorismeThis doctoral dissertation investigates, and aims at highlighting, the ways in which the «ibadou of Senegal» account for the current Islamic practices and beliefs in Senegal and how they cope with the predicaments of Islam in the context of a globalizing world, mainstreamed ideas of radical Islam and terrorism, of which 11th of September 2001 has been a historical landmark. In Senegal, the majority of the Muslim population is affiliated to Sufism. Four main Sufi groups, namely the tajaniyya, the mouridiyya, the qadirriya and the layiniyya, organize the Islamic life and define the identity of the Muslim population in the country. However, since the late 1970s, some Senegalese people pursued other ways of practicing their religion, outside of Sufism while remaining Sunnis (with a minority of Chia Muslims). They organize themselves in communities with highly dynamic Islamic movements. Their religious rigorism mas made them categorize their Islamic faith and practices as Orthodox, and that of others as Heterodox (The Sufi Muslims). Furthermore, with an outright different dress code, they segregate themselves from the Sufi group by criticizing their beliefs and practices and promoting Islamic practices and social conduct of their own. They were, first, called “Arabist” by training and by their very religious and identity logics, (in opposition to those affiliated with the French schooling system) then now are known as « ibadou », in reference to Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane, a name chosen for the members, but by the founders, of the Association
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Bin, Ali Mohamed. "The Islamic doctrine of Al-Wala' wal Bara' (Loyalty and Disavowal) in modern Salafism." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/9181.
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This study examines the Islamic concept of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in modern Salafism referred to here as WB. The research is divided into two parts. Part One introduces the phenomenon of modern Salafism and the concept of WB (Chapter One). It also demonstrates how the Quran, particularly its sixtieth chapter (Surah Al-Mumtahanah) and the concept of Millat Ibrahim (Religion of Abraham) play an important role in formulating the modern Salafi concept of WB (Chapter Two). Part Two discusses the realities and complexities of the concept. First, the concept in Wahhabism, whose adherents form the majority of modern Salafis, and whose tradition is believed to have influenced and shaped modern Salafism, is discussed (Chapter Three). The complexities of WB are described as the research recognizes the diversity or “spectrum” of the concept in modern Salafism, which ranges from what might be termed “very mild” to “very extreme” (Chapter Four). The research shows that one of the main reasons for this diversity is the different Salafi orientations or the backgrounds from which modern Salafis emerge. This is proven through analyzing the writings on WB by Salafis of purist, politico and Jihadi backgrounds – a specific categorization of modern Salafis used for the purpose of this research (Chapter Five). The analysis is conducted by mainly observing the role of WB within their intellectual systems. Through this analysis, it is concluded that a particular Salafi orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis. This reflects the position of WB in modern Salafism as being fluid and multi-dimensional. The research then, aims to explore the centrality, breadth and complexity of the WB concept in modern Salafism, and proves that WB in modern Salafism is not static but flexible and dynamic. The significance of the research lies in the fact that understanding modern Salafi conceptions of WB is an urgent priority in the lives of Muslims today. This understanding is critical, as Muslims increasingly live as minority communities across the globe and WB has specific implications for whether (and how) Muslims can live with non-Muslims. The research concludes that the consequences of applying the modern Salafi concept of WB are serious – WB generally promotes a way of life that is insular and hostile towards non-Muslims and this, it might be argued, is at variance with more tolerant, inclusive nature of Islam.
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Cherem, Youssef Alvarenga. "A crença, a lei, a guerra = uma análise do pensamento de 'Isâm Muhammad Tâhir al-Barqâwî." [s.n.], 2010. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280788.
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Orientador: Omar Ribeiro ThomazTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-16T02:17:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cherem_YoussefAlvarenga_D.pdf: 1035958 bytes, checksum: 4a762265cb3536a4d795c76a9b2437a9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010
Resumo: Quais são os papéis e os signicados do conceito de jihad para os movimentos islamistas contemporâneos? Este trabalho pretende analisar o conceito de jihad na ideologia do jordaniano-palestino 'Isâm Muhammad Tâhir al-Barqâwî (Abû Muhammad al-Maqdisî). Com isso, procuraremos demonstrar que o jihad moderno, em sua manifestação salafista militante, está ligado a uma recomposição da identidade islâmica em três eixos: a crença ('aqîda), a lei (sharî'a) e a guerra/luta/combate (qitâl, jihâd, h. arb). O jihad, portanto, não pode ser dissociado da visão de mundo específica em que se insere. E, segundo o pensamento salalista-jihadista, é parte imprescindível do modo de vida do verdadeiro muçulmano. E, diversamente de outras leituras históricas e contemporâneas do jihad, esse jihad se torna, ele próprio, um modo de vida: uma missão, uma ideologia, e uma doutrina religiosa
Abstract: What are the roles and meanings taken by the concept of jihad for contemporary islamist movements?The aim of this work is to analize the concept of jihad in the ideology of the Palestinian-Jordanian 'Is.âm Muhammad T. âhir al-Barqâwî (Abû Muhammad al-Maqdisî). I contend that modern jihad, in its militant, salafi conception, is connected to a recomposing of Islamic identity on three axis: belief ('aqîda), law (sharî'a), and war/combat/fight (qitâl, jihâd, h.arb). Jihad, therefore, cannot be set apart from the specific worldview wherein it thrives. According to salafi-jihadi thought - and contrary to other historical and contemporary understandings among Muslims - jihad becomes a way of life in itself: a mission, an ideology, and a religious doctrine
Doutorado
Antropologia
Doutor em Antropologia Social
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Welty, Laura Jane Boatsman. "Preventing and Countering Salafist Radicalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/28068.
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Salafist mujahideen arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian War (1992-1995). The presence of mujahideen, coupled with the increased scrutiny on the Islamic World post-9/11, led to the narrative of Bosnia being primed for the proliferation of jihadi takfiri Salafi ideology. This prediction was supported by the existence of villages that adhered to shari’a law and parajamaats, parallel mosques, which operated outside of the control of the formal Bosnian Islamic Community (BIC). In the mid-2010s, Bosnian-born foreign fighters travelled to foreign theatres of conflict, mainly Syria and Iraq, to support and fight for terrorist groups, including ISIS.
According to radicalisation theories often applied to European case studies, Bosniaks were expected to accept and proliferate Salafism. This assumption is based on Bosnia’s history of ethnic violence and trauma, socio-economic challenges, and a dramatic unpreparedness to counter the presence of foreign entities promoting the ideology domestically. However, as of 2016, the flow of Bosnian-born foreign fighters had halted, as has the presence of Salafist radicals willing to break the threshold of violence.
This thesis proposes reasons why a vast majority Bosnian Muslims did not radicalise as expected by exploring the actions taken by civil society, the Bosnian Islamic Community, and the central government to combat Salafist radicalisation in Bosnia. The thesis evaluate how actions and policies were perceived and critiqued by those with localised knowledge and lived experience. This thesis uses an interpretive framework and employs insights from political anthropology and political ethnography, drawing on interviews to present a ‘from within’ analysis. The analysis of Bosnia's historical and cultural complexities and radicalisation literature reveal significant gaps regarding the interplay of the different segments of Bosnian society in countering and preventing Salafist radicalisation.
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Urban, Jacob C. "Contemporary salafism and the Rightly Guided Caliphate: why is it emulated and what was its reality?" Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39030.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.The contemporary Salafist movement idealizes the Rightly Guided Caliphate. Given the tumultuous nature of the period and the grandeur of the Golden Age of Islam that occurred several centuries later, its veneration seems paradoxical. To explain the reality of the Rightly Guided Caliphate and the reasoning behind its emulation, this study explores both the traditional historical account and the contemporary Salafist narrative of the period. Comparative analysis indicates that the period is revered, despite the paradoxical turmoil and violence associated with it, because it is perceived as the summit of both spiritual purity and temporal power in Islamic history. Contemporary Salafists long for a resurgence of Muslim power in the world but do not want to sacrifice religious purity to obtain it. The Rightly Guided Caliphate epitomizes this notion because its earliest generation was the most pure, in terms of the practice of Islam, of any Muslim generation. In addition, its seemingly miraculous expansion signified enormous temporal powerrelative to its competitors, who have since overtaken themthat is easily romanticized. Much of the periods violence is omitted from the narrative to protect an idealized remembrance of the states power, not its religious unity.
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Mimouni, Abdelghani. "Debating al-Ḥākimiyyah and Takfīr in Salafism : the genesis of intra-Salafī schism in the 1990s." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/25598.
