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1
Chan, Heng Huat, and Wen-Chin Liaw. "On Russell-Type Modular Equations." Canadian Journal of Mathematics 52, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 31–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.4153/cjm-2000-002-0.
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AbstractIn this paper, we revisit Russell-type modular equations, a collection of modular equations first studied systematically by R. Russell in 1887. We give a proof of Russell’s main theorem and indicate the relations between such equations and the constructions of Hilbert class fields of imaginary quadratic fields. Motivated by Russell’s theorem, we state and prove its cubic analogue which allows us to construct Russell-type modular equations in the theory of signature 3.
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Oppy, Graham. "On the Lack of True Philosophic Spirit in Aquinas." Philosophy 76, no. 4 (October 2001): 615–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000602.
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Mark Nelson claims that Russell's remarks—in his History of Western Philosophy—about Aquinas are ‘breathtakingly supercilious and unfair’ and ‘sniffy’. I argue that Nelson completely misrepresents Russell's criticisms of Aquinas. In particular, I argue that the silly epistemological doctrine which Nelson attributes to Russell plays no role at all in the criticism which Russell actually makes of Aquinas. Since—as Nelson himself concedes—there is no other reason to think that Russell commits himself to the epistemological doctrine in question, either in the passages under discussion or elsewhere, I conclude that there is equal justice in the claim that it is Nelson's dismissal of Russell which is ‘unfair’ and ‘sniffy’.
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Yajun, Fang, and Wang Lihua. "Russell’s View of Character and Its Insight on Children’s Anti-Smoking Education." Tobacco Regulatory Science 7, no. 5 (September 30, 2021): 2024–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.18001/trs.7.5.122.
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Objectives: In this study, we qualitatively studied Russell’s view of character and tried to seek the insight on children’s anti-smoking education. Results: Russell’ view suggests that human character refers to human qualities which are distinguishable as good (i.e., desirable) or bad. Russell focused on desirable human qualities, and he raised that the four characteristics of human beings (i.e., vitality, courage, sharpness, and reason) together absolutely constitute the basis of an ideal personality. This standpoint stems from Russell’s assumption that human character attention can promote personal good habits and consider the details of education. This assumption has formed Russell’s view that human character can be cultivated through games and imagination, skill learning and scientific explanation, knowledge acquisition, and accuracy training. Conclusion: The findings show that Russell’s concept of human character is neutral. Russell advocates the pursuit of universal desirable character. Russell’s view of character connects children’s behavior to human character development. From Russell’ s view, children’s smoking behavior is far from four good human qualities, which is obstructive to their character development. Russell’ s insights instruct people that anti-smoking education should promote children ’ s performance spirit of anti-smoking propaganda, cultivate children’ s coping abilities of smoking allure, and guide children’ s comprehensive thinking of smoking damage.
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Revington, Robert. "Bertrand Russell’s Unpublished Correspondence on C.S. Lewis’ Mere Christianity." Journal of Inklings Studies 7, no. 2 (October 2017): 71–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ink.2017.7.2.5.
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In April 1958, after reading C.S. Lewis's Mere Christianity, a woman from Manchester wrote a letter to the philosopher Bertrand Russell. After reading Lewis's book, the woman was deeply concerned that she would have to become a Christian, and so she asked Russell–one of the most prominent atheist intellectuals of the twentieth century–for advice. That letter began a correspondence of five letters (and one greeting card) between Russell and the woman. In his first response, Russell told the woman that ‘the whole idea of throwing away your life blindly as an imagined service to Christ is a form of glorifying masochism’. With the exception of one of Russell's letters, this complete correspondence has never been published, but it is available in the Bertrand Russell Archives. This study analyzes the contents of that fascinating correspondence and will compare Russell's and Lewis's attitudes on religious sacrifice. Using Lewis's own writings, it will be demonstrated that Lewis himself would not have agreed with Mrs Mound's extreme interpretation of his work, and would have had some sympathy with Russell's response.
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URQUHART, ALASDAIR. "RUSSELL AND GÖDEL." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22, no. 4 (December 2016): 504–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bsl.2016.35.
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AbstractThis paper surveys the interactions between Russell and Gödel, both personal and intellectual. After a description of Russell’s influence on Gödel, it concludes with a discussion of Russell’s reaction to the incompleteness theorems.
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Metzger, Scott. "Understanding the Welby-Russell Correspondence." Dialogue 59, no. 4 (December 2020): 579–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000268.
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ABSTRACTA shallow reading of the 1905 correspondence between Victoria Welby and Bertrand Russell yields the impression that Welby has misunderstood Russell's “On Denoting.” I argue that a deeper reading reveals that Welby should be understood, not as misunderstanding Russell, but as bringing a pragmatic attitude to bear on Russell's theory of descriptions in order to expose the limits of his strictly logical analysis.
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Tully, R. E. "Pre-Vintage Russell." Dialogue 26, no. 1 (1987): 147–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300042360.
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The general editorial plan behind The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell calls for two parallel series, one concerned with Russell's work on philosophy, logic and mathematics, the other with his less technical contributions in areas such as politics, practical ethics, history and education. Volume 1, sub-titled Cambridge Essays, 1888–99, is in a sense the ancestral volume of both series, for it comprises both technical and non-technical subjects. Russell appears here as diarist, public speaker, political commentator, as well as apprentice philosopher and expert on non-Euclidian geometries. The Collected Papers as a whole will span the more than 80 years of Russell's writings devoted to a formidable range of topics from the personal to the highly abstract but, large as it is, this publishing project will make no attempt to bring together the totality of his writings, since many of these remain in print and are readily available. Instead, the project's distinct emphasis will be on Russell's shorter writings, such as essays, articles, reviews and speeches, which are not so easily located, even when previously published. Grouped together in convenient subdivisions, these papers will chronicle for us Russell's intellectual and social growth to an extent even greater than that attempted by Russell himself in his three-volume Autobiography or in My Philosophical Development, and they will also serve to acquaint us with the thoughts, feelings and attitudes of the venerable figure behind the well-known major books. The project's essential aim, then, is to mine and refine the vast Russell Archives in a way that will yield a permanent foundation of study for anyone, whether mere admirer or life-long scholar, who has any interest in Russell's life and work.
