Academic literature on the topic 'Revolutions – Tunisia'

A year and a half after the Iranian uprising in 2009, the unprecedented popular uprisings in several Arab countries at the beginning of 2011 provided some of the most evocative moments when power met its opposite, in decisive and surprising ways. In a matter of weeks, some of the most powerful hereditary/republican regimes in the region, such as Tunisia’s and Egypt’s, crumbled under relentless pressure and opposition from highly mediated “street politics” that shook the foundations of authoritarian and repressive rule, undermining hegemonic structures and configurations of power within nation sates and between nations. Technology, as in the case of Iranian uprising, emerged as one of the main explanations on offer to make sense of this new wave of revolts against tyranny. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in particular, inevitably drew some comparisons with the Iranian uprising of 2009. The most significant question for many Iranians was how come that the two revolts in Iran and Tunisia which immediately and rather simplistically labelled as ‘Twitter revolution’ had a totally different outcome? Many in Iran started raising such searching questions: “Chera Tunis Toonest v ma natoonestim?” (Why Tunisia could and we couldn’t) or “toonestan az Tunis miad”! (Capability comes from Tunis). So how can we compare Arab Revolutions with that of situation in Iran? What the different outcomes tell us about the similarities and the differences, and what lessons can be learnt? This paper takes a broader comparative frame, beyond technology, to explore the issue of power and revolutions and to examine the similarities as well as the differences between Iran and the Arab World.

The Arab Springs is known as “a revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests, riots, protracted civil wars and other forms of opposition (both violent and non-violent) in the Arab territories” (Elfaith. 2015, 121). Starting in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi a street vendor, set himself on fire after being harassed by municipal police officials. Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation sparked international attention, leading Tunisia into a revolution. After being in power for 23 years as Tunisia’s President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia (Bunton 2013, 16). Tunisia’s revolution led both the Arab and non-Arab world to witness “spontaneous explosions of protests, [revolutions] and popular political upheaval” in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania (Ismael and Ismael 2013, 229). The high levels of political corruption, economic hardships and the desire for a free democratic government all inspired the citizens of these countries to take action against their governments.

The “Arab Spring,” as the revolutions in some Arab countries were called by the international media, was triggered by the “Jasmine Revolt” in Tunisia, which provoked a domino effect to some Arab leaders, starting from Tunisia and spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc. Using the insights of cognitive-pragmatics, the current article shows how the last three speeches of Husni Mubarak, the demised president of Egypt (DPE), framed the revolution in Egypt and filled person deixis. In particular, the article argues that, from the antepenultimate to the ultimate speech, the DPE, unlike his Tunisian counterpart, made little change to the initial framing of the revolution in Egypt as a strategy to maintain the sociopolitical situation as it was. As transpires from the lexical items environing person deixis, the DPE filled it with cognitive content which prevented him from coming any closer to a pragmatic rapprochement to the Egyptian people.

This paper examines the Arab revolutions of 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, and their impact on street traders in Tunis and Cairo. Drawing on the literatures on urban conflict and resilience, the paper argues that the authoritarian regimes that the revolutions deposed left a vacuum in governance in which street traders found it hard to profit from the idealism and opportunism of an emerging new order. Despite being hindered by their lack of organization and voice, and disruption to their trade during the revolutions, street traders displayed resilience through small-scale adaptations to their trade and absorbed newcomers into the sector in the face of political conflict.

The democratic transition in Tunisia and free and fair elections that followed offer a unique opportunity to assess whether the experience of participating in successful political efforts translates into subsequent political participation. We consider whether participation in a democratic revolution is associated with greater rates of participation in nascent ‘normal’ democratic processes. Leveraging data from two surveys fielded in the wake of the revolution and the Constituent Assembly elections that followed, we find scant evidence of a relationship between protest participation and subsequent turnout. We also consider the possibility that young – presumably more impressionable – Tunisians were more likely to be ‘activated’ by protest participation. However, our findings run directly counter to this expectation. Our findings show that the socializing effects of monumental historical events can be strikingly circumscribed.

Arab League position form a milestone of the revolution in the Arab region, especially in North Africa, was unsatisfying, blurred and hesitant in its direction to what is called variables (revolutions of the Arab Spring). The paper is divided to four axes and the conclusions presented. the first axis deals with the Arab League's position on the revolution in Tunisia, e second axis is on the position of the Arab League in the revolution in Egypt occur, and the third axis is the Arab League's position on the revolution in Libya, finally, an analytical vision on the Arab League's position on the Arab revolution in North Africa is elaborated.

