Journal articles on the topic 'Roman law, religious aspects'

AbstractIn Gal 1:10, Rom 1:1, and Phil 1:1 Paul refers to himself as δοῦλος Χριστοῦ (Ἰησοῦ). This self-designation is open to interpretation. What is the function of this claim of roles, which is slightly varied syntagmatically in the three passages mentioned, i.e., tends to be linguistically flexible on Paul's part and thus adapted to the context in each case? The present contribution is intended to expand the interpretive framework with an aspect that has been rather neglected in previous Pauline research, when it invokes the interpretive context of Roman law. For it is Roman law that is of particular interest for the self-definition as a slave. In Roman legal discourse, which finds universal application through the ius gentium as the ‘law of all men' (Gaius 1.1), i.e. also application to non-Romans or the peregrinus, the scope of action for slaves in relation to their ‘masters' is also conceptually determined by taking into account the ‘human characteristic of the slave'. Within the interpretive framework of ancient Roman law, therefore, those lines of meaning in Pauline self-fashioning as δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ that reveal self-designation in subordination to Christ as enabling ambition, zeal, honour, and success are particularly revealing. These aspects include (1) the Pauline description of status and the legitimation and exposition of his (2) relationship to the “Lord”, the description of (3) his areas of work and responsibilities, and his (4) socio-economic living conditions and lifestyle. Thus, against the background of ancient Roman law, which primarily focused on its pragmatisation rather than problematising the socio-historical reality of slaves or the moral-philosophical attitude toward slavery, certain aspects of Paul's understanding of himself and his apostolate can be more sharply defined.

The subject of the sixth meeting of the Colloquium of Anglican and Roman Catholic Canon Lawyers in Rome 2005 was the Roman Catholic position that Anglican orders are invalid. The meeting employed a canonical framework to explore the status and terms of Apostolicae curae (1896) and the modern applicability of the canonical issues of intent, matter, form, and minister to the question of Anglican orders. The meeting did not examine pneumatological aspects of ordination. This article seeks to set alongside each other the ritual elements of the liturgy for the ordination of priests in both the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches in their respective canonical contexts. It proposes the value of a pneumatological approach for possible Roman Catholic recognition of the vitality of Anglican orders. A draft of this paper was presented to the seventh meeting of the Colloquium of Anglican and Roman Catholic Canon Lawyers in Johannesburg in February 2006, where it was favourably received.

The research includes the analysis of the causes for divorce in Roman law and how to regulate the dissolution of marriage through legal provisions. Divorce and marriage are ancient institutions of matrimonial and family law, which countries from the ancient times had this as a trend for their regulation through legal provisions. Many principles and rules of Roman law are adopted also from the legal systems of many countries of the modern world, in order to unify their own private national law. This trend is particularly noticeable in the states member of the European Union, which refers to IUS COMUNE, which simultaneously is the common basis of legal practice worldwide. Roman jurists work techniques present a model with permanent value for legal doctrine and jurisprudence of many countries when it comes to the practical operation of law and its social needs adjustment. In Roman law the dissolution of marriage recognized since LEX IULIA DE ADULTERIIS, the law issued during the reign of Augustus in year 18 BC, which had defined and has codify the oldest rate of self-righteousness. Through this lex-of (the law) was removed from the hand of the affected family an important part of ascertaining of adultery and the punishment of preparations by treating it through public bodies. Fill into this form he found in Corpus Iuris Civilis and has exerted influence on marriage in Europe until the modern age. Dissolution of marriage was also provided by the law of XII tables approved in year 450 BC. In the research are analyzed the ways of divorce under the Roman law, which were: Divorce without the willpower of the spouses, or because of natural events and Divorce by willpower of the spouses or known as divorce caused by human actions. In the post-classic period, due to changes in moral views who brought Christianity, emperors decide religious provisions on divorce. At this time there were two basic types of marriage dissolution: Divortium cum damno, or divorce followed with bad consequences, and Divortium sine damno, or divorce without bad consequences

In publication, which is about public discourse, done analyze case polish Roman Catholic Church, as a social actor which participate in permanent dispute about law regulations about in vitro fertilization in VI and VII cadency of polish first house parliament. Done comparison religious, political and media discourse.

The use of Latin in the multilingual society of Roman Egypt was never more than marginal. Yet, as a language of the ruling power, the Roman Empire, Latin enjoyed to some extent a privileged status. It was generally more widely applied in the army, as well as on some official occasions, and in the field of law. Less expectably, various Latin inscriptions on stone had religious contents or were found in sacred spaces and contexts. Such texts included honorary and votive inscriptions, visitors’ graffiti, and funerary inscriptions. All three groups are surveyed and evaluated focusing especially on their actual relation to the religious sphere and social background, noting both continuity and changes of existing practices and traditions. Such analysis of the inscriptions allows to draw conclusions not only regarding the use of Latin in religious matters in Egypt but also reveal some aspects of the use of Latin in Egypt in general and the role of Roman culture in the Egyptian society.

One of the main goals of the Second Vatican Council (the 50th anniversary of whose opening will be celebrated in 2012) was the unity of all Christians. Not least among its achievements was the fact that it launched the Catholic Church into the Ecumenical Movement and also paved the way for a global revision of the Church's Code of Canon Law. This article reflects from a Roman Catholic perspective on aspects to do with canon law and ecumenism. It does so in the light of the Council's teaching and reception. Conciliar hermeneutics and questions left open at the Council are considered. In conclusion, the author suggests that greater attention to the Church's charismatic principle and missionary mandate underlined at the Council offers wide scope for continuing exploration among Anglican and Roman Catholic canonists in the cause of unity.

The research identifies “Infamia” as a pervasive legal construct, intricately linked with notions of reputation, honor, and societal standing. The concept significantly influenced various aspects of Roman jurisprudence, spanning from contractual relations (such as fiducia, societas, depositum, tutela, and mandatum) to inheritance laws, and even marital unions. This study underscores the intricate interplay between legal regulations and moral considerations, illustrating how Roman society intertwined religious beliefs, trust, and conscientiousness in shaping legal conduct.Examining the inheritance laws, the research delineates the pivotal role of “Infamia” in determining the transfer of rights and responsibilities following an individual’s demise. The inheritance process becomes a crucial juncture where societal values are intertwined with legal mandates, influencing the distribution of familial assets. Notably, the Roman institution of “pater familias” vested nearly absolute authority over familial members, restricting their ownership rights. Furthermore, the study traces the evolution of inheritance practices through distinct historical periods, including the legislative reforms introduced by Justinian. These amendments aimed to rectify perceived injustices, providing mechanisms for disinherited heirs to contest their exclusion through the querella inofficiosi testamenti. The research also scrutinizes “Infamia” within the realm of marital law, discerning its presence in the dissolution of marriages through practices like “divoritum” and “repudium.” These terminations, whether consensual or unilateral, bore financial and reputational consequences, with the latter potentially resulting in societal disgrace. In conclusion, this comprehensive review illuminates the intricate and dynamic role of “Infamia” in Roman legal and societal frameworks. It underscores how this concept permeated various facets of Roman life, serving as a potent tool for regulating conduct, shaping social relations, and upholding moral values. By synthesizing a diverse range of scholarly works, this study offers a holistic understanding of “Infamia” and its far-reaching implications in ancient Rome.

In many churches nowadays, there has been a standardized approach to premarital counseling for couples involving social, pastoral, and psychological perspectives. In contrast, many rabbis and other Jewish officials still concentrate on legal aspects alone. The need for resolving important issues on the verge of wedlock is too often left to secular experts in law, psychology, or counseling. However, in recent years, this lack of formal training for marriage preparation has also been acknowledged by the Jewish clergy in order to incorporate it in the preparatory period before the bond is tied. This case study focuses on Jewish and Roman Catholic conceptions of marriage, past and present. We intend to do a comparative analysis of the prerequisites of religious marriage based on the assumption that both Judaism and the Roman Catholic Church have a distinct legal framework to assess marriage preparation.

I am grateful to the Ecclesiastical Law Society and the Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland for their invitation to address this theme, although I have to confess, as a non-lawyer, I do feel rather a fraud standing here. I take comfort, however, first from the fact that, albeit welcome, your invitation was unsought, and second from my understanding that the purpose of canon law is to give legal expression to the theology of the church and that the purpose of the theology of the Church (in its positive and articulated aspects) is to explain the purposes and the work of God. In other words, the ultimate point of canon law is and must be pastoral, as is well expressed by the last canon, Canon 1752, of the 1983 Code of Canon Law for the Roman Catholic Church, with its reference to ‘the salvation of souls, which in the Church must always be the supreme law’.

