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1
Karolak-Michalska, Magdalena. "About Russia Policy Towards Their Compatriots Living in Post-Soviet Area." Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość XIII (May 3, 2017): 231–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0054.3075.
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This article deepen the study of Russia's policy towards compatriots abroad the country. The author notes that post-Soviet Russia began to look beyond the instruments of political and economic, which could keep influence in the "near abroad." This indicates fact that the change in attitude of Russia in relation to Russians abroad was taking the presidency by Vladimir Putin when Russia decided to exploit the potential of Russian-speaking population abroad, referring to it closer cooperation. Exploring the selected topics, shows that against the background of post-Soviet states Russia's policy towards the Russian minority has a special character in relation to the Russians in Ukraine. The author comes to the conclusion that Russia is protecting the rights of the Russian minority "paves" "paths" to exert influence on the policy of the CIS states, which turn strengthens its position in the post-Soviet area. In turn, the same minority also works to promote the interests of the Russian Federation, which is especially the case in countries of Eastern Europe.
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f, f. "Study on Changes in the Language Situation of the Republic of Estonia during so-called Special Military Operation." Korean Association of Slavic Languages 29, no. 1 (April 30, 2024): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.30530/jsl.2024.29.1.33.
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All three Baltic states considered the Soviet period an illegal occupation and, since gaining independence, have pursued the most hostile policy towards the Russian Federation. The use of Russian language was expanded during the Soviet period due to the migration of many Russians and Russian speakers, but since gaining independence, the three countries have designated each language of the titular nation as their state language and deprived official status of Russian language (a means of inter-ethnic communication) and ignored its very existence. This was especially aggravated after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and a so-called Special Military Operation by Russian Federation in 2022. Russian repression and the ban on the use of the Russian language are noticeable in Estonia. Kaja Kallas (1977-), who was appointed Prime Minister of Estonia in January 2021, has been hostile towards Russia and Russian language and is the most hostile towards Russia in the world after a special military operation. Currently, the number of Russians living in Estonia is 306,801, accounting for 22.46% of Estonia's total population of 1,365,884, the largest population among ethnic minorities, and it is very difficult to drive out Russians and the Russian language at this point, but it is obvious that cooperation with neighboring countries, EU and NATO members will lead to a break with the Russian Federation. It is clear that this will soon lead to the assimilation of Russians and Russian-speaking users living in Estonia, or to their expulsion, which will also have a significant impact on neighboring Latvia.
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DUNCAN, PETER J. S. "CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST." Historical Journal 48, no. 1 (March 2005): 277–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x04004303.
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This is a review of recent English-language scholarship on the development of Russian identity since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first part examines literature on the economic and political changes in the Russian Federation, revealing how scholars became more sceptical about the possibility of Russia building a Western-type liberal democracy. The second part investigates approaches to the study of Russian national identity. The experience of empire, in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, gave Russians a weak sense of nationhood; ethnic Russians identified with the multi-national Soviet Union. Seeking legitimacy for the new state, President El'tsin sought to create a civic identity focused on the multi-national Russian Federation. The Communist and nationalist opposition continued to promote an imperial identity, focused on restoring the USSR or creating some other formation including the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics. The final section discusses accounts of the two Chechen wars, which scholars see as continuing Russia's imperial policy and harming relations with Russia's Muslim population. President Putin's co-operation with the West against ‘terrorism’ has not led the West to accept Russia as one of its own, due to increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism.
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Kuzio, Taras. "Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiya failed." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 4 (November 2, 2019): 297–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.10.007.
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This article discusses two inter-related issues. Firstly, the factors lying behind Russia's fervent belief that its Novorossiya (New Russia) project, aimed to bring back to Russia eight oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhhya, Odesa, Mykolayiv, and Kherson in eastern and southern Ukraine and launched during the 2014 “Russian Spring,” would be successful. Russian identity misunderstood, and continues to misunderstand, Ukraine and Ukrainians through stereotypes and myths of Ukraine as an “artificial state” and Ukraine's Russian speakers as “fraternal brothers” and Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” (odin narod). Secondly, why Ukrainian national identity was different than these Russian stereotypes and myths and how this led to the failure of the Novorossiya project. Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians came face to face with the reality of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism and their low support for the Russkij Mir (Russian World). The article compares Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians with how Ukrainians see themselves to explain the roots of the 2014 crisis, “Russian Spring,” and failure of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Novorossiya project.
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Obushnyi, Mykola. "FEATURES OF ETHNOCULTURAL ACTIVITY OF THE UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN RUSSIA IN THE AGE OF PUTINISM." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 28 (2021): 77–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2021.28.13.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of the Ukrainian diaspora organizations ethnocultural activity peculiarities in the Russian Federation (RF), the beginning of which is connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of Ukraine‟s independence (1991). The author connects their appearance with the growth of national consciousness, which was based on the idea of Ukraine‟s independence. This idea has always been perceived extremely negatively and cautiously by the ruling class of Russia, as well as by a significant number of Russians, at all times when Ukrainians were under the imperial roof. Even in the conditions of the total crisis at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, when the systemic disintegration of the USSR began, the Communist Party leadership constantly kept the "Ukrainian question" in view. This is confirmed, in particular, by the termination in 1989 of the magazine "Ukrainian Question", the publication of which was organized by the Moscow branch of the "Ukrainian Helsinki Union". A similar fate befell a number of other Ukrainian communities already in modern Russia. Among them are the two largest all-Russian diaspora organizations of Ukrainians in Russia: the Union of Ukrainians of Russia (ESD) and the Federal National-Cultural Autonomy "Ukrainians of Russia" (FNKAUR). The analysis below shows that their activities were carried out in accordance with Russian legislation, in particular the Federal Law of Russia "On National and Cultural Autonomy" and was aimed at organizing and conducting ethnocultural work among Ukrainians. However, Putin's leadership found "evidence of political activity" from both ESD and FNKAUR and banned their activities by court order. In fact, the main reasons for the author's cessation are the independence policy of modern Ukraine and the leaders of Ukrainian diasporas, their "disobedience" to pursue Russia's state imperial policy among Ukrainians, and their unwillingness to ignore the ethnocultural needs of Ukrainians. Currently, there is no all-Russian organization of Ukrainians in Russia. Activists of the Ukrainian diaspora have repeatedly, and since 2014, tried to register at least one of them, but they are constantly denied on the grounds that they will allegedly "glorify Bandera" and negatively affect Ukrainian-Russian relations. In fact, the reason is different, namely, in the traditional imperialism not only of Russia's ruling class, but also of a significant number of Russians who do not see a Russian neo-empire without Ukraine. This Russian propaganda cliché penetrated deeply not only into the consciousness of Russians, but also distorted the national consciousness of a significant number of Ukrainians in Russia, who cease to identify themselves as Ukrainians. The article emphasizes that the deidentification of our compatriots is based on persecution, harassment, contempt, not only the Kremlin authorities, but also a significant number of Russians towards Ukrainians in Russia.
