Academic literature on the topic 'Retributionist versus utilitarian focus'

Purpose A distinct view of customer participation in services classifies the characteristics of the participation process as experience- versus outcome-oriented, each of which affects customer participation success uniquely for different types of services (utilitarian vs hedonic). This study aims to investigate if service managers should differentiate and focus on distinct characteristics according to the service types. Design/methodology/approach Two consumer experiments serve to assess the potential moderating effect of service type on consumer preferences for experience- versus outcome-oriented forms of customer participation. Findings The two empirical studies affirm the proposed moderating effect of service type on the effect of experience- and outcome-oriented customer participation characteristics. Experience-oriented characteristics work better for hedonic than for utilitarian services, and one study confirms a stronger positive effect of outcome-oriented characteristics for utilitarian services. Research implications Further research should replicate the experimental findings with a field study. Furthermore, continued research could analyze the mediators of the interaction of co-production characteristics with the service type in greater detail. Practical implications Managers can design the characteristics of the customer participation processes according to the nature of the service (hedonic vs utilitarian) and, thus, maximize customers’ willingness to pay. Originality/value This study offers a new perspective on customers’ reactions to customer participation in services: depending on the service type or situation in which a service is being consumed, different customer participation characteristics lead to (financial) success.

The COVID-19 pandemic is putting the NHS under unprecedented pressure, requiring clinicians to make uncomfortable decisions they would not ordinarily face. These decisions revolve primarily around intensive care and whether a patient should undergo invasive ventilation. Certain vulnerable populations have featured in the media as falling victim to an increasingly utilitarian response to the pandemic—primarily those of advanced years or with serious existing health conditions. Another vulnerable population potentially at risk is those who lack the capacity to make their own care decisions. Owing to the pandemic, there are increased practical and normative challenges to following the requirements of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Both capacity assessments and best interests decisions may prove more difficult in the current situation. This may create a more paternalistic situation in decisions about the care of the cognitively impaired which is at risk of taking on a utilitarian focus. We look to these issues and consider whether there is a risk of patients who lack capacity to make their own care decisions being short-changed.

Purpose – This paper aims to explore not only the utilitarian but also the hedonic persuasive effects of promotional techniques like 99-ending prices and the influence of consumers’ decision style when evaluating these appeals. Evidence suggests that retailers use 99-ending prices as a promotional technique, based mostly on its savings appeal. Design/methodology/approach – Three complementary studies were performed. A first field study among 317 shoppers allows to test the hypotheses for two groups of decision-makers (intuitive and analytical) using structural equation modeling based on the partial least squares algorithm. Then, a laboratory experiment assigned to 123 respondents manipulates the decision-making style and, in turn, tests more precisely the proposed hypotheses. Finally, the third study replicates the laboratory experiment with 104 respondents without manipulating decision-making; rather it is measured, which allows to test the effect of internal-based versus contextual-based decision style. Findings – First, the 99-ends are not strictly associated to utilitarian benefits (savings, quality or convenience) but also to hedonic benefits fulfilling consumer’s needs for exploration, value expression and entertainment. Second, a better understanding of the moderating role of the decision-making style is obtained: consumers in an intuitive decision mode give importance only to hedonic benefits; and there are differences in the analytical decision mode: when the decision-making style is internal (measured as a personal trait), consumers give importance to both utilitarian and hedonic benefits; however, when the decision-making style is contextual (manipulated), consumers focus only on utilitarian benefits. Research limitations/implications – It is necessary to check the robustness of the results depending on other marketing variables (e.g. product category knowledge, purchase frequency) and individual consumers’ differences in price-sensitivity (e.g. price consciousness). Practical implications – The findings help to better understand the image effect of 99-ends underlying both consumers’ individual differences and contextual effects. Findings also help retailers and pricing managers in their use of 99-ends as a promotional technique. Originality/value – This research contributes to a better understanding of the persuasive promotional effect associated to 99-ends. The study demonstrates that utilitarian benefits cannot fully explain consumers’ responses to 99-ends, as 99-end prices can also provide stimulation, entertainment and help fulfill consumers’ needs for information, exploration and self-esteem. The authors further examine the moderating role of the decision-making style between promotional benefits and proneness to buy 99-ends products. The intuitive mode, either internal or contextual, activates hedonic benefits, whereas the analytical mode activates both utilitarian and hedonic benefits when the mode of processing is internal and only utilitarian benefits when the mode of processing is contextual.

Background: Smoking-related intervention remains an important social marketing challenge. This article investigates the role of precipitation in driving smoking initiation and, by extension, examines how the nature of the persuasive appeal of anti-smoking messages can mitigate this effect. Focus of the Article: Research and Evaluation, Insights on Social Marketing-Mix (i.e., 4Ps). Research Question: This article aimed to investigate the role of precipitation in driving smoking initiation as well as to examine how the nature of the persuasive appeal of anti-smoking messages might moderate this effect. Importance to the Social Marketing Field: This research extends prior literature exploring how external factors might impact cigarette consumption. Also, this study brings a new understanding regarding the role of affect in everyday consumption and enriches the literature studying downstream consequences of negative affect and emotion regulation. Moreover, this research contributes to the theory of consumption motive and yields managerial implications into the social marketing domain regarding curbing precipitation-induced smoking. Methods: This research utilizes a survey (Study 1) and a controlled laboratory experiment (Study 2). Results: The results provide converging evidence that precipitation tends to induce one’s negative mood, which in turn triggers urges to smoke (Study 1—marginally significant main effect of weather: p = .058). Furthermore, the hedonic (vs. utilitarian) anti-smoking message is more likely to mitigate the precipitation-induced cigarette smoking (Study 2—significant interaction between weather and persuasion type: p = .04). Recommendations for Research or Practice: This research deepens the understanding of how natural environment, and precipitation, in particular, is linked to cigarette-smoking behavior and contributes to the literature on cigarette consumption and affect regulation. For social marketers and policy makers, the findings offer actionable insights into leveraging social marketing-mix (i.e., 4Ps) in the context of smoking-related interventions. Limitations: Conceptualization of negative mood was broad. Future research should investigate the specific types of negative moods (e.g., anger, depression, sadness) for a more nuanced understanding of the precipitation effect.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pros and cons of service standardization (vs customization) from the consumer’s perspective, the key factors influencing consumers’ preference for standardized (vs customized) services and the outcomes of service standardization (vs customization). Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted a qualitative study and two behavioral experiments to test the hypotheses. Findings The authors find that the advantages of service customization include greater perceived control and higher consumer satisfaction. The drawbacks of service customization include greater perceived risk. These findings also suggest that consumers’ preference for standardized (vs customized) service depends on their consumption goal. Specifically, consumers with a hedonic goal tend to prefer customized services, while those with a utilitarian goal tend to prefer standardized services. These effects are moderated by their need for uniqueness. Research limitations/implications The qualitative and experimental studies in this research reveal the antecedents (utilitarian vs hedonic goal) on consumer preference for service standardization versus customization, as well as the consequences in terms of perceived risk, consumer satisfaction and perceived control. The experimental studies were conducted with Chinese and American consumers, respectively, which lend credence to the robustness of the findings. Practical implications Results of the present research provide new insights into service standardization versus customization and have significant practical implications. In particular, service organizations should consider designing the appropriate service mode based on consumers’ characteristics, particularly their consumption goals and their need for uniqueness. If the customers focus on efficiency and functionality, the organization should try to provide standardized services. In contrast, for customers who are seeking fun and a novel experience, the service firm should try to tailor to their hedonic needs. Originality/value While previous research identifies “heterogeneity” as a key characteristic of services in general, the present findings qualify this received wisdom. In particular, the authors show that consumers’ preference for service standardization versus customization is a function of their consumption goal and need for uniqueness. Thus, the present findings refine the current understanding of service heterogeneity, which makes a significant contribution to the services marketing literature.