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Russell, Bertrand, Nikolay Milkov, and Kenneth Blackwell. "Notes on McTaggart's Lectures on Lotze." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 40 (August 6, 2020): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v40i1.4421.
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Russell preserved notes he took on McTaggart’s course on Lotze’s major works in 1898. They are published here for the first time. Russell’s abbreviations are expanded and deletions noted. N. Milkov introduces the notes and provides Russell’s biographical and philosophical background. The course on Lotze, on whose philosophy of geometry Russell had already written, was influential in his development away from monism.
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Jayakody, RL. "Russell of Russell's viper fame." Ceylon Medical Journal 46, no. 2 (January 30, 2014): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.4038/cmj.v46i2.6488.
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Stevenson, Michael D., and Sarah-Jane Brown. "“A Lovelorn Orphan in a Cold World”." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38 (July 16, 2018): 5–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v38i1.3642.
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Bertrand Russell undertook an extended North American lecture tour in 1931 to raise funds for the Beacon Hill experimental school he operated with Dora Russell. To rectify the existing lack of scholarly analysis of the 1931 tour, this paper provides annotated transcriptions of twenty-eight letters Russell sent during the tour to Dora and to Patricia Spence, Russell’s mistress. These letters provide intriguing insights into the state of Russell’s financial and professional affairs and illuminate personal relationships he cultivated in the United States and Canada. Most importantly, they document his complex marital situation at this tumultuous juncture in his life before he decided to end his relationship with Dora early in 1932 in favour of Spence.
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Stevenson, Michael D., and Sarah-Jane Brown. ""A Lovelorn Orphan in a Cold World": Bertrand Russell's 1931 North American Lecture Tour." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38 (September 2, 2019): 5–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v38i1.4087.
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Bertrand Russell undertook an extended North American lecture tour in 1931 to raise funds for the Beacon Hill experimental school he operated with Dora Russell. To rectify the existing lack of scholarly analysis of the 1931 tour, this paper provides annotated transcriptions of twenty-eight letters Russell sent during the tour to Dora and to Patricia Spence, Russell’s mistress. These letters provide intriguing insights into the state of Russell’s financial and professional affairs and illuminate personal relationships he cultivated in the United States and Canada. Most importantly, they document his complex marital situation at this tumultuous juncture in his life before he decided to end his relationship with Dora early in 1932 in favour of Spence.
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Monk, Ray. "Cambridge Philosophers IX: Bertrand Russell." Philosophy 74, no. 1 (January 1999): 105–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819199001072.
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This paper attempts to summarise the philosophical career of Bertrand Russell, concentrating in particular on his contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. It takes as its starting point Russell's conception of philosophy as the search for foundations upon which certain knowledge might be built, a search which Russell, at the end of his career, declared to be fruitless. In pursuing this search, however, Russell was led to develop lines of thought and techniques of analysis that have had a profound and lasting influence on the philosophy of the twentieth century.
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Linsky, Bernard, and Kenneth Blackwell. "Russell’s Corrected Page Proofs of Principia Mathematica." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 39 (January 25, 2020): 141–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v39i2.4210.
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We report here on the set of complete proofs of Volumes I and II of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica newly acquired by the Bertrand Russell Archives. These proof sheets, marked with a number of corrections, were likely bound for Russell by Cambridge University Press, though not exactly the same as the first edition. We assess the information to be gained from the texts and the corrections, most significantly around *110 in Vol. II and the lost dot of the empty relation in Vol. I. All are in Russell’s hand and described in an appendix. We also note several revisions in the first edition that were made after these proofs. We discuss the provenance of the volumes, and Russell’s correspondence about proofs of PM with M. H. Dziewicki, but we find that there is insufficient evidence to determine the chain of possession from Russell to their discovery for sale in Australia in recent years.
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Klepuszewski, Wojciech. "“WE COULD SING BETTER SONGS THAN THOSE”: DRINK IMAGES IN WILLY RUSSELL’S PLAYS." Acta Neophilologica 1, no. XX (June 1, 2018): 145–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/an.2692.
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Willy Russell is an example of a writer whose popularity and critical reception is not extensively reflected in serious studies. There is a noticeable tendency to appraise rather than analyse Russell’s work. The aim of the present article is to dissect the function of drink images in the context of class-related issues Russell thematises in his plays.
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FINN, MARGOT C. "Colonial Gifts: Family Politics and the Exchange of Goods in British India, c. 1780–1820." Modern Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (February 2006): 203–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x06001739.
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In August 1851, James Russell travelled to London from his estate on the banks of the Tweed. As a young man decades earlier, Russell had served as a cavalry officer in India, and he was anxious to exploit this visit to the metropolis to renew his acquaintance with the men who had formed his social circle years ago in Hyderabad. Having arrived in London, James Russell called on Charles Russell (no relation) at the latter's residence in Argyle Street. Chairman of the Great Western Railway, Charles Russell too had passed his youth in India, serving as a lieutenant in the Company's army and as an assistant to the diplomatic Resident at Hyderabad—his older brother, Henry. In a letter to his brother—now Sir Henry and (thanks to his Indian fortune) the proprietor of an extensive landed estate in Berkshire—Charles described James Russell as ‘still a great oddity, almost mad I think’, but conceded that ‘all his feelings are those of [a] gentleman and his pursuits have always been intellectual’. To substantiate this assessment of his old friend's sensibilities, he instanced James Russell's retention and use of a dictionary given to him by Charles in Hyderabad. ‘He gratified me by telling me that he still retained “a handsome Greek Lexicon” which I gave him, when he resumed the study of Greek’, Charles informed his brother Henry. ‘On his way home [from India] he followed the retreat of the ten thousand with Xenophon in his hand; and he has since worked hard, he tells me, at the Greek historians, poets & dramatists’. Having reminisced in London with Charles, James Russell journeyed to Berkshire to visit Sir Henry Russell, who read excerpts from Charles's letter aloud to his guest. ‘I always liked him’, Sir Henry wrote to his brother upon James Russell's departure, ‘and when I read to him your reference to early days, his eyes filled with tears’.