The article discusses some aspects of the influence of RomanByzantine law on the legal system of Kievan Rus. Such legal transplants were conducted through the religious sphere of society, namely, through representatives of the clergy and institutions of the Christian church. The author comes to the conclusion that the legal doctrine of Russia had been Christian-centric since the time of the Kievan Rus. The ancient Slavs were not only ready for the adoption of such a legal paradigm, but even demanded it. In particular, this is indicated by the granting to the church court of several greater powers than in Byzantium. According to the author, Christian-centricity is a fundamental element of the legal paradigm of modern Russia, which is proven by the peculiarities of constitutional reform in the country.

Several highly critical theological responses to political liberalism have appeared in recent years. John Milbank, continuing his onslaught on all things modern, complains that political liberalism's “empty heart” suffers from a “totalitarian drift” toward “an increasingly joyless and puritanical world.” For Oliver O'Donovan, liberalism is “a false posture of transcendence” and modernity is “conceived as Antichrist, a parodie and corrupt development of Christian social order.” Robert Song warns against “the partial and limited character” of liberalism's freedoms and proclaims that “a responsible theology will learn to articulate its ‘No’” to liberal political society. Other commentators offer critiques of particular aspects of political liberalism, often suggesting revisions based on their own theological perspectives. These critical voices join others such as Stanley Hauerwas, one of liberalism's most outspoken theological critics for more than a quarter century, and they continue a line of critique that extends back through Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth.Not all the theological voices are critical. Christophe Insole, for example, finds that “politically liberal principles are compatible with a full-blooded and theologically main-stream Christian commitment.” Several Roman Catholic theologians have commented on the increasing mutuality between liberal democracy and Roman Catholic political and social teachings. Paul Sigmund notes that “the relation between Catholicism and liberal democracy has now become a positive and, one would hope, a mutually reinforcing one, even if there are a number of continuing tensions between them.” And Daniel Dombrowski offers a general defense of Rawlsian liberalism against claims that it is hostile to religion.

AbstractMany aspects of the remarkable career of the intellectually inclined Roman Catholic priest FC Kolbe of Cape Town have been documented, but little has been published about his opposition to British imperialism during the Second Anglo-Boer War. Particularly in his capacity as the founding editor of the South African Catholic Magazine he sought to influence popular opinion both before and after the eruption of hostilities in October 1899. The present article focuses on the expression of his position in that journal and compares Kolbe's stance with those taken by the editors of certain other religious periodicals and the secular press in the Cape. Also considered is Kolbe's involvement in the editing of Albert Cartwright's anti-war newspaper The South African News, especially his opposition to martial law. The secular reasons for Kolbe's objections to the war are evident; the theological, meta-ethical underpinnings are only obliquely implied in his discourses.

The present article discusses the issue of moral certainty in the canonical process for the annulment of marriage and analyzes the problem of applying the procedural principle testis unus testis nullus. The reason for undertaking the subject was the publication in 2015 of two papal documents of the rank of apostolic letters, which introduced significant changes in the area of the process for the annulment of marriage. One of the aspects that underwent legislative modification was the principle testis unus testis nullus. It was decided that in marriage cases the testimony provided by a single witness may have the value of complete proof, provided that certain conditions are met. Therefore, the current considerations are an attempt to find an answer to the question whether the judge who takes a decision in marriage cases on the grounds of a single-witness testimony is able to achieve inner conviction (certitudo moralis) with regard to the factual state of the matter, and pass a verdict in accordance with the truth. In addition, the article outlines the legal construct of moral certainty, characteristic of canon law, and discusses the principle testis unus testis nullus within the framework of the existing canon law, taking into account a broad historical perspective, including both the biblical-canonical tradition as well as Roman law.

The article analyzes the changes that the metric books of the Roman Catholic parishes of the BSSR underwent in the conditions of the anti-religious campaigns in 1945–1991. With the establishment of the Soviet power on the territory of Belarus, active secularization processes began in all spheres of social life. One of the aspects of the secularization was the ban in 1917 on keeping metric books. They were replaced by the civil status acts registered by the Registry Office. After the accession of Western Belarus to the BSSR in 1939, All Catholic believers in Belarus started getting spiritual guidance from the Apostolic Administration of Vilnius and its branch in Bialystok. As a result, at an unofficial level, due to the demands of the bishops in those Roman Catholic parishes that were not liquidated, the practice of metrication continued. They lasted the whole phase of existence of the Soviet state. The key moment of the functioning of the metric books in the post-war period was the instruction of the Apostolic Administrator in 1948. It emphasized the primacy of the ecclesiastical law over the civil law in relation to the metrication materials. The metric books had lost the rigor of the form. The entries were often made in the school notebooks and on the scraps of paper using the non-literary forms of the language. The right to make an entry in the books on baptisms, marriages, burials was granted to the people who had not been ordained.

This study aimed to describe the millennials' perception of Islam in contemporary society as a basis for interfaith dialogue and cooperation. A descriptive research method was utilized. Respondents were selected using stratified probability sampling. A total of 255 were used primarily as the respondents of this study. The data gathered were analyzed using the SPSS software V21x64. The statistical methods used were frequency and percentage counts, standard deviation, mean, and the grand mean. The respondents’ demographic profile relative to age, the 25-28 age group had more respondents than other age groups. As to sex, females dominated the number of respondents. In terms of tribe, most respondents are Cebuano. Regarding religious affiliation, Roman Catholics have a significant number of respondents and in educational attainment, most of the respondents are high school graduates. Millennials with a moderately high perception of Islam view the religious practices of Islam in a positive light. They may appreciate the emphasis on prayer, fasting, and charity as acts of devotion. Regarding cultural aspects of Islam, millennials with moderately high perceptions may appreciate the rich history and traditions associated with Islamic culture. Relative to governance, millennials with moderately high perceptions may acknowledge the influence of Islamic principles in shaping societies governed by law. They may recognize the importance of justice, fairness, and social welfare in Islamic governance systems and appreciate the emphasis on community and public welfare. Millennials with a moderately high perception of Islam will likely have a positive view of it, appreciating its religious practices, cultural contributions, and governance principles. They may also be open to learning more about Islam and engaging in interfaith dialogue and cooperation with practitioners of different religions.

In this scientific approach, we will focus on the historical dimension of the right of pre-emption. This paper is structured in three chapters highlighting the most important historical aspects underlying the right of pre-emption. Etymologically, pre-emption comes from the Latin words pre (before) and emptio (sale). The first notions of the right of protimis appear in Roman law, where property and inheritance are treated as religious derivations. The great French historian Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges (1830 - 1889), in his work Cité Antique (Ancient City), stated that property appears to be of divine origin.It belongs to a family, which includes the protective gods, the dead and the continuators of the family cult, i.e. those who are alive or those who will be born. Each individual of the family is considered a temporary possessor of the property with the obligation to pass these rights on to the descendants in order to continue the family's domestic cult.

The value of humanity is an attitude or behavior among fellow human beings that is related to mutual tolerance, freedom, openness, fairness, fairness, honesty, between religious communities. Novel Dust Dust Jerusalem tells the story of a difference that occurred between Roman religious, Christian, and Jewish. This difference resulted in a disaster for humans at that time. The method used in this research is Qualitative Descriptive. The approach used is the Sociology of Literature approach. The research data source is the novel DebuYerussalem by QuodvultdeusBagaskoro. The research instrument uses tables of lattice instruments of human values and corpus data. Data collection techniques using text analysis techniques. The validity used is a flowing technique that includes three components of activity namely data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing. The stages of research carried out consist of several stages, namely the initial stage, the implementation phase, and the completion phase.Based on the results of the study, it can be concluded that in the novel DebuYerussalem by QuodvultdeusBagaskoro contains human values that are very useful for the readers. Humanity values contained in the novel cover three aspects of aspects, namely the aspect of justice, fair in deciding a case based on the law and religion that has been determined. Not taking sides with one party but prioritizing peace, choosing for the common good for peace between people. Aspects of suffering, physical and mental suffering with acts of torture include hitting, kicking, killing carried out on humans. Feeling a sense of hurt in humans.The aspect of love, the realization of compassion, compassion, attention expressed by responsible behavior.Providing a sense of devotion and comfort for others.Keywords: Values, humanity, Dust of Jerusalem

The paper presents a comparative legal and comparative historical analysis of one of the aspects of the institution of the arbitration, namely, the election of an arbitrator. The contractual, non-state nature of arbitration leaves the disputing parties with a wide freedom of expression, including in determining the personality of a mediator or intermediaries in resolving a dispute. The paper focuses on identifying the key features that the disputing parties should pay attention to when choosing an arbitrator (judges). The Roman jurists established comprehensive and justified set of personality traits that an arbitrator should possess in order to maintain the general idea of the conclusiveness of judicial decisions. According to the norms of Roman law, an arbitrator must be a free person, physically healthy, with a developed intellect, with life experience, not tainted by immoral acts, not involved in illegal activities, not interested in a certain outcome of the case. In the Middle Ages, the system of mandatory requirements for a mediator in a dispute was reduced due to the simplification of public relations regulated by customary law, which was reflected in legislative documents. Priority was given to the high social stratum, ethnic and religious conformity of the judge to the disputing persons. In modern times, the freedom of litigants to choose arbitrators is almost absolute, taking into account the tendency to individualize the interests of the parties to the conflict and the inability to take into account all the particular circumstances of various disputes that could affect the choice of an arbitrator. Only when resolving economic disputes, the parties were guided by the judge’s special knowledge, which makes it possible to understand the essence of the property dispute and make a fair decision. The analysis made it possible to identify the continuity of the provisions of Roman law and the requirements imposed on the arbitration intermediary in the Middle Ages and Modern times. Historical comparison revealed a tendency to reduce the number of mandatory features of the candidate for arbitration, which determined the growing importance of the freedom of the disputing parties as the most significant feature of the arbitration court.