PurposeSocial live-streaming services are an emerging form of social media that is gaining in popularity among researchers and practitioners. By facilitating real-time interactions between video content creators (i.e. streamers) and viewers, live-streaming platforms provide an environment for novel engagement behaviors and monetization structures. This research aims to examine communication foci and styles as levers of streaming success. In doing so, the authors analyze their impact on viewers' engagement with the stream.Design/methodology/approachThis research draws on a unique dataset collected via a multi-wave questionnaire comprising viewers' perceptions of a specific streamer's communications and their actual behavior toward them. The authors analyze the proposed impact of communication foci on viewing and donating behavior while considering the moderating role of communication style using seemingly unrelated regressions.FindingsThe results show that communication foci represent a double-edged sword: community-focused communication drives viewership while reducing donations made to the streamer. By contrast, content-focused communication curbs viewing but drives donating.Practical implicationsOf specific interest for practitioners, the study demonstrates how streaming content providers (e.g. influencers) should adjust their communications to drive engagement in the context of synchronous social media such as social live-streaming services. Beyond that, this research identifies unique characteristics of engagement that can help managers to improve their digital service offerings.Social implicationsSocial live-streaming services provide an environment that offers unique opportunities for self-development and co-creation among social media users. By allowing for real-time interactions, these emerging social media services build on ephemeral content to provide altered experiences for users.Originality/valueThe authors highlight the need to distinguish between engagement behaviors in asynchronous and synchronous social media. The proposed conceptualization sheds new light on success factors of social media in general and social live-streaming services specifically. To maximize user engagement, content creators in synchronous social media must consider their communications' focus (content or community) and style (utilitarian or hedonic).

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文指出「種類主義」及「反種類主義」都不可取，唯一令人信服的觀點，是人類與眾多類動物都有不同的內在價值，只不過是程度問題而已。但由此卻引申自兩個問題，均當人類及動物兩者的利益互相衝突時而產生。第一個問題是當人類較次要的利益與動物較重要的利益有所衝突時而產生的，筆者指出由於我們要也考慮人類較高的內在價值和動物較低的內在價值，此問題是解決不了的。第二個問題包涵性較廣，包括所有人類侵犯動物利益的情況，更包括犧牲一定數量的動物的生命，以研製可救回更多人的生命的藥物，問題是究竟動物有沒有權利－－尤其是生存權。筆者指出這問題現時無法解決，因為一來我們對權利的必要及充分條件並不清楚，二來由魚蝦類、爬行類、鳥類到哺乳類動物及人類這一連接的幅度，很難說哪些動物有生存權，哪些則沒有，而又不牽涉隨意性。所以本文並不打算對這些問題提出答案，而是把問題的結構突顯出來。Until relatively recently, ethics has been a subject involving only human persons. Whether the issue concerns euthanasia, pornography, capital punishment, or world hunger, only human persons are involved. Since then, moral issues have arisen that involve not only human persons, but also non-human animals. This is a significant change, because the ethics involving only human persons is ill-adapted for problems involving not only them, but also non-human animals. In this paper, I argue that the traditional ethics is inadequate for solving the problem of animal research and non-vegetarianism, and that arguments trying to show that animals can be sacrificed in experiments in order to save human lives is inconclusive.There are three different views on the moral status of non-human animals. The first is the speciesist view that only human beings have moral status. The second view is the anti-speciesist view according to which human and non-human animals have equal moral status. Both views hold that moral status is an all-or-nothing matter. In contrast, the third view holds that moral status is a-matter-of-degree, and that human and non-human animals have moral status, or intrinsic value, but to different degrees. On this view, moral status, or intrinsic value, of an animal is dependent on, and derived from, its capacity to have a rich life, which is in turn dependent on its experiential capacity. Given that human beings have the capacity to a richer life than other animals, they also have higher intrinsic value or moral status. Similarly, mammals also have higher intrinsic value than birds, which in turn would have higher intrinsic value than reptiles, which has higher intrinsic value than fish, shrimps, etc. I claim that the "matter-of-degree" view is the only plausible view on the comparative moral status between humans and non-humans.However, this view leads to a problem. If we can save either (1) a human being from injury, or (2) a dog from death, but not both, which should we save? This is a different problem from the traditional problems in which a human being's claim is compared with the claim of another human being or human beings, because in these problems only the relative importance of the competing claims are at issue. Thus, in deciding whether people have the right to defame others as a special case of right to free speech, for instance, we take into account the pros and cons of allowing defamation versus the pros and cons of prohibiting defamation. In other words, we have to weigh and compare the competing claims of potential defamers versus those of potential victims. However, in the case of choosing to save either a human being from injury, or a dog from death, an extra consideration is in play, namely, the intrinsic value of the human versus the ( lower) intrinsic value of the dog. But the problem due to this extra "variable" seems to have no solution, because there is at present no ethical calculus or any conceptual schemes by which to compare the lesser claim of a human being and the greater claim of a lesser entity. Thus, if we compare (1) a human being's claim to the taste of a cow's meat, and (2) a cow's claim to life, we do not know how to make the comparison, because (1) and (2) are incommensurable.To use an analogy, we can solve an equation with one variable (e. g., 2x+4=8), but cannot solve an equation with two variables (e.g., 2x+y+4=8), because there is one unknown too many. The moral analogue in the issue of animal rights is as follows. We can solve the problem of competing claim s in which two entities of different intrinsic value have claims of the same type. (We know we should save a human person's life rather than a dog's life, if we can only save one of them.) Moreover, we can solve the problem in which two entities of the same intrinsic value have claims of different type and different importance. (We should save a stranger from dying, rather than another stranger from injury.) However, we cannot solve the problem in which two entities of different intrinsic value compete for claims of contrary importance－that is, when a greater entity makes a lesser claim whereas a lesser entity makes a greater claim, because there is one unknown too many. (Thus, the utilitarian axiom that every person is to count for one is not only important in its own right, but is also a vital premise without which no maximization of utility could possibly begin. For by assuming that everyone is equal, utilitarianism assumes everyone's intrinsic value to be equal. This allows utilitarianism to hold "one variable" constant, and thereby in effect eliminate it from "the equation. ")Speciesists only focus on the relative moral status (or intrinsic value) between humans and non-humans, whereas anti-speciesists stress the difference in intrinsic value between humans and non-humans. The truth, however, is that we have to take both variables into account, and yet there seems no way to combine both variables in the issue of non-vegetarianism. To give it a name, call this the two-variable problem.In many cases of animal experimentation, the two-variable problem has no relevance, since by sacrificing the lives of a relatively small number of non-human mammals, we can prevent the mortality (and morbidity) of a greater number of human beings. It looks as though we have a net gain both in terms of lives as well as in terms of intrinsic value. But there lurks the question as to whether non- human animals have rights in general, and the right to life, in particular. If non-human animals have the right to life, then we are morally prohibited from using them as materials for experimentation, or as a source of food. On the other hand, if they don't have such a right, (though it does not mean we can therefore treat them in whatever way we like) it would seem to be justifiable to sacrifice them for experiments that can save many more human lives.However, I argue that to answer the question whether animals have the right to life, we are faced with two major hurdles. First, we do not know what would constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for having the right to life. Second, the intrinsic value from lowly creatures such as shrimps and fish to homo sapiens represents a continuous spectrum. To determine which type of creatures would have the right to life, and which would not, will surely involve a certain degree of arbitrariness. Since arbitrary solutions are not good