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1
Cherkasov, P. "IMEMO in Early 1990s (continued)." World Economy and International Relations, no. 8 (2015): 101–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-8-101-110.
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The article analyzes IMEMO activities in 1992–1993, when in Russia, under the influence of both radical economic reforms and drastic weakening of the central government, a deep political crisis emerged and gained a dangerous traction, fraught with the death of a young democracy and even the collapse of the state. Under these conditions, along with economic issues, the politological research came to the fore in IMEMO – the analysis of the country's new political system, the definition of its development vector. The Center of Socio-economic and Socio-political Research of IMEMO headed by German Germanovich Diligenskii played the major role in this work. Analysts of the Center prepared a number of recommendations for public authorities concerning the creation and development of a new democratic political system in Russia. IMEMO experts paid the utmost attention to the nature of the political crisis that arose in the post-Soviet Russia in late 1991, and the ways to overcome it. In January 1993, the results of the study were presented to the discussion at the Academic Council. It was agreed that one of the main causes of the political crisis in the country was the social tensions worsening, as a consequence of the “shocking therapy” conducted by the government of Gaidar in 1992. In the discussion on the political outlook German Diligenskii, rejecting the possibility of the old command-administrative system restoration, substantiated a probability of transformation of the "market democracy" not yet established in Russia into the "authoritarian monopoly or monopoly-bureaucratic system". Noting the disunity of democratic forces, weakness of the entrepreneurial class, largely dependent on the state, Diligenskii formulated a program for uniting all adherents of “arket democracy” under the slogan of "social liberalism", which would take into account Russian specifics. Consolidation of democracy and market economy in Russia is impossible without preservation of the state territorial integrity and consolidation of the central government, with a clear division of functions and powers of its constituent branches. Monopolization (usurpation) of all power by one of the branches – legislative or executive – should not be allowed. The victory of any of them in any case would mean the defeat of democracy. Such was, in general terms, the position of IMEMO in the face of the 1992–1993 political crisis. Acknowledgement. The publication was prepared as part of the President of Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientifi c schools NSh-6452.2014.6.
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Orekhovsky, P. A. "PARADOXES OF REGRESSIVE MODERNIZATION AND EXPORT OF RUSSIAN INSTITUTIONS." Federalism, no. 2 (July 22, 2019): 61–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.21686/2073-1051-2019-2-61-71.
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In Russia, the topic of modernization continues to be relevant. The government, the parliament, the opposition, and the scientific community regard it as an urgent task. The process of economic growth, which began in the 00s, is viewed as recovery after the USSR catastrophe, and the modernization project is associated with the construction of the Russian analogue of the Western “welfare society”, in many ways resembling old dreams of “socialism with a human face”. But there are various options for modernization. In the 1980-s S. Hall proposed the concept of regressive modernization for characterize the policy of the government of M. Thatcher. This concept allows a much better understanding of the history of the 1990s and the current economic policy in Russia. The specific paradox of regressive modernization is that the Russian center-right government conducts elements of neoliberal politics in combination with state paternalism and even populism. Elements of social archaics, such as clericalism and national autonomy, which enjoy separate legal regimes within the Federation, remind us of a flexible imperial political system. The export of traditionalism and paternalism, which at the same time look like a modern institutional design, is the basis of Russian “soft power”. This creates opportunities for increasing profitable trade and economic cooperation with countries of both left orientation and preserving autocratic, right-wing conservative political regimes.
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Kondratenko, O. "THE ESSENCE OF THE PHENOMENON OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION GEOPOLITICS." Actual Problems of International Relations, no. 133 (2017): 4–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2017.133.0.4-15.
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The essence of the internal geopolitics of the Russian Federation (RF) and its influence on the foreign policy of Moscow is analyzed in the article. It was found that on the background of Russian nationalism the activation of separatist sentiments in the Russian national autonomies had occurred, particularly in the North Caucasus (Chechnia, Dahestan).Eventually, it caused two Chechen wars, as well as to the formation of dissatisfaction with the Center’s actions in Tatarstan, South and East Siberia and others. However, after internal politics and internal economy shocks of the 1990-th Russia has outlined a course to restore the status of a great state. An important factor for the Russian government is the support of its foreign policy by the population. It is traced that the level of electoral support of the Russian president entirely depends on the success of the Russian Federation on the international arena. Kremlin actively cultivates and uses imperial mood of society in order to justify the return of its “unjustly deprived” great power status. Therefore, governmental expansionist geostrategy obtains active support among theintelligentsia and broad social strata.
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Leisse, Olaf, and Utta-Kristin Leisse. "A Siberian Challenge: Dealing with Multiethnicity in the Republic of Buryatia." Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (September 2007): 773–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990701475178.
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The Republic of Buryatia, along with 12 other former Soviet states during the same year, had declared its sovereignty no later than 8 October 1990. This did not actually mean a declaration of independence. Rather, this step was taken to urge the central government to acknowledge Buryatia as a free and equal partner at the political level. Boris Yeltsin, during his time as Russian president, did much to support this claim by propagating a vision of a post-Soviet Russia as a union of free peoples with equal rights. The central government in Moscow therefore recognized the existence of relatively autonomous regions. This was also done to respond to the interests of the different ethnic groups, which became increasingly important in the political sphere.
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Maltseva, Elena. "The Politics of Retirement Age Increase in Russia: Proposals, Protests and Concessions." Russian Politics 4, no. 3 (September 27, 2019): 375–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00403005.
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The article discusses the changes to the Russian pension system since 2013, focusing specifically on the most recent policy moves. It argues that, despite the apparent instability of the Russian pension system caused by numerous policy shifts that have occurred since 2015, one element has remained constant: since the early 1990s the transformation of the Russian pension system has been driven primarily by neoliberal economic advisers to the Russian government. Passage of the long-delayed decision to raise the retirement age, which provoked large-scale protests, can be understood in light of the current geopolitical and economic risks that complicate the future of Russian economy.
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Fylypenko, Artem. "The Transnistrian Conflict in 1992 and Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: Comparative Analysis." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 37-38 (December 12, 2018): 62–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2018.37-38.62-70.
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The article presents a comparative analysis of the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992 and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in 2014-2018. The similarities and differences between the two conflicts are analyzed. It is proved that the scenario under which events in the Donbas are developing is very similar to the events in Transnistria in 1990-1992, in particular, through the use of linguistic issues for the emergence of confrontation, the provision of military and political support, including through the involvement of irregular formations , direct intervention of armed units of the regular Russian army in war.
Particular attention is paid to the methods of information warfare against Moldova in the early 90's. The similarity of these methods with those used by Russia in the information war against Ukraine is shown, in particular: 1) dehumanization of the enemy, dissemination of information about its cruelty and inhumanity; 2) manipulation of historical facts; 3) representation of the struggle against separatism as the aggression of one state against the other; 4) appeal. to the events of the Second World War; 5) the statement that foreign troops are fighting on the side of government forces; 6) attempts to present separatist movements as "popular".
The conclusions state that the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992, as well as the occupation of Crimea and the conflict in the East of Ukraine in 2014-2018, are part of Russia's overall strategy to preserve the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in its sphere of influence. The ultimate goal of this strategy is the reintegration of separatist enclaves under conditions favorable to Russia, namely: the ability to influence foreign policy, change foreign policy priorities (rejection of the course on European and Euro-Atlantic integration), preservation of dependence on supplies of Russian energy carriers.
Key words: Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Transnistria, Transnistria conflict, Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Donbass
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Mironov, B. N. "Ethnic Discrimination in the Formation of State Bodies of the USSR." Modern History of Russia 11, no. 1 (2021): 149–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.110.
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The level of ethnopolitical inequality is estimated as the ratio of the share of an ethnic group employed in public authorities to the share of this ethnic group among the entire employed population. This indicator can be called the coefficient of ethnopolitical representativeness. In Imperial Russia, almost all major non-Russian ethnic groups had representatives in power structures, although in most cases this was unrepresentative; the number of nominees from an ethnic group did not correspond to its population size. During the entire Soviet period, 1917–1990, there was a steady and systematic decrease in the inequality of ethnic groups in power structures. In 1989, discrimination in the authorities as a whole practically disappeared. The advantages of Russians in forming the Soviet government were minimized; their percentage in government corresponded to their share in the population. In some areas of government, ethnic inequality was leveled at different rates. In the state apparatus, equality in representation was already achieved in 1959. In the apparatus of party and public organizations, there was also a tendency to overcome discrimination, but in this area, by 1990, the percentage of non-Russians remained slightly lower than their share in the population. Minimization of ethnic inequality was a natural consequence, on the one hand, of the national policy of the country’s leadership, on the other — the desire of ethnic elites for equality in political rights.
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Helf, Gavin, and Jeffrey W. Hahn. "Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990." Slavic Review 51, no. 3 (1992): 511–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2500058.
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Much of the analysis of the results of republican and local elections held in the USSR in 1989-1990 understandably focused on the dramatic victories of candidates and groups committed to a radical reform of the old system. Anti-communist majorities were elected to the parliaments of several republics. The city governments of Moscow, Leningrad and Sverdlovsk fell under the control of activists associated with the self-styled “democratic bloc” and, in summer 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected to chair the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Conversely, local party officials suffered embarrassing defeats in the face of competition from popular fronts united under the banner of Democratic Russia. That the Party itself was in disarray over how to respond to these challenges was reflected in the open split between rival platforms at the 28th party Congress in July 1990. Taken together, these events could easily convey the impression that old party elites “lost” the local elections of 1990 and that they lost because they failed to adapt to the new rules of democratic politics.
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Yakutin, Yu V. "Academician Abalkin. Precepts of the Russian school of socio-economic thought and the practice of perestroika reforms." Management and Business Administration, no. 4 (December 2020): 116–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.33983/2075-1826-2020-4-116-180.