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Lankina, Tomila. "The Cossacks: A Guarantor of Peace or a Land-Mine in Russia's Federalism?" Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (December 1996): 721–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999608408480.
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Russia's policy towards the Cossacks may prove detrimental to the development of federalism in Russia. Their rehabilitation is important for the rebirth of Russian culture. Yet, the Cossacks as a social-military institution, may further harm the relations between ethnic Russians and non-Russians in the Caucasus, which may revive the dispute over the preservation of the ethnic principle in Russia's federalism.
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Knox, Zoe. "Russian Orthodoxy, Russian Nationalism, and Patriarch Aleksii II." Nationalities Papers 33, no. 4 (December 2005): 533–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990500354004.
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The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is a highly visible institution in Russia, and arguably the most prominent and influential religious or cultural body. The Orthodox Church figures prominently in various discussions as the driving force behind Russia's post-Soviet renewal and recovery. Surveys show that Russians trust the Orthodox Church more than any other public institution, including law courts, trade unions, mass media, the military, the police and the government. Estimates of the number of self-identified Orthodox adherents range from 50 million, which amounts to slightly more than one-third of Russia's population, to 70 million, or roughly one half of the population. A leading newspaper consistently ranks Patriarch Aleksii II, head of the Moscow Patriarchate, the governing body of the Orthodox Church, in the top 15 of the country's most influential political figures. These indicators confirm that the Orthodox Church has a significant role in Russia's post-Soviet development. This is widely accepted by commentators both within and without the Orthodox Church, and within and without Russia.
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Arshin, Konstantin. "RUSSIANS AS A «STATE-FORMING PEOPLЕ» OR «STATE-FORMING PEOPLE» AS RUSSIANS (Response to the article by V.A. Achkasova “Why do Russians need the status of a “state-forming people?”)." Political Expertise: POLITEX 19, no. 2 (2023): 333–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu23.2023.212.
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The article disputes the point of view that the introduction of the term state-forming people into Article 68 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation is a legal nonsense and has only the consequence that it irritates the ethnocratic elites of the national republics that are part of Russia. From the author's point of view, the Russians have never asserted themselves as a state-forming people. The culture of the Russian people was inclusive, which allowed it to include the most important elements of the culture of other peoples. Slogan "Russia for the Russians", popular among modern Russian nationalists and nationalists of the early 20th century, turns out to be borrowed, and its initial understanding was associated with the assertion of the need for Russia's development and as a reaction (!) to the actions of the ethnocratic elites of the outlying territories of the country. In Soviet times, it was the Russians who brought a lot of good to the peoples of the RSFSR and the union republics. An analysis of the current state in terms of the formation of the Russian nation has shown that, according to sociological studies, it is regions (where Russians are the majority) who are more positive about the idea of the Russian nation and are ready to form it. On the contrary, residents of national republics are more inclined to emphasize their regional identities to the detriment of their general civic identity. The author agrees with a number of political scientists who argue that the basis of the nation is the development of civil society, and only if a developed civil society appears in Russia, the project of a general civil Russian nation can be successfully implemented.
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Senina, E. V., and K. A. Poliakova. "Cultural-Perceptions of Russia and Russians in China Today." Concept: philosophy, religion, culture 7, no. 3 (September 30, 2023): 90–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2023-3-27-90-103.
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The study of cultural-perception of countries and peoples’ has been gaining momentum in history, literary studies, ethnopsychology, journalism, imagology and other fields of scientific knowledge over the past decade. The cultrual-perception is constructed by ethnic, religious, political, ideological and artistic frames of perceptual consciousness. In connection with the development of Russian-Chinese relations, the topic of rethinking Oriental studies in line with the framework of the studies of philosophical and cultural problems is especially relevant today. The novelty of the research consists in updating the data already available in scientific publications on the culturalperception of Russia and Russians by the Chinese. This article examines the cultural-perception of Russia and Russians in China based on the results of polls conducted by the authors in 2021–2022. The poll contained open-ended questions concerning associations with Russia, symbols of the country, names of famous Russians, the Russian character, and Russian cities. The data obtained helped to identify and confirm certain historical patterns and stereotypes concerning the perception of the Russian character. The analysis of the poll results showed that Chinese people’s perceptions of Russia depend largely on their personal experience with Russians. The Chinese who have not been to Russia have an image of our country closely associated with that of the Soviet Union; they have a vague idea of contemporary life in Russia but are quite familiar with the works of Russian classics writers and composers. The Chinese permanent residents of the Russian Federation are more aware of both the classical and contemporary culture of the Russians. In addition, the personality of Russian President Vladimir Putin plays an important role in shaping the current perception of Russia in China. Putin's personality plays an important role in shaping the current perception of Russia.
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Peyrouse, Sébastien. "Les Russes d'Asie centrale : une minorité en déclin face à de multiples défis." Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest 39, no. 1 (2008): 149–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/receo.2008.1885.
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Russians in central Asia: A declining minority faced with major challenges Since the 1990s, the situation of the Russian minority in central Asia has been deeply affected. Left behind by the empire, it has had to cope with massive migrations toward Russia and challenges to its privileged status. Organizations for defending Russians and political authorities in the five new states differ with regard to the questions of: dual citizenship, occupational discrimination, the status of the Russian language, schooling in Russian and access to the media in Russia. However tighter economic relations between central Asia and Russia (in particular labor migrations) are creating a clear-cut separation between the question of the Russian minority and that of the Russian language in the region.
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Pulkkinen, Oili. "Russia and Euro-Centric Geography During the British Enlightenment." Transcultural Studies 14, no. 2 (December 12, 2018): 150–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/23751606-01402003.