philosophical solutions, animal rights issues as well as other issues have remained unsolved. These include the problem of personal identity, in which memory is a matter of degree whereas personal identity is all-or-nothing. The problem of whether a fetus is a person is another instance: A fetus grows continuously, but whether it is a person is supposed to be an all-or-nothing matter. Finally, the search for a definition of knowledge is another example. Knowledge is supposed to be all -or- nothing, but the justification of belief is a matter of degree.I try to unveil the deeper structure of the problem of animal rights. As I said, those who accept the all-or-nothing views would have an easier dealing with the issue of animal rights. For if speciesism is correct, we can feed on animals, and use them for experimentation. If, on the other hand, anti-speciesism is correct, non-vegetarianism is forced on us, and animal experimentation must be banned. This is because in assuming either that non-human animals have intrinsic value equal to that of human persons, or that they have no intrinsic value at all, the two-variable problem is thereby reduced to a one-variable problem, which is solvable. But such reduction is premised upon implausible all -or-nothing views.However, since speciesism and anti-speciesism are both implausible, the fact that the issues of animal rights would have been solvable if they were plausible is unhelpful. I don't know whether－nor do I suppose－that the problems of animal rights are in the end unsolvable. But I hope to have shown why there appears to be no satisfactory solution to these problems, at least as at present.One reason why all -or- nothing views fail is that the moral reality is messier and more complex than they portray. In philosophy, views that take short cuts (e.g., some forms of reductionism) often achieve solution s by cutting the reality down in size or scope. The residual reality is manageable. But the desire for solutions and simplicity is satisfied at great costs, because the problem attacked is no longer the original issue.Moreover, as Thomas Nagel observes, "[s] implicity and elegance are never reasons to think that a philosophical theory is true." Perhaps, as Nagel also points out, "one should trust problems over solutions, ... and pluralistic discord over systematic harmony." At the very least, Nagel seems to be correct about the issue of animal rights. For the all-or-nothing views are forms of reductionism that cut down the moral reality in size, that is, by cutting down a two-dimensional issue into a one-dimensional one.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 112 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Purpose Companies are beginning to rely more on customer participation (CP). As a result, consumers are expected to expend more resources throughout the service exchange. Through three studies, this study aims to examine the effect of CP on customers’ evaluations of these exchanges. Study 1 examines the interaction between two levels of CP (low versus high) and shopping experience type (hedonic versus utilitarian). In Study 2, the focus shifts to understanding the negative consequences of high CP. In Study 3, the authors explore how the negative effects of high CP can be mitigated. Design/methodology/approach Scenario-based experiments were implemented across three studies. This study used multivariate analysis of variance (Study 1) and PROCESS (Hayes, 2018; Studies 2 and 3) to uncover how consumers respond to CP. Findings Results of Study 1 indicate that the CP level negatively impacts satisfaction and positive word-of mouth (PWOM) in a utilitarian context but has no effect in a hedonic context. Study 2 finds that the negative effects of high CP on satisfaction and PWOM are mediated by fairness and frustration. Study 3 suggests that these negative results can be mitigated by offering a financial incentive. Originality/value This study’s two primary objectives address specific calls in the CP literature. First, this study examines the effects of increased CP during hedonic and utilitarian shopping experiences. Second, this study investigates mediators and moderators associated with the negative effects of increased CP, shedding light on how the consumer processes high CP service encounters.

Photo by Evgeni Tcherkasski on Unsplash ABSTRACT Public health ethics has been contingent on a political landscape leading to several operational hurdles, especially during global health emergencies. Several scholars have pointed out that liberal decision-making has prevented public health institutions from achieving their goals. Thus, the need for a substantive outlook on public health has never been stronger. First, this article highlights the ethical tension and limitations of a presumptive approach to public health that a vaccination policy might produce in a liberal political landscape. Second, influenced by the works of Angus Dawson, this article emphasizes the importance of a substantive approach to public health, especially in a post-COVID era. Last, it looks at how TM Scanlon’s theory of contractualism aids in framing a substantive approach to health policy design and the added advantages of the theory. INTRODUCTION A public health intervention like a vaccination program for COVID-19, let alone a mandatory one, faces difficulties in implementation as it presents a clash between the role of the government and liberty of its citizens.[1] The clash stems from public health operating in a liberal political landscape that accords great regard for individual liberty. The government, in good conscience, is right in feeling morally obligated to act in ways that serve to prevent the pandemic from escalating. To represent the citizens, governments and policymakers prioritize achieving and maintaining herd immunity. The tension of the state versus individual liberty questions the extent to which governments can go to implement a vaccination policy. In trying to balance the considerations of individual liberty and the scope of the state to impose an intervention, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics came up with a design known as the ‘intervention ladder.’[2] The takeaway from the intervention ladder is that the state has the burden of proof in justifying reasons for implementing a particular policy.[3] Such justified trade-offs envisioned from the intervention ladder have guided policymakers in their attempt to design and shape interventions. However, public health ethics and even the intervention ladder view public health through a presumptive or a moderate liberal lens.[4] In a presumptive approach or a moderate-liberal approach to public health, policymakers regard values like liberty or autonomy as more prominent when weighed against values like creation of public goods and their maintenance.[5] A libertarian approach favors liberty and autonomy even more strongly. The substantive view of public health holds that values, such as liberty and autonomy, do not automatically hold precedence over community-oriented values such as public goods creation.[6] Some have critiqued the intervention ladder endorsed by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics. Angus Dawson remarks that the intervention ladder as a metaphor prevents the act of climbing. He claims the ladder assumes that liberty is the only guiding principle in policymaking. Such a view neglects any responsibility the citizens have in achieving public goods and maintaining them.[7] The emphasis on the drawbacks of a presumptive approach, especially in a situation like the COVID-19 pandemic, leads us to question should public health undergo a redefinition? The approach in public health focusing on non-interference stems from traditional clinical bioethics.[8] However, I argue that public health ethics in a pandemic should accord less emphasis to individual liberty and evaluate every ethical value on a level playing field. Individual liberty provides less platform for action in situations where the community has not established herd immunity. Accountability for the harm principle and maintenance of public goods override concerns surrounding liberty.[9] Angus Dawson argues that with more participation in a vaccination program, protection of public goods from disease can be created faster.[10] Characterizing public health as an antagonist to individual liberty undermines the confidence in public health institutions and interventions for which public trust is vital. Although the government may propose a mandatory vaccination policy when voluntary measures fail to meet public health requirements, clear scientific evidence and accountability for public welfare should be the guiding principle. Thus, resetting the parameters gauging a public health intervention is the starting point to prepare for future pandemics. In Resetting the Parameters, Angus Dawson suggests that utilitarianism or contractualism could serve as philosophical frameworks that may aid in framing a substantive approach to public health.