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This study examines the intra-Salafī disputes in the 1990s over the legitimacy of present-day rulers in the Muslim world and their status as Muslims. While these issues are theological in their essence, they are intertwined with the political milieu of the Middle East. Fundamentally, these intra-Salafī disputes pivot around the central question of the impact of implementing manmade law systems (instead of sharīʿah) on the legitimacy of the ruler. This study tackles this question and related issues that form the themes addressed in this study. It begins by providing a minimal definition of Salafism which identifies its main characteristics that distinguishes its adherents from other Muslim denominations. Chapter two and three discuss the disputes over whether present-day rulers meet the required qualification to qualify as legitimate rulers in Islam and hence what position Muslims should take towards them. Chapter four digs deeper into the theological aspect of these debates in order to ascertain the different views on what acts can and cannot strip a Muslim from his/her status as a Muslim. It begins by highlighting the importance laid on creed in Salafism and providing the general principles on belief and unbelief upon which all Salafī proponents agree. After that, it examines the disagreements amongst contemporary Salafīs over which criteria should be considered to determine that an act of omission or commission is sinful enough to cause unbelief. Chapter five investigates the accusations levelled against the prominent Salafī scholar al-Albānī in regards to deviancy from the teachings of Salafism on belief and unbelief as an example of the importance of this debate. This study demonstrates how intra-Salafī disputes evolved from a mere disagreement over the legitimacy of political opposition to the state to become an intense complex quarrel on the nature of the Islamic faith. It argues that political affiliations alone fail to explain intra-Salafī disagreements over politics and violence and only through accurate analyses of the underpinning doctrinal differences one can understand their divergent reactions to contemporary political issues. This research aims to contribute to the study of the Islamic governance genre as well as to the studies on Salafism which despite its rapid spread worldwide, remains a scarcely studied subject.
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Toutin, Thierry. "Le djihadisme, aspects juridiques et criminologiques." Thesis, Paris 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA020078.
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Les premiers signes de la radicalisation salafo-djihadiste contemporaine remontent au début des années 80, dans le sillage de l'intervention Soviétique en Afghanistan et de l'instauration de la république islamique d'Iran. Courant minoritaire, totalitaire et ultraconservateur de l’islam, il se considère comme le fédérateur de l'Oumma (communauté des croyants) et l'incarnation de l'islam authentique des origines. Ce mouvement plus proche d’une idéologie révolutionnaire que d’un message religieux, a pris une ampleur internationale, dans le sillage des révoltes du Printemps Arabe fin 2010. Une organisation particulièrement habile dans l'utilisation des moyens modernes de communications et dans la diffusion de la propagande a su créer une dynamique efficace suscitant l'adhésion de jeunes gens et des moins jeunes, depuis tous les continents. Cette organisation terroriste dénommée Daesh ou Etat islamique a réussi à s'imposer là où ses prédécesseurs ont échoué. Comment y est-elle parvenue ? Qui sont les volontaires prêts à mourir pour cette cause ? Quelles sont leurs motivations ? Comment répondre à cette nouvelle forme de menace d’une extraordinaire complexité ? Quelles sont les solutions et les évolutions de ce phénomène d’ampleur ? C’est à toutes ces questions que la présente recherche tente de répondre, sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, avant de conclure sur quelques perspectives et voies d’exploration, de nature à contrecarrer davantage l’influence et les effets d’une idéologie meurtrière qui marquera durablement le 21ème siècleThe first signs of the contemporary salafo-Jihadism radicalization date back to the early 1980s, following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a minority, totalitarian and ultraconservative Muslim, he considers himself to be the federation of the Ummah (community of believers) and the embodiment of authentic Islam from its origins.This movement closer to the revolutionary ideology than the religious message has taken on an international dimension in the wake of the Arab Spring revolts at the end of 2010. An organization particularly skilled in the use of modern means of communication and in disseminating Propaganda has created an effective dynamic, attracting young people and young people from all continents. This terrorist organization called Daesh or Islamic state managed to impose itself where its predecessors failed. How did she get there? Who are the volunteers ready to die for this cause? What are their motivations? How to respond to this strong new threat? What are the solutions and evolutions of this phenomenon of magnitude? This is to those questions that this research attempts to answer, without claiming to be exhaustive, before concluding on a few prospects and ways of exploration, such as to thwart more influence and the effects of ideology a murderer who will permanently mark the 21st century
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Nahouza, Namira. "Contemporary Wahhabism rebranded as Salafism : the issue of interpreting the Qur'anic verses and hadith on the Attributes of God and its significance." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10036/88347.
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This research studies the theology of those Wahhabis who have now named themselves Salafis. For the purpose of the study, they are referred to as the ‘Wahhabis-self-named-Salafis’ (WSNS). The thesis starts with the observation that the WSNS are usually studied from a political perspective, much less frequently a theological one. Recent research has identified that the theological background of all the different factions of the WSNS is one and the same. This is true for the WSNS who advocate a peaceful way to achieve their goals, as well as those who do not. This thesis aims to explore some of the theological issues that unify these factions. This research demonstrates that, because the WSNS are opposed to the very concept of interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith, especially when these texts deal with important theological issues such as the Attributes of God, they have developed a vision of Islamic history which is entirely different from the one which had traditionally been accepted by most Muslim scholars and Western academics. They have redefined the notion of Sunnism as it has been known, mostly basing themselves on this single issue. This thesis shows that the WSNS deny the existence of any interpretation ever made by a recognised member of the Salaf (i.e. the Muslims of the first three generations). In contrast, the Sunnis who do not claim to be Salafis, but who nonetheless consider themselves as treading the path of the Salaf (called in the thesis: ‘Sunnis-not-claiming-to-be-Salafis’) are of the view that they did allow interpretation. The WSNS therefore consider that the Ash‘ari scholars (from the main Sunni theological school) had a corrupted creed concerning God. This leads the followers of the WSNS, from across the spectrum of the different factions, to consider that most of the Islamic scholars from the past had actually failed to understand the proper Tawhid, or Oneness of God, which is tantamount to considering them all as misguided, with the notable exception of Ibn Taymiyya and his students, and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his students. The research argues that, by favouring the non-violent factions of the WSNS simply because they are officially opposed to terrorism and suicide bombings, current counter-terrorism strategies are allowing the gradual replacement of the core of the notion of Sunnism to go ahead, thereby fuelling future chaos and confusion in the Muslim community. This thesis highlights the longer term implications of these strategies for the Muslim community and the world at large.
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Kelly, James E. "Not Our Fight Alone: An Analysis of the US Strategy Combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1036.
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The recent policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, combined with the collapse of the Syrian state in 2011, created conditions that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or “ISIS.” As of November 2014, ISIS controls large areas of western and northern Iraq and northern and eastern Syria, an area roughly the size of Belgium. The rise of ISIS in the past three years has caught the attention of every major nation, especially the United States, and world leaders are justified in fearing a strong ISIS in the Middle East.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the US strategy in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The effectiveness of the United States strategy is closely linked with numerous factors, including the history of sectarian violence in Iraq. These factors will be explored throughout the paper. This analysis sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of the US strategy and provides various ways the US can further its goals in the region.
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El, Kachtoul Othman. "L’exploitation idéologique des références eschatologiques de l’islām : le cas du groupe « État islamique »." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019STRAC026.
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Le Qur’ān est un texte eschatologique et non apocalyptique. Le scénario eschatologique cataclysmique passif qui y est décrit ne s’étant pas réalisé, la tradition millénariste émergera dans les premières sources extracoraniques qui ont fourni les détails manquants concernant les évènements devant précéder l’Heure. Les détails que la tradition contient semblent avoir été fortement influencés par les événements socioculturels, politiques et théologiques de l’époque à laquelle elles étaient écrites. L’un des traits caractérisant le groupe « État islamique » est l’accent qu’il met dans sa propagande sur un narratif apocalyptique qui se déroule à Dabiq ou A‘maq. Selon cette vision, le monde se dirige vers une fin dramatique et inévitable, où les « vrais » croyants seront acteurs de combats épiques qui les opposeront aux rūm, aux juifs et à une coalition de kuffār réunis sous la bannière du daǧǧāl. Ces malāḥim s’accompagneront de fitan qui verront se déchirer la communauté et marqueront la séparation entre les deux camps. Ces évènements culmineront par l’apparition du Mahdī, suivie du retour sur terre de ʿĪsā/Jésus. Ces deux figures messianiques mèneront les musulmans à la victoire promise contre le daǧǧāl et à la conquête de Constantinople et de Rome. Si le Groupe n’est ni le premier ni le seul mouvement terroriste à prôner la violence par une réappropriation des traditions apocalyptiques et par une réinterprétation de celle-ci à son bénéfice exclusif, son discours signifie à ses récepteurs sa volonté de réaliser, d’abord dans l’ordre du symbole puis dans l’ordre du réel, le gouvernement de Allāh sur terre, donc la possibilité de l’eschaton que signifie l’accomplissement de la promesseThe Qur'ān is an eschatological and non-apocalyptic text. Since the passive cataclysmic eschatological scenario described therein has not materialized, the millenarian tradition emerged in the first extra Qur’ānic sources that provided the missing details regarding the events to precede the Hour. The details contained in the tradition seem to have been strongly influenced by the socio-cultural, political and theological events of the time they were written. One of the characteristics of the "Islamic State" group is the emphasis it places in its propaganda on an apocalyptic narrative that takes place in Dabiq or A'maq. According to this vision, the world is heading towards a dramatic and inevitable end, where the "true" believers will be actors in epic battles against rūm, the Jews and a coalition of kuffār united under the banner of daǧǧāl These malāḥim will be accompanied by fitan which will see the community torn apart and will mark the separation between the two camps. These events will culminate in the appearance of Mahdī, followed by the return to earth of ʿĪsā/Jesus. These two messianic figures will lead the Muslims to the promised victory against daǧǧāl and the conquest of Constantinople and Rome. If the Group is neither the first nor the only terrorist movement to advocate violence through a reappropriation of apocalyptic traditions and a reinterpretation of it for its exclusive benefit, its discourse signifies to its receivers its willingness to realize, first in the order of symbol and then in the order of reality, the government of Allāh on earth, thus the possibility of the eschaton that means the fulfilment of the promise
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Camurri, Tommaso. "Historical Research on Boko Haram: a Debate : The Cases of Ansaru and the Chibok Kidnapping." Thesis, Högskolan Dalarna, Afrikanska studier, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-31321.
