Academic literature on the topic 'Right and left (Political science) – Great Britain'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Right and left (Political science) – Great Britain.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Right and left (Political science) – Great Britain"

1

Williams, John P. "Oh Britannia: Great Britain’s Exit from the European Union and Its Impact on Globalism and Nationalism." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 20, no. 1-2 (March 25, 2021): 186–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341590.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract Globalization unleashed trends such as the free movement of capital, people, and goods; trickle-down economics, and diminished stature of nation-states. While largely embraced by most countries in the WTO, a growing tension within the European Union to push back went largely ignored until recently. Britain’s exit represents such a push back, a rejection of a single banking system, a single budget, and a single political entity. This article examines the historic 2016 British referendum that saw 52 percent of voters favor England leaving the EU. This research serves four purposes: one, to identify the origins of this important referendum as well as the positions of both its supporters and detractors; two, to analyze the fallout of the vote and its impact on other European nations; three, to correlate the results of this referendum and the rise of populist parties on the left and right in the EU; and four, to discuss briefly what the future holds for globalism.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Myazin, Nikolai. "Street right-wing radical groups in Great Britain." Contemporary Europe, no. 2 (April 9, 2014): 81–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope220148190.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Hayter, P. D. G. "The Parliamentary Monitoring of Science and Technology in Britain." Government and Opposition 26, no. 2 (April 1, 1991): 147–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1991.tb01130.x.

Full text
Abstract:
THROUGHOUT THE TWENTIETH CENTURY THE HOUSE OF Lords has been looking for a role. It lost its original power base with the decline in influence of the landed aristocracy and the growth of the party system. At the same time the composition of the House became increasingly difficult to justify; membership based on the accidents of birth no longer seemed an adequate justification for the right to legislate or to overrule the people's elected representatives.The Parliament Act 1911, which took away the Lords' absolute right to veto legislation, promised reform. But nothing happened. In 1968 the Labour government introduced a reform bill. It failed, the victim of assaults from Left and Right in the House of Commons.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Frazer, Elizabeth. "Citizenship Education: Anti-Political Culture and Political Education in Britain." Political Studies 48, no. 1 (March 2000): 88–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00252.

Full text
Abstract:
The British Government white paper ‘Excellence in Schools' and the subsequent report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship Education for Citizenship recommend that schools educate pupils in citizenship and democracy. This recommendation is considered in the context of reasons why there has traditionally been no formal or well articulated political education in schools. Among these reasons a pervasive antipathy to politics and to government is identified as one of the most powerful. This antipathy is expressed from the left and the right wings of the political spectrum, and the ‘critical’ opposition to both, as well as from interests such as those defending professional and personal autonomy. These arguments imply that ‘politics' is optional, not a set of practices and institutions with which individuals must be familiar. It is argued that this proposition cannot be valid.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Bolshakov, A. "Regulatory Autonomy of Great Britain: Problems and Perspectives." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 7 (2021): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-71-79.

Full text
Abstract:
Sovereignty does not imply regulatory autonomy. After Brexit, the UK should align its regulatory policy with European norms, if it is interested in close partnership with the EU. Compromises must be made by both sides in order to ensure stability of the partnership. The EU will have to acknowledge the UK’s right to diverge from European rules. Britain will have to partly accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The structure of dispute settlement mechanism which will be created under the partnership agreement should be a product of a compromise. The present study shows that optimal structure of dispute settlement mechanism must include two different procedures: one for political issues and the other for commercial issues. The central role for the European Court of Justice must be envisaged as a part of politically oriented procedure. There must be no role for the European Court of Justice or any Union to set the pace of political communication. The latter reflects the interest of Great Britain to simplify economic relations, which means that, firstly, disputes are resolved by independent arbiters; secondly, the EU acknowledges the UK’s right to diverge from European regulations; and thirdly, the UK accepts the EU’s right to impose countervailing duties to compensate for adverse effects of divergence on competition. This article also examines the main problems of future British regulatory policy, especially in the field of state aid. Boris Johnson’s government has decided not to form a full-fledged regulatory regime in the area of state aid. Its stance is politically appropriate since Conservative party manifesto for the 2019 general election promised to support local industries without limitations. But that decision created a great deal of economic risk. Firstly, the absence of a domestic subsidy control regulator can cause chaos within regulation system because workable norms and rules can only be sustained by a tight enforcement mechanism. Secondly, the EU can cite lack of subsidy control as an obstacle for British business to have unrestricted access to the European market.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Nagel, Jack H., and Christopher Wlezien. "Centre-Party Strength and Major-Party Divergence in Britain, 1945–2005." British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (March 24, 2010): 279–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123409990111.