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In this article, I shall examine the European part of the Russian Empire, Russian culture and Russians in eighteenth century handbooks of geography when “the Newtonian turn” took place in that discipline. Thanks to travel literature and history writing, we are used to thinking of the Russians as representing “otherness” in Europe. Still, in handbooks of geography, Russia was the gate between Asia and Europe. This article will explicate the stereotype(s) of the British characterisations of the Russian national character and the European part of the Russian Empire (excluding ethnic minorities in Russia), in order to reconstruct the idea of Russia in the British (and Irish) geography books.
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Rajić, Nikola. "Russia's neo-imperialist ambitions: Analysis of the foreign policy towards Georgia." Civitas 11, no. 2 (2021): 226–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/civitas2102226r.
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The Caucasus, dubbed "the Eurasian Balkans" by Zbigniew Brzezinski, or "the near abroad" (bližnee zarubež'e) by the Russians, is both a region of strategic interest for Russia, and a space where the Russian foreign policymaking was clearly manifested, Russia's main goal being to establish regional dominance and discourage the Western influence in the region. Using comparative and content analysis and relying on the theory of offensive structural realism, the paper will discuss the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards Georgia in the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Analysing the case studies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the paper seeks to show how Russia's neo-imperial foreign policy has been shaped, and how Russia's foreign policy has shifted in accordance with the part of the Caucasus involved in the conflict and the degree of anti-Russian influence in it. The results show that Russia carefully created the conditions and chose the moment to use the conflict, i.e., the secession on the Georgian soil, to position itself as a regional hegemon.
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Vasilenko, A. V. "Russian Federation and Uzbekistan: Russian Identity and Attitude to Russians." Russia & World: Sc. Dialogue, no. 4 (January 2, 2024): 136–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.53658/rw2023-3-4(10)-136-147.
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The article presents the results of a study of the communication regime of the Republic of Uzbekistan in relation to the Russian Federation, in the context of modern changes in the world order. Despite the global challenges, the Republic of Uzbekistan is strengthening its close and friendly relations with the Russian Federation. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty underlines the importance of strengthening cooperation between the two countries. The analysis of the communication regime covers both official resources and the media, while revealing a positive trend in communicationswith Russia. Russian identity and the degree of positivity of communication in relation to the Russian language and Russian identity in Uzbekistan are considered in the article. The Russian language is preserved, and the Russian identity is encouraged and supported. The Republic supports friendly and positive communication with respect to Russia, Russians, Russian language and Russian identity, even in the face of global changes. Uzbekistan continues to strengthen relations with Russia on the basis of mutual respect, partnership and common historical memory, which remains important in the modern geopolitical reality.
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Davis, Howard, and Anna Sosnovskaya. "Representations of otherness in Russian newspapers: the theme of migration as a counterpoint to Russian national identity." Journal of Intercultural Communication 9, no. 3 (September 30, 2009): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.36923/jicc.v9i3.486.
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This article examines the coverage of migration topics in a selection of Russian newspapers with nationwide circulations in the first six months of 2005 and tries to answer to the question: how does the Russian national press represent people and features which are significantly different from so-called Russian character and national identity?
The analysis is based on three main themes: immigration, the national project, and Russians abroad. The coverage of immigration addresses issue of Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics; immigrants, refugees and displaced persons on territories of Russia; and labour force decline and ‘brain drain’ from the Russian Federation. The discourse on migration is conducted within the framework of the developing national project on construction of a new identity for Russia and Russians. The national project is expressed in terms of the consolidation of Russian society and creation of unified values.
The conclusion is that representatives of ‘others’ who differ from Russians significantly in terms of language and culture or who are territorial outsiders are represented in the press in three main ways. Firstly, there is a benevolent attitude expressed in terms of traditional ties to sisters and brothers from the fifteen Soviet republics. Secondly, there is a predominantly aggressive stance towards those who are seen as not wanting to assimilate or not wanting to engage with Russia and regard it as the older brother. Representations of the Chinese and the Baltic states fit this category. Finally, there is an ambivalent response, mainly in relation to stories of Russians abroad in Europe or North America, toward the interactions between Russian and non-Russian attitudes, values, etc. When the question of Russian national identity surfaces, there is a consistent message but it is differently articulated according to the diversity of the Russian press.
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Bodio, Tadeusz. "ANDRZEJ WIERZBICKI, “RUSSIA FOR RUSSIANS”. RUSSIAN NATIONALIZM AND ETHNOPOLITICS." Studia Politologiczne 53 (September 15, 2020): 231–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.33896/spolit.2019.53.13.
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Solovei, V. D. "The Revolution of Russian Identity: Russia for the Russians?" Sociological Research 47, no. 3 (May 2008): 56–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/sor1061-0154470305.
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Solovei, V. D. "The Revolution of Russian Identity: Russia for the Russians?" Russian Social Science Review 49, no. 4 (July 2008): 56–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2008.11065295.
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Solovei, V. D. "The Revolution of Russian Identity: Russia for the Russians?" Russian Social Science Review 50, no. 2 (March 2009): 17–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2009.11065345.
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Lai, Wantao, Ye Dongmei, and Duanan Zheng. "New trends in Sino-Russian entrepreneurship." Upravlenie 7, no. 1 (May 7, 2019): 72–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.26425/2309-3633-2019-1-72-76.
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Not only the long history of Sino-Russian economic communication but also Good timing, geographical convenience and good human relations help build up a solid foundation for modern cooperation between China and Russia as well as provide entrepreneurs with good opportunities to process global operation in Russian market or Chinese market.. This paper explores some new trends in entrepreneurship, which are both in China and Russia and pinpoint the underlying reasons behind those new trends. The article studies the legal framework for the development of Chinese-Russian trade and economic relations. The bilateral trade of Russia and China with the introduction of innovative technologies has been considered. The work of Chinese entrepreneurs in Russia has been analyzed. The assessment of the Russian market and its potential by the Chinese has been given. The conclusion of bilateral Sino-Russian agreements, the establishment of joint ventures, as well as the difficulties that Chinese businessmen have to deal with in Russia have been described. The work of Russian entrepreneurs in China has been examined. The opportunities for Russians to do business in China have been shown. The interest of the Chinese government and business circles in Russian investments, bilateral economic and cultural cooperation has been noted. Сhinese regard such good relationships between China and Russia as “honeymoon”. Under “honeymoon”, it is believed that Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs should seize the opportunity, expanding cross-border e-commerce communication, promoting technical exchange, and creating a win-win situation for both Chinese and Russians.
