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Journal articles on the topic 'Retributivism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 April 2022

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1

Galoob, Stephen R. "Retributivism and Criminal Procedure." New Criminal Law Review 20, no. 3 (2017): 465–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2017.20.3.465.

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Retributivist theories of punishment are in tension with due process. Some retributivists adopt a simple view that punishment of the deserving is normatively justified. However, this Simple Retributivism licenses unjust and illegitimate rules of criminal procedure. A more refined version of retributivism, on which a person’s punishment is justified only if she deserves to be punished for the offense with which she is charged and her desert bases cause her to be liable to punishment, avoids the troubling implications of Simple Retributivism. Refined Retributivism also entails specific principles for implementing criminal law—that is, a distinctively Retributivist Criminal Procedure. On this Retributivist Criminal Procedure, procedural mechanisms must establish that there are good reasons to believe that an offender deserves to be punished for an offense, and these reasons must cause the offender’s liability to punishment. Yet Refined Retributivism is also difficult to reconcile with due process. Although Retributivist Criminal Procedure has some salutary implications, it also calls for abolishing core aspects of the U.S. system of criminal justice and features that are essential to any legitimate criminal justice system. Thus, retributivism (whether Simple or Refined) does not provide the basis for a just criminal procedure.

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2

Bronsther, Jacob. "The Limits of Retributivism." New Criminal Law Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 301–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2021.24.3.301.

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“Limiting retributivists” believe that the vagueness of retributive proportionality represents a moral opportunity. They maintain that the state can permissibly harm an offender for the sake of crime prevention and other nonretributive goods, so long as the sentence resides within the broad range of retributively “not undeserved” punishments. However, in this essay, I argue that retributivism can justify only the least harmful sentence within such a range. To impose a sentence beyond this minimum would be cruel from a retributive perspective. It would harm an offender to a greater degree without thereby increasing the realization of our retributivist ends. Thus, if our nonretributive policy aims required a harsher sentence, the offender’s retributive desert could not provide the rationale, and we would need another theory that explains why, if at all, harming an offender as a means of realizing the desired nonretributive good is permissible.

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RYBERG, JESPER. "Retributivism and Resources." Utilitas 25, no. 1 (March 2013): 66–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820812000271.

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A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism – and thus the obligation to punish perpetrators – implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation (e.g. obligations to provide its citizens with some degree of health care, education, protection, etc.). Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of punishment.

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Gurnham, David. "The moral narrative of criminal responsibility and the principled justification of tariffs for murder: Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables." Legal Studies 23, no. 4 (November 2003): 605–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2003.tb00230.x.

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This paper examines the role of retributivism as a principled justification for punishment in the context of the judicial tariff judgments on Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables. The paper examines the development of retributivist theory from the foundational premise of liberal individualism to its contemporary understanding as a communication of public censure. It is argued that, against the background of legal judgment on tariff issues, retributivism cannot be meaningful in itself. Determining the retributive requirements of justice necessarily involves the construction of a moral narrative made up of both retributivist (retrospective) and consequentialist (prospective) elements.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Making Sense of Retributivism." Philosophy 76, no. 1 (January 2001): 77–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000067.

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This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position.

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Moore, Michael S. "Justifying Retributivism." Israel Law Review 27, no. 1-2 (1993): 15–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700016836.

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I shall address two concerns in this paper: first, what retributivism is, and second, how one justifies retributivism as the only proper theory of punishment. Since this paper is necessarily short, treatment of these topics is likewise abbreviated, although hopefully not so abbreviated but that it whets the appetite for those who wish to pursue them in greater depth.Retributivism is the view that we ought to punish offenders because and only because they deserve to be punished. Punishment is justified, for a retributivist, solely by the fact that those receiving it deserve it. Punishment of deserving offenders may produce beneficial consequences other than giving offenders their just deserts. Punishment may deter future crime, incapacitate dangerous persons, educate citizens in the behavior required for a civilized society, reinforce social cohesion, prevent vigilante behavior, make victims of crime feel better, or satisfy the vengeful desires of citizens who are not themselves crime victims.

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7

Shaw, Elizabeth. "Retributivism and the Moral Enhancement of Criminals Through Brain Interventions." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (October 2018): 251–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000383.