Revolutions are by nature unpredictable and unsettling. That the wave of revolutions in North Africa and the Arab Middle East began so unexpectedly and spread with such speed, leading to the fall of the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, has added to the concern regarding the “new order” that is to come after the initial euphoria. From the outset, the fear has been that these revolutions will follow the same trajectory as Iran did in 1979—in other words, that they will marginalize those who launched the revolutions and provide the grounds for the rise to power of the most savvy, purposeful, and best organized of the opposition groups, namely, the Islamists. Yet when one considers the recent uprisings in the Arab world through the prism of Iran's experiences in 1979, the parallels are not so evident. Mindful of the variations and distinctions between each of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, it would appear that in broad terms, and beyond superficial similarities, there is little in common between the events of Iran in 1979 and what has happened in the past year in the Arab world.

The Arab Spring is the last revolution and, at the same time, one of the most critical events in the Arab world. The paper analyzes the literary representations of this current social phenomenon. The focus is on the narratives written immediately before, during, and after the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. The revolution has become a significant theme of Arab literature, so its reflections in the novel are plural and divergent. The perspectives of the Arab Spring vary from the optimism of Nawal al-Sa’dawi and Abu Bakr al-Ayadi to the dystopian image in the novels of Khalid Khalifa and the insightful discovery of the revolution as a void by Izzudin Fishayr.

In recent years one of the most actual issues among Russian scientists and politicians was the topic of the Coloured Revolutions. The questions of transformation of political regimes in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kirgizstan, Egypt and Tunisia during 2000- 2014 years are revealed in the article. The article provides an overview of the Western technologies of soft power and non-violent struggle using in the Coloured Revolutions. The author argues that «revolutionists» were unable to provide the formation of stable democratic regimes and the consequences of these events, internal and external, have not approved the aspirations of the people of these countries.

This research examines the revolution of 2010 in Tunisia due to the paucity of empirical research on the subject and to resolve analytical problems that plague research on similar events. The research is based in both the cultural turn in social movement research and the state constructionist theory of revolutions. The methodology employed is a case study which combines a content analysis of an Al Jazeera news program called Al Hassad Al Maghrebi with data from two public opinion surveys conducted in Tunisia shortly after the revolution, and pre-existing academic research. The findings indicate that Al Jazeera did play a role in increasing mobilization against the Ben Ali regime by broadcasting the spread of protests and regime concessions. This was facilitated by the censorship practices of the Ben Ali regime which caused a popular news channel like Al Jazeera to rely purely on opposition sources for its broadcasts.

Abstract In this thesis I’m seeking to explain the reasons that are bihind the Tunisian revolution and how the Tunisian youths Succeeded to shift a strong political system and one of bigs dictatorship in the Arab world Leaded by Zine AlBidine Ben Ali with a peacful revolution without no leadership and no previous plan. Added to that, they opened the doors to the other Arab youths to revolt against their dictator systems like what happens in Libiya, Egypt,Yemen and Syria. So what happened in Tunisia spread quiklly among the other Arab countries and specially the youths to became a serious of revolutions that has become what we call “The Arab spring”. My thesis is going to be diveded into two main parts. In the first part, I will folks on the social and the political reasons behind the Tunisian revolution and how a Simple protest started from simple street saler, named by Mohammed El Bouazizi, has devolopped to become a national manifestations against a strong police system that governs the country for 24 years. While in the secound part I will analyse how does this revolution influenced the youth of the rest Arab world and make them following the steps of the Tunisian youth to revolt against their political systems. In addition to that, the second part will analysis the success and the fail of the other revolutions like the Egyption, Libyan, Syrian, yemenian and the Bahranian.

