Journal articles: 'Right-wing extremists – Europe, Western'

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Falter, Jürgen W., and Siegfried Schumann. "Affinity towards right‐wing extremism in Western Europe." West European Politics 11, no. 2 (April 1988): 96–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402388808424684.

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Kim, Eunyoung, and Duckhyung Jang. "Refugee crisis and violent right-wing extremism in Western Europe." Gachon Law Review 12, no. 4 (December 31, 2019): 265–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15335/glr.2019.12.4.009.

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Knigge, Pia. "The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 34, no. 2 (October 1998): 249–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00407.

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Copsey, Nigel. "‘Fascism… but with an open mind.’ Reflections on the Contemporary Far Right in (Western) Europe." Fascism 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00201008.

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The political science community would have us believe that since the 1980s something entirely detached from historical or neo-fascism has emerged in (Western) Europe - a populist radicalization of mainstream concerns - a novel form of ‘radical right-wing populism.’ Yet the concept of ‘radical right-wing populism’ is deeply problematic because it suggests that (Western) Europe’s contemporary far right has become essentially different from forms of right-wing extremism that preceded it, and from forms of right-wing extremism that continue to exist alongside it. Such an approach, as this First Lecture on Fascism argues, fails to appreciate the critical role that neo-fascism has played, and still plays, in adapting Europe’s contemporary far right to the norms and realities of multi-ethnic, liberal-democratic society. Political scientists should fixate less on novelty and the quest for neat typologies, and instead engage far more seriously with (neo) fascism studies.

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BETZ, HANS-GEORG. "Contemporary Right-Wing Radicalism in Europe." Contemporary European History 8, no. 2 (July 1999): 299–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777399002076.

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Herbert Kitschelt in collaboration with Anthony J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 323 pp., $49.50, ISBN 0-472-10663-5.Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the 90s (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 304 pp., £18.50/$24.50, ISBN 0-714-64207-X.Urs Altermatt and Hanspeter Kriesi, L'Extrême droite en Suisse. Organisations et radicalisation au cours des années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix (Fribourg: Les Éditions Universitaires, 1995), 293 pp. (pb.), SFr. 42.00, ISBN 2-827-10727-9.Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure of British Fascism. The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition (London: Macmillan, 1996), 182 pp. (hb.), £35.00, ISBN 0-333-58438-4.Gerhard Feldbauer, Von Mussolini bis Fini. Die Extreme Rechte in Italien (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1996), 224 pp. (pb.), DM 29.40, ISBN 3-885-20575-0.Helmut Reinalter, Franko Petri and Rüdiger Kaufmann (eds.), Das Weltbild des Rechtsextremismus. Entsolidarisierung und Bedrohng der Demokratie. Gesellschaftliche Bedingungen, Strukturen und Wirkungen rechtsextremen Denkens (Innsbruck/Vienna: Studienverlag, 1998), 576 pp., DM 82.00, ISBN 3-706-51258-0.Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses (Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug, 1997), 386 pp., Kr 298.00, ISBN 8-251-83665-4.Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjørgo (eds.), Nation and Race: The Development of a Euro-American Racist Subculture (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 273 pp. (pb.), £19.00, ISBN 1-555-53331-0.

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Caiani, Manuela, and Claudius Wagemann. "The Rise and the Fall of the Extreme Right in Europe: Towards an Explanation?" Modern Italy 12, no. 3 (November 2007): 377–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532940701633882.

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In the last two decades, the extreme right has experienced a dramatic rise in electoral support in many West European democracies, achieving more parliamentary and even governmental power. Despite extensive interest in this phenomenon and a myriad of academic publications about it, both in sociology and political science, little consensus has been reached about the reasons for the observed growth of right-wing extremism. Three books; The Extreme Right in Western Europe by Elisabeth Carter, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe by Piero Ignazi and Radical Right by Pippa Norris, try to overcome this lack of consensus through up-to-date analyses of the current situation of extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe and (in Norris’ case) even beyond. All three authors try to go beyond the existing analyses which mainly concentrate on socio-demographic characteristics of extreme right voters. However, they focus on partly different research questions and, consequently, are based on slightly different research designs.

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Doerr, Nicole. "How right-wing versus cosmopolitan political actors mobilize and translate images of immigrants in transnational contexts." Visual Communication 16, no. 3 (June 26, 2017): 315–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470357217702850.

