Journal articles on the topic 'Russia imperiale'
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Navone, Nicola. "«Tutti questi Capo Maestri Luganesi» : costruttori «ticinesi» nei cantieri della Russia imperiale." Mélanges de l’École française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 119, no. 2 (2007): 413–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/mefr.2007.10372.
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Fagiolo, Sofia. "Imperial Russian Newspapers." Charleston Advisor 23, no. 3 (January 1, 2022): 29–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5260/chara.23.3.29.
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Imperial Russian Newspapers is a free access database containing a rich collection of digitized newspapers published in the Russian Empire. The project is still in progress and it is actively supported by the National Library of Russia. With nearly 40,000 issues, this database is an excellent resource for scholars and researchers as it provides a unique perspective on the historical events in Russia from 1767 to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Currently, the collection covers 25 titles and it will continue to grow in the future.
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Bulvinskiy, A. "Impact of the Imperial State Tradition on Modernization in Contemporary Russia." Problems of World History, no. 2 (December 1, 2016): 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2016-2-3.
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The article explains the influence of imperial state tradition on the substance, direction and purpose of the modernization in contemporary Russia. One of the key factors of the imperial nature of the Russian statehood is the historically formed imperial consciousness of Russian elites and Russians as the dominant ethnic group, which is being constantly reproduced. Contemporary Russia pursues a strategy of defensive modernization that aims at overcoming the military-technical gap between Russia and the advanced Western countries. The Russian leadership has neither conducted nor planned modernization of the Russian state and political system on the basis of the principles of the real non-controllable democracy. It is shown that successful technological, economic, and especially political modernization is impossible without changing the socio-political model established in modern Russia.
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Partsvaniya, Vakhtang. "Evolution of the imperial essence of Russia: on the concept of “empireness,” of V. Inozemtsev and A. Abalov." Социодинамика, no. 10 (October 2021): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-7144.2021.10.36481.
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This article is a review to the new book by V. Inozemtsev and A. Abalov “The Everlasting Empire: Russia in Pursuit of Itself". The author reflects on the imperial nature of Russian statehood through the prism of the concept of “empireness” described in the book. Lining up with the thesis on the everlasting existence of Russia as an empire, the author focuses on the factors that predetermined the imperial nature of the Russian State and the historically established trajectories of its development: first and foremost in pertains to Byzantine, Mongolian and Western European receptions that infiltrated the Russian mentality and continue to reproduce the imperial attributes of world perception therein. The thesis is advanced that these factors alongside the revealed in the book fuzziness of boundaries between the colonial power and colonial territories on the example of Russia, absolutize the imperial principle in the Russian politics and substantiate the formation of various ideological movements of the XIX – XX centuries. The authors of this article also polemicize with the authors of the book on the issues affecting the stability of imperial structures in Russian statehood. Criticism is levelled at certain statements on the possibility of development of adequate forms of post-imperial political existence of Russia. The book is remarkable for the profound analysis, original universalistic view of the authors on the problem, and can be highly recommended to vast audience.
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Petukhov, Alexander, and Tatyana Kozhina. "THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE BORDERLANDS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AT THE TURN OF THE 19-20TH CENTURIES IN THE TEACHING OF HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DISCIPLINES." vol 5 issue 15 5, no. 15 (December 26, 2019): 1434–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.18769/ijasos.592115.
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The article analyzes the approaches to the consideration of the imperial policy of Russia at the turn of the 19-20th centuries in the teaching of historical and legal disciplines in Russian universities. The authors state the discrepancy between the results of modern research on the Russian empire and the idea of the Russian empire as an ethnically homogeneous state that remains in the practice of teaching. Adjusting such an outdated view requires greater attention to the issues of heterogeneity of the Russian empire, its place among other empires at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the nature and typology of the Russian imperial borderlands and their relationship with the imperial center. Using the example of the Volga-Ural region, the authors consider the processes that took place at that imperial borderland of Russia at the turn of the 19-20th centuries, and its place in imperial politics. The Volga-Ural is characterized as the first imperial borderland of the Russian Empire, where a model of Russian imperial politics was formed. The central place in Russian imperial politics was played by the Christianization of the local population, which could be either violent or voluntary. The results of the imperial confessional policy were contradictory. The success of Christianization led to the beginning of the 20th century to the formation in the region of new identities among residents, who perceived themselves as Orthodox, but distinguished themselves from the ethnically Russian population. On the other hand, the opposition to Christianization by local Muslims contributed to the identity of the Volga-Ural Tatars, which was based on adherence to Islam. The article offers a number of specific recommendations for updating the teaching of historical and legal disciplines by introducing into their content issues of imperial control at the borderlands of Russia at the turn of the 19-20th centuries. Keywords: Borderlands of the Russian Empire, teaching of historical and legal disciplines.
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Galina, Talina. "Imperial National Conscience as International Recognition." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 1 (February 1, 2022): 45–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2022-0-1-45-55.
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In the second half of the 17th century and under the conditions of the Westphalian system based on the principles of national state sovereignty, the relations between the empires existing since Middle Ages and Russia, that came to the imperial development scenario only in the New times, entered a new stage. The most morbid reaction to Russian imperial ambitions was demonstrated by the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire. The most important task of Moscow tsars and their diplomats became the task to obtain the Roman Empire’s recognition of the equal status of its rulers and that of the Russian sovereigns. The present article describes how Moscow solved that problem. Special attention is paid to the issue of the Russian tsars titles; to the nuances of diplomatic etiquette related to the work of Russian embassies in the Holy Empire, as well as the reception of the imperial authorized representatives in Russia. In Russian domestic practice the titling of Russian tsars as emperors started with the Latin translation in the official documents addressed to the tsars of the Full Royal title. The specific problem in the relations of the two states remained their affiliation with different confessions. The article describes the attempts of the Holy Roman Empire to recognize the higher international status of Russian tsars in exchange for the permission to hold Catholic services in Russian territory without difficulty.
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Berest, Julia. "John Stuart Mill and His Autobiography in Imperial Russia." Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography 10, no. 1 (August 22, 2017): 28–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22102388-01000003.
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Among Western European thinkers whose works were translated into Russian in the 19th century, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was one of the most influential and controversial figures. As an economist with socialist sympathies and an advocate of women’s rights, Mill enjoyed special popularity among the left intelligentsia in Russia. Ironically, Mill’s reputation proved higher and more long-lasting in Russia than in Mill’s home country. This essay examines the Russian reception of Mill’s Autobiography, the last of his works to be translated into Russian. It illustrates significant differences in the Russian and British treatments of Mill’s legacy.
