Relevant bibliographies by topics / Retributivism

Academic literature on the topic 'Retributivism'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 25 April 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Retributivism"

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Galoob, Stephen R. "Retributivism and Criminal Procedure." New Criminal Law Review 20, no. 3 (2017): 465–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2017.20.3.465.

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Retributivist theories of punishment are in tension with due process. Some retributivists adopt a simple view that punishment of the deserving is normatively justified. However, this Simple Retributivism licenses unjust and illegitimate rules of criminal procedure. A more refined version of retributivism, on which a person’s punishment is justified only if she deserves to be punished for the offense with which she is charged and her desert bases cause her to be liable to punishment, avoids the troubling implications of Simple Retributivism. Refined Retributivism also entails specific principles for implementing criminal law—that is, a distinctively Retributivist Criminal Procedure. On this Retributivist Criminal Procedure, procedural mechanisms must establish that there are good reasons to believe that an offender deserves to be punished for an offense, and these reasons must cause the offender’s liability to punishment. Yet Refined Retributivism is also difficult to reconcile with due process. Although Retributivist Criminal Procedure has some salutary implications, it also calls for abolishing core aspects of the U.S. system of criminal justice and features that are essential to any legitimate criminal justice system. Thus, retributivism (whether Simple or Refined) does not provide the basis for a just criminal procedure.
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Bronsther, Jacob. "The Limits of Retributivism." New Criminal Law Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 301–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2021.24.3.301.

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“Limiting retributivists” believe that the vagueness of retributive proportionality represents a moral opportunity. They maintain that the state can permissibly harm an offender for the sake of crime prevention and other nonretributive goods, so long as the sentence resides within the broad range of retributively “not undeserved” punishments. However, in this essay, I argue that retributivism can justify only the least harmful sentence within such a range. To impose a sentence beyond this minimum would be cruel from a retributive perspective. It would harm an offender to a greater degree without thereby increasing the realization of our retributivist ends. Thus, if our nonretributive policy aims required a harsher sentence, the offender’s retributive desert could not provide the rationale, and we would need another theory that explains why, if at all, harming an offender as a means of realizing the desired nonretributive good is permissible.
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RYBERG, JESPER. "Retributivism and Resources." Utilitas 25, no. 1 (March 2013): 66–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820812000271.

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A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism – and thus the obligation to punish perpetrators – implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation (e.g. obligations to provide its citizens with some degree of health care, education, protection, etc.). Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of punishment.
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Gurnham, David. "The moral narrative of criminal responsibility and the principled justification of tariffs for murder: Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables." Legal Studies 23, no. 4 (November 2003): 605–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2003.tb00230.x.

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This paper examines the role of retributivism as a principled justification for punishment in the context of the judicial tariff judgments on Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables. The paper examines the development of retributivist theory from the foundational premise of liberal individualism to its contemporary understanding as a communication of public censure. It is argued that, against the background of legal judgment on tariff issues, retributivism cannot be meaningful in itself. Determining the retributive requirements of justice necessarily involves the construction of a moral narrative made up of both retributivist (retrospective) and consequentialist (prospective) elements.
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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Making Sense of Retributivism." Philosophy 76, no. 1 (January 2001): 77–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000067.

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This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position.
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Moore, Michael S. "Justifying Retributivism." Israel Law Review 27, no. 1-2 (1993): 15–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700016836.

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I shall address two concerns in this paper: first, what retributivism is, and second, how one justifies retributivism as the only proper theory of punishment. Since this paper is necessarily short, treatment of these topics is likewise abbreviated, although hopefully not so abbreviated but that it whets the appetite for those who wish to pursue them in greater depth.Retributivism is the view that we ought to punish offenders because and only because they deserve to be punished. Punishment is justified, for a retributivist, solely by the fact that those receiving it deserve it. Punishment of deserving offenders may produce beneficial consequences other than giving offenders their just deserts. Punishment may deter future crime, incapacitate dangerous persons, educate citizens in the behavior required for a civilized society, reinforce social cohesion, prevent vigilante behavior, make victims of crime feel better, or satisfy the vengeful desires of citizens who are not themselves crime victims.
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Shaw, Elizabeth. "Retributivism and the Moral Enhancement of Criminals Through Brain Interventions." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (October 2018): 251–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000383.