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This article examines visual posters and symbols constructed and circulated transnationally by various political actors to mobilize contentious politics on the issues of immigration and citizenship. Following right-wing mobilizations focusing on the Syrian refugee crisis, immigration has become one of the most contentious political issues in Western Europe. Right-wing populist political parties have used provocative visual posters depicting immigrants or refugees as ‘criminal foreigners’ or a ‘threat to the nation’, in some countries and contexts conflating the image of the immigrant with that of the Islamist terrorist. This article explores the transnational dynamics of visual mobilization by comparing the translation of right-wing nationalist with left-wing, cosmopolitan visual campaigns on the issue of immigration in Western Europe. The author first traces the crosscultural translation and sharing of an anti-immigrant poster created by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a right-wing political party, inspiring different extremist as well as populist right-wing parties and grassroots activists in several other European countries. She then explores how left-libertarian social movements try to break racist stereotypes of immigrants. While right-wing political activists create a shared stereotypical image of immigrants as foes of an imaginary ethnonationalist citizenship, left-wing counter-images construct a more complex and nuanced imagery of citizenship and cultural diversity in Europe. The findings show the challenges of progressive activists’ attempts to translate cosmopolitan images of citizenship across different national and linguistic contexts in contrast to the right wing’s rapid and effective instrumentalizing and translating of denigrating images of minorities in different contexts.

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Acha Ugarte, Beatriz. "The Far Right in Western Europe: “From the Margins to the Mainstream” And Back?" Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, no. 59 (October 31, 2018): 75–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-59-2018pp75-97.

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This paper analyses the rise of the Far Right in Western Europe and the widespread political, social and scholarly concern due to the extremist parties’ recent electoral performances. It holds that, already since the late 1980s, we are witnessing a new (third) “wave” of right-wing extremism in several European countries —with some of these parties having already undergone electoral and political consolidation— and joins other contributions that approach the issue of their “mainstreaming” process. It presents some data on the Far Right’s electoral and political evolution, which seem to confirm that some mainstreaming did take place in the decades between the 1980s and the 2000s. However, more recently the immigration issue and the “refugees’ crisis” seem to have prompted the radicalisation of many (if not all) of these parties, and even of some parties which were not thought to be extremist. The paper reflects on this process of alleged radicalisation of the Far Right. The conclusion speculates on its future evolution and highlights future avenues for research.Received: 23 February 2018 Accepted: 8 May 2018 Published online: 31 October 2018

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Zhang, Chenchen. "Right-wing populism with Chinese characteristics? Identity, otherness and global imaginaries in debating world politics online." European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 1 (May 20, 2019): 88–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066119850253.

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The past few years have seen an emerging discourse on Chinese social media that combines the claims, vocabulary and style of right-wing populisms in Europe and North America with previous forms of nationalism and racism in Chinese cyberspace. In other words, it provokes a similar hostility towards immigrants, Muslims, feminism, the so-called ‘liberal elites’ and progressive values in general. This article examines how, in debating global political events such as the European refugee crisis and the American presidential election, well-educated and well-informed Chinese Internet users appropriate the rhetoric of ‘Western-style’ right-wing populism to paradoxically criticise Western hegemony and discursively construct China’s ethno-racial and political identities. Through qualitative analysis of 1038 postings retrieved from a popular social media website, this research shows that by criticising Western ‘liberal elites’, the discourse constructs China’s ethno-racial identity against the ‘inferior’ non-Western other, exemplified by non-white immigrants and Muslims, with racial nationalism on the one hand; and formulates China’s political identity against the ‘declining’ Western other with realist authoritarianism on the other. The popular narratives of global order protest against Western hegemony while reinforcing a state-centric and hierarchical imaginary of global racial and civilisational order. We conclude by suggesting that the discourse embodies the logics of anti-Western Eurocentrism and anti-hegemonic hegemonies. This article: (1) provides critical insights into the changing ways in which self–other relations are imagined in Chinese popular geopolitical discourse; (2) sheds light on the global circulation of extremist discourses facilitated by the Internet; and (3) contributes to the ongoing debate on right-wing populism and the ‘crisis’ of the liberal world order.

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Celso, Anthony. "The Synergy between White Supremacist and Jihadist Violence in the Targeting of Religious Institutions." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 7, no. 7 (August 1, 2020): 580–603. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.77.8637.

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The 2019 Easter Islamic State (IS) attacks on Sri Lankan churches is seen by the government as retribution for a white nationalist attack on Christchurch New Zealand mosques. This article analyses the synergy between white nationalist and jihadi violence. It examines the growth of the Western extremist right as a response to economic globalization and the cultural-religious transformation of European and North American society. In part right-wing terrorism is a response to past jihadi attacks in the West and radicalized minority sub-communities within Europe’s large Muslim Diaspora population. Much like the left-right terrorist violence that convulsed Europe in the 1970’s we may be facing a destabilizing future of revenge attacks by jihadists and their far-right antagonists that target religious institutions and celebrations. This process results in a synergistic level of violence in which Jews are at the greatest risk for attacks.

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Horáková, Nicole. "Neo-nationalism in the Czech Republic and Its Self-presentation on Social Networks Using the Example of Facebook." Politeja 16, no. 4(61) (December 31, 2019): 111–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.16.2019.61.07.