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Coury, Aline Germano Fonseca, and Denise Silva Vilela. "Russell's Paradox: A Historical Study about the Paradox in Frege's Theories." Revista Brasileira de História da Matemática 19, no. 37 (October 16, 2020): 95–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.47976/rbhm2019v19n3795-116.
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For over twenty years, Frege tried to find the foundations of arithmetic through logic, and by doing this, he attempted to establish the truth and certainty of the knowledge. However, when he believed his work was done, Bertrand Russell sent him a letter pointing out a paradox, known as Russell’s paradox. It is often considered that Russell identified the paradox in Frege’s theories. However, as shown in this paper, Russell, Frege and also George Cantor contributed significantly to the identification of the paradox. In 1902, Russell encouraged Frege to reconsider a portion of his work based in a paradox built from Cantor’s theories. Previously, in 1885, Cantor had warned Frege about taking extensions of concepts in the construction of his system. With these considerations, Frege managed to identify the precise law and definitions that allowed the generation of the paradox in his system. The objective of this paper is to present a historical reconstruction of the paradox in Frege’s publications and discuss it considering the correspondences exchanged between him and Russell. We shall take special attention to the role played by each of these mathematicians in the identification of the paradox and its developments. We also will show how Frege anticipated the solutions and new theories that would arise when dealing with logico-mathematical paradoxes, including but not limited to Russell’s paradox.
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Rosenkrantz, Max. "Dealing with Meanings." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38 (July 16, 2018): 69–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v38i1.3644.
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It is universally agreed that in the “Gray’s Elegy Argument” (GEA) Russell raises a difficulty for the attempt to “speak about” meanings (the phrase is Russell’s) and that the difficulty, assuming it to be genuine, shows the very notion of meaning to be unintelligible. In this paper I try to show that in the GEA Russell considers and rejects an alternative way of manifesting an understanding of meanings—namely, by “dealing with” them (also Russell’s phrase). This step in the GEA has not, so far as I am aware, been noticed before.
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Elkind, Landon D. C., and Jeremy Shipley. "Why Russell Was Not an Epistemic Structural Realist." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 40 (August 6, 2020): 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v40i1.4260.
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Bertrand Russell’s work in philosophy of science has been identified as a progenitor of structuralism in contemporary philosophy. It is often unclear, however, how the philosophical problems facing contemporary structuralist programmes relate to the problems of philosophy as Russell saw them. We contend that Russell has been mistakenly identified as an epistemic structural realist. The goal of this essay is to clarify the relationship between Russell’s programme and contemporary structuralist projects. In doing so, we hope to display the motivation for a broad, truly Russellian structuralist project in the philosophy of science.
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Milkov, Nikolay. "Bertrand Russell’s Philosophical Logic and its Logical Forms." Athens Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 3 (September 14, 2023): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajphil.2-3-3.
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From 1901 to 1919, Russell persistently maintained that there were two kinds of logic and distinguished between one and the other as mathematical logic and philosophical logic. In this paper, we discuss the concept of philosophical logic, as used by Russell. This was only a tentative program that Russell did not clarify in detail; therefore, our task will be to make it explicit. We shall show that there are three (-and-a-half) kinds of Russellian philosophical logic: (i) “pure logic”; (ii) philosophical logic investigating the logical forms of propositions; (iii) philosophical logic exploring the logical forms of facts: in epistemology and in the external world. In particular, Russell’s program or philosophical logic of the facts of the external world remained less than sketchily outlined. Keywords: Russell, mathematical logic, philosophical logic, Wittgenstein
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Kitchener, Richard F. "Bertrand Russell's Naturalistic Epistemology." Philosophy 82, no. 1 (January 2007): 115–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819107319050.
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Bertrand Russell is widely considered to be one of the founders of analytic philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Individuals have usually stressed his early philosophical contributions as seminal in this regards. But Russell also had another side–a naturalistic side–leading him towards a naturalistic epistemology and naturalistic philosophy of science of the type Quine later made famous. My goal is to provide an outline of Russell's naturalistic epistemology and the underlying philosophical motivations for such a move. After briefly presenting Russell's conception of the nature of philosophy, I sketch his theory of philosophical method, which is a version of the method of analysis. This provides the underpinnings for a discussion of his Naturalistic Epistemology, which led him to adopt a version of a behavioristic epistemology. Although Russell vacillated on the question of the adequacy of such an account, it provided a major element in his later philosophical views. I suggest that we must reevaluate our conception of the history of analytic philosophy and, in particular, our understanding of Russell's place in the history of 20th century philosophy.
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Henry, Holly. "Bertrand Russell in Blue Spectacles: His Fascination with Astronomy." Culture and Cosmos 08, no. 0102 (October 2004): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.46472/cc.01208.0221.
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Bertrand Russell frequently formulated his epistemological investigations of the material world with examples drawn from astronomical phenomena. He persistently evoked images of stars and starlight, the planets, the sun, eclipses, even planetariums, to stage his arguments. This is true for early publications such as ‘Our Knowledge of the External World’ (1914) and ‘The Analysis of Mind’ (1921), as well as later works such as ‘An Outline of Philosophy’ (1927), and ‘Human Knowledge’ (1948). Russell was clearly fascinated by astronomy and cosmological phenomena. He notes that his interest in astronomy was inspired by his uncle, Rollo Russell, who lived in Bertrand’s childhood home, and whose conversations with Bertrand ‘did a great deal to stimulate [his] scientific interests’. The Honourable Rollo Russell ‘was a meteorologist, and did valuable investigations of the effects of the Krakatoa eruption of 1883, which produced in England strange sunsets and even a blue moon’. At a very young age, Bertrand knew something of the planets. He noted that, at about age five or six, he would wake early in the morning to watch Venus rise: ‘On one occasion I mistook the planet for a lantern in the wood’. ‘The world of astronomy,’ Russell later observed, ‘dominates my imagination and I am very conscious of the minuteness of our planet in comparison with the systems of galaxies’. Russell also once noted, ‘I have always ardently desired to find some justification for the emotions inspired by certain things that seemed to stand outside human life and to deserve feelings of awe…the starry heavens…the vastness of the scientific universe…’. This fascination with the stellar universe would be productive for Russell’s philosophical inquiries into the nature, and multiplicity, of physical phenomena. This paper will explore the importance of Russell’s analogies of astronomy for British literary writers such as Virginia Woolf and Vita Sackville-West. The paper will offer a reading of two fiction selections, ‘Solid Objects’ by Woolf and ‘Seducers in Ecuador’ by Sackville-West, against the backdrop of Russell’s fascination with astronomy.
