Journal articles on the topic 'Religious Cognition'
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1
Whitehouse, Harvey. "Cognitive Evolution and Religion: Cognition and Religious Evolution." Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology 3, no. 3 (December 1, 2008): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21301/eap.v3i3.2.
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This paper presents contemporary cognitive approaches to the evolution of religious beliefs. Arguments are put forward that different types of beliefs, or ‘modes of religiosity’, occur as a result of a number of evolutionary factors (biological, cultural, socio-political etc). At the same time, religions across the world retain a significant level of common and shared elements, also explained in evolutionary terms.
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Golovneva, E. V., and N. I. Martishina. "RELIGIOUS COGNITION: ESSENCE, SPECIFICITY, AREAL." Review of Omsk State Pedagogical University. Humanitarian research, no. 31 (2021): 9–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.36809/2309-9380-2021-31-9-15.
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Religious cognition is considered as one of the types of cognition that coexist in the overall cognitive process. The author identifies the qualitative and defining properties of religious cognition: the admissibility and priority of extra-logical means of cognition, traditionalism, authoritarianism, symbolism, and polyvariant determinism. On this basis, an extended terpretation of the title concept of the work is proposed. Religious knowledge in a narrow sense is the understanding of sacred objects and sacred history, with the obligatory reliance on the idea of supernatural reality. Religious cognition in a broad sense is the comprehension of other realities, which is carried out using the same set of logical means, through the procedures of sacralization, canonization, and giving symbolic meaning to objects. This interpretation also significantly expands the scope of cognitive processes that can be attributed to religious cognition. The paper presents examples of manifestations of religious knowledge in a broad sense.
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Watts, Fraser. "The evolution of religious cognition." Archive for the Psychology of Religion 42, no. 1 (March 2020): 89–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0084672420909479.
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Several accounts of the evolution of religion distinguish two phases: an earlier shamanic stage and a later doctrinal stage. Similarly, several theories of human cognition distinguish two cognitive modes: a phylogenetically older system that is largely intuitive and a later, more distinctively human system that is more rational and articulate. This article suggests that cognition in the earlier stage in the evolution of religion is largely at the level of intuition, whereas the cognition of doctrine or religion is more conceptual and rational. Early religious cognition is more embodied and is more likely to carry healing benefits. The evolutionary origins of religion in humans seem to depend on developments in the cognitive architecture. It is further suggested that the cognition of early religion shows less conceptual differentiation, is characteristically participatory rather than objectifying and is less individualistic. The development of religion in recent centuries appears to show some approximate recapitulation of the stages through which religion originally evolved.
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Tan, Tobias. "William James and Embodied Religious Belief." Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 3 (August 31, 2018): 366–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01503006.
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Scholars have recently identified resemblances between pragmatist thought and contemporary trends in cognitive science in the area of ‘embodied cognition’ or ‘4E cognition.’ In this article I explore these resemblances in the account of religious belief provided by the classical pragmatist philosopher William James. Although James’s psychology does not always parallel the commitments of embodied cognition, his insights concerning the role of emotion and socio-cultural context in shaping religious belief, as well as the action-oriented nature of such beliefs, resonate with embodied and embedded accounts of religious belief. James’s insights are readily extended in light of contemporary embodied cognition research to highlight the interdependency between religious belief of individuals and the cognitive scaffolding provided by embodied religious practices.
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Grafman, Jordan, Irene Cristofori, Wanting Zhong, and Joseph Bulbulia. "The Neural Basis of Religious Cognition." Current Directions in Psychological Science 29, no. 2 (February 3, 2020): 126–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419898183.
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Religion’s neural underpinnings have long been a topic of speculation and debate, but an emerging neuroscience of religion is beginning to clarify which regions of the brain integrate moral, ritual, and supernatural religious beliefs with functionally adaptive responses. Here, we review evidence indicating that religious cognition involves a complex interplay among the brain regions underpinning cognitive control, social reasoning, social motivations, and ideological beliefs.
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Pennycook, Gordon. "Domain generality in religious cognition." Religion, Brain & Behavior 5, no. 3 (June 6, 2014): 247–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2153599x.2014.910256.
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Sauerteig-Rolston, Madison, Lisa Barnes, Patricia Thomas, and Kenneth Ferraro. "RELIGION AND TRAJECTORIES OF COGNITIVE FUNCTION AMONG WHITE, BLACK, AND HISPANIC OLDER ADULTS." Innovation in Aging 6, Supplement_1 (November 1, 2022): 550. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geroni/igac059.2083.
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Abstract Most prior research on the relationship between religious involvement and cognition among older adults is based on cross-sectional data and yields inconsistent results. We use longitudinal data from 14,161 older adults in the Health and Retirement study (HRS) to investigate whether religious involvement, measured by attendance, integration, and religiosity (i.e., beliefs, meanings, and values) is associated with trajectories of cognitive function from 2006 to 2016 among a diverse sample of respondents. We find that religiosity is associated with lower levels of cognition at baseline among White adults (b=-0.12, p < 0.001), but higher levels of cognition among Black adults (b=0.18, p < 0.05). In addition, growth curve analysis reveals that religious attendance is associated with higher cognition over time for Hispanic respondents (b=0.07, p < 0.001). Religious involvement is associated with later-life cognition, but this relationship differs for White, Black, and Hispanic older adults.