The Peruvian educational reform law of 1972, promulgated by the military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, was considered at the time one of the best to date in the history of Latin America. With the dismantling of many of the reform laws of the “First Phase” (1968-75) of the revolution during the “Second Phase” (1975-80), and the nearly total repudiation of the entire military period by the democratically elected government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-85), there was no change more regretted than the undoing of the educational reform. One of the main reasons for the reform's setback was the intense opposition it aroused among private upper-class schools which resented the social aspects of the law. Half of these schools were church-run. But contrary to what has happened in other Latin American countries, the battle in Peru was not between an authoritarian laicist state and the Roman Catholic Church. The real forces that lined up against each other in Peru were, on the one hand, the government, the official church and progressive groups within the church, which in the wake of Vatican II and the bishop's conference of Medellín not only came out in support of the law but even participated directly in composing it, and on the other hand, the powerful cluster of upper-class religious and lay schools which represented the traditional and rightest groups in the church. The educational reform, therefore, was the occasion for a clash among Catholics themselves. At the same time it forced the church to make a fundamental choice: between continuing its uncritical support for upper-class religious education or openly siding with the many state-supported church schools for the middle and lower classes, especially in cases of conflict between the two systems.

Violation of the universal requirement of harmony in law causes negative legal consequences. In the end, this leads to the emergence of obstacles in legal regulation, violations of law and order. Long-term violation of harmony in law, caused by stable factors, leads to the emergence of “protrusion of law.” “Protrusion of law” is a complex phenomenon that exists in the legal system of a particular state, associated with the negative influence of long-standing factors of disharmony, manifested in the existence of a set of legal norms (established models of law enforcement and positions of interpretation of law), which for one reason or another is not coherent to the general one, established, legal order, which causes a set of negative consequences in the end, leading to a complex violation of legal regulation. Protrusion has three main forms: normative protrusion (based on a violation of the coherence of a rule of law to other legal norms), law enforcement (sacred with the contradiction of the content of a legal norm and a law enforcement position developed in the course of applying such a norm) and hermeneutic protrusion (associated withare typical, as a rule, for special situations and legal regimes. They are manifested to the greatest extent in conditions of special administrative regimes of emergency and martial law, legal regimes of functioning of certain political regimes (in particular, an autocratic regime). Protrusions are manifested in different ways in legal systems belonging to different legal families. So, in the conditions of the Romano-Germanic legal family, the protrusion of law, as a rule, manifests itself in the normative sphere and is associated with the emergence of legal norms that are not coherent with other norms. The main form of overcoming protrusion is rule-making activity aimed at identifying and eliminating norms that lead to protrusion. In an Anglo-Saxon legal family, protrusion is less likely to occur. The presence of normative non-coherence does not lead directly to negative consequences, but is leveled by the action of the court, which, through case-law, can harmonize this norm in the context of the general legal order. At the same time, protrusions can occur in the very law enforcement practice, causing the destruction of the previously achieved harmony. In the context of other legal systems, the emergence of protrusion, as a rule, is caused by the identification of legal regulations that contradict the basic principle of the formation of such legal systems (religious, doctrinal, traditional).

Romans 6 has been a difficult chapter owing to a number of dialectical elements: being and doing, theology and ethics, indicative and imperative, divine and human agency, and ‘already’ and ‘not yet’. Despite some previous attempts to view this chapter as presenting the theology of baptism, this article argues that Paul’s primary concern in this chapter is to explain the fundamentals of the gospel of grace and their implications for Christian life. The proper understanding of the gospel of grace includes: that everyone belongs to one of the two domains of authority (either under the domain of law/sin or under the domain of grace/Christ); that by the grace of God believers have experienced the transfer of lordship; and that despite this transfer, both aspects of ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ are creatively working together in Christian life. This article concludes with two implications: that the gospel of grace does require (rather than ignore) a moral life and that in Christian moral life we must not lose sight of both God’s empowerment and humans’ power.

Ruler Michael the Brave’s acts, followed, under various forms, by the rulers of Wallachia or even by Transylvanian principles, taken over, later on, by political or military men of the West or of the East, will mark the Romanians’ First Great Union (1600), which he realized and which will be, centuries later, the spur for the Little Union (24 January 1859), under the Ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1859-1866, † 1873), but also for their Second Great Union (1 December 1918), under King Ferdinand I (1914-1927). During the reign of Ruler Michael the Brave, considered, in truth, in the specialized literature, the hero of the Romanians’ three countries’ union, the Ortho¬dox Church of Transylvania recorded a rebirth, by the measures he undertook. These measures were part of the efforts of reorganization of the religious life and consolidation of the Orthodox faith in the face of the protestant propaganda, but also of the Roman-Catholic expansion, especially after the Union of Brest-Litovsk (1595- 1596). It ought to be reminded that neither were the Romanians among the accepted nations of the Principality, nor had their ancestral faith or law been accepted among the ‟accepted religionsˮ or ‟accepted confessionsˮ, the Romanians being granted, in exchange, the status of ‟toleratedˮ, while being not acknowledged among the ‟statesˮ of Transylvania. Thus, in this study were presented, in brief or in detail, the following aspects: 1) the honour received by Michael the Brave in the area of Dâmbovița; 2) the Romanians’ first Great Union, an event realized under Michael the Brave’s sceptre; 3) the elements of the Romanians’ unity and their relation of faith with those of other nations; 4) miracles and acts of confession of the Orthodoxy, being described the liturgical debate of Alba Iulia, according to the testimony of Saint Petru Movilă; 5) a few aspects regarding the Church policy of Ruler Mihael the Brave in Transylvania and the Metropolitan Church he founded at Alba Iulia; 6) the manifestation, by Voivode Michael the Brave, of a conscience of Christian ruler; 7) testimonies regarding Ruler Michael the Brave’s earthly remains. Concerning certain aspects of this part of the study, several keys of interpretation are given, while other aspects await clarification.

Given that the right to marry is an inalienable right of everyone, guaranteed by international law and national legislation of different world countries, it is accordingly forbidden to interfere with the lawful marriage. At the same time, the marriage procedure in different countries has its own characteristics, which depend on such factors as culture, religion, features of the legal system, etc. The influence of these factors on the marriage with a foreign element and some problems that may arise during its conclusion were taken into account while writing this scientific article. Thus, since the current legislation and the legal system of different countries may significantly vary, there may be some problems in the implementation of marital relations with foreigners, which require more detailed study. The problematic issue of realization of marital relations with foreigners on the territory of Ukraine and in foreign countries with different legal systems has been revealed. The procedure of concluding marriage between citizens of the state and certain aspects of marriage with foreigners has been determined. Particular attention has been paid to the analysis of the procedure of marriage with a foreign element in countries with common law, Romano-Germanic and Islamic legal systems. It has been noted that marital and family relations are regulated by separate legislative acts and in some countries by religious norms. The practical aspects of marriage registration have been revealed, in particular, the conditions, the observance of which is obligatory for the registration of marriage with a foreign element have been described and characterized. It has been noted that marriage under current law of different countries can take place only if the established requirements are followed: conclusion of marriage contract, lack of close blood ties, compliance with the requirements of religion, reaching marriage age, mutual consent of both parties, equality, presence of witnesses while concluding a marriage contract and marriage, observance of folk traditions. The emphasis has been placed on the fact that a foreign element within international family law at the time of marriage is manifested in two aspects: as a subject of legal relations and as a legal fact. The authors have analyzed the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in regard to the protection of the rights of married women, which has answers to a wide range of problematic issues that arise in certain life circumstances regarding the conclusion of marriage, including with a foreign element.