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Stevens, Graham, and Michaael Rush. "Is Motion “Contradiction’s Immediate Existence”?" Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 39 (August 22, 2019): 36–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v39i1.4068.
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A driving concern of Russell’s rejection of Idealism was his conviction that reality is free of contradictions. However, echoing the neo-Hegelians that Russell is usually taken successfully to have refuted, Graham Priest has argued that the analysis of motion provides a motivation to adopt dialetheism (the thesis that some contradictions may be true). Furthermore, Priest argues that the Russellian account of motion as given in The Principles of Mathematics fails accurately to capture the phenomenon. In this paper we argue that Priest’s objections to Russell are neither new nor decisive. We show that even if one shares Priest’s concerns about the Russellian model there are alternatives inspired by Russell’s own contemporaries that do not entail dialetheism. We conclude that not only are Priest’s objections to Russell unconvincing, but even one who shares Priest’s intuitions has no reason to resurrect the Hegelian account of motion.
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Motte, André. "From Democritus to Bertrand Russell and Back." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 10, no. 1 (November 29, 2019): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2019.1.8.
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Although Bertrand Russell is probably most famous for his “logical atomism,” it is his ethical thought that this article will attempt to contrast with the ethics of the founder of the ancient atomism: Democritus of Abdera. Russell has himself suggested certain affinity here. More concerned with practice than theory, both philosophers advocate a certain teleological and eudemonistic morality; furthermore, they both adopt the same approaches to various related topics. Yet, what had only been outlined by Democritus was extensively developed by Russell. Hence, it is worth examining whether there is any deeper common ground between the two: can Russell’s clarity throw some light on Democritus’ fragments?
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Westphal, Kenneth R. "‘Sense Certainty’, or Why Russell had no ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’." Hegel Bulletin 23, no. 1-2 (January 2002): 110–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026352320000793x.
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Famously, by launching analytic philosophy Moore and Russell revolted against British Idealism, with Hegel tossed in for good measure. In 1923 Russell declared:I should take ‘back to the 18th century’ as a battle-cry, if I could entertain any hope that others would rally to it. (CP 9:39)To Russell, the philosophical headmaster of the Eighteenth Century was Hume, not Kant. Russell sought to dispatch rationalism with his logically sophisticated empiricism, based on ‘knowledge by acquaintance’: the non-conceptual apprehension of simples. He sought to dispatch Hegel in particular by condemning his alleged conflation of the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication.The battle lines thus drawn between analytic philosophy and (especially) Hegel's philosophy have had deep, lasting and very unfortunate consequences in the field. Hence it is all the more tragic that neither of Russell's criticisms of Hegel is sound. Sense Certainty presumes that the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication are the same, or rather, that it can dispense with predication and hence with any predicative use of ‘is’. Hegel accepts Sense Certainty's presumption as a premise in his reductio ad absurdum argument against sense certainty. Thus Hegel shares rather than denies Russell's thesis about the two senses of ‘is’. However, Hegel further argues that predication is required in order to identify any particular one presumes to know. In this way, Hegel refutes Russell's ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ just over a century in advance.
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Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da. "Russell and Wittgenstein on time and memory: two different uses of the cinematographic metaphor." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 18, no. 1 (September 12, 2015): 197–227. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v18i1.2521.
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O objetivo deste artigo é explorar os usos de Wittgenstein e de Russell da metáfora cinematográfica. Wittgenstein utilizou a metáfora frequentemente durante o período intermediário (1929-1933). Russell a usou em um artigo de 1915. Situarei o uso de Russell em relação a sua filosofia de 1912-1919 (em especial, durante o período construtivista (1914-1919)) e o de Wittgenstein em relação a sua filosofia do período intermediário. Como será visto ao longo do artigo, o aspecto temporal é o elemento central da metáfora. Buscarei reconstruir os conceitos de tempo por eles mobilizados e explorarei os diferentes estatutos concedidos à memória, como condição de possibilidade do tempo da experiência imediata. Embora seja possível localizar várias semelhanças entre esses autores, veremos também algumas diferenças cruciais. O principal elemento que buscarei expor através dessa análise é a maneira como Russell e Wittgenstein concebem de forma inversa o estatuto ontológico da metáfora. AbstractThe aim of this paper is to explore Wittgenstein's and Russell's use of the cinematographic metaphor. Wittgenstein used the metaphor frequently during his middle period (1929--1933). Russell used it in a paper from 1915. I place their uses of this metaphor against the background of Russell's philosophy from 1912 to 1919 (especially his constructivist period from 1914 to 1919) and Wittgenstein's middle period. As demonstrated throughout this paper, time is the key element of both uses. I reconstruct their concepts of time and deal with the important roles attributed to memory in relation to time. Although many similarities can be found, with careful examination some remarkable differences can be seen. The cinematographic metaphor can be used as a starting point to articulate those differences. My final objective is to show how Russell and Wittgenstein used the metaphor inverting its ontological status.Recebido em novembro de 2014 Aprovado em abril de 2015
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Sanhueza, Sebastián. "Are Russellian Indexicals Eliminable?" Síntesis. Revista de Filosofía 3, no. 2 (December 28, 2020): 126–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448vol3iss2a333.
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It is widely thought that, in his later work An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Bertrand Russell argued that our natural languages could in principle do away with indexicals. This brief piece, by contrast, aims to show that, instead of suggesting the potential eliminability of such expressions, Russell outlined a semantic account of indexicals according to which such expressions fundamentally depend on the perspectival way in which they refer to worldly items. If correct, this proposal would not only show that, in Russell’s later work, the meaning of expressions like indexicals is not exhaustively determined by the items they refer to: it would also show that Russell did not mean to eliminate indexicals from our natural languages at all.
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Kaplan, Brett Ashley. "Converged Aesthetics: Blewishness in the Work of Anthony Mordechai Tzvi Russell." Arts 12, no. 4 (August 21, 2023): 178. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts12040178.