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Krátký, Jan. "Cognition, material culture and religious ritual." DISKUS 13 (July 19, 2014): 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.18792/diskus.v13i0.27.
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Britt, Katherine, Kathy Richards, Shelli Kesler, Gayle Acton, Jill Hamilton, and Kavita Radhakrishnan. "ASSOCIATION OF RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE WITH NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SYMPTOMS, COGNITION, AND SLEEP IN COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT." Innovation in Aging 6, Supplement_1 (November 1, 2022): 819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geroni/igac059.2946.
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Abstract Neuropsychiatric symptoms (NPS), cognitive decline, and sleep disturbances are common among older adults with cognitive impairment. Religious practices may protect mental and physical health, yet few studies have been reported in older adults with cognitive impairment. Utilizing the Health and Retirement Study in 2006 and 2008 and sub study, Aging, Demographics, and Memory study in 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, we examined the association of religious attendance with NPS, cognition, and sleep disturbances controlling for social interaction in older adults with cognitive impairment (N = 63). Bootstrapped Spearman’s partial Rho correlation was conducted separately for time points one (T1) and two (T2); Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to examine significant change over time. Mean age was 81.89(5.26) years, 65.9% were non-Hispanic White, 50.1% were female, and mean cognition (Clinical Dementia Rating) was .94(.228). Significant changes over 1.5 years were found for sleep disturbances but not for NPS and cognition. Significant associations were found for religious attendance and NPS (T1: rs (97)= - .103, 95% CI [-.108, -.098], p < .0005 and T2: -.243, 95% CI [-.246,-.239], p < .0005), cognition, (T1: rs (97) = - .119, 95% CI [-.122, -.115], p < .0005, and T2: rs (97) = -.104, 95% CI [-.107,-.102], p < .0005), and sleep disturbances, (T1: rs (97) = .028, 95% CI [.023, .033], p < .001, and T2: rs (97) = -.051, 95% CI [-.056,-.047], p < .001). Increased religious attendance was associated with lower NPS and cognition at both time points and greater sleep disturbances at T1 but lower at T2. Longitudinal studies are needed to examine associations further.
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Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. "Doing it the Other Way Round: Religion as a Basic Case of ‘Normative Cognition’." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 22, no. 4 (2010): 322–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006810x531102.
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AbstractReligious traditions abundantly demonstrate how norms, rules, constraints and models are installed and transmitted in multiple media: myth, dogma, ritual, institutions, etc. These abound in cosmologies, classification systems, morality, and purity and they influence individual and collective human practice. The term ‘normative cognition’ is introduced here as a covering term for such enculturated and socio-culturally governed cognition. The ‘normative cognition’ approach deals with ‘cognitive governance’ effects of higher-order cognitive products on those of lower levels. Higher-order cognitive products range from religious purity rules, over highway codes to normative scripts, schemata and frames for all kinds of behavior. In short: socio-cultural products allow individual biological brains to interact and act on the world and thereby facilitate the existence of human society. I suggest that research on normative cognition not only casts new light on religion but that it contributes to a general understanding of the complex relations between cognition and culture.
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Pham, Thanh Hang, Lan Hien Do, and Ekaterina Nikolaeva. "Religious ecology in sustainable development in the world and Vietnam." E3S Web of Conferences 258 (2021): 05006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125805006.
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Religious ecology is a new approach to the research of religions from the angle of ecological issues. The purpose of this approach is to find in the scriptures, theological theories and hermeneutic texts of different religions the values relating to ecology from the perspective of religious cognition, worldview, outlook on life, ethical principles, norms, rituals. Thus, religious ecology considers the ways religious organizations guide their followers’ behavior in relation to the environment around, evaluates their roles in dealing with the present environmental problems, thence proposes ways to put the ecological dimension of religions into practice. The paper focuses on the theoretical and practical issues of religious ecology in the word and Vietnam, towards the sustainable development goals.
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Bainbridge, William Sims. "Social cognition of religion." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29, no. 5 (October 2006): 463–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x06239104.
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Research on religion can advance understanding of social cognition by building connections to sociology, a field in which much cognitively oriented work has been done. Among the schools of sociological thought that address religious cognition are: structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, conflict theory, phenomenology, and, most recently, exchange theory. The gulf between sociology and cognitive science is an unfortunate historical accident.
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Pyysiäinen, Ilkka. "Intuitive and Explicit in Religious Thought." Journal of Cognition and Culture 4, no. 1 (2004): 123–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853704323074787.
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AbstractIt has been argued within the new cognitive science of religion that people's actual religious concepts and inferences differ from their explicitly held religious concepts and beliefs; the latter are too complex to be used in fast online reasoning. Natural intuitions thus tend to overwrite theological doctrine and to drive behavior. The cognitive science of religion has focused on this intuitive aspect of religion, ignoring theological thought. Here I try to outline a theoretical model on the basis of which it should be possible to explain the interaction of the intuitive and explicit processes in religious cognition.