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The thesis focuses on the phenomenon of Boko Haram in Nigeria, attempting to give an understanding of the group based on the academical analysis that has been elaborated through time. A contextualisation of the movement’s evolution introduces two cases of study, currently under scholars’ scrutiny: the birth of the splinter-cell Ansaru and the Chibok kidnapping. The work is integrated by on-going debates among scholars and the most recently published contributions to the research.
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De, Féo Agnès. "Le voile intégral en perspective : France, 2008-2019." Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0104.
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La présente thèse porte sur un phénomène féminin contemporain : le voilement du visage chez des musulmanes françaises, entre octobre 2008 et 2019, année qui marque la fin de l’État islamique en Syrie. Ce travail se veut à la fois textuel et visuel. Il commence par une recherche des occurrences du voilement du visage dans la culture occidentale, notamment dans la tradition monacale catholique, ainsi que dans les différentes cultures musulmanes, qui servent aujourd’hui de référence au revivalisme symbolique d’un islam des origines. La compilation des occurrences du voilement du visage se poursuit par un recensement des productions culturelles et artistiques, ainsi que des différentes tendances de la modernité comme le zentaï et le facekini.Cette étude a été réalisée en temps réel en suivant l’apparition d’un phénomène en lien avec sa médiatisation autour de son interdiction en 2010. Le but est d’appréhender une manifestation de la religiosité visible sous un angle inédit : non pas comme un simple fait religieux, mais comme une expression de la modernité, une transgression par rapport au voile traditionnel et au consensus laïc de la société française, perçue comme éradicatrice de l’expression identitaire musulmane. Le niqab est une réaction d’opposition, et non la résurgence d’une culture d’origine. Il est aussi un outil subversif d’une partie de la population française qui trouve dans l’islam visible une manière de s’affranchir de l’autorité étatique, notamment depuis que ses manifestations font l’objet d’un fort rejet populaire. Sans oublier des motifs plus prosaïques qui poussent certaines femmes à s’isoler de la société pour se protéger d’une masculinité envahissante.Ce travail cherche à appréhender un phénomène largement fantasmé, au moyen d’une recherche empirique auprès de plus de deux cents femmes portant le niqab enrichie d’entretiens suivis sur une décennie. La caméra m’a permis de fixer leur discours et de réaliser cinq documentaires qui servent de références à la démonstrationThis dissertation focuses on a contemporary feminine phenomenon: the veiling of the face of French Muslim women between October 2008 and 2019, the year that marks the end of the Islamic State in Syria. This work is both textual and visual. It begins with a search for occurrences of facial veiling in Western culture, particularly in the Catholic monastic tradition, as well as in the different Muslim cultures, which today serve as a reference to the symbolic revivalism of an original Islam. The compilation of occurrences of facial veiling continues with a census of cultural and artistic productions, as well as different trends of modernity such as zentai and facekini.This study was conducted in real time following the appearance of a phenomenon related to its media coverage around its ban in 2010. The goal is to capture a manifestation of religiosity visible from an unprecedented angle: not as a simple religious fact, but as an expression of modernity, a transgression in relation to the traditional veil and the secular consensus of French society, perceived as eradicating the expression of Muslim identity. The niqab/veil is a reaction of opposition, not the resurgence of a culture of origin. It is also a subversive tool for a part of the French population who find in visible Islam a way to free themselves from state authority, especially since its demonstrations are the subject of a strong popular rejection. Not to mention more prosaic reasons that push some women to isolate themselves from society to protect themselves from invasive masculinity.This work seeks to capture a largely fantasized phenomenon, through empirical research with more than two hundred niqab wearing women enriched with interviews over a decade. Filming allowed me to set their speech and make five documentaries that serve as references to the demonstration
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Baghali, Hawzhin. "Un salafisme kurde? Sunnisme protestataire et jihadisme en Iran, depuis 2001." Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0006.
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La présente thèse propose de mettre au jour l’apparition et la transformation d’un salafisme kurde, via une sociologie historique des pratiques discursives et avec un intérêt particulier pour les changements des deux dernières décennies dans le cadre politique particulier de la République islamique d’Iran. L’auteure y analyse les dynamiques du clivage générationnel apparu, au tournant du XXIe siècle, entre un “islam de vieux”, à dominante soufie héritée de l’histoire moderne, et un “islam des jeunes” souvent identifié avec le salafisme. Cherchant à comprendre les ressorts de cette rupture, cette étude interroge les contextes socioéconomique et politique de deux décennies riches en faits et événements (des lendemains géopolitiques du 11 Septembre à l’essor des réseaux sociaux) qui ont affecté les interrelations entre espaces politique et religieux. On s’y est penchée, en particulier, sur la production d’espaces neufs dans la société kurde par une diversité d’acteurs politico-confessionnels.L’enquête s’appuie à la fois sur une diversité de sources primaires textuelles, l’activitédes islamistes kurdes sur la Toile et dans les réseaux sociaux, ainsi que sur des entretiens réalisés avec les membres de cinq groupes distincts, en Iran et en Iraq : le Maktab-e Qor’an et la Société iranienne pour la prédication et la réforme, tous deux d’inspiration frériste, le Yekgrtou Islamî, le Komeley Islamî et des salafistes jihadistes kurdes d’Iran, ainsi qu’avec des maîtres et disciples des Voies soufies historiques de la Qadiriyya et de la Naqshbandiyya, le tout dans onze localités différents des régions de peuplement kurde majoritaire d’Iran et d’Iraq.Parmi les conclusions suggérées : l’importance des impacts qu’ont exercé les transformations successives de l’État iranien, depuis la fin de la période Qadjar à nos jours, et d’une manière plus générale les modernités moyen-orientales, sur la transformation graduelle du champ religieux kurde, en particulier sur l’émergence de mouvements se réclamant, à la fois, d’une rationalisation et d’un effort d’autonomisation par rapport à la société globale – effort perceptible depuis le Maktab-e Qor’an, à la fin des années 1970, jusqu’à une variété de salafismes actuels. Ce que l’on remarque également – du point de vue ne particulier de la distribution genrée des rôles au sein de ces mouvements – est une grande continuité du point de vue de la maintenance de discours autoritaires, nourris d’un héritage de coercition. L’auteure insiste, enfin, sur la nécessité d’une prise en compte du caractère complexe et dynamique des interrelations entre, d’une part, les islamistes d’une ancienne marche tribale de l’Iran héritiers, aussi, du nationalisme kurde de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, et d’autre part une République islamique persane et chiite, certes, mais souvent tentée au cours de quarante ans d’histoire de jouer la carte d’une instrumentation de la dissidence confessionnelleThis thesis proposes to uncover the emergence and transformation of Kurdish Salafismthrough a historical sociology of discursive practices, with a particular interest in thechanges of the last two decades against the political background of the Islamic Republic ofIran. The author has been analysing the dynamics of the generational cleavage that emergedat the turn of the 21st century between an ‘old people's Islam’, predominantly Sufi, inherited from modern history, and an ‘Islam of the young’ often identified with Salafism. In an attempt to understand the reasons for this rupture, this study examines the socioeconomic and political contexts of two decades rich in facts and events (from the geopolitical aftermath of September 11 to the rise of social networks) that have deeply affected the interrelationships between political and religious spaces. In particular, it focuses on the production of new spaces in Kurdish society by a diversity of political and confessional actors.The survey is based on a variety of primary textual sources, on the activity ofKurdish Islamists on the Internet and in social networks, as well as on interviews withmembers of five distinct groups in Iran and Iraq: the Maktab-e Qor'an and the IranianSociety for Preaching and Reform, both of Muslim-Brother inspiration, the Yekgrtou Islamî,the Komeley Islamî and Kurdish jihadist Salafists of Iran, as well as with masters anddisciples of the historic Sufi Paths of the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya, all in elevendifferent locations in the Kurdish-majority districts of Iran and Iraq.Among the suggested conclusions: the importance of the impacts that the successivetransformations of the Iranian state, and more generally Middle Eastern modernities, havehad on the gradual transformation of the Kurdish religious field since the end of the Qajarperiod to the present – in particular on the emergence of movements claiming bothrationalisation and empowerment in relation to global society (an effort perceptible fromthe Maktab-e Qor'an in the late 1970s to a variety of current Salafisms). What is alsonoticeable – from the viewpoint of the gendered distribution of roles within thesemovements, especially – is a great continuity of authoritarian discourses, nourished by alegacy of coercion. Finally, the author insists on the need to take into account the complex and dynamic nature of the interrelationships between, on the one hand, the Islamists of a former tribal march of Iran, heirs, too, of the Kurdish nationalism developed in the second half of the 20th century, and, on the other hand, a Persian and Shiite Islamic Republic often tempted, over the course of forty years of history, to utilise to its profit confessional dissidence
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Thomas, Matthew Nickolai. "Perceived Salafi-Jihadi Exceptionalism and its effects on CVE (Counter Violent Extremism) Policy." Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1556284965124805.