En 2011, des mouvements sociaux et révolutionnaires d’une ampleur rare ont agité certains pays du nord de l’Afrique. Cela correspond à ce qu’on a appelé le printemps arabe.Le premier de ces pays touchés par ces mouvements est la Tunisie. Cette thèse porte sur la révolution tunisienne. Elle propose une analyse théorique et empirique de cette révolution.D’un point de vue théorique, ce travail se situe dans le cadre de l’analyse économique. Nous nous situons donc dans le prolongement de la littérature économique qui, à partir des années 1970, s’est intéressée aux mouvements sociaux et plus précisément les révolutions. La théorie économique a offert un autre cadre permettant d’analyser la manière dont l’action d’un petit groupe d’individus peut provoquer des bouleversements de grande envergure. L’un des objets de cette thèse est alors de proposer une synthèse de cette littérature. Nous soulignons que cette thèse revient sur les définitions de la révolution et propose une présentation qui essaye d’être exhaustive des analyses économiques des révolutions. Quatre types de modèles sont définis : la méthode décisionnelle, la théorie des jeux, la méthode d'analyse Tobit et le modèle seuil de mobilisation. Ces modèles ont parvenu à expliquer l’émergence d’un mouvement révolutionnaire mais ne prennent pas en compte la particularité de chaque pays, nous insistons en particulier sur ce point. Il n’en est pas moins vrai que, la littérature théorique sur les révolutions a précisé ce caractère unique pour chaque révolution. Autour de cette spécificité, l’idée centrale de cette thèse a été construite : quelles sont les causes de la révolution tunisienne ? En outre, la contribution principale de cette thèse est d’ordre empirique. Bien que de nombreuses recherches aient analysé de différentes manières les causes des révolutions (Données de panel, modèles économétriques), la méthode d’analyse en composantes principales (ACP) est, à notre connaissance, la première contribution dans l’analyse des révolutions et surtout la première étude de ce type appliquée à la Tunisie. Cette méthode a pu détecter trois ramifications caractérisant le 14 janvier 2011. Trois révolutions d’ordre sociologique et sociétal semblent particulièrement importantes : une révolution démographique, une révolution de l’alphabétisation et une révolution des attentes. Premièrement, la transition démographique et ses implications économiques et sociales. Deuxièmement, les inégalités et l’élargissement de la fracture sociale entre les régions. Troisièmement, la mauvaise gestion du pays suite à l’emprise de l’économie sous Ben Ali et ses conséquences catastrophique sur l’investissement et la création d’emplois
Revolution, which embodies major turns in the course of history, has for a long time been a social study subject. With the coming of the school of public choice in the 1960's, a new economic current helped to undestand revolution. Many economists such as: James M. Buchanan (1962), Gordon Tullock (1971-1974) and John E. Romer (1985) have applied economic theory to social and political science using tools developed by microeconomy. The goal of my research paper is to highlight the contribution of economic theory in the understanding of revolution. I have first drawn a line between two approaches that have studied revolution: The sociological approach which mainly explains why do people revolt when they are faced with structural imbalances. The economic approach which uses the theory of rational choice to demonstrate how people choose to be passive when they are confronted with a revolution

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la fabrique des routes marchandes mondialisées en Tunisie, à partir de l’étude des approvisionnements des marchés du commerce dit « parallèle », installés aux débouchés de routes transnationales d’échange de biens banals. Elle explore d’abord le postulat d’une organisation réticulaire et labile de l’économie marchande transnationale en Tunisie. Ce réseau articule des places marchandes, notamment celles situées au centre de Tunis et à Ben Gardane, qui forment des nœuds d’échange nés de processus locaux et territorialisés. Partir de ces lieux permet de mettre en évidence les trajectoires professionnelles des commerçants, modestes à l’origine, et de démontrer comment ces derniers sont parvenus à développer leurs relations d’affaires. La thèse met ainsi à jour un réseau de marchés qui structure l’importation transnationale dans le pays, via ses ports et ses régions frontalières. La thèse examine ensuite les effets de la révolution tunisienne sur ce réseau de marchés, en particulier au niveau des dispositifs de contournement des barrières douanières que les flux de marchandises empruntent. Le changement politique survenu en 2011 agit comme un révélateur des implications du régime de l’ancien président Ben Ali dans une économie marchande pourtant présentée comme « parallèle ». Plus encore, sous l’effet de l’effondrement du régime, les relations marchandes, les activités, et les itinéraires empruntés se recomposent, montrant ainsi que le « commerce parallèle » est devenu un enjeu de gouvernance dans la Tunisie en transition. Enfin, la thèse entreprend une réflexion sur l’analyse formelle de ces réseaux. L’enjeu est alors de poser les jalons d’une géographie des réseaux sociaux et spatiaux, à travers la prise en compte des relations sociales des acteurs dans la structuration des relations commerciales, et l’identification et l’analyse de réseaux de marchés
This thesis focuses on the making of globalized trade routes in Tunisia, based on the study of the supply of marketplaces that are specialized in the so-called “parallel trade”. These marketplaces are located at the end of transnational trade routes which import everyday consumer products in the country. First, it proceeds on the basis that transnational trade economy in Tunisia is organized as a labile network. This network articulates marketplaces, including those located in Central Tunis and in Ben Gardane, two trading hubs that have emerged from local and territorialized processes. Starting from these places makes it possible to highlight the professional trajectories of their tradesmen, and to demonstrate how the latter have developed their business relationships. The thesis thus reveals a network of marketplaces that shapes transnational import into the country, through Tunisian ports and border regions. The thesis then examines the effects of the Tunisian Revolution on this markets network, more closely at the level of customs barrier bypass devices used by the flow of goods. The political change in 2011 thus reveals the participation of former President Ben Ali’s regime in trade economy, yet presented as informal economy. Moreover, with the regime’s collapse, trade relationships, commercial activities and trade routes have been reshaped, thereby pointing out that "parallel trade" has become a governance issue in Tunisia during the period of democratic transition. Finally, the thesis considers the formal analysis of these networks. It thus aims to lay the foundations for a geography of social and spatial networks by taking into account, on the one hand, the actors’ social relationships and their role into the organization of commercial relations, and on the other hand, the identification and analysis of marketplaces networks