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Chuchvaha, Hanna. "The Russian canvas: painting in imperial Russia, 1757–1881." Canadian Slavonic Papers 61, no. 1 (December 17, 2018): 127–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2018.1552382.
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Lapteva, Elena Vasilievna. "The Imperial mentality of Russia and Anglo-American research in Russian Studies of the 1980s and 2000s." Genesis: исторические исследования, no. 4 (April 2021): 104–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-868x.2021.4.35367.
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This article is dedicated to the reflection of the topic of the Russian imperial spirit and its manifestations in the Anglo-American historiography of 1970 – 2000. The article relies on the works of the representatives of American Russian studies, from its major figures (Z. Brzeziński and R. Pipes) to modern representatives (A. Grigas). The author reviews the key positions of American researchers of Russia on the general characteristic of the imperial mentality that are inherent to the Russian people and determine their political and life behavior. Reference to the manifestations of the imperial spirit and its analysis in the modern period is important, as it allows seeing the history of Russia from an outside perspective, as well as carrying out a political-sociological and historical-chronological analysis to avoid similar mistakes in the future. The main conclusions are based on the works of Anglo-American Russian studies, which indicate that the study of imperial mentality, traditions, life and political behavior of Russia remains popular in the Western sector of Russian studies. On the one hand, it continues the tradition of American Soviet studies, while on other – separates from it and delves into the local and culturological research. However, the politological component retains its positions, and searches for the new topics and approaches. The author believes that these two trends would continue to be viewed in parallel in the Anglo-American Russian studies for a long time.
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Elishev, S. O. "Features of sociological analysis of religion of Russia during the imperial period of its history." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 27, no. 3 (October 4, 2021): 129–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2021-27-3-129-151.
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The article deals with the features of sociological analysis of religion in Russia during the imperial period of its history. The national sociological tradition of study of religion as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a social institution, which was developed during this period, had its own unique and peculiar appearance and was just begun to revive again in post-Soviet Russia, is sharply different from the tradition that took place in the West. In this context, the appeal to the works of classics of Russian religious, socio-political thought, unfortunately undeservedly forgotten, is a very promising area of modern sociological research. When studying this issue, the author emphasizes the peculiarities of the historical development of Russian society and the state and the events that had a significant impact on the formation and development of scientific understanding of religion in Russia: reforms of Peter I, the elimination of patriarchy, the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church, its transformation into part of the bureaucratic state system created by Peter I, the beginning of a large-scale process of secularization of Russian society, the emergence of Westernism (the direction of the Russian social thought and political ideology focused on values of the Western European culture, which is negative to the idea of originality, an originality, uniqueness of ways of development of the Russian culture, combined with the aspiration of representatives of this trend to impose to the Russian nation of a form of the western culture, social practice and political system, rejecting the system of values and traditional foundations of activity of the Russian society), the imperial nature of the Russian statehood and official imperial ideology. The author analyzes the content of the Uvarov’s triad formula, which underlies the official imperial ideology, as well as the discussions that took place between representatives of Slavophilism and Westernism about understanding the historical path and fate of Russia, the historical role of Orthodoxy, the Russian Orthodox Church in the fate of the Russian people, Russian society and the state, as well as the whole world. In his opinion, this problem has remained relevant to the present, including in the framework of a sociological analysis of religion in post-Soviet Russia.
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Rimestad, Sebastian. "Russland an der Ostsee: Imperiale Strategien der Macht und kulturelle Wahrnehmungsmuster (16. bis 20. Jahrhundert) – Russia on the Baltic: Imperial Strategies of Power and Cultural Patterns of Perception (16th–20th Centuries) ed. by Karsten Brüggemann and Bradley D. Woodworth." Ab Imperio 2014, no. 2 (2014): 440–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2014.0043.
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AGEEVA, Olga. "THE PEACE OF NYSTAD AND RUSSIA’S IMPERIAL STATUS." Perspectives and prospects. E-journal, no. 4 (27) (2021): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.32726/2411-3417-2021-4-49-62.
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The beginning of the 18th century was marked for Russia by a protracted war with Sweden, which lasted 21 years and ended with the signing of peace in Nystad on August 30, 1721. The article tells a documented story of the celebration of the Russian victory in the Great Northern War and the ceremony of presenting Peter I with the title of the Emperor of All Russia. The author also traces history of international recognition of the imperial title for Russian Tsars and imperial status for their land, which required diplomatic efforts and took several decades. This story clearly demonstrates the predominant understanding of the imperial status in the worldview of the epoch as a sign of a state’s place in the European hierarchy of powers rather than other characteristics of the imperial type of rule.
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Subotic, Milan. "Siberia on Russian mental maps: The imperial and national space." Filozofija i drustvo 23, no. 2 (2012): 205–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1202205s.
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Starting from the theoretical problem of understanding the nation-building process within continental empires, this paper investigates the various meanings of ?Siberia? in the Russian imperial and national imagination. Analyzing discursive practices that create various representations of the geographical space, this study shows the changes in Russian perceptions of Siberia from the ?alien? space and the ?colony?, to an unalienable part of the national territory (?Russian land? or ?homeland?). Tracing the creation of ?Russianness? of Siberia, the author interprets this concept as a part of broader debates about ?Russian identity? and the relationship between ?European? and ?Asiatic? Russia. Therefore, the principal aim of the present study is to examine one of the most important aspects of the process Russia?s transformation from imperial to a ?nationalizing State?.
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CHULOS, CHRIS. "IMPERIAL RUSSIA." Russian History 35, no. 1-2 (2008): 99–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633108x00193.
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Khudoyar, L. V. "The imperial paradigm of the “Russian world”." ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR AND THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE, no. 13 (October 1, 2022): 346–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.33663/2524-017x-2022-13-55.