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Selim, Hebatullah Nazy Sayed. "Religionizing politics : Salafis and social change in Egypt." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2017. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/7636/.
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Egypt’s 2011 revolution led to debates about Salafis’ entry into politics for the first time. The socio-political vision and character of Salafi groups were relatively understudied. As such, the primary question of this thesis is what is the Salafis’ vision for social and political change in post-revolution Egypt? The vision is traced through Salafis’ discourse concerning change. The texts analyzed were collected from Al-Da’awa Al-Salafyya (DS), and its political arm the Al-Nor party: the latter is the only surviving Islamist party, following the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in 2013. The texts were gathered through field research, and analyzed using Critical Discourse Analysis. This analysis enabled what is the first mapping of DS’ vision for change. Based on this, the thesis argues that following its entry into politics, DS reproduced its long-held discourse of social and political change. It achieved this by introducing changes to the form of its discourse, while preserving its core content. The thesis demonstrates that “continuity and consistency” of DS’ key discourse for change (Manhaj), was central to its framing processes towards mobilizing political participation. More broadly, the thesis concludes that the wider movement and the specific political party are both intellectually and structurally connected.
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Bokhari, Syed Kamran. "Moderations among Salafists & Jihadists." Thesis, University of Westminster, 2017. https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/q430q/moderations-among-salafists-jihadists.
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SAAIDI, ABDELHADI. "Allal al fasi et la salafiyya." Strasbourg 2, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998STR20024.
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Au debut du xxeme siecle, le maroc voyait se developper un mouvement reformiste qui devint plus tard une force de resistance politique face au protectorat francais et un projet de reforme pour la societe marocaine au debut des annees de l'independance. Ce travail se propose de reflechir et etudier l'influence de la salafiyya sur la pensee de allai al-fasi a travers ses ecrits. Il comprend trois parties: la premiere est consacree a 1 etude du contexte historique dans lequel se developpa la salafiyya au maroc. Dans la deuxieme partie ,on parle du wahhabisme en orient, sa penetration au maroc et du renouveau du salafisme au xxeme siecle. La troisieme partie est consacree a l'etude de l'influence de la salafiyya sur la pensee de allai al-fasi; cette etude est axee sur les principaux themes de sa pensee a savoir, la religion, le nationalisme et la societeAt the beginning of the twentieth century a reformist movement developped itself extended in morocco. It became later on a force political resistance facing the french protectorate and in the early days of independance a project of reform of the moroccan society. This survey that comprises 3 parts proposes to think about and to examine the influence of salafiyya on the thought of allal al fassi through his writings. The first part is about the study of the historical context in wich the salafiyya developped itself in morocco. The second part deals with wahhabism in the orient, its penetration in morocco and the revival of salafism in the twentieth century. The third part is about the influence of salafiyya on the thought of allal al fassi, and is based on the main theme of his thought, that is to say religion, nationalism and society
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Rosen, Ehud. "Modern conceptualisations of bid‘a : Wahhābīs, Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2015. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/20358/.
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One of the most interesting ways to follow the development of a religion over time is to look at the way that basic religious terms have been perceived in various times, places and circumstances. The term bid'a in this respect is unique, since it touches the very essence of the development of Islam itself: in particular, what is permitted to be innovated, and who should have the authority to decide what is or is not permitted. This work opens with a short historical survey of the origins of this term, and the ways it was understood in the first centuries of Islam. The research spans the 'modern' period from the end of the eighteenth century up until the late 20th century - an era of great social, geographic and political changes, which in the Middle East also saw the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that had ruled the region for centuries under the authority of Islam. We will look into modern conceptualisations of bid'a of two main groups - conservatives and revivalists. More specifically we will delve into the writings of two groups: 1. The early 'salafi' revivalists and the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter being in many respects the main group which continued the course of the former. 2. Prominent 'ulama' from the Wahhabi trend, to which we dedicate two chapters, examining both classic and more recent views, and the ways they adopted to return to their notion of 'pure' Islam; We will look at the causes which brought about the decline of Islam according to their thinking, and their thoughts on the relationship between the neccessity for renewal in Islam and deeply rooted religious guidelines - in this case, on the question of innovation. In each chapter we will also try to determine the overall scope of the discussion on bid'a, and its place in light of the discussions on related religious terms, such as tajdīd, ijtihād, shirk and ḍalāla.
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Haberstock, Kara Lyn. "Sheikhs, Salafis, and the State: The Evolution of Muslim Politics in Chechnya." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/297597.
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Current discourse regarding the contemporary status of Islam in Chechnya tends toward one of two narratives. In the first, Islam becomes merely a political tool wielded in the hands of nationalists, warlords, and now the pro-Russian Chechen government seeking to unite the North Caucasian ethnic groups in the aftermath of a Soviet collapse. In the second, Islam is bound up in the Chechen identity and viewed as a form of resistance to Russia and distinguishing cultural trait. In both narratives, Chechen Muslims are studied in isolation from wider trends within the Central Asian region and the greater Islamic realm. This paper situates events in Chechnya within the context of movements across the Middle East and Central Asia. Through the examination of symbols, rituals, and rhetoric employed by the state and by dissident groups within Chechnya, I analyze the current struggle between the state and dissident Islamists in Chechnya to establish a dominant discourse of Islamic practice. Through this analysis, I move beyond labels of "fundamentalist" Islam and "traditional" Islam often assigned within the Chechen context to demonstrate how Islamic tradition and practice are being re-imagined in the wake of the Soviet collapse and the failed separatist conflict in Chechnya.
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Zouaghi, Sabrina. "L'influence du salafisme dans le processus de rédaction de la nouvelle constitution tunisienne." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/32535.
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Le présent mémoire tente d’apporter un éclairage nouveau sur le phénomène du salafisme et son implication au coeur du processus de constitution-making de la transition tunisienne en répondant à la question de recherche suivante : « les salafistes tunisiens, de par leur idéologie qui ne privilégie que la légitimité de leurs propres revendications et de par leurs actions qui ne favorisent pas la négociation, le compromis et la coexistence de différentes factions sociétales, ont-ils influencé le processus de rédaction de la nouvelle constitution tunisienne, et si oui, de quelle(s) manière(s) et quels ont été les impacts ? ». Les résultats du mémoire font état que les salafistes tunisiens ont influencé le processus constitutionnel, mais pas le contenu de la constitution. En effet, ils ont réussi à remettre sur la table la question de la charî’a dans les débats constitutionnels et plus particulièrement dans les discussions internes du parti Ennahda grâce à des formes de mobilisation parainstitutionnelle. Cependant, ces formes de mobilisation n’ont pas eu l’effet escompté d’inscrire la charî’a dans la nouvelle constitution. En réalité, le contexte socio-politique a plutôt favorisé l’exclusion des salafistes à cause de leurs discours qui discréditaient les autres factions sociétales et politiques et de leurs actions qui ne favorisaient pas la négociation, le compromis et la coexistence avec ces factions. Les salafistes, comme groupe social particulier qui attire les franges populaires de la société, véhiculent une idéologie religieuse entraînant des impacts politiques et sociaux qui les distingue de la majorité des Tunisiens. Si Ennahda entretenait certains objectifs communs avec les salafistes, ses deux partenaires politiques ne se retrouvaient pas dans une situation similaire, bien au contraire. Les salafistes, par leurs discours et leurs actions, empêchaient l’atteinte d’un compromis démocratique entre ces partis politiques et représentaient une menace pour les règles de garantismo qu’ils étaient en train de négocier. Ils exacerbaient la polarisation entre « islamistes » et « non-islamistes » et menaçaient la coexistence des deux camps. Lers intérêts paraissaient ainsi ne pas faire partie d’un consensus possible entre les factions les plus importantes qui ne considéraient pas les salafistes comme des acteurs significatifs au sein de la société tunisienne. Ils ont été dès lors exclus du jeu démocratique, à la fois des débats et du processus. La mise au rancart de leurs intérêts a été l’un des coûts à assumer pour Ennahda, afin d’assurer l’adoption de la nouvelle constitution tunisienne et la réussite de la transition démocratique.