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Kara-Murza, Alexey A. "Philosophy in Russia and Russian philosophical journalism." Philosophy Journal 16, no. 3 (2023): 17–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-17-23.
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The article examines the question of the correlation of the phenomena “Russian philosophy” and “philosophy in Russia”. The author believes that these phenomena are not identical to each other, and Russian philosophy, being an important fragment of intellectual subculture, was often created outside of Russia. This phenomenon became especially prominent in the twentieth century, when Russian dissidents who were exiled abroad, working in the West, continued to be the largest Russian philosophers. On the other hand, within Russia itself (the Moscow Kingdom, the Russian Empire, the short “democratic republic”, the USSR, post-Soviet Russia), not only Russians in language and culture philosophized and continue to philosophize. The author notes that Russian literature and philosophical journalism played an exceptional role in domestic philosophizing. It was they who most often made philosophy, as knowledge objectively tending to universality, a nationally colored Russian philosophy.
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Javed, Muhammad, Nazim Rahim, and Assad Mehmood Khan. "Russia's Annexation of Crimea and Security Implications for the Baltic States." Global Social Sciences Review IV, no. III (September 30, 2019): 383–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2019(iv-iii).48.
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This article discusses Russia's annexation of Crimea and its security implications for the Baltic States. The study exclusively examines two considerable impacts of the Russian annexation of Crimea, in term of its Compatriots and Hybrid warfare strategies on the security of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) through qualitative and descriptive analysis. It discusses Russia's Compatriot policy which was behind this annexation, and how this policy is an essential tool of the Kremlin against the Baltic States using their large portion of the population comprised of ethnic Russians. The paper finds that Russia annexed Crimea due to its geostrategic importance. Each of the three Baltic States also has strategic significance for the Russian Federation. In this sense, Russia's aggressive policies are becoming a great challenge for the security of the three States. This instant study highlights the security implications of the Russian annexation of Crimea for the Baltic States in a descriptive-analytical way.
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Wang, Keyi. "The History of Russian Nationalism from the 15th Century to the Present." Communications in Humanities Research 6, no. 1 (September 14, 2023): 421–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/6/20230349.
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Russian nationalism has continuously developed with historical development since the 15th century and it remains an important issue on contemporary Russia. This paper explores the major nationalist ideas in Russia, including Greater Russia, Pan Slavism, and the National Separation Movement. The paper also examines its content, origin, development, and impact of Russian nationalism. Despite a desire to move closer to some western countries, Russians have always had a strong sense of power, national pride and pride throughout history. By providing a better understanding of Russian nationalism, the paper contributes to research on Russian domestic affairs and international diplomacy. To comprehend the behavior of the Russian government, its relationship with the West, and its future direction, it is crucial to examine the dynamics of Russian nationalism.
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Gutarin, Maksim Mikhaylovich. "REVIEW ON THE ARTICLE BY Y.M. POLYAKOV “THE DESIRE TO BE RUSSIAN”." Neophilology, no. 16 (2018): 85–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/2587-6953-2018-4-16-85-89.
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We analyze journalistic article “The Desire to be Russian” by Y.M. Polyakov. We notice that demand reconsideration on “Russian issue” on the state level. Non-priority and belittled position of Russians in Russia which existed for several centuries. In times of tsarist power and especially in the era of the USSR in the country there was no desire to deal with the “Russian” issue. It’s simply sought not to notice. Most of the peoples of Russia had the opportunity to open ethnic self-identification, but the Russian people do not have it in full now. It is stated that Y.M. Polyakov considers as “Russian caretaker” that “being Russian in our country publicly is somehow awkward”. The author is also concerned about national issues: why Russian experience some discomfort in Russia. So, the issue arises on such important discipline as ethnic ethics.
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Brooks, Willis. "Russia's Conquest and Pacification of the Caucasus: Relocation Becomes a Pogrom in the Post-Crimean War Period." Nationalities Papers 23, no. 4 (December 1995): 675–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999508408410.
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“The history of Russia is the history of a nation that colonized itself.”Russia's greatest historian has affirmed that the expansion of Russian rule, particularly its method, is of fundamental significance in understanding the course of Russian history, and the establishment of Russian power in the Caucasus has attracted as much scholarly attention as any other region where Russian imperialism spread in the last two centuries. Russia's finest literary figures, scholars of the most divergent bent, Russian participants in the conquest and, of course, native inhabitants themselves have examined geographic, political, military and economic, as well as cultural and other factors that would explain how the many non-Slavic peoples of this strategically critical region were incorporated into the tsarist empire. From such a literature a lengthy list of quite diverse tactics are testimony to the deep concern Russian leaders had about integrating its divergent societies in the Caucasus into the Russian empire. The tsarist ideal was stated in the simplest language when Nicholas I endorsed a report in 1833 that would force the native inhabitants of the Caucasus to “speak, think, and feel Russian.” Not surprisingly, one of the striking qualities of the tsarist, Soviet and, to a great degree, Western literature is that it often focuses, as does this essay, on the frustrations Great Russians experienced while attempting to conquer, pacify and assimilate the multi-ethnic peoples of the Caucasus within the Russian-dominated empire. In addition, while charting the demographic vagaries of the Caucasus most scholars have concentrated on the creeping in-migrations of Cossacks and others from the internal Russian provinces and on the relocation of mountain tribesmen (gortsy) from their inaccessible villages (auly) to valley floors where watchful Russians could “civilize” them. What is strikingly absent from such literature, part of what this essay attempts to provide, is an examination of the policy considerations that led to such decisions, particularly in the post-Crimean War period.
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ROCCHI, T. "REVOLUTION FROM THE RIGHT: THE RUSSIAN BLACK HUNDREDS MOVEMENT AND ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS Part II-I: the Black Hundred understanding of Russianness in the general European context of the history of nationalism and the consolidation of nations: origins and development of varieties of nationalism in the Russian Empire and Europe." Historical and social-educational ideas 10, no. 3/2 (August 4, 2018): 54–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.17748/2075-9908-2018-10-3/2-54-71.