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AbstractThis chapter will focus on the biomedical moral enhancement of offenders – the idea that we could modify offenders’ brains in order to reduce the likelihood that they would engage in immoral, criminal behaviour. Discussions of the permissibility of using biomedical means to address criminal behaviour typically analyse the issues from the perspective of medical ethics, rather than penal theory. However, recently certain theorists have discussed whether brain interventions could be legitimately used for punitive (as opposed to purely therapeutic) purposes. For instance, Jesper Ryberg argues (although he himself is not a retributivist) that there is nothing to prevent retributivists from endorsing brain interventions as a legitimate form of retributive punishment. Legal academics have not yet paid sufficient attention to whether this proposal would be compatible with international human rights law, nor have retributivist philosophers discussed whether their favoured penal theories have the conceptual resources to explain why brain interventions would not be an appropriate method of punishment. This chapter considers whether there is any indication that these interventions are being used at present for punitive purposes and whether this would violate the European Convention on Human Rights. It examines different versions of retributivism and considers which theory is in the best position to challenge the use of brain interventions as a form of punishment. Finally, it considers whether offering these interventions as an alternative to punishment would violate principles of proportionality.
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Brooks, Thom. "Is Hegel a Retributivist?" Hegel Bulletin 25, no. 1-2 (2004): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002044.

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Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes. The theory is retributivist insofar as the criminal punished must be demonstrated to be deserving of a punishment that is commensurable in value only to the nature of his crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. As Antony Duff says:[retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial effects but of itsintrinsicjustice as a response to crime; the justificatory relationship holds between present punishment and past crime, not between present punishment and future effects.Punishment is given only to persons responsible for committing crime. In addition, the degree of punishment is set in proportion to the relative badness of the precipitating crime. Thus, retributivism can be understood as anindividualistictheory because the only relevant factors pertain solely to the individual criminal himself.The general attraction of Hegel's version of retributivism is that the punishments his theory is thought to endorse are commensurable in value with precipitating crimes, in contrast to the strict equivalence required by Kant's theory of punishment. As a result, Hegel's theory is praised both for being more acceptable to modern readers than Kant's so-called ‘pure retributivism’, as well as for being an ‘emphatically anti-utilitarian’ theory. Despite widespread agreement on these general features, it is hotly contested how exactly we are to understand the way in which punishment cancels crimes, and Hegel's difficult style has only served to make the controversy deeper. For example, Ted Honderich says: ‘A punishment is an annulment, a cancellation or a return to a previous state of affairs … All this, of course, is obscure. It is by Hegel’.
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LANDA, DIMITRI. "On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism." Utilitas 21, no. 3 (September 2009): 276–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820809990057.

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One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is the analysis of whether a punishment should be understood as a restriction of a criminal's freedom properly understood. I argue that the affirmative view faces serious difficulties that have not been, and are not likely to be, resolved by retributivist justifications that draw their support from Kantian moral theory.
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Clark, Michael. "Retribution and Organic Unities." Journal of Moral Philosophy 3, no. 3 (2006): 351–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468106071231.

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AbstractG.E. Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the crime with the punishment of its perpetrator is less bad in itself than the crime unpunished. Moore’s principle excludes any form of retributivism that regards the punishment of a guilty person as an intrinsic good. Jonathan Dancy offers a different account of such unities on which, pace Moore, value does not necessarily stay the same from one context to another. This alternative account is defended, but still seems to create difficulties for various forms of retributivism.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Retributivism"

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Martin, Robert Edward. "Retribution, proportionality and retributivism." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.298806.

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Flohil, Jill Caroline. "Retributivism, functionalism, annulment and why consequences do and should matter." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp04/mq22826.pdf.