The right to human dignity respect is the fundamental aspect for any developed country and its legal system, where human dignity usually takes the most central role. However, taking into account certain provisions of the customary law and its origins, certain cultural or religious aspects in forming the legal regulations, specific court decisions and precedents,it is fair to say that the views on dignity within different legal systems will differ in their own way. In the context of the above, the countries of the Islamic world are no exception, as the study of dignity as a legal category through the prism of Muslim legal experience cannot be separated from the religion. That is because Muslims, as followers of Islam, have their own unique perception of the world based primarily on the ancient religious customs, traditions, beliefs, etc. The Islamic concept of human rights, in comparison with, for example, the Romano-Germanic approaches, does not emphasize the natural origin of rights and freedoms, because its foundation is based on other sources and other values, which in essence constitute the content of the Islamic world order. According to some researchers, the Islamic legal concept is based on such principles as: dignity and brotherhood; equality of all members of Islamic society, without division on the basis of race and colour or social status; respect for the honour, reputation and family of each individual; presumption of innocence and personal freedom. By studying dignity as a legal category through the prism of Islamic religious and legal principles, one can’t but highlight the fact that one of the specifics of such a legal family is the realization that rights and freedoms are the gift of Allah, and rights and freedoms are based on a certain sacred meaning that constitute the will of the Almighty. That is the reason why the dignity in the Muslim world perception is considered something divine, as human rights in Islam derive their power not from the will of the state or representatives of the government machine or human nature, but only from the will of the Creator. Given the sacred content of dignity as a multifaceted category in Muslim law, it is strictly forbidden to take action against a person’s authority, honest name, reputation and position in society. Keywords: human dignity, Islamic law, rights and freedoms, Islam.

The ancient Mesopotamia had ancient civilizations such as Babylonian and Sumerian, which provided many civilizational achievements, such as laws and legislation, which urged respect for women's rights and other legislations to protect such laws, such as the reforms of Prince Urkagina and the law of Hammurabi, which emphasis on some women's rights and dignity and curb violations of men's abuse. However, in most agricultural civilizations, especially the Mesopotamian, the status of women has declined in a patriarchal society. Men direct all aspects of life with their different diversities, make major decisions, and women have to obey this masculine authority. Father, or husband after marriage and family formation. Despite this, the status of women in Mesopotamia was much better than that of other ancient civilizations such as Greek and the Roman. Sumerian women had more rights than women had in the Akkadian, Babylonian and Assyrian cultures. A Sumerian woman can own real estate, run a business alongside her husband, and can be a priest, a writer, a doctor,or act as a judge. It is a tribute to the representatives of the earthly Gods, and it is a source of pride for them. Service of the girls in the temples is also a pride for their fathers. Babel was unique in the way she treated women's rights and status. Babylonian society retained the traditions of the motherly era, and women often took precedence over men. Women were also allowed to enjoy different levels of independense, but they were always subject to men. The laws of Hammurabi presented first model of the laws in the entire ancient world. The status of women in the old Babylonian law has reached an important amount of social, human and legislative progress. Legislation on marriage, its forms, divorce, cases, abuse and marital irregularities, incest and adultery. As for the status of women in the Assyrians, their social status has declined compared to their status in the Sumerian and Babylonian civilizations. They were considered to be the property of men, and they have the right to deprive them of everything they own. Assyrians were also among the oldest religious peoples who subjected women to hijab and included head and face jackets. Only free women were permitted to wear headscarves, while odalisque wore hijab when they went out with their master.

Summary. Religious differences may rise and actually historically rose tensions and even wars. In the history, Christians also caused wars and were a threat to social integration and peace, despite the fact that Christianity is a religion of peace. God in Christians’ vision is a God of peace, and the birth of Son of God was to give peace «among men in whom he is well pleased» (Lk 2,14b). Although Christians themselves caused wars, died in them, were murdered and had to fight, the social doctrine of Christianity is focused on peace. Also the social thought of the Roman Catholic Church strives to build peace. Over the years, the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church was formed, which sees the conditions and foundations for peace. These are: the dignity of the human person, the natural law, human rights, common good, truth, freedom, love and social justice. The development of the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on peace was contributed by popes of XX century: Pius XI (1922–1939), Pius XII (1939–1958), with high impact – John XXIII (1958–1963), Paul VI (1963–1978), Pope John Paul II (1978–2005) and Pope Benedict XVI (2005–2013). After Pope Benedict XVI’s resignation, the most important role of the preceptor in the Church of Rome fulfills Francis – the pope from Argentina. Although his pontificate is not long, and teaching is not complete, but you can tell that he continues to build the social doctrine of the Roman Church in matters of peace through the development of so-called «culture of encounter». Based on selected speeches and letters of two years’ pontificate of Francis, the first figure of «culture of encounter» can be lined out as a way of preventing and resolving tensions in the contemporary world. Fundamentals of the concept of dialogue Francis created in the days of being a Jesuit priest and professor at Jesuit universities. He based it on the concept of Romano Guardini’s dialogue. Foundations of the look at the dialogue – in terms of Jorge Mario Bergoglio are strictly theological: God enters into dialogue with man, what enables man to «leaving himself» and enter into dialogue with others. Bergoglio dealt with various aspects of the dialogue: the Church and the world, culture and faith, dialogue between religions and cultures, dialogue inter-social and inter-national, dialogue rising solidarity and co-creating the common good. According to him the dialogue is a continuous task, not a single event; is overcoming widespread «culture of effacement» and «culture of fight» towards a «culture of encounter»; it releases from autism, isolation, gives strength and meaning of life, renews the ability to listen, lets looking at community in the perspective of the whole and not just selected units. As Bishop of Rome Jorge Mario Bergoglio continues and develops his idea of «a culture of dialogue and encounter». In promoting dialogue, he sees his own mission and permanent commitment imposed on him. He promotes the atmosphere – a kind of «music» – of dialogue, by basing it on emotions, respect, intuition, lack of threat and on trust. The dialogue in this sense sees a partner in each person, values the exchange always positively, and as a result it leads to making life ethical, bringing back respect for life and rights of every human being, granting the world a more human face. «Culture of encounter» has the power of social integration: it removes marginalization, the man is the goal not the means of actions, it does not allow a man to be reduced to a mere object, tools for profit or authority, but includes him into a community that is created by people and for their benefit. Society integrated in this way, constantly following «culture of encounter» rule, renews itself all the time and continually builds peace. All people are called to such building: believers and those who do not believe, all of good will. Also, the heads of state have in this effort of breaking the spiral of violence and a «culture of conflict» – both in economic and political dimension – big task and responsibility. Pope Francis reminded about this in a special letter to president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on September 14, 2014 year. In the letter he wrote: «it is clear that, for the world’s peoples, armed conflicts are always a deliberate negation of international harmony, and create profound divisions and deep wounds which require many years to heal. Wars are a concrete refusal to pursue the great economic and social goals that the international community has set itself, as seen, for example, in the Millennium Development Goals. Unfortunately, the many armed conflicts which continue to afflict the world today present us daily with dramatic images of misery, hunger, illness and death. Without peace, there can be no form of economic development. Violence never begets peace, the necessary condition for development». On thebasis of the current teaching of PopeFrancisthe following conclusion can be drawn, thatthe key topeace in the worldin many dimensions- evenbetweenreligions–isadialoguedeveloped under «cultureof encounter».

This article examines the concept of proprietary expectations in the context of the Anglo-Saxon legal system. It analyzes the nature and significance of property expectations for individuals and companies operating in this legal system. Research focuses on how property expectations affect legal relationships, including contractual obligations, property, and other aspects of civil law. Understanding this concept is important for the effective functioning of the legal system and ensuring justice in society. The Anglo-Saxon legal system, emerging in England before the Norman Conquest of 1066, provides a fascinating study of early medieval property law. This legal framework was characterized by its integration of customary practices, local judicial decisions, and evolving notions of land tenure and ownership. The period saw the development of property expectations rooted in both communal obligations and individual rights, laying foundational principles that would influence English common law.The Anglo-Saxon period (circa 410-1066 AD) was marked by a transition from Roman to Germanic influences, profoundly affecting legal conceptions of property. Land was the primary source of wealth and power, and its control was crucial for maintaining social and political structures. Early Anglo-Saxon laws, as recorded in various legal codes such as those of King Æthelberht, King Ine, and King Alfred, reflect a blend of tribal customs and practical needs of agrarian communities. Property was primarily communal, with the king or local lords acting as custodians of land. The concept of “bookland” (land granted by charter) versus “olkland” (land held by customary right) illustrates the dual nature of property rights, blending formal grants with traditional usage. Inheritance laws were pivotal in ensuring the continuity of landholding families. Male primogeniture was not strictly followed; instead, property could be divided among sons, and even daughters could inherit under certain conditions. Wills and charters often provided detailed instructions for the division of land, reflecting both family intentions and societal norms. Disputes over property were common and were resolved through a mix of local assemblies (moots), royal courts, and ecclesiastical adjudication. Witness testimony and oath-taking were critical in establishing claims, underscoring the importance of community reputation and support. The Church played a significant role in property matters, both as a major landowner and as an influencer of legal principles. Monasteries and bishoprics received extensive land grants, often protected by royal charters. The Church’s involvement added a spiritual dimension to property rights, intertwining religious duty with legal obligations. Over the Anglo-Saxon period, there was a gradual shift from collective to more individualistic notions of property. This transition was facilitated by the increasing use of written charters, which provided clearer, legally enforceable records of land transactions. The development of more formalized legal procedures also contributed to this evolution, offering more consistent mechanisms for resolving disputes and enforcing property rights. The property expectations and legal practices of the Anglo-Saxon era laid the groundwork for the feudal system introduced by the Normans. Many principles, such as the importance of written documentation, judicial dispute resolution, and the interplay between royal authority and local customs, persisted and evolved into the common law traditions of England. The Anglo-Saxon legal system’s treatment of property provides invaluable insights into the early development of English law. By balancing communal norms with emerging individual rights, it established enduring principles that would shape the trajectory of property law in medieval England and beyond. Understanding these early legal frameworks helps to appreciate the complexities and continuities in the history of English property law.