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The article continues the series of articles in the journal MBA about Russian academicians who actively collaborated with the VEO of Russia. Academician L.I. Abalkin (1930–2011) — a prominent scientist and economist of the last decades of the Soviet era and the beginning of the post-Soviet period. L.I. Abalkin's activity is multi-faceted both in the field of economic theory, especially political economy, and in the field of practical justification of economic reforms, transformation of the planned Soviet system into a market economy. Participation in 1989–1990 in the work of the government as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Chairman of the Commission on economic reform, describes him as an outstanding representative of academic science, who had a huge impact on the development of economic theory and economic practice. L.I. Abalkin played an exceptional role in developing the problems of the Russian school of socio-economic thought. He not only justified its distinctive features and principles of methodological approach to its study, but also brought back to scientific circulation the works of many undeservedly forgotten Russian economists. The article also shows the need to continue Abalkin's research in this area of economic theory, the creative development of the scientific heritage of L.I. Abalkin.
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Büdenbender, Mirjam, and Andrea Lagna. "Statecraft strategies and housing financialization at the periphery: Post-socialist trajectories in Russia and Poland." Finance and Society 5, no. 2 (December 6, 2019): 105–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2218/finsoc.v5i2.4136.
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A new literature on housing and financialization has emerged in recent years, but scholars have yet to examine how political actors shape national trajectories of housing financialization. In this article, we address this shortcoming by examining the cases of Russia and Poland in the 1990-2018 period. We argue that in both contexts political elites implemented a radical market-oriented reshaping of housing finance. However, by pursuing distinct statecraft strategies and modes of integrating the domestic economy into global markets, Russian and Polish political elites created two divergent trajectories of housing financialization. Russian political elites pursued patrimonial statecraft strategies and a mode of global economic integration based on raw material exports. The Putin administration channeled revenues from raw material exports into the securitization-based housing finance system and used this infrastructure as an instrument of hegemonic power. In doing so, the Russian government shielded homeowners from exposure to financial risk. In contrast, Polish political elites pursued liberal statecraft strategies and a mode of global economic integration based on foreign capital inflows. Polish political parties therefore enabled foreign banks to dominate the housing finance system and sell foreign currency mortgages, which exposed homeowners to considerable financial risk. In light of these findings we call for further research into the political factors that shape the process of housing financialization, both in the post-socialist space and beyond.
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Cherkasov, P. "IMEMO in Early 1990s." World Economy and International Relations, no. 6 (2015): 91–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-6-91-107.
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The article analyzes IMEMO activities in 1992, when Russia began to implement radical economic reforms. The rapid development of events outpaced their deep understanding, let alone the forecasting of socio-economic consequences of a "shocking therapy". During this period, IMEMO experts tried to analyze the implementation of economic reforms and formulate their attitude towards them. The main platform for discussions held at the Institute was its Academic Council where the most important reforms of the "Gaidar team" were discussed. The individual members of this team – Petr Aven, Sergei Glaz'ev, Maksim Boiko – gave explanations, and assessments of economic reforms – support and rejection – were revealed during discussions at the meetings of the Academic Council. In general, the approval of reforms prevailed in the expert community of IMEMO. But even the supporters of Egor Gaidar among IMEMO economists saw their serious shortcomings and negative effects: hasty, unfounded hopes for self-regulating market; neglect of social factors; surge of corruption during the privatization and corporatization of state property; continuing inflation, which contradicted the adopted principle of monetarism; underestimation of the state participation in the process of reforming the economy, etc. The interaction between IMEMO reformers and the government was a serious problem. Scientists criticized the government for neglecting their recommendations, and officials argued that academic science is constantly late with its recommendations and advice. The question of the IMEMO experts' direct involvement in the work of individual ministries – Economy and Finance, Foreign Economic Relations and other – was only partially solved through the secondment of some Institute employees to these ministries. In general, the problem of closer cooperation between science and practice was not successfully solved. Acknowledgement. The publication was prepared as part of the President of the Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientific schools, NSh-6452-2014.6.
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Dos Reis Quadros, Marcos Paulo, and Lauren Machado. "A Rússia e o exterior próximo: potencialidades e entraves para um projeto de grande potência/Russia and the Near Abroad: possibilities and barriers for a great power project." Brazilian Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (December 21, 2015): 582–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2237-7743.2015.v4n3.07.p582.
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Considerando a política externa russa dos anos 1990 até a atualidade, o artigo visa identificar a importância exercida pela região conhecida como Exterior Próximo para o posicionamento internacional da Rússia. Para tanto, investiga inicialmente o contexto de virtual ostracismo político e econômico que acompanhou o governo de Boris Yeltsin, evidenciando que a política externa russa do período flertou abertamente com o Ocidente e conformou-se à perda de prestígio decorrente da implosão da URSS. No entanto, a pesquisa salienta que as administrações capitaneadas por Vladimir Putin suscitaram uma revigorada assertividade da Rússia no plano internacional, reintroduzindo, na prática, um projeto de grande potência para o país. Através de análise que enfatiza os documentos intitulados “Conceito de Política Externa da Federação Russa”, publicados em 1993, 2000 e 2008 pelo Kremlin, o artigo sugere que o país procura confirmar e robustecer sua presença no Exterior Próximo justamente por considerar a região fundamental para efetivar seu protagonismo no cenário internacional. Por fim, o artigo discute as potencialidades e os entraves para os interesses russos na região, destacando as relações políticas e econômicas e o peso da coerção militar.Palavras-chave: Política Externa Russa; Exterior Próximo; Grande Potência.Abstract: Considering the 1990s’ Russian foreign policy until the present, this article aims to identify the importance exerted by the region known as Near Abroad to Russia’s international positioning. To do so, initially this study investigates the virtual political and economic wilderness context that has accompanied the government of Boris Yeltsin, showing that Russian foreign policy in this period has openly flirted with the West and conformed itself to prestige’s loss resulted from the URSS’ implosion. However, the research stresses that Vladimir Putin’s administrations have raised Russia's assertiveness on the international stage, reintroducing, in practice, a great power project for the country. Through an analysis that emphasizes the documents entitled "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", published in 1993, 2000 and 2008 by the Kremlin, this article suggests that the country seeks to confirm and strengthen its presence on the Near Abroad precisely because Russia considers this region fundamental to carry out its role on the international stage. Finally, the article discusses the possibilities and obstacles for Russian interests in the region, highlighting the political and economic relations and the military coercion’s weight.Keywords: Russian Foreign Policy; Near Abroad; Great Power. DOI: 10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n3p582-607
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Grebennikov, Marat. "Farewell to the Caucasus: Regional ethnic clan politics and the growing instability of the ruling elite after the 2012 presidential elections in Russia." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46, no. 1 (January 8, 2013): 159–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.12.011.
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One of the most lingering questions about Russian politics that dominates public discourse and media coverage is the future of political regime after the 2012 presidential elections. The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the extent of differences between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, how long their “tandemocracy” will last and what can bring about regime change as scarce critics of the Kremlin, from ultra-liberals to communists, have been haphazardly co-opted into the power system, leaving no political ambitions that they would not, in principle, be ready to abandon in return for proper compensation.In sharp contrast to the views of many regional experts and commentators, the presentday Russian Federation is the world’s most anti-Soviet state. It is based upon a very different set of values: private ownership, dire individualism, the cult of money, a clan-based political system, and pervasive corruption at all levels of government. The North Caucasus ethnocratic elites, however, do not have access to abundant resources for sale, and are forced to look around for alternative sustenance, as rigid centralism and unification limit their rent-seeking capabilities. Alexander Khloponin, the incumbent presidential envoy in charge of the North Caucasus Federal District, seems to continue the policy of buying the loyalty of regional archaic clan-based elites that aggravates rather than improves the situation.The paper addresses this puzzle: why, against rigorous rhetoric and demonstration of tight grip over the region, neither Putin nor Medvedev has real power to bring change to the North Caucasus? In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the paper examines the triadic relationship among central political elite, who benefited from the massive privatisation of lucrative segments of Soviet industry in the early 1990s, regional clan-based ethnocracy, and non-systemic religious opposition. Drawing on the works of Russian scholars and experts in Russian politics, the paper explores the hypothesis that on-going instability in the North Caucasus can no longer be explained by a well-known set of theories of ethnic violence, because it is carefully negotiated by regional and central political elite, who do not see the North Caucasus as an indispensable part of the Russian Federation and whose clan-based rent-seeking agendas have gradually driven Russian statehood into a complete dead-end. Instead of facing the real challenges that are addressed in this paper, it is only able to make a public show of action on the eve of crucial political campaigns: the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The paper concludes that the deep freeze in the Russian political system has exhausted its debatable potential for change through the existing tandem model of government with its obscure division of roles between two leaders. What we actually see is an imitation of political reform and the resulting degradation of the entire system of governance. Over the past century, Russian polity has never been as weak as today, because the only legitimate source of power in Russia is corruption.
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Naumov, A. V. "On the historical experience of preserving the territorial integrity of the state by criminal law means." Penitentiary Science 14, no. 3 (2020): 309–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.46741/2686-9764-2020-14-3-309-314.
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The article examines the historical experience of preserving the territorial integrity of the state through the adoption of criminal laws. This is done using the example of two such attempts in the history of the Russian state (by the Provisional Government after the February Revolution of 1917 and during Gorbachev’s perestroika in connection with the decision of the union republics of the Baltic states to gain state independence). In both cases legislators passed strict criminal laws, which, however, proved unable to prevent violation of the territorial integrity of the state. For example, under the Provisional Government criminal liability was increased for violent encroachments on changing the existing state system in Russia or “to tear away any part of it from Russia” (the perpetrators were even subjected to life or urgent hard labor). The second experience, also unsuccessful, dates back to the spring of 1990, when the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) declared their state independence. The extraordinary Third Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR immediately reacted to this, recognizing these decisions as invalid as contrary to the Constitution of the USSR. The all-Union power, recorded in the decisions of the congresses of people’s deputies, almost openly announced to the republics that their withdrawal from the USSR was impossible and they had nothing to hope for in this sense. So, in an interview for Soviet and French television in November 1990, the President of the USSR, recognizing that the Constitution of the USSR provides for the right to self-determination up to the secession of a republic and referring to the existence of a special mechanism for this exit, at the same time said that he had come to the conclusion, the country cannot be divided. The outcome of this legislative “fight” is known and dates back to December 1991. What should a legislator learn from these historical lessons? Most importantly: he must firmly grasp that there are certain limits to the possibilities of criminal law to achieve political and socio-economic goals.