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The article attempts to investigate the origins and genesis of the Russian imperial paradigm over the past 500 years. In particular, pay attention to the role of Ukraine in the imperial paradigm of the “Russian world”. The stages of transformation and the main historical and modern components of Russia’s imperial paradigm are highlighted. In his articles, the author reached the following conclusions: The imperial paradigm of the “Russian world” began to take shape at the end of the 15th – during the 16th century. Its genesis continues to this day. Over the past 500 years, its components have hardly changed, mostly only the means and methods of their implementation have evolved. The main historical and modern components of the imperial paradigm of the “Russian world” are: the historically formed imperial consciousness of the ruling elite and the population; the despotic repressive power of the rulers; deindividualization and slave mentality of the people; the hierarchy is not of vassals, but of the sovereign’s slaves; the ideological concept “Moscow - the Third Rome”, on the basis of which the messianic idea of the divine election of the Russian people was formed (later the concept of “messianicity” became a secular construct, and the religious concept of “messiah” was replaced by the secular image of “autocrat”); aggressive expansionist and aggressive foreign policy; the concept of world distribution and the idea of world domination; the principle of “legitimate influence”, which was understood as the legal, inalienable right of Russia to ensure its own ideas about security (preemptive conquests, determined not by the needs of the economy or the development of new lands, but by the idea of ensuring the country’s security on its distant approaches); the right of zaymanshchyna, which was interpreted as belonging to Russia on lands where a Russian set foot for the first time without taking into account the rights of the autochthonous population; the “superiority” of Russians over other Slavic peoples; the idea of an “eternal” enemy; selective observance of norms of international law, universal human and Christian values in relation to other “unfriendly” nations, which can and must be destroyed; the destructive nature of the legal order, in which there are no moral assessments of behavior, inhumane principles and illegal ways of solving the tasks set by the authorities operate; distorted religious beliefs; cult of the personality of the ruler; the idea of destroying advanced civilizations; the idea of “sinlessness” of the Russian population and lack of guilt for illegal acts; xenophobia and conservatism. This list is far from exhaustive. The main “theses” of the imperial concept of the “Russian world “ in relation to Ukraine are: Russians and Ukrainians are a single people; the Ukrainian language does not exist, it is Russian corrupted by Polonisms; The Orthodox Church of Ukraine cannot exist; Moscow – the Third Rome; gathering the “Russian world” is a joint matter of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church; leveling Ukraine’s course towards the EU and NATO; creation of a single economic and humanitarian space with the Russian Federation; denazification; forcing Ukraine by all means, including military aggression, to integrate with Russia. Key words: Russian imperial paradigm, “Russian world”, Ukraine, Russia, Moscow – the Third Rome.
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Obushnyi, Mykola. "«RUSSIAN WORLD» AS THE NEO-IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY OF MODERN RUSSIA." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 27 (2020): 122–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2020.27.18.
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In the article the essence of the neo-imperial ideology of the «Russian world», is revealed, which appearance is connected with the necessity of the modern Russia`s expansionist policy in ideological substantiation after the collapse of the Bolshevik`s empire commune – the Soviet Union. Moreover, the basis for resuscitation and the creation of a new empire is still preserved. In the newly created states from the post-Soviet republics, the vast majority of former party leaders came to the power, who sought little or no effort to eliminate the old, in essence, authoritariantotalitarian system of political government, almost all of them sought to preserve the economic ties that were established in a single economic complex between the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Union of Independent States (CIS), established in December 1991, provided additional opportunities for the new neo-empire. Under such conditions, pro-Kremlin theorists-statesmen were actively involved in the development of ideological and theoretical foundations for the new ideology. However, the very name «Russian world» was introduced into scientific and political circulation only in 2005. Since then, the spatial boundaries of the ideology «Russian world» are constantly expanding and now include those countries and peoples «where the Russian language is heard». Thus, the main goal of the new ideology «Russian world» is to include in the Russian neo-empire not only Russia itself, but all of Russia abroad, ie «almost a third - a billion Russian-speaking people or almost every twentieth inhabitant of the Earth» (O. Batanova). Thus, according to the great powers, it will be possible to correct the geopolitical mistake associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has been proved that the neo-imperial ideology of the «Russian world» is based on Russian ultranationalism, which is permeated by the ideas of pan-Russianism, Russian exclusivity, and strong statehood, which Putin now embodies. This feature of the ideology of the «Russian world» indicates its neo-imperial orientation and geopolitical intentions of the great-power policy of modern Russia.
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Welch Behringer, Paul J. "Images of Empire: Depictions of America in Late Imperial Russian Editorial Cartoons." Russian History 45, no. 4 (November 27, 2018): 279–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763316-04504001.
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Although historians have paid much attention to American perceptions of Russia, few have looked at Russian views of the United States, particularly in the imperial period. This paper surveys editorial cartoons in Novoe Vremia, one of the few Russian newspapers to publish illustrations as commentary on international affairs. Novoe Vremia published cartoons depicting the United States in the years between 1898 and 1912 in the late imperial period, that is, beginning with the War of 1898 and ending with the abrogation of the u.s.-Russia commercial treaty. This paper finds evidence for the argument that Russian views of American empire and race relations persisted into the Soviet period. However, the Russian Revolution swept away the strong anti-Semitic overtones in many portrayals of the United States, at least in editorial cartoons.
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Makarychev, Andrey, and Alexandra Yatsyk. "Russian “Federalism”: Illiberal? Imperial? Exceptionalist?" Slavic Review 77, no. 4 (2018): 912–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/slr.2018.289.
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Relations between the center and regions in Russia, being always in the limelight of attention in political science literature, remain a battlefield of different scholarly interpretations. Several narratives shape the current debate on Russian subnational regionalism or, in very legalistic terms, “federalism.” One is bent on applying to Russia such normatively-loaded concepts as multilevel and networked governance, meta-governance, indigenous governance, civil society participation, and others with strong liberal and institutional pedigrees. In this vein, Russia might be referred to—for example, along with Germany and France—as a “post-imperial democracy,” with an implicit anticipation of the prefix “post-” to signify Moscow's commitment to a democratic, rather than imperial, future. Seen from this perspective, with all its specificity Russia still conforms to basic standards of democratic rule and therefore can be approached, described, and analyzed in the language applicable to the liberal west, where institutions mitigate controversies over interests and create consensus over rules of the game.
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Yakutin, Yu. "Admiral Mordvinov: «Where the government itself distorts the good morals of the people, it cannot succeed in anything». Dissenting opinions." Management and Business Administration, no. 2 (July 5, 2021): 115–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.33983/2075-1826-2021-2-115-160.
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The article continues the series of publications devoted to the academicians-economists of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who actively worked with the Free Economic Society of Russia — the VEO of Russia. Telling about the life milestones and stages of state and public activity of a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, Admiral Nikolai Semyonovich Mordvinov, the article reveals the essence and meaning of the admiral's special opinions on key aspects of the socio-economic policy of the Russian Empire in the first half of the XIX century. N.S. Mordvinov's reflections on property, serfdom, industry, trade, and tariffs are summarized; about finance, banks, and insurance. The role of N.S. Mordvinov in the practical activities of the Imperial Free Economic Society of Russia is emphasized. N.S. Mordvinov's vision of the goals and objectives of the VEO as an important institution of Russian civil society is revealed.
