Academic literature on the topic 'Resaca (Ga.), Battle of, 1864'

William T. Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta campaign from the first week of May until he reached the Chattahoochee River by mid-July 1864 was highly successful. Relying on his railroad link with Louisville, Kentucky, Sherman refused to risk his men in repeated or heavy frontal attacks against the well-fortified positions Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston established at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain. Although Sherman experimented with a few attacks along the way, most notably at Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain, his failure did not result in crippling losses like those suffered by Ulysses S. Grant at the same time in Virginia. Johnston's tendency to evacuate his strong positions at the slightest sign of Union flanking moves, or because his corps leaders thought those positions untenable, not only contributed to Sherman's success but tremendously increased the morale of Union soldiers to the point where they were supremely confidence in their leader and in the eventual success of the campaign. In contrast, when Johnston fell back across the Chattahoochee River on July 9, Confederate President Jefferson Davis lost all patience with his Fabian strategy in Georgia and came to the conclusion that he had to be replaced. Johnston failed to protect all the possible crossings of the Chattahoochee that could be used by the Federals. As a result, Sherman was able to secure two bridgeheads on the south side of the river, well north of its junction with Peach Tree Creek, in the days following Johnston's fall back.