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Sarayeva, Yelena L., and Igor’ A. Tsoy. "The 1870s populists’ idea of Russian origins of why they were in opposition." Vestnik of Kostroma State University, no. 4 (2019): 25–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.34216/1998-0817-2019-25-4-25-31.
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The analysis of the 1870s populists' idea of historical circumstances that influenced the development of the revolutionary movement, the formation of the worldview of that time's radicals is suggested in the paper. The novelty of the study lies in the reconstruction and interpretation of the populists' views on the politics of the government, on social relations under Alexander II of Russia. The socio-political circumstances of the "Great Reforms" era served as the historical context of the revolutionary movement. It is important to analyse the populists' ideas about the reasons for radicalising the mood of some young people in the Reform era of Alexander II of Russia. The problem of origins of why the populists were in opposition is under-studied. The study is carried out in the context of axiological and humanitarian approaches, which oblige to study the personality culture of the past, those people's system of values and ideas. The populists' texts – their memories and writings – formed the source base of the study. Written for the purpose of wide popularisation of revolutionary ideas, they contain reliable information about the 1870s revolutionaries' worldview, they reveal the features of their subculture, historical memory. Populist ideas about the reforms of Alexander II of Russia, about the repression of the authorities after the tsar assassination attempt committed by Dmitry Karakozov, about the social contradictions of that time, about the circle of reading of the revolutionaries as factors that influenced the formation of their beliefs, are revealed in the article. The analysis of those perceptions allows reproducing the features of the populist version of the Russian origins of why they were in opposition.
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ORLEVYCH, Iryna. "SPLIT IN THE RUSSOPHILE CIRCLES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RUSSIAN AGRARIAN PARTY." Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Identity, Statehood 36 (2022): 69–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.33402/ukr.2022-36-69-93.
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The activity of the Russophile party restored in the interwar period, which remained true to its own ideological orientations, declaring the longevity of its historical tradition and succession to the pre-war institution, is studied. Competing for influence in the political arena, this party, with its inherent conformism, was able to gain the support of the Polish government and regain control of its societies: Stauropegion, «People’s House», «Halychyna-Ruthenian Matica». The problem of fighting for the right to the «People’s House» – the only society for which government commissioners were appointed – has long gripped all Ukrainian politics, becoming the cause of inter-party conflicts and intra-party quarrels of Russophiles, the issue of political bargaining between parties and government in election battles, an indicator of relations with the state and one of the main public discourses. It is shown that the struggle for the «People's House» was an important prerequisite for the split of the «Russian People's Organization» (RPO) in 1926. A group of people led by M. Bachynskyi, L. Cherkavskyi, and O. Lysiak left the RPO and founded the Russian Agrarian Party (RAP), explaining this by the desire to create a «healthy opposition» to the Russophile leadership and more actively defend the rights of the peasantry. RAP members enlisted the support of Polish government officials to seize the «People’s House» and win seats in the 1928 and 1930 elections. In the elections to the Sejm and the Senate in 1928, with the assistance of the Polish government, the RPO and the RAP united, but never received a single mandate. In the 1930 election campaigns, the RAP ran on the same electoral list as the pro-government BB party and won two seats. An attempt is made to please the Polish authorities with the head of the RAP M. Bachynskyi, who declared the difference between the ideology of his political force and all Russophilia, positioning its members as «Ruthenians» who, unlike the RPO, did not seek unification with Russia (but at the same time they continued to profess the idea of the unity of the «Russian» people and used the term «Russian» to mean Ukrainians of Halychyna). M. Bachynskyi's anti-Ukrainian position on complex aspects of Ukrainian-Polish relations is highlighted. This Russophile figure negatively assessed the patriotic Ukrainian forces, including the GCC, which he accused of not stopping the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919 by its clergy. He also did not condemn the «pacification» carried out by the Polish government against the Ukrainian population, opposed the introduction of national identifiers «Ukrainian», «Ukraine» and others. For the first time, the archives of the Stanislav Voivodeship show attempts by the Polish authorities to support Russophiles from the RAP, calling the members of this party «Ruthenians», just as the Poles called the entire Ukrainian people. It was the agreement policy and unpopularity among the masses that led to the liquidation of the RAP (since 1931 – RAO) in 1934. Its members joined the «Russian Peasant Organization» (RPO)
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P. Krüger, Louis. "Black economic empowerment in post-1994 South Africa: ANC curse and/or socialist/communist covenant?" Problems and Perspectives in Management 14, no. 3 (September 6, 2016): 162–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.14(3-1).2016.03.
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After more than 21 years under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), post-1994 South Africa finds itself yet again embroiled in race-related politics. Government policies such as black economic empowerment (BEE) and employment equity (EE) have not brought about the economic growth, social development and political democracy that the late former President Nelson Mandela had envisaged and what the ANC had promised to all the people of South Africa. South Africa is currently disengaging itself from the West including the Unites States of America (USA) and certain European Union (EU) countries and appears to rather embrace and align itself with countries such as Russia and China that pursue socialist and communist ideologies. Both these two issues may have a profound impact on how businesses will be managed in the future. In an exploratory, qualitative study using a “5 Star” research methodology, the direct and indirect impacts of BEE policies were investigated and the possible movement in South Africa’s ideological stance was explored. BEE does not appear to have helped to bring about high economic growth to help to reduce unemployment and eradicate the high levels of poverty and inequality, and government graft and corruption have increased at all levels of government, including local municipalities. BEE appears to have become the ANC’s curse to economic, social and political progress and should be scrapped. A national debate should follow on whether the ANC’s current covenant with pro-socialism and pro-communism rather than Western free-market capitalism is the appropriate ideology for South Africa to pursue. Keywords: black economic empowerment (BEE), employment equity (EE), African National Congress (ANC), capitalism, socialism, communism. JEL Classification: M14, M21
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van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. "Sanctions Against the Russian War on Ukraine: Lessons from History and Current Prospects." Journal of World Trade 56, Issue 4 (June 1, 2022): 571–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2022023.
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This article studies the case of the sanctions against the Russian war on the Ukraine in 2022 against the background of four major and well-documented historical sanction episodes: (1) the anti-Apartheid sanctions of the 1980s, (2) the sanctions against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, (3) the sanctions against Iranian nuclear capabilities and (4) the US and EU sanctions against the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Two cases (South Africa and Iran) have a comparatively low probability of success based on pre-sanction trade linkage between sender and target and the target’s regime type (the autocracy score). The key to understanding their success is in the banking channel (debt-crisis and international payment system sanctions) and the behaviour of the private sector (divestment and over-compliance). The failure of the sanctions against Iraq underscores the importance of regime type and the need for a viable exit strategy and shows that some decision-makers cannot be influenced with economic hardship. The 2014 sanctions against Russia illustrate the comparative vulnerability of the European democracies and their weakness in organizing comprehensive sanctions that bite. Given the increased Russian resilience, the increasingly autocratic nature of President Putin’s government, the credibility of his 2014 tit-for-tat strategy and the failure of European democracies to implement appropriate strong and broad-based measures, smart and targeted sanctions are unlikely to influence the Kremlin’s calculus. The European Union could only influence that calculus by restoring its reputation as a credible applicant of strong sanctions, including an embargo on capital goods and a boycott of Russian energy. Sanctions, Comprehensive sanctions, Smart sanctions, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Apartheid, Iran, Iraq, Crimea, comparative case study
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Kuras, Leonid V., and Bazar D. Tsybenov. "От Уполномоченного императорского российского правительства в Монголии И. Я. Коростовца до Уполномоченного НКИД РСФСР в Монголии О. И. Макстенека: к 100-летию российско-монгольских дипломатических отношений." Монголоведение (Монгол судлал) 13, no. 2 (November 30, 2021): 351–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.22162/2500-1523-2021-2-351-365.
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Introduction. An urgent issue of Mongolian studies today is the role of Russian-Mongolian diplomatic relations in promoting the statehood of Mongolia in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The revolutionalry movement in Inner Asia, in particular, and the social-political history of modern Mongolia, in general, are closely associated with the efforts of Russian diplomacy and, especially, with a number of diplomats who greatly contributed to the promotion of Mongolian direction of the Russian politics in the East. The aim of the present article is the study of the activities of Russian diplomats, namely I. Ya. Korostovets, the Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Russian Government in Mongolia, and O. I. Makstenek, the Representative of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR in Mongolia. Accordingly, the research has been conducted along the following lines: i) history of the issue, ii) examination of 1912 Russian-Mongolian agreement, iii) description of the events in Outer Mongolia between 1917 and 1920, and iv) analysis of Makstenek’s report as a source on the history of Mongolian Revolution of 1921 and the Soviet-Chinese relations. Conclusions.Both Korostovets, on behalf of the Russian Imperial Government, and Makstenek, on behalf of the RSFSR, played a significant role in establishing the regional system of international relations in the Baikal region. The 1912 Russian-Mongolian Agreement, which was in fact the result of Korostovets’ efforts, was instrumental in promoting Mongolia as a subject of international law and in initiating the movement of Mongolians to their de facto and de jure independence from China. Makstenek’s report shows much effort the Soviet diplomat took in preparing the Mongolian Revolution of 1921. Besides receiving and delegating Mongolian revolutionaries to Soviet Russia, taking an active part in preparations to the First Congress of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and in the formation of military detachments of Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army, Makstenek conducted negotiations with the Chinese authorities in Urga and Maimachen, i.e. in fact initiated the diplomatic proceedings designed to prepare the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia.
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Spaulding, Robert Mark. "German trade policy in Eastern Europe, 1890–1990: preconditions for applying international trade leverage." International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 343–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300033130.