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AbstractThis chapter will focus on the biomedical moral enhancement of offenders – the idea that we could modify offenders’ brains in order to reduce the likelihood that they would engage in immoral, criminal behaviour. Discussions of the permissibility of using biomedical means to address criminal behaviour typically analyse the issues from the perspective of medical ethics, rather than penal theory. However, recently certain theorists have discussed whether brain interventions could be legitimately used for punitive (as opposed to purely therapeutic) purposes. For instance, Jesper Ryberg argues (although he himself is not a retributivist) that there is nothing to prevent retributivists from endorsing brain interventions as a legitimate form of retributive punishment. Legal academics have not yet paid sufficient attention to whether this proposal would be compatible with international human rights law, nor have retributivist philosophers discussed whether their favoured penal theories have the conceptual resources to explain why brain interventions would not be an appropriate method of punishment. This chapter considers whether there is any indication that these interventions are being used at present for punitive purposes and whether this would violate the European Convention on Human Rights. It examines different versions of retributivism and considers which theory is in the best position to challenge the use of brain interventions as a form of punishment. Finally, it considers whether offering these interventions as an alternative to punishment would violate principles of proportionality.

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8

Brooks, Thom. "Is Hegel a Retributivist?" Hegel Bulletin 25, no. 1-2 (2004): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002044.

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Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes. The theory is retributivist insofar as the criminal punished must be demonstrated to be deserving of a punishment that is commensurable in value only to the nature of his crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. As Antony Duff says:[retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial effects but of itsintrinsicjustice as a response to crime; the justificatory relationship holds between present punishment and past crime, not between present punishment and future effects.Punishment is given only to persons responsible for committing crime. In addition, the degree of punishment is set in proportion to the relative badness of the precipitating crime. Thus, retributivism can be understood as anindividualistictheory because the only relevant factors pertain solely to the individual criminal himself.The general attraction of Hegel's version of retributivism is that the punishments his theory is thought to endorse are commensurable in value with precipitating crimes, in contrast to the strict equivalence required by Kant's theory of punishment. As a result, Hegel's theory is praised both for being more acceptable to modern readers than Kant's so-called ‘pure retributivism’, as well as for being an ‘emphatically anti-utilitarian’ theory. Despite widespread agreement on these general features, it is hotly contested how exactly we are to understand the way in which punishment cancels crimes, and Hegel's difficult style has only served to make the controversy deeper. For example, Ted Honderich says: ‘A punishment is an annulment, a cancellation or a return to a previous state of affairs … All this, of course, is obscure. It is by Hegel’.

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LANDA, DIMITRI. "On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism." Utilitas 21, no. 3 (September 2009): 276–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820809990057.

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One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is the analysis of whether a punishment should be understood as a restriction of a criminal's freedom properly understood. I argue that the affirmative view faces serious difficulties that have not been, and are not likely to be, resolved by retributivist justifications that draw their support from Kantian moral theory.

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Clark, Michael. "Retribution and Organic Unities." Journal of Moral Philosophy 3, no. 3 (2006): 351–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468106071231.

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AbstractG.E. Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the crime with the punishment of its perpetrator is less bad in itself than the crime unpunished. Moore’s principle excludes any form of retributivism that regards the punishment of a guilty person as an intrinsic good. Jonathan Dancy offers a different account of such unities on which, pace Moore, value does not necessarily stay the same from one context to another. This alternative account is defended, but still seems to create difficulties for various forms of retributivism.

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Jacobs, Jonathan. "Luck and Retribution." Philosophy 74, no. 4 (October 1999): 535–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819199000662.

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The main claims are the following. (1) If we keep before us the distinction between the justification of punishment and its aims, we see that retribution is not an aim of punishment, and that there is a central place for retributivist considerations in the justification of punishment. (2) Justifications based upon aims or consequentialist considerations suffer from a serious epistemic vulnerability not shared by retributivism. (3) There are ethically sound sentiments that underwrite retributivist justification, and it would be a mistake to redeploy those sentiments. (4) The ethical authority of those sentiments justifies punitive sanction. (5) Retributivist justification is compatible with consequentialist aims.

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12

McKenna, Michael. "Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theorists." Monist 104, no. 4 (September 4, 2021): 510–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onab016.

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Abstract Wimpy retributivism finds reasons to refrain from giving the blameworthy and culpable what they deserve, even if it comes to very little. These reasons have to do with the moral hazards of being mistaken about when harsh treatment is justified. A moral influence theory can help supplement retributivist reasons with further consequentialist considerations and thereby keep these skeptical worries in check.