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Neo-nationalistic movements, extreme right-wing organisations, and right‑wing parties are booming not only in Europe; they can be found in nearly all western societies, and, in some countries, they form an inherent part of the political system and participate in government, playing an active role in civil society, organising demonstrations and festivals and publicly providing information about their ideas. In doing so they are gaining influence not only on the political scene, but their topics also affect the opinions and debates of the general public. Neo-nationalistic right-wing movements are common in, for example, Germany and France, and especially in the Central European countries of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. They consider themselves to be ‘patriots’, whose aim is to ‘protect’ their own national culture and nation as such from foreign life forms and religions. This kind of ‘protection’ refers mainly to cultural, ethnic and religious issues. In my contribution, I deal with two neo-nationalistic movements in the Czech Republic and analyse how they present themselves on social media (Facebook). The main focus of my research are Internet memes, through which I want to show how the organisations fight against multiculturalism and open society. The present contribution is divided into three parts: first I provide a brief historical overview of the development of right-wing extremism in the Czech lands, the second part deals with the current situation regarding neo-nationalistic movements in the Czech Republic, and the last presents my research on Internet memes and attempts at categorising them, aiming not only to show the different types of memes but also to discover the strategies, argumentation and ideas of neonationalistic movements.

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Yashlavskii, A. "Ultra-Right Terrorism in the West in the 21st Century: Trends and Features." World Economy and International Relations 64, no. 12 (2020): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-12-5-14.

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An alarming trend observed in the 2010s was the growth of ultra-right terrorism in Western countries. Being a highly heterogeneous phenomenon, extreme right-wing extremism is fueled by crises of the socio-economic and spiritual order in Western societies. A feature of the development of this phenomenon in the last decade is the assertion by supporters of ultra-right extremist ideas about themselves as a “shield” protecting the West not only from the “invasion” of alien migrants, but also from the danger of Islamist terrorism. The reorientation of right-wing extremists towards “anti-jihadism” can be partly explained by the desire to arrange a “restyling” of the ultra-right movements in order to give them not only the appearance of greater moderation, but also in a sense to legitimize their attitudes as a force opposing Islamist terrorists. However, an analysis of the theory and practice of extreme right-wing terrorists demonstrates similarities with terrorism of the “jihadist” kind in many respects. Militant Islamists and far-right extremists alike deny tolerance, rely on violence, spread hatred and mistrust. Both those and other terrorists use a similar “hate speech”. In a sense, “jihadists” and ultra-right extremists are necessary for each other, because each side finds a different explanation and justification for its own crimes in actions. The crisis phenomena generated by the global pandemic of a new type of coronavirus in 2020 not only contributed to the activation of propaganda by supporters of ultra-right ideas, but created objective conditions for these ideas to resonate with some Westerners. Accordingly, this poses a severe threat of both expanding the social base of ultra-right movements and the implementation of new acts of violence.

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Smith, Gordon. "Radical right-wing populism in western Europe." International Affairs 71, no. 3 (July 1995): 644. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2624916.

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Stern, Fritz, and Hans-Georg Betz. "Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe." Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 172. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20046974.

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Scheuerman, William E., and Hans-Georg Betz. "Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe." Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 1 (1995): 142. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2152069.

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Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 3 (May 2002): 345–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00015.

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Rosensweig, Anna. "Whose Resistance Theory?" Modern Language Quarterly 83, no. 3 (September 1, 2022): 335–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00267929-9791016.

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Abstract This essay examines how members of the political Right in the United States—including insurrectionists, antiabortion extremists, and adherents of the QAnon conspiracy—have mobilized theories of resistance from early modern Europe to justify their opposition to state and federal law. Rather than simply dismiss these right-wing appeals to resistance theory as unscholarly and anachronistic, the essay argues that we must take them seriously as an uncomfortable part of this theory’s legacy.

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Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?" Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 1 (October 17, 2007): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006294168.

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Unlike for the green party family, no empirically backed scholarly consensus exists about the grievances mobilized by populist right parties in Western Europe. To the contrary, three competing grievance mobilization models can be distinguished in the existing literature. These models focus on grievances arising from economic changes, political elitism and corruption, and immigration. This study discusses these three grievance mobilization models and tests them on comparable cross-sectional survey data for all seven relevant countries using multinomial probit analysis. The study finds that no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration. However, it finds several examples of populist right parties experiencing electoral success without mobilizing grievances over economic changes or political elitism and corruption. This study therefore solves a long-standing disagreement in the literature by comprehensively showing that only the appeal on the immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties.

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Aughey, Arthur. "Immigration policy and right-wing populism in Western Europe." Journal of Contemporary European Studies 30, no. 1 (October 21, 2021): 192–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1995236.

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Shaffer, Ryan. "Jihad and Counter-Jihad in Europe: Islamic Radicals, Right-Wing Extremists, and Counter-Terrorism Responses." Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 2 (March 10, 2016): 383–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1140538.