Full text
Abstract:
British elections exhibit two patterns contrary to expectations deriving from Duverger and Downs: centrist third parties (Liberals and their successors) win a large vote share; and the two major parties often espouse highly divergent policies. This article explores relations between the Liberal vote and left–right scores of the Labour and Conservative manifestos in the light of two hypotheses: the vacated centre posits that Liberals receive more votes when major parties diverge; the occupied centre proposes a lagged effect in which major parties diverge farther after Liberals do well in the preceding election. Data from elections since 1945 confirm the vacated-centre hypothesis, with Liberals benefiting about equally when the major parties diverge to the left and right, respectively. The results also support the occupied-centre hypothesis for Conservative party positions, but not for Labour’s. After considering explanations for this asymmetry, we identify historical events associated with turning points that our data reveal in post-war British politics.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Rouban, Luc. "The uncertainty of French political life: the shift to the right and the crisis of representative democracy." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 3 (2021): 188–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2021.03.08.

Full text
Abstract:
This article deals with the evolution of French politics between 2017 and 2020. Using systematic surveys, which are conducted by the Center for the Study of French Political Life and in which the author is directly involved he shows that President Macron’s policies have not succeeded in dissipating a democratic crisis affecting trust in political institution. The sanitary crisis had a great impact on the political situation in the country. In France, the crisis associated with Covid-19 was manifested not in the confrontation of political forces, but in the criticism of the government by civil society and in the growth of populism. In this respect, France is very different from Germany, where there is a general public consensus, and Great Britain, where confidence in the system-forming parties remains. Populism has gained ground in French politics and explains, more than any other factor, both the distrust in the Presidency and in government health policies. The rise of left-wing and rightwing populism has not led to the disappearance of the division between left and right. A shift toward right values and State intervention can be observed in French public opinion, changing the electoral game for the 2022 presidential campaign.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Steenbergen, Marco R., and Tomasz Siczek. "Better the devil you know? Risk-taking, globalization and populism in Great Britain." European Union Politics 18, no. 1 (January 29, 2017): 119–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116516681858.

Full text
Abstract:
Right-wing populist parties in European democracies appeal to citizens’ feelings of uncertainty related to globalization by promoting tough immigration laws and curbing the power of the European Union. This article adds to our understanding of how individuals’ risk propensity relates to support for right-wing populist parties and their ideas in the context of globalization. In particular, by drawing on survey data from the United Kingdom we investigate how this personality trait relates to support for the United Kingdom Independence Party and the vote for a British exit from the European Union. The article explores the complex interplay between risk propensity and right-wing populist appeals by dissecting the direct, indirect and total effects of this trait.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

James, Malcolm, and Sivamohan Valluvan. "Coronavirus Conjuncture: Nationalism and Pandemic States." Sociology 54, no. 6 (December 2020): 1238–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038038520969114.

Full text
Abstract:
Writing from Britain in the month of May 2020, this essay draws the multiple and conflicting alignments of the Covid-19 moment into conjunctural relief. It seeks to understand how prominent trends of welfarism, collectivism and capitalism are being reorganised across a Left–Right spectrum and to specifically situate nationalism in this general political flux. Focusing on Britain, the essay will explore how an otherwise unsettled ruling Right is reviving a nationalist political imagination through a pandemic consciousness – with an emphasis on the politics of bordering, the spectre of China, reheated civic patriotism, a poetics of survival and melancholic whiteness. The essay will however also speculate about the limits to nationalism amid the imperatives of global pandemics.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

McALEER, G. J. "Red Tory: How Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It." Perspectives on Political Science 40, no. 1 (January 13, 2011): 58–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2011.536739.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Right and left (Political science) – Great Britain"

1

KARREMANS, Johannes. "State interests vs citizens’ preferences : on which side do (Labour) parties stand?" Doctoral thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/45985.