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JÄRVINEN, HANNA. "‘The Russian Barnum’: Russian Opinions on Diaghilev's Ballets Russes, 1909–1914." Dance Research 26, no. 1 (April 2008): 18–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e0264287508000042.
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This article discusses the little-known Russian reviews of Sergei Diaghilev's ballet company. It argues that Diaghilev's reputation and social position in Imperial Russia affected how his troupe and the works famous in Western Europe were regarded in the Russian press. In Russia, Diaghilev was accused of exporting a false image of Russia as a semi-Oriental nation of barbarians. Russian critics found evidence for this from the predominantly Orientalist reviews appraising the Ballets Russes in Paris and London. They also judged their Western colleagues incompetent for not corresponding to the Russian idea of what was important in ballet as an art form.
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Horiunova, Yevgeniya. "THE IMPERIAL CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN MEMORIAL POLICY IN ANNEXED CRIMEA." Intermarum history policy culture, no. 9 (December 25, 2021): 209–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.35433/history.112024.
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The purpose of the article is to analyze the basic principles of Russian memorial policy in Crimea in the context of Russia's current imperial ambitions. Research methodology is based on a systematic approach, which allows us to consider the policy of memory in Russia as part of public policy to restore the status of "great power" in the world. Scientific novelty of the study is that it has been proved that Russia is actively filling the symbolic space of Crimea with imperial symbols at the same time as preserving the symbols of the Soviet times to restore the imperial status in modern realities. Conclusions. Russia has always considered Crimea its own territory and was not going to give up the peninsula. To support the dominance of pro-Russian sentiment, they actively used symbolic space, trying to fill it with their own cultural symbols. With monuments in honor of Empress Catherine II, the Russian authorities reminded of the first annexation of Crimea and demonstrated their own historical claims to the peninsula. Even, partial decommunization in Crimea took place according to the Russian scenario – the streets were given back the names of the times of the Russian Empire. After the annexation, the Kremlin implemented its own memory policy on the peninsula, demonstrating through new monuments the «Russian status» of the peninsula and its role in the formation and development of the Russian Empire. Accordingly, imperial symbols, along with Orthodox ones, are beginning to play a key role in Crimea. At the same time, Moscow preserves and enlarges the Soviet symbolic space to accelerate the process of building the «Fifth Empire» through the reconciliation of «white» and «red» projects in the mental field, the expansionist foundation of which was laid by the annexation of Crimea.
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Jersild, Austin. "Rethinking Russia From Zardob: Hasan Melikov Zardabi and the “Native” Intelligentsia." Nationalities Papers 27, no. 3 (September 1999): 503–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/009059999108984.
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Many non-Russians in the Russian Empire were active members of imperial educated society (obshchestvo), and they often conceived of the colonial advance of Russia as part of the march of the progressive West and “civilization” itself into the backward lands of the East. Reformist empire builders who criticized the brutal wars and population transfers that marked the conquest of the southern borderlands also emphasized the civilizing mission of the empire on its eastern frontier. This article explores the conception of Russia and its empire in the work of the Azerbaijani publicist Hasan Melikov Zardabi. Zardabi was genuinely enthusiastic about Russia and the prospect of an enlightened imperial future for the lands of the former khanates on the frontier of the Iranian and Ottoman empires. The unusual circumstances of his life, however, which included exile to his remote and native village of Zardob, a small fishing village on the Kura River to the west of Baku, compelled him to re-evaluate his estimation of Russia and the benefits of imperial rule. Zardabi learned from his experience in Zardob, and grew to rethink his earlier views about civilization and the Russian Empire.
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Bykova, Iuliia Igorevna. "To the question of creation of Great Imperial Crowns in Russia in the XVIII century." Человек и культура, no. 5 (May 2020): 54–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8744.2020.5.33920.
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The object of this research is the Great Imperial Crowns of the Russian monarchs in the XVIII century. The goal consists in clarification of the circumstances of creation and existence of the Great Imperial Crowns in Russia during this period, determination of their artistic peculiarities, and analysis these regalia as the works of jewelry art with consideration of stylistic evolution. For achieving the goal, the complex method based on the synthesis of art and historical-cultural approaches is applied. The author refers to a range of sources: unpublished archival documents, memoirs of the contemporaries, and visual material. This article presents a first comprehensive study on creation of the Great Imperial Crowns in Russia. The examines archival documents allow specifying names of the artists who created these regalia, many of which are introduced into the scientific discourse for the first time. The analysis of artistic image of Great Imperial Crowns is carried out. The research demonstrates that in the XVIII century this image transformed under the influence of stylistic preferences in the Russian art culture, as well as due to succession of the court jewelers who belonged to different jewelry schools. Up until Paul I of Russia, who made these regalia hereditary, the Great Imperial Crowns were usually taken apart after the coronation ceremony they were made for.
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Gronsky, Alexander D. "Alexander Solzhenitsyn Through the Eyes of Byelorussian Publicists." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 66 (February 20, 2019): 317–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2019-0-1-317-326.
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For Byelorussian nationalists Alexander Solzhenitsyn was the symbol of struggle against Soviet regime. But his essay «Rebuilding Russia» changed the attitude to Solzhenitsyn. Byelorussian publicists started to see Solzhenitsyn as supporter of Russian imperial policy. Nevertheless, for Byelorussian nationalism anti-Soviet Solzhenitsyn was more important than Solzhenitsyn imperial views supporter.
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Berest, Julia. "The Reception of J.S. Mill’s Feminist Thought in Imperial Russia." Russian History 43, no. 2 (July 30, 2016): 101–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763316-04302002.
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The essay explores the publication and reception of J. S. Mill’s The Subjection of Women in Imperial Russia. Translated in 1869, the same year that the book came out in Britain, The Subjection of Women found a wide audience in Russia, attracting both feminist and conservative readers, many of whom had already been familiar with Mill’s name after the publication of his Principles of Political Economy in Russia nine years earlier. Until the end of Imperial period, the book was published in four translations and six editions, some of which were accompanied by extensive editorial introductions and followed by reviews in the leading Russian journals. The essay analyzes conservative and feminist responses to Mill’s ideas in the context of Russian intellectual and socio-political developments in the second half of the nineteenth century. It also highlights the similarities and differences in the reception of Mill’s feminist thought in Russia and in England.
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Weeks, Theodore. "“Us” or “Them”? Belarusians and Official Russia, 1863–1914." Nationalities Papers 31, no. 2 (June 2003): 211–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990307125.