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13

Bülow, William. "Retributivism and the Use of Imprisonment as the Ultimate Back-up Sanction." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 32, no. 02 (August 2019): 285–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2019.16.

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AbstractImprisonment is often said to be the ultimate back-up sanction for offenders who do not abide by their non-custodial sentence. From a standard consequentialist perspective this is morally justified, if it is a cost-effective means to crime prevention. In contrast, the use of imprisonment as a back-up is much harder to justify from retributivist perspectives, with their emphasis on just desert or deserved censure. The crux is this: if the reason for a non-custodial sentence is that a prison sentence risks being a disproportionate or inappropriate sanction, retributivists need to explain how a prison term can be warranted as the backup sanction for those who breach the requirements of their non-custodial sentence, even though their original crime wasn’t serious enough to warrant imprisonment in the first place. The aim in this paper is to critically assess the extent to which retributivists can justify the use of imprisonment as the ultimate back-up sanction. In doing so, I first examine two broad strategies that are discussed in the literature, and which retributivists could employ in order to respond to this problem. The first strategy stresses how desert has only a limited role in sentencing such that it demarcates a range of deserved punishment. On this view, associated with limiting retributivism, one could initially opt for a less harsh yet deserved punishment, leaving room for the imposition of back-up sanctions when needed. The second strategy focuses on how the act of breach is a reprehensible act that can allow for a penalty increase, and thereby lead to imprisonment. Although it is argued that both strategies fail, the paper proposes an alternative solution to this problem.

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14

Lenta, Patrick. "AMNESTY AND RETRIBUTION." Public Affairs Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 119–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/26909987.

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Abstract This paper addresses the relationship between amnesty granted to perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and retributivism. It rebuts arguments advanced by Dan Markel and Lucy Allais in support of their claim that the granting of conditional amnesty—amnesty in exchange for perpetrators’ confessing to, and disclosing the details of, their wrongdoing—by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was consistent with retributivism. Markel contends that conditional amnesty was perfectly in line with recipients’ desert, while Allais submits that the TRC secured as much retribution as was possible in the circumstances of South Africa’s democratic transition. The argument of the paper is that while retributivists have good reasons to view conditional amnesty as justified, the reasons provided by Markel and Allais are not among them.

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Strauß, Sophie, and Rebecca Bondü. "Who May Punish How?" Zeitschrift für Psychologie 230, no. 2 (April 2022): 174–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000463.

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Abstract. According to the intuitive retributivism hypothesis, individuals favor retributivist (getting even) over consequentialist (prevention of norm transgressions) motives when asked to rate the appropriateness of punishment responses representing these motives. This hypothesis has rarely been tested in children; restorative motives (norm clarification, settlement) and potentially influencing variables have rarely been considered. We had 170 elementary school children ( M = 9.26, SD = 1.01) rate the appropriateness of six punishment responses by themselves and teachers for two types of norm transgression as well as their justice sensitivity. Children rated punishment responses thought to represent restorative motives as most appropriate, followed by special preventive and other retributive motives, revenge, general preventive motives, and doing nothing for both themselves and their teachers. Transgression type did not influence appropriateness ratings. Justice sensitivity was related to a stronger tendency to punish. Findings favor intuitive pacifism over intuitive retributivism, indicate children’s preference for target-specific, communicative punishment, and show only small influences by other variables.

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16

Husak, Douglas. "Holistic Retributivism." California Law Review 88, no. 3 (May 2000): 991. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3481203.

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17

Ten, C. L. "Positive Retributivism." Social Philosophy and Policy 7, no. 2 (1990): 194–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500000820.

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One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the presence of others, he pretends that he has turned over a new leaf. He asks for religious and educational books, hoping (he tells everyone) to make up for his poor education and deprived social background. But he immediately discards them when he is alone in favor of the pornographic magazines which he has bribed a nurse to smuggle in for him. His deception and various obscene acts committed in the hospital are exposed; by the time he comes up for trial, everyone knows that he is still a lustful, sadistic, and unrepentant man.Most retributivists have a sufficient justification for punishing Yuso independently of the social consequences of his punishment. Two features of the case might cause some difficulties. First, Yuso has already experienced considerable suffering and deprivation both before and after his crime, and retributivists might disagree about the relevance of the suffering to his punishment. Secondly, Yuso is unrepentant, and it is unlikely that punishment will change him. This might, as we shall see, create a problem for those who think that the justifying aim of punishment is the moral reform of the offender.