[11] Evaluating utilitarianism and contractualism according to the COVID-19 facts would help clarify which is better suited to framing a substantive public health approach. l. Is Utilitarianism Substantive? Under utilitarianism, the morbid circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic urge us to act in ways that translate to maximizing the overall good. Utilitarianism is a philosophical theory that prides itself on maximizing the best of outcomes for the maximum number of people. In an ideal utilitarian framework, a morally right act does good for all. Utilitarians consider utility the single determining variable that should guide actions.[12] The actionable aspect of a utilitarian framework is its ability to quantify thresholds or markers that mostly dwell in the abstract. In Utilitarianism and the Pandemic, Savulescu et al. outline certain determinants as aids in applying utilitarianism.[13] Looking at the aids in the context of a mandatory vaccination policy in light of COVID-19, shows some pitfalls of utilitarianism. The first utilitarian aid is to save the maximum number of lives.[14] Rightly so, an intuitive starting point in a pandemic with striking mortality rates is attempting to save the most lives. However, implementing and justifying a policy with the aim of saving the highest number of lives is complex. While a high number of deaths is a concern, it is reductionist to concentrate only on the end goal and not the means through which such a goal is attained. The second utilitarian aid is the length of life.[15] The length of benefit gained from an outcome is crucial for utilitarians. The duration of a benefit determines the quantity of good produced. As an extension, younger people should then, theoretically, count for more than older individuals in prioritizing benefits. Such prioritization has been a matter of concern during the COVID-19 pandemic. While it is true that younger people might tend to benefit more, the pathology of COVID-19 goes against such logic. Elderly populations have experienced disproportionately more severe cases. Therefore, prioritizing youth when the elderly are suffering more of the harm would be ethically contentious.[16] The third utilitarian aid is the quality-of-life post-intervention.[17] Through measures such as QALYs and DALYs,[18] utilitarians have attempted to quantify each individual's quality after an intervention. This quantification can result in connecting an individual’s quality of life to their social worth. From a utilitarian viewpoint, a person's ability to produce relevance in society becomes a key determinant in shaping public policy. By extension, people born with disabilities such as mental illness or late-stage dementia can be overlooked merely because they lack "social value.”[19] And yet, “taboo trade-offs occur when we are forced to put a finite monetary value on these sacred values [life, health, ability], when we acknowledge that there is a maximum ‘price’ that we want to pay to uphold values that should be of ‘infinite’ value.” [20]. As such, it is unethical to place a value on someone's life based on the duration or quality of life they may have after an intervention. Besides creating difficulty in assessing the quality of life, measures such as QALYs do not address the nuances in providing healthcare. In Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions, Luyten et al. discuss several operational changes that account for these nuances.[21] Utilitarians believe in a moral indifference between actions and omissions as the fourth aid.[22] It does not matter how a result is achieved as long as it benefits the common good. Putting forward a bad policy is the same as not putting forward a policy. In the ever-changing and unpredictable dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic, actions and omissions have different moral implications. Equating them often places an unfair burden on lawmakers, leaving them emotionally and morally exhausted as they weigh the advantages and risks of various outcomes. Actively avoiding social biases, feelings, intuitions, and heuristics is the fifth aid.[23] The pandemic elicits strong feelings and aggressively tests beliefs. During the pandemic, some profoundly troubling ethical dilemmas stemmed from bias. In a utilitarian system, a mandatory vaccination policy aimed at crossing the threshold for herd immunity may overlook groups of people who are vulnerable due to a lack of access to the social determinants of health. Attempting to avoid feelings and intuitions all the time does not always result in the creation of a fair policy. Anti-vaccination activists use emotion to further their cause, hence it is critical that politicians consider the feelings at stake for the general public when enacting a mandatory vaccination policy. While utilitarianism has benefits such as developing simple operationalizable concepts, providing a quantitative check, and a balance sheet of risks and benefits, it is based on an ethical dystopia. Utilitarian policies can treat people as a means to an end by focusing solely on outcomes. Utilitarianism rests on a presumptive outlook toward public health by replacing liberty with utility. It ignores fair and just distribution and allocation of resources. Utilitarianism is not the most ethical approach to pandemic vaccination policy. ll. Is Contractualism Substantive? The libertarian and utilitarian frameworks assume positive and negative connotations to different actions. They hold that certain acts are right and certain acts are wrong. A libertarian might hold that unnecessary infringement of individual liberty is not acceptable, while a utilitarian might be of the opinion that actions that contribute to disutility are unfavorable for the promotion of the greatest happiness principle.[24] Contractualism is a philosophy that values the social contract. A contractualist approach begins its discourse by arguing that actions have inherent neutrality.[25] By saying that, “being valuable is not always a matter of being ‘to be promoted’”[26], Scanlon does not neglect the value of certain actions but urges us to respond to value through other means, as well as to find value in plurality. In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon finds morality through the ability to reason while attributing inherent neutrality to our actions. A discourse in contractualism does not begin by presuming that values such as liberty or autonomy hold precedence among other ethical values, i.e., it is not presumptive in its approach. Instead, he locates morality in the ability to reason and find justifications for certain actions. Thus, compared to utilitarianism, contractualism allows for a substantive approach by holding all the relevant ethical values in a level playing field. Liberty would gain precedence when justifications for safeguarding it are strong and cannot be reasonably rejected. The same goes for other values, such as promoting public goods. In short, an action is termed wrong when “the principle that allows for it, can be reasonably rejected.”[27] For Scanlon, justifiability to others is the normative determinant of right or wrong.[28] He proceeds to say that the value of justifiability is the underlying premise of our duties. Additionally, Verweij argues that treating people rationally occurs by treating them in “ways they cannot reasonably reject.”[29] By disregarding any a priori assumptions about the importance of different values, people can find and construct values that cannot be reasonably rejected as they would be justified. Scanlon believes that this can be attained if we reflect on what we owe to each other. lll. The Inherent Moral Neutrality Allows for a Substantive Approach A contractualist approach has implications for framing a substantive approach to public health. These values have been adapted from Scanlon and Verweij, and the elaboration has been framed in the context of COVID-19. The inherent neutrality of principles that contractualism holds becomes crucial while devising a public health intervention. The COVID-19 pandemic presents a situation where otherwise acceptable ethical principles require scrutiny. A blank state where there are no a priori principles that suggest which acts are morally justified and which are not helps us navigate the operational principles involved in a vaccination policy. Thus, values such as liberty, utility, and autonomy are viewed on the same level as the creation of public goods, fairness in contribution, and avoiding collective harm. a. Arriving at Principles Starting with the inherent neutrality, the state, policymakers, and the public can identify ethical principles that would form a part of the vaccination policy smorgasbord. In a public health framework where negotiation is a crucial aspect in its implementation, it is important that all the stakeholders aim to find principles that are acceptable for everyone. This would culminate with principles of action that would produce the least number of complaints by all the parties involved. If an individual has very strong reservations against a principle, these cannot be outweighed by weaker reservations held by others.