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Perkins, Joanna. "Justification and responsibility in private law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.312714.

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Johnson, Amanda Jane. "An Ideal Justification of Punishment." University of Sydney, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1937.

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Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Legal punishment is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of both the legal system and of society more broadly yet (surely to its detriment) it is a practice which lacks a firm philosophical foundation. In spite of exercising many extremely capable legal and philosophical minds (particularly during the twentieth century) no generally agreed upon justification of punishment has been found. The nub of the problem has however been acknowledged as the inability of either of the major candidate theories (utilitarianism or retributivism) to provide an account able to address all the relevant parties. Whilst utilitarianism is often regarded as competent to the task of justifying punishment to society in terms of the attainment of some greater good, it seems entirely inadequate when it comes to formulating a justification to the criminal to explain why he has been singled out for punishment. And in the case of retributivism the situation is reversed. To the criminal it can be put that through punishment he is treated in accordance with what has done, but in the matter of justifying punishment to society, the key principle of desert is unable to be properly grounded. Thus the central motivation of this thesis is to attempt to redress this shortcoming in the philosophical literature and to formulate a viable justification of legal punishment. Ultimately it will be argued that the accounts of both Kant and Hegel offer a way of resolving the dilemma of punishment, and in particular their idealist orientation over and above their more widely acknowledged characterization as retributivists. In Kant’s case his contribution is derived from a reworked and more sophisticated version of his retributivism than is generally found in the literature, inspired by the work of Susan Meld Shell. Following Shell’s lead Kant’s construction of justice is explored and found to both enhance and support the traditional justification of punishment he can offer to the criminal, and to furnish an otherwise elusive justification of punishment to society more broadly. A reading of Hegel on punishment is also developed by taking seriously his theory of recognition and aspects of his logic, particularly regarding negation and contradiction. His account then addresses quite neatly and straightforwardly the three audiences for whom a justification of punishment is sought – the criminal, the victim and society itself. Not only does the thesis address the problem of punishment but it has further implications for Kant and Hegel scholarship as well as philosophy more broadly. One of the key points to come out of this thesis is that Kant and Hegel (if given adequate intellectual consideration) seem potentially able to offer up significant contributions to contemporary problems and issues beyond just the one argued for here regarding punishment. Their work is not merely of historical interest but has real and wide ranging possibilities which provide a rich resource for future research.
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Parsley, Stephen. "Rethinking Legal Retribution." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/98.

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In this paper I discuss retributivist justifications for legal punishment. I argue that the main moral retributivist theories advanced so far fail to support a plausible system of legal punishment. As an alternative, I suggest, with some reservations, the legal retributivism advanced by Alan Brudner in his Punishment and Freedom.
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Södermark, Philip. "Angående obarmhärtiga samariter och vad som bör göras åt dem : En idékritik av obarmhärtig samarit-lagar." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-179889.

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What ought to be criminalized? There are many different answers to this question and the justifications vary widely. There are some things that most people seem to be able to agree onbut the opposite is very much true of other behaviors, examples that spring to mind are drugs, prostitution and gambling. The subject matter of this analysis falls square in the latter category. Bad samaritan laws prohibit individuals from refraining to rescue others in peril aslong as the risk to their own safety is minimal. Many countries in the world have passed such laws and yet they remain fiercely contested. At a glance this might seem odd: isn’t it a moral imperative to come to the aid of others who need our help, especially when there is little at stake for ourselves? Few actually contest this principle but there is a big leap from immorality to criminalization. Certain bad behaviors should be of no concern to the state but there are difficulties in deciding what kinds of immoral behavior should be subject to criminalization. This analysis is an attempt to determine whether bad samaritanism is the kind of wrong that merits state punishment. An ideational critique where a variety of arguments from the literature are surveyed, these arguments are then tested against the normative criteria of two theories of punishment: consequentialism and retributivism. Although there is some merit to bad samaritan laws, the author concludes that both traditions should reject them.
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Chehata, Hanan. "A penological critique of Christian and Islamic justifications of capital punishment." Thesis, Brunel University, 2006. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/5162.