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This series of articles investigates the Black Hundreds’ understanding of Russianness in the general European context of the history of nationalism. In brief, Russianness is the totality of nationally specific characteristics that define Russians as Russians and that distinguish Russians from other peoples. Through Russianness, according to the Black Hundreds, Russians should form a cohesive, selfidentifying community united in loyalty to the triple formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality”. The Black Hundred understanding of Russianness strongly differed from the definition of Russianness by other Russian nationalists of the period. Several historians have noted that the Black Hundreds’ definition of a “true Russian” indicated not an ethnic but rather a political affiliation - loyalty to the triple formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality”. The Black Hundreds’ understanding of Russianness had contradictory applications. The Black Hundreds emphasized the allembracing nature of the Russian people and considered many members of the non-Russian peoples as members of the Russian nation. However, they also excluded entire categories of Russians from the ranks of the Russian people and divided the non-Russian peoples of the Empire into the categories of “friendly to Russia” and “hostile to Russia”. The Black Hundreds also often used eschatological themes of demonization of external and especially internal enemies of Russia and the Russian people. Note that the Black Hundreds followed general European trends in political eschatology. It is important to note that the debates about Russianness were an integral part of the general European process of the consolidation of both ethnic and political nations against the background of competing understandings of identity of individuals, groups, and societies. The articles will give a comparative analysis of the Black Hundreds’ concept of Russianness with the concepts of Frenchness in the French Revolution and Germanness in Nazi Germany. The articles’ theme has a huge contemporary relevance in light of debates about national identities and values in the Russian Federation and many European countries.
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Demin, V. N. "Issues of protecting the rights of compatriots living abroad in the context of increasing Russophobia in Western politics." Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba (Diplomatic Service), no. 1 (January 31, 2024): 64–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/vne-01-2401-08.
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As a result of the collapse of the USSR and the formation of new independent states, millions of compatriots found themselves separated from the Russian Federation by state borders. In many cases, they are forced to live and determine their future fate in a difficult political, economic, social, cultural and psychological situation and need help and support from both the States of permanent residence and Russia. It should be noted that the current Russian leadership pays tribute to the contribution of compatriots living abroad to the culture and economy of Russia. Currently, the problem of compatriots is a significant factor in the formation of Russia's relations with various countries and, above all, the CIS member states and the Baltic States. A state dialogue is organized with the Russian-speaking diaspora abroad, television programs are filmed about its best representatives, they become a positive example for the young generation of Russians. The article published below tells in detail about the features of this work with compatriots.
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Litvinov, V. Yu. "The Comparative Analysis of the Views of the Youth from Different Parts of the Country about Russian, Western, and Oriental Civilizations." Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Psychology 46 (2023): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/2304-1226.2023.46.17.
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The article presents the results of the empirical study that analyzes the views of the young people from different Russian regions about Russian, Western, and Oriental civilizations. The study involved 755 people in eight federal districts of the Russian Federation. The method of psychosemantic scaling, which included 33 bipolar scales, has been used. The study has revealed differences in the views of young Russians about their own country, and Western and Oriental civilizations. Their view of Russia is largely intracultural, and are significantly different from those of Western and Oriental civilizations. Young Russians single out Russia as a separate civilization. According to the psychological distance index. They consider both Western and Oriental civilizations as “alien” ones, not fully corresponding to spiritual values of Russian youth.
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Korbut, Viktar. "The Image of Russia and the Russians on the Pages of the Vilna Belarusian Newspaper “Nasza Niwa” in 1906 and 1907." East Slavic Studies 1 (2022): 58–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2782-473x.2022.1.04.
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The publication in 1906, during the First Russian Revolution, in Vilna (Vilnius) of the first newspapers in the Belarusian language “Nasza Dola” and “Nasza Niwa” was a revolutionary event. This marked the beginning of a stable process of the formation of the national identity of the Byelorussian intelligentsia, outside the Polish and Russian national discourses, which took place mainly on the pages of these publications. One of the important factors in the formation of the Byelorussian national identity in this period was the awareness of the differences between Byelorussians and Russians, their understanding of their place in the Russian Empire, which included the Byelorussian lands. Russia and Russians — “other” or “alien”? Russia and Byelorussia — an empire and a region or two different countries? Rasieja, rasiejski, ruski — the names of the state and the people: what was invested in these concepts. The answers to these questions are important for understanding the process of forming the image of Russia and Russians in the ideology of the Byelorussian national movement, which entered an active phase during the First Russian Revolution.
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Tolz, Vera. "Conflicting “Homeland Myths” and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia." Slavic Review 57, no. 2 (1998): 267–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2501851.
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The second disintegration of the empire this century has reopened the debate over Russian state and nation building with direct implications both for Russia's reform process and for its relations with other newly independent states. In December 1991, the Russian Federation was transformed into an independent state as a historically formed regional entity, not as a nation state. Scholars argue that the Russian empire was built “at the cost of Russia's own sense of nationhood.” In the past, the efforts spent conquering and ruling vast territories and diverse populations diverted the Russian people and their leaders from the task of consolidation and nation building. This was true not only in the prerevolutionary but also in the Soviet period, during which the majority of Russians saw the entire USSR rather than the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) as their homeland. Now, after the disintegration of the USSR, the questions arise whether the majority of Russians can accept the borders of the Russian Federation as final, and, if not, what the alternative myths of Russia's national homeland are? The answers to these questions determine whether Russians will ever be able to define themselves other than as an imperial people.
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Zhir-Lebed, Marina. "Rising Civic Awareness through Local Instagram: Young Kazakhstani Russians and Their Belongingness to Kazakhstan." Central Asian Affairs 9, no. 1 (April 12, 2022): 67–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340016.
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Abstract The Russia-Ukraine conflict raised fears that Kazakhstani Russians outside of Russia could be mobilized by the idea of the Russkiĭ mir (Russian world), which has been actively spread on the Russian-speaking segment of social media. Although Russian- speaking social media are popular in Kazakhstan, the example of young Kazakhstani Russians demonstrates that social media usage strengthens the connection to Kazakhstan rather than to the historical “home” country. Being surrounded by visual and textual information related to Kazakhstani urban centers, local Russian youth begin to envisage and create their version of Kazakhstan based upon personal social media feeds. As a result, their civic awareness and sense of belonging to Kazakhstan raise and allow these young people to navigate and portray their national identity in a positive way.