Full text
Abstract:
Defence date: 31 March 2017
Examining Board: Professor Pepper Culpepper, formerly EUI/University of Oxford (Supervisor); Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, EUI (Co-Supervisor); Professor Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg; Professor Maurits Van der Veen, College of William & Mary
This dissertation deals with the question of how the partisan nature of government still matters in the current globalized and post-industrial world. In particular, it compares the representativeness of two contemporary centre-left governments with that of two centre-left executives from the 1970s in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. According to the more provocative theories about the state of contemporary representative democracy, these countries should be forerunners of a general European trend in which governments care more about technical competence rather than political representation and responsiveness. These tendencies are expected to particularly affect the partisanship of Labour ministers. In order to test these theories, I do a comparative content analysis of how Labour finance ministers/Chancellors justify the yearly government budget in front of the parliament. The justifications are divided into those that characterize the government as representative of the partisan redistributive preferences (input-justifications) VS those that profile it as a competent caretaker of public finances (output-justifications). Following the above-mentioned theories, the hypothesis is that today the output-justifications are more important than in the past. As this approach is relatively novel with regards to the study of responsiveness, the thesis also dedicates one chapter to the justification strategies of a technical and a neoliberal government. The purpose of this extra comparison is to have more empirical evidence of what renders an output-justification different from an input-justification. By incorporating these two cases, thus, I get a deeper comparative insight into what is a typical left-wing/partisan discourse characteristic and what constitutes governmental/institutional talk. This extra comparison, consequently, allows me to reflect more deeply on the findings emerging from the overtime comparison of Labour governments. The findings of my research tell a two-sided story. On the one hand, contrary to my hypothesis, the contemporary cases feature slightly more input-justifications than the governments from the 1970s. On the other, the logic of the discourses suggests that, while in the 1970s the responsiveness to social needs was presented as a policy goal per se, today the input-justifications tend to be more subordinated to justifications about economic and financial considerations. The findings thus speak both to theories according to which today we are not witnessing a decline of political representation, but simply a change in kind, as well to the theories speaking of a gradual hollowing out of political competition. In the iv conclusion of my dissertation I reflect on what is right and wrong on the two sides of the debate.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Tijani, Hakeem Ibikunle. "Britain and the development of leftist ideology and organisations in West Africa: the Nigerian experience, 1945-1965." Thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/2025.

Full text
Abstract:
Although organised Marxist organisations did not emerge in Nigeria until the mid-1940s, leftist ideology had been prevalent among nationalist and labour leaders since the late 1920s. Both official documents and oral histories indicate deep-rooted support for leftism in Nigeria and anxiety among British colonial officials that this support threatened the Colonial Office's own timetable for gradual decolonisation. This study analyses the development of leftist ideology and attempts to establish a nationwide leftist organisation in colonial and post-independent Nigeria. The role of the Zikist movement is retold in light of new evidence, while other leftist organisations are salvaged from the footnotes of Nigeria nationalist history. More importantly, the adaptability of Marxist-Leninist ideology to colonial reality by the different leftist groups in Nigeria is emphasized. The reaction of Anglo-American officials in Lagos and the metropolis towards the Communist Party of Great Britain and other leftist organisations' sponsorship of Marxist groups in Nigeria are discussed. Lastly, the continuity between the departing colonial power and the Balewa administration is addressed to juxtapose the linkage between the two governments. The study thus provides a lucid explanation for the failure of leftist ideology and organisations in Nigeria during the twentieth century. In this eight-chapter thesis I consistently argue, based on official documents from England, Nigeria, and the United States, that the role of Marxists and Soviet Cold War interests in colonial territories are relevant to nationalism and decolonisation in Nigeria; that the issue is not to determine or measure whether or not Anglo-American policies are direct response to Soviet interests; that there are political, economic, and diplomatic policies carried out as part of the transfer of power process; and that the success of these is partly a result of collaboration with local subaltern leaders and official resolve to institutionalise imperial preferences before independence on October 1, 1960.
History
D.Litt. et Phil. (History)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Right and left (Political science) – Great Britain"

1

1926-, Tivey Leonard James, and Wright Anthony 1948-, eds. Party ideology in Britain. London: Routledge, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

British political ideologies. New York: Philip Allan, 1991.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