[30] b. Reasonable Rejection as a Marker of Deliberation A mandatory vaccination policy in a contractualist framework would then have to incorporate reasonable rejection. A framework based on reasonable rejection includes a variety of moral considerations that shape well-being and provide a basis for fairness, choice, and responsibility. Scanlon makes an important remark in the thesis of What We Owe to Each Other: the acceptability of a principle depends on a one-by-one assessment of the strength of individuals' reasons for rejecting the principles compared to any existing alternatives. In other words, for Scanlon, what is foundational for contractualism is not minimizing what is undesirable but constructing principles no one can reasonably reject. In the context of COVID-19, a person should be able to justify the level of precaution he takes to anyone who would bear the risk of exposure. Each individual would then have strong reasons for contributing to herd immunity with regard to their duty to protect the vulnerable. The justification to forego vaccination would need to be strong.[31] The difference in a contractualist approach is that it provides a platform for valid concerns from the public. This allows more room for dialogue and for individual liberty, which seems to form a significant part of the critique. A plan of action that allows for individual concerns such as safety, efficacy, and strong medical reasons to forego vaccination encourages inclusivity in policymaking. Another public concern is that public health institutions have alienated themselves from society in general.[32]A dialogue between the stakeholders would remedy such a notion and help redefine public health according to how Dawson and Verweij view “public”– as a social entity/target as well as a mode of intervention (requiring collective action).[33] Contractualism, like the rest of the ethical frameworks, has its own set of critiques. In Obligatory Precautions Against Infection, Marcel Verweij argues that a contractualist theory inadvertently ends up asking for excessive precautions. The first claim that contractualism asks for excessive precautions arises from the fact that a contractualist approach does not consider the consequences of individual actions.[34] He believes that since consequences are not weighted, one individual’s wish to forego precautionary measures does not justify another’s non-compliance towards precaution, culminating in the other having to take excessive precautions. He also criticizes the contractualist deliberation for its failure to focus on the consequences of individual acts but on creating universalizable principles.[35] While this may seem true, such a conclusion rests on the fact that the consequences of individual acts are not weighted. However, an excerpt from Verweij’s paper offers evidence that contractualism does weigh individual acts: Suppose that we both aim to find moral principles that regulate our interaction and that can be accepted by both of us. If you then propose a principle that imposes many risks on me but none for you, then it would be reasonable if I were to reject it (especially if there are alternative principles that would yield much lower risks).[36] Both a consequentialist approach and a contractualist approach share the language of risks and burdens. For the utilitarian, risks and burdens are consequences of an action, whereas, for the contractualist, they are consequences of accepting or rejecting a principle. In the excerpt above, when an individual assesses the risks imposed, a consequentialist way of thinking is incorporated in contractualism and consequences to individuals do matter and are weighed. Verweij’s contention that a contractualist approach does not focus on individual consequences is not supported, and, as a logical extension, the argument of excessive precautions begins to fade. Being vaccinated would absolve us of having to take excessive precautions. Upon crossing the threshold of herd immunity, excessive precautions such as masks, social distancing, rigorous testing pre- as well as post-travel, and obsessively checking our phones for exposure can be done away with. The COVID-19 pandemic has immersed us in routines of excessive precautionary measures that it has become normalized for most of us. Thus, being vaccinated and covering society with a blanket of herd immunity removes the need for excessive precautions. lV. Bridging What “Is” and What “Ought” To Be Although contractualism presents a perspective that best suits a substantive approach to public health, it appears desirable only in theory. There exists a distinct reality outside of academia – politics, societal engagement, and governance reflect a different picture. This can be thought of as the gap between the is and the ought. We could envision and claim that a mandatory vaccination policy ought to be implemented in a certain manner, however, it might not be. In her paper, Realizing Bioethics’ Goals in Practice: Ten Ways “Is” Can Help “Ought,” Mildred Z. Solomon provides several reasons for this disconnect.[37] The general theme is the importance of empirical research – the need to find a balance between normative assumptions and empirical evidence – and how policymakers can, in turn, use such evidence to fine-tune the policy design process. Contractualism can prove especially useful to bridge the divide between is and ought. Theories of libertarian philosophy and utilitarianism rest on a design based on a normative approach that values liberty and utility and should guide the policymaking process. However, contractualism separates itself from these theories since constructing principles justifiable for all, and the idea of reasonable rejection must rely on empirical evidence. Engagement between various stakeholders and recognizing the plurality in values helps bridge the disconnect between the is and the ought. This is more important in the context of a mandatory vaccination policy since its requirement arises only if voluntary vaccination policies fail. Knowing why vaccination rates are low and how better to reach herd immunity will be important empirical evidence that can fine-tune the policy. In Re-enchanting Democracy as a Mode of Governance, Patsy Healey acknowledges that a struggle for political change often focuses on installing new policy designs.[38] Healey provides a list of qualities to keep in mind when designing a more people-centered policy initiative. The first quality is recognizing a shared, diverse, and conflictual political community where distributive justice is vital. The second is to foster is respect for different arguments, positions, and feelings— considering groups with conflicting values as adversaries but not enemies. The third quality is that of an ‘intelligent’ and multi-sided discussion of issues and reasoning ‘in public.’ The fourth is the fostering of respect for the role of the government while simultaneously recognizing the complexities of interactions. The fifth, and a key value in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, is fostering respect for people who perform public services. Liberalism and utilitarianism create combative ethical discourse around those qualities, while contractualism could elevate shared public values. While liberal democracies arguably have the makings of those qualities, public engagement must be fostered at an intellectual level to promote cohesion. Another important aspect to consider is the question of what a framework should aim to answer. In Building an Ethical Framework for COVID-19 Resource Allocation: The How and Why, Angus Dawson addresses the goal of a framework, especially at the time of a pandemic.[39] He stresses the importance of context in constructing a framework and urges to engage with a diverse group of people. Value-laden normative approaches such as the libertarian and utilitarian frameworks provide less opportunity for different stakeholder claims. Dawson then argues that explicit discussions provide more clarity and help policy makers better understand the role of context in shaping a framework. Dawson asserts that a frame chosen sympathetically can help the public better appreciate the moral content involved in deliberation, whereas aiming for goals such as liberty and utility is a distraction from the workings of reality. In evaluating stakeholders, those with lower incomes often are unable to work remotely. They face a greater risk of COVID-19 due to workplace exposure as well as commutes and living conditions.[40] Although a mandatory vaccination policy has the clearly defined goal of achieving herd immunity, ensuring distributive and procedural justice should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive. CONCLUSION Societal change relies on justifiable goals, policies, and a multitude of viewpoints. As such, a contractualist approach best accommodates a multitude of views of what we owe each other. Moving forward, if pandemic-type circumstances do disseminate within the constructs of our society, public policy should further consider contractualist approaches as a healthy, inclusive means. - [1] Luyten, Jeroen. "Mutual Moral Obligations in the Prevention of Infectious Diseases." In Justice, Luck & Responsibility in Health Care, pp. 85-100. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013. [2] Council, Nuffield Bioethics. "Public Health: Ethical Issues." Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2007) [3] Dawson, Angus J. "Snakes and Ladders: State Interventions and the Place of Liberty in Public Health Policy." Journal of Medical Ethics 42, no. 8 (2016): 510-513. [4] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [5] Dawson, Angus. "Resetting the Parameters." Public Health Ethics (2011): 1-19. [6] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [7] Dawson, Angus J. "Snakes and Ladders: State Interventions and the Place of Liberty in Public Health Policy." Journal Of Medical Ethics 42, no. 8 (2016): 510-513. [8] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [9] Savulescu, Julian. "Good Reasons to Vaccinate: Mandatory or Payment for Risk?." Journal of Medical Ethics 47, no. 2 (2021): 78-85. [10] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [11] Dawson, Angus. "Resetting the Parameters." Public Health Ethics (2011): 1-19. [12] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [13] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [14] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [15] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [16] Luyten, Jeroen, and Yvonne Denier. "Explicit Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Health Care: A Kaleidoscope." Social Justice Research 32, no. 2 (2019): 155-171. [17] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [18] Luyten, Jeroen, Huseyin Naci, and Martin Knapp. "Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions: An Introduction to Cost-Utility Analysis." Evidence-Based Mental Health 19, no. 2 (2016): 49-53. [19] Luyten, Jeroen, and Yvonne Denier. "Explicit Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Health Care: A Kaleidoscope." Social Justice Research 32, no. 2 (2019): 155-171. [20] (Luyten and Denier, 2019, p.10) [21] Luyten, Jeroen, Huseyin Naci, and Martin Knapp. "Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions: An Introduction to Cost-Utility Analysis." Evidence-Based Mental Health 19, no. 2 (2016): 49-53. [22] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [23] Savulescu, et al. [24] Mill, John Stuart. "Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher." (2001). [25] Scanlon, Thomas M. "Précis of" What We Owe to Each Other"." (2003): 159-161. [26] Scanlon 2003 p.159) [27] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [28] Scanlon, Thomas M. "Précis of" What We Owe to Each Other"." (2003): 159-161. [29] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [30] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [31] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [32] Financial Times, 2021, “Covid is the Enemy, Not the Government” Sunil Jain April 26 Accessed 14 May 2021 https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/covid-is-the-enemy-not-the-government/2240340/ [33] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [34] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory Precautions Against Infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [35] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory Precautions Against Infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [36] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory Precautions Against Infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [37] Solomon, Mildred Z. "Realizing Bioethics' Goals in Practice: Ten Ways “Is” Can Help “Ought”." Hastings Center Report 35, no. 4 (2005): 40-47. [38] Healey, Patsy. "Re-enchanting Democracy as a Mode of Governance." In Connections, pp. 61-78. Routledge, 2017. [39] Dawson, Angus. "Building an Ethics Framework for COVID-19 Resource Allocation: The How and the Why." Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (2020): 757-760. [40] Schmidt, Harald, Lawrence O. Gostin, and Michelle A. Williams. "Is it Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?." Jama 324, no. 20 (2020): 2023-2024.

When we think of disability today in the Western world, Christopher Reeve most likely comes to mind. A film star who captured people’s imagination as Superman, Reeve was already a celebrity before he took the fall that would lead to his new position in the fame game: the role of super-crip. As a person with acquired quadriplegia, Christopher Reeve has become both the epitome of disability in Western culture — the powerful cultural myth of disability as tragedy and catastrophe — and, in an intimately related way, the icon for the high-technology quest for cure. The case of Reeve is fascinating, yet critical discussion of Christopher Reeve in terms of fame, celebrity and his performance of disability is conspicuously lacking (for a rare exception see McRuer). To some extent this reflects the comparative lack of engagement of media and cultural studies with disability (Goggin). To redress this lacuna, we draw upon theories of celebrity (Dyer; Marshall; Turner, Bonner, & Marshall; Turner) to explore the production of Reeve as celebrity, as well as bringing accounts of celebrity into dialogue with critical disability studies. Reeve is a cultural icon, not just because of the economy, industrial processes, semiotics, and contemporary consumption of celebrity, outlined in Turner’s 2004 framework. Fame and celebrity are crucial systems in the construction of disability; and the circulation of Reeve-as-celebrity only makes sense if we understand the centrality of disability to culture and media. Reeve plays an enormously important (if ambiguous) function in the social relations of disability, at the heart of the discursive underpinning of the otherness of disability and the construction of normal sexed and gendered bodies (the normate) in everyday life. What is distinctive and especially powerful about this instance of fame and disability is how authenticity plays through the body of the celebrity Reeve; how his saintly numinosity is received by fans and admirers with passion, pathos, pleasure; and how this process places people with disabilities in an oppressive social system, so making them subject(s). An Accidental Star Born September 25, 1952, Christopher Reeve became famous for his roles in the 1978 movie Superman, and the subsequent three sequels (Superman II, III, IV), as well as his role in other films such as Monsignor. As well as becoming a well-known actor, Reeve gained a profile for his activism on human rights, solidarity, environmental, and other issues. In May 1995 Reeve acquired a disability in a riding accident. In the ensuing months, Reeve’s situation attracted a great deal of international attention. He spent six months in the Kessler Rehabilitation Institute in New Jersey, and there gave a high-rating interview on US television personality Barbara Walters’ 20/20 program. In 1996, Reeve appeared at the Academy Awards, was a host at the 1996 Paralympic Games, and was invited to speak at the Democratic National Convention. In the same year Reeve narrated a film about the lives of people living with disabilities (Mierendorf). In 1998 his memoir Still Me was published, followed in 2002 by another book Nothing Is Impossible. Reeve’s active fashioning of an image and ‘new life’ (to use his phrase) stands in stark contrast with most people with disabilities, who find it difficult to enter into the industry and system of celebrity, because they are most often taken to be the opposite of glamorous or important. They are objects of pity, or freaks to be stared at (Mitchell & Synder; Thomson), rather than assuming other attributes of stars. Reeve became famous for his disability, indeed very early on he was acclaimed as the pre-eminent American with disability — as in the phrase ‘President of Disability’, an appellation he attracted. Reeve was quickly positioned in the celebrity industry, not least because his example, image, and texts were avidly consumed by viewers and readers. For millions of people — as evident in the letters compiled in the 1999 book Care Packages by his wife, Dana Reeve — Christopher Reeve is a hero, renowned for his courage in doing battle with his disability and his quest for a cure. Part of the creation of Reeve as celebrity has been a conscious fashioning of his life as an instructive fable. A number of biographies have now been published (Havill; Hughes; Oleksy; Wren). Variations on a theme, these tend to the hagiographic: Christopher Reeve: Triumph over Tragedy (Alter). Those interested in Reeve’s life and work can turn also to fan websites. Most tellingly perhaps is the number of books, fables really, aimed at children, again, on a characteristic theme: Learning about Courage from the Life of Christopher Reeve (Kosek; see also Abraham; Howard). The construction, but especially the consumption, of Reeve as disabled celebrity, is consonant with powerful cultural myths and tropes of disability. In many Western cultures, disability is predominantly understood a tragedy, something that comes from the defects and lack of our bodies, whether through accidents of birth or life. Those ‘suffering’ with disability, according to this cultural myth, need to come to terms with this bitter tragedy, and show courage in heroically overcoming their lot while they bide their time for the cure that will come. The protagonist for this this script is typically the ‘brave’ person with disability; or, as this figure is colloquially known in critical disability