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18

Molander, Joakim. "Atonement Retributivism." Studia Theologica - Nordic Journal of Theology 63, no. 2 (December 2009): 178–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00393380903351071.

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Eva, Richard R. "Multilateral Retributivism." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 8, no. 1 (April 18, 2015): 65–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.8.1.65-70.

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In this paper I argue for a theory of punishment I call Multilateral Retributivism. Typically retributive notions of justice are unilateral: focused on one person’s desert. I argue that our notions of desert are multilateral: multiple people are owed when a moral crime is committed. I argue that the purpose of punishment is communication with the end-goal of reconciling the offender to society. This leads me to conclude that the death penalty and life without parole are unjustified because they necessarily cut communication short.

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Eva, Richard R. "Multilateral Retributivism." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 8 (2015): 65–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance201587.

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21

Hanna, Nathan. "Retributivism revisited." Philosophical Studies 167, no. 2 (February 12, 2013): 473–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0103-0.

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Berman, Mitchell N. "Rehabilitating Retributivism." Law and Philosophy 32, no. 1 (October 2, 2012): 83–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-012-9146-1.

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23

Dimock, Susan. "Retributivism and Trust." Law and Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1997): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3504818.

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Shafer-Landau, Russ. "Retributivism and Desert." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, no. 2 (June 2000): 189–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00102.

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Lippke, Richard L. "Victim-Centered Retributivism." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, no. 2 (June 2003): 127–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00166.

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Husak, Douglas. "Retributivism In Extremis." Law and Philosophy 32, no. 1 (August 29, 2012): 3–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-012-9145-2.

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27

Seregin, Andrei V. "Against metaphysical retributivism." Philosophy Journal, no. 3 (2021): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-1-5-19.

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The paper offers an argument against metaphysical retributivism, i.e. the belief that the existence of physical evil (suffering) can be causally explained and normatively justified by being interpreted as a just punishment for the moral evil committed by those who suffer. First, the author introduces a disjunctive distinction between the humanistic and the non-humanistic normative theories of moral good and evil. Then, he justifies his anti-retributivist thesis with regard to both of these alternatives. The humanistic theories, according to which an activity can only be morally evil due to the fact that it inflicts physical evil on other agents, logically imply that physical evil is a precondition of moral evil and, therefore, cannot just be one of its consequences. This is demonstrated with respect both to the linear (e.g. “abrahamic”) metaphysical scenarios and the circular ones (e.g. ancient or esoteric). Besides, according to these theories, the infliction of very intensive physical evil presupposed by metaphysical retributivism cannot be morally justified even if it is formally just. On the other hand, the non-humanistic normative theories logically imply that the very content of the notion of moral evil is in no way related to the notion of physical evil. However, in that case moral and physical evil are essentially heterogeneous and incommensurable. Therefore, one cannot establish a proportional correlation between them which is a necessary prerequisite for a just and morally justified retribution.

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Hallich, Oliver. "Strafe als Vergeltung: Plädoyer für einen hermeneutischen Retributivismus." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 75, no. 3 (August 15, 2021): 383–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433021833548688.

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Retributivism is usually taken to be a theory of the justification of punishment. In this contribution, I develop an alternative understanding of retributivism. Rather than as a theory of the justification of punishment, I propose to regard it as a hermeneutic theory, i.e.a theory about how we understand (some) punishments. I start with an explanation of what "hermeneutical retributivism" is (1). In what follows, I examine the ramifications of this view (2). It leads to a different assessment of the relation between retributive theories and prevention theories (2.1) and of the relation between punishments and non-punitive mea- sures such as preventive custody (2.2). It also leads to a reconceptualisation of the problem of the justification of punishments (2.3). Some concluding remarks summarize the arguments in favor of hermeneutical retributivism (3).

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29

Nadelhoffer, Thomas, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan, and Shaun Nichols. "FOLK RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE COMMUNICATION CONFOUND." Economics and Philosophy 29, no. 2 (July 2013): 235–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267113000217.