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Over the past century, Germany has repeatedly attempted to use trade as a tool of foreign policy vis-à-vis Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Against the background of continual German economic superiority, this article analyzes Germany's ability to apply trade leverage in terms of four other factors: the nature of the prevailing international trade regime, government views of trade leverage as a tool of statecraft, the degree of German state autonomy in setting trade policies, and the availability of an effective bureaucratic mechanism for controlling German imports and exports. The historical record demonstrates that beyond economic superiority, the application of trade leverage requires a permissive international trade regime, state acceptance of trade-based economic statecraft, an autonomous domestic regime, and a rigorous trade control bureaucracy. Surprisingly, this conjunction of factors, as they applied to Eastern Europe, occurred during both the Nazi period and the early years of the Federal Republic. The article closes by pointing out how two important factors—the politicized nature of the East-West trade regime and the Federal Republic's high degree of state autonomy in setting Eastern trade policy–are being eroded by political and economic change in Eastern Europe.
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Zakharchenko, Alexey Vladimirovich, Maksim Sergeevich Kirdyashev, and Ksenia Viktorovna Pankeeva. "Public mood of the Kuibyshev Region residents in 1990-1991 in the context of the social history of Russia." Samara Journal of Science 7, no. 4 (November 30, 2018): 263–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/snv201874219.
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This paper deals with 1990-1991 as a turning point, which marked the collapse of the policy of perestroika, the communist institutions of power became a relic of the past, metamorphoses took place in the social structure of the Soviet society. The focus of everyday life history is the reality in the interpretation of its immediate participants, who were witnesses of the events of those years. Such events can relate to different spheres of life, and participants in these events can be people of different social strata. Newspapers and magazines are considered to be an irreplaceable source of information for studying the relationship between government and society in this chronological period. Letters and appeals of citizens from the regional newspaper Volzhskaya Kommuna were taken into consideration. There were rubrics expressing public opinion about the dynamics of the perestroika policy. The emotional reaction reflected in the letters is of great interest. The sources clearly record the main tendencies and stages of the public mood that prevailed in that period, thereby transfer the political apathy that spread in the society. The information received from the sources makes a definite contribution to the study of the everyday life history and can serve as a basis for research and reveal new aspects in social history.
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Richardson, William. "“To the World of the Future”: Mexican Visitors to the USSR, 1920-1940." Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 1002 (January 1, 1993): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/cbp.1993.53.
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During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union was a place of pilgrimage for foreigners hoping to see a new world in the process of creation. When faced with Soviet reality, most found that their idealized images were far too optimistic, however, and many of them left the country in moods of dejection and disappointment. Some were appalled at the revived bourgeois way of life that seemed to be encouraged by the New Economic Policy of the 1920s, while others were concerned by the growth of bureaucracy and the apparent eagerness of the government to involve itself actively in the intellectual and aesthetic life of the nation, for example. Communist party politics, which became increasingly bitter and caustic, and indeed more public during the second half of the 1920s, caused many other foreigners to question their ideological allegiance to the new Soviet state. The enthusiasm associated with the Five Year plans revived their spirits, however. Here at last, under the leadership of Joseph Stalin and his associates, the peoples of the Soviet Union were beginning to build a new society. Russia was being transformed from a backward agrarian country into a modem industrial state, new towns were being built in virgin territories, and older cities were being reconstructed at a time when the West was sinking ever more deeply into economic depression. Individualism and privatism were being replaced by collectivism, it appeared, and a new egalitarian, proletarian society would provide a model for the world to emulate.
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Ivanchenko, Maria Alexandrovna. "The development of the political system of Russia and Argentina in the 30-40s of the twentieth century." Политика и Общество, no. 2 (February 2022): 28–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0684.2022.2.36670.
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The article is devoted to the features of the development of the political system of Russia and Argentina in the 30-40s of the twentieth century. A special emphasis is placed on the formation of state policy and key aspects of the creation of political institutions during the reign of Stalin in Russia in the context of the development of communist ideology and socialist construction. It is also indicated that the liberal system established by the Constitution of 1853 in Argentina has shown its inability to cope with the political, social, economic and ideological challenges and transformations of Argentina after the falsification of elections in 1930.In this context, the experience of the rather difficult development of the political system of Argentina and Russia in the 30-40s of the twentieth century is of considerable interest, since these two countries faced similar problems of state structure, especially in the field of economics and politics. The political system of a society currently undergoing transformational changes is at the modernization stage of development, which brings it to the status of an object of research and professional interest of political scientists, lawyers, philosophers, sociologists, historians and specialists in the field of other humanities. As a result of these shifts, one of the pressing problems that political science is currently dealing with is the development of clear ideas about the consequences of institutional changes. The issues of the development of democracy, democratic transits, transformations of political systems have become one of the main directions of political science in recent decades. The task of finding out the sources of changes in political institutions and predicting their consequences became especially acute at the beginning of the twentieth century, when a number of countries in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe began to move away from the authoritarian way of government and embarked on the path of democratic development.
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Stašulāne, Anita. "ESOTERICISM AND POLITICS: THEOSOPHY." Via Latgalica, no. 2 (December 31, 2009): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17770/latg2009.2.1604.
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Interference of esotericism and politics became apparent especially in the 19th century when the early socialists expected the coming of the Age of Spirit, and narratives about secret wisdom being kept in mysterious sacred places became all the more popular. Thus, the idea of the Age of Enlightenment underwent transformation: the world will be saved not by ordinary knowledge but by some special secret wisdom. In this context, Helena Blavatsky (1831–1891) developed the doctrine of Theosophy the ideas of which were overtaken by the next-generation theosophists including also the Russian painter Nicholas Roerich (1874–1947) and his spouse Helena Roerich (1879–1955) who developed a new form of Theosophy. The aim of this article is to analyse the interference between Theosophy and politics paying special attention to its historical roots, which, in the context of Roerich groups, are to be sought in the political activities of Nicholas Roerich, the founder of the movement. The following materials have been used in the analysis: first, writings of the founders of Agni Yoga or Teaching of Living Ethics; second, the latest studies in the history of Theosophy made in the available archives after the collapse of the soviet regime; third, materials obtained from the interviews of a field research (2006–2008). The author has made use of an interdisciplinary approach combining anthropological methods with the method of systematic analysis. The historical roots of the political activity of contemporary theosophists stretch into the political aspirations of Nicholas Roerich, the founder of Agni Yoga or Teaching of Living Ethics. Opening of the USSR secret archives and publication of several formerly inaccessible diaries and letters of theosophists offer an opportunity to study the “spiritual geopolitics” of the Roerichs. Setting off to his Central Asian expeditions (1925–1928; 1934–1935), Nicholas Roerich strived to implement the Great Plan, i.e. to found a New State that would stretch from Tibet to South Siberia comprising the territories governed by China, Mongolia, Tibet and the USSR. The new state was conceived as the kingdom of Shambhala on the earth, and in order to form this state, Nicholas Roerich aspired to acquire the support of various political systems. During the Tzarist Empire, the political world outlook of Nicholas Roerich was markedly monarchic. After the Bolshevik coup in Russia, the artist accepted the offer to work under the wing of the new power, but after his emigration to the West Roerich published extremely sharp articles against the Bolsheviks. In 1922, the Roerichs started to support Lenin considering him the messenger of Shambhala. Roerich’s efforts to acquire Bolshevik support culminated in 1926 when the Roerichs arrived in Moscow bringing a message by Mahatmas to the soviet government, a small case with earth for the Lenin Mausoleum from Burhan-Bulat and paintings in which Buddha Maitreya bore strong resemblance to Lenin. The plan of founding the Union of Eastern Republics, with Bolshevik support, failed, since about the year 1930 the soviet authorities changed their position concerning the politics of the Far East. Having ascertained that the Bolsheviks would not provide the anticipated support for the Great Plan, the Roerichs started to seek for contacts in the USA which provided funding for his second expedition (1934–1935). The Roerichs succeeded even in making correspondence (1934–1936) with President Roosevelt who paid much larger attention to Eastern states especially China than other presidents did. Their correspondence ceased when the Security Service of the USA grew suspicious about Roerich’s pro-Japanese disposition. Nicholas Roerich has sought for support to his political ambitions by all political regimes. In 1934, the Russian artist tried to ascertain whether German national socialists would support his efforts in Asia. It may seem that the plans of founding the Union of Oriental Republics have passed away along with Roerich; yet in 1991 his son Svyatoslav Roerich (1904–1993) pointed out once again that the Altai is a very important centre of the great future and Zvenigorod is still a great reality and a magnificent dream. Interference between esotericism and politics is observed also among Latvian theosophists: the soviet regime successfully made use of Roerich’s adherents propagating the communist ideology in the independent Republic of Latvia. In the 1920s and 1930s, the embassy of the USSR in Riga maintained close contacts with Roerich’s adherents in Latvia and made a strong pressure on the Latvian government not to ban the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society who actively propagated the success of soviet culture and economy. On 17 June 1940, the soviet army occupied the Republic of Latvia, and Haralds Lūkins, the son of the founder of the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society, was elected to the first government of the soviet Latvia. Nevertheless, involvement of theosophists in politics was unsuccessful, since after the official annexation of Latvia into the USSR, on 5 August 1940, all societies including the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society were closed. Since the members of the movement continued to meet regularly, in 1949, Haralds Lūkins was arrested as leader of an illegal organization. After the Second World War, theosophists were subjected to political repressions. Arrests of Roerich’s followers (1948–1951) badly impaired the movement. After rehabilitation in 1954, the repressed persons gradually returned from exile and kept on their illegal meetings in small groups. To regain their rights to act openly, Roerich’s followers started to praise Nicholas Roerich as a supporter of the soviet power. With the collapse of the soviet regime, Roerich’s followers in Latvia became legal in 1988 when the Latvian Roerich Society was restored which soon split up according to geopolitical orientation; therefore, presently in Latvia, there are the following organisations: Latvian Roerich Society, Latvian Department of the International Centre of the Roerichs, and Aivars Garda group or the Latvian National Front. A. Garda fused nationalistic ideas with Theosophy offering a special social reorganization – repatriation of the soviet-time immigrants and a social structure of Latvia that would be formed by at least 75% ethnic Latvians. Activity of A. Garda group, which is being criticized by other groups of theosophists, is a continuation of the interference between theosophical and political ideas practised by the Roerichs. Generally it is to be admitted that after the crush of the soviet regime, in theosophist groups, unclear political orientation between the rightists and leftists is observed, characterised by fairly radical ideas.