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In the final decades of the nineteenth century, nationality as an “ordering principle” became for the first time a significant factor for Russian imperial policy. Among the most thorny issues facing the imperial bureaucracy was the delimitation of the boundaries of the “Russian nation.” As is well known, St Petersburg never accepted either Ukrainians (at the time more often referred to as “Little Russians”) or Belarusians as separate nations. On the other hand, official Russia also did not deny the linguistic and cultural difference of these two groups entirely. Categories used in the 1897 census reflect this: under the category “mother tongue” (not surprisingly, no specific category of “nation” or “ethnicity” was included), those surveyed could respond “Great Russian,” “Little Russian,” or “Belarusian.” All three of these categories were then, however, subsumed into the larger category “Russian.” In a similar way, Russian officials never denied that Belarusians were in certain respects different from their brethren in central Russia. They did, however, indignantly reject the idea that these differences were so great as to exclude Belarusians from membership in the Russian nation.
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Kasamara, Valeria, and Anna Sorokina. "Imperial ambitions of Russians." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, no. 3-4 (August 12, 2012): 279–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.002.
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This article is based on the findings of the Political Ideas of Russian Society project realized by the Laboratory for Political Studies since 2008. The Laboratory has already conducted about 1000 in-depth interviews with respondents of various age cohorts and various social–economic statuses. All respondents demonstrated the Great Power pathos formed by two basic components — Russia is a great power and/or nostalgia of the lost Soviet might — serves the leitmotiv of authoritarian sentiments.
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Makarenko, V. "Russian State Mind from the Point of View of the Osman-Russian Imperial Comparative Studies." Problems of World History, no. 3 (May 16, 2017): 30–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2017-3-2.
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To adequately formulate the problem of the empire in history and in modern Russia, a distance is required in relation to concepts that are developed by representatives of official science and propaganda within Russia and by Russian scientists outside the country. The concept of distance allows to master the theoretical space of the solid work of Dominic Lieven in the context of modern Russian transformations with simultaneous distancing from political conjuncture and intellectual and political fashions. These refinements make it possible to introduce the necessary concretization into the concept of D. Lieven and to determine the agenda of the discussion on the problem of Russian state mind in the context of the Ottoman-Russian comparative studies. The article systemizes the general problems of the Russian Empire until 1917 and poses the problem of their reproduction in modern Russia.
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Maxim, Sigachev, Kharin Alexey, and Skakun Pavel. "Neoimperial Project for Contemporary Russia: Theoretical Conceptualization and Political Projecting Attempt." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 2 (May 27, 2022): 287–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2022-0-2-287-310.
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The article is devoted to the examination of the issue of the new type empires. The authors systematically analyze the following questions: 1) the theory of empires and neo-empires, neo-imperial discourse in Russia, 2) the imperial project in the history of Russia and the challenges to the contemporary Russian state system, 3) complex network empire. The article emphasizes the idea of the principal difference between the phenomenon of neo-empires and the global “Empire”, conceptualized in the works of M. Hardt and A. Negri.
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Waysband, Edward. "Vladislav Khodasevich's "on Your New, Joyous Path" (1914–1915): The Russian Literary Empire Interferes in Polish-Jewish Relations." Slavic and East European Journal 59, no. 2 (2015): 246–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.30851/59.2.005.
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This paper contextualizes Khodasevich’s unfinished poem “On Your New, Joyous Path” (1914–1915) as his poetic response to his precarious Russian-Polish-Jewish self-awareness as well as to contemporary Polish-Jewish tensions. I argue that for both predicaments, Khodasevich proposes an identical solution: the redemptive assimilation into Russian imperial, supranational culture. This vision crystallized during World War I. At that time, the key dichotomy underlying Khodasevich’s imperial project – between the national and the imperial – took the form of opposition between Polish particularism and the universalism of Russian culture. Yet an attempt to realize this vision in the poem discussed underscores its inner ambiguity, since it reinforces clear-cut imperial narratives of Russia as the epitome of humanitarian values while leaving the logic of imperial power struggle untouched. Conflicting Jewish and Polish identities and the historical circumstances of the Polish-Jewish tensions are considered as a context for the poem’s vision of Russian messianic superiority. In conclusion, I discuss the reception of Khodasevich’s assimilatory project by his target audience.
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Igor, Tyapin. "Modern Evaluation of the Imperial Experience of Russian Civilization: the Confrontation of Approaches and the Possibility of Their Integration." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 2 (May 27, 2022): 277–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2022-0-2-277-286.
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The article provides a comparative conceptual analysis of the three approaches to the examination of the imperial experience of monarchical and Soviet Russia, conventionally referred to as liberal-globalist, statist and centrist-academic ones. It is recognized that the first two approaches remain firmly opposed in assessing the overall significance and prospects of Russia’s imperial experience, and that it is impossible for the third one to directly become the basis for forming a common stand. At the same time, there exist certain common views on a number of individual issues related to the determination and nature of the imperial model in Russia. Accordingly, the possibilities of organic integration of all the three approaches are seen in understanding the common aspects relying on the unity of objective truth, the ideal of justice and the interests of Russian society. The author comes to the conclusion that preserving the modernized imperial features in ideology has good potential for the formation of a full-fledged national consciousness in modern Russia.
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Bobrovnikov, Vladimir, Ilyas Kayaev, Fasih Baderkhan, and Karimula Khalikov. "На путях к федеративным Георгиевским договорам 1783 и 1802 гг.: мусульманские общества и владения Дагестана в арабоязычной дипломатической переписке и соглашениях с Картли-Кахети и Российской империейXVIII в." Islamology 6, no. 2 (March 18, 2013): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.24848/islmlg.06.2.09.
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This selection of 15 diplomatic letters and agreements between Muslim khanates and village leagues of the East Caucasus, Georgia and imperial Russia sheds light on how a federative union under the Russian imperial protectorate formed in the region between the 1740s and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Documents were gathered in private and state archives, translated from Arabic into Russian, commented and introduced by Vladimir O. Bobrovnikov and Ilyas A. Kayaev with assistance of Karimulla G. Khalikov and Fasih Baderkhan.
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NAROCHNITSKAYA, Natalia. "TREATY OF NYSTAD, GEOPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE AND CONTROVERSIAL NARRATIVE ON RUSSIA’S IMPERIAL TRADITION." Perspectives and prospects. E-journal, no. 4 (27) (2021): 6–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.32726/10.32726/2411-3417-2021-4-6-25.