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Retributivist accounts of punishment maintain that it is right to punish wrongdoers, even if the punishment has no future benefits. Research in experimental economics indicates that people are willing to pay to punish defectors. A complementary line of work in social psychology suggests that people think that it is right to punish wrongdoers. This work suggests that people are retributivists about punishment. However, all of the extant work contains an important potential confound. The target of the punishment is expected to be aware of the punitive act. Thus, it's possible that people punish because they want to communicate something to the wrongdoer, e.g. disapproval, the presence of a norm, etc. In three studies, we examine whether people will punish even when the punishee will be ignorant. We find that people are no less likely to punish when the punishee will be ignorant. This finding emerges both in a survey study and in a monetized behavioural decision study.

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Lippke, Richard L. "Retributivism and Plea Bargaining." Criminal Justice Ethics 25, no. 2 (June 2006): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.2006.9992198.

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Brink, David O. "Retributivism and Legal Moralism." Ratio Juris 25, no. 4 (November 19, 2012): 496–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00524.x.

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Kershnar, Stephen. "A Defense of Retributivism." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2000): 97–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap20001416.

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Lippke, Richard L. "Retributivism and Victim Compensation." Social Theory and Practice 46, no. 2 (2020): 317–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202033187.

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Given the desert-centric character of retributive penal theory, it seems odd that its supporters rarely discuss the undeserved losses and suffering of crime victims and the state’s role in responding to them. This asymmetry in the desert-focus of retributive penal theory is examined and the likely arguments in support of it are found wanting. Particular attention is paid to the claim that offenders, rather than the state, should supply compensation to victims. Also, standard retributive accounts of why the deserving should be punished are shown to support state-supplied victim compensation.

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34

Dolinko, David. "Some Thoughts About Retributivism." Ethics 101, no. 3 (April 1991): 537–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293316.

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Whitman, James Q. "A Plea Against Retributivism." Buffalo Criminal Law Review 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2003): 85–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2003.7.1.85.

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Duus-Otterström, Göran. "Fairness-Based Retributivism Reconsidered." Criminal Law and Philosophy 11, no. 3 (September 29, 2015): 481–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-015-9382-1.

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Shafer-Landau, Russ. "The failure of retributivism." Philosophical Studies 82, no. 3 (June 1996): 289–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00355311.

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Brien, Andrew. "Mercy, utilitarianism and retributivism." Philosophia 24, no. 3-4 (December 1995): 493–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02379975.

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Ryberg, Jesper. "Retributivism and Multiple Offending." Res Publica 11, no. 3 (September 2005): 213–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-005-3522-8.

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Sifferd, Katrina L. "Why not ‘weak’ retributivism?" Journal of Legal Philosophy 46, no. 2 (October 12, 2021): 138–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2021.02.05.

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Holmgren, Margaret R. "Retributivism and Current Sentencing Practices." Criminal Justice Ethics 33, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 58–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.2014.899771.

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Kershnar, Stephen. "Mercy, Retributivism, and Harsh Punishment." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14, no. 2 (2000): 209–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap200014215.

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Hanna, Nathan. "Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts." Criminal Law and Philosophy 13, no. 1 (April 13, 2018): 109–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-018-9461-1.

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Petersen, Thomas Søbirk. "(Neuro)predictions, Dangerousness, and Retributivism." Journal of Ethics 18, no. 2 (April 30, 2014): 137–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9167-0.

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Clarke, Randolph. "Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism." Journal of Ethics 20, no. 1-3 (June 8, 2016): 121–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9228-7.

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Andrei SEREGIN. "The Case Against Metaphysical Retributivism." Social Sciences 52, no. 002 (June 30, 2021): 98–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.21557/ssc.68515152.

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Yamamoto, Susan, and Evelyn M. Maeder. "Creating the Punishment Orientation Questionnaire: An Item Response Theory Approach." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 45, no. 8 (January 11, 2019): 1283–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167218818485.

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The purpose of these studies was to examine the principles people engage in when thinking about punishment, using a new measure (the Punishment Orientation Questionnaire [POQ]). Although traditional conceptualizations of punishment divide it into utilitarianism (e.g., deterrence) and retributivism (“eye for an eye”), we argue that a more useful metric of lay attitudes concerns orientation toward or away from punishment. After pilot testing and factor analysis, we used item response theory to assess four scales: prohibitive utilitarianism (limiting punishment based on utility), prohibitive retributivism (aversion to punishing innocent people), permissive utilitarianism (willingness to give strict punishment based on the benefits thereof), and permissive retributivism (desire for just deserts). The POQ showed good predictive validity for capital jury eligibility and sentencing recommendation in response to a death penalty trial stimulus. This study provides a better understanding of how classic punishment philosophies manifest among laypersons and contributes data outside of classical test theory.