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Sholeye, Yusuf, and Amal Madibbo. "Religious Humanitarianism and the Evolution of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (1990-2005)." Political Crossroads 24, no. 1 (September 1, 2020): 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.7459/pc/24.1.03.
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During the Cold War, military and economic tensions between the US and the Soviet Union shaped the process of war in conflict regions in different parts of the world. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s reshaped the balance of power in global politics, as new actors appeared on the global scene and global foreign policy shifted to mediating and providing humanitarian assistance in conflict regions zones. Humanitarianism became the method of conflict resolution, which provided humanitarian organizations, especially the religious ones among them, with the opportunity to have more influence in the outcomes of sociopolitical events occurring in the world. These dynamics impacted conflicts in Africa, especially within Sudan. This is because that era coincided with Sudan’s Second Civil War (1983-2005) between the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan (GofS). During the Cold War, both the US and Russia intervened in the civil war in Sudan by providing military and economic assistance to different parties, but, again, in the post-Cold War era humanitarianism was used in relation to the civil war. Transnational religious organizations provided humanitarian assistance in the war-torn and drought-afflicted regions in Southern Sudan, and sought to help implement peace initiatives to end the war. The organizations included Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a consortium of UN agencies and NGOs1 which was created in 1989. In addition, transnational religious groups based in the United States and Canada such as the Christian Solidarity International (CSI), the Canadian Crossroads, Catholic Relief Service, Mennonite Central Committee and the Lutheran Church got involved in humanitarian relief in Sudan. The global focus on religious humanitarianism extended to Southern Sudan as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was founded in 1989-1990 to coordinate the humanitarian assistance. Because SPLA has led the civil war on behalf of Southern Sudan and had suzerainty over territories there, the humanitarian organizations had to build relationships with the SPLA to deliver relief through Southern Sudan and negotiate peace initiatives. This article analyzes how the transnational activities of the religious humanitarian groups shaped the evolution of SPLA from 1990 to 2005, with a particular focus on the US and Canadian organizations. We will see that the organizations influenced SPLA in a manner that impacted the civil war both in positive and negative ways. The organizations were ambivalent as, on one hand, they aggravated the conflict and, on the other hand influenced the development of both Church and non-Church related peace initiatives. Their humanitarian work was intricate as the civil war itself became more complex due to political issues that involved slavery, and oil extraction in Southern Sudan by US and Canadian multinational oil companies. All the parties involved took action to help end the civil war, but they all sought to serve their own interests, which jeopardized the possibility of a lasting peace. Thus, the interpretation of that history provides ways to help solve the current armed conflict in South Sudan.
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Żelichowski, Ryszard. "Poles and Finns under Russian rule." Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej 8 (December 30, 2019): 47–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/2300-0562.08.03.
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An attempt to compare Russian Tsar Alexander I was the head of the Grand Duchy of Finland, which the Russian army captured in 1809 as a result of the Russo-Swedish war. The final act of the Congress of Vienna of June 1815 decided to establish the Kingdom of Poland. Beside the title of Grand Duke of Finland tsar, Alexander I was awarded the title of the King of Poland. From that moment on, for over one hundred years, the fate of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Poland was intertwined during the rule of five Russian tsars.
The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether two different ways on the road to independence – romantic Polish way with national uprisings, and pragmatic Finnish, relative loyal to the Russian tsars – had an impact on their policy towards both nations. The Kingdom of Poland and the Duchy of Finland were autonomous, were in a personal union with Russian tsars, had their own constitutions, parliaments, armies, monetary systems and educational structures, and official activities were held in Polish (Polish Kingdom) and Swedish (in the Grand Duchy of Finland). Both countries also had their own universities.
The first national uprising in the Kingdom of Poland, which broke out in November 1830, resulted in a wave of repression. The Constitution was replaced by the so-called The Organic Statute, the Sejm (the Parliament) and the independent army were liquidated. The Kingdom was occupied by the mighty Russian army, and in 1833 martial law was introduced. The second national uprising of January 1863 led to another wave of repression and intensive Russification of Polish territories. In 1867, the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, its name and budget were abolished. From 1872 the Polish language was only an optional choice. After 1863, the policy of the Russian authorities changed towards the Grand Duchy.
A session of the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) was convened for the first time since 1809, the new parliamentary law allowed the dissemination of the Finnish language. After the deadly assault on Alexander II in 1881, his son Alexander III made attempts to limit also Finland’s autonomy. The years 1899–1904 were called the first period of Russification in Finland (“the first period of oppression”). The Manifesto of June 1900 introduced obligatory Russian language in correspondence of officials with Russia. In 1901, the national Finnish army was liquidated. In Russia this was the beginning of the process of the empire’s unification into one cultural, political and economic system. After a short thaw as a result of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the Grand Duchy of Finland, the so-called “second period of oppression” and anti-Finnish politics took place. During the great war of 1914–1918, the Grand Duchy was on the side of Russia. The territories of the former Kingdom of Poland were under German rule since 1915. After the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the Eduskunta (on 6 December 1917) passed a Declaration of Independence. After a short period of regency, on 19 July 1919, the Finns adopted the republican system with a parliamentary form of government.
On 11 November 1918 Germany surrendered on the Western Front. On that day, the Regency Council in Warsaw handed over military authority to the Polish Legion commander Józef Piłsudski. Although Poland still had to fight for the final shape of the state, the 11th of November 1918 is considered the first day of recovered Polish independence.
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Korotkova, M. V. "Imaginal Geography of Regional Integration 1990s: the Latvian and the Estonian Experience." Journal of International Analytics, no. 3 (September 28, 2019): 30–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2019-0-3-30-37.
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After the end of the Cold War many variants of space organization at macro- and microlevel were suggested instead of traditional West–East division. There were in detail worked projects of invented regions building and discoursive projections of regions. Among them the ideas deserve special attention, which were put forward by the states that had been within frontier zone of the European politics poles before. The “Amber gateway” and the “Yule land” are examples of mental projections of the Baltic Sea area which were constructed by Latvia’s and Estonia’s political elites. In the article research of the ideas leans on I. Newmann’s region-building approach. Articles and speeches which were the work of representatives of two republics’ organs of government served sources. They were consecutively collected, systematized and analyzed. Categorical apparatus of the article includes the concepts which are derived from concept “mental map” often mentioned by the author. In general mental map means the map of part of surrounding space which was created in consciousness of a man or any social group. This category is concept of relatively new science – imaginal geography which is interpreted here as one studies forming of system of ideas, concepts describing any territory in people’s consciousness. When the research was made, it became evident that the Latvian mental construction did not presuppose liquidation of the barrier between Europe and Russia / West and East. Russia had to remain on the other side of dividing line, but not in isolation. Latvia assigned the role of “mediator between two worlds” for ensuring communication and transit to itself. Claim that Estonia was among the Northern countries gave the opportunity to the republic’s ruling circle to distance from post-Soviet space as a whole and Latvia and Lithuania in particular. The “Amber gateway” and the “Yule land” reflected specific character of spatial imagination of Baltic republics’ governments. The use of cultural markers in the mental maps was caused by aspiration to make imaginary regions natural and clear for other participants of intended integrations, as the lasts preferred connections at the level of public institutions, but not of state ones. But the Latvian and the Estonian politicians looked at the process of region–building in the light of interstate interaction. Estonia strove to emphasize its belonging to “Europe of regions” by means of “Yule land”, but Latvia accentuated strengthening of its own role in limits of “Amber gateway”.
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Aydin, Filiz Tutku, and Fethi Kurtiy Sahin. "The politics of recognition of Crimean Tatar collective rights in the post-Soviet period: With special attention to the Russian annexation of Crimea." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 1 (February 19, 2019): 39–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.02.003.
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This paper examines the process of how Crimean Tatars strived to attain group-differentiated rights since they have returned to their homeland in the early 1990s. Whereas the politics of minority rights were viewed through security lens in earlier literature, we emphasize the significance of cultural constructs in influencing the minority policies, based on qualitative content analysis of “speech acts” of elites, and movement and policy documents. Focusing on the interaction of the framing processes of Crimean Tatars with the Crimean regional government, Ukraine, and Russia, we argue that the “neo-Stalinist frame” has played a major role in denying the rights of Crimean Tatars for self-determination and preservation of their ethnic identity in both pre and post annexation Crimea. The Crimean Tatars counter-framed against neo-Stalinist frame both in the pre and post-annexation period by demanding their rights as “indigenous people”. Ukraine experienced a frame transformation after the Euromaidan protests, by shifting from a neo-Stalinist frame into a “multiculturalist frame”, which became evident in recognition of the Crimean Tatar status as indigenous people of Crimea.
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Pendzey, I. "Károly Grósz: the Main Priorities of the Policy of Reforms (1987-1989)." Problems of World History, no. 6 (October 30, 2018): 118–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2018-6-9.
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The socio-economic reforms of the government of Károly Grósz, his activities as secretary general of the Communist Party, are analyzed. The peculiarities of the world-view vision of the Hungarian “young reformers” of the urgent problems of social development of the country and the ways of their solution proposed by them are revealed. Sharing the prevalent in Hungarian and Russian historiography of critical perception of K. Grósz’s work at the highest state and party posts, an attempt is made to give a more balanced assessment of his role in the country’s transition to a new social and political phenomenon – multiparty, parliamentary democracy, human rights, that is, the actual change of system. The article illustrates the international activity of K. Grósz, estimates of his reforms by M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. K. Grósz’s activities are characterized by the deterioration of key indicators of the country’s development, the crisis of one-party socialism, and international challenges. Considerable attention is paid to the characterization of the process of the ideological and organizational breakdown in the ruling party, the activities of radical reformist forces, which were grouped around I. Pozsgay, clarifying the circumstances of reducing the influence of “young reformers” and removing K. Grósz from politics. He failed to overcome the inheritance of the errors of the HSWP, defending it in renewed clothes, not supported by the Hungarians in the 1990 parliamentary elections.