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Amengay, Abdelkarim, and Daniel Stockemer. "The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Meta-Analysis of Structural Factors." Political Studies Review 17, no. 1 (May 23, 2018): 30–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929918777975.

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In this meta-analysis, we summarize the results of 48 peer-reviewed articles on the radical right-wing vote in Western Europe. These results come from 48 peer-reviewed articles published from January 1990 until October 2017. We use the following inclusion criteria, the selected articles must focus on Western Europe, they must have the vote share of one or several radical right-wing parties as the dependent variable, and at least one structural variable as the independent variable. We find that more than 20 different structural variables have been tested. Most of them, like unemployment, reflect mitigate results in explaining the electoral support for radical right-wing parties. For others, like immigration, the statistical significance and direction of the relationship seem to be highly dependent on the type of proxies used. In fact, only a few variables, such as crime rates and the district magnitude seem to have a consistent effect on the vote share for radical right-wing parties.

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Badaeva, A. S. "The Pandemic Strategies of the Far-Right Parties in Western Europe." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 13, no. 5 (November 27, 2020): 94–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2020-13-5-6.

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The author explores the behavior of the West-European far-right parties under the coronavirus crisis circumstances. In the beginning stage of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020 opposition right-wing nationalist parties tried immediately to take advantage of the difficult health situation and of the following social shock and economic problems. The actions and the rhetoric of these parties varied depending on the each country specific circumstances: number of pandemic casualties, strictness and effectiveness of measures taken by the government, national characteristic. Right-wing nationalist were able to achieve success exactly in those West-European countries, where the society was not enough consolidated. For example, Vlaams Belang in Belgium and Brothers of Italy became very popular. In front of this national cohesion and unity of society have created a formidable opposition to anti-government right-wing agitation. Political campaigns of Scandinavian far-right parties, Alternative for Germany, National Rally and the Freedom Party of Austria were almost ineffective. The current situation is unprecedented and indefinite. All sides of the political process are under tension and they are trying to calculate all possible scenarios for further development of events.

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Betz, Hans-Georg. "The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe." Review of Politics 55, no. 4 (1993): 663–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500018040.

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During the past several years, radical right-wing populist parties have made impressive electoral gains in a growing number of West European countries. Their dramatic surge to political prominence has obscured the fact that these parties hardly form a homogeneous party group. Generally, it is possible to distinguish between neo-liberal and national populist parties. Both types of parties are a response to the profound economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced societies interpreted as a transition from industrial welfare to postindustrial individualized capitalism. National populist parties are primarily working-class parties which espouse a radically xenophobic and authoritarian program. Neoliberal parties appeal to a mixed social constituency and tend to stress the marketoriented, libertarian elements of their program over xenophobic ones. Rather than being mere short-lived protest phenomena, radical right-wing populist parties are a reflection and expression of new political conflicts created by the transition to postindustrial capitalism.

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Koga, Mitsuo. "Are radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe “cultural backlash”?" Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association 70, no. 2 (2019): 2_84–2_108. http://dx.doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.70.2_84.

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Swank, D. "Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe." Socio-Economic Review 1, no. 2 (May 1, 2003): 215–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/soceco/1.2.215.

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Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Simon Otjes. "A hot topic? Immigration on the agenda in Western Europe." Party Politics 25, no. 3 (August 31, 2017): 424–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817728211.

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The party politics of immigration is one of the fastest growing bodies of research within the study of West European politics. Within this literature, an underlying assumption is that immigration has become one of the most salient issues. However, this is rarely documented, let alone explained. Drawing on a new coding of party manifestos in seven West European countries, this article shows that party attention to immigration has grown in all countries since 1980 but only in Denmark has the issue become one of the most salient issues of party politics. We find that the general increase in attention reflects the rising number of immigrants and rise of radical right-wing parties. In terms of the issue becoming a top issue of party politics, a comparative analysis of the politicization of immigration in Denmark and the Netherlands shows that the interest of mainstream right-wing parties and coalition dynamics are the crucial factors.

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Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. "The new challengers: greens and right-wing populist parties in western Europe." European Review 6, no. 2 (May 1998): 191–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798700003227.

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The decline in confidence in the traditional parties in Western Europe has manifested itself through the emergence of the Green parties on the Left and populist parties on the Right. Despite successes in some countries, these parties have remained small, although they have been able, respectively, to play on the growth of ‘post-materialist’ values on the Left, and of anti-immigrant sentiments on the Right. The prospects for these parties are not very good, in particular for the right-wing populist parties, which are highly dependent on the popularity of their leaders, and even for the Green parties, although these can exploit the internal divisions within Socialist parties between supporters of the ‘traditional’ Left and supporters of the ‘New’ Left.

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Rydgren, Jens. "Social Isolation? Social Capital and Radical Right-wing Voting in Western Europe." Journal of Civil Society 5, no. 2 (September 2009): 129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448680903154915.