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The 300th anniversary of the Peace of Nystad, which boosted a major geopolitical transformation of Europe, prompts a retrospective look at the jealous attitude of European powers toward Russian expansion and consolidation. The creation of the Russian Empire was an imperative of the time as a response to geopolitical and civilizational challenges. Since then, a nihilistic view of Muscovy enshrined in Western historical consciousness has been gradually transferred to Imperial Russia, the USSR and to contemporary Russia turning into a kind of phobia. Western media propagate the image of an alien, undercivilised and hostile Russian realm, originating from selected history books, regardless of differing perceptions of Russian history among Western scientific and intellectual communities. This image has incorporated negative stereotypes about Orthodoxy and Russia from various eras, from the Great East-West Schism and “Mongolian Slavery” to the Communist experiment and the new split over values and progress.
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SHISHKOV, V. V., and S. V. KHOROSHEV. "DISINTEGRATED NARRATIVE: POST-IMPERIAL DISCOURSE ABOUT THE NATIONAL STATE IN RUSSIA." Central Russian Journal of Social Sciences 16, no. 1 (2021): 87–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2071-2367-2021-16-1-87-101.
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The purpose of the article is to analyze the conceptualization of the development of the nation and national state in Russia in modern research. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is a constructivist approach to understanding the nation and the national state. In addition, due to the fact that the imperial past is of decisive importance for the development of national statehood, the article uses the actual results of research on empires and works carried out within the framework of postcolonial discourse. It is assumed that the process of the national-state development of historical Russia is not completed, in connection with which it is characterized as a disintegrated narrative. The Russian Empire was implementing a nation-building project - the creation of a large Russian nation, in the article this process is considered from the point of view of constructivism. On the other hand, the article analyzes the position presented in the framework of the postcolonial discourse, according to which the state-national development of Russia is a process of internal colonization (A. Etkind). The heuristic potential and the problematic nature of the consideration of domestic nation-building and Russian statehood in postcolonial discourse are examined. The conclusion summarizes the results of the study. The author points out the inadequacy of the theoretical basis for the modern national development of Russia. In addition, it is necessary to further study the ways to consolidate the socio-political center of Russian society on the basis of the historical and cultural heritage.
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McDonald, David MacLaren. "Russian Statecraft after the “Imperial Turn”: The Urge to Colonize?" Slavic Review 69, no. 1 (2010): 185–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0037677900016752.
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Willard Sunderland and Peter Holquist find in the same cohort of imperial officials—the “technocrats” in the Resettlement Administration—a key moment in the history of Russian statecraft (gosudarstvennost’), linked in turn to the Russian state's career as a “modern colonial empire.” Thus, each historian seeks to ensconce within a larger institutional historical framework the burgeoning discussion occasioned over the last two decades by the “imperial turn” in Russian and European historiographies.However, each article situates the resettlement administration in very different developmental narratives, reaching equally distinctive conclusions. guided by the foucauldian notion of “governmentality” and james scott's insights on statecraft, sunderland presents the resettlement administration as a proto-ministry of asiatic russia, whose “experts“ would impose in asiatic russia the institutionalization of “difference“ between metropolis and periphery—defined and explained by the new hilfsiuissenschaften—that european empire-builders had applied in civilizing their own overseas colonies.
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Cohen, Aaron J. "Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the Russian Emigration and the Soviet Union." Slavic Review 62, no. 1 (2003): 69–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3090467.
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Historians of Russia have not analyzed the roles that the memory of World War I played in Russian life, and Russia remains largely absent from comparative studies of the war and its legacy. Russian people did have “sites of memory” where they expressed myths, displayed symbols, and mobilized public opinion around the memory of World War I. Outside the Soviet Union, a non-Soviet Russian memory of the Great War flourished in the interwar years, and the war became an important memory that military émigrés used to overcome the rupture from the past (imperial Russia) and the present (Russian territory) caused by revolution and life in emigration. The war had a different expression in Soviet Russia, where journalists and publicists evoked its image, but not its historical content, to break the USSR from the Russian past and separate the first socialist society from its enemies in the present.
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Burbank, Jane. "Revisioning Imperial Russia." Slavic Review 52, no. 3 (1993): 555–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2499723.
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Alexander, Gronsky. "The Byelorussian Imperial Project in the Political Discourse of the Beginning of the 21 Century." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 2 (May 27, 2022): 335–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2022-0-2-335-342.
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The article explores the Byelorussian imperial discourse. It appeared in the early 90s of the twentieth century, but got no further development. In the 2010s, that discourse was revived, but also failed to gain a foothold in the minds of the intellectuals. The Byelorussian imperial project is not viable, because the country does not have the necessary resources. It is not advantageous for Russia to create a joint Russian-Byelorussian imperial project, since Moscow, not Minsk, will be spending the main resources. The Byelorussian imperial discourse was gradually replaced by the Eurasian one.
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Etkind, Alexander. "How Russia ‘Colonized Itself’." International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 3, no. 2 (March 28, 2015): 159–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/hcm.481.
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In the late imperial period, Russian historiography was dominated by the self-colonization school. Russian historians wrote detailed accounts of Russia’s takeover of the Crimea, Finland, Ukraine, Poland, and other lands, but they did not describe these areas as Russian colonies. Instead, mainstream Russian historians argued that ‘Russia colonized itself’. The discourse of self-colonization was a specific, though longterm and surprisingly robust, moment in Russian historiography. Appropriating the western idea of colonization, Russian historiography transformed this idea in quite a radical way. First, in Russia, the process of colonization was construed as self-reflexive and internal, rather than as object-directed and external. Second, in Russia, we find an uncritical approval of the processes of colonization, which is different from the British and French historiographical traditions and from the postcolonial approach to colonization. However, some Russian historians held a critical stance toward the peculiar character of the Russian Empire.
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Vasilyev, Pavel. "A Revolutionary Feeling of Justice? Emotion and Legal Judgement in Late Imperial and Early Soviet Russia." Oñati Socio-legal Series 9, no. 9(5) (December 1, 2019): 596–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1074.