Bali, as a province with strong roots in local cultural traditions and significant economic importance for Indonesia, is striving to balance modernity and tradition, economics, especially mass tourism, and cultural identity. This is why Universitas Warmadewa, one of the largest Balinese universities, chooses the theme ‘Local Wisdom and Business Law’ for its international conferences each year.As a non-Indonesian legal scholar, this theme presents two challenges for me. Firstly, I am not an expert in tourism economics and can only approach the topic from a traditional market law perspective, theoretically. Secondly, the terms used in Indonesian legal discussions may seem vague and unclear from a German perspective, as the legal discussion in Indonesia integrates traditional legal phenomena pragmatically into the applicable legal system. This may also be historically conditioned because since independence Indonesia has to handle a legal pluralism in law, which also finds its cause in the legacy of the colonial era.When speaking on the legal perspective of ‘local wisdom’, several questions are unclear to me:What exactly is local wisdom and how can it be defined?Where does it fit into the Indonesian legal system?What role can local wisdom play in contemporary law?Local wisdom may be understood as part of traditional customary law or Adat, at least in terms of its influence on legal issues, as the conference theme suggests. The terminology around ‘customary law’, ‘Adat’, ‘indigenous law’, or ‘living law’ is still a problematic issue in Indonesian scientific discussion and should only be briefly mentioned in this presentation. The term ‘Adat law’ was originally not used in Indonesian society and was first systematically used by the Dutch. Van Vollenhoven, considered the ‘father of Indonesian Adat law’ by Indonesian scholars, defined Adat law as law that is not based on codified legal rules from the legislator. This definition is still used by contemporary Indonesian scholars. Adat law in this sense contains sanctions, making the character of ‘law’. It was characterized by Van Vollenhoven as dynamic and flexible folk law, which combines the term with the often-used term of ‘living law’. There are numerous discussions in Indonesian literature about Indonesian customary law, its functions, and significance, but the terminology has not been clearly defined and the role of religious law is also subject to numerous publications.Therefore, having read various contributions on the topic, I am left confused because some of them discuss the existence of legal principles of living customary law and describe them as “national Indonesian principles,” which can replace parts of the post-colonial Indonesian law, but they do not clearly identify these principles. The topic seems to be of almost patriotic importance to Indonesia, making it particularly difficult for foreign scholars to approach the subject in presentations before Indonesian colleagues. My contribution should be seen in light of this difficulty, as a first observation of the phenomenon from a foreign perspective.The term Adat is already difficult to comprehend, and this is even more true for the term “local wisdom” in a legal context. So, what is the “Local Wisdom” that I am asked to talk about? The Terms of Reference of our conference describe the meaning of “local wisdom” mainly as the clash of market actors in local Balinese tourism that can lead to conflicts, which the law should resolve. These conflicts are said to occur because local communities and institutions, based on a kind of traditionally grown trust, seek to build and maintain their business relationships in the tourism industry. This trust, which one could call “traditional good faith,” meets the need to regulate contractual arrangements more formally in terms of contract law (“more official...instead of just relying on promises or good faith”).In this sense, local wisdom is an aspect of good faith. Based on this understanding of the term, I have no systematic issues with the term “local wisdom.” However, it should be noted that good faith and contract, as a predictable shaping of legal relationships between market actors, should not be seen as opposites. It is possible and necessary to resolve disruptions in contractual relationships in light of good faith and, if necessary, adapt contractual regulations. Here, “local wisdom” should not be understood as a unique source of good faith, but as a general aspect that can influence the expectations of the contracting parties and their trust in shaping the law. This raises the question of which factors should be taken into account by the non-local contracting party in good faith, and which should not. It is a question of the concrete assessment of the structure of interests and the balance of the contract, how to allocate risk and assign external aspects to the contracting parties and which aspects should be considered subsequently.This is a theoretical matter, and it is unlikely to play a significant role in practice since local market actors and communities have the freedom, within the framework of private autonomy, to incorporate their traditional interests into the contract negotiations. This allows for traditional interests to participate in the “equivalence justice” of the contract. However, if the traditional interests of the local community result in unacceptable consequences for the contract’s execution, the question of whether these reasons can lead to a change in the contract’s basis may arise. In civil law systems, the clausula rebus sic stantibus is regulated as a limitation of the pacta sunt servanda principle and falls under the principle of good faith (bona fides). If the invocation of “local wisdom” by one party leads to the other party having to agree to an adjustment, it would have to be examined.I would like to give you an example of this, which seems credible even if no prove about the issue can be delivered due to the ‘popular’ source: A person without Indonesian citizenship acquired the right to use a plot of land with a house in Bali ten years ago. Since foreigners cannot acquire land ownership in Indonesia themselves, the foreigner had agreed on a legal arrangement with an Indonesian citizen resident in Bali, in which the Indonesian acquired ownership (hak milik) of the land with the foreigner’s money and agreed on right to use for the foreign partner. After ten years, the foreigner wanted to sell the property again to move to his country of origin. The agreement with the Indonesian partner stipulated that the Indonesian partner must agree to the sale of the plot on the wish of the foreign partner and would receive 10% of the sale amount in the event of a sale. In the case described, however, the Indonesian partner seems to have refused to sell the property on the agreed terms. He was not satisfied with the 10% share and demanded a 70% share instead. As justification for this, he argued that the contract terms should be changed because he had spiritually enhanced the property over the years through certain religious rituals and this required a revaluation of his shareholding.It is not known whether the case was heard in an Indonesian court and how it was finally settled. Assuming the case had occurred as described, from the perspective of Indonesian civil law, it is clear that no change in the business basis of the contract occurred as a result of the Indonesian partner’s spiritual acts, which can lead to an adjustment of the agreement between him and the foreign contractual partner. Just as local communities depend on their interests in cultural identity being taken into account even in legal relations with partners coming from outside, foreign investors must be able to rely on certain standards of contractual obligation. The principle of good faith would be grotesquely overstretched if local contracting partners could use fuzzy notions of ‘local wisdom’ to make contractual arrangements more flexible in their favour.Another example of the clash between traditional legal customs and supra-regional legal ideas in highly traditional markets with supra-regional economic importance, such as Bali, is the handling of legal disputes and methods of dispute resolution. The trust of traditional communities in supra-legal ties of interest in business relationships, as mentioned in the Terms of Reference to this Conference, meets a systemic trust in formal contractual regulations of non-local actors. The reference points of trust of the respective groups of market actors thus differ. This also affects dispute resolution. According to Sulastriyono, the voluntary character of traditional customary law has the advantage over civil law methods of litigation and dispute resolution of a ‘win-win’ solution, which leads to greater acceptance of the solution by the parties to the conflict. In theory, this is undeniable. However, it is questionable whether this acceptance can also be achieved among contract participants who do not originate from the respective culture, because the existence of sufficient advantages for a party may well depend on the integration of the party in the respective local society. Moreover, the indisputable advantages of consensual dispute resolution can also be well integrated in state procedural law via mediation mechanisms.Cases such as the one outlined one above would in principle be likely to erode the confidence of foreign investors in Indonesian law in general if courts do not rule clearly and draw clear boundaries here. The example seems to be a particularly extreme case, but it shows how important it is to clearly determine the meaning and possible role of terms such as ‘local wisdom’ and ‘tradition’ for use in law. Culturally related aspects are prone to serve as a tool for discrimination against individuals and companies that do not belong to the respective cultural environment. The difficulty, for example, of establishing an intellectual property right on cultural heritage follows not only from the contrast between individual subjective rights and collective subjective rights. It follows above all from the problem of determining the collective rights holders who are to benefit from ‘their’ cultural heritage. Who is a member of a certain culture? Is there a generational link or does it depend on the integration of the individual into his or her living environment? If the legal system does not want to fall back to abstruse considerations of ‘blood identity’, what remains is the assignment of such claims to territorial authorities or the state itself, whose task it is to protect cultural diversity on its territory. This is the path that the Indonesian legislature had taken in Art 38 Law No 28/2014 on copyright law.The misuse of cultural aspects carried into the application of law is also visible in another aspect: In another paper I have pointed out the problem that the concept of traditional customary law in Indonesian law and the position of Adat law in the hierarchy of norms seems in need of