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Bououne, Saïd. "La résurgence d'une pratique thérapeutique religieuse "al-Ruqya" : ses liens avec la salafya." Aix-Marseille 3, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005AIX32004.
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Cette thèse se donne comme ambition d’apporter une compréhension scientifique sur une nouvelle forme de la thérapie religieuse qui est la Ruqya (thérapie par récitation du Coran). L’étude est le fruit d’un travail qui s’est prolongé sur plusieurs années sur Marseille et ses environs. Un terrain spécialement riche et singulièrement abondant dans son offre des thérapies traditionnelles. Cette étude a tenté de démontrer en quoi la Ruqya serait différente des autres thérapies traditionnelles (son explication étiopathogénique de certaines maladies, la nosographie qu’elle utilise et les rituels thérapeutiques qu’elle mobilise). L’autre objectif de cette recherche est de comprendre pourquoi cette thérapie trouve-t-elle une audience dans les milieux instruits et auprès de certains professionnels de la santé ? Et quels sont les liens qui existeraient entre la résurgence de la Ruqya et la nouvelle tendance à islamiser la connaissance (notamment les sciences de la santé mentale), partie intégrante de la Salafiya ?This thesis is given as ambition to bring a scientific comprehension on a new form of the religious therapy, which is Ruqya (therapy by recitation of Coran). The study is the fruit of a work which was prolonged over several years on Marseilles and its surroundings. An especially rich and singularly abundant ground in its offer of the traditional therapies. This study tried to show in what Ruqya would be different from the other traditional therapies (its etiopathogenic explanation of certain diseases, the nosography which it uses and the ritual therapeutic ones that it mobilizes). Does the other objective of this research is to include/understand why this therapy find an audience in the mediums educated and near certain professionals of health? And which are the bonds which would exist between the resurgence of Ruqya and the new tendency to Islamize knowledge (in particular sciences of the mental health), integral part of Salafiya?
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Al-Zekri, Muhammad A. "The religious encounter between Sufis and Salafis of East Arabia : issue of identity." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.410772.
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Uhlmann, Milena. "Konversionen zum Islam in westeuropäischen Gesellschaften." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/22978.
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Konversionen zum Islam erregen Neugier, Faszination, und auch Angst – gerade seit den Terroranschlägen des 11. Septembers 2001 und den darauffolgenden islamistischen Anschlägen auch in Europa. Das Phänomen wirft besonders in diesem Kontext Fragen zu Motivation zur Konversion, dem Bezug der Konvertiten zu ihrem zum Herkunftskontext und zur sozialwissenschaftlichen und sicherheitspolitischen Bewertung des Phänomens auf.
Um Antworten auf diese Fragen näher zu kommen, hat die Autorin zwischen 2009 und 2011 insgesamt 27 Konvertiten zum Islam in Deutschland, England und Frankreich interviewt und ihre Einstellungen, Identitätsausdeutungen und Relevanzen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse ihrer Auswertung setzt sie mit einer Betrachtung des Phänomens des jugendkulturellen Salafismus in Bezug und entwickelt auf dieser Basis zwei grundlegend unterschiedliche Kategorien des Wechsels zum Islam: Die „Konversion zum reflexiven Islam“ und die „Alternation zu einer jugendkulturellen Ausprägung des Salafismus“.Conversions to Islam evoke curiosity, fascination, and also fear – especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and Islamist terrorist attacks that followed also in Europe. The phenomenon raises questions regarding the motifs for conversion, the relation of converts to their society of origin, and the sociological assessment as well as security policy aspects of the phenomenon. In order to come closer to answers to these questions, the author interviewed 27 converts to Islam in Germany, England and France, and analysed their attitudes, identity reconstruction and relevances. She compared the results with a reflection on the phenomenon of a youth-cultural phenomenon of Salafism and developed two fundamentally different categories of people choosing Islam as their religion: “conversion to reflexive Islam” and “alternation to a youth-cultural interpretation of Salafism”.
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Bonnefoy, Laurent. "Les relations religieuses transnationales contemporaines entre le Yémen et l'Arabie Saoudite : un salafisme importé ?" Phd thesis, Institut d'études politiques de paris - Sciences Po, 2007. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00372124.
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Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi‘î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la religion, de même que les acteurs transnationaux (migrants, commerçants, étudiants) sont perçus comme des instruments de la domination exercée par les États. Les approches en terme de puissance ou d'impérialisme ne permettent de rendre compte que très partiellement de la réalité des relations étudiées. Ainsi, le développement du salafisme dans le contexte yéménite est avant tout le résultat des recompositions locales, globales et translocales que connaît la péninsule Arabique contemporaine. Les dynamiques sociologiques à l'œuvre voient en effet s'entremêler des processus de niveaux multiples : parcours migratoires individuels, recompositions des identités religieuses et politiques ou encore effets de la « lutte contre le terrorisme ». La trajectoire complexe du salafisme dans l'environnement yéménite démontre alors l'importance des structures domestiques et des institutions. Pour les acteurs individuels, cette pratique n'a donc pas la même signification ni la même portée au Yémen qu'en Arabie Saoudite. C'est essentiellement pour cette raison que l'État, même dominant, n'en contrôle pas totalement le devenir idéologique ni les parcours de ses partisans et entrepreneurs.
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Maher, Shiraz. "Salafi-jihadism : the history of an idea." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2015. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/salafijihadism(a8b84578-37f1-4355-b7a9-8a39794360d2).html.
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This dissertation examines the development of salafi-jihadism as an idea within the broader salafist movement, using historical method. It argues that salafijihadism is principally defined by five essential ideas: taūhid, jihad, hakimiyyah, takfir, and walā’ wa-l-barā’. These are neither contentious nor particularly special ideas within normative Islam. What this dissertation does, however, is to examine each idea thematically while explaining what is unique, different, special, or new, about the manner in which the salafi-jihadi movement has interpreted it (as compared with other salafis). It does this by providing an overview of each idea, showing its development and ideational trajectory over time. It also demonstrates how intra-salafi debates have allowed the jihadi movement to create a distinct branch of thought within the salafi tradition. Moreover, this dissertation argues that even within the salafi-jihadi movement some ideas produce greater differences of opinion than others, depending on how relevant they are for jihadi practitioners when compared with jihadi theorists. For example, even very conservative salafi-jihadi theorists such as Abu Hamza al-Masri or Abu Baseer al-Tartousi argue for strict limits on takfir whereas al-Qaeda has had to ‘operationalise’ these ideas in the battlefield and therefore applies the idea more liberally. This is true for takfir, jihad, and walā’ wa-l-barā’. Finally, this dissertation argues that the doctrine of salafi-jihadism is one that is principally borne of conflict. It is during moments of war and political crisis over the last three decades that this ideology has undergone its most significant periods of transformation, with the most concentrated period of development coming in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
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Fouad, Hazim [Verfasser]. "Zeitgenössische muslimische Kritik am Salafismus : Eine Untersuchung ausgewählter Dokumente / Hazim Fouad." Baden-Baden : Ergon Verlag, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1212398769/34.
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Amghar, Samir. "Salafis et Ahbâsh : réseaux, organisation, et socialisation d'un nouvel islam militant européen (France, Belgique et Suisse)." Paris, EHESS, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010EHES0078.