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Mitrofanova, A., and O. Mikhailenok. "Right Wing Populist Civic Movements: Western Experience and the Situation in Russia." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 3 (2021): 120–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-3-120-129.

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The article aims at identifying the characteristics shared by the right-wing populist civil movements of Western Europe and the USA and evaluating the possibility to use them for researching right-wing nationalist organizations in Russia. The movements selected for the comparison range from party-like electoral actors to unorganized protesters. They include as follows: The Five-star Movement (Italy), PEGIDA and the like (Germany), the English Defence League (the UK), the Tea Party Movement (the US). The authors identified several interrelated characteristics shared by these movements: (1) dealing with local, usually social, issues, (2) network-like structure of autonomous local groups building the agenda from below, (3) ideological ambivalence leading to replacing ideology with subculture, (4) digitalization of activism. Although in Russia there are no civic movements structurally or functionally identical to Western right-wing populists, the authors demonstrate that local social issues and civic responsibility have become important topics for some Russian nationalists (right-wing radicals) since the mid 2000s. The trends of deideologization and dealing with non-political local issues are researched mainly on the example of the “Frontier of the North” (Komi Republic). The authors conclude that some of the radical Russian nationalists are gradually declining their own independent agenda, following local protests instead. This opens up the possibility for right-wing organizations to become local civil society institutions and to participate successfully in local elections, similar to the “electoral break-through” of right-wing populists in the West. Although it is too early to speak about the deideologization of Russian nationalism, the article suggests that some nationalists are ready to mitigate ideological tensions to secure expanded social support. At the moment, nationalist organizations in Russia remain frozen between right-wing radicalism and emulating Western right-wing populism.

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Haynes, Jeffrey. "Right-Wing Populism and Religion in Europe and the USA." Religions 11, no. 10 (September 27, 2020): 490. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel11100490.

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The aim of this paper is to examine comparatively the growth and political effectiveness of right-wing populism in Western Europe, Central Europe, and the USA since 9/11. The focus is on such politicians’ vilification of Islam as a faith and Muslims as a people. The paper examines the following research question: how and why do right-wing populists in the USA and Europe use an ideological form of “Christianity”, known variously as “Christianism” or “Christian civilizationism”, to vilify Muslims and Islam? The political purpose seems obvious: to influence public perceptions and to win votes by questioning the desirability of Muslims in both the USA and Europe, claiming that Muslims’ religious and cultural attributes make them unacceptable as neighbors. As Muslims are not capable, so the argument goes, of assimilating to European or American norms, values, and behavior, then they must be excluded or strongly controlled for the benefit of nativist communities. Right-wing populists in both the USA and Europe pursue this strategy because they see it as chiming well with public opinion at a time of great uncertainty, instability, and insecurity.

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Scruton, Roger. "The New Right in Central Europe I: Czechoslovakia." Political Studies 36, no. 3 (September 1988): 449–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1988.tb00241.x.

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‘The New Right’, as it has come to be known, derives from at least two major intellectual sources, free market theory and social conservatism. The question how far these are compatible is frequently raised. The aim of this two-part article is to explore the impact of ‘New Right’ thinking in East Central Europe (specifically in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) in order to show that, in the conditions of ‘real socialism’, free market and social conservative ideas seem to arise naturally from the same root conceptions. The first part deals with Czechoslovakia-specifically with the thought of Patocka, Have1 and Bratinka, and with the conservative wing of the Charter movement. It argues that, while many writers would specifically reject labels like ‘conservative’ or ‘right-wing’, the actual content of their thought is very close to that of the New Right in the western hemisphere. In particular, the call for a ‘depoliticization’ of society, for responsible accounting, and for a lived historical identity which will be both national and European, are indistinguishable from long-standing themes of social conservatism.

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Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. "Flank attacks." Party Politics 23, no. 3 (July 23, 2015): 193–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514.

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How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.

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Formisano, Ron. "Interpreting Right-Wing or Reactionary Neo-Populism: A Critique." Journal of Policy History 17, no. 2 (April 2005): 241–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jph.2005.0010.

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During the 1980s and 1990s in countries across the globe, new populist protest movements and radical political organizations emerged to challenge traditional parties, ruling elites, and professional politicians, and even long-standing social norms. The revolts against politics-as-usual have arisen from many kinds of social groupings and from diverse points on the political spectrum. Through the 1980s, in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and North America, populist discontent erupted intermittently. But the end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, unleashed a torrent of popular movements and political parties opposed to what the discontented perceived as the corruption and deceitfulness of the political classes and their corporate patrons. Some protest movements promoted more democracy, pluralism, and economic opportunity; some expressed intolerance, bigotry, and xenophobic nationalism.