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Goncharova, E. I. "Analysis of the verbal image of Russia and Russians in the process of teaching RFL." Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities 29, no. 1 (February 17, 2024): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/1810-0201-2024-29-1-143-150.
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Importance. The development of a positive attitude towards Russia and its inhabitants is a priority task for a teacher of Russian as a foreign language. It seems necessary to carry out purposeful work in creating a system of verbal images of Russia and Russians in the representation of foreign students. The purpose of the study is to explore the theoretical prerequisites for studying the verbal image and describing the components of the verbal image of Russia and Russians among foreign students.Materials and Methods. The results analysis of a survey conducted among international undergraduate students at the Institute of Russian as a Foreign Language of the Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University revealed the components of the verbal image of Russia. The data obtained are taken into account when teaching Russian as a foreign language to form a positive image of the country.Results and Discussion. The results analysis of the first survey of foreign students revealed negative associations in the minds of foreigners, which must be corrected, as they reduce motivation to master the Russian language. The results of the second survey of foreign students after training demonstrate the presence of positive verbal images in their minds, proving the effectiveness of the training.Conclusion. The results obtained in the course of the study have theoretical and practical significance, as they enable a teacher of Russian as a foreign language to predict possible negative verbal images of Russia among foreign students, take them into account when teaching Russian to foreigners and, thereby, make the process more effective.
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Velychenko, Stephen. "Restructuring and the Non-Russian Past." Nationalities Papers 22, no. 2 (1994): 325–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999408408330.
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The official interpretation of the histories of the nations of the USSR emerged between 1934 and 1953 on the basis of decrees signed by Stalin and/or the Central Committee. This interpretation subsumes the histories of the non-Russian Republics within the “history of the USSR” that begins not in 1917 or 1922 in Moscow, but in prehistoric Asia. The official view recognized the non-Russian nations and republics as separate historical entities, yet imposed upon their pasts a Russocentric statist framework while denying the Russians a separate history of the RSFSR. Within this scheme the history of non-Russian nationalities before they became part of the tsarist state was built around the idea of “oppression” of “the people” and their “struggle” against native and foreign ruling classes. Russian and non-Russian “working people” were assumed always to have been “fraternal” while non-Russian political leaders, before and after incorporation, were judged according to their sympathy and/or loyalty to Russia. Russian political and cultural tutelage of non-Russians was stressed and activists in nineteenth-century national movements were labelled “reactionary” if they were not radical socialists. Official historiography admitted that non-Russians suffered political and cultural oppression but not economic colonialism under tsarist rule. In keeping with the logic of Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia, the official view argued that tsarist economic development was “progressive” for non-Russians because it centralized production and tied “outlying regions” of the empire to the world market. Accordingly, the non-Russian “national bourgeoisie” were “reactionary” because both threatened the integration supposedly demanded by the forces of production. By contrast, during the twenties and the thirties, Russian/non-Russian relations in the Tsarist Empire were presented in terms of Lenin's Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Historians argued that tsarist centralism impeded the development in non-Russian provinces and that “national liberation movements” were “progressive” responses to Russian economic colonialism.
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Klingenberg, Darja. "Auffällig unauffällig." osteuropa 69, no. 9-11 (2019): 255–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.35998/oe-2019-0088.
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Curanović, Alicja. "Why don't Russians fear the Chinese? The Chinese factor in the self-identification process of Russia." Nationalities Papers 40, no. 2 (March 2012): 221–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2011.652610.
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Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.
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Shevtsov, Nikita V., and Leila O. Algavi. "Russkoye Bogatstvo (Russian Wealth): Narodniki’s Magazine and the World Economic Crisis of 2020." RUDN Journal of Studies in Literature and Journalism 26, no. 2 (December 15, 2021): 237–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-9220-2021-26-2-237-246.
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Russia was proud of Russkoye Bogatstvo (Russian Wealth) magazine for a long while. It was among the most reputable and influential periodicals in the country. Not only had many Russians known of the magazine, but they were also its dedicated readers. On the one hand, the interest in Russkoye Bogatstvo could have been justified by the excellent selection of its authors among the best Russian writers and scientists. On the other hand, its publishers were Russias most famous critics, publicists, and outstanding literary figures recognized in the cultural and scientific circles. The magazine publications stood out due to their excellent style and availability for people of various social levels: both educated readers and those without profound knowledge of literature, science, and arts. The readers pool included older and experienced people and very young students. Later, the name of the magazine became a symbol of the great intellectual wealth of Russia.
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Afanasevskii, V. L. "On the philosophical "dumbness" of ancient Russian literature." Aspirantskiy Vestnik Povolzhiya 22, no. 3 (September 24, 2022): 57–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.55531/2072-2354.2022.22.3.57-60.
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Aim to review the process of formation of Russian philosophical discourse. The author supports the position that there was no philosophical discourse in the literature of the ancient Russians, and the original Russian philosophy began to form only in the 18th century. The books of Ancient Russia are characterized by the absence of a direct connection with the ancient philosophical tradition. The ideas of Ancient authors came to Russia through Byzantium. However, the ancient Russian scribes perceived them as "Hellenic sophistry" and manifestations of paganism.
The author comes to the conclusion that the Russian religious literature is specific for its essential orientation to the Greek religious literature of the IV-VI centuries. Russian philosophy historians can understand better the specifics of the Russian intellectual culture analyzing religious texts.
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Bulvinskiy, A. "Impact of the Imperial State Tradition on Modernization in Contemporary Russia." Problems of World History, no. 2 (December 1, 2016): 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2016-2-3.
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The article explains the influence of imperial state tradition on the substance, direction and purpose of the modernization in contemporary Russia. One of the key factors of the imperial nature of the Russian statehood is the historically formed imperial consciousness of Russian elites and Russians as the dominant ethnic group, which is being constantly reproduced. Contemporary Russia pursues a strategy of defensive modernization that aims at overcoming the military-technical gap between Russia and the advanced Western countries. The Russian leadership has neither conducted nor planned modernization of the Russian state and political system on the basis of the principles of the real non-controllable democracy. It is shown that successful technological, economic, and especially political modernization is impossible without changing the socio-political model established in modern Russia.
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Simonyan, Renald H. "The Russian-speaking Diaspora in the Baltic States: a socio-cultural aspect." Baltic Region 14, no. 2 (2022): 144–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-9.