clarification. Shidarta notes that there is no sufficient clarity about the relationship between Adat law and state law and thus no consistent system of Indonesian law as a whole. Accordingly, the maturation of an independent Indonesian legal system suffers to this day from the internal conflict with the colonial legacy of existing state law based on Dutch civil law and the lack of a consistent overarching pluralistic concept of law. This is seen by Shidarta as a major reason why the systematic positions of customary law, Islamic law and western law within national law are not clearly defined and why a clear hierarchical determination of the various sources of law in relation to national law is lacking. The doubts about the systematic location and certainly also the failure to establish the principles of traditional customary law as original Indonesian law after the attainment of independence instead of the sources of law inherited from the colonial period are probably due - in addition to the idea of the state founders of an Indonesian unitary state (‘eenheidstaat’) - above all to the disagreement about the concept of customary law, which is formally understood in the sense of a binding source of law defined during the colonial period, or as post-colonial Adat law in the sense of traditional customary rights of various Indonesian ethnic groups either with a binding character or as norms of social order based on voluntariness. In this respect, too, different definitions of the term can be found in the literature:There is thus generally a more philosophical recognition of the importance of traditional customary law in the sense that customary law reflects the actual sense of law of the people and the Indonesian people as a nation. The latter statement seems problematic to me because the statement only applies with regard to the significance of customary law as a source of law, but not to the content of the individual customary laws of the various ethnic groups, in which different legal customs apply in each case. It therefore seems questionable to me whether Adat law can be understood in the sense of an alternative to Indonesian state law. In my opinion, Adat as a source of concrete legal norms has a supplementary development perspective in the communal area. Here it can certainly have an influence on economic life in the regions if it is applied consistently and transparently, and its importance would grow especially if the autonomy of municipal territorial units were strengthened, and a strong federalism were developed. However, a scientific inventory of norms and principles of local customary law is then required, and a clear formulation of such norms is needed, because it must be ruled out that the invocation of undefined, non-transparent or arbitrarily formulated Adat rules unduly restricts the freedom of market actors and are used as protectionist instruments in the provinces.In this sense, I believe that the postulate that Indonesian law must simply recognise Adat law as it has grown and as it is applied alive within the Indonesian local societies falls short, because the compatibility of social rules based on voluntariness and constantly changing with the overall legal system based on the rule of law is at least debatable. In other words: either one renounces the legal certainty and predictability of legal norms in the area of traditional customary law. This could then constitute a breach of the constitutionally enshrined principle of the Rule of Law. Or one formulates clear norms based on traditional legal principles, which have the character of binding legal norms and applies them in the sense of subsidiarity in the local environment with priority over central state law in certain predefined aspects. Then the rules of the hierarchy of norms must be correspondingly clear. However, the question of the hierarchy of norms then no longer presents itself as a problem of the nature of Adat or customary law because the latter would have lost its character as actual customary law. The advocates of a strong recognition of Adat by state law will, however, reject this path because they see the advantage of traditional customary law over state law precisely in its flexibility and ability to change. This flexibility would no longer be readily available through an integration of traditional principles into a local classical law in the sense of imperative norms.A clear hierarchy of norms defined by constitutional law seems indispensable, because such local customary law cannot displace state law without further ado, but only if the principle of subsidiarity and the better regulation of local circumstances by local law indicates otherwise. This would also be in line with the philosophical assessment of local customary law as the law that best captures the living conditions of the people in its cultural area of application. The importance of the principle of subsidiarity should generally be given more attention in the discussion on legal pluralism in Indonesia. This can not only ensure greater recognition of traditional customary law, but also enable the transparency necessary for the predictability of the law.Insofar as Adat is to be understood as the source of ‘abstract normative’ aspects, as certain common Indonesian legal values and principles in the sense of a ‘pan-Indonesian’ legal order and, as such, is to find its way into an independent state Indonesian civil law, legal scholarship in Indonesia will also have to identify and clearly define these principles. In doing so, it will be necessary to determine which principles of traditional customary law in the various regions of the archipelago are suitable as overarching legal principles, so that they can possibly have an identity-forming effect in a national private law. This difficult process might lead to reform of the Indonesian Civil Law which meets the special requirements of a socially and culturally integrated legal system.Indonesia as a state with a unified internal market needs a cross-cultural private law and commercial law. Consideration of the interests of local communities and traditions is of importance in a multicultural state. The Indonesian constitution therefore emphasises the specifics of traditional rights and thus guarantees Adat its own status in the legal system. However, there seems to be a lack of a clear hierarchy of norms in the legal system and a clear definition of the nature of Adat. A hint of a certain hierarchy between Adat and state law is indeed found in agricultural law (Art. 5 Law No. 5/1960 on the Basic Regulations of Agrarian Principles) and in forestry law (Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry). Adat is recognised here but must harmonise with state law. It is therefore likely to be in a relationship of subsidiarity to state law. The fundamental assertion of the primacy of state law over other co-existing legal systems is also in line with the view of Indonesian legal scholars such as Sunaryati Hartono. Referring to Griffiths’ formulation of “weak legal pluralism”, where co-existing legal systems are subordinated to a dominant formalistic national law, it can be stated that the Indonesian legal system follows this model.In my opinion, the integration of traditional customary law into the legal system should not be done as a mere tolerance of state law towards deviating regulations of facts in certain regions. From my perspective as a foreign observer, this seems to lead to significant problems for the development of the Indonesian economy and for investment. In particular, this seems to me to be the case for Bali. Local Wisdom can be incorporated into the contractual relations of the parties within the framework of private autonomous arrangements. A ‘creative’ qualification of protectionist measures against outside market actors or the justification of the failure to sanction breaches of contract or violations of law against outsiders as ‘Adat’ or ‘protection of local traditions’ should be consistently avoided.Incidentally, it seems to me that in contract law there is no real opposition between state law and traditional customary law. Either the parties trust each other, in which case state law does not prevent an agreement based on good faith. Or they do not, in which case only state contract law can lead to proper solutions. The same applies to traditional dispute resolution methods, to which the parties to the conflict can easily submit. In contrast, the integration of customary law as independent Indonesian legal principles or as legal norms at the local or municipal level into Indonesian law would require considerable academic effort. For this, the principles concerned would have to be clearly identified, systematised, and formulated to be able to substantiate a claim to validity beyond the respective local communities. The mere reference to historically evolved convictions of local communities is too vague. The term ‘local wisdom’ seems to me to be problematic in this sense to accurately describe the question of the collision of traditional customs and expectations of outside market actors, especially since it is already conceptually positively evaluative. Finally, it should not be forgotten, that the continental European codifications are culturally neutral and in big parts based on the Roman law. Roman law itself was not developed under the cultural framework of northern and middle European regions, however it served well as source for the modern European codifications. These codifications are working fine until these days in different nations without obvious incompatibilities with local traditions. The amount of a ‘Volksgeist’ after the idea of Friedrich Carl von Savigny within the Private Law does not play a big role in the contemporary discussion as law should be seen in a pragmatic way as a viable tool to organize the modern society. Indonesia is an important economically emerging nation. As such it might be a good idea to keep an internationally compatible private law, which might be carefully adapted to certain peculiarities of the Indonesian society. The use of general clauses as entrance doors for local legal convictions seems to be a good way for that and a clearly defined legal hierarchy with a constitutionally based legal subsidiarity principle seems important. In contrast, the foundation of modern law on nationalistic, local, or indigenous traditional customs should only be done with extreme caution, if at all. The contemporary discussion on the role of Adat in Indonesian law shows the great difficulty of determining viable legal rules that can enter a future reformed Indonesian private law as ‘originally Indonesian’. The criticism against Von Savigny’s ‘Volksgeist’ idea also applies here: Defining who the ‘people’ are and what constitutes their common identity is already hardly rationally possible in a non-multi-ethnic state, even more in a multi-ethnic state. National identity-forming circumstances are hardly suitable as common principles for pluralistic societies.