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Cowan, Benjamin. "“Why Hasn’t This Teacher Been Shot?” Moral-Sexual Panic, the Repressive Right, and Brazil’s National Security State." Hispanic American Historical Review 92, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 403–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182168-1600279.

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Abstract This article takes up the story of right-wing mobilization before and during Brazil’s military government of 1964–1985. Understanding the regime’s violent countersubversion requires analysis of the ideology that framed it. This ideology flourished among a long-neglected group of far-right intellectuals and organizations that had considerable influence in successive military administrations and worked to define subversion—the military state’s ever-invoked enemy—in terms chiefly moral and sexual. Scholars have noted that defense of “Western Christian civilization” peppered the vague rhetoric of Cold War autocrats throughout Latin America. Yet inattention to the Right per se and to those considered extremists has impeded our understanding of the specific values bound up in such visions of the West and hence of the centrality of morality and culture in countersubversive thought. This article argues that rightists, some of them radical, echoed past conservatisms by linking morality, sexuality, and subversion in ways that gained increasing influence in the 1960s and 1970s.

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Tuomola, Salla. "Ideological parlances on right-wing media in Britain and Finland." Journal of Alternative & Community Media 5, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 173–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/joacm_00082_1.

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One of the main themes of alternative right-wing media is a strong anti-immigrant approach, which has allegedly intensified a radical and polarized world-view throughout Europe and the United States. In this article, by comparing two right-wing news sites, I examine whether commonalities in their reporting can be discerned at a transnational level. The focus is on the US-based Breitbart London and the Finnish-language MV-lehti, both founded in 2014. The comparative study approaches the research data by utilizing the method of discourse narratology to examine the similarities and differences between the two in terms of their ideological parlances. The results show that there are indisputable commonalities, with parlances that seek to undermine liberal democracy as an outspoken opponent to strengthen the homogeneous battlefront. Accordingly, right-wing news sites in Europe adhere to the shared ideology, leaning on a strong confrontation between western and Islamic countries.

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Betz, Hans-George. "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe." Comparative Politics 25, no. 4 (July 1993): 413. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/422034.

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RAVNDAL, JACOB AASLAND. "Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarisation." European Journal of Political Research 57, no. 4 (November 22, 2017): 845–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12254.

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van Gorp, Johannes AAM. "Book review: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?" Party Politics 26, no. 3 (February 11, 2020): 347–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068820905386.

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van der Brug, Wouter, and Eelco Harteveld. "The conditional effects of the refugee crisis on immigration attitudes and nationalism." European Union Politics 22, no. 2 (February 1, 2021): 227–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116520988905.

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What was the impact of the 2014–2016 refugee crisis on immigration attitudes and national identification in Europe? Several studies show that radical right parties benefitted electorally from the refugee crisis, but research also shows that anti-immigration attitudes did not increase. We hypothesize that the refugee crisis affected right-wing citizens differently than left-wing citizens. We test this hypothesis by combining individual level survey data (from five Eurobarometer waves in the 2014–2016 period) with country level statistics on the asylum applications in 28 EU member states. In Western Europe, we find that increases in the number of asylum applications lead to a polarization of attitudes towards immigrants between left- and right-leaning citizens. In the Southern European ‘arrival countries’ and in Central-Eastern Europe we find no significant effects. Nationalistic attitudes are also not affected significantly.

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Parker, Christopher Sebastian. "Status Threat: Moving the Right Further to the Right?" Daedalus 150, no. 2 (2021): 56–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01846.

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Abstract Over the last few years, right-wing movements have proliferated among Western democracies. Although much of the growth has taken place across the “pond” in Europe, this phenomenon is not confined to that continent. As recent events make clear, the United States is another major case. In this essay, I offer a theory of the emergence of reactionary movements, fueled by status threat, using the United States as a case. To demonstrate the explanatory range of the theory (and measure), I focus on immigration, impeachment, and support for Donald Trump in the 2020 election. Examining self-identified Republicans only, I argue that status threat motivates the reactionary wing of the GOP in the United States. Drawing on data culled from a national sample, I find support for my expectation that, beyond ideology and racism, status threat furnishes a new explanation for reactionary preferences. I close with a discussion of the implications.

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Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J. "Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox." Research & Politics 6, no. 2 (April 2019): 205316801985168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2053168019851680.

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The 2018 regional elections in Andalucía marked the end of Spain’s exceptional status as a country with a party system free from the radical right. The electoral success of the radical right-wing challenger, Vox, who gained 11% of the vote and 12 seats in the regional parliament, brought this exceptionalism to an end. This paper analyses the individual-level determinants that explain the electoral success of Vox and the emergence of the radical right within the Spanish party system. The results indicate that concerns over devolution, likely engendered by the Catalan separatist crisis, predominantly explain voters’ preferences for the right-wing challenger. This is true both amongst the general electorate as well as amongst the former voters of other right-wing parties. Significantly, against popular assumptions and empirical observations explaining the rise of radical right-wing parties across much of Western Europe, the results display no empirical link between immigration and electoral support for Vox.