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This article explores the intellectual history of the concept of “feeling of justice” and related concepts and the attempts to make them central to legal practice in the context of early 20th century Russia. It starts by tracing the emergence of new modes of thinking about judicial emotion in fin-de-siècle Russian Empire and accounts for both international and local influences on these ideas. It further examines the development of these theories after the 1917 Russian Revolution and notes both continuities and ruptures across this revolutionary divide. Finally, the article explores the attempts to put these radical ideas into practice by focusing on the experimental legal model of “revolutionary justice” that was employed in Soviet Russia between 1917 and 1922 which highlights the discrepancies between bold utopian projects and harsh material realities of the revolutionary period. Este artículo trata sobre la historia intelectual del concepto de “sentimiento de justicia” y conceptos relacionados, y los sitúa en el centro de la práctica del derecho en el contexto de la Rusia de principios del siglo XX. Comienza situando el surgimiento de nuevas formas de pensar sobre la emoción judicial en el imperio ruso de fin de siglo, y explica las influencias nacionales e internacionales en esas ideas. Además, examina el desarrollo de dichas teorías tras la Revolución Rusa de 1917, y hace notar continuidades y rupturas a lo largo de la fractura revolucionaria. Por último, el artículo analiza los intentos de llevar esas ideas radicales a la práctica, atendiendo al modelo jurídico experimental de “justicia revolucionaria” que se utilizó en la Rusia soviética entre 1917 y 1922 y que subraya las discrepancias entre los audaces proyectos utópicos y las duras realidades materiales del período revolucionario.
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O'Keeffe, Brigid. "Murder Most Russian. True Crime and Punishment in Late Imperial Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 8 (September 14, 2014): 1385–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.941706.
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Krasivskyy, Orest. "Foreign Threats to Ukraine’s Independence and the Challenge Posed to Polish National Security." Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, no. 4 (January 15, 2021): 77–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2020.4.4.
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The purpose of the article is to examine the Russian threat to Ukraine’s state sovereignty and its impact on Poland’s national security; to underline that Russia intends to take revenge for its defeat in the Cold War, to regain control over the former Soviet Union republics, to defeat the USA and EU, and to establish control in the territory of the Eurasian continent. The research hypothesis is that the main purpose of Russia’s foreign policy is the reconstruction of a neo-imperial state, Ukraine’s reintegration into the post-Soviet space, and ensuring Russia’s domination in the region. The research task was completed using the research methods of a detailed study of sources and literature and a critical analysis of the information available to the author. Conclusions: Russia is trying to take revenge for its defeat in the Cold War, to regain control over the former Soviet Union republics, to defeat the West, and to establish control over the Eurasian continent. Russia considers Ukraine and Poland as dangerous agents of Atlanticism. That is why the Russian Eurasian geopolitical project aims for the Ukrainian and Polish states to be neutralized in a radical way. To this end, Russia has started a “hybrid war” against Ukraine. Poland and the Baltic countries will be the next targets of Russian aggression. It is profitable for Russian neo-imperialism to destroy trust and the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine, and to act in accordance with the divide-and-conquer algorithm. In such circumstances, Ukraine and Poland need to work out a new “Doctrine of restraining Russia’s aggression,” to pursue gradual and coordinated policy for the sake of the victory over Russian neo-imperialism and the dismantlement of the Russian imperial social system. The article describes the peculiarities of the modernization of the Russian imperial system at the present stage, analyzes the content of the Russian neo-imperialistic policy against Ukraine, Poland and the West, the reasons for the failure of Ukraine to neutralize Russian expansion, and also shows possible geopolitical consequences for the national security of Poland in the event of the successful implementation of Russia’s geopolitical strategy.
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Qin, Lizhi. "The geopolitical origins of Russian strategic culture and its enlightenment in China." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations 15, no. 4 (2022): 367–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.402.
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The main challenge for Russia in the post-Cold War era is that the geographical space available for strategic autonomy has been greatly compressed. Due to the checks and balances of Western powers, the security panic of neighboring countries, and the decline of its own strength after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to maintain the Strategic control model. Russia is torn between imperial historical traditions and nation-state strategic narratives. Will Russia return to the imperial age? The investigation of the geopolitical mechanism of Russian strategic culture is helpful to study and judge its regular behavior pattern. Continental identity, flanking position, and terrestrial claim tradition are three variables which have shaped Russia’s strategic culture. At the same time, the pursuit of sea power, the yearning for modernization in the heartland, and the wise shrinking of tough external forces have verified the logic that Russia’s strategic culture will be adjust dynamically with the change of relative power status and strategic environment. Russian strategic culture shapes strategic motivation dominated by fear and exerts indirect and nonlinear influence on strategic behavior including strategic intention. Risk aversion/risk-taking, the two decision-making preferences for dealing with geopolitical risks, are caused by differences in the degree of fear of power status and the external environment. Through the historical practice of Russian strategic culture investigation, the author believes that: if the current and future development trends show a negative expected trend, then Russia will make necessary revisions to the existing historical experience to suit the current strategic situation. The process-tracking study of Russian imperial history since Peter the Great also verifies the theoretical inferences of this study from case studies. The study of Russian strategic culture will help to promote the deepening and expansion of cooperation between China and Russia. Although the cooperation between the two countries started from the geopolitical pressure of the global strategic offensive of the United States, the beneficial dialogue and communication at the strategic and cultural level can transcend the historical normalcy of the cooperation between the two countries forced by the external geopolitical threats and shape the strategic stability of China and Russia.
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Saidov, Akhmedkhan, and Alibekova Yakhyaevna. "Islam and the Russian State in the Imperial Period: the Nature and Stages of Relations." Islamovedenie 12, no. 4 (December 30, 2021): 44–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.21779/2077-8155-2021-12-4-44-58.
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The article is devoted to the study of the Islamic policy of the Russian state in the Imperial Period, which today is of great interest to the Russian academia due to a wide involvement of socio-historical knowledge in the process of developing a modern concept of state structure in the Russian Federation. Analyzing the current controversy on this issue associated with finding legitimate, political and ideological grounds for the new concept and comparing various ideological positions and assessments of the nature of the relationship between Islam and the imperial state, the authors discover a differentiated approach of the imperial state to different Muslim peoples and their social categories. A significant drawback of contemporary controversy is that its participants, when dealing with such an essential issue, do not attach importance to the Eurasian, multi-ethnic, confessional and civilizational foundations of integration and modernization of the Russian society, thus repeating the mistakes of tsarism and post-Soviet “Westernizers”. Due to the use of new ideological approaches and sources of information, the authors integrate the most important elements of Islamic political culture with political and legal processes in the Russian state and analyze the conditions and positive factors that can give stability and dynamic development to the Russian society proceeding from its civilizational essence. The work highlights qualitatively different stages of the relationship between Islam and the imperial state, reveals the socio-political, ideological and moral limitations of tsarism. The authors conclude that only a truly democratic and legitimate system of government in Russia is capable of creating and sustaining the political and ideological foundations of state-building based on indepth civilizational, ethnic and confessional Eurasian priorities. Regrettably, these characteristics were not inherent to the Russian Empire and are not typical of contemporary Russia.