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This essay examines the converged aesthetic of Anthony Mordechai Tzvi Russell, focusing on the Kosmopolitan video projects. These videos, and Russell’s work overall, resist the singular terms “Black” and “Jew,” constructing a Blewish converged aesthetic by overlaying images of Josephine Baker or a lonely, lost child walking backward with Russell’s rich and full voice singing Yiddish songs. These remarkable videos, and the projects created by Tsvey Brider (Russell and Dimitri Gaskin), disrupt assumptions about race, gender, sexual orientation, and ethnoreligious affiliation in profound and important ways. I argue that this work performs convergence, thus bucking against the very insistence on antagonism that forms the conditions of possibility for racism.
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HANSEN, KAREN KIRHOFER, LARRY A. LATSON, BRUCE A. BUEHLER, and LARRY A. LATSON. "Silver-Russell Syndrome With Unusual Findings." Pediatrics 79, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 125–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1542/peds.79.1.125.
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In 1953, Silver et al1 described a syndrome of short stature and low birth weight with hemihypertrophy and abnormal sexual development. Independently, in 1954, Russell2 described a condition with similar findings, but his description emphasized disproportionately short arms, maternal difficulty during pregnancy, and craniofacial dysostosis. These two descriptions are now accepted as a continuum of the same entity, termed the Silver-Russell syndrome. A hallmark of the syndrome is its extreme clinical diversity. The findings most commonly seen in children with Silver-Russell syndrome are summarized in the Table.3 Recently, we encountered multiple cafe-au-lait spots, primary hypoparathyroidism, congenital glaucoma, congenital heart disease, and glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency in a newborn black girl with severe intrauterine growth retardation.
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Pitt, Eduardo Antônio. "A metafísica de 'Os Princípios da Matemática' de Russell e a controvérsia à respeito da suposta semelhança entre essa metafísica e a ontologia meinongiana." EDUCAÇÃO E FILOSOFIA 34, no. 72 (March 23, 2021): 1339–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.14393/revedfil.v34n72a2020-53704.
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Resumo: No presente artigo, objetiva-se apresentar as principais características da metafísica do realismo lógico, desenvolvido por Russell em Os Princípios da Matemática, de 1903, e, principalmente, analisar a controvérsia sobre se os princípios dessa metafísica podem realmente ser interpretados como semelhantes aos princípios da ontologia meinongiana. São comparados os pontos de vista opostos dessa controvérsia à luz dos trechos de Os Princípios da Matemática que supostamente comprometeram Russell de ter elaborado uma gramática filosófica na qual todo e qualquer nome próprio ou descrição definida, ocupando a posição de sujeito lógico nas proposições, referem-se a objetos com alguma categoria de Ser. Ao realizar tal análise, conclui-se que o problema central diz respeito aos nomes próprios vazios e que, portanto, a metafísica de Os Princípios da Matemática expressa uma perspectiva instável da teoria da denotação de Russell.
Palavras-chave: Russell; Ser; Existência; Significado.
Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics metaphysics and the controversy over the supposed similarity between this metaphysics and the meinongian ontology
Abstract: This article aims to present the main characteristics of the metaphysics of logical realism, developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics, of 1903, and, mainly, to analyze the controversy about whether the principles of this metaphysics can really be interpreted as similar to the principles of meinongian ontology. The opposing points of view of this controversy are compared in the light of the excerpts from The Principles of Mathematics that supposedly committed Russell to having elaborated a philosophical grammar in which all and any proper names or definite descriptions, occupying the position of logical subject in the propositions, refer to objects with some category of Being. In carrying out such an analysis, it is concluded that the central problem concerns empty proper names and that, therefore, the metaphysics of The Principles of Mathematics expresses an unstable perspective of Russell’s theory of denotation.
Keywords: Russell; Being; Existence; Meaning.
La metafísica de Los Principios de las Matemáticas de Russell y la controversia sobre la supuesta similitud entre esta metafísica y la ontología meinongiana
Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar las principales características de la metafísica del realismo lógico, desarrollada por Russell en Los Principios de las Matemáticas, de 1903, y, principalmente, analizar la controversia sobre si los principios de esta metafísica pueden realmente interpretarse como similares a los principios de la ontología meinongiana. Los puntos de vista opuestos de esta controversia se comparan a la luz de los extractos de Los Principios de las Matemáticas que supuestamente comprometieron Russell a haber elaborado una gramática filosófica en la que todos y cualquier nombre propio o descripción definida, ocupando la posición de sujeto lógico en las proposiciones, se refieren a objetos con alguna categoría de Ser. Al realizar tal análisis, se concluye que el problema central concierne a los nombres propios vacíos y que, por lo tanto, la metafísica de Los Principios de las Matemáticas expresa una perspectiva inestable de la teoría de la denotación de Russell.
Palabras clave: Russell; Ser; Existencia; Significado.
Data de registro: 10/04/2020
Data de aceite: 08/12/2020
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Quinn, Patrick. "What we must pass over in silence." Claridades. Revista de Filosofía 14, no. 2 (November 14, 2022): 49–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/claridadescrf.v14i2.13699.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Bertrand Russell’s views on mysticism show their intense interest in this subject and how they explored its nature and possibilities. Wittgenstein, who had abandoned his Catholic faith as a teenager, became a religious searcher, which began from his fears of the terrors of war. He had enlisted as a soldier to fight for Austro-Hungary during which his terror of war led him to pray to God for refuge. The fortuitous discovery of Leo Tolstoy’s book, The Gospel in Brief, opened Wittgenstein’s mind to the importance of Jesus and led him to value Christianity once more. Russell’s interest in mysticism appears in a published article written in 1914 and seems to have been one of curiosity, rather than religious. From a young age, Russell became extremely interested in mathematics and he came to perceive that this subject might be called mathematical mysticism. In both cases, Wittgenstein and Russell shared a keen interest in mysticism, with Wittgenstein concluding in his Tractatus that the mystical was transcendent while Russell chose to examine how mysticism and empiricism might complement each other.
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Griffin, Nicholas. "Was Russell Shot or Did He Fall?" Dialogue 30, no. 4 (1991): 549–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011860.