At all stages of history, an important role in the sphere of social relations was played by religion, which also acted as the most important factor in the interaction between society and the state. Although religion can be considered as an independent legal system, such as Sharia, and in the general form of religious law, in the concept of law, the religious function, it seems, should be highlighted in particular in view of the fact that it plays an independent role in the entire legal system and develops in a special way. The purpose of the article is to show the evolution of the religious function in Roman law, which underlies many modern legal systems. The sacred function was the main one at the beginning of the formation of Roman law, and then more features that were secular began to appear in it. However, the transition to the Empire led to the fact that the religious function was firmly entrenched in Roman public law, and during the period of Christianization of the 4th century, this function assumed consolidation in laws the formulas of faith binding on all the subjects.

One hears frequently of missionaries and often about the Roman Catholic Church's missionary effort. But seldom does one find in English a survey of the canon law of Roman Catholic missionary prelates. This may be because the canon law of missions was perfected only in this century and because to this day it remains only partly codified. In any case, for reasons which will later become apparent, this body of canon law has special application in the Commonwealth.

Roman canon law did not cease to have an effect within the Church of England after the Reformation. English ecclesiastical lawyers continued to use pre-Reformation foreign papal law and domestic provincial and legatine law. These lawyers used several ideas to explain its status in pre-Reformation England. They usually held that it continued in force after the Reformation on the basis of section 7 of the Submission of the Clergy Act 1533 (if not repugnant to laws of the realm) – and a commission would reform it. However, it is submitted here that this statute enabled the continuance of only domestic provincial law and perhaps legatine law but not foreign papal law. Yet a 1543 statute continued the provincial law and ‘other ecclesiastical laws’ used in England, which may or may not have included legatine and papal law. Another of 1549 has no continuance provision, but the commission was to review ‘ecclesiastical laws used here’ – which, too, may or may not include legatine and papal law. A statute of 1553 repealed these earlier statutes. A statute of 1558 repealed that of 1553 but revived only the 1533 statute, not those of 1543 or 1549. This suggests that only domestic provincial law, and perhaps legatine law, continued on the basis of statute, and not foreign papal laws. The latter might have applied from 1543 to 1553 but not after 1558, as only the 1533 statute perpetuating solely domestic law was revived. Nevertheless, English lawyers continued to invoke foreign Roman canon law. By the nineteenth century they did so on basis of custom not statute – and the 1533 Act section 7 was repealed in 1969.

Freedom of testation remains one of the cornerstones of the South African law of succession. Nobody irrespective of his/her relationship to the deceased, can in principle lay claim to benefit from the estate of a deceased in contravention of the validly executed last will of the testator. There is no claim to a legitimate portion. Although South African law does recognise a dualistic approach to some aspects of private law, eg by recognising a polygenic marriage if the couple adhere to the particular customary principles, no alternative set of principles for the law of succession is recognised. If the deceased has preferred to dispose of his/her assets according to his/her last will, the will must comply with all the requirements of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 and not be in conflict with the rich heritage of principles governing the law of testate succession. No separate set of rules to govern the administration of the estate of a deceased who belonged to a particular religious belief, cultural grouping or sports club is recognised. To the extent that a deceased has not disposed validly of all his/her assets in a last will, the default principles of the uniform law of intestate succession will govern the disposition of the uncovered assets. If a deceased has felt compelled by religious belief or for any other reason to benefit his sons more liberally than his daughters, then this is an exercise of freedom of testation and not of unfair discrimination. The testator is not unfairly discriminating against anybody not mentioned as a beneficiary for whatever portion of the estate for the same reason that John is not unfairly discriminating against June by proposing marriage to her sister, Mary, and not June. Such discrimination is fair in a legal system valuing the individual integrity of its citizens as legal personalities. In similar vein, the fact that the rest of the milliards of peoples in the world have not been mentioned as beneficiaries in the last will of the testator does not translate to those milliards being unfairly disinherited – nemo damnum sentire debet per alterius lucrum – no one ought to be prejudiced through benefiting another. Disinheritance is neither defined in the Wills Act nor carries a defined content in common law. The emphasis is on the positive exercise of freedom of testation to identify the chosen beneficiaries and not on motivating why the rest of the milliards of the world are not named as beneficiaries. Disinheritance is not to be confused with qualifying to become a potential beneficiary with unfair conditions, eg my daughter will be my sole beneficiary on condition that she divorces her current husband, John. Such a condition is contra bonos mores and should be treated as pro non scripto. In addition to the rich heritage of principles governing succession to assets of a deceased received from the Roman-Dutch and common law, the legislature has incorporated new rules into the law of succession. Apart from the well-known received principles governing the disqualification of certain persons from benefiting from the estate of a deceased, irrespective of whether the testate or intestate norms govern the particular dispositions, eg the bloedige-hand rule disqualifies the person responsible for the demise of the deceased from any form of benefiting from his/her involvement with the demise of the deceased, the act also disqualifies the witness, amanuensis or executor involved with the execution of the last will from benefiting from that will. Whenever any person is consequently disqualified as beneficiary for any of these reasons, he/she is not disinherited as such, but disqualified. In these cases, the named potential beneficiaries do not qualify as potential beneficiaries because of their involvement with the execution of the last will and the perceived possibility of undue influence on the exercise by the testator of his/her freedom of testation. The additional statutory conditional disqualification of the erstwhile spouse of the testator, who was divorced from the testator less than three months before the demise of the latter, belongs to the same type of disqualification; it is not an example of statutory disinheritance either. In JW v Williams-Ashman NO ((823/2020) 2023 ZASCA 44 (31 March 2023)) the supreme court of appeal upheld the correct decision in the court a quo and dismissed the appeal of the appellant as erstwhile husband of the deceased because the couple had been divorced less than three months before her demise. Although mentioned as sole beneficiary in her last will executed before their marriage, the erstwhile husband is disqualified from benefiting from anything in her last will. Because no potential beneficiary acquires any patrimonial right owing to the spes of being a potential beneficiary of the testator before delatio and dies cedit, the effect of section 2B of the Wills Act is not to dispossess the hopeful potential beneficiary of any patrimonial benefit – even if all patrimonial rights are to be included under the term “property” in section 25 of the constitution. Contrary to the formulation used in the decision of the supreme court of appeal, this is not an instance of disinheritance at all: “Section 2B thus disinherits the previous spouse, by operation of law, should the testatrix die within the 3 months period” (par 19). This statutory disqualification in section 2B of the Wills Act of the potential competency of the erstwhile husband as divorcee is in harmony with the best practice encountered in comparable legal systems: “that will shall be implemented in the same manner as it would have been implemented if his previous spouse had died before the date of the dissolution concerned, unless it appears from the will that the testator intended to benefit his previous spouse notwithstanding the dissolution of his marriage”. If any amendment to this section is to be considered in future, it should then be to expand the amendment to all forms of living arrangements, not limiting its effect to legally married people only; the time limitation of three months after divorce should also be deleted. Any beneficiary named as such in a will of an erstwhile spouse executed under seriously different circumstances than those which prevail after a divorce, should automatically be disqualified from benefiting under a clause in the testator’s will unless, after the divorce, the erstwhile spouse was again named a testamentary beneficiary in a newly executed testamentary writing that complies with all the requirements for the execution of a valid will. For example where the will, as in this case, was executed before the marriage and when the couple were still contemplating to be married “till death us do part”. The statutory disqualification contained in section 2B of the Wills Act does not fall foul of the provision contained in the bill of rights against unfair discrimination merely because it centres on marital status, gender or sexual orientation: “Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) [ie including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth] is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair” (s 9(5)). It would be a pity if the constitutional court should in future consider following its unconvincing judgment in King NNO v De Jager (2021 4 SA 1 (CC)) and also judge this clause in section 2B to be an exercise of unfair discrimination. It remains to be seen how the apex court is going to apply its reasoning in the King case to a validly executed will by a deceased who, as a devoted Muslim, exercised his freedom of testation to abide by the rule in the Holy Qur’an (4: 11) that obliges him regarding his children’s inheritance: to bequeath to every male child, a portion equal to that of two females because these fixed shares are ordained by Allâh.

This essay overviews key aspects of Stratford Caldecott’s idea of liberal arts education, within the Roman Catholic tradition and especially focuses on the centrality of the Eucharist in his thought. It also considers how, according to Caldecott, liberal arts education contains a kind of liturgical affordance or sympathy with the form and nature of worship (within Roman Catholicism). In so doing, this paper offers, to date, the most substantive scholarly introduction to key aspects of Caldecott’s Eucharistic idea of education, within the context of the liberal arts tradition (broadly conceived).

A.H.M. Jones, the great British historian of the later Roman Empire, was once asked what difference conversion to Christianity made to Rome. His answer: None. Brutal gladiatorial contests continued to be held, slavery was not abolished, and cruel penalties were laid down for seemingly minor moral infractions. Thus, Jones reasoned, the actual impact of Christianity on secular Roman society is difficult to see. Jones's view, however, has not been universally shared, particularly when it comes to the Roman legal system. Biondo Biondi saw Christianity as bringing about “un profundo rivolgimento” in late Roman law, which had ramifications in many different areas. As a religion, Christianity differed in unmistakable ways from its pagan competitors, and it would be quite surprising if these differences did not have some impact on Roman law and society when Christianity was adopted as the official state religion. The late Roman era offers a fertile testing ground for the impact a nascent religion might have on a society and its legal institutions.