The broken compass: How left and right lost their meaning. London: Continuum, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Hitchens, Peter. The broken compass: How left and right lost their meaning. London: Continuum, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Barry, Hindess, ed. Reactions to the right. London: Routledge, 1990.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

1963-, Lawson Neal, and Sherlock Neil 1963-, eds. The progressive century: The future of the centre-left in Britain. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: PALGRAVE, 2001.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Protest vote: Why UKIP is taking votes from the left and right. London: Gibson Square, 2015.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

6, Perri. On the right lines: The next centre-right in the British Isles. London: Demos, 1998.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

The Conservative Party and the extreme right, 1945-75. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

New right, new racism: Race and reaction in the United States and Britain. Washington Square, N.Y: New York University Press, 1997.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Right and left (Political science) – Great Britain"

1

Jones, Stephen. "10. Realist criminology and victims." In Criminology. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198768968.003.0010.

Full text
Abstract:
This chapter focuses on realist criminology, a phenomenon that appeared under different names in Britain and the USA during the 1980s. Just as with the re-emergence of interactionism and the development of the ‘new criminologies’ in the 1960s, realist criminology owes much to the political background of the day: what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Reagan–Thatcher Decade’, with right-wing governments in both countries. In such a climate, it is hardly surprising that little interest was shown in considerations of why people commit crimes, but great interest was shown in doing something about it. Out of this, two ‘realisms’ have emerged: a ‘Right Realism’ and a ‘Left Realism’.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Jones, Stephen. "10. Realist criminology and victims." In Criminology, 209–27. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198860891.003.0010.

Full text
Abstract:
This chapter focuses on realist criminology, a phenomenon that appeared under different names in Britain and the USA during the 1980s. Just as with the re-emergence of interactionism and the development of the ‘new criminologies’ in the 1960s, realist criminology owes much to the political background of the day: what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Reagan–Thatcher Decade’, with right-wing governments in both countries. In such a climate, it is hardly surprising that little interest was shown in considerations of why people commit crimes, but great interest was shown in doing something about it. Out of this, two ‘realisms’ have emerged: a ‘Right Realism’ and a ‘Left Realism’.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Riehle, Kevin. "Yezhovshchina-Era Defectors, 1937–1940." In Soviet Defectors, 45–99. Edinburgh University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474467230.003.0003.

Full text
Abstract:
The second group includes eight officers who were the first to violate the new rules regarding defection. Their revelations identify Soviet political intelligence priorities directed toward Great Britain, followed by Germany, while foreign science and technology collection cast a wider net, to include the United States. Most of the officers in this group had joined a Soviet intelligence or state security service at about the same time as the defectors in Chapter 1, but they persevered through most of the 1930s, sometimes participating in the very actions that led earlier officers to defect. The Great Purge, or what came to be known as the Yezhovshchina, prompted these officers and their families to defect. They left because they saw their own colleagues being arrested and executed, and they felt the need to save their own skins.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Hardy, Lawrence Harold. "A History of Computer Networking Technology." In Encyclopedia of Multimedia Technology and Networking, Second Edition, 613–18. IGI Global, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-014-1.ch082.