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Yarulin, Ildus, and E. Pozdnyakov. "World outlook split in Europe." Journal of Political Research 5, no. 1 (March 26, 2021): 133–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/2587-6295-2021-5-1-133-149.

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The article deals with the reasons for the emergence of ideological differences between the Eastern and Western Europe. The article also describes how the views of the population of "new" Europe give rise to a demand for the right-wing state policy. The methodological basis was the principles of comparative analysis. The differences in the worldview of Western and Eastern Europeans are analyzed. The author suggests that the confrontation between a number of the EU countries (Poland, Hungary) with Brussels is caused, first of all, by serious ideological differences between the worldview concepts of the population of different regions of Europe. It is concluded that the inhabitants of the East largely disagree with the progressive views of the West, which gives rise to misunderstanding at the level of the population of the current EU policy (in particular, the problems of discrimination against minorities and the dispute over quotas for the admission of migrants are mentioned). It is concluded that in the society of the "new" Europe, a demand for right-wing politics has been formed, based on the cultural past of these countries. The request finds a way out in the victory of the conservative parties in the elections, which complicates relations with Brussels. The author concludes that the confrontation between the West and the East largely arises from the desire of the first to "level" the Europeans according to a certain standard of liberal democracy, although in the countries of Eastern Europe the population it does not agree with the imposition of such a system.

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Prowe, Diethelm. "‘Classic’ Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts." Contemporary European History 3, no. 3 (November 1994): 289–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777300000904.

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Ever since the end of the Second World War, the connection between the horrors of the ‘classic’ fascism of the interwar years and contemporary movements of the European radical right has seemed obvious. In the later 1940s and 1950s any extreme nationalist groups were naturally identified as neo-fascist or proto-Nazi, not least because they harboured so many old henchmen of the fascist regimes. But even today, news of violent acts or electoral successes of radical right organisations in Europe raise the spectre of fascism in the minds of observers everywhere. There is hardly a popular or scholarly article that does not refer to this link at least indirectly, above all in analyses of German politics. Thus one German weekly, in a report on nationalist activities in the new eastern Länder, asked forebodingly: ‘Is the ex-GDR sinking into a brown [Nazi] morass? Is the SA marching again, is the Fourth Reich imminent?’2 A recent scholarly article on the German Republikaner made the same obligatory references in a more veiled manner: ‘Against the background of the course of twentieth-century European history, right-wing radical tendencies any where in Europe warrant special attention.’3 No doubt, this will hold true for decades to come. The link of all present-day right-wing movements with the interwar years remains inescapable. The catastrophes associated with fascism are the kind of historical experience that shapes the political consciousness of several generations. Both for the adherents of extreme nationalism and for their enemies, interwar fascism thus provides a basic paradigm through which contemporary rightist groups are defined or define themselves.

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Rosta, Miklós, and László Tóth. "Is there a demand for autocracies in Europe? Comparing the attitudes of Hungarian and Italian university students toward liberal democratic values inspired by János Kornai." Public Choice 187, no. 1-2 (February 15, 2021): 217–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00877-y.

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AbstractIn the European Union right-wing and left-wing populist parties are increasingly becoming stronger. Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe autocracies are emerging and becoming stabilized. Italy and Hungary are two notable examples of these processes. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where a coalition of purely populist parties won an election, while Hungary has the most mature autocracy in the European Union. By using survey methodology, we examined the preferences of Hungarian and Italian students regarding the values of liberal democracy. We seek answers to the questions whether there are any significant differences between the proportion of Hungarian students and Italian students who identify themselves with the values of liberal democracy and which of these values of liberal democracy they consider to be protected values. Based on our results, we claim that students from both countries are more likely to support liberal democratic values than to support either right-wing or left-wing populist values, even if the distributions of the two groups differ significantly. We found that Italian students adhere more strongly to liberal democratic values, while Hungarians are more open to left-wing and right-wing populism. Our results confirm that in Hungary, because of the values that many people hold, conditions are conducive for establishing a sustainable autocracy, while in Italy, the demand for such a system is much weaker.

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Gassner, Günter. "Spiral movement: Writing with fascism and urban violence." Sociological Review 70, no. 4 (July 2022): 786–809. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00380261221106526.

