Journal articles: 'Revisionist public choice theory'

1

Brennan, Geoffrey, and Alan Hamlin. "Revisionist Public Choice Theory." New Political Economy 13, no. 1 (March 2008): 77–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563460701859744.

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Miller-Kahn, Linda, and Mary Lee Smith. "School Choice Policies in the Political Spectacle." education policy analysis archives 9 (November 30, 2001): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v9n50.2001.

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This article presents research on school choice. It takes the case of a school district in Boulder, Colorado, through the decade of the 1990s and shows how interest groups took advantage of federal, state, and district policies meant to promote school choice and molded them into a system of schools that met individualistic interests rather than the common good. Extensive interviewing and analysis of documents and media reports served as sources of evidence. The authors argue that district officials accommodated the demands of elite groups of parents to transform the district. The study is framed by revisionist theories of policy, particularly Murray Edelman's theory of political spectacle wherein real values are allocated to a few groups, the allocation occurring largely out of public scrutiny. For most of the public, however, policies are largely symbolic.

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Schwartz, Herman M. "Public Choice Theory and Public Choices." Administration & Society 26, no. 1 (May 1994): 48–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009539979402600104.

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Finlayson, Alan. "Public choice theory: enemy of democracy." Soundings 24, no. 24 (July 1, 2003): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/136266203820467608.

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Rubin, Edward L., Daniel A. Farber, and Philip P. Frickey. "Public Choice in Practice and Theory." California Law Review 81, no. 6 (December 1993): 1657. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3480959.

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DeAngelo, Gregory, and Bryan C. McCannon. "Psychological game theory in public choice." Public Choice 182, no. 1-2 (June 27, 2019): 159–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00676-6.

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Shughart, William F., and Fred S. McChesney. "Public choice theory and antitrust policy." Public Choice 142, no. 3-4 (October 27, 2009): 385–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9552-6.

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Kociemska, Hanna. "Theory of Public Choice, Theory of Social Choice and Public-Private Partnership in a Heterodox Approach." Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio H, Oeconomia 51, no. 6 (April 13, 2018): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/h.2017.51.6.129.

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Sagan, Scott D., and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants." Ethics & International Affairs 33, no. 4 (2019): 411–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679419000431.

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AbstractTraditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear at least some responsibility for advancing an immoral end, even if they otherwise fight ethically. This article examines the attitudes of the American public regarding the moral equality of combatants. Utilizing an original survey experiment, we find that the public's moral reasoning is generally more consistent with that of the revisionists than with traditional just war theory. Americans in our study judged soldiers who participate in unjust wars as less ethical than soldiers in just wars, even when their battlefield conduct is identical, and a large proportion supported harsh punishments for soldiers simply for participating in unjust wars. We also find, however, that much of the American public is willing to extend the moral license of just cause significantly further than revisionist scholars advocate: half of the Americans in our survey were willing to allow an unambiguous war crime—a massacre of innocent women and children—to go unpunished when the act was committed by soldiers fighting for a just cause. Our findings suggest that incorporation of revisionist principles into the laws of war would reinforce dangerous moral intuitions encouraging the killing of civilians.

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van Basshuysen, Philippe. "Rationality in games and institutions." Synthese 199, no. 5-6 (October 18, 2021): 12295–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03333-y.

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AbstractAgainst the orthodox view of the Nash equilibrium as “the embodiment of the idea that economic agents are rational” (Aumann, 1985, p 43), some theorists have proposed ‘non-classical’ concepts of rationality in games, arguing that rational agents should be capable of improving upon inefficient equilibrium outcomes. This paper considers some implications of these proposals for economic theory, by focusing on institutional design. I argue that revisionist concepts of rationality conflict with the constraint that institutions should be designed to be incentive-compatible, that is, that they should implement social goals in equilibrium. To resolve this conflict, proponents of revisionist concepts face a choice between three options: (1) reject incentive compatibility as a general constraint, (2) deny that individuals interacting through the designed institutions are rational, or (3) accept that their concepts do not cover institutional design. I critically discuss these options and I argue that a more inclusive concept of rationality, e.g. the one provided by Robert Sugden’s version of team reasoning, holds the most promise for the non-classical project, yielding a novel argument for incentive compatibility as a general constraint.

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Jovanovic, Radmila. "Two impossibility results in public choice theory." Theoria, Beograd 55, no. 3 (2012): 55–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1203055j.