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Currently, more than 20 million Russians permanently reside outside Russia. As migration trends show, their number will be increasing in the future. The Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States is an essential part of the Russian community abroad. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia used to be a single state with Russia for a long time. It could not but affect the formation of these countries as subjects of international politics. Since May 2004, the Baltic States have been members of the European Union. Together with Finland, they constitute the EU’s border space with Russia. To a large extent, it determines their geopolitical role in Europe. The article examines the Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States. It substantiates the factors facilitating its stability and the preservation of the Russian cultural space, analyses the socio-economic and legal status of different groups of Russian-speaking residents, and identifies the peculiarities of various groups of the Russian-speaking population as well as prospects for the development of the diaspora.
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Gayda, Fyodor A. "Белоруссизм в контексте столыпинского национализма." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 58 (August 1, 2020): 237–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2020-0-2-237-242.
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The article examines the political potential of the two programs and practices of nation-building at the beginning of the twentieth century associated with all-Russian and Belarusian national movements. The all-Russian project was formulated by the Prime Minister of the Russian Empire P.A. Stolypin. He proceeded from the idea of gradual and inevitable erosion of the estate system and democratization of the social system of Russia. Stolypin envisioned the creation of the political nation, the core of which would be the Russian people, quite traditionally understood as the trinity of Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians. According to Stolypin, the creation of the Russian nation led not to the restriction of the rights of ethnic minorities, but to their gradual expansion in the future, but on condition of loyalty to the state system and the national development of Russia. Until 1917, Russian nationalism in the Northwest region was much more influential than Belarusianism. The latter was represented by only a small circle of «Nasha Niva» journal supporters. Unlike Stolypin’s project, Belarusianism had no impact on any significant part of the local population.
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Birinci, Ebru, Ali Emre Sucu, and Ivan Alekseevich Safranchuk. "The Role of non-Western Countries in the Construction of Russian Great Powerness: The Cases of Turkey and Israel." Vestnik RUDN. International Relations 21, no. 3 (September 20, 2021): 517–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-3-517-528.
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This article contributes to the study of Russian great powerness, focusing on the potential of the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations to influence the construction of Russias great power status in a multipolar world. Based upon Russian and English literature dedicated to the study of great power concept and Russian great powerness, authors adopt analytic eclecticism for the theoretical framework of the study. In this regard, for a comprehensive understanding of Russian great powerness, both constructivism with its focus on identity, and neorealism stressing national interests, security, and power, are applied. The authors actively employ the official documents, international agreements, statements of government officials, and official declarations. As a result, the study examines to what extent bilateral relations with Turkey and Israel, the Wests traditional non-Western allies, can contribute to the construction of Russian great power identity. For this purpose, first of all, the factors of Russian great power construction and its role in Russian foreign policy are examined. After addressing the efficiency of great power status as a foreign policy tool, the development of Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations are discussed. It is concluded that Russia has developed strategically significant relations with Turkey and Israel despite the deteriorated relations with the West, and the development of these relations has supported the consolidation of Russias great power status at the international and regional levels. Furthermore, the study suggests that Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli bilateral relations can enable Russia to strengthen its great power status vis--vis the West via cooperation and competition and contribute to the construction of a multipolar world.
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Khramova, Marina N., Abubakr Kh Rakhmonov, and Dmitry P. Zorin. "EMIGRATION AND THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PANDEMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS IN 2022." Scientific Review. Series 2. Human sciences, no. 5-6 (2022): 36–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.26653/2076-4685-2022-5-6-03.
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The article discusses some aspects of the modern history of emigration from Russia to the United States, the factors and scale of emigration flows. The features of the visa regime between the Russian Federation and the United States in the context of obtaining various types of visas by Russian citizens are analyzed. Some data on the number, structure and distribution of the Russian-speaking population in individual US states are given. It is shown that the emigration sentiments of Russians towards the United States are based on economic, social, and, to some extent, political factors. It is shown that in recent years the number of non-immigrant visas issued to Russians in the United States has significantly decreased. An additional factor in the decline in the number of visas issued was the pandemic, which disrupted the mobility of the population around the world. The situation in Ukraine led to a further cooling of relations between Russia and the United States, including the impact on the attitude towards the Russian-speaking population in the United States by the local population and authorities. There are precedents associated with discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in the United States. Cases of appeals of citizens of the Russian Federation to international human rights organizations for the protection of their rights were recorded. Also, since the beginning of the conflict situation between Russia and Ukraine, a new wave of emigration from Russia to the United States has begun. The US and EU countries have consistently introduced several packages of sanctions against Russia and the Russian leadership, which has led to the withdrawal of many foreign companies from the Russian market. At present, we can only draw preliminary conclusions, but there is reason to believe that among those leaving there are many young professionals who will have to build a life in a new reality for themselves. Therefore, one of the tasks that we set is to investigate the impact of new external factors on the formation of Russian-speaking communities in the United States.
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Frolov, Vasily. "Ethnocratic State in Estonia as a Threat to Russian National Interests in the Baltic Region." ISTORIYA 13, no. 2 (112) (2022): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840008229-0.
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The article discusses the features of building an ethnocratic state in the Republic of Estonia in the post-Soviet period, which sees in Russia, Russians, and the «Russian World» a threat to its integrity and sovereignty. For almost 30 years, the nationalist-minded authorities of Estonia have been implementing in their Republic a policy aimed at infringing on the rights and freedoms of the Russian-speaking population. In this “democratic” Baltic State, Russians are faced with such acute and egregious problems as mass statelessness, anti-Russian language policy, the absence of the main part of political rights among “non-citizens”, and falsification of national history. The author of the work focuses on the fact that in many respects the anti-Russian and anti-Russian policies in the Republic of Estonia are pursued by local authorities in order to please their new “elder brother” and ally — the United States, from which this Baltic Republic has long been in economic and political dependence. According to the results of the study, it is concluded that the presence of a neighboring state, in which a deliberate anti-Russian and anti-Russian policy has been pursued for a long period of time, cannot but cause Russia anxiety and concern and not contradict its national interests.
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Detochenko, L. V., and V. V. Fesenko. "ANALYSIS AND GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL OUTBOUND TOURISM OF RUSSIAN RESIDENTS DURING THE 2020-2021 CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC." Bulletin of Udmurt University. Series Biology. Earth Sciences 32, no. 2 (July 5, 2022): 205–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2412-9518-2022-32-2-205-215.