Full text
Abstract:
The computer has influenced the very fabric of modern society. As a stand-alone machine, it has proven itself a practical and highly efficient tool for education, commerce, science, and medicine. When attached to a network—the Internet for example—it becomes the nexus of opportunity, transforming our lives in ways that are both problematic and astonishing. Computer networks are the source for vast amounts of knowledge, which can predict the weather, identify organ donors and recipients, or analyze the complexity of the human genome (Shindler, 2002). The linking of ideas across an information highway satisfies a primordial hunger humans have to belong and to communicate. Early civilizations, to satisfy this desire, created information highways of carrier pigeons (Palmer, 2006). The history of computer networking begins in the 19th century with the invention of the telegraph, the telephone, and the radiotelegraph. The first communications information highway based on electricity was created with the deployment of the telegraph. The telegraph itself is no more than an electromagnet connected to a battery, connected to a switch, connected to wire (Derfler & Freed, 2002). The telegraph operates very straightforwardly. To send a message (electric current), the telegrapher rapidly opens and closes the telegraph switch. The receiving telegraph uses the electric current to create a magnetic field, which causes an observable mechanical event (Calvert, 2004). The first commercial telegraph was patented in Great Britain by Charles Wheatstone and William Cooke in 1837 (The Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2007). The Cooke-Wheatstone Telegraph required six wires and five magnetic needles. Messages were created when combinations of the needles were deflected left or right to indicate letters (Derfler & Freed, 2002). Almost simultaneous to the Cooke-Wheatstone Telegraph was the Samuel F. B. Morse Telegraph in the United States in 1837 (Calvert, 2004). In comparison, the Morse Telegraph was decidedly different from its European counterpart. First, it was much simpler than the Cooke-Wheatstone Telegraph: to transmit messages, it used one wire instead of six. Second, it used a code and a sounder to send and receive messages instead of deflected needles (Derfler & Freed, 2002). The simplicity of the Morse Telegraph made it the worldwide standard. The next major change in telegraphy occurred because of the efforts of French inventor Emile Baudot. Baudot’s first innovation replaced the telegrapher’s key with a typewriter like keyboard. His second innovation replaced the dots and dashes of Morse code with a five-unit or five-bit code—similar to American standard code for information interchange (ASCII) or extended binary coded decimal interchange code (EBCDIC)—he developed. Unlike Morse code, which relied upon a series of dots and dashes, each letter in the Baudot code contained a combination of five electrical pulses. Eventually all major telegraph companies converted to Baudot code, which eliminated the need for a skilled Morse code telegrapher (Derfler & Freed, 2002). Finally, Baudot, in 1894, invented a distributor which allowed his printing telegraph to multiplex its signals; as many as eight machines could send simultaneous messages over one telegraph circuit (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia , 2006). The Baudot printing telegraph paved the way for the Teletype and Telex (Derfler & Freed, 2002). The second forerunner of modern computer networking was the telephone. It was a significant advancement over the telegraph for it personalized telecommunications, bringing the voices and emotions of the sender to the receiver. Unlike its predecessor the telegraph, telephone networks created virtual circuit to connect telephones to one another (Shindler, 2002). Legend credits Alexander Graham Bell as the inventor of the telephone in 1876. He was not. Bell was the first to patent the telephone. Historians credit Italian- American scientist Antonio Meucci as the inventor of the telephone. Meucci began working on his design for a talking telegraph in 1849 and filed a caveat for his design in 1871 but was unable to finance commercial development. In 2002, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution recognizing his accomplishment to telecommunications (Library of Congress, 2007).
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Hardy, Lawrence Harold. "A History of Computer Networking Technology." In Networking and Telecommunications, 26–32. IGI Global, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-986-1.ch003.

Full text
Abstract:
The computer has influenced the very fabric of modern society. As a stand-alone machine, it has proven itself a practical and highly efficient tool for education, commerce, science, and medicine. When attached to a network—the Internet for example—it becomes the nexus of opportunity, transforming our lives in ways that are both problematic and astonishing. Computer networks are the source for vast amounts of knowledge, which can predict the weather, identify organ donors and recipients, or analyze the complexity of the human genome (Shindler, 2002). The linking of ideas across an information highway satisfies a primordial hunger humans have to belong and to communicate. Early civilizations, to satisfy this desire, created information highways of carrier pigeons (Palmer, 2006). The history of computer networking begins in the 19th century with the invention of the telegraph, the telephone, and the radiotelegraph. The first communications information highway based on electricity was created with the deployment of the telegraph. The telegraph itself is no more than an electromagnet connected to a battery, connected to a switch, connected to wire (Derfler & Freed, 2002). The telegraph operates very straightforwardly. To send a message (electric current), the telegrapher rapidly opens and closes the telegraph switch. The receiving telegraph uses the electric current to create a magnetic field, which causes an observable mechanical event (Calvert, 2004). The first commercial telegraph was patented in Great Britain by Charles Wheatstone and William Cooke in 1837 (The Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2007). The Cooke-Wheatstone Telegraph required six wires and five magnetic needles. Messages were created when combinations of the needles were deflected left or right to indicate letters (Derfler & Freed, 2002). Almost simultaneous to the Cooke-Wheatstone Telegraph was the Samuel F. B. Morse Telegraph in the United States in 1837 (Calvert, 2004). In comparison, the Morse Telegraph was decidedly different from its European counterpart. First, it was much simpler than the Cooke-Wheatstone Telegraph: to transmit messages, it used one wire instead of six. Second, it used a code and a sounder to send and receive messages instead of deflected needles (Derfler & Freed, 2002). The simplicity of the Morse Telegraph made it the worldwide standard. The next major change in telegraphy occurred because of the efforts of French inventor Emile Baudot. Baudot’s first innovation replaced the telegrapher’s key with a typewriter like keyboard. His second innovation replaced the dots and dashes of Morse code with a five-unit or five-bit code—similar to American standard code for information interchange (ASCII) or extended binary coded decimal interchange code (EBCDIC)—he developed. Unlike Morse code, which relied upon a series of dots and dashes, each letter in the Baudot code contained a combination of five electrical pulses. Eventually all major telegraph companies converted to Baudot code, which eliminated the need for a skilled Morse code telegrapher (Derfler & Freed, 2002). Finally, Baudot, in 1894, invented a distributor which allowed his printing telegraph to multiplex its signals; as many as eight machines could send simultaneous messages over one telegraph circuit (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia , 2006). The Baudot printing telegraph paved the way for the Teletype and Telex (Derfler & Freed, 2002). The second forerunner of modern computer networking was the telephone. It was a significant advancement over the telegraph for it personalized telecommunications, bringing the voices and emotions of the sender to the receiver. Unlike its predecessor the telegraph, telephone networks created virtual circuit to connect telephones to one another (Shindler, 2002). Legend credits Alexander Graham Bell as the inventor of the telephone in 1876. He was not. Bell was the first to patent the telephone. Historians credit Italian- American scientist Antonio Meucci as the inventor of the telephone. Meucci began working on his design for a talking telegraph in 1849 and filed a caveat for his design in 1871 but was unable to finance commercial development. In 2002, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution recognizing his accomplishment to telecommunications (Library of Congress, 2007).
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