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This thesis provides a critique of the penology of capital punishment from the perspectives of Christianity and Islam. In order to ascertain the basic theological approaches of both religions towards capital punishment, Chapters 2 and 3 examine the core Scriptural texts, laws and traditions of both Christianity and Islam respectively. These chapters reveal how different methods of Scriptural interpretation and differences in religious practice, within each faith, have led to divergent opinions regarding the legitimacy and acceptability of capital punishment. Chapters 4 and 5 examine two of the primary penological justifications for the death penalty; retributivism and deterrence. It is demonstrated how they can be used, within secular and religious frameworks, to both condemn and condone the use of the punishment. Chapter 6 considers a variety of contemporary methods used to execute offenders and asks whether the methods used have any effect on the religious acceptance or rejection of the penalty. Finally, Chapter 7 presents one of the most controversial aspects of the contemporary death penalty debate, namely the unequal application of the penalty as it pertains particularly to black offenders, indigent offenders and mentally ill offenders. This serious criticism of the death penalty is considered first in general secular terms and then in light of the teachings of both religions and it is asked how the religious arguments in favour of the death penalty stand in light of such serious violations of human rights and justice. The thesis concludes with the assertion that, while a strong case can be made from within both religions for the use of capital punishment in principle, in practice given current practices of criminal justice systems worldwide there is a strong case to be made, if not for abolition, then at least for a drastic curtailment of the practice and a long-term moratorium on capital punishment on religious grounds.
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Thomson, Cameron Matthew. "Morality, id est, worthiness to be happy : Kant's retributivism, the 'law' of unhappiness, and the eschatological reach of Kant's 'law of punishment'." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/8131.

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Throughout his work, Kant regularly glosses ‘morality’ (and cognate expressions) as ‘worthiness to be happy’ (Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein). As a rule, Kant’s commentators do not find this remarkable. Correctly understood, however, Kant’s gloss on ‘morality’ is remarkable indeed. This thesis shows why. In it, I argue that whenever we encounter Kant’s gloss, we are faced with an implicit, durable cluster of unjustified commitments; that these commitments both antedate and survive his ‘critical period’; that they are fundamentally practical in nature (i.e., that they are unexamined commitments to particular practices); and that these commitments entail a number of problematic theological consequences. I argue, in particular, that Kant’s gloss is a habit that signals, obscurely and implicitly, his antecedent commitments to the practice of capital punishment, on the one hand, and to a particular set of practical attitudes towards the happiness and unhappiness of immoral agents, on the other. I show that this habit has key implications for Kant’s thinking about the agent that he calls ‘God.’ My point of departure is Kant’s claim, in his Religion, that the human being’s particular deeds are imputable to her ‘all the way down,’ only on condition that the underlying ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung) from which they arise (according to their kind, qua moral or immoral) is imputable to her as well—that is, only if her (im)moral character may be regarded as the upshot of, or in some sense identical to, an utterly unassisted, unmotivated, originary deed on her part. I argue that Kant evades the question whether we really are permitted, without further ado, to regard this disposition (and with it an agent’s deeds) as so imputable. He simply affirms his commitment to the practice of imputing particular deeds to particular agents and, with this affirmation, affirms that he takes the warrant that it requires (the imputability of ‘Gesinnung’) to be secure. I argue, then, that the theoretical significance of imputation, as expressed in this extraordinary, evasive leap, supervenes on the urgency of the commitments that are expressed in Kant’s habitual glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ The practice for which we would lack a warrant if the human being’s character were not imputable to her is the imputation of her deeds under a description (of imputation) that has immediate reference to this same ‘one’s’ punishment—specifically and only, however, to the extent that Kant takes punishments to be justifiable in none but strictly retributivist terms. These stakes and the constraining role of Kant’s habitual gloss are clearest, I argue, in his thinking about the practice of putting murderers to death—a practice, I argue, that has both a political and an eschatological significance for him.
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Agrawal, Devika. "The Impulse to Punish: A Critique of Retributive Justice." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/635.