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"L'épuisement de la mouvance islamiste politique issue la matrice des Frères musulmans et de l'organisation missionnaire du Tabligh coïncide avec la montée de la mouvance salafiste et de l'organisation des Ahbâsh. Ces deux mouvements arrivent sur fond de dilution de la portée contestataire de l'islamisme et d'épuisement des mouvements de jeunes musulmans. En invoquant les ancêtres pieux de l'Islam, ils souhaitent grâce à une prédication active rétablir la « vraie » tradition face à qu'ils perçoivent comme une excessive accommodation, voire comme un abandon proposé par les Frères musulmans et le Tabligh. Pour celles et ceux qui choisissent ces mouvements, cette démarche religieuse stricto sensu paraît participer fortement d'une quête identitaire. Se poser en s'opposant, tel semble être également le slogan qui commande l'ensemble de leur conduite religieuse. Incarnant une affirmation de soi en rupture avec les valeurs dominantes, le salafisme et l'organisation des Ahbâsh semblent délégitimer le système de croyances des musulmans, en les proclamant théologiquement hors-la-loi et, par ricochet, légitimer la contestation de l'ordre social que leurs croyances symbolisent. "The subsiding of the Islamic political movement that emerged from the matrix of the Muslim Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat's missionary organization coincides with the rise of the Salafi movement and the AI-Ahbash organization. These two movements appear in the context of a lessening of Islamism’s anti-establishment reach and a fading away of movements of young Muslims. By invoking Islam' s pious ancestors, they hope to use active preaching to reestablish the "real" tradition, in the face of what they perceive as excessive accommodation and even abandonment proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat. For the men and women who choose these movements, the religious act (strictly defined) seems to be a strong part of the quest for an identity. Positioning oneself in opposition: this seems to be the slogan that commands the ensemble of their religious behavior. By incarnating self-affirmation in a break with dominant values, Salfism and the AI-Ahbash organization seem to delegitimize the system of Muslim beliefs by proclaiming them to be theologically outside of the law which, consequently, legitimizes contesting the social order than these beliefs symbolize
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Salae, Hafiz. "The political accommodation of Salafi-reformist movements in Thailand." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/20038/.
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This thesis examines the political accommodation of contemporary Salafi-reformist movements into Thailand’s dual context of a Buddhist majority centralised state and the Malay Muslim minority. The two chosen case studies are Assalam (est. 1977) and the Muslim Group for Peace (MGP) (est. 2001) situated in the Deep South and Bangkok respectively. On the study of these movements’ ideological, organisational, and behavioural dimensions, I have developed three conceptual frameworks: Islamic reformism, network-based movements, and accommodation, which is based on the literature of Islamism, Islamic social movements and activism and Thai Muslim politics. While previous studies of Islamic reformists in Thailand have focused on the role of individuals as a unit of analysis, this thesis looks into a larger level of social movement organisation, without ignoring the importance of influential leaders. This thesis also contributes to the literature of Thai Muslim politics by identifying ideological differences between Salafism and reformism. This thesis argues that in their attempts to domesticate their Islamic reformist ideologies into Thailand’s socio-political structures, Salafis adopted pragmatism as an essential approach that enabled them to become successfully accommodated. Their organisational strategies relied on the creation of network-based movements encompassing educational, media, social, and political organisations. Equipped by internal strength of modernist elements and external political opportunities and constraints, the formalisation of organisations became a transition point that made the movements shift from the narrow rigid Salafi positions to the broader socially engaged reformist perspectives. Thus, their activisms expanded from organising religious educational programmes to providing religious-social services. In pursuit of accommodation, it is necessary for both movements to balance the compromise between their Salafi-reformist ideologies and socio-political realities. Although these pragmatic efforts resulted in relatively successful accommodation with the Thai state and better recognition from Malay Muslim society – with a significant degree of latent conflict and competition, the movements failed to maintain a relationship with their purist Salafi networks.
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Iqbal, Asep Muhamad. "Cyber-activism and the Islamic Salafi movement in Indonesia." Thesis, Iqbal, Asep Muhamad (2017) Cyber-activism and the Islamic Salafi movement in Indonesia. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2017. https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/36066/.
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Prevailing studies of Islamic activism and the internet tend to evaluate the significance (or insignificance) of the internet for an Islamic movement as a unified whole, ignoring intra-movement heterogeneity and internal dynamics. By contrast, this study offers a pluralistic vision of Islamic activism, identifying separate streams or groups of a particular theological tradition within Islam. It therefore analyses the relevance of the internet for such Islamic groups in a more nuanced and variegated manner. To this end, drawing on resource mobilization theory, it analyses internet use by the Salafi movement with a specific focus of Salafists in Indonesia. It identifies resource inequality among different Salafi groups as accounting for intra-movement difference and the varied significance of the internet for groups within the Salafi movement. The study demonstrates that although each Salafi group adopted the internet as a new important resource for their social, religious, and organizational interests, groups did not actually mobilize it for this purpose in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi groups tended to mobilize the internet more actively than the resource-rich ones. Different access to resources among Salafi groups contributed to these different levels of actual mobilization of the internet by the Salafi groups. Accordingly, the significance of the internet is not uniform across the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Rather, each Salafi group’s use of the internet was influenced by offline factors and particularly access to other organizational resources. Therefore, this study argues that the significance of the internet for Islamic movements is not uniform, but rather diverges due to intra-movement complexities and dynamics including internal fragmentation and the differential state of intra-movement organizational resources. The significance of the internet as a resource for an Islamic movement thus varies enormously across intra-movement factions or groups depending on access to other resources.
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Borghée, Maryam. "Le salafisme européen dans la modernité : la réforme de soi aux prises avec l'héritage culturel. Socio-anthropologie d'un conflit normatif." Thesis, Paris, EPHE, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015EPHE5050.
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Filali, Abdelkader. "Salafi Jihadism, Disengagement, and the Monarchy: Exploring the case of Morocco." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39719.
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What meanings have formerly engaged (radicalized) Salafists ascribed to their disengagement and how have they become embedded in their everyday lives? There are two narratives that can explain this question. On the one hand, there is a central inclusive narrative that suggest the institutionalization of the religious terrain in Morocco through the Institution of the Commander of the Faithful (mou’assassat imarat al mou’minine) or ICF, which allows the Monarchy to play the king-religious role as the guarantor of religion and other faiths. On the other hand, Salafi Jihadists represent the second exclusive narrative through a religious concept that has taken a violent understanding called “loyalty and disavowal” (Al Wal’a wal Bar’a) or WB. The power of this narrative lies in the ability to divide society into a near and far enemy. Put it another way, to ask how those very meanings affect their everyday lives, a change in Salafi worldview for example allows them to live lives that seemed not possible before far from violence. As a result, there is no one picture of disengagement. Disengagement happens very differently in each case. Specifically, we argue that Salafi Jihadists’ disengagement has been informed, and shaped, by the meanings they attribute to their experiences in the everyday life. As such, this thesis is not about process, or pathways, or models of engagement and disengagement it is about meanings each one assigns to his or her experience. In addition to advancing theories of violent radicalization and disengagement from violence, this thesis makes a methodological contribution to the study of the meanings of disengagement through an ethnographic fieldwork in Morocco and Jordan.
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Mathieu, Michel. "L'Islam entre tradition réformiste et sectarisme révolutionnaire : une analyse de l'influence du "wahhabisme"." Paris 5, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007PA05D002.
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Cette thèse a pour objet de montrer que l'Islam orthodoxe se caractérise par une adhésion du plus grand nombre des musulmans à des principes et des règles juridiques qui ont été définis par le courant traditionniste. La tradition n'a jamais exclu le réformisme et ne peut être confondue avec un conservatisme rigide ou des courants minoritaires caractérisés par leur sectarisme révolutionnaire. La tradition est l'expression d'un Islam qui tente de concilier la fidélité au dogme immuable et la prise en compte des évolutions. En proposant une analyse nouvelle de penseurs traditionnistes tels Ahmed Ibn Hanbal ou Ibn Taimiya et en prenant comme pivot le préréformiste Mohammed Abdel Wahhab, la thèse étudie l'évolution de la doctrine traditionniste depuis les premiers siècles de l'Islam jusqu'à nos jours, en passant par le grand courant réformiste illustré par al Afghani, Mohammed Abdou, Rachid Rida ou al Kawakibi. La recherche tend à démontrer que la tradition islamique constitue une meilleure réponse aux dérives sectaires extrémistes qu'une occidentalisation qui conduirait à une négation de l'identité musulmane. C'est dans cette mesure que l'avenir appartient à la traditionThis research will show how orthodox Islam succeeds in bringing together the largest number of the Moslems with a creed, legal principles and rules which were defined by the traditionist current. Tradition never rejected reformism and cannot be compared with rigid conservatism or with minority, but active, trends defined by their radical revolutionary sectarianism. Tradition is the voice of Islam which tries to reconcile faith and respect of the immutable dogma and nowadays evolutions. The thesis develops a new analysis of traditionists as Ahmed Ibn Hanbal or Ibn Taimiya, and having as a main reference the works of the pre-reformist Mohammed Abdul Wahhab. The thesis studies the developments and evolution of the traditionist doctrines since the first centuries of Islam up to now, taking into account the important reformist trend with thinkers as Al Afghani, Mohammed Abdu, Rashid Rida or Al Kawakibi. This work demonstrates that the Islamic tradition is a better answer to the sectarian extremists drifts than an occidentalization which would lead to the denial and loss of the Moslem identity. Therefore we can say that the future of Islam belongs to the tradition
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Panos, Nicholas Christopher. "The Political Impact of the Rising Salafi-Wahhabi Influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/52346.