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Ginter, Jaan. "The Survival of Retributivism in our Modern Knowledge-based World." Juridica International 25 (November 5, 2017): 100. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/ji.2017.25.11.

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The article discusses the development of theories of punishment in modern, more and more knowledge-based society. Are any changes foreseeable in how we rationalise expending scarce public resources on inflicting grievances on those fellow members of our society who have behaved in a manner not approved by general society? Adherents to retributivism strive to justify criminal punishment by simply referring to the punishment as the consequence that the criminal plainly deserves and stating that there is no need to present any utilitarian justifications for applying punishments. There is already mounting evidence from research suggesting that certain objective circumstances cause predisposition of certain persons to commit crimes, and some research suggests that there are several treatments that may in some cases be more suitable in place of criminal punishments. The paper presents an attempt to appraise whether these novel approaches leave any room for retributivist ideas. The article suggests that the more the science is able to understand why certain persons commit criminal offences and is able to find opportunities to treat these conditions, the less need there will be to think of punishments as just deserts, as what simply must be applied, without looking for any other utilitarian justification.

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Howard, Jeffrey W. "Yaffe on Democratic Citizenship and Juvenile Justice." Criminal Law and Philosophy 14, no. 2 (September 19, 2019): 241–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-019-09508-6.

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Abstract Why, exactly, should we punish children who commit crimes more leniently than adults who commit the same offenses? Gideon Yaffe thinks it is because they cannot vote, and so the strength of their reasons to obey the law is weaker than if they could. They are thus less culpable when they disobey. This argument invites an obvious objection: why not simply enfranchise children, thereby granting them legal reasons that are the same strength as enfranchised adults, and so permitting similarly severe punishment? Yaffe answers this question by arguing that child enfranchisement would objectionably undermine the values of political equality and self-government. This article explores some serious doubts about these arguments. It closes by questioning Yaffe’s reliance on a retributivist theory of punishment, contending that, once we reject retributivism in favor of more humane and productive alternatives, the thesis that child criminals deserve a break—which Yaffe assumes to be undeniably correct—becomes less plausible.

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Budic, Marina. "Kant's retributivism and the death penalty." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 3 (2017): 130–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1703130b.

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The paper deals with Kant's notion of punishment in general, as well as one specific form of punishment, namely, the death penalty. In the first part of the article we will exmine, Kant's views on punishment as well as an extent to which it is retributive. According to Kant's view, offenders should be punished exclusively for having committed an offense (retribution), and proportionally to the crime commited (ius talionis). In recent literature, there are interpretations that indicate Kant's criminal theory is not completely retributive, but rather combined, so that it contains elements of retribution and intimation. If we clearly outline the goal, justification and extent of punishment, the purpose and justification of forming the state (time and punishment), we will make sure that these interpretations are incorrect. The paper shows that Kant retribution determines the goal and justification of punishment, that the reason and justification of the state (and punishment) is the achievement of justice, that is, the preservation of individual freedoms of citizens on an equal footing, while the control of crime should be understood as the achievement of this goal. Also, one needs to bear in mind the distinction between the factual and the normative level - Kant claims that a person should be punished exclusively for having committed the offense, although her punishment simultaneously intimidates or deters the offense of another citizens, which is a factual claim. The theory of punishment prescribes the goal and justification of punishment, which falls within the normative domain, and in Kant?s opinion, it is fundamentally retributive. It is also necessary to take into account another distinction that Kant introduces, which is the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal spheres of existence. Justice is a noumen or an idea, that the state pursues to achieve, while it is realized or made into a phenomenon when the state applies laws and penalties in a particular community. Intimidation or control of crime is part of the realization of justice in the empirical world. The second part deals with Kant's affirmation of the death penalty, objections to this affirmation, and ultimately, an alternative to this punishment is proposed. The alternative to the death penalty stems from incoherence in the application of the ius talionis principle. That could be one Kantian approach to punishment. A lifetime imprisonment argument avoids the objection of irreversibility of punishment (the argument from the irrevocability of the death penalty) and is in line with the basic principles of Kant's ethics.

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