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How to move against the rise of the far-right and seemingly unstoppable autocratic leaders in many Western liberal democracies? Antifascism’s interest in the built environment is often limited to the collection of address data of right-wing extremists with the aim of locating its enemies. In this piece, I write with fascism and violence through vignettes of urban situatedness. I adopt an eclectic approach, engaging with diverse theories of violence and establishing loose connections between classical sociology and fascist urbanisation, liberalism in practice and historical fascism, and material aesthetics and right-wing spaces. In so doing, I highlight endemic forms of state and capitalist violence and their spatial manifestations of ghettoisation, beautification and overcoding. Acknowledging the limits of factual knowledge and liberal appeals to the truth in breaking through fascist worldviews of domination, the architecture of the text uses a circular infrastructure that connects various parties: ‘they’ (Twitter users), ‘I’ (author), ‘you’ (Walter Benjamin), and numerous ‘we’ who are thrown together in urban environments. Rather than developing a linear argument that tries to persuade fascists, I explore writing as a collective political practice that refutes totalising accounts. With the aim of opening meaning-makings through returning to and reworking numerous views, I respond to a spiral of violence with a movement that is organised around a shared commitment to an anti-oppressive, non-hierarchical world; a movement that is out of someone’s control and that spirals towards collective liberation.

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Morozov, Ilya Leonidovich. "HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF COUNTERING YOUTH POLITICAL TERRORISM BY THE POLICE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND CONCLUSIONS FOR PRESENT-DAY RUSSIA (TERROR GROUP ‘RED ARMY FRACTION’ TAKEN AS AN EXAMPLE)." Russian Studies in Law and Politics 1, no. 1 (December 24, 2017): 4–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.12731/2576-9634-2017-1-4-11.

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‘Red Army Fraction’ is a youth extremist left-wing terror group that was active in the 1970–1980s on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The terror group and its ideology originated mostly in Western German university circles. Most representatives of the group were descendants from wealthy families of high social standing. The ideology of the group included a mix of concepts related to social equity, preventing autocratic tendencies in the government machinery and interventions of Western countries against developing ‘third world’ countries and peoples. State security system of West Germany was unable to suppress the terror group for over two decades. The group finally announced its voluntary dissolution in 1998 due to a dramatic change in socio-political climate and general crisis of the left-wing political ideology. The growth of oppositional sentiments among present-day Russian young people is partially similar to the students’ unrest that had place in Western Europe in the 1960s and gave rise to terrorist groups. This makes the study of West Germany’s experience in countering the threat important.

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Messina, Anthony M. "The Not So Silent Revolution Postwar Migration to Western Europe." World Politics 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 130–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.1996.0020.

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In the 1990s scholars working within the subfield of immigration studies in Western Europe have advanced four major arguments. (1) In a liberal era of global economic markets the capacity of states to govern their territorial borders has significantly eroded. (2) The widespread diffusion of liberal norms has severely inhibited the ability of governments to execute a rational immigrant policy. (3) The experience of mass immigration has transformed the boundaries of national citizenship. And 4) postwar immigration has fostered the surge of radical right-wing populist movements. This article evaluates these arguments in light of the evidence presented in both the collected scholarship under review and other select works. It concludes by arguing the case for new scholarly initiatives to synthesize and unify the separate literatures represented by the volumes under review.

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Rizki, Aufar. "Presence of The Right Wing: Threatening the Refugee Crisis?" Jurnal Sentris 1, no. 1 (August 19, 2020): 97–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/sentris.v1i1.4160.97-120.

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The presence of the right wing in The Western Europe, such as The Front National in French that is led by Marine Le Pen, Alternative Für Deutschland in Germany by Alexander Gauland, and Partij Voor de Vrijheid by Geert Wilders in Netherlands, are the whimsicality phenomenon in European political scene. The rise of the right wing groups in some countries, could impend the pluralism value in the respective country. Furthermore, this movement will be inducing the humanitarian crisis, specifically the refugee crisis. European Union has asylum policy for the refugees, but precisely the migrants who received the asylum policy are somehow causing the instability and insecurity in the country they are migrated to. That is a dilemma of conducting the asylum policy; first consideration is to receive the refugees with main purpose of decreasing the humanitarian crisis, but on the other hand it could induce instability, or other consideration is to close the asylum policy as the right wing postulate, which will increase refugee crisis but give more stable nation.

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van Spanje, Joost. "The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative Analysis of ‘Anti-Immigration’ and ‘Far Right’ Parties." Government and Opposition 46, no. 3 (2011): 293–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01340.x.

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AbstractAcross Western Europe, parties have emerged that are both right wing and in favour of restrictions on immigration. These parties are commonly referred to in terms of either ideology (e.g. ‘far right’) or policy (‘anti-immigration’). This article compares far right parties, selected on the basis of their ideologies, and anti-immigration parties, selected based on their immigration policies. I argue and empirically demonstrate that, contrary to what the extant literature suggests, these sets of parties are not identical. I point out similarities and differences, showing why it is useful to distinguish between these two types of party. The article concludes by discussing the relevance of these differences to the relevant literature.

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van der Waal, Jeroen, and Willem de Koster. "Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands." Political Studies 66, no. 3 (November 10, 2017): 560–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321717723505.

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Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands, where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey data ( n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency). Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Right-wing extremists – Europe, Western'

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