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Krynyukov, P. E., V. B. Simonenko, V. G. Abashin, and S. V. Beskrovnyy. "They remained the servants of Russia (the fate of military doctors of the Russian Imperial Army)." Clinical Medicine (Russian Journal) 98, no. 6 (November 26, 2020): 473–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.30629/0023-2149-2020-98-6-473-479.
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The article presents the biographical data of military doctors of the Russian Imperial Army who continued to serve Russia after 1917 and participated in subsequent wars of the first half of the 20th century.
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Gergało-Dąbek, Nadia. "Soft power kultury rosyjskiej w kontekście wojny Federacji Rosyjskiej przeciwko Ukrainie." Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 20, no. 4 (November 2022): 177–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.36874/riesw.2022.4.8.
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The article aims to look at Russian culture as a soft power through the prism of the large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and to analyze the changes in its perception that have occurred as a result of these events. Russian culture, especially high culture, is known and appreciated in the world, which gives it the power of attraction and the possibility of exerting influence. At the same time, it is not only a source of prestige and a tool for promoting Russia, but also spreading Russian imperial myths that contributed to the invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the operation of Russian cultural institutions outside the borders of the Russian Federation is strictly controlled by the authorities, and its popularization is treated as a “special operation”. Russian culture imposed imperial optics on the perception of “near abroad”, deprived Ukraine of the right to its history, identity and cultural heritage. Due to its colonial nature, it does not perceive the suffering of oppressed nations, and is therefore unable to prevent the tragedy of their destruction, as is the case with Ukraine and its culture. As a result of the initiated war, Russia has embezzled some of its soft power. However, there is no consensus among the international community regarding the imposition of sanctions on Russian culture. Ukrainian cultural activists accuse the international community of hypocrisy because, in defending Russian culture, it does not perceive the deliberate and systematic destruction of Ukrainian culture. Russian culture requires a reinterpretation and unmasking of the imperial optics, as consuming it indiscriminately poses a threat to the national security of the “near abroad” states.
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Filyushkin, Alexander. "Why Did Russia Not Become a Composite State?" Russian History 47, no. 3 (March 30, 2021): 201–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/18763316-12340006.
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Abstract The paper asks how the Russian Empire emerged. In the course of European monarchical rise of the 16–17th centuries, composite monarchies turned into nation states and then empires. Russia never became a composite; very soon after its emergence at the end of the 15th century, it immediately moved to the imperial stage. The answer to why this happened is the key to understanding the Russian Empire’s history. One factor that prevented Russia from building a composite monarchy was the weakness of political actors united under Moscow’s leadership. European composite monarchies emerged when and where the dominant monarchy forcefully broke local laws, fought against local class and political systems. But Moscow’s rivals were too weak, and Russian monarchs did not need to compromise with them. A shared Orthodox faith, common culture, language, and economic structure, as well as the absence of natural borders on the Eastern European plain were other factors that allowed Moscow to ignore the rights of conquered regions. Russia’s background as a part of the Mongol Empire also played a role. By the time Russia faced strong European monarchical competitors, its imperial development path already formed. An important feature of the early Muscovite Empire was the dominance of political practice over ideology. The ideological design of the Empire occurred only in the 18th and 19th century. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the imperial character of Muscovy was formed intuitively and spontaneously; one might call it a neonatal, rudimentary, infant empire.
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Sakon, Yukimura. "The Launch of the Volunteer Fleet: Late Imperial Russia and the “Empire Route”." Asian Review of World Histories 10, no. 2 (July 29, 2022): 182–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22879811-12340117.
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Abstract We examine the first decade that the Russian Volunteer Fleet, established due to the patriotic upsurge that followed the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, connected Odessa with the Russian Far East after 1879. We also discuss government support for Russian ships’ passage through the Suez Canal, triggered by the opening of the Chinese and Indian routes of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company in 1871. The history of shipping trade in late Imperial Russia gives us hints regarding the scarcely examined relations between Russia and the global economy. Using documents from the Russian State Historical Archive in St. Petersburg, we reveal what Russia’s ruling politicians expected from maritime transportation. We argue that Russia’s shipping network, despite its many foreign ports of call, developed to promote the consolidation and development of domestic maritime trade. Some involved in Russia’s shipping trade thought that entering international trade was contrary to national interest.
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Dotsenko, Victor. "THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORICAL MEMORY ON MODERN UKRAINIANS’ POSTCOLONIAL SYNDROME OVER COME." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 22 (2017): 36–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2017.22.5.
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The attempts to determine main fundamental historical myths, which were used by soviet and modern Russian ideologists for soviet person historical conscience formation and their overcome in modern Ukraine are represented in the article on the basis of scientific works, analysis of existent historians, political social analysts. The concept of «nation’s friendship» dominated in historiography and public discussions in USSR during the decades. This concept successfully hided soviet type of imperialism and colonialism. It was the inheritance of new Ukrainian state. The struggle for Ukrainian nation’s conscience between Ukraine and imperial Russia continued during the whole modern history of Ukrainian state. Russia tries to privatize the historical memory about Slavonic state origin and to use it for new imperial ideological project creation. Ukrainian scientistsand culture figures firmly resist to Russian ideological offensive at the same time getting tiny support from politicians. The winner in the war for national Ukrainian identity saving and Ukrainian political nation creation is going to be a person who will reveal the real Ukrainian history without ideological myths and post-imperial stereotypes.
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Dotsenko, Victor. "THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORICAL MEMORY ON MODERN UKRAINIANS’ POSTCOLONIAL SYNDROME OVER COME." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 22 (2017): 36–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/520-2626/2017.22.5.
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The attempts to determine main fundamental historical myths, which were used by soviet and modern Russian ideologists for soviet person historical conscience formation and their overcome in modern Ukraine are represented in the article on the basis of scientific works, analysis of existent historians, political social analysts. The concept of «nation’s friendship» dominated in historiography and public discussions in USSR during the decades. This concept successfully hided soviet type of imperialism and colonialism. It was the inheritance of new Ukrainian state. The struggle for Ukrainian nation’s conscience between Ukraine and imperial Russia continued during the whole modern history of Ukrainian state. Russia tries to privatize the historical memory about Slavonic state origin and to use it for new imperial ideological project creation. Ukrainian scientistsand culture figures firmly resist to Russian ideological offensive at the same time getting tiny support from politicians. The winner in the war for national Ukrainian identity saving and Ukrainian political nation creation is going to be a person who will reveal the real Ukrainian history without ideological myths and post-imperial stereotypes.