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This thesis examines the political impact of Salafi-Wahhabism in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) since the El Mujahed Brigade of mujahedeen introduced this puritanical Saudi form of Islam during the 1992-1995 War that broke apart the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFROY). This study employs tenets of the English School of International Relations and utilizes a historical analytic approach to identify durable features of Bosnian Muslim religious economic activity, Bosnian education, and Bosnian political processes to answer the research question: what kind of influence has Salafi-Wahhabism had on BiH society and government since the end of the 1992-1995 Balkan War? Emergent evidence captured by these variables suggests a momentum of Salafi-Wahhabism influence is developing that may undercut the sovereignty of BiH and possibly impede its European Union membership bid. As a result of this rising Wahhabi influence in several facets of Bosnian society, the aggregate level of Islamism in the country is also likely increasing.Master of Arts
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BARRY, YAYA. "Representations of British Salafi Responses to the 7/7 Bombings : An Iconographical Analysis." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-230208.
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Mainstream media has markedly depicted Salafism in quite monolithic ways, giving an impression of uniformity in ideology and practice of this community. This picture has moreover been framed in particularly negative ways when destructive phenomena like transnational terrorism, violent Jihadism and radical insurgency are closely associated with the movement. I decided to study how British Salafist responses to the London 7/7 bombings have been represented. The aim has been to study how such an atrocious act with the capacity to divide society has stimulated the will to live in peace or conflict; and moreover, I aim to look at how these responses have been portrayed by Salafis themselves over against the depictions given by mainstream media. I have however chosen to focus on the visual iconographic representations of these responses because I found them intriguing: “a picture paints a thousand words.” The thesis conducts a critical discourse analysis of these visual representations of Salafist responses to 7/7.
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Adraoui, Mohamed-Ali. "Par-delà le discours : le salafisme en France, socialisation ou rupture d'un groupe social ? : analyse de l'émergence d'un nouveau visage de l'islam en France." Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011IEPP0032.
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Le salafisme fait écho à un fondamentalisme musulman. L’islam se caractérise par une pluralité de courants et celui-ci cherche à réhabiliter la foi et la pratique des premiers croyants, les Salaf Salih (« Pieux Devanciers »). Cette approche est puritaine et cherche à faire revivre le modèle de société qui prévalait au début de cette religion. Cependant, ce courant se divise en plusieurs branches opposées qui se signalent notamment par leur rapport au politique. Certains salafis sont adeptes de la lutte armée pour renverser des régimes honnis pour leur « trahison » envers l’islam. D’autres sont réformistes et participent aux élections dans le cadre d’un activisme politico-religieux. D’autres, enfin, se reconnaissent dans une démarche quiétiste et, en apparence, apolitique. Cette dernière acception donne lieu à une socialisation économiquement engagéé et apolitique. Les adeptes ont l'impression qu'ils forment un "groupe sauvé" et qu'ils vivent en rupture. Toutefois, cette dernière doit d'abord se concevoir comme un langage en ce que le religieux vient redéfinir des liens avec le reste de la société qui préexistaient. L'identité salafie reprend de nombreux codes de la postmodernité tels que l'apolitisme et le consumérismeSalafism refers to an Islamic Fundamentalism. Islam is defined by a purality of currents et this one aims at restoring first believers' faith and practise, the Salaf Salih ("Pious Ancestors"). This approach is purist and wants to give birth to the initial social pattern that ruled at the beginning. However, this current is divided into several opposed branches which diverge from their relations with politics. Some Salafis are in favour of armed conflict so as to knock over hated regimes for their treachery as regards Islam. Others are reformists and take part into elections in the frame of political and religious activism. Others, eventually, are closer to a non political approach. This last one engenders a socialization which is engaged economically and resistant to political involvment. Followers have the impression that they stand for a "saved group" and they live apart. However, this socialization must be analyzed first of all as a langage given religion defines now relations with the rest of the society that already existed. Salafi identity take many aspect psotmodern societies back. It is the case with non political behaviours and consumerism
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Ayima, Kwesi. "Counter-Ideology as a Wider Strategy for Defeating the Boko Haram Terrorist Group." ScholarWorks, 2019. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/7854.
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There is a need to address current military strategies to defeat the resilience of the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) group. The purpose of this qualitative study was to provide a counter-ideology framework as an alternative strategy to defeat the group. The relational/vengeance and relative deprivation theories provided the theoretical foundation for the study, and the research question addressed the extent to which counter-ideology strategies can be instituted to defeat the BHT group. Data were collected through semi structured interviews from 20 participants who were Muslim clerics, community leaders, and military personnel, and data were analyzed using Nvivo software. The themes for the study were developed using a content analysis approach. The findings indicated that the resilience of Boko Haram was due to the group's ability to maintain an ideological consistency with the extreme version of Jihadi-Salafism. Thus, there is a need to develop an effective reconciliatory national security strategy that is focused on counter-ideology policies to augment the ongoing military strategy. Given that counter-ideology offers a nonmilitary counterterrorism approach, it can deescalate the security situation in Northeast Nigeria, which can lead to socioeconomic benefits for the youth in Nigeria.
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Thomas, Jason. "The OODA loop and Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism: a tactic of asymmetric warfare." Thesis, Curtin University, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/668.
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This thesis applied John Boyd’s Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act loop as an adaptable strategic model of terrorism to case study research methodology, to test the theory that Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare. The case studies examined al Qaeda’s adaptation into a dynamic, regenerative brand and its ability to penetrate Western moral boundaries. The concept of manoeuvring exploiting Western moral boundaries while simultaneously inspiring new followers is described as moral manoeuvrability.
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Nsobya, Abdulhakim Abdalla. "Allied democratic forces (ADF) in Uganda: A Jihadi- Salafi movement or local political movement in disguise." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/29839.
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Since 1996, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has waged a campaign of terror in Uganda and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has resulted in a number of fatalities and continues to threaten the security of the region. From its inception, the objective of the ADF has been to overthrow the Ugandan government and establish an Islamic state governed by a Salafi interpretation of Islam. This study seeks to document the history of the ADF and to locate its position within contemporary Salafi debates. It does so by answering the following questions: (1) what do we know about the ADF? (2) How did the ADF emerge in Uganda? (3) Is the ADF Jihadi-Salafi movement or local political movement in disguise? This study utilises interviews, as well as archival and ethnographic approaches to research. Findings suggest that the ADF is a Jihadi-Salafi militant movement, which was originally established under the name Salafi Jihad Council (SaJiCo). However, the initial failure to stand alone and the Busitema defeat forced them to join other non-Muslim rebel groups to form the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). In addition, this study confirmed that, persuasive rhetoric of ADF leader, Jamilu Mukulu in addition to a long history of economic, social and political marginalisation of Muslims in Uganda by colonial and post-colonial governments, played a significant role in the creation and recruitment strategies for the Movement.
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Obaid, Hasan [Verfasser], and Jochen [Akademischer Betreuer] Hippler. "The Ideological Transformations of Islamic Social Movements in Egypt : The Cases of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Call between 1981-2013. / Hasan Obaid ; Betreuer: Jochen Hippler." Duisburg, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1191693201/34.
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Riquier, Marie. "In the Name of Ideology : Assessing the role of Ideology in Salafi Jihadist groups readiness to negotiate." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-385683.
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This study aims to contribute to the scholarly literature on terrorism and negotiations by contributing to the debate on the relationship between ideology and organizational factors in explaining armed groups behavior. It is argued organizational factors influence the lethality of terrorist groups, more than ideology does. This study extends this debate to the realm of negotiations and the specific Salafi-Jihadism ideology. Over the past 20 years, a handful of Salafi-Jihadist groups have expressed readiness to negotiate. Yet, this puzzling outcome has been under investigated so far. However, the role of ideology has been appointed as influencing groups behavior in general, as well as organizational factors. This argument is tested in a structured focused comparison of four Salafi-Jihadist groups, with two positive cases. The analysis shows evidence for the influence of ideology and its implementation, between less radical and more radical groups, on the expression of readiness to negotiate across Salafi-Jihadist groups. It also highlights the need to consider ideology and organizational factors together.
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Owaisi, Fakhruddin Ahmed. "A critique of contemporary Puritan/Salafi discourse on the issue of the mawlid and its classification as Bid'ah." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9265.