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O'Bright, Ben. "Child Soldiery in the Information Age." Allons-y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security 2 (March 27, 2020): 52–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.15273/allons-y.v2i0.10051.
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In 2007, Estonia was the victim of a significant, coordinated cyberattack, which crippled government communications, newspaper websites, banks and other connected entities in Europe’s most Internet-saturated country. At the time, leading theories suggested that Russia, or at the very least elements of its intelligence community, might be somehow involved, spurred by the physical symbolism of Estonia removing Soviet-era monuments from city squares and public spaces (Davis, 2007). Indeed, in an attempt to visibly remove its history of engagement as part of the Soviet Union, Estonian authorities and political figures had become determined to demolish and destroy remaining statues erected pre-1990. Two years after the cyberattack, an event that Wired Magazine colloquially termed “Web War One,” further details of the unexpected perpetrators would begin to emerge. According to reports by the Financial Times and Reuters, Nashi, a pro-Kremlin youth group with an estimated membership of 150,000, claimed responsibility for the digital assault against Estonia; they described to authorities a strategy of repeated denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, (Clover, 2009; Lowe, 2009). Nashi members, based on different sources, range between the ages of 17 and 25 (Knight, 2007).
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Khatun, Rabia. "Openness in Financial Services Trade and Financial Development: Evidence from the BRICS Economies." South Asian Survey 26, no. 1 (March 2019): 55–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971523119837032.
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This article investigates the long-run relationship between openness in financial services trade (OPTIFS) and financial development in five BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies, for the period of 1990–2012. It is found that the variables under consideration possess a long-run relationship in the mentioned economies. Fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) and dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) have been performed to find the long-run coefficient of the variables. Results from FMOLS and DOLS have confirmed that OPTIFS has a positive and significant impact on financial development. The study reveals that 1 per cent increase in trade in financial services causes 0.109 increase in total credit to private sector, which is used as a proxy for financial development, indicating that the government should try to remove barriers from trade in financial services in order to develop better financial structure, thereby promoting further growth. It is also found that some of the control variables like gross savings and gross domestic product have positive and significant impact on financial development at 5 per cent level of significance
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Druzyaka, Andrey. "The System of Regulation of External Migration in the Far East of the Russian Federation (1991–2020)." DEMIS. Demographic Research 1, no. 3 (September 19, 2021): 114–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.19181/demis.2021.1.3.10.
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The article considers the system of regulation of external migration in the Russian Far East, which consists of bodies ensuring the entry and exit of Russian citizens and foreigners to the territory of Russia, the regime of their stay, registration, labor activity and naturalization. The periodization of the stages of the Russian migration policy in specific conditions determined by the political and economic conjuncture is given. The purpose of the article is to analyze the historical conditions, as well as the characteristic features of the creation, functional formation and organizational transformation of the bodies of the system of state regulation of migration control in the period 1991–2020. The problems of their functioning and the results of the implementation of migration policy in the Russian Far East are considered. This article will briefly present the main aspects of the formation of the system of state regulation of immigration in the 1990s, as well as the associated difficulties that manifested themselves in the implementation of the state migration policy during the period under study. Based on the analysis of the activities of a number of federal and regional social, administrative and law enforcement agencies, the experience of state regulation of external migration in the period 1990–2020 is considered, the analysis of the implementation of the functions of the migration authorities system and the results of their impact on individual external migration flows is given. The opening of borders and the massive influx of migrants from Asian countries in the Far East in the 1990s coincided with the period of reforming the system of state control over migration, which was subjected to organizational changes, received a number of new functions and tasks. In the Russian Far East, the process of reforming this system was complicated by regional difficulties associated with the development of relations between federal and regional authorities with entrepreneurship and local self-government. The weakness and insufficient coordination of the activities of migration control bodies, their lack of common and understandable goals, the transfer of the competence of naturalization and registration of migrants into the hands of law enforcement agencies, the loss of social orientation in working with migrants have largely caused failures in social policy towards migrants, the formation of closed criminal communities in their environment, which are the basis for the formation of extremist practices and xenophobic attitudes in the host Russian society on the territory of Russia. As a result of the analysis of the results of the activities of the migration authorities system, general conclusions are made about the effectiveness of its work in the Far East, the successes achieved. At the same time, the article offers a number of proposals on improving work with foreign workers and immigrants, aimed at compensating for the loss of population and labor resources in the region. The results of the study can be used to improve the migration control system, to develop the foundations of migration policy in the region. The issues raised in it can become the basis for a more in-depth study of the processes related to the activities of state, municipal and public bodies involved in the regulation of migration, in order to attract, settle and adapt migrants necessary for the Far East.
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Myrzataeva, Z., D. Alipova, K. Zhumabaeva, S. Z. Sapanov, and A. S. Ualtayeva. "THE ROLE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN THE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL LIFE OF THE ATYRAU REGION IN 1920-1930S." History of the Homeland 97, no. 1 (March 30, 2022): 139–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.51943/1814-6961_2022_1_139.
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In article considers the role of oil industry in the social and political life of Atyrau region in 1920-1930 based on Atyrau state regional archive. 20-30 years of XX century in social and political life of Atyrau region played a significant role in development of the oil industry. The formation and development of research of oil industry in the Kazakh Soviet Union and Atyrau (Guryev) region in 1920-1930, the labor and welfare of workers, the social status of workers was a relevant issue. The Soviet government paid great attention to the involvement of indigenous population of the country (Kazakhs) in these industries. Kazakhs had working together with other nationalities and made a huge contribution to the development of both oil industry. Mostly the changes and development of oil industry in Atyrau region occurred at the end of the XIX century. The basis of personnel potential was made by impoverished Kazakh sharua, hired workers, Russian immigrants, the poorest layers of urban population, the lowest military ranks, as well as specialists invited from the inner provinces of Russia. The development of Emba field were great importance to the economy of the Soviet Union and Kazakh Soviet Union. However, despite the great contribution of these industries to the country’s economy, the Soviet government did not pay due attention to the development of oil industry in Atyrau region and considered it as a raw material appendage of the center.
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Brinegar, Sara. "The Oil Deal: Nariman Narimanov and the Sovietization of Azerbaijan." Slavic Review 76, no. 2 (2017): 372–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.83.
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This essay, with a focus on Baku, Azerbaijan, demonstrates that the need to secure and hold energy resources—and the infrastructures that support them—was critical to the formation of the Soviet Union. The Azerbaijani statesman Nariman Narimanov played a pivotal role in the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan by attempting to use Baku's oil to secure prerogatives for the Azerbaijan SSR. In part, Narimanov gained his position by striking a deal with Vladimir Lenin in 1920, an arrangement that I am calling the oil deal. This deal lay the foundations of Soviet power in the south Caucasus. Lenin charged Narimanov with facilitating connections between the industrial stronghold of Baku and the rural countryside of Azerbaijan and Narimanov agreed to do what he could to help supply Soviet Russia with oil. Lenin put Narimanov in charge of the Soviet government of Azerbaijan, with the understanding that he would be granted significant leeway in cultural policies. Understanding the role of the south Caucasus in Soviet history, then, is also understanding how the extraction and use of oil and other natural resources were entangled with more familiar questions of nationalities policy and identity politics.
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Beglov, Alexey, Ivan Fadeyev, and Evgeniia Tokareva. "Catholic Liturgical Practices in Soviet Russia in the 1920s and 1930s: Canonical Norms and Anomalies." State Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide 38, no. 4 (2020): 265–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2073-7203-2020-38-4-265-293.
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This paper examines changes in the liturgical and paraliturgical practices of Roman Catholics in Soviet Russia in the 1920s and 1930s. Nine documents from different archives outside Russia were first used to show changes made at the request of Russian Catholics. These documents deal with a number of disciplinary issues, such as the time for the celebration of Mass, observation of a natural fast before Mass, permission for lay people to bring Holy communion to the sick or imprisoned people. The Holy See readily relaxed canonical requirements. Consequently, at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the time for the celebration of Mass became variable, moving more often to the evening hours; the rules of a natural fast before Mass for clergy and laity were relaxed, which paved the way for regular communion at evening Masses; laity were given permission to bring Holy communion to those who could not personally hear the Mass; the practice of stipends for Mass became an instrument of financial support given by the Holy See to impoverished Catholic clergymen in critical situations. The main reason for these dramatic changes was the anti-religious policy of the Soviet government and the disruption of the traditional calendar. The fact of continuing contacts with the Vatican sheds light on those aspects of religious life in Soviet Russia that are not reflected in the official Soviet documentation.
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Mustafa, Aram Ali. "The Relationships between the Soviet Union and the Turkey (1920-1930) and its impact on the Kurdish issue." Journal of University of Human Development 5, no. 4 (October 6, 2019): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.21928/juhd.v5n4y2019.pp25-40.
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Relations between Russia and Turkey have gone through five centuries at different stages, sometimes in difficult wars and conflicts, sometimes in harmony and good relations. However, conditions changed in the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was weakened and disintegrated. Russia played an important role in cutting down parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as in reducing the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, which was considered a great nation for centuries.
At the end of the First World War, after the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Russian troops withdrew from the war fronts. The Bolshevik government exposed the secret clauses of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, with the Quadruple Alliance, led by Germany and the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Empire, like its German ally, took advantage of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the war fronts. In contrast to the agreement, attacks were launched on the Caucasus regions controlled by Russian Russia. However, following the emergence of the Turkish National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal and the signing of the Sevre Treaty and there were changes in the war fronts, as in the political arena. Russia, which became Soviet Russia at that time, found a new friend and ally, which had common interests with Soviet Russia, against the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. Both countries have benefited from this friendship and alliance.
But at a time when the Kurds, especially in the Ottoman Kurdistan, had a chance to move towards achieving their goals and national rights, and at least making some progress in accordance with the provisions of the Sovereign Convention on the Rights of the Kurds. As the first country to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Turkey with the help of the Kemalist Movement in various ways, Russia, as well as economic, industrial and mining assistance, became a great supporter of Turkey in international and diplomatic forums.