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The purpose of the article is to study the features of the development of international outbound tourism of Russian residents during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and 2021. The dynamics of international tourist trips of Russians is presented, the changes that have occurred in the geography of tourist trips of Russian residents in 2020 and 2021 compared to pre-COVID times. The features of the tourist "opening" of countries for tourists from the Russian Federation are shown, the factors influencing visits to individual countries by Russian tourists during the pandemic are studied. The features of visits by tourists from Russia to individual host countries during the pandemic are presented. The problems of development of international outbound tourism of Russians in the modern period are named. The conclusion is made about the main reasons for the tourist "success" of individual states in receiving tourists from Russia - the opening of the country for Russians, the supply of charters from the regions and the weakening of the main anti-COVID restrictions.
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Henderson, Jane. "Russia – Russian Constitutional Law." European Public Law 1, Issue 4 (December 1, 1995): 508–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro1995056.
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Fedorchenko, A. V. "Russian" Israel and Russia." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(47) (April 28, 2016): 245–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2016-2-47-245-250.
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Cohen, Stephen F. "Russian Studies Without Russia." Post-Soviet Affairs 15, no. 1 (January 1999): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.1999.10641461.
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Kanet, Roger E. "Rebuilding “Greater Russia” and the Invasion of Ukraine." Transatlantic Policy Quarterly 22, no. 1 (June 1, 2023): 27–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.58867/ibis9578/pwcn9568.
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This article examines Vladimir Putin's commitment to rebuilding "Greater Russia" and its implications in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. Putin's vision involves re-establishing the former Soviet Union and extending Russian dominance beyond its borders, fueled by a belief in the historical and cultural ties between Russians and Ukrainians. The article explores Russia's assertive and unilateralist approach to international politics, its military interventions in neighboring countries, and the justifications used to expand Moscow's control over former Soviet territories. Highlighting the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and its devastating consequences, the author raises questions about Putin's long-term goals and whether they involve recreating "Greater Russia" or countering perceived threats from the West and neighboring states. The author contends that despite other factors that might play a role in influencing Russian policy, the re-establishment of Moscow’s influence/control over as much post-Soviet territory as possible – the recreation of “Greater Russia” -- is the most important role – not NATO expansion, although it no doubt was an issue. If the Russians are successful in dominating Ukraine, other former Soviet areas – for example, the Baltics – are likely to become targets of future expansion.
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Julia Magdalena Wuysang, Ira Patriani, and Netty Herawati. "Misrepresentation of Russian Interests in the Russo–Ukrainian War: The Closure of News Offices in Russia." Technium Social Sciences Journal 49, no. 1 (October 26, 2023): 305–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v49i1.9820.
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The misrepresentation of Russian interests in the ongoing Russo–Ukrainian War has drawn extensive public criticism. Scholars have investigated the war between Russia and Ukraine using diverse perspectives and using various aspects. Few, however, have examined the mechanisms through which Russian interests have been misrepresented. This article, thus, uses media analysis to investigate the Russo–Ukrainian War, relying on a review of the literature (previous studies, books, and digital news articles) to obtain its data. This study of the misrepresentation of Russian interests in the Russo–Ukrainian War finds 1) American and Ukrainian media have highlighted the disarray of the Russian offensive; 2) the media has misrepresented Russia's interests; 3) Russia and Ukraine have presented different information regarding the Russia–Ukraine War; 4) throughout the Russo–Ukrainian War, Russia has employed a DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy) strategy for its international politics. This study contributes to an understanding of the misrepresentation of Russia's interests on social media during the Russo–Ukrainian War.
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Lukonin, Sergei. "Russia-China Relations: An Asymmetrical Partnership?" MGIMO Review of International Relations 16, no. 2 (May 24, 2023): 65–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-2-89-65-86.
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Due to the breakdown in relations between Russia and major Western countries, Moscow is compelled to take extraordinary measures to reorient its political, trade, and economic ties. Due to its large and diversified economy and geographical proximity, China is increasingly becoming Russia's primary partner. Therefore, assessing the main outcomes of Russian-Chinese cooperation in trade, finance, economics, and science is crucial while identifying their achievements and probable limitations for further development. China has been Russia's largest trading partner for over a decade, importing mainly mineral products while exporting advanced technical products. In 2022, statistics indicate that the roles of Russia and China in bilateral trade have remained unchanged. China has further solidified its position as Russia's primary supplier of high-tech equipment, while Russia continues to be one of China's primary sources of gas and oil. China accounts for around 20% of the total foreign trade volume of the Russian Federation, while Russia's share in Chinese foreign trade turnover is about 3%. Although evaluating mutual direct and accumulated investments is challenging, it can be argued that China is among Russia's largest investors, whereas Russia's direct and accumulated investments in China, while likely higher than official estimates, are still relatively insignificant. The scope of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the scientific and technological sectors is narrowing, although additional incentives for expansion have emerged amid the heightened USChinese strategic rivalry and the crisis between Russia and the West. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the financial sector has had some successes, primarily the expansion of the use of national currencies in bilateral trade. However, this expansion is significantly limited by anti-Russian sanctions. In the current international climate, Russian-Chinese relations have the potential to deepen, but doing so will necessitate the creation of various mechanisms that enable large Chinese companies to avoid secondary sanctions.
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Awramiuk-Godun, Alina, and Tomasz Wites. "The Image of Russia and Russians as Seen by Polish University Students." Quaestiones Geographicae 32, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 91–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/quageo-2013-0016.
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Abstract The results presented in this study are part of a joint research project undertaken in 2011 by the University of Warsaw and the University of St. Petersburg entitled “The perception of Polish-Russian relations by students in Poland and Russia”. The main purpose of the research conducted in Poland was to investigate the beliefs and attitudes of students at the University of Warsaw toward Russia and Russians. Students are open to the surrounding reality, conscious of the mental and spatial proximity that links Poles and Russians, and aware of the problems that define the present-day Polish-Russian relations. A vast majority of participants are people who possess a fairly extensive knowledge of various aspects of life in Russia and express sympathy for Russia and Russian people. In the opinion of the authors, the results of the above study can be useful to teachers at universities, especially those that deal with European, socio-cultural and geographical subjects.