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Includes bibliographical references.In the contemporary Salafi/Puritan discourse, the traditional Muslim practice of celebrating the Prophet's birthday (mawlid) is consistently termed as 'bid'ah,' i.e. an innovation. In the Puritan discourse, all 'innovation' is considered reprehensible. In the first half of this study, I attempt to prove the inherent error and contradiction in the Puritan approach to the issue of innovation in Islam. I argue that the Puritan understanding of what constitutes bid 'ah and the conditions for its acceptability and rejection, is flawed, both from a textual and a logical point of view, and is in fact contrary to the way of the Prophet himself and his Companions (the salaf); thus belying their claims to 'Puritanism,' and 'Salafism.' Puritans base their discourse on certain hadith such as, "Every bid 'ah is misguidance," and "Whoever innovates in this matter of ours that which is not of it, it is to be rejected," as well as certain statements by the sahabah, and the works of al-Shatibi. In this work, I critically analyze these hadith and statements from a fresh point of view, substantiating my points with an abundance of essential scriptural evidences and historical data, which Puritans have long ignored or evaded. I also discuss other relevant issues such as the concepts of tark and the 'good bid'ah' in considerable detail. Traditionally, the jurists of Islam have termed 'beneficial' practices that appeared after the era of the Prophet as either 'bid'ah hasanah' (good innovation) or 'sunnah hasanah' (good practice/tradition), the latter being the position of those scholars whom the Puritans claim to be inspired by. My point is that the difference is only semantical and not really conceptual, as both schools agree on the acceptance of a certain amount of 'good' innovations in Islam, albeit with different terminologies. In the second half of the paper, I use the contentious issue of the mawlid as my case-study of the practical implementation of the conflicting approaches towards bid'ah. After studying the origins and development of the maw lid, as well as looking at some of the early discussions and arguments around it, I conclude that the mawlid, if proven to be based upon sound Islamic principles and evidences, cannot then be considered a reprehensible bid'ah, as Puritans, based upon a questionable logic, consider it to be. In the contemporary Salafil/Puritan discourse, the traditional Muslim practice of celebrating the Prophet's birthday (mawlid) is consistently termed as 'bid'ah,' i.e. an innovation. In the Puritan discourse, all 'innovation' is considered reprehensible. In the first half of this study, I attempt to prove the inherent error and contradiction in the Puritan approach to the issue of innovation in Islam. I argue that the Puritan understanding of what constitutes bid 'ah and the conditions for its acceptability and rejection, is flawed, both from a textual and a logical point of view, and is in fact contrary to the way of the Prophet himself and his Companions (the salaf); thus belying their claims to 'Puritanism,' and 'Salafism.' Puritans base their discourse on certain hadith such as, "Every bid 'ah is misguidance," and "Whoever innovates in this matter of ours that which is not of it, it is to be rejected," as well as certain statements by the sahabah, and the works of al-Shatibi. In this work, I critically analyze these hadith and statements from a fresh point of view, substantiating my points with an abundance of essential scriptural evidences and historical data, which Puritans have long ignored or evaded. I also discuss other relevant issues such as the concepts of tark and the 'good bid'ah' in considerable detail. Traditionally, the jurists of Islam have termed 'beneficial' practices that appeared after the era of the Prophet as either 'bid'ah hasanah' (good innovation) or 'sunnah hasanah' (good practice/tradition), the latter being the position of those scholars whom the Puritans claim to be inspired by. My point is that the difference is only semantical and not really conceptual, as both schools agree on the acceptance of a certain amount of 'good' innovations in Islam, albeit with different terminologies. In the second half of the paper, I use the contentious issue of the mawlid as my case-study of the practical implementation of the conflicting approaches towards bid'ah. After studying the origins and development of the maw lid, as well as looking at some of the early discussions and arguments around it, I conclude that the mawlid, if proven to be based upon sound Islamic principles and evidences, cannot then be considered a reprehensible bid'ah, as Puritans, based upon a questionable logic, consider it to be.
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Lahoud-Tatar, Carine. "Les mouvements sociaux islamistes sunnites au Koweït : étude d'un activisme politique (1952-2006)." Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010IEPP0033.
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L’étude porte sur les dynamiques de mobilisation politique des mouvements sociaux islamistes sunnites dans un environnement autoritaire, avec le Koweït comme étude de cas. Elle analyse le processus d’émergence et de développement de l’association des Frères musulmans et des divers courants salafistes (apolitiques, wahhabites, réformateurs et jihadistes) sous l’angle de la théorie générale de l’action collective afin d’englober à la fois leur dimension stratégie et de minimiser leur nature et identité religieuse. En effet, devenus des professionnels de la politique, les mouvements islamistes sont soumis aux mêmes opportunités et contraintes d’actions que les différentes forces libérale, chiite et tribale. Il n’existe pas de modèle unique de développement des groupes religieux : leur trajectoire étant conditionnée par l’environnement national dans lequel ils s’enracinent. En effet, le Koweït est un cas d’étude atypique dans une région, la péninsule arabique, où les régimes contrôlent l’espace politique soit en initiant des politiques de libéralisation qui n’affecte en rien le cœur du pouvoir soit en interdisant son accès. Le Koweït, en revanche, offre un espace politique dynamique et concurrentiel, institutionnalisé depuis 1962, où existent de réels enjeux électoraux. En fin de compte, les islamistes n’ont pas transformé le paysage politique en profondeur. S’ils sont devenus une force politique dominante, ils ont été contraints par le régime à une certaine cohabitation. Ils n’ont jamais constitué une réelle menace au régime des Al SabahThis dissertation focuses on the dynamics of political mobilization of Islamist Sunni movements in an authoritarian environment, Kuwait being a case study. It analyzed the Muslim Brotherhood Society and the Salafi currents (apolitical, Wahhabi, Reformers and Jihadi) under the perspective of the general theory of social movements in order to encompass their strategic dimension and to minimize their religious nature and identity. In fact, Islamist movements as political actors face the same opportunities and constraints of actions as other political forces, as becoming professionals of politics. This implies a reorganization of their mobilizing structures, a reformulation of their discourse that deals with political reforms rather than cultural issues, and the empowerment of elite of technocrats. There is no single model of development of religious movements: their path being structured by the national environment that clearly weighs on their development. Indeed, Kuwait is an atypical case study in an area, the Arabian Peninsula, where regimes lock out the access to the political arena either by banning or regulating liberalization policies. Kuwait has surprisingly a dynamic and competitive political life. Finally, the Islamists have failed to mobilize beyond their social base. If they are the dominant force within the political landscape, they are nevertheless constrained by the regime to some coexistence with other political actors. They never constituted a real threat to the regime of Al Sabah. On the contrary, they have been a strong ally when its legitimacy was undermined
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Weeks, Douglas M. "Radicals and reactionaries : the polarisation of community and government in the name of public safety and security." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3416.
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The contemporary threat of terrorism has changed the ways in which government and the public view the world. Unlike the existential threat from nation states in previous centuries, today, government and the public spend much of their effort looking for the inward threat. Brought about by high profile events such as 9/11, 7/7, and 3/11, and exacerbated by globalisation, hyper-connected social spheres, and the media, the threats from within are reinforced daily. In the UK, government has taken bold steps to foment public safety and public security but has also been criticised by some who argue that government actions have labelled Muslims as the ‘suspect other'. This thesis explores the counter-terrorism environment in London at the community/government interface, how the Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade deliver counter-terrorism policy, and how individuals and groups are reacting. It specifically explores the realities of the lived experience of those who make up London's ‘suspect community' and whether or not counter-terrorism policy can be linked to further marginalisation, radicalism, and extremism. By engaging with those that range from London's Metropolitan Police Service's Counterterrorism Command (SO15) to those that make up the radical fringe, an ethnographic portrait is developed. Through that ethnographic portrait the ‘ground truth' and complexities of the lived experience are made clear and add significant contrast to the aseptic policy environment.
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Rajab, Gamaan Muhsen Alzahrani. "A corpus-based critical discourse analysis of the ideological representations and legitimation in the Salafi discourse in Saudi Arabia (1980-2000)." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.680524.
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Haag, Christian. "Two Sides of the Same Coin : A Comparative Study of Salafi Jihadi and White Nationalist use of History of Religion in Propaganda." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Religionshistoria, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-412921.
Full textAbstract:
This master’s thesis is a comparative propaganda analysis that studies the use of history with a religion dimension, similarities and framing of propaganda messages in the Islamic States propaganda magazine Dabiq and Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto The Great Replacement. The propaganda has been analysed with Jowett and O’Donnell’s propaganda model, combined with Jan Assmann’s theories about cultural memory, historia sacra and cultural semantics. The results show that both actors use history with a religious dimension to frame their messages, but that Tarrant uses more cultural aspects than religious. Both actors also project similar messages such as referring to supranational communities, the sacred history of ancestors, ancient enemies, new foundational history and a call for organisation by their target audience.