All this, along with many other factors, helped the Republic of Turkey stand on its own feet. When the revolutions and movements against the injustice and tyranny of the Turks occurred in Northern Kurdistan in the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet Russia sided with all possible means, military and political, as well as the Turkish Republic. Which brutally suppressed these uprisings and every move of a Kurdish nationalist nature.
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Mironova, E. M. "Russian Political Delegation, 1919–1920." Modern History of Russia 11, no. 4 (2021): 871–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.403.
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Using materials from Russian archives as well as from the Leeds Russian Archive (Great Britain), this article traces stages of activity of the Russian Political Delegation (RPD). The Delegation was established in 1919 by the Russian Political Meeting (RPM) in Paris for direct participation in the Versailles Peace Conference. Its activities were authorized by Admiral Kolchak, Supreme Ruler of Russia. The article covers the formation of the RPD, which included Prince Lvov, N. V. Tchaikovsky, V. A. Maklakov, and S. D. Sazonov. Due to circumstances beyond its control, the Delegation did not get the opportunity to participate in the conference, and its international activities were quite limited. However, after the dissolution of the Russian Political Meeting, the Russian Political Delegation continued its activities, claiming the status of the foreign center of a White Movement. Its ranks aggravated the split between public figures and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Movement: social activists wanted the government of Omsk to remove S. D. Sazonov. Admiral Kolchak decided to retain control of his government over foreign missions, keep S. D. Sazonov as Minister, and asked the delegation to continue its work. In fact, in late 1919 and early 1920, the Russian Political Delegation managed to head the foreign mission of the White Movement. However, it was unable to cope with problems standing on its agenda. G. E. Lvov and N. V. Tchaikovsky, who used the situation of the Delegation members to influence affairs, diligently supported its existence. The last statements of the Russian Political Delegation refer to the end of 1920, the period of evacuation of the Wrangel’s army from Crimea. Analysis of the RPD’s activities provides an insight into challenges that in general were characteristic of the Movement and that eventually played their role in its defeat.
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Alpyspaeva, Galia А., and Gulmira Zhuman. "Islamic discourse in the state confessional policy of the Soviet government in Kazakhstan in the 1920 - 1930s." BULLETIN of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Historical sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series 138, no. 1 (2022): 7–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2022-138-1-7-24.
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The article considers the social and political aspects of the Soviet state policy towards the Muslims of Kazakhstan in the 20- the 30s of the XX century. Documentary materials from the archives of the Republic of Kazakhstan represent the source study base of the research. Based on the analysis of archival sources, the transformation of state-Muslim relations is shown as the Soviet power strengthened: from a tolerant attitude towards Islam in the first years of the victory of the Bolsheviks to the complete secularization of the rights and freedoms of Muslims in the following decades. The author gives a characteristic of the forms and methods of the anti-religious struggle of the Soviet state, substantiates the thesis about its harmful influence on the spiritual life of Muslims that, under conditions of the most severe administrative pressure and total restriction, took the form of a semi-legal existence. The policy of the Soviet state in relation to Islam was built considering the political situation in the country. The loyalty of politics in the early years of Soviet power to a certain extent contributed to the temporary revival of the religious movement. It was due to the desire of the latter to receive political support from a huge number of Muslims of the former Russian Empire, including Kazakhstan. At the same time, loyalty did not exclude the conduct of anti-religious propaganda aimed at limiting Islam. As the Soviet power strengthened, the anti-Islamic doctrine became tougher, acquiring the character of an uncompromising struggle aimed at closing the objects of a religious cult and spiritual education, limiting, and then eliminating the Muslim clergy, etching the religious worldview from the minds of the masses, and imposing communist ideology. The declared “class struggle against the enemies of socialism,” which included the Muslim clergy, became the political underpinnings of the tightening of confessional policy. Public organizations made their contribution to whipping up the atmosphere of intolerance towards religion, to the destruction of the spiritual foundations of society: the Union of Militant Atheists of Kazakhstan, Anti-religious, the Union «Koshchi».
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GUNAEV, E. A. "THE RESULTS OF THE KORENIZATION POLICY IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS BY THE MIDDLE 1930s – EARLY 1940s." Kavkazologiya, no. 3 (2021): 162–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.31143/2542-212x-2021-3-162-175.
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The policy of “korenization” carried out by the Soviet government in the 1920s – 1930s had its own peculiarities in the North Caucasus, due to the complex historical past of integration into a single Russian political and legal space and the ethnic diversity of the region. Mass korenization in the North Caucasus began later than the rest of the country's regions, it was officially announced in 1929. Russian historiography notes that this process was accompanied by both objective (low literacy rate, alertness of the local population, interethnic tension, armed resistance to the Soviet government) and subjective difficulties (organizational and managerial problems). Korenization was far from complete by the beginning of the 1940s. Mass repressions against the leadership of the national cadres, the national intelligentsia of the late 1930s also played a negative role.
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Tsvetkov, Vasiliy Zh. "Projects of the South of Russia’s Government on the development of urban self-government in the White Crimea, October - November 1920." RUDN Journal of Russian History 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 517–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2021-20-4-517-530.
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The article studies the development of an economic and political-legal basis for the development of urban self-government under General Wrangels Government of the South of Russia, in the Crimea, in the autumn of 1920. From among the Wrangel governments reforms in the Crimea in 1920, transformations in the sphere of urban life and urban self-government are less well-known than transformations in agrarian policy and the zemstvo reform. But changes in the operation of city dumas and city administrations are no less relevant for Russian historiography. The article considers the specifics of the evolution of municipal law in a situation where it was hoped that the offensive of the Red Army at Perekop could be beaten back. The article notes the importance of changing the legislative framework regarding the expansion of the powers of city self-government not only in the social, political, but also in the economic sphere. First of all, this was manifested in the field of granting the right to impose taxes and fees by city structures. The article discusses the prospects that an increased role of city self-government was supposed to have on economic and political decisions by the Wrangel government. The analysis includes the supposed forms of cooperation between the White power and the public in the 1920s. Special attention is paid to the problems that were considered at a specially convened congress of city self-government in Simferopol, on the eve of the Perekop-Chongar operation. The decisions taken during this congress were supposed to strengthen the financial situation of the Crimea. The article also examines the interaction between the authorities of the Wrangel government and the local population during the military-political crisis of the White Movement in the autumn of 1920.
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Puchenkov, Alexander S. "Ethnic Disintegration and the Dissolution of the USSR." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History 65, no. 3 (2020): 826–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2020.308.
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An immense role in the collapse of the USSR was played by a whole array of factors: the public being tired of the Communist project; the massive shortages of consumer goods, which made people hate the government; the growing opposition within the Communist party to Gorbachev’s reforms; the hesitation of the General Secretary who tried to rely in turn either on the right or on the left wing; the drastic fall in the living standards. The crucial role, however, was played by “the parade of sovereignties” and the Centre being too late in its attempts to address the national question. By the autumn of 1990, the President’s close associates started to sense that power was slipping from Gorbachev’s hands; with the fellow countrymen staying remarkably indifferent, the Soviet Union was heading towards dissolution as the ambitions of local party leaders in the constituent republics generated and cannily magnified nationalist and separatist trends. Gorbachev kept up his maneuver strategy, which put him on the verge of resignation in the spring of 1991 when his support was minimal. He seemed, though, to have managed to pull out of this dive thanks to the Soviet Union referendum held on March 17, in which the voters were asked if they considered the preservation of the USSR necessary. Eventually, however, the issue of preserving or not preserving a unified state depended directly on the position of Russia as the backbone of the Soviet Union. The study draws on the author’s personal archive of original testimonies and interviews of the political figures directly involved in the events in question.
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Budaev, A. M. "The President and Local Government in Russia: The Theory and Practice of Interaction." Actual Problems of Russian Law 15, no. 12 (December 30, 2020): 41–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2020.121.12.041-047.
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Since the adoption of the current Constitution of Russia that established the constitutional foundations of the implementation of state power and local self-government in the Russian Federation, more than 25 have passed. This period was saturated from the point of view of the formation of the legal framework of socio-political and socio-economic relations in our country. The analysis shows that local self-government is one of the basic characteristics of the Russian model of democracy. On the other hand, in recent years it is impossible not to mention the tendency to increase the efforts of federal authorities, and first of all the head of state, to maximize the involvement of local authorities of self-government in a unified political and legal field of the State. This is largely justified by the need to provide every resident of the country with equal opportunities for a comfortable and safe life. The paper formulates the author’s view concerning the changes that are taking place; and at the same time, it is proposed to continue scientific discussions regarding the development of local self-government—an institution of a modern civilized democratic state that is necessary for us all.
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Gorkina, T. I. "Prospects of interregional energy hub formation in Turkey." Regional'nye issledovaniya, no. 3 (2019): 76–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/1994-5280-2019-3-7.
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The article examines the energy policy of Turkey in connection with the country’s desire to become an international energy hub concentrating supplies from neighboring energy resources exporting countries, due to its unique geographical location. Its key position between Asia and Europe facilitates the passage through its territory of transport routes, allowing diversification of exports and imports for neighboring countries. Turkish economic policy, conducted in recent decades, allowed the country to make a leap in its development. To maintain the existing growth rates of the economy, it is necessary to have sufficient energy consumption. The dependence of the country on external energy sources leads to a multi-vector geopolitics, conducted by the country’s government. Turkey is surrounded by countries with which there are economic and geopolitical disagreements. Orientation on Russia with its large and diverse energy resources and a capacious domestic market will support the existing growth rates of the economy, occupy the unemployed population and stabilize energy supplies. Energy diplomacy has become an important factor in ensuring the energy security of both Turkey and its partners. Energy security is influenced by such factors as disruptions in energy supply and price volatility in the global energy market. The development of energy is currently taking place in the mainstream of energy programs, the main components of which are economics, politics, scientific and technical progress, social and environmental problems. The uniqueness of EGP between the zones of energy production and consumption increased the importance of the country as an transiter of energy, that controling the Black Sea straits and having ports on the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
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Kanevskiy, P. S. "Development of lobbying in Russia: pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 27, no. 4 (November 19, 2021): 192–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2021-27-4-192-215.