Focusing on the context of post-uprising Tunisia and using a gender lens, I explore gender and body politics through embodied social protest. I examine the post-uprising constitutional and decision-making processes as well as discursive representations in the Constitution and the role of protesting and legitimacy in shaping institutional tools and mechanisms. I draw attention to the status of women and the LGBTQI++ community as well as vulnerable individuals and their role in social change during the country’s democratic transition by analyzing narratives and discourses around protesting and bodily rights and themes such as legibility/illegibility. I complement my analysis with three qualitative, in-depth interviews with three Tunisian activists; I also reflect on my personal experience as a former reporter and student-activist during and post uprisings. I conclude that the emergence of new forms of mobilization and discourses create unique possibilities to negotiate power and gender norms

Le projet de recherche s'est concentré sur les rôles des associations féminines en Tunisie depuis l’indépendance du pays au lendemain de la révolution de janvier 2011. Sur le plan conceptuel, je reprends la notion de « agency » en tant que cadre d’analyse pour étudier l’engagement et les moyens de mobilisation des individus qui militent dans les associations féminines. Dans la mesure où ce concept de « agency » indique un engagement dans la société, cette notion se prête parfaitement aux démarches épistémologiques dans mes enquêtes auprès des personnalités des associations féminines. Cette notion de « agency » me donne un cadre pour penser à la fois les actions des femmes et des hommes qui agissent au sein des associations étudiées mais aussi au niveau de l’influence qu’elles/ils laissent dans la société de par leurs actions. J’ai cherché à comprendre si l’agency, en tant que capacité individuelle de s’imposer dans des domaines de la vie sociale, politique ou économique pour apporter des innovations et modifications, pourrait s’appliquer à un groupe et donc pourrait être utile pour comprendre un pouvoir collectif. En analysant les entretiens que j’ai conduits avec les membres des associations féminines, j'ai cherché à suivre l’histoire de ces organisations et leur impact dans la société tunisienne durant le dernier demi-siècle depuis l’indépendance de la Tunisie à nos jours, et cela dans les domaines économique, social, politique et légal afin de répondre à ma question principale : quel est le rôle des associations féminines en Tunisie postcoloniale, notamment avant et après la révolution de 2011, surtout à l’égard du processus de la démocratisation dans le pays ?
The research project focused on the rôle of the feminist associations since the indipendence of Tunisia until the revolution of 2011, analyzing the context of the creation and the process, putting the accent on different women's associations which engaged themselves in order to ensure that the gained women's rights are respected and diffused in all country with the intention to improve women to became « fully citizens ».Every time I went to Tunisia, I had some interviews with the members of the organisations during the years before and after the revolution, in order to observe the evolution of their involvement in the association and in the society.The objective of this thesis is to contextualize the socio-political rôle occupied from the four associations in the history of the country, since their creation until the present day.On the conceptual plan, I included the « agency » notion, in order to analyse the involvement and the ressources of mobilisation of the people who participate in the work of the feminist associations.I tried to understand if « agency », as individual ability to impose on the domaines of the social, political and economic life to change something, it could be a collective ability, then a collective power. Analyzing the interviews with members of the associations, I attempted to track the history of the feminist tunisian organisations and their impact on the social life of the country, to answer to a final question : which is the rôle of the feminist associations in the postcolonial Tunisia, especially before an dafter the revolution of january 2011, mainly in relation to the democratic process of the country ?