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Stadnyk, Mykola. "IRRATIONAL AND RATIONAL RELIGIOUS IN SCIENTIFIC COGNITION." Sophia. Human and Religious Studies Bulletin 14, no. 2 (2019): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/sophia.2019.14.6.
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In the article, the author reveals the metaphysical systems of the irrational justification for the existence of the supernatural. It is shown that diverse arguments in the protection of the supernatural are based on references to the limited and historical underdevelopment of human practice, the evidence of the presence of uncontrolled and therefore incomprehensible phenomena of nature, society and the human psyche. A characteristic feature of theological cognition is not systematic, but spontaneous, irrational at its basis. The process of cognition for Orthodox theologians involves the domination of faith and the silence of the mind. A similar understanding of the process of cognition and the role of science has changed over time. The logic of the structure of religious consciousness shows that the mind in this process plays only an auxiliary role along with the intuitively gained faith. With this understanding, the role of faith significantly increases and the role of knowledge diminishes and therefore thought of a person, his scientific search is completely ignored. At the same time, the idea that cognitive activity should be focused above all on the comprehension of God is embedded in the consciousness of a person. Under the influence of the growing role of science, theologians began to point out in some questions not only the possible combination of religion with scientific knowledge, but also to prove the beneficial influence of religion on science. In theological understanding, this indicates the leading role of religion in the emergence of science. The task of religion is the knowledge of the supernatural through the suggestion, conviction of people in its reality. Scientific knowledge strives for objective significance and maximum accuracy, excluding all personal and subjective. Religion not only recognizes subjectivism but also brings theological faith and inner experiences to the rank of criteria of truth. Science is characterized by dynamism and development. It relies on rational knowledge. Religion is conservative, static in nature. Its support is irrational consciousness. Science is based on experience. However, the basis of religion is a belief in supernatural, mystical experience. The comparative analysis of scientific and religious knowledge indicates that their purpose, methods and criteria of knowledge are essentially opposite.
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Van Eyghen, Hans. "What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey." Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 3 (August 31, 2018): 387–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01503007.
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I use three ideas from philosopher John Dewey that are of service for Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). I discuss how Dewey’s ideas on embodied cognition, embedded cognition can be put to work to get a fuller understanding of religious cognition. I also use his ideas to criticize CSR’s reliance on the modularity of mind thesis
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Billingsley, Joseph, Cristina M. Gomes, and Michael E. McCullough. "Implicit and explicit influences of religious cognition on Dictator Game transfers." Royal Society Open Science 5, no. 8 (August 2018): 170238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.170238.
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Does religion promote prosocial behaviour? Despite numerous publications that seem to answer this question affirmatively, divergent results from recent meta-analyses and pre-registered replication efforts suggest that the issue is not yet settled. Uncertainty lingers around (i) whether the effects of religious cognition on prosocial behaviour were obtained through implicit cognitive processes, explicit cognitive processes or both and (ii) whether religious cognition increases generosity only among people disinclined to share with anonymous strangers. Here, we report two experiments designed to address these concerns. In Experiment 1, we sought to replicate Shariff and Norenzayan's demonstration of the effects of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers to anonymous strangers; unlike Shariff and Norenzayan, however, we used an online environment where anonymity was virtually assured. In Experiment 2, we introduced a ‘taking’ option to allow greater expression of baseline selfishness. In both experiments, we sought to activate religious cognition implicitly and explicitly, and we investigated the possibility that religious priming depends on the extent to which subjects view God as a punishing, authoritarian figure. Results indicated that in both experiments, religious subjects transferred more money on average than did non-religious subjects. Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis that implicit religious priming did not increase Dictator Game transfers in either experiment, even among religious subjects. Collectively, the two experiments furnished support for a small but reliable effect of explicit priming, though among religious subjects only. Neither experiment supported the hypothesis that the effect of religious priming depends on viewing God as a punishing figure. Finally, in a meta-analysis of relevant studies, we found that the overall effect of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers was small and did not statistically differ from zero.
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Day, Matthew. "The Ins and Outs of Religious Cognition." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 16, no. 3 (2004): 241–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570068042652284.
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Guo, Qing, Xiang Dong Zhu, and Chong En Wang. "Embodiment of Polytheism in Architectures of Southeastern Shanxi - A Case Study of Hongji Monastery in Wuxiang County." Applied Mechanics and Materials 253-255 (December 2012): 45–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.253-255.45.
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Through field visit to Hongji Monastery in Wuxiang County of Shanxi Province, a detailed investigation on its spatial arrangement and religious functions of architectures is conducted, which deeply reflects the historical inevitability of polytheism and the improvement of people’s cognition toward religious thoughts by combining reasons for the appearance of polytheism and relations between religious activities and religious architectures. This trend of polytheism gives rise to the infusion of deities from different religions in the same religious architecture, which works as a practical carrier of spiritual ballast.
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Fux, Michal. "Cultural Transmission of Precautionary Ideas: The Weighted Role of Implicit Motivation." Journal of Cognition and Culture 16, no. 5 (November 7, 2016): 415–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342186.
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Inspired by the idea that cognitive systems evoke cultural phenomena, this study tested a theory suggesting precautionary cognitive mechanisms as both a constraint and an enabler of transmission of cultural concepts such as religious rituals. Using ‘restricted range of themes’ as a link between precautionary cognition and religious rituals, this cross cultural study of Zulu communities in sa tested people’s inferences about implications of failure to perform life-stage rituals in order to identify the nature of the presence of precautionary themes in Zulu rituals and any involvement of environmental factors. The results reflected inferences rather than echoing of formal descriptions of rituals, and revealed a consistent affinity between certain threat-domains and specific Zulu rituals: birth and early age rituals evoked the Contamination/Contagion domain, women’s maturity rituals evoked the Decline in Resources domain, marital rituals evoked a mixture of Decline in Resources and Loss of Status domains, and death rituals evoked the Predation/Assault domain. This suggests that precautionary cognition effect on religious rituals is mediated by life-history strategy rather than by ecology factors, and also, that understanding precautionary cognition is crucial for uncovering the real motivations for religious behaviour, as direct reports cannot be taken at face value.
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McNamara, Patrick. "Do You Need Cognitive Neuroscience to Understand Religious Cognition, Experience and Texts?" Journal of Cognitive Historiography 2, no. 1 (June 3, 2016): 66–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/jch.v2i1.30988.
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Porcher, José Eduardo, and Fernando Carlucci. "Afro-Brazilian Religions and the Prospects for a Philosophy of Religious Practice." Religions 14, no. 2 (January 26, 2023): 146. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14020146.
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In this paper, we take our cue from Kevin Schilbrack’s admonishment that the philosophy of religion needs to take religious practices seriously as an object of investigation. We do so by offering Afro-Brazilian traditions as an example of the methodological poverty of current philosophical engagement with religions that are not text-based, belief-focused, and institutionalized. Anthropologists have studied these primarily orally transmitted traditions for nearly a century. Still, they involve practices, such as offering and sacrifice as well as spirit possession and mediumship, that have yet to receive attention from philosophers. We argue that this is not an accident: philosophers have had a highly restricted diet of examples, have not looked at ethnography as source material, and thus still need to put together a methodology to tackle such practices. After elucidating Schilbrack’s suggestions to adopt an embodiment paradigm and apply conceptual metaphor theory and the extended mind thesis to consider religious practices as thoughtful, we offer criticism of the specifics of his threefold solution. First, it assumes language is linear; second, it takes a problematic view of the body; and third, it abides by a misleading view of the “levels” of cognition. We conclude that the philosophy of religion should adopt enactivism to understand religious practices as cognitive enterprises.
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McQueen, Moira. "Sparking Religious Conversion through AI?" Religions 13, no. 5 (May 4, 2022): 413. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13050413.
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This paper will take the stance that cognitive enhancement promised by the use of AI could be a first step for some in bringing about moral enhancement. It will take a further step in questioning whether moral enhancement using AI could lead to moral and or religious conversion, i.e., a change in direction or behaviour reflecting changed thinking about moral or religious convictions and purpose in life. One challenge is that improved cognition leading to better moral thinking is not always sufficient to motivate a person towards the change in behaviour demanded. While some think moral bioenhancement should be imposed if necessary in urgent situations, most religions today see volition in conversion as essential. Moral and religious conversion should be voluntary and not imposed, and recent studies that show possible dangers of the use of AI here will be discussed along with a recommendation that there be regulatory requirements to counteract manipulation. It is, however, recognized that a change in moral thinking is usually a necessary step in the process of conversion and this paper concludes that voluntary, safe use of AI to help bring that about would be ethically acceptable.
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Van Esch, Patrick, James Teufel, Ally Geisler, and Skye van Esch. "Religious Cognition in Social Marketing Campaigns: Savior or Pariah?" Review of European Studies 9, no. 1 (December 26, 2016): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/res.v9n1p74.
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Religious cognition is regarded as a major influencing factor in popular culture, helping shape individual attitudes and decisions regarding food choice, personal associations and social interactions. Social marketing campaigns derive from marketing and social science and are used to influence positive behaviour change through different types of communication methods. A substantial body of literature exists on both religious cognition and social marketing campaigns, yet the literature on where the two phenomena intersect is limited. Religious cognition is empirically proven as a predictor of positive healthy behavior. However, these elements receive minimal attention from social marketing researchers and practitioners. A review of the existing literature is provided with compelling evidence that religious cognition would positively influence behavior change when more congruent with social marketing campaigns. Knowledge gaps are identified and four propositions recommended for future research.
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Toth-Gauthier, Maria, and James M. Day. "Cognitive complexity, religious cognition, cognitive development, and religious judgment: An empirical study of relationships amongst “normal” and “gifted” young people." Behavioral Development Bulletin 20, no. 1 (April 2015): 60–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0101034.
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Shtulman, Andrew, and Max Rattner. "Theories of God: Explanatory coherence in religious cognition." PLOS ONE 13, no. 12 (December 26, 2018): e0209758. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209758.
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Purzycki, Benjamin Grant, and Aiyana Koka Willard. "Accounting for variation and stability in religious cognition." Religion, Brain & Behavior 6, no. 3 (April 8, 2015): 266–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2153599x.2015.1009850.
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Russell, Yvan I., and Fernand Gobet. "What is Counterintuitive? Religious Cognition and Natural Expectation." Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4, no. 4 (September 26, 2013): 715–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0160-5.
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Butler, Paul M., Patrick McNamara, and Raymon Durso. "Side of Onset in Parkinson’s Disease and Alterations in Religiosity: Novel Behavioral Phenotypes." Behavioural Neurology 24, no. 2 (2011): 133–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2011/493013.
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Behavioral neurologists have long been interested in changes in religiosity following circumscribed brain lesions. Advances in neuroimaging and cognitive experimental techniques have been added to these classical lesion-correlational approaches in attempt to understand changes in religiosity due to brain damage. In this paper we assess processing dynamics of religious cognition in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD). We administered a four-condition story-based priming procedure, and then covertly probed for changes in religious belief. Story-based priming emphasized mortality salience, religious ritual, and beauty in nature (Aesthetic). In neurologically intact controls, religious belief-scores significantly increased following the Aesthetic prime condition. When comparing effects of right (RO) versus left onset (LO) in PD patients, a double-dissociation in religious belief-scores emerged based on prime condition. RO patients exhibited a significant increase in belief following the Aesthetic prime condition and LO patients significantly increased belief in the religious ritual prime condition. Results covaried with executive function measures. This suggests lateral cerebral specialization for ritual-based (left frontal) versus aesthetic-based (right frontal) religious cognition. Patient-centered individualized treatment plans should take religiosity into consideration as a complex disease-associated phenomenon connected to other clinical variables and health outcomes.
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Nakissa, Aria. "Rethinking Religious Cognition and Myth: A New Perspective on how Religions Balance Intuitiveness and Interest-Provokingness/Memorability." Journal of Cognition and Culture 21, no. 1-2 (June 1, 2021): 112–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12340099.
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Abstract In his influential work on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), Pascal Boyer argues that the spread of religious ideas involves a tradeoff between their “intuitiveness” and their interest-provokingness/memorability (i.e.,their capacity to provoke interest and be remembered). For Boyer, religious ideas are “intuitive” insofar as they are easy to understand and learn. However, other CSR studies suggest that religious ideas are “intuitive” insofar as they are easy to believe. In analyzing the spread of religious ideas, no study has considered the tradeoff between interest-provokingness/memorability and intuitiveness in the sense of being easy to believe. The present article takes up this task by considering several religious concepts that are intuitively easy to believe (e.g., immortal souls, spirit beings, a Creator God, a just world). It is argued that, in typical religions, such concepts are incorporated into myths. Through incorporation, these concepts lose some of their intuitive believability but gain interest-provokingness/memorability.
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Ferretti, Francesco, and Ines Adornetti. "Biology, Culture and Coevolution: Religion and Language as Case Studies." Journal of Cognition and Culture 14, no. 3-4 (July 24, 2014): 305–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342127.
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The main intent of this paper is to give an account of the relationship between bio-cognition and culture in terms of coevolution, analysing religious beliefs and language evolution as case studies. The established view in cognitive studies is that bio-cognitive systems constitute a constraint for the shaping and the transmission of religious beliefs and linguistic structures. From this point of view, religion and language are by-products or exaptations of processing systems originally selected for other cognitive functions. We criticize such a point of view, showing that it paves the way for the idea that cultural evolution follows a path entirely autonomous and independent from that of biological evolution. Against the by-product and exaptation approaches, our idea is that it is possible to interpret religion and language in terms of coevolution. The concept of coevolution involves a dual path of constitution: one for which biology (cognition) has adaptive effects on culture, the other for which, in turn, forms of culture have adaptive effects on biology (cognition). This dual path of constitution implies that religion and language are (at least in some aspects) forms of biological adaptations.
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Tallon, Andrew. "Affection, Cognition, Volition." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68, no. 2 (1994): 211–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq199468225.
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Day, Matthew. "Religion, Off-Line Cognition and the Extended Mind." Journal of Cognition and Culture 4, no. 1 (2004): 101–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853704323074778.
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AbstractThis essay argues that the "classical" or "standard" computation model of an enviroment of thought may hamstring the nascent cognitive science of religion by masking the ways in which the bare biological brain is prosthetically extended and embedded in the surrounding landscape. The motivation for distinsuishing between the problem-solving profiles of the basic brain and the brain-plus-scaffolding is that in many domains non-biological artifacts support and augment biological modes of computation - often allowing us to overcome some of the brain's native computation limitations. The recognition that in some contexts not all of the relevant computational machinery fits inside the head suggests that we should reconsider the possible role(s) and significance of material culture in religious cognition. More specifically, the broad spectrum of rituals, music, relics, scriptures, statues and buildings typically associated with religious traditions may be more than quaint ethnographic window dressing. Rather than thin cultural wrap arounds that decorate the real cognitive processes going on underneath, these elements could represent central components of the relevant machinery of religious thought. By introducing tangible features of the world that can be physically manipulated and tracked in real-time, for example, the cognitive scaffolding that religious material culture affords seems tailor-made for allowing people to exchange the intricate "off-line" problems that arise from dealing with invisible, counter-intuitive supernatural agents for the kinds of "on-line" cognitive tasks they are naturally good at doing (i.e., recognizing patterns, modeling simple worldly dynamics, and manipulating objects).
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Strawn, Brad D., and Warren S. Brown. "Enhancing Christian Life: How Extended Cognition Augments Religious Community." Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 73, no. 3 (September 2021): 180–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.56315/pscf9-21strawn.
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ENHANCING CHRISTIAN LIFE: How Extended Cognition Augments Religious Community by Brad D. Strawn and Warren S. Brown. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2020. 176 pages, including title pages, acknowledgments, and indexes. Paperback; $21.00. ISBN: 9780830852819. *"I'd like to supersize it" is not a statement I usually utter without guilt and some consternation. However, in Enhancing Christian Life: How Extended Cognition Augments Religious Community, Strawn and Brown present an argument that makes me question whether I say it enough--in the right contexts--and whether I live in a way that makes it so. *Strawn, a clinical psychologist, and Brown, an experimental neuropsychologist, wrote this book for individuals invested in deepening Christian lives. Across ten chapters, they develop an evidence-based argument in support of their assertion that "No one is Christian (or "spiritual") entirely on their own" (p. 12). Writing in response to the focus on single persons (e.g., individual spiritual experience) at the forefront of many Western evangelical churches, Strawn and Brown argue that such a prioritization of these internal, private experiences produces no more than a "puny" Christian faith and life. *The text is divided into three parts, guiding the reader through evidence about what persons are like (section 1), how persons function in the world (section 2), and what this knowledge of persons--what we are like and how we function--means for the church and Christian life (section 3). *Section 1 explores how different views about human persons influence behavior and religious practice. Strawn and Brown contextualize the modern priority of internal, private, and emotional spirituality within the philosophical and historical framework of soul-body dualism. Following Owen Thomas,1 Strawn and Brown propose that Christian spirituality and spiritual formation should be decentered away from personal piety and the "inner world of a person" (p. 33) and recentered on "the reign of God" and "how one lives one's actual life in the body (the outer)" (p. 33). This perspective, expounded in section 2, lays the groundwork for the implications of understanding persons as embodied, embedded, and extended. *Section 2 begins with the premise that relinquishing Cartesian dualism does not automatically solve the problem of prioritizing internal experiences or its consequences (i.e., salvation of souls as primary; activities related to physical, economic, and social needs are pursued secondarily, if at all). Indeed, some materialist views of persons have replaced Cartesian dualism with a Cartesian materialism wherein the brain, like an encapsulated and isolated computer, functions like a (relabeled) soul. Strawn and Brown reject this notion as well, as it reinforces the idea that there is some "inner reality (whether a soul or a brain) that is the real person" (p. 42). *Pointing to embodied cognition as a robust alternative to Cartesian dualism and materialism, Strawn and Brown note, "Embodied cognition argues that the processes of thinking actually involve the entire body--that is, what we refer to as our 'mind' is grounded in interactions between the brain and the body, and is not solely dependent on brain processes" (p. 45). *This profoundly integrated sense of a whole person should also be understood as "fundamentally relational ... A self is a body whose actions are embedded in, and contextualized by, a community" (p. 56). Taken on its own, this view of human persons has important implications for religious practice and community. Yet, Strawn and Brown further the discussion by exploring how embodied and embedded individuals engage in the world in ways that surpass physiological boundaries; that is, humans are capable of extension--supersizing--beyond their embodied and embedded capabilities. *Strawn and Brown explore extended cognition in two chapters (chapters 4 and 5), arguing that human beings have brains flexible enough to incorporate objects external to their bodies into their mental processes in ways that extend and enhance their capacities. Take, for example, an expert carpenter who wields a hammer like an extension of her own arm. Extended cognition suggests that this is not just a simile describing the carpenter's expertise with a hammer. Instead, the hammer functions as an extension of her own arm; extensive practice and engagement with the hammer has reshaped her representation of herself, a reshaping that allows her to wield the hammer effortlessly and effectively. This reshaping--this extension of her cognition--is evident behaviorally and neurologically. The important conclusion is that tools can extend human thinking. "Compared to what is possible through extension, the nonextended mind is less potent, diminished, and relatively puny" (p. 71); extending minds to include tools "supersizes" and significantly enhances cognition beyond the capacity of the material and embedded body alone. *In moving toward an argument about religious community, Strawn and Brown apply the logic and evidence for cognitive extension to social relationships. It is not just tools that can supersize human thinking; other people can (and do). Discussion about collaborative projects (e.g., in science), marriage, family, cultural practices, and psychotherapy all illustrate the fundamental principle that "... our minds include and incorporate what emerges from our interactions with others. Incorporation of other minds constitutes supersizing of our mental life beyond our capacities as solo thinkers" (p. 88). *Section three links these ideas to address the question, why is Christian community important? Strawn and Brown contend that church was never meant to be a place where individual spiritual people come together. Instead, they persuasively argue that the church is a place where "reciprocal extension ... and spiritual enhancements ... make Christian life richer, both individually and collectively" (p. 94), surpassing what could have been possible by a single Christian alone. *Importantly, just as the expert carpenter had to practice extending her cognition to incorporate the hammer and just as collaborative projects do not always go well, enhancement of Christian life through extension is not automatic. It is a process that involves reorienting the purpose and practice of engagement in religious community and personal devotional practices. *I found Strawn and Brown's description of a church community that was soft coupled--extended and connected in a way that something new beyond the capacity of the individual emerges--to be profound and challenging. When applied to corporate practices of prayer, scripture reading, worship, communion, and preaching, the ideas underlying extended cognition require a reevaluation of practice and, in many ways, a head-on confrontation of culturally Western notions of independence. Moreover, taking seriously the idea of extended cognition in religious communities requires that we ask ourselves difficult questions about our personal religious practices: "Is this practice ultimately about God and others or primarily about me?" (p. 126). Personal religious disciplines acquire new meaning and significance when understood through an extended cognition framework. *The book concludes with a brief discussion on the mental institutions ("wikis") that inform praxis along with practical ideas for churches to create spaces for supersizing Christian life through the repeated practice and extension of individuals' cognition. In aiming to develop "a new understanding of Christian life that includes what is beyond our individual selves" (p. 139), Strawn and Brown have written a text that will, at minimum, challenge readers to ask important questions about Christian life--personal and corporate. For example, as I read this text, I reflected on the putative notion of young people leaving the church and asked: without this deeply embodied, embedded, and extended community, does leaving really change anything? Were these young people ever in what was meant to be the church in the first place? Readers, with their own experiences and backgrounds, should similarly find this text thought-provoking. And, importantly, I believe this text offers a critical response to the fierce Western independence of self and spirituality that permeates many Christian lives. *Note *1Owen C. Thomas, "Interiority and Christian Spirituality," The Journal of Religion 80, no. 1 (2000): 41-60. *Reviewed by Erin I. Smith, Associate Professor of Psychology, California Baptist University, Riverside, CA 92504-3206.
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Mather, Hannah R. K. "Affect, Ethics, and Cognition." Journal of Pentecostal Theology 29, no. 2 (September 21, 2020): 179–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455251-bja10003.
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Abstract This article considers the Spirit’s role in the interpretation of Scripture, otherwise known as pneumatic interpretation. It outlines that whilst we may approach scripture seeking to interpret its written truth, the Spirit’s concern is with so much more than just our minds. Thus, pneumatic interpretation is holistic and cannot be restricted to interpretation of the scriptural text. The Spirit always works through and beyond the written words, seeking to interpret and appropriate scriptural truth affectively, ethically, and cognitively in our lives in ways that align with Scripture and transform us holistically into knowledge of and relationship with God as Father, Son, and Spirit. However, within this lies a paradox that whilst the Holy Spirit of God is all-powerful, discernment and reception of truth brought by the Spirit through Scripture (or in ways leading towards Scripture) is either helped or hindered by ethical action and choice.
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Oviedo, Lluis. "Religious Cognition as a Dual-Process: Developing the Model." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 27, no. 1 (February 9, 2015): 31–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341288.
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Several authors in the field of the cognitive science of religion have resorted to ‘dual-process’ models in their own developments. These models distinguish between non-conscious (fast, intuitive, and automatic) and conscious (slow, reflective and controlled) forms of religious reasoning. Most of the published studies focus only on the first of those two processes when dealing with religion. The present pages offer a summary of the current state of dual-process research, their application to religion to the date, and a plea for their broader use, aimed at building a more integrated view of religion as a combination of both cognitive dimensions. The developments on ‘heuristics’ might contribute to a better understanding of several features of the religious mind.
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Azari, Nina P., and Dieter Birnbacher. "THE ROLE OF COGNITION AND FEELING IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE." Zygon® 39, no. 4 (December 2004): 901–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2004.00627.x.
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Duriez, Bart. "Vivisecting the religious mind: Religiosity and motivated social cognition." Mental Health, Religion & Culture 6, no. 1 (March 2003): 79–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1367467031000085928.
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Kraal, A. Zarina, Neika Sharifian, Afsara B. Zaheed, Ketlyne Sol, and Laura B. Zahodne. "Dimensions of Religious Involvement Represent Positive Pathways in Cognitive Aging." Research on Aging 41, no. 9 (July 14, 2019): 868–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0164027519862745.
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Older Black and Hispanic adults report more religious involvement, and religious involvement has been linked to better cognition. This study examined which aspects of religious involvement are associated with better longitudinal episodic memory and whether religious involvement offsets racial and ethnic inequalities in episodic memory. Using Health and Retirement Study data ( N = 16,069), latent growth curves estimated independent indirect pathways between race and ethnicity and 6-year memory trajectories through religious attendance, private prayer, and religious belief, controlling for nonreligious social participation, depressive symptoms, chronic health diseases, age, education, and wealth. Negative direct effects of Black race and Hispanic ethnicity on memory were partially offset by positive indirect pathways through more private prayer and religious attendance. While results were significant for memory intercept and not subsequent memory change, religious attendance and private prayer were independently associated with better cognitive health among diverse older adults. Findings may inform culturally relevant intervention development to promote successful aging and reduce older adults’ cognitive morbidity.
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Tokman, Volodymyr V. "The phenomenon of the sacred and the problem of understanding the essence of religion." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 14 (June 2, 2000): 35–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2000.14.1072.
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Historically there were and there are specific religions (there are about five thousand or even more), but there was not and there is no "religion at all". In order to explore the diverse world of religious phenomena, an appropriate notion is being developed in science, and its definition (which is believed to be about 250) is undoubtedly of great heuristic significance. This concept is a product of the long-term development of cognition; in its diverse interpretations, it helps to comprehend the religious processes of both modernity and the past.
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Pyysiäinen, Ilkka. "Holy Book — a Treasury of the Incomprehensible. The Invention of Writing and Religious Cognition." Numen 46, no. 3 (1999): 269–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568527991208999.
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AbstractThis paper provides a theoretical discussion of the role the introduction of writing plays in the development of religious conceptual systems. It is argued that the writing down of religious traditions makes the transmission of radically counter-intuitive ideas possible, and that the formation of Canons introduces the distinction between a foundational text and its philosophical commentary. Defending the foundational role of the sacred texts by rational argumentation either leads to endless regression of arguments, or to circular reasoning and paradoxes. To accept this as natural, would deprive sacred texts of their special status as the foundation. In religions, this deadlock is used to illustrate the limits of human reasoning powers and, by the same token, to prove that there must be an ultimate reality which can only be accessed through "revelation", "enlightenment", and the like.
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Antognazza, Maria Rosa. "KNOWLEDGE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF." Think 20, no. 58 (2021): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147717562100004x.
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ABSTRACTIntroductions to epistemology routinely define knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria. In the first two sections of this article, I discuss this account and its application to religious epistemology by the influential movement known as Reformed Epistemology. In the last section, I argue that the controversial consequences drawn from this account by Reformed Epistemology offer one of the best illustrations of the untenability of a conception of knowledge as a kind of belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative account of cognition which also provides a different framework for religious epistemology.
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Thagard, Paul. "The Emotional Coherence of Religion." Journal of Cognition and Culture 5, no. 1-2 (2005): 58–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568537054068642.
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AbstractThis paper uses a psychological/computational theory of emotional coherence to explain several aspects of religious belief and practice. After reviewing evidence for the importance of emotion to religious thought and cognition in general, it describes psychological and social mechanisms of emotional cognition. These mechanisms are relevant to explaining the acquisition and maintenance of religious belief, and also shed light on such practices as prayer and other rituals. These psychological explanations are contrasted with ones based on biological evolution.
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Nicholson, Hugh. "Religion, Cognition, and the Myth of Conscious Will." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 31, no. 2 (April 5, 2019): 91–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341437.
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AbstractCharacteristic of the recent cognitive approach to religion (CSR) is the thesis that religious discourse and practice are rooted in an inveterate human propensity to explain events in terms of agent causality. This thesis readily lends itself to the critical understanding of religious belief as “our intuitive psychology run amok.” This effective restriction of the scientific critique of agent causality to notions of supernatural agency appears arbitrary, however, in light of evidence from cognitive and social psychology that our sense of human agency, including our own, is interpretive in nature. In this paper I argue that a cognitive approach to religion that extends the critique of agent causality to the folk psychological experience of conscious will is able to shed light on several characteristically religious phenomena, such as spirit possession, ritual action, and spontaneous action in Zen Buddhism.
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Kang, Bada, Eunhee Cho, and Sarah Oh. "Social Disengagement and Cognitive Function: Does the Association Vary by Gender?" Innovation in Aging 5, Supplement_1 (December 1, 2021): 697. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geroni/igab046.2614.
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Abstract Although social disengagement is considered to be a predictor of cognitive decline, and increase risk of Alzheimer’s and related dementias, little is known regarding the gender-specific association between social disengagement and cognition among Korean middle-aged and older adults. Korea’s Confucianism-based gender roles provide unique contexts to examine gender differences in the influence of social disengagement on cognition. This study investigated the association between social disengagement and cognitive function in a nationally representative sample of Koreans aged 45 years or older (N = 5,196 women and 2,707 men), using data from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (2008-2018). Results from the generalized estimating equation model showed that compared to consistent social engagement, consistent non-engagement was significantly associated with lower cognitive function among both genders. Transitioning from social engagement to non-engagement was significant for males only. Of various types of social activities (religious, senior center, sport, reunion, voluntary, political), consistent non-engagement in a senior center was most associated with lower cognitive function among both genders, while consistent non-engagement in religious activities was significant for females only. While household arrangements were not associated with cognition in men, widowed women had increased risk of cognitive decline than married women, as did women living in households of three or more people. Depression was a predictor of cognitive decline among males only. In this gender-specific study, we found that consistent participation in social activities, especially via membership in a senior community center, is beneficial in preventing cognitive decline among both genders.
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Davidson, Arnold I. "Ethics between Cognition and Volition." Journal of Religion 93, no. 4 (October 2013): 452–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/671119.
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Hornbeck, Ryan G., Brianna Bentley, and Justin L. Barrett. "Examining Special Patient