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The article is dedicated to the political, sociological and historical analysis of lobbying development in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This article opens a series of two articles on the genesis of the institution of lobbying in Russia. Numerous discussions on lobbying in Russia over the past three decades boil down to arguments that the country is not ready to institutionalize interaction between interest groups and the government. There is a widespread opinion that this institution is not rooted in Russian political culture and political traditions. However, analysis of interest groups and their interactions with the government in different periods of Russian history allows us to conclude that this is not a new phenomenon. Analysis of how of lobbying was formed, first under the monarchy, then in Soviet times contributes to a better understanding of the way mechanisms of interest representation evolved over time. It also helps to understand how these mechanisms gave birth to informal lobbying practices that were evolving in the 1990s and why lobbying activities continue to take place in the shadows and under unclear rules of the game.
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Groznov, Evgeny A., and Sergei V. Starikov. "COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE AGRARIAN POLICY OF THE WHITE MOVEMENT GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1918–1920)." Historical Search 3, no. 3 (September 29, 2022): 18–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.47026/2712-9454-2022-3-3-18-24.
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The article attempts to carry out a comparative analysis of the agrarian policy pursued by the governments of the White Movement during the Civil War (1918–1920). The period of the second half of the XIX – early XX century was marked by the development of land relations in the Russian Empire. Despite serfdom abolition, peasant land scarcity continued to be the main problem of the peasant issue. The First World War, like the Russian-Japanese war, was supposed to be a small victorious war in order to postpone making the final decision on the agrarian issue. Absence of reforms combined with a protracted nature of the war contributed to the emergence of new liberal democratic forces in Russia. Beginning with February 1917, the Provisional Government tried to pursue a revolutionary policy to raise the authority of the government among soldiers, peasants and workers. However, political misconceptions and mistakes contributed to further power decentralization in Russia, which led first to the counter-revolution formation, and only then to isolation of the White Movement from this united front. With small resources, the leaders of the European part of the movement faced a problem that was not yet solved. Despite the Decree on Land adopted by the Soviet government, redistribution of land was not carried out, the agrarian issue continued to be acute, especially in the outskirts, which were under the rule of the whites. In contrast to the Decree on Land, the leaders of the White Movement had to pursue their own policy, which would be more attractive to the peasant masses. 95% of the population of Russia was peasants, so to gain their support would mean victory in the civil war. The regional and the national character of the White Movement determined future agrarian policy. It is also necessary to take into account that domestic policy was implemented in wartime conditions, which affected the effectiveness of reforms. Contradictions between the right-wingers and left-wingers delayed the development and implementation of reforms, which ultimately resulted in their failure. However, despite this, the white governments managed to lay a regulatory framework in their territorial entities, while taking into account the national and climatic specifics of the region.
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Kim, N. N. "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA SEEKING COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET RUSSIA (1920–1922)." Вестник Пермского университета. История, no. 2 (2022): 166–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2219-3111-2022-2-166-178.
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As a result of the March 1st uprising, which swept colonial Korea in the spring of 1919, Korean nationalists established the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. One of the main tasks of the Provisional Government was to achieve international recognition and receive financial assistance for the implementation of anti-Japanese resistance. To this end, it tried to establish contacts with the Soviet government, which expressed support for the national liberation movement of Koreans against Japanese imperialism. Based on the documents from the Archive of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and published sources of the Russian Archive of Socio-Political History, the article analyzes diplomatic correspondence between the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and the government of the RSFSR, and identifies the key stages and problems of bilateral relations in 1920–1922. Initially, the relations between two sides were developing on a friendly basis. The Soviet government was interested in deepening cooperation with all groups of the Korean anti-Japanese resistance. But, as the situation on the Far Eastern Front changed and contradictions between different groups within the Korean left movement in Russia and abroad intensified, the Soviet position towards the Korean nationalists was rethought. However, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was still interested in recognition and financial assistance from the Bolsheviks. The dispatch of two emissaries of the Provisional Government to Russia over only two years testifies to serious contradictions within the national liberation movement, which directly affected the government’s image in the international arena. Finally, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs decided that the power of the Provisional Government was not legitimate and that it could not be fully considered a representative of the Korean people.
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Greene, Samuel A., and Graeme B. Robertson. "Politics, justice and the new Russian strike." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 1 (October 29, 2009): 73–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.10.009.
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After almost a decade of passivity, Russian workers are once again striking. For the first time since the 1990s, labor unrest has spread across the country, affecting foreign and domestic investors, well-to-do industrial and natural-resource enterprises and infrastructural installations. But unlike in the 1990s, these strikes have accompanied an economic boom, suggesting that patterns of Russian labor unrest are beginning to resemble those in other countries. Analysis of several recent strikes, meanwhile, suggests the early emergence of a new labor proto-movement, characterized by feelings of entitlement and injustice that stem in part from government rhetoric, while pushed into opposition by the state’s refusal to accommodate genuine labor mobilization.
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Motruk, Svitlana. "EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AS A FACTOR OF MODERNIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY." European Historical Studies, no. 19 (2021): 33–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2021.19.3.
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On the basis of a wide range of documents the article analyzes main stages and factors of the Czech Republic integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations. The author emphasizes that transition into a full NATO member in March 1999 was the result of a long, complicated and controversial process of «European Come Back», which started in the beginning of 1990’s and allowed the state’s government to solve a number of problems in the military-political and military-technical spheres. The article draws special attention to the results and consequences of the Czechia NATO membership, its participation in the structures and activities of the Alliance. Numerous facts provided in the paper allow to evaluate the state’s gains from the integration processes and to emphasize key tendencies, main challenges and new opportunities for the country. The study proves that Euro-Atlantic integration has contributed to the institutional and legal reconstruction of the entire system of foreign relations of the Czech Republic, has become an important stimulus to the transition to a democratic model of political system, stability and national security. The article examines the defense strategy of the Czech Republic, reveals its goals and objectives in the field of European security and defense at the present stage. It is noted that NATO Allies supported the proposal to update the 2010 Strategic Concept. Since its adoption the Alliance has faced a new security environment and Russia has turned from a potential strategic partner into an aggressor state. The Czech experience has revealed the advantages and vulnerabilities of the Euro-Atlantic vector. Last but not lease the article studies the causes of polyvariety of the Euro-Atlantic realities and prospects for Alliance enlargement. Based on the results of public opinion polls conducted by the Czech research organizations, the article examines the attitude of Czech political parties and citizens towards their country’s membership in NATO, the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in ensuring the security of the Czech Republic and international relations in general.
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Barysheva, Elena V. "Mythologization of the History of the 1920-30s Festivities." Herald of an archivist, no. 1 (2020): 180–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2020-1-180-193.
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The article discusses techniques and methods used by the Soviet government to formulate the historical myth of the revolutionary movement in Russia and of the 1917 revolution. Holidays in Soviet Russia and later in the Soviet Union were not just days of relaxation. They served educational function, formed new spiritual values, instilled a sense of engagement with the events of 1917. As one of the ways to influence the mass consciousness, the festive events of the first decades of the Soviet power formed public opinion and influenced perception of historical and current events by the population. Popularization of the emerging official history of the new socialist state, which had begun in 1917, was especially effective during celebrations owing to their inherent emotional component. The use of historical plots in various dramatizations, mass actions, political processions, carnivals, and demonstrations of workers created an appearance of the new government’s legitimacy, contributed to the formation of the collective memory of the revolutionary days within the frameworks of their official interpretation. The article uses archival materials of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the RCP (B.), which testify to the importance that the party authorities attached to the scenarios of the festive events. Memoirs of the direct participants in the events played their role in creating heroic myth of the revolution. An obligatory element of the celebration of the anniversaries was meetings with workers revolutionaries and witnesses of the revolutionary events that were arranged at the enterprises. Participation in these “evenings of remembrance” became a way of “self-identification” of an individual in new, socialist society, for speakers, as well as listeners. During these festive meetings, appearance of belonging, not only to the heroic past, but also to the epic present, was created. Specifics and ideological implications of the 1920s–30s memoirs contributed to the use of the “memorial boom” in the forming official narrative of the revolution.
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Baranets, Sergei. "Local government in Russia: new ways of constructing explanatory models for the needs of public administration." Socium i vlast 3 (2021): 67–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/1996-0522-2021-3-67-77.
Full textAbstract:
The article proceeds from the concept of understanding local government in Russia as a projection of the potestar (pre-state) organization of public life, which transforms under the dominance of methods of state organization of public life, but retains its influence as the essential core of political and social interaction between people. The existing complex «state-municipal» mechanism for exercising power at the local level largely determines the forms and nature of political actors’ interaction at the regional level. State authorities, which are focused on the totality of their own administrative influences, have not yet succeeded in fully integrating local self-government into the general public space of responsibility for powers, since local power is unbuilt initially on the principles of autogenesis, autochthony and autonomy. The current situation contributes to the archaicism of a part of social relations. For some time now, to work in the multidimensional reality of society, the authorities have begun to need analytical models to understand what is happening. As an explanatory theoretical basis for the modes of existence of local authorities developed and described by the author in the current stage of development of Russian statehood, a modal methodology is used, supplemented by the results of constructing model-oriented political ontologies, which reflect the aggregates of the layers and actors of the municipal sphere of sociopolitical reality at the regional level that are actually and actively present in the Russian society. The author is interested in searching the patterns that operate in the environment created and cultivated by the organizational and activity efforts of state structures against the background of sociocultural and other characteristics inherent in the regions. Possible working models for the needs of public administration arising from the modes offered by the author are still under development, since the reform of constitutional rules proposed by the country’s leadership raises the question of new forms of organizing the continuum of coexistence and interaction of local and state authorities in Russia. The article outlines the main research lines that indicate a number of features and reference points of the author’s approach in understanding the relationship between local government and municipal government, which may serve as an occasion for a new circle of discussions of specialists interested in the prospects for the development of political potential in the Russian municipal environment.