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In this paper we deal with some problems of public choice theory. We start with exposition of Arrow's impossibility result which was the starting point in constitution of a whole problematic: the impossibility of existence of a social welfare function. We will mention one solution to the paradox, proposed by Duncan Black, namely, the existence of single-peaked structure of preferences. Then we will pass to another impossibility result that of impossibility of aggregation of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions. We will introduce the idea that this problem represents a larger frame in which the problem of aggregating preferences can be embedded. We will expose one solution to that paradox as well - the existence of unidimensional alignment in the structure of individuals. The main question then is by what means do we achieve this kind of a structure? We will propose a skecth for a future study in which a belief revision theory play important role in finding a solution to these problems.

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Lane, Jan-Erik. "The Epistemological Foundations of Public Choice Theory." Scandinavian Political Studies 13, no. 1 (March 1990): 65–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1990.tb00105.x.

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Hylton, Keith N., and Vikramaditya Khanna. "A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure." Supreme Court Economic Review 15, no. 1 (February 2007): 61–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656028.

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Webster, Christopher J. "Public Choice, Pigouvian and Coasian Planning Theory." Urban Studies 35, no. 1 (January 1998): 53–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0042098985078.

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15

Miller, James C. "Public choice theory and antitrust policy: comment." Public Choice 142, no. 3-4 (October 31, 2009): 407–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9530-z.

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Nureev, R. "Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 6. Public Choice under Representative Democracy: Political Competition." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 20, 2003): 128–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-1-128-153.

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The specifics of pubic choice under representative democracy are considered in the sixth chapter of the textbook. Two definitions of representative democracy are distinguished. The concept of political competition is defined. The types of political parties and political systems are analysed. The model of two-party competition is characterized. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

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17

Khoo, Su-ming. "On decolonial revisions of modern social theory." International Sociology 36, no. 5 (September 2021): 704–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02685809211057468.

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This review essay discusses decolonial and revisionist approaches to the sociological canon, centring on a major new work, Colonialism and Modern Social Theory by Gurminder Bhambra and John Holmwood (2021). The challenge to ‘classical’ social theory and the demand to reconstitute the theory curriculum come in the context of increased visibility for wider decolonial agendas, linked to ‘fallist’ protests in South Africa, Black Lives Matter and allied antiracist organizing, and calls to decolonize public and civic spaces and institutions such as universities, effect museum restitution, and colonial reparations. The review identifies continuities and complementarities with Connell’s critique of the sociological canon, though Colonialism and Modern Social Theory takes a different tack from Connell’s Southern Theory (2009). Bhambra and Holmwood’s opening of sociology’s canon converges with Connell’s recent work to align a critical project of global and decolonial public sociology with a pragmatic programme for doing academic work differently.

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Balcaen, Pieter, Cind Du Bois, and Caroline Buts. "The Hybridisation of Conflict: A Prospect Theoretic Analysis." Games 12, no. 4 (October 26, 2021): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12040081.

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Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of force posture and composition. We examine the choice process associated with this contemporary form of state competition by modelling the interactions between two actors, i.e., a defender and a challenger. As these choices are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we study the choice from the framework of prospect theory. This behavioural–economic perspective indicates that the defender will give a higher weight and a higher subjective value to conventional threats, inducing a higher vulnerability in the domain of hybrid deterrence. As future conflict will increasingly involve choice dilemmas, we must balance threats according to their probability of occurrence and their consequences. This article raises awareness regarding our cognitive biases when making these choices.

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19

Forbes, Lisa. "Public health and nudge theory." Journal of Health Visiting 8, no. 12 (December 2, 2020): 524–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/johv.2020.8.12.524.

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Martin, William J. "PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM*." Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 34, no. 3 (December 1990): 189–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8489.1990.tb00495.x.

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MacLean, Stephen Michael. "PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM." Economic Affairs 31, no. 3 (October 2011): 46–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2011.02103.x.

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22

Holcombe, Randall G. "The median voter model in public choice theory." Public Choice 61, no. 2 (May 1989): 115–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00115658.

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Anderson, Gary M., William F. Shughart, and Robert D. Tollison. "A public choice theory of the great contraction." Public Choice 59, no. 1 (October 1988): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00119446.

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24

Baird, Ian. "Chaplains of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-18: modern revisions on one hundred years of historiographical development." British Journal of Canadian Studies 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/bjcs.2021.1.

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This article surveys nearly 100 years of how British and Canadian Great War army chaplains were historicised through three distinct stages: the interwar decades, the counterculture movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and a revisionist phase that began in the 1990s and continues. Postwar memoirs of numerous literary-minded British and Canadian veterans almost invariably characterised chaplains as hypocritical and irrelevant to the average soldier, doing more harm than good to the cause of organised religion. This and other war disillusionment motifs were taken up by the 1960s anti-war movement and sealed into public consciousness. The 1990s, however, witnessed the beginning of scholarly, revisionist efforts to disentangle history from literature and myth. The effort has produced a more balanced, complex, and interesting assessment of chaplain front-line performance, as revealed through the diverse testimony of soldiers from all socio-economic backgrounds, not just the educated literary class.