"distrust of the intellectual, typical of British art circles, and other factors of British theatrical life, has led to the assumption by many that to ‘think’ about performing will inhibit the ‘feeling’ necessary to the creative act. To cap it all, of course, Brecht actually set himself against naturalism as a style or intent, and thus (or so many practitioners assumed for some time) also set himself against the development of a clear emotional line in performance – another black mark for him from a theatre that prided itself on its ability to ‘move’ an audience by a truthful display of deep sentiment. The great British actor Alec Guinness wrote in 1949 in answer to an article by Brecht on acting: I find his theories cut right across the very nature of the actor, substituting some cerebral process for the instinctive and traditional accumulation of centuries . . . I believe in the mystery and illusion of the theatre which Brecht seems to despise. And yet the part of the British theatrical tradition that is built on the performing of Shakespeare so often brings the performer very close to Brechtian notions of theatre. Brecht’s own generous accolade to the bard – that his was a truly epic form – is a strong testimony here; and as many practitioners acknowledge (and are quoted in subsequent chapters of this book), the natural inclination of British actors towards ironic story-telling, so familiar to us from Shakespeare, makes them easy converts to Brechtian practice. Until the mid-1950s, only among a small band of left-wing enthusiasts was Brecht’s work actively supported in Britain. The great boost to the development of a public for the play-wright came from the first visit to London by his company, the Berliner Ensemble, in 1956 – shortly, that is, after his death. Since the Berliner performed in German, it is not surprising that the major impact they had was on ‘theatrical style’, on the visual and physical aspects of production, rather than on thematic content. A number of British directors and designers were immediately struck by the bareness and simplicity of the company’s staging, the careful detail lavished on and produced in costumes and props, and the robust clarity and exuberance of the acting. These responses led to a small crop of British productions of Brecht plays in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but these received somewhat mixed reviews. The feeling persisted that there was something wrong with the plays themselves, acceptability of which was certainly not helped by the difficulties of translating Brecht’s specialised verbal language. The archaic words and phrases, unusual rhythms, poetic word order, and so on, proved, and continue to prove, a challenge to any translator. And the early British productions of Brecht appeared to suffer from either an over-fidelity to ‘Brechtianism’ as understood by the performers, or from a lack of understanding of the essential combination in Brecht of socio-political meaning and theatrical fun. Even critics who admired these early productions sometimes felt (and declared) that they had to overlook or ignore Brecht’s politics in order to enjoy the performance." In Performing Brecht, 14. Routledge, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203129838-10.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography