Academic literature on the topic 'Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Hercegovina). Vojska'

Prije agresije na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, u Bijeljini su zajedno živjeli: Bošnjaci, Srbi, Hrvati, Jugoslaveni i Ostali. Prema popisu stanovništva iz 1991. godine, u općini Bijeljina je živjelo 96.988 stanovnika. Bošnjaka je bilo 30.229 (31,17%), Srba 57.389 (59.17%), Hrvata 492 (0,51%), Jugoslavena 4.426 (4,56 %) i Ostalih 4.452 (4,59 %). U isto vrijeme, u gradu Bijeljina živjelo je 36.414 stanovnika: 19.024 Bošnjaka (52,24%), 10.450 Srba (28,70%), 366 Hrvata (1,00%), 3.452 Jugoslavena (9,48%) i 3.122 Ostalih (8,57%). Stanovništvo Općine je živjelo u gradu Bijeljina i još 58 naselja. Bijeljina je kao strateški važan grad u planovima i ciljevima agresora, bila meta napada već od 1991. godine. Na ovaj bosanski grad je planirana, pripremana i organizovana agresija i ratni zločini nad Bošnjacima. U Bijeljini su organizirani logori za Bošnjake, ubijani su civili, vršena su masovna i sistematska silovanja i drugi oblici seksualnog nasilja, ciljano je ubijana i progonjena bošnjačka elita, masovno su protjerivani i deportovani civili, uništavana su kulturna dobra i imovina te srušeni svi islamski vjerski objekti. Bijeljina je prvoga aprila 1992. godine, bila napadnuta od strane tzv. ''srpskih snaga''. Meta napada bili su Bošnjaci, Albanci, Romi i drugi nesrbi, koji nisu bili svjesni šta se dešava u njihovome gradu. Ubijani su u svojim kućama, stanovima, džamijama. Masakrirani su i na Ramazanski bajram, 4. aprila 1992. godine. Okrutnošću se posebno isticala tzv. Srpska dobrovoljačka garda (SDG), specijalna jedinica Službe državne bezbjednosti Srbije, koju je predvodio Željko Ražnatović Arkan, i koja je bila pod direktnom komandom režima Slobodana Miloševića u Srbiji, te ''Mirkovi četnici'' koje je predvodio Mirko Blagojević. Pod Arkanovu komandu stavila se općinska vlast, policija, vojska, sudstvo, Teritorijalna odbrana.ubijena najmanje 93 civila (81 Bošnjak, 8 Albanaca, 3 Srbina i 1 Hrvat). Od 31. marta do 6. aprila 1992. godine, ubijeno je najmanje 55 civila. Slike zločina sa bijeljinskih ulica, brzo su obišle svijet, ali na slike užasa međunarodna zajednica nije reagirala. Bijeljina je bila generalna proba za rat, ubistva, ratne zločine i genocid koji su ubrzo uslijedili u cijeloj Republici Bosni i Hercegovini. Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini je okončan potpisivanjem Dejtonskog sporazuma 14. decembra 1995. godine u Parizu. Po mišljenju mnogih istraživača, intelektualaca različitih profila, Sporazum je legalizirao genocid nad Bošnjacima u Bosni i Hercegovini. Prema Dejtonskom sporazumu, u unutrašnjoj strukturi Bosne i Hercegovine postoje dva entiteta: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, koju čini 10 kantona i Republika Srpska. Osim dva entiteta, postoji i Brčko distrikt Bosne i Hercegovine, koji je nastao Odlukom Međunarodnog arbitražnog suda. Uspostavljen je 8. marta 2000. godine. U periodu od 1992. do 1995., približno 2,2 miliona ljudi u Bosni i Hercegovini bilo je primorano napustiti svoje domove. Poslije rata počeo je povratak, između ostalog, i u Bijeljinu. Proces povratka prognanih Bošnjaka tekao je sporo i neorganizirano. Prvi val povratka tekao je od 1996. do 2000. godine. Prognanici su se najviše vraćali u Mjesnu zajednicu Janja. Godine 1998. obnovljen je rad Medžlisa Islamske zajednice u Bijeljini i od tada počinje proces povratka imovine. Sve je išlo izuzetno sporo uz puno opstrukcija lokalnih vlasti. Ipak, 2002. godine ''izliveni'' su temelji za svih pet porušenih džamija u Bijeljini. Džamije su obnavljane zahvaljujući, između ostaloga, sredstvima bijeljinaca koji su živjeli u inozemstvu. Otežavajuća okolnost za povratnike je i činjenica što u bosanskohercegovačkom entitetu Republika srpska negira bosanski jezik. Zabranjuje se izvođenje nastave na bosanskom jeziku, a jezik se imenuje nepostojećim bošnjačkim jezikom. Time se vrši diskriminacija učenika koji žele da se njihov jezik imenuje bosanskim jezikom. Osim toga, visoki zvaničnici iz Republike srpske u javnim istupima negiraju državu Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Bošnjake kao narod, što utiče na perspektivu ljudi ovih prostora. Situacija sa upošljavanjem u javnoj upravi nije dobra. Povratnici se, uglavnom, bave poljoprivredom, no ovdje postoji problem plasmana viška proizvoda. Godine 2013. izvršen je popis stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini. Bio je to prvi popis nakon rata i agresije. Općina Bijeljina imala je 107.715 stanovnika, što je za 10.727 stanovnika više u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Stanovništvo je živjelo u gradu Bijeljina i još 66 naselja, što je za 8 naselja više u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Etnićka struktura stanovništva se značajno promijenila pod utjecajem rata protiv Bosne i Hercegovine. Srba je, 2013. godine, bilo 91.784, što je za 34.395 osoba više u odnosu na 1991. godinu, Bošnjaka 13.090, što je za 17.139 osoba manje, Hrvata 515, što je za 23 osobe više, Ostalih 1.550, što je za 2.902 osobe manje u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Onih koji se nisu izjasnili, u etničkom smislu, u općini Bijeljina bilo je 674 a bez odgovora 102 osobe. U gradu Bijeljini živjelo je 42.278 stanovnika, što je za 5.864 osobe više u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Srba je bilo 35.798, što je za 25.348 osoba više u odnosu na 1991. godinu, Bošnjaka 4.469, što je za 14.555 manje, Hrvata 315, što je za 51 osobu manje i Ostalih 1.159, što je 1.963 osobe manje u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Onih koji se nisu izjasnili u etničkom smislu bilo je 502 i bez odgovora 35 osoba. Općina Bijeljina imala je, u ukupnom stanovništvu, 85,21% Srba, što je za 26.04% više u odnosu na 1991. godinu, a Bošnjaka 12,15%, što je za 19,02% manje u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Hrvata je bilo manje za 0,03%, a Ostalih manje za 3,14% u odnosu na 1991. godinu. U gradu Bijeljini došlo je do drastične promjene etničke strukture stanovništva u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Naime, Bošnjaci su 1991, činili 52,24% stanovništva grada, Srbi 28,70%, Jugoslaveni 9,48%, Ostali8,57% i Hrvati 1,00%. Broj Bošnjaka smanjen je za 41,67% i iznosio je 10,57% u ukupnom stanovništvu Bijeljine. Za isto vrijeme povećao se procenat Srba sa 28,70% na 84,67%. Povećanje je, dakle, iznosilo 55,97%. Procenat Hrvata smanjen je za 0,25%, a Ostalih za 5,83% u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Bijeljina je tipičan primjer kako se ratom, ubistvima, protjerivanjem, silovanjem, zastrašivanjem, odvođenjem u logore, prisilnom mobilizacijom, rušenjem i drugim sredstvima može drastično promijeniti etnička struktura stanovništva jednoga grada. Svakako, ne treba zanemariti ni druge uzroke smanjenja broja Bošnjaka u Bijeljini, kao što su: sigurnosna situacija, ekonomski položaj, obrazovanje, putna i druga infrastruktura itd. Bijeljina je bila okupirana. amo u toku mjeseca aprila 1992. godine u Bijeljini su ubijena najmanje 93 civila (81 Bošnjak, 8 Albanaca, 3 Srbina i 1 Hrvat). Od 31. marta do 6. aprila 1992. godine, ubijeno je najmanje 55 civila. Slike zločina sa bijeljinskih ulica, brzo su obišle svijet, ali na slike užasa međunarodna zajednica nije reagirala. Bijeljina je bila generalna proba za rat, ubistva, ratne zločine i genocid koji su ubrzo uslijedili u cijeloj Republici Bosni i Hercegovini. Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini je okončan potpisivanjem Dejtonskog sporazuma 14. decembra 1995. godine u Parizu. Po mišljenju mnogih istraživača, intelektualaca različitih profila, Sporazum je legalizirao genocid nad Bošnjacima u Bosni i Hercegovini. Prema Dejtonskom sporazumu, u unutrašnjoj strukturi Bosne i Hercegovine postoje dva entiteta: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, koju čini 10 kantona i Republika Srpska. Osim dva entiteta, postoji i Brčko distrikt Bosne i Hercegovine, koji je nastao Odlukom Međunarodnog arbitražnog suda. Uspostavljen je 8. marta 2000. godine. U periodu od 1992. do 1995., približno 2,2 miliona ljudi u Bosni i Hercegovini bilo je primorano napustiti svoje domove. Poslije rata počeo je povratak, između ostalog, i u Bijeljinu. Proces povratka prognanih Bošnjaka tekao je sporo i neorganizirano. Prvi val povratka tekao je od 1996. do 2000. godine. Prognanici su se najviše vraćali u Mjesnu zajednicu Janja. Godine 1998. obnovljen je rad Medžlisa Islamske zajednice u Bijeljini i od tada počinje proces povratka imovine. Sve je išlo izuzetno sporo uz puno opstrukcija lokalnih vlasti. Ipak, 2002. godine ''izliveni'' su temelji za svih pet porušenih džamija u Bijeljini. Džamije su obnavljane zahvaljujući, između ostaloga, sredstvima bijeljinaca koji su živjeli u inozemstvu. Otežavajuća okolnost za povratnike je i činjenica što u bosanskohercegovačkom entitetu Republika srpska negira bosanski jezik. Zabranjuje se izvođenje nastave na bosanskom jeziku, a jezik se imenuje nepostojećim bošnjačkim jezikom. Time se vrši diskriminacija učenika koji žele da se njihov jezik imenuje bosanskim jezikom. Osim toga, visoki zvaničnici iz Republike srpske u javnim istupima negiraju državu Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Bošnjake kao narod, što utiče na perspektivu ljudi ovih prostora. Situacija sa upošljavanjem u javnoj upravi nije dobra. Povratnici se, uglavnom, bave poljoprivredom, no ovdje postoji problem plasmana viška proizvoda. Godine 2013. izvršen je popis stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini. Bio je to prvi popis nakon rata i agresije. Općina Bijeljina imala je 107.715 stanovnika, što je za 10.727 stanovnika više u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Stanovništvo je živjelo u gradu Bijeljina i još 66 naselja, što je za 8 naselja više u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Etnička struktura stanovništva se značajno promijenila pod utjecajem rata protiv Bosne i Hercegovine. Srba je, 2013. godine, bilo 91.784, što je za 34.395 osoba više u odnosu na 1991. godinu, Bošnjaka 13.090, što je za 17.139 osoba manje, Hrvata 515, što je za 23 osobe više, Ostalih 1.550, što je za 2.902 osobe manje u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Onih koji se nisu izjasnili, u etničkom smislu, u općini Bijeljina bilo je 674 a bez odgovora 102 osobe. U gradu Bijeljini živjelo je 42.278 stanovnika, što je za 5.864 osobe više u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Srba je bilo 35.798, što je za 25.348 osoba više u odnosu na 1991. godinu, Bošnjaka 4.469, što je za 14.555 manje, Hrvata 315, što je za 51 osobu manje i Ostalih 1.159, što je 1.963 osobe manje u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Onih koji se nisu izjasnili u etničkom smislu bilo je 502 i bez odgovora 35 osoba. Općina Bijeljina imala je, u ukupnom stanovništvu, 85,21% Srba, što je za 26.04% više u odnosu na 1991. godinu, a Bošnjaka 12,15%, što je za 19,02% manje u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Hrvata je bilo manje za 0,03%, a Ostalih manje za 3,14% u odnosu na 1991. godinu. U gradu Bijeljini došlo je do drastične promjene etničke strukture stanovništva u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Naime, Bošnjaci su 1991, činili 52,24% stanovništva grada, Srbi 28,70%, Jugoslaveni 9,48%, Ostali8,57% i Hrvati 1,00%. Broj Bošnjaka smanjen je za 41,67% i iznosio je 10,57% u ukupnom stanovništvu Bijeljine. Za isto vrijeme povećao se procenat Srba sa 28,70% na 84,67%. Povećanje je, dakle, iznosilo 55,97%. Procenat Hrvata smanjen je za 0,25%, a Ostalih za 5,83% u odnosu na 1991. godinu. Bijeljina je tipičan primjer kako se ratom, ubistvima, protjerivanjem, silovanjem, zastrašivanjem, odvođenjem u logore, prisilnom mobilizacijom, rušenjem i drugim sredstvima može drastično promijeniti etnička struktura stanovništva jednoga grada. Svakako, ne treba zanemariti ni druge uzroke smanjenja broja Bošnjaka u Bijeljini, kao što su: sigurnosna situacija, ekonomski položaj, obrazovanje, putna i druga infrastruktura itd.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state composed of different ethnic, religious and cultural identities, with a complicated political and administrative system in which it is difficult to achieve political and economic progress. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state in which the symptoms of conflict and fragmentation are present, particularly in the context of secessionist efforts by representatives of the Republika Srpska. Although the conflict or the dispute over the secession of the Republika Srpska could be considered rational, we considered the ambitions of the representatives of the Republika Srpska to be irrational, also in view of the predicted development of this dispute and the impact of the efforts of the international community. Therefore, the study was focused on the threat of secession efforts from the Republika Srpska and analysed and assessed the actual situation in the years 2020-2023. The aim of the study was to predict the development of the situation in relation to the secessionist efforts of the representatives of the Republika Srpska. The study used the model of unrecognised statehood to make a forecast. It took into account not only the ambitions of the secessionist entity and the threatened state, but also the influence of external actors pursuing their ambitions. By applying a comprehensive approach to assessing the secessionist conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study predicted the outcome in terms of “status quo equilibria”.

U tekstu se istražuju i objašnjavaju događaji koji su neposredno doveli do vojno-policijske operacije Hrvatske protiv Republike Srpske Krajine nazvane “Oluja”. Prvi tematski krug posvećen je operaciji “Ljeto 95” u jugozapadnoj Bosni i Hercegovini iz jula 1995. koja je dovela do zauzimanja teritorija koje je kontrolisala vojska bosanskih Srba (Bosansko Grahovo i Glamoč), čime je Knin bio direktno ugrožen. Drugi tematski krug posvećen je političkoj akciji hrvatskih vlasti da, pre svega u SAD-u, obezbede podršku za operaciju “Oluja”. Istražuju se i diplomatski napori za pronalaženjem mirnog rešenja. U tom kontekstu, opisuju se i pregovori dve strane vođeni u Ženevi, kao i poslednje pripreme hrvatskog državnog vrha uoči početka operacije. U završnom delu rada daje se pregled stavova najznačajnijih srpskih političara prema događajima koji su doveli do pada Republike Srpske Krajine.

The presence of regular Yugoslav military forces in central Podrinje and their participation in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina have been evident from the very beginnings. As there were no significant forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Bosnian Podrinje, in the beginning of April 1992 the 336th Motorized brigade was dislocated from the area of Tuzla and it established its command post in Šekovići, thus becoming the bearer of battle activities and organization of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this region, including in its organic composition all Serb armed formations from Zvornik, Kalesija, Šekovići, Vlasenica, Milići, Bratunac and Skelani. In the attacks during which the Serb forces gained control over a broader area of Central Podrinje, and the Bosniak population, which constituted a pronounced majority of the overall population, was suppressed and reduced to three isolated enclaves on the territory of Cerska, Konjević Polje and Srebrenica, the function of leading and commanding these forces, as well as other regular and irregular units which were directed or acted from the territory of Serbia, was conducted by the Operative group “Drina”, a formation under the command of the Belgrade military zone, later the 1st Army of the Yugoslav Army. In the attacks on the remaining enclaves of Podrinje during the summer and autumn of 1992 the aviation of the Yugoslav Army was employed along with lighter jets of agricultural aviation, as well as artillery from the firing positions of the Yugoslav Army on the territory of Serbia. The contents of the Wance-Owen peace plan, according to which the greater part of the Bosnian Podrinje was supposed to be included into one of the provinces with a Bosniak ethnic majority, which would have spelt the end of the Serb national policy in Podrinje, represented an announcement of a large winter offensive of the Serbian forces. With a directive issued on 19 November 1992 the Drina corps of the Army of Republika Srpska was ordered to defend Višegrad, Zvornik and the corridor towards Serbia with its main forces, to deblock the communication on the line Milići – Konjević Polje – Zvornik, and to exhaust the enemy on the broader area of Podrinje, inflict upon him as much loss as possible, and force him to “leave the areas of Birač, Žepa and Goražde together with the Muslim population”. On the basis of this directive act, the planned offensive military activities of the Serb forces in Central Podrinje, initiated during November and finished with the agreement on the demilitarization of Srebrenica in April 1993, according to the documents of the Army of Republika Srpska, had three successive phases codenamed: “PROBOJ” (Breakthrough), “PESNICA” (Fist) and “UDAR” (Assault). Despite the significant engaged forces, the offensive “PROBOJ” did not go according to plan, and in the counterattacks during December the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina liberated a large number of settled places, and until 9 January 1993 gained control over Serb strongholds in the communication region of Bratunac – Kravica, and thus physically connected all parts of the liberated territory. Then a new offensive was launched, codenamed “PESNICA”, which, aside from the stabilization of the Serb defence of Bratunac, did not achieve its stated goals, while on the other side the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived to the part of the state border with Serbia in the region of Skelani. In the final phase of the offensive, that bore the code name of “UDAR”, the Army of Yugoslavia directly joined the fighting in Central Podrinje on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the direction of Bratunac towards Srebrenica the forces from the composition of OG “Drina” and parts of other units from the 1st Army of the Yugoslav Army were active, which established a command outpost in Ljubovija. In central Podrinje parts of the Special units corps of the Yugoslav Army also operated, and during the offensive they were stationed in the region of Skelani. From that side, from the direction of Skelani towards Srebrenica, the forces from the composition of the Užice corps of the 2nd Army of the Yugoslav Army were also active. When the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were suppressed from the larger part of the territory and together with the masses of Bosniak civilians restricted to the broader town area of Srebrenica, the units of the Yugoslav Army could retreat to the territory of their state. The offensive was concluded with the signing of the agreement about the demilitarization of Srebrenica.

The harmful entomofauna on apple, in East Sarajevo area was carried during the vegetation in 2022, in three localities. In two localities, Kasindo and Klek, the survey was done in extensive orchards, and in semi-intensive orchard (location Kula). Visuel rewieving method of trees, riddance of branches and taking a sample of infested plants organs, and rearing before adult stadium and determination of collected and reared insects was carried out. Total number of determined harmful insects species is 31, in extensive orchards, Kasindo 28 species and Klek 22 species, and in semi-intensive orchard (Kula), 15 species. The most number of species belong Lepidoptera order, among which dominate leafminers (7 species) and tortrix moths (6 species).

The 2011 population census recorded 4,290,612 residents of Croatia among which 584,947 or 13.7% were born abroad. Even though the most of them were born in Bosnia and Herzegovina (70% or 409,357) no research was conducted about this significant group of immigrants. This paper analyses the migration flows between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia during the last 60 years, especially focusing on demographic data available from diverse secondary sources and data on migration history and transnational activities obtained through empirical study ?The Effects of Immigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Sociodemographic Development of Croatian Urban Areas?. The survey was conducted in 2014 in Sesvete, district of City of Zagreb on a judgemental/purposive sample of 301 adult Croatian residents born in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Historical events (especially war) and economic developments had the influence on the number of immigrants as well as their motivation and decision to move from Bosnia and Hercegovina to Croatia. The data obtained through secondary sources and the results of conducted survey confirmed the shift in dominant migration patterns during three periods. First period, after the WWII until beginning of 1990s, indicated mostly labour migration where the migrations from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia were mostly driven by economic underdevelopment of the country of origin and directed towards Croatian commercial and industrial centres. In the first half of 1990s the change of socio-political system (breakup of the former federal state) and the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina induced significant forced migrations directed towards Croatia. After the end of the war and due to the consequences of armed conflict effecting the contemporary socioeconomic and political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a part of its citizens who were temporary settled in Croatia (as labour migrants or refugees) or elsewhere abroad, decided not to move back to Bosnia and Herzegovina but permanently stay in or move to Croatia. This was followed by the new period of migration driven (again) mostly by economic reasons complemented by general social situation and advanced unfavourable demographic processes in Bosnia and Hercegovina. These conditions stimulated the citizens of Bosnia and Hercegovina to migrate more frequently to other, economically more developed countries (Germany, Austria) effecting significantly the number of immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia. The respondents included in empirical research are mostly Croats by ethnic affiliation (93.4%) and 99% of them have Croatian citizenship. In the highest proportion they migrated to Croatia during the 1990s. The results showed statistically significant correlation between the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina from where they moved to Croatia and the period of migration (the most numerous migrations were recorded from the area of the contemporary Republika Srpska). Three most frequent reasons of migration were war destruction (41.5%), economic reasons (33.2%) and family reasons (13%). Almost two thirds of respondents (63.1%) had no prior migration experience and more than 90% plan to stay permanently in Croatia. The study also confirmed significant social and transnational activities of immigrants. However, these respondents cannot be considered as the ?typical migrants? since they largely share language, culture and tradition of receiving society which presents a favourable environment for their legal/political, socioeconomic and sociocultural integration.

In this article, with some methodological dilemmas, an attempt is made to speak more clearly from a certain historical perspective about the current Serbian and Croatian political conceptions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, which „produce“ an almost permanent political crisis in this area - from Dayton to today. The continuity and current effects of these policies, which have their roots in some dark historical depths and myths, never changing their essence and their goals, were pointed out. In the current Serbian and Croatian political conceptions, Bosnia and Herzegovina is treated as a „sphere of interest“, which should be mastered as much as possible in peace, if it did not succeed in the war. Serbia and Croatia, in the historical sense, since they have existed as political entities, have been opposed to each other in almost everything. The only thing on which there was a high degree of agreement was the question of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, again depending on historical circumstances and other circumstances. (to mention only Tudjman and Milosevic). In the last few years, intensive cooperation and a high degree of „agreement“ between Serbian and Croatian politics have been noticed, again „regarding“ Bosnia and Herzegovina, its status and the definitive post-Dayton division. In this sense, it is not difficult to recognize several common characteristics of both policies. In this article, the author focuses on the following: the first is a declarative and formal public declaration of both to respect the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while in practical politics this sovereignty is continuously violated and „trampled“, acting as its „rulers“. . Another common feature is the belittling and labeling of all pro-Bosnian political forces, reducing them to „political Sarajevo“ in the pejorative sense of the word, with multiple offensive and deeper meanings, which, in addition to Milorad Dodik (to make the absurd even greater, as president or member of the Presidency of BiH) from the Serbian one, Zoran Milanović, the current president of Croatia, until yesterday a declared friend of Bosnia and the pro-Bosnian SDP, is increasingly expressing himself in his own way. Obstruction of the process of reforms and rapprochement of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the European Union and NATO membership is the third session of the characteristics of Serbian and Croatian politics (albeit in different versions), while the fourth, denial of decisions and verdicts of the Hague Tribunal for crimes and atrocities is dominant over Bosniaks (again in a different version): Serbs deny genocide verdicts, and Croats deny convictions for the Joint Criminal Enterprise. In addition to common characteristics, this paper highlights some special features of the current Serbian and Croatian policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, again, boils down to one goal: to strengthen (make independent) the Republika Srpska and cantons with a Croat majority, as well as the position of Croats in Federation with the aim of forming a third entity and at the same time weaken the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina until the question of the meaning of its existence is raised. The state's inability to organize the procurement of coronavirus vaccines is just one of the latest proofs that these destructive political forces have succeeded to a great extent. This article points out the consequences of such a policy and emphasizes the need to stop further degradation and collapse of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. Such forces exist, they just have to be activated.

Među dokumentima koji Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju (Srbiju i Crnu Goru) direktno povezuju s agresijom izvršenom na republike Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Hrvatsku nalaze se i zapisnici Vrhovnog saveta odbrane (VSO) Savezne Republike Jugoslavije (SRJ). Sadržaj ovih dokumenata inkriminirajući je za SRJ, jer eklatantno pokazuje i dokazuje učešće ove države u agresiji i izvršenju zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava počinjenih na područjima nekadašnjih jugoslavenskih republika, nakon proglašenja njihovog osamostaljenja i nezavisnosti. Koji značaj imaju ovi dokumenti pokazuju oznake “državna tajna” / “vojna tajna” i “strogo povjerljivo” koje su im dodijeljene. O radu sjednica VSO vođen je zapisnik koji je zajedno sa materijalima za raspravu i stenografskim bilješkama predstavljao arhivsku građu. Ovi dokumenti neupitno dokazuju da su oficiri Vojske Jugoslavije (VJ) koji su službovali u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme oružanog sukoba dobijali plaće i ostvarivali druge prinadležnosti iz personalnog centra VJ u Beogradu (30. kadrovski centar). Zapisnici VSO također pokazuju da je VJ osiguravala logističku pomoć širokih razmjera Vojsci Republike Srpske (VRS) koja se sastojala iz velike količine pješadijske i artiljerijske municije, goriva, rezervnih dijelova, te u izvođenju obuke i pružanju stručne pomoći kako bi se izvodile oružane operacije na području Republike Bosne i Hercegovine. U ovom radu nam je cilj da metodom analize dokumenata – zapisnika sa sjednica VSO do(po)kažemo na koji je način SR Jugoslavija i kojom vrstom aktivnosti izvršila agresiju na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, nezavisnu i suverenu državu. Obim dokumentacione građe ograničava nas na obradu dokumenata po periodima, te se u ovom tekstu bavimo analizom zapisnika iz 1992. i 1993.

Nationalism has made a significant contribution to state formation, but also to state deformation, secessionist movements, and wars. In international relations, nationalism has emerged as a particularly pressing problem over the question of disputed territorial boundaries. Indeed, nationalist movements seeking to change or revise boundaries by either negotiation, stealth, or force have been one of the most fundamental causes of both international and internal conflict in the modern era. The case of Bosnia-Hercegovina is a classic example of a long-running nationalist conflict which has had a profound empirical implications for both the social sciences and the humanities. The massacre at Srebrenica, ruled as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, had a considerable impact beyond the Balkans and the Netherlands. While discussing genocide and crimes against humanity in fair historical context within parts of Serbia and enclaves within Republika Srpska and Montenegro today has remained a difficult and challenging task, a growing number of scholars have shown interest in comparative genocide and the way in which events can be meaningfully compared. The case of Bosnia has also provoked numerous debates in other areas, including the role of sexual crimes in war; obfuscation and genocide denial among extreme nationalists; issues of citizenship, reconstruction, and peacekeeping; the shortcomings of the international community (with particular reference to the United Nations); and the role of international law, especially the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Amodern Example May Help to Clarify some of the issues to be discussed in this chapter. Formerly one of the six republics forming the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Bosnia- Hercegovina has since 1995’s Dayton Agreement been an uneasy international protectorate, divided into a Croat-Muslim Federation, and the Serbian ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS). Bosnia’s coinage speaks powerfully about the paradoxes of a state created through a bloody war of identity and ethnic cleansing. These two entities—the Federation and the RS— and three communities—Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim—display strong and sometimes aggrieved senses of their own individual identities, and ethnic divisions can arise over the simplest of everyday differences. For example, car registration stickers until recently identified cars as registered either in the Federation or in the RS. The International Community felt compelled to design a coinage in which ethnic differences were avoided. The currency itself is a paradox—known as the ‘Convertible Mark’ (KM), it converts to another currency, the Deutschmark, which no longer exists. But it is in the choice of iconography that the Bosnian KM is most striking; these are some of the least attractive coins ever issued, more akin to subway tokens than to genuine coinage. One side of the 1 KM coin displays the stylized shield motif of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a device approved by the International Community. The other bears the denomination and the words ‘Bosne i Hercegovina’ twice, in one language, and two alphabets, though Serbs, Muslims, and Croats might deny that the Latin script of Catholic Croatia, and the Cyrillic of Orthodox Serbia represent the same language. Aside from this need for linguistic even-handedness, no other motifs are to be found. An iconographic void appears to be the only means of compromise. What does this tell us? First, any minting authority can use coins to send an ideological and iconographical message. Coinages represent both political and economic acts. Second, coinage is in no sense an unmediated or direct guide to the ethnic identities of communities; it represents deliberate political choices made by those in control and may therefore mirror social attitudes of those not in control, attempt to modify them, or ignore them outright.