studies and the disability movement — the super-crip. This discourse of disability exerts a strong force today, and is known as the ‘medical’ model. It interacts with a prior, but still active charity discourse of disability (Fulcher). There is a deep cultural history of disability being seen as something that needs to be dealt with by charity. In late modernity, charity is very big business indeed, and celebrities play an important role in representing the good works bestowed on people with disabilities by rich donors. Those managing celebrities often suggest that the star finds a charity to gain favourable publicity, a routine for which people with disabilities are generally the pathetic but handy extras. Charity dinners and events do not just reinforce the tragedy of disability, but they also leave unexamined the structural nature of disability, and its associated disadvantage. Those critiquing the medical and charitable discourses of disability, and the oppressive power relations of disability that it represents, point to the social and cultural shaping of disability, most famously in the British ‘social’ model of disability — but also from a range of other perspectives (Corker and Thomas). Those formulating these critiques point to the crucial function that the trope of the super-crip plays in the policing of people with disabilities in contemporary culture and society. Indeed how the figure of the super-crip is also very much bound up with the construction of the ‘normal’ body, a general economy of representation that affects everyone. Superman Flies Again The celebrity of Christopher Reeve and what it reveals for an understanding of fame and disability can be seen with great clarity in his 2002 visit to Australia. In 2002 there had been a heated national debate on the ethics of use of embryonic stem cells for research. In an analysis of three months of the print media coverage of these debates, we have suggested that disability was repeatedly, almost obsessively, invoked in these debates (‘Uniting the Nation’). Yet the dominant representation of disability here was the cultural myth of disability as tragedy, requiring cure at all cost, and that this trope was central to the way that biotechnology was constructed as requiring an urgent, united national response. Significantly, in these debates, people with disabilities were often talked about but very rarely licensed to speak. Only one person with disability was, and remains, a central figure in these Australian stem cell and biotechnology policy conversations: Christopher Reeve. As an outspoken advocate of research on embryonic stem-cells in the quest for a cure for spinal injuries, as well as other diseases, Reeve’s support was enlisted by various protagonists. The current affairs show Sixty Minutes (modelled after its American counterpart) presented Reeve in debate with Australian critics: PRESENTER: Stem cell research is leading to perhaps the greatest medical breakthroughs of all time… Imagine a world where paraplegics could walk or the blind could see … But it’s a breakthrough some passionately oppose. A breakthrough that’s caused a fierce personal debate between those like actor Christopher Reeve, who sees this technology as a miracle, and those who regard it as murder. (‘Miracle or Murder?’) Sixty Minutes starkly portrays the debate in Manichean terms: lunatics standing in the way of technological progress versus Christopher Reeve flying again tomorrow. Christopher presents the debate in utilitarian terms: CHRISTOPHER REEVE: The purpose of government, really in a free society, is to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people. And that question should always be in the forefront of legislators’ minds. (‘Miracle or Murder?’) No criticism of Reeve’s position was offered, despite the fierce debate over the implications of such utilitarian rhetoric for minorities such as people with disabilities (including himself!). Yet this utilitarian stance on disability has been elaborated by philosopher Peter Singer, and trenchantly critiqued by the international disability rights movement. Later in 2002, the Premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr, invited Reeve to visit Australia to participate in the New South Wales Spinal Cord Forum. A journalist by training, and skilled media practitioner, Carr had been the most outspoken Australian state premier urging the Federal government to permit the use of embryonic stem cells for research. Carr’s reasons were as much as industrial as benevolent, boosting the stocks of biotechnology as a clean, green, boom industry. Carr cleverly and repeated enlisted stereotypes of disability in the service of his cause. Christopher Reeve was flown into Australia on a specially modified Boeing 747, free of charge courtesy of an Australian airline, and was paid a hefty appearance fee. Not only did Reeve’s fee hugely contrast with meagre disability support pensions many Australians with disabilities live on, he was literally the only voice and image of disability given any publicity. Consuming Celebrity, Contesting Crips As our analysis of Reeve’s antipodean career suggests, if disability were a republic, and Reeve its leader, its polity would look more plutocracy than democracy; as befits modern celebrity with its constitutive tensions between the demotic and democratic (Turner). For his part, Reeve has criticised the treatment of people with disabilities, and how they are stereotyped, not least the narrow concept of the ‘normal’ in mainstream films. This is something that has directly effected his career, which has become limited to narration or certain types of television and film work. Reeve’s reprise on his culture’s notion of disability comes with his starring role in an ironic, high-tech 1998 remake of Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window (Bleckner), a movie that in the original featured a photojournalist injured and temporarily using a wheelchair. Reeve has also been a strong advocate, lobbyist, and force in the politics of disability. His activism, however, has been far more strongly focussed on finding a cure for people with spinal injuries — rather than seeking to redress inequality and discrimination of all people with disabilities. Yet Reeve’s success in the notoriously fickle star system that allows disability to be understood and mapped in popular culture is mostly an unexplored paradox. As we note above, the construction of Reeve as celebrity, celebrating his individual resilience and resourcefulness, and his authenticity, functions precisely to sustain the ‘truth’ and the power relations of disability. Reeve’s celebrity plays an ideological role, knitting together a set of discourses: individualism; consumerism; democratic capitalism; and the primacy of the able body (Marshall; Turner). The nature of this cultural function of Reeve’s celebrity is revealed in the largely unpublicised contests over his fame. At the same time Reeve was gaining fame with his traditional approach to disability and reinforcement of the continuing catastrophe of his life, he was attracting an infamy within certain sections of the international disability rights movement. In a 1996 US debate disability scholar David T Mitchell put it this way: ‘He’s [Reeve] the good guy — the supercrip, the Superman, and those of us who can live with who we are with our disabilities, but who cannot live with, and in fact, protest and retaliate against the oppression we confront every second of our lives are the bad guys’ (Mitchell, quoted in Brown). Many feel, like Mitchell, that Reeve’s focus on a cure ignores the unmet needs of people with disabilities for daily access to support services and for the ending of their brutal, dehumanising, daily experience as other (Goggin & Newell, Disability in Australia). In her book Make Them Go Away Mary Johnson points to the conservative forces that Christopher Reeve is associated with and the way in which these forces have been working to oppose the acceptance of disability rights. Johnson documents the way in which fame can work in a variety of ways to claw back the rights of Americans with disabilities granted in the Americans with Disabilities Act, documenting the association of Reeve and, in a different fashion, Clint Eastwood as stars who have actively worked to limit the applicability of civil rights legislation to people with disabilities. Like other successful celebrities, Reeve has been assiduous in managing his image, through the use of celebrity professionals including public relations professionals. In his Australian encounters, for example, Reeve gave a variety of media interviews to Australian journalists and yet the editor of the Australian disability rights magazine Link was unable to obtain an interview. Despite this, critiques of the super-crip celebrity function of Reeve by people with disabilities did circulate at the margins of mainstream media during his Australian visit, not least in disability media and the Internet (Leipoldt, Newell, and Corcoran, 2003). Infamous Disability Like the lives of saints, it is deeply offensive to many to criticise Christopher Reeve. So deeply engrained are the cultural myths of the catastrophe of disability and the