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This thesis explores the strength of the two major theories of punishment, consequentialism and retributivism. It also explores the two most critiqued systems of punishment in the world: The U.S and Norway. By presenting the idea that retributivism is the only plausible theory that can morally justify the U.S. penal practises, I argue against the theory by incorporating various objections delivered by Antony Duff, Michael Zimmerman, and Jeffrie Murphy. I then explore the question of what could possibly ground the Norwegian justice system, for the answer to this is crucial, if we hope to demand prison reform and tailor our systems to resemble the Norwegian ideal. To answer this question, I present a theory that incorporates the ‘capabilities approach’ as developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, arguing that the Norwegian prison system is grounded in a hybrid theory of consequentialism that aims to enhance our human rights.
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Landon, Matt. "Conceptions of Justice: A Sampling of Student Perspectives." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2014. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1611.

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Although the literature in the field of criminal justice and philosophy is full of ideas of what constitutes "justice," little to nothing has been done to see where the average individual's opinion falls in relation to these ideas. This paper analyzes a cross-sectional convenience sample of students at UCF to determine their preference of six models of justice: utilitarianism, contractarianism, fairness, retributivism, moralism, and libertarianism. Correlating demographic factors are also discussed.
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Books on the topic "Retributivism"

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White, Mark D. Retributivism: Essays on theory and policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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Retributivism has a past: Has it a future? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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International Society for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Canadian Section. Special Nordic Conference. Retributivism and its critics: Papers of the special Nordic conference held at the University of Toronto, 25-27 June 1990. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992.

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Lodigiani, Felice. Sistemi retributivi e contabilità delle paghe. 4th ed. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1992.

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Santi, Paolo. Sindacato, differenziali retributivi, riformismo: Paolo Santi, scritti e testimonianze. Milano: F. Angeli, 2002.

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Donati, Amedeo. Prontuario del lavoro: Tabelle dei trattamenti retributivi, normativi, previdenziali e fiscali del lavoro subordinato. Milano: Il sole 24 ore, professione impresa, 1991.

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Valvo, Tino. Retribuzioni a confronto: Indagine empirica sulle strutture e sui differenziali retributivi, condotta nell'area torinese. Milano, Italy: F. Angeli, 1986.

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Manicastri, Maurizio. Il part-time: Aspetti normativi, retributivi e previdenziali della prestazione di lavoro a tempo parziale. 4th ed. Roma: Buffetti, 1988.

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Colle, Enrico Del. La disuguaglianza retributiva: Analisi statistico-economica dei trattamenti retributivi in Italia e riflessi sullo Stato sociale. Milano, Italy: F. Angeli, 1998.

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Retributivism & Its Critics (Arsp Beiheft,). Coronet Books, 1991.

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Book chapters on the topic "Retributivism"

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White, Mark D. "Retributivism." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–6. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_524-1.

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White, Mark D. "Retributivism." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1809–13. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_524.

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Donoso, Alfonso. "Traditional Retributivism." In Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 5239–49. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_679.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Assessing Retributivism." In Responsibility and Punishment, 61–97. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0421-2_5.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Assessing Retributivism." In Responsibility and Punishment, 83–115. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0776-4_6.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Assessing Retributivism." In Responsibility and Punishment, 49–76. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9851-4_5.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Retributivism and Recidivism." In Responsibility and Punishment, 117–25. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0776-4_7.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Forgiveness, Mercy, and Retributivism." In Responsibility and Punishment, 98–112. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0421-2_6.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Forgiveness, Mercy, and Retributivism." In Responsibility and Punishment, 77–87. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9851-4_6.

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Norrie, Alan W. "Purifying Juridical Individualism: Kantian Retributivism." In Law, Ideology and Punishment, 39–63. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0699-0_3.

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