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Nureev, R. "Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 7. Public Choice under Representative Democracy: Government and Coalitions in Parliament." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 2 (February 20, 2003): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-2-111-132.

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The specifics of pubic choice under representative democracy are considered in the seventh chapter of the textbook. The factors of forming of coalitions in parliament are analyzed. The methods of voting manipulation including the formulation of Arrow's impossibility theorem are described. The concept of logrolling is distinguished. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

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Webster, Chris. "Analytical public-choice planning theory: a response to Poulton." Town Planning Review 69, no. 2 (April 1998): 191. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/tpr.69.2.x466u2032k606n8t.

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27

Rada, Roger D. "A Public Choice Theory of School Board Member Behavior." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 10, no. 3 (September 1988): 225–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/01623737010003225.

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The study of educational governance has suffered by being insufficiently concerned with axiomatic-deductive theories. It is behind the times. The theory presented in this paper should move things forward. A public choice theory of school board member behavior makes two major contributions to the study of school governance. First, it provides a theoretical framework for microanalyses of school governance, that is, the focus is on each actor and each school district rather than on aggregates of abstract data. Secondly, the theory has the potential to greatly increase the power to predict behavior and events in school governance. A framework for understanding and predicting the micro, as well as the macro, events of school governance is needed. The theory of school governance proposed in this paper provides such a framework.

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Haar, Charles M. "Public Choice Theory: A Unifying Framework for Judicial Activism." Harvard Law Review 110, no. 5 (March 1997): 1161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1342121.

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Nureev, R. "Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 12. Constitutional Economics." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 7 (July 20, 2003): 110–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-7-110-127.

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The necessity of formation of constitutional economics is considered in the twelfth chapter of the textbook. The model of constitutional order by F. Hayek is analyzed. The requirements to effective constitution are described. The law is viewed as the public capital. The concepts of defending and producing state are defined. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

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30

Bernholz, Peter. "Public choice theory: Some items for a research agenda." Public Choice 77, no. 1 (September 1993): 29–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01049217.

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31

Stewart, Jenny. "Rational choice theory, public policy and the liberal state." Policy Sciences 26, no. 4 (1993): 317–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00999475.

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32

Quartner, David. "PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY, PROTECTIONISM AND THE CASE OF NAFTA." Economic Affairs 26, no. 1 (March 2006): 59–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00615.x.

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Vanzetti, David. "The next round: Game theory and public choice perspectives." Food Policy 21, no. 4-5 (September 1996): 461–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0306-9192(96)00020-6.

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34

Neimun, Max, and Stephen J. Stambough. "Rational Choice Theory and the Evaluation of Public Policy." Policy Studies Journal 26, no. 3 (September 1998): 449–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1998.tb01912.x.

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35

TOLLISON, ROBERT D. "GORDON TULLOCK'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE." Economic Inquiry 33, no. 3 (July 1995): 355–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01868.x.

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36

McKay, D. H. "A Reappraisal of Public Choice Theory of Intergovernmental Relations." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 3, no. 2 (June 1985): 163–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c030163.

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37

McLean, Iain. "Some Recent Work in Public Choice." British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 3 (July 1986): 377–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400004452.

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The standing of the public choice approach to politics is ambiguous. Most people now accept that there is something in it, even if the ‘something’ is restricted to Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy, Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, and (perhaps) Riker's The Theory of Political Coalitions. The Logic, for instance, is a cult abbreviation propagated by Olson himself but accepted by others. Three new adjectives (Downsian, Arrovian and Olsonian) are now established, although I have not yet found ‘Rikerian’. By analogy (Keynesian, The General Theory), the language seems to denote acceptance. But the seminal works (they are always seminal, as dawn in the Odyssey is always rosy-fingered) came out between 1951 and 1965; so where are their successors? Why have they had relatively little impact on student texts and informed public opinion? In short, what has been going on?A very great deal, in fact. The first generation proposed bold hypotheses; their successors have put enormous efforts into refining them and proposing new ones, and (unfortunately) rather limited efforts into testing them. There have been four main lines of development. It would be impossible to review all four critically in a single article; therefore I make only fairly brief comments on the first three and devote most of this article to the fourth, which I think is one of the most promising and of the greatest interest to political scientists.

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Klein, Herbert S., and Jacques A. Barbier. "Recent Trends in the Study of Spanish American Colonial Public Finance." Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 35–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0023879100034701.