creation of Reeve as icon that any critique runs the risk of being received as sacrilege, as one rare iconoclastic website provocatively prefigures (Maddox). In this highly charged context, we wish to acknowledge his contribution in highlighting some aspects of contemporary disability, and emphasise our desire not to play Reeve the person — rather to explore the cultural and media dimensions of fame and disability. In Christopher Reeve we find a remarkable exception as someone with disability who is celebrated in our culture. We welcome a wider debate over what is at stake in this celebrity and how Reeve’s renown differs from other disabled stars, as, for example, in Robert McRuer reflection that: ... at the beginning of the last century the most famous person with disabilities in the world, despite her participation in an ‘overcoming’ narrative, was a socialist who understood that disability disproportionately impacted workers and the power[less]; Helen Keller knew that blindness and deafness, for instance, often resulted from industrial accidents. At the beginning of this century, the most famous person with disabilities in the world is allowing his image to be used in commercials … (McRuer 230) For our part, we think Reeve’s celebrity plays an important contemporary role because it binds together a constellation of economic, political, and social institutions and discourses — namely science, biotechnology, and national competitiveness. In the second half of 2004, the stem cell debate is once again prominent in American debates as a presidential election issue. Reeve figures disability in national culture in his own country and internationally, as the case of the currency of his celebrity in Australia demonstrates. In this light, we have only just begun to register, let alone explore and debate, what is entailed for us all in the production of this disabled fame and infamy. Epilogue to “Fame and Disability” Christopher Reeve died on Sunday 10 October 2004, shortly after this article was accepted for publication. His death occasioned an outpouring of condolences, mourning, and reflection. We share that sense of loss. How Reeve will be remembered is still unfolding. The early weeks of public mourning have emphasised his celebrity as the very embodiment and exemplar of disabled identity: ‘The death of Christopher Reeve leaves embryonic-stem-cell activism without one of its star generals’ (Newsweek); ‘He Never Gave Up: What actor and activist Christopher Reeve taught scientists about the treatment of spinal-cord injury’ (Time); ‘Incredible Journey: Facing tragedy, Christopher Reeve inspired the world with hope and a lesson in courage’ (People); ‘Superman’s Legacy’ (The Express); ‘Reeve, the Real Superman’ (Hindustani Times). In his tribute New South Wales Premier Bob Carr called Reeve the ‘most impressive person I have ever met’, and lamented ‘Humankind has lost an advocate and friend’ (Carr). The figure of Reeve remains central to how disability is represented. In our culture, death is often closely entwined with disability (as in the saying ‘better dead than disabled’), something Reeve reflected upon himself often. How Reeve’s ‘global mourning’ partakes and shapes in this dense knots of associations, and how it transforms his celebrity, is something that requires further work (Ang et. al.). The political and analytical engagement with Reeve’s celebrity and mourning at this time serves to underscore our exploration of fame and disability in this article. Already there is his posthumous enlistment in the United States Presidential elections, where disability is both central and yet marginal, people with disability talked about rather than listened to. The ethics of stem cell research was an election issue before Reeve’s untimely passing, with Democratic presidential contender John Kerry sharply marking his difference on this issue with President Bush. After Reeve’s death his widow Dana joined the podium on the Kerry campaign in Columbus, Ohio, to put the case herself; for his part, Kerry compared Bush’s opposition to stem cell research as akin to favouring the candle lobby over electricity. As we write, the US polls are a week away, but the cultural representation of disability — and the intensely political role celebrity plays in it — appears even more palpably implicated in the government of society itself. References Abraham, Philip. Christopher Reeve. New York: Children’s Press, 2002. Alter, Judy. Christopher Reeve: Triumph over Tragedy. Danbury, Conn.: Franklin Watts, 2000. Ang, Ien, Ruth Barcan, Helen Grace, Elaine Lally, Justine Lloyd, and Zoe Sofoulis (eds.) Planet Diana: Cultural Studies and Global Mourning. Sydney: Research Centre in Intercommunal Studies, University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1997. Bleckner, Jeff, dir. Rear Window. 1998. Brown, Steven E. “Super Duper? The (Unfortunate) Ascendancy of Christopher Reeve.” Mainstream: Magazine of the Able-Disabled, October 1996. Repr. 10 Aug. 2004 http://www.independentliving.org/docs3/brown96c.html>. Carr, Bob. “A Class Act of Grace and Courage.” Sydney Morning Herald. 12 Oct. 2004: 14. Corker, Mairian and Carol Thomas. “A Journey around the Social Model.” Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory. Ed. Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare. London and New York: Continuum, 2000. Donner, Richard, dir. Superman. 1978. Dyer, Richard. Heavenly Bodies: Film Stars and Society. London: BFI Macmillan, 1986. Fulcher, Gillian. Disabling Policies? London: Falmer Press, 1989. Furie, Sidney J., dir. Superman IV: The Quest for Peace. 1987. Finn, Margaret L. Christopher Reeve. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 1997. Gilmer, Tim. “The Missionary Reeve.” New Mobility. November 2002. 13 Aug. 2004 http://www.newmobility.com/>. 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The guiding orientation of the present research was whether two conflicting positions, (1) that sentencing in a criminal case is a complex decision-making process, and (2) that sentencing is a judgment based upon few offence and/or offender details, could be reconciled. The competing claims lend support to the opposing viewpoints on sentencing guidelines, and are explicitly or implicitly utilised by each side in the law and order' debate, but each is deficient in current empirical or theoretical investigation. Archival research was undertaken on assault occasioning bodily harm cases from the Queensland District Court. Study 1 (N = 244) investigated the correlations between 27 offence, offender, victim and sentencer characteristics (e.g., use of a weapon in the assault, offender's prior convictions, victim's gender and sentencer's expertise), five theorised preliminary decisions (e.g., whether to impose a tariff versus individualised penalty, to set a utilitarian versus retributive punishment), and five sentencing decisions (e.g., to record or not record a conviction, to impose a lenient or a harsh penalty). Results favoured the conclusion that sentencing is a complex decision-making process. Numerous correlations between the variables were initially indicated, although the effects on the sentencing decisions decreased when the offence seriousness and the offender's prior criminal history were controlled for. Guided by the results from Study 1, five increasingly complex legal and theoretical models were developed. The models were arranged hierarchically, initially including only legal variables and then expanded to incorporate concepts from Schubert's (1965;1974) Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court decision-making, and from Heise's (1988) Affect Control Theory. These were evaluated in Study 2 (N=393) using structural equation modelling. Model comparisons revealed that while the Simple Legal Model, (the first model presented including the harm caused by the offence, the offender's prior criminal history, and prescribed aggravating features of the attack) explained almost half of the variance in the sentencing decision, the model offered a poor fit to the data. While each of the three succeeding models improved the model fit, it was the fifth model, incorporating legal variables, preliminary decisions, attitudes, and particularly the sentencer's evaluation of the `character' of the offender, which best represented the data, without sacrificing parsimony, in addition to accounting for almost two-thirds of the variance in the sentencing decision (65.3%). It was concluded that sentencing is a complex decision-making process, and that the judgment is based upon few offence and/or offender details. Firstly, a relatively small number of offence and offender characteristics accounted for the greater part of the variance in the sentencing decision. Judges however, appeared to organise the information provided in order to make assessments about the offender, in the manner predicted by Affect Control Theory. The overall result therefore, supported the complex decision-making process subscribed to by judges. Limitations of the research and the implications of these results for the main players in the process, the inclusion of psychological theory in the courtroom, and the community's understanding of the system, are discussed.