Throughout history, the legal regulation of holidays has been the product of human needs for rest and entertainment, religious beliefs, and pragmatic economic imperatives dictating the optimal use of time to produce goods. The first part of the article examines the significance of the division between dies fasti and dies nefasti and explores the categorisation of holidays in the Roman pagan era and their legal implications. The author then looks at the origins of Sunday as a day of rest and considers Theodosius’ reform of the Roman calendar. This reform established the liturgical year in the emerging Christian state, and enduringly shaped the calendar of most European countries. The third part considers the attitude of the late Roman state towards Jewish and pagan festivals, and the innovations in medieval ecclesiastical legislation concerning holidays. The final section of the paper reflects on the role of tradition in the state’s recognition of religious festivals as public holidays.

‘Is there some other form of law?’ – that is how Gaius Iulius Caesar (played by Ciaran Hinds) in the TV series ‘Rome’ comments on Roman Law. ‘Rome’ (2005–2007) is a historical drama set in the last days of the Roman Republic. It is one of the most interesting shows helping to visualize Rome. One of the elements portrayed in the series is Roman Law. Although there is a criminal trial presented in one of the episodes the audience is rarely acquainted with law and its rules directly, Roman legal system can be discovered mostly through characters’ actions. There are many legal elements e.g.: penal trial, executing penalty (damnatio ad gladium ludi), manumission (manumissio), funeral arrangements, or corporal punishment of the soldiers (castigatio). Some of the legal aspects are presented correctly others contain some discrepancies; nevertheless there is a quite interesting portrayal of Roman Law in the series. The aim of the article is to find and describe some legal issues presented in ‘Rome’. It can be both scientific and educational. Nowadays the lecturers search for innovative or more engaging ways to teach, I believe the series could be a useful tool for students of law.

Abstract Aim of this paper is to describe the strategies that a specific type of Roman priests, namely the galli who worshipped the goddess Mater Magna, used to enhance their own religious authority. By doing so, they were transcending a state-given political hierarchy and a long established social normativity, namely the masculine hegemony of the ancient Roman society. More generally, temporary priestly offices were highly political: every Roman statesman had to fulfil at least one such office for some time during his life. However, there were also priests and priestesses that held their offices for life. Lacking the possibility of generating prestige through warfare or political success, like Roman statesmen, the galli had to garner prestige in their lifelong priesthood, and consequently social power, through different aspects. Specific religious services, such as sacrifices, spells, etc., were one possibility. However, the galli’s power could also have been generated through social aspects, such as habitus, which is rooted in the living conditions, the cultural milieu, and the biography of an individual (Schreg, Zerres, et al. 2013, 101). This article discusses the case of the priesthood of the Mater Magna cult, a religion that emerged in Rome at the end of the 3rd century BCE and in which the priests applied a specific form of stigma management to foster their religious authority. I argue that the priesthood of the Mater Magna—although they were even defamed by the Roman intellectuals for their inconclusive sex—made use of their ‘otherness’ to generate a certain religious authority, as a form of stigma management, that elevated them in the social hierarchy and created heterarchical relations.

The article is devoted to the study of the main points of Roman law and its impact on the progressive development of social relations from patriarchal to capitalist, reflected in the evolution of constitutional law. In accordance with this, people’s worldview, cultural and scientific values of society, as well as religious aspirations changed.

The aim of the research: to identify changes in the nature of relationship between mythological, religious and social aspects in the sphere of agonistics in Ancient Greece in the Roman Era. Methods and research: Analysis of literature and written sources on the history of ancient agonistics. The result of the study is the determination of the specific traits of agonal traditions of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. The article explores the sacral and secular aspects of the traditions and rules of antique agon. The Author shows a change in their ratio in Ancient Greece in the Roman Era. The paper focuses on the process of transformation of the sacral and secular content of agonistics and a variety of agon in Ancient Greece in the Roman Era, which is characterized by the clash of Hellenic and Roman agonal traditions. One of the most significant phenomena in the ideological life of that period was the cult of the Emperor, which was the official political religion of the Roman Empire. The Emperor’s cult with agon as one of the rituals became widespread in the western and eastern provinces including Greece. Greece had the status of "Achaea Roman Province" at that time. The Author describes the events that took place in Olympia and other religious centers of Ancient Greece at that time. Conclusion: Agonist features of the period were determined by changing the ratio of religious and social components of agonistics and transforming agony as a religious ritual into a spectacle that was widely used for political purposes.

La nueva Constitución Apostólica sobre la Curia romana viene a dar estabilidad a la reforma emprendida por el papa Francisco desde el inicio de su pontificado. Formula una serie de principios y criterios transversales, cuyos ejes fundamentales son la misión y el servicio, que afectan por igual a todos los que prestan servicio en la Curia y exigirán una actualización de la organización. Al tiempo, sienta las bases para una mayor participación, incluso en puestos de gobierno y responsabilidad, de fieles laicos, así como para el desarrollo de un estilo de trabajo basado en la ayuda mutua y la cooperación. En este artículo se hará un estudio de la composición de las instituciones curiales y de los aspectos relacionados con sus componentes, tales como la profesionalidad y otras cualidades necesarias para la idoneidad. Finalmente, se hará una relación de los oficios de nombramiento pontificio encomendados a laicos.

The debate in January 2007, as presented by the mass media, concerning whether an exemption should be provided for Roman Catholic Adoption Agencies from new laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the provision of goods and services, rested upon two erroneous assumptions. The first was an assumption that awarding exemptions on grounds of religion was novel; the second was that the debate concerned whether there ought to be a religious exemption at all. This article seeks to engage with the real debate concerning the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, which is not whether there ought to be a religious exemption (since one has been given) but rather the scope of the exemption. It also aims to show that religious exemptions are common in English law, including discrimination law, and to elucidate the various exemptions, paying particular attention to their beneficiaries and the basis on which discrimination is permitted. In short, this article seeks to understand the state of the law as a whole contextualising the recent moral panic.

The article is the study of certain periods of the development of abuse of right in civil proceedings. It is noted that one can foundthe first references to the abuse of right and its consequences for the legal order as a whole, as well as prototypes of liability for its commission,in the ancient documents of Roman law. It is substantiated that the Romans, in their understanding of the limits of the exercise of subjective rights, worked the way upfrom giving absolute freedom in its exercise to identifying typical cases of unfair behavior and reasonably prohibiting it in case of intentionsto cause harm to others. Actually, the intentions to cause harm to another person by one’s actions became one of the reasons forthe legislative description by Roman lawyers of the proper use of subjective right and the introduction of targeted restrictions on itsexercise, especially in the field of real estate.The abovesaid is mainly related to the subject of material civil law, however, it also matters for understanding the general contextof the development of the doctrine of abuse of right. The issues of the procedure for the enforcement of law, though not separated frommaterial law, were slightly developed in Roman law. In this regard, the concept of a lawsuit was of particular importance to the Romans.It is significant that even in Roman law, when determining the procedure for adjudicating disputes, special attention was drawnto the possible unfair actions of the litigation parties and methods of dealing with such actions. It was mainly about typical cases of fi -ling a case without merit or objecting to it.The study indicates that in spite of the collapse of the Roman Empire, the main developments and achievements of Romanlawyers in the field of private law were not lost. On the contrary, later they came into widespread use. The evidence of it is, for example,the so-called Italian canonical trial.According to some researches, in the legislation of this period, one can also find the reference to the prohibition of chicanery,that is actions formally meeting legal requirements, but carried out solely for the purpose of causing harm.It is proved that the search for the most effective means of dealing with the abuse of right continued at a new stage in the deve -lopment of the legal system of European states and owing to their successful reception of Roman law. The civil procedural legislationof Germany, France and England, having adopted the Roman idea on preventing the unlawful exercise of subjective right, demonstratedthe main approaches to a possible solution to the problem of abuse of civil procedural rights.

The purpose of the present work is to analyze the little-studied aspects of the influence of Roman law on the formation and establishment of modern legal systems related to the Romano-Germanic legal family. The author conducts a historical and dialectical analysis of the formation of the sources of Roman law, makes assumptions about their origin, and highlights the specifics of some of them. Legal reception has been considered separately as the main factor of influence of Roman law on the creation and formation of the law of the states of the Romano-Germanic legal family. It has been concluded that it is necessary to harmonize the sources of national law with the requirements of Roman law, the hypothesis has been proved that it was the qualitative characteristics of Roman law that served as the main reason for its reception by the states of the Romano-Germanic legal family.