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Fiscal history has become one of the most active new fields of research on colonial Spanish America. This trend has resulted from a number of recent breakthroughs, most notably the reconstruction of colonial treasury records and the appearance of the first revisionist studies based on the new data. These works are challenging traditional views, particularly the general understanding of the colonial economic experience and the evolution of imperial ties. Indeed, the fiscal series now being made available, if properly supported by qualitative research and regional studies, may affect seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historiography as notably as the demographic works of the Berkeley school affected sixteenth- and seventeenth-century historiography.

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39

Bonetti, Shane. "A test of the public choice theory of economic sanctions." Applied Economics Letters 4, no. 12 (December 1997): 729–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/758528716.

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40

Nureev, R. "Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 9. Economics of Bureaucracy." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 4 (April 20, 2003): 135–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-4-135-157.

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The main features of the economics of bureaucracy are considered in the ninth chapter of the textbook. The models of bureaucracy behavior created by W. Niskanen, G. Tullock, A. Breton, G. Brennan and J. Buchanan are analyzed. Special interests groups are distinguished. The mechanism of lobbying is characterized. The concepts of rent-seeking and corruption are defined. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

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41

Waller, Spencer Weber. "Public Choice Theory and the International Harmonization of Antitrust Law." Antitrust Bulletin 48, no. 2 (March 2003): 427–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x0304800206.

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42

Worland, Stephen T. "The Danner Thesis and Public Choice Theory: A Review Essay." Review of Social Economy 54, no. 3 (September 1996): 367–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346769600000019.

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43

Magness, Phillip W. "The anti-discriminatory tradition in Virginia school public choice theory." Public Choice 183, no. 3-4 (March 7, 2020): 417–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00794-6.

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44

Tarantino, Bob. "Calvinball: Users’ Rights, Public Choice Theory and Rules Mutable Games." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 35 (May 30, 2018): 40–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v35i0.5110.

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This article proposes the “rules mutable game” as a metaphor for understanding the operation of copyright reform. Using the game of Calvinball (created by artist Bill Watterson in his long-running comic strip Calvin & Hobbes) as an illustrative device, and drawing on public choice theory’s account of how political change is effected by privileged interests, the article explores how the notion of a game in which players can modify the rules of the game while it is being played accounts for how users are often disadvantaged in copyright reform processes. The game metaphor also introduces a normative metric of fairness into the heart of the assessment of the copyright reform process from the standpoint of the user. The notion of a rules mutable game tells us something important about the kinds of stories we should be telling about copyright and copyright reform. The narrative power of the “fair play” norm embedded in the concept of the game can facilitate rhetoric which does not just doom users to dwell on their political losses, but empowers them to strategize for future victories.

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Schug, Mark C., Donald R. Wentworth, and Richard D. Western. "Public Choice Theory: A New Perspective for Social Education Research." Social Studies 85, no. 6 (December 1994): 275–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00377996.1994.9956318.

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DiLorenzo, Thomas J. "Competition and political entrepreneurship: Austrian insights into public-choice theory." Review of Austrian Economics 2, no. 1 (December 1988): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01539298.

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Anderson, Gary M., William F. Shughart, and Robert D. Tollison. "A public choice theory of the Great Contraction: Further evidence." Public Choice 67, no. 3 (December 1990): 277–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00224687.

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Yi, Wenxi. "Public Choice Theory Perspective—Issue Research on Public Project Construction Involving Non-Governmental Organization." Research in Economics and Management 3, no. 2 (May 23, 2018): 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/rem.v3n2p145.

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<em>General Secretary Xi has repeatedly stressed the need for redevelopment of public projects in the party’s nineteenth report, accelerating the construction of projects and seeking for greater development. Public project construction is the main vehicle of public administration and is the cornerstone of overall social operation. Due to the majority of public welfare projects that are characterized by economic and social development services, which are non-profit, difficult to profit or have a long payback period, they are often necessary for the development of national or regional economic development. Therefore, NGO need to participate in and participate in the public project construction with their advantages and particularity. NGO undertake many governmental responsibilities and functions that cannot be performed by the government. However, in practice, the NGO faces many problems and difficulties.</em>

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BOCIU, Alexandru. "Required conditionalities in applying public choice theory in the field of public utility services." Audit Financiar 15, no. 147 (August 2017): 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.20869/auditf/2017/147/469.

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Nureev, R. "Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 10. Political Economy and Public Policy. Administrative Resource." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 5 (May 20, 2003): 136–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-5-136-157.

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The problems of public sector swelling known as "the Leviathan's menace" are considered in the tenth chapter of the textbook. The size of state expenditures and the limits of public sector are analyzed. The concept of administrative resource is defined and the methods of its estimation are offered. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Revisionist public choice theory'

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