Cette recherche questionne le partage de l’ambiance urbaine par le biais du climat politique. Menée tout au long d’une période exceptionnelle de l’histoire de la Tunisie, elle interroge l’impact de la révolution tunisienne sur le partage du sensible dans l’espace public urbain.Ce travail repose sur l’hypothèse qu’il y a une mutation ambiantale, engendrée par le processus révolutionnaire, qui s’opère dans l’espace public urbain de Tunis et dont découle de manière sous- jacente un nouveau partage du sensible. Une question fondamentale se pose alors: Quel rôle joue la situation politique dans la définition et la caractérisation de ce nouveau partage su sensible ?Pour répondre à cette interrogation, nous avons mis en place une méthodologie pluridisciplinaire (approche sensible et qualitative in situ tel que le parcours commenté, la réactivation par l’image,… et une documentation bibliographique sous divers formats tels que les documentaires, les films, les journaux, les ouvrages,…) appliquée à des tissus urbains aux configurations spatiales et aux compositions sociales différentes, mais tous situés dans le Grand Tunis.Au terme de cette recherche, nous avons pu relever une territorialisation des comportements urbains où le facteur politique intervient directement pour définir autant le domaine du permissif que de l’interdit dans l’espace public.Ainsi, l’ambiance urbaine n’est pas seulement témoin d’un bouleversement politique, elle en est aussi le porteur et l’enjeu. En mettant au jour ce qui est possible de faire ou de ne pas faire dans l’espace public, elle devient l’objet de la lutte politique.MOTS CLES: Ambiance urbaine, Politique, Partage, Sensible, Révolution
This research questions the sharing of urban atmosphere through the political climate. Conducted throughout an exceptional period in the history of Tunisia, it questions the impact of the Tunisian revolution on sharing of sensitivity in urban public space.This work relies on the assumption that there is a mutation in the urban atmosphere, caused by the revolutionary process taking place in the urban public space of Tunis, which follows sounder lying a new distribution of the sensitive. A fundamental question arises: What role has the political situation in the definition and the characterization of this new sharing of sensitive?To answer this question, we have set up a multidisciplinary methodology (qualitative and sensitive approach in situ as the course commented, reactivation by the image ... and bibliographic documentation in various formats such as documentaries, movies, newspapers, books, ...) applied to urban space with different features and different social compositions, but all located in the Greater Tunis.After this research, we were able to identify a regionalization of urban behavior where the political factor intervenes directly to define as the field of permissive than the forbidden in public space.Thus, the urban atmosphere is not only witnessed in political upheaval, it is also the carrier and the challenge. By uncovering what is possible to do or not to do in public space, it becomes the object of political struggle.KEY WORDS : Urban atmosphere, Politic, Sharing, Sensitive, Revolution

The monograph is devoted to the consideration of one of the urgent problems of political theory and practice — the revolution of freedom and dignity in Tunisia, which opened the way for deep democratic transformations in the Islamic country. This revolution has become a convincing example of new, one might say unprecedented before, opportunities for revolutionary renewal of the world within the framework of the current law and without violence, based on revolutionary legality. For the first time in the Islamic world, the possibility of a certain and sufficiently broad cooperation between revolutionary forces and representatives of the former dictatorial power in the country was shown in practice. The main force in the Tunisian Revolution was the masses of the people, who acted independently in the absence of any universally recognized leaders, political parties and movements. Finally, perhaps the highest achievement of the revolution was the adoption of a new constitution that defined the conditions for the subsequent political development of Tunisia. It is addressed to everyone who is interested in the political development of the modern world. It will be useful for postgraduates and undergraduates studying in the fields of "Political Science" and "Sociology", as well as for university and college teachers.

Zusammenfassung Several years after the Tunisian uprising of 2010–11, it is now time to explore the literary production of its aftermath. This chapter focuses on novels written in French and Arabic that have found acclaim in the Tunisian literary scene, all of them winners of the Tunisian prize for fiction, the Prix Comar d’Or. At the same time, the works deal in some way with the uprising of 2010/2011. This starting point allows various insights: First, it compares the novels, exploring trends such as autobiographic reflections and the turn to past revolutions. Secondly, the chapter asks more structural questions about the context of the novels’ production (authors, publishers) as well as about their honorary reception through literary awards. Beyond characterizing the post-revolutionary Tunisian literary scene, this approach also makes it possible to address the ways in which the Tunisian literary establishment wants the revolutionary events to be reworked in literature.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.