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In his critical notice of Russell's Theory of Knowledge, R. E. Tully takes issue with my interpretation of Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of judgment. Against it he raises two objections and also sketches an alternative interpretation. On Tully's characterization, I believe that Russell was shot out of the tree by a subtle but devastating argument, while Tully believes that he was shaken out of the tree by a much broader but non-lethal attack on his conception of a proposition. The metaphor is not inappropriate. I certainly believe that Wittgenstein's attack was lethal to Russell's theory of judgment and shows extraordinary marksmanship. But I do not want to deny that there was a lot of tree shaking going on at the same time—concerning, in particular, the logical constants and the concept of a proposition, both of which were topics closely related to the theory of judgment. Thus, while I maintain that Russell was shot, I do not subscribe to a single-bullet theory (although it must be admitted that, in such cases, the individuation of bullets is far from precise).
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Hom, Peter W., and Rodger W. Griffeth. "What Is Wrong With Turnover Research? Commentary on Russell's Critique." Industrial and Organizational Psychology 6, no. 2 (June 2013): 174–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iops.12029.
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Dr. Russell (2013) provocatively critiqued turnover research, expressing a sentiment that we share—namely, the lamentable modest predictability of turnover. All the same, we disagree with certain criticisms of turnover theory, methodology, and practicality. We organize our reactions into sections: predictive validity for the standard turnover criterion; other criteria for model evaluation; incremental validity controlling quit intentions; Russell's proposed methodology, the potential biases of the Russell and Van Sell (2012) test; and an alternate approach by Hom, Mitchell, Lee, and Griffeth (2012).
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Blackwell, Kenneth, Giovanni D. De Carvalho, and Harry Ruja. "A Secondary Bibliography of <em>A History of Western Philosophy</em>, Part I: Extracted Reviews in English. Introduction by John G. Slater." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 39 (August 22, 2019): 73–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v39i1.4072.
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Extracts from the more academic reviews in English follow. They are representative of the totality rather than of individual reviews. Those in the popular press indicate Russell’s high reputation in the mid-1940s but little else. Excluded are blurbs from the Allen & Unwin dustjacket, and there were none on the Simon and Schuster jacket. Copies of all but one of these 132 reviews are in box 1.65 of the Bertrand Russell Archives; they are also preserved in the Russell Archives as PDFs.
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Oleinik, P. I. "Философия математики Б. Рассела до логицизма." Вестник Вятского государственного университета, no. 1(147) (August 7, 2023): 50–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.25730/vsu.7606.23.005.
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The analysis of B. Russell's philosophy of mathematics does not lose its relevance due to the emergence of new modern programs of philosophy of mathematics. This article explores the intellectual path of B. Russell in the transition from Kant's philosophy of geometry, presented in his dissertation "On the foundations of Geometry" in 1897, to his position in the work "Principles of Mathematics" in 1903, where for the first time the ideas of B. Russell's logicism are explicitly presented, according to which all mathematics is derived from formal logic. The problematic question is whether the transition is really B. Russell's transition from Kantianism in the philosophy of mathematics to logicism was a cardinal change in the philosophical and mathematical paradigm. The purpose of the study is to analyze the evolution of B. Russell's philosophical and mathematical views. The research uses historical and philosophical analysis and historical and philosophical reconstruction, methods of comparative and interpretive analysis. The argumentation of J.'s statement is analyzed. Hayes says that B. Russell, when writing "On the Foundations of Geometry", was already committed to a kind of "logicism" that does not correspond to the traditional interpretation of his work. The expediency of separating the general concept of logicism and the specific tasks to be performed by this program is argued. It is also shown that intuition plays a small role in Russell's early philosophy of mathematics. It is revealed which ideas of B. Russell should be revised and excluded in order for B. Russell to accept logicism. It is shown that the concept of logic in B. Russell's early philosophy of mathematics does not correspond to the goals and objectives of logicism. At the same time, it is demonstrated that, regardless of the logic used, the position of B. Russell can conform to the spirit of logicism (but is unable to fulfill its tasks). It is concluded that some basic ideas of logicism are expressed in the early work of B. Russell. At the same time, the very concept of logic in B. Russell has fundamental differences in different periods of his work. Анализ философии математики Б. Рассела не теряет своей актуальности в связи с появлением новых современных программ философии математики. В этой статье исследуется интеллектуальный путь Б. Рассела при переходе от кантовской философии геометрии, представленной в его диссертации «Об основах геометрии» 1897 г., к его позиции в работе «Принципы математики» 1903 г., где впервые эксплицитно представлены идеи логицизма Б. Рассела, согласно которому вся математика выводится из формальной логики. Проблемным является вопрос, действительно ли переход Б. Рассела от кантианства в философии математики к логицизму был кардинальной сменой философско-математической парадигмы. Цель исследования – анализ эволюции философско-математических взглядов Б. Рассела. В исследовании используются историко-философский анализ и историко-философская реконструкция, методы компаративного и интерпретирующего анализа. Анализируется аргументация утверждения Дж. Хейса о том, что Б. Рассел при написании «Об основах геометрии» уже был привержен своего рода «логицизму», несоответствующего традиционной интерпретации его творчества. Аргументируется целесообразность разделения общего понятия логицизма и конкретных задач, которые должны быть выполнены этой программой. Также показано, что интуиция в ранней философии математики Рассела играет небольшую роль. Выявляется, какие идеи Б. Рассела должны быть пересмотрены и исключены для принятия Б. Расселом логицизма. Показано, что концепция логики в ранней философии математики Б. Рассела не соответствует целям и задачам логицизма. Вместе с тем демонстрируется, что вне зависимости от используемой логики позиция Б. Рассела может соответствовать духу логицизма (но не в состоянии выполнить его задачи). Делается вывод о том, что некоторые базовые идеи логицизма высказываются в раннем творчестве Б. Рассела. Вместе с тем сама концепция логики у Б. Рассела имеет принципиальные различия в разные периоды его творчества.
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Wishon, Donovan. "Russell on Experience and Egocentricity." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 98, no. 1 (July 2024): 185–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae002.
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Abstract Neutral monism is the view that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are composed of, or grounded in, more basic elements of reality that are intrinsically neither mental nor material. Before adopting this view in 1918, Russell was a mind–matter dualist and a pointed critic of it. His most ‘decisive’ objection concerns whether it can provide an adequate analysis of egocentricity and our use of indexical expressions such as ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘now’, and so on. I argue that M. G. F. Martin (2024) and other recent interpreters cannot make proper sense of Russell’s shifting views about egocentricity because they misascribe to his early dualism the thesis that experience is in some sense ‘diaphanous’ or ‘transparent’. Against this, I make the case that (1) Russell rejected the diaphaneity of experience as a dualist, (2) this rejection played a key role in his early objections to neutral monism, and (3) several decades later Russell takes his neutral monism to have key resources for answering his prior objections.
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Rodríguez Consuegra, Francisco. "El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 23, no. 67 (December 13, 1991): 15–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1991.792.
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After a brief presentation of Russell' s logicism, I attempt a global explanation of its philosophical significance. I reject the existence of two different kinds of logicism (Putnam) with the argument that Russell was trying to justify the existing mathematics and, at the same time, to escape from a mere formal calculus. For the same reason, the logicist definitions cannot be regarded as new axioms to be added to Peano's postulates (Reichenbach): according to Russell it is necessary to show that there is a constant meaning satisfying those postulates. The lack of a clear definition of logic in Russell (and Frege) is a consequence of his whole philosophy, therefore we must not look for it in the concept of necessity (Griffin), nor must we interpret this lack as a gap in the system (Grattan-Guinness). Russell's starting point was Moore's notion of truth as something indefinable and intuitive according to which we immediately recognize the true propositions. The problem of logicism is rather the deep tension between the ontological preeminence of relations (structures) and their terms (fields). [F.R.C.]
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Steinhoefel, Antje. "Art and Astronomy in the Service of Religion Observations on the Work of John Russell (1745–1806)." Culture and Cosmos 08, no. 0102 (October 2004): 437–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.46472/cc.01208.0265.
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John Russell’s lunar images have so far been neglected and misunderstood by both historians of art and of astronomy. On the one hand this is due to the fact that the images do not come within many current definitions of the notion of art, particularly when the function of art is seen as an agency of subjective experience. Ironically, the reverse of this argument explains why historians of astronomy neglected Russell’s moon images. Compared with the more technical look of lunar maps, equipped with latitude and longitude grids as well as legends, Russell’s ‘photo-realistic’ pastels came across as works of art. They were therefore neglected because of their very nature, their double identity combining aspects from both art and astronomy. On the other hand, the moon images have to be seen in the context of Russell’s life and as more than just the work of an artist and astronomer, but also as the work of a Methodist. Russell’s lifelong devotion to Methodism is well known. Never before, however, has this pivotal attitude of the artist towards religion been taken into account in connection with the study of his moon images. In my paper I argue that Russell was part of the movement that attempted to unite nature and religion in the late eighteenth century. While prominent artists such as William Blake argued that nature was the work of the devil and to study it was blasphemy, Russell shared his beliefs with other evangelicals who saw the study of nature in no contradiction with God at all. In fact, Russell actively searched for proof of God’s part in the creation of the world and His presence within it. This association between God and nature has been termed natural theology and peaked in the late seventeenth century, with the work of Isaac Newton himself. I attempt to show that Russell conducted years of astronomical study, leading to the moon pastels, out of religious motivation. This contextualisation of Russell’s work within the tradition that believed in the ‘God of Nature’, will, I hope, explain the previously unsolved puzzle of the artist’s incentive to portrait the moon.
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Do Valle, Júlio César Augusto. "Ciência, misticismo e educação: uma análise russelliana da pretensa neutralidade da matemática frente à religião." Horizontes 34, no. 1 (July 26, 2016): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24933/horizontes.v34i1.334.
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ResumoO propósito deste artigo consiste na elucidação dos elementos da obra de Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), eminente matemático e filósofo, que tornem possíveis os debates acerca da pretensa neutralidade da matemática diante dos misticismos que sempre estiveram presentes na história da humanidade, mas que, devido aos equívocos que impregnaram sua perspectiva, consideramos, muitas vezes, genericamente obscurantistas e perniciosos. Para isto, tornou-se necessário evidenciar as abordagens à ciência, aos misticismos e à educação na obra russelliana. Pretende-se, portanto, destacando a possibilidade de compreender a matemática como credo, demonstrar que posturas decorrem da tradicional educação matemática que podem favorecer posturas de intolerância religiosa e sugerir, também com Russell, a introdução de uma postura de enfrentamento.Palavras-chave: Matemática; Bertrand Russell; Misticismo; FilosofiaScience, mysticism and education: a russellian analysis of the supposed neutrality of mathematics towards religionAbstractThe purpose of this article is to elucidate the elements of the work of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), eminent mathematician and philosopher, which make possible the debates about the alleged neutrality of mathematics towards the mysticism that has always been present in human history, but due to misconceptions that pervade their perspective, we consider often generically obscurantist and pernicious. For this, it was necessary to highlight the approaches to science to mysticism and education in Russell's work. It is intended, therefore, highlighting the possibility of understanding mathematics as creed, show that attitudes stem from traditional mathematics education that can foster religious intolerance poses and suggest, also with Russell, the introduction of a confronting posture.Keywords: Mathematics; Bertrand Russell; Mysticism; Philosophy
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Ellens, J. P. "Lord John Russell and the Church Rate Conflict: The Struggle for a Broad Church, 1834–1868." Journal of British Studies 26, no. 2 (April 1987): 232–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/385887.
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In the election campaign of 1859, after twenty-five years of tirelessly defending the church rate principle that ratepayers of all religious denominations were liable to the rate levied for the maintenance of Anglican parish churches, Lord John Russell declared that he had come to favor abolishing church rates. The Tory Standard railed that the aging statesman had caved in to “senile ambition,” while another conservative critic charged that Russell had agreed to sacrifice church rates at the Willis's Rooms meeting in 1859 as part of a deal made to win the political support of Protestant Nonconformists. Spencer Walpole, the High Church chancellor of the Exchequer, was more charitable and more accurate, however, when after the election he responded to Russell's decision by acknowledging that the establishment was indebted to Russell for stalwartly having defended the church rate for decades as a bulwark of the church establishment.Although Russell was too clever a politician to disregard political advantage or public opinion during his quarter-century fight to retain church rates, it was not his Whig politics but his Broad Church ecclesiology that best accounts for his long and dogged defense of the church rate. From 1834 through 1837, during the first four years of the church rate conflict, Russell's stance appeared to be that of the Whig statesman. First in Earl Grey's administration and then in Lord Melbourne's, he attempted to reform the church rate system sufficiently to satisfy Dissenters that they could count on the Whig party as the party of reform.
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Stubenberg, Leopold. "The Place of Naïve Realism in Russell’s Changing Accounts of Perception." Roczniki Filozoficzne 72, no. 1 (March 27, 2024): 15–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.2.
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In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy (1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a sense-datum version of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the “everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from 1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. (5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception.
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Blackwell, Kenneth, Giovanni D. De Carvalho, and Harry Ruja. "A Secondary Bibliography of A History of Western Philosophy, Part II: Extracted Non-English Reviews." Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 39 (January 25, 2020): 176–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v39i2.4213.
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For “Part I: Extracted Reviews in English”, see Russell 39 (summer 2019): 23–96. The reviews combine Russell’s own files and copies of many reviews added and identified in this compilation and earlier.
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Ryan, Alan. "Russell." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26, no. 2 (June 1996): 247–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839319602600205.
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White, Philip. "Russell." Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 32, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 166. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/45226646.
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Rossi, Alessandro. "Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ Existential Assertions." Sophia 60, no. 2 (April 19, 2021): 389–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00831-x.
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AbstractLeibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.
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Herrlich, Horst, Kyriakos Keremedis, and Eleftherios Tachtsis. "On Russell and Anti Russell-Cardinals." Quaestiones Mathematicae 33, no. 1 (March 2010): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.2989/16073601003718222.
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Tully, R. E. "Russell's Other Alter Ego." Dialogue 27, no. 4 (1988): 701–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730002031x.
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This is the first volume in the Collected Papers which deals exclusively with Russell's non-technical writings and, chronologically, it is the immediate successor of volume 1. Volumes 2 through 7 cover roughly the same span of years as volume 12 (1902–1914) but are devoted to his technical writings on mathematics, logic and philosophy. Of this group, however, only volume 7 has so far been published. The contents of volume 12 are intended to show two contrasting sides of Russell's highly complex character: the contemplative (but nonacademic) side and the active. The latter is much easier to delineate and much more widely known. During 1904, Russell rose to defend traditional Liberal principles of free trade and to assail the British government's protectionist proposals for tariff reform. His various articles, book reviews, critiques and letters to editors are gathered here. Three years later, he campaigned for election to Parliament from Wimbledon as the Women's Suffrage candidate against a staunch anti-suffragist. The outcome was never in doubt, not even to Russell, since Wimbledon was a safe seat for the Conservatives, and in the end Russell lost by a margin greater than 3-to-l, but his fight had been vigorous and had managed to gain national attention.
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Laguna, Rogelio, and Gonzalo Zurita. "Bertrand Russell y el pragmatismo." Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía 34 (June 1, 2018): 159–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2018.0.806.
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This paper analyzes the two stages of the relationship of the British philosopher Bertrand Russell withpragmatism. The first section reviews the criticisms that the author made to American pragmatists.The second exposes Russell’s pragmatic turn, exposing the causes of this turn and its consequences. This paper argues that both stages should be understood in the context of the discussions about truth that were observed in philosophy in the first decades of the 20th century.
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Connelly, James. "Why Russell Abandoned: Theory of Knowledge : The Logical Interpretation." Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 44, no. 1 (June 2024): 45–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rss.2024.a929931.
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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment was the decisive factor in Russell’s abandoning his Theory of Knowledge manuscript. Secondarily, Russell’s progress was halted by other problems in the analysis of molecular propositional thought, which became evident as he was working through the analysis of atomic propositional thought in Part ii of Theory of Knowledge . I call my reading of Wittgenstein’s critique and Russell’s paralysis the “Logical Interpretation”. In developing and defending this interpretation, I will thus try to explain both Wittgenstein’s intentions with respect to his criticisms, along with their impacts on Russell.
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Pribram-Day, Ivory. "Meinong’s Multifarious Being and Russell’s Ontological Variable: Being in Two Object Theories across Traditions at the Turn of the 20th Century." Open Philosophy 1, no. 1 (October 1, 2018): 310–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0023.
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AbstractThis paper discusses the problems of an ontological value of the variable in Russell’s philosophy. The variable is essential in Russell’s theory of denotation, which among other things, purports to prove Meinongian being outside of subsistence and existence to be logically unnecessary. I argue that neither Russell’s epistemology nor his ontology can account for the ontological value of the variable without running into qualities of Meinongian being that Russell disputed. The problem is that the variable cannot be logically grounded by Russell’s theory of denotation. As such, in so far as being is concerned, Meinong and Russell’s theories are much closer than is typically thought. The arguments are supported with concerns raised by Russell, Frege, and Moore regarding the ontological value of the variable. The problem can be summarised as follows: the variable is the fundamental denoting-position of a formal theory that is meant to explain the structure of the ontological. If such a formal theory is meant to ground the ontological, then the formal must also represent the actual structure of the ontological. Yet the variable, the fundamental symbol of denotation in a theory that defines objects, is ontologically indefinable.
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KLEMENT, KEVIN C. "THE FUNCTIONS OF RUSSELL’S NO CLASS THEORY." Review of Symbolic Logic 3, no. 4 (September 30, 2010): 633–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020310000225.
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Certain commentators on Russell’s “no class” theory, in which apparent reference to classes or sets is eliminated using higher-order quantification, including W. V. Quine and (recently) Scott Soames, have doubted its success, noting the obscurity of Russell’s understanding of so-called “propositional functions.” These critics allege that realist readings of propositional functions fail to avoid commitment to classes or sets (or something equally problematic), and that nominalist readings fail to meet the demands placed on classes by mathematics. I show that Russell did thoroughly explore these issues, and had good reasons for rejecting accounts of propositional functions as extralinguistic entities. I argue in favor of a reading taking propositional functions to be nothing over and above open formulas which addresses many such worries, and in particular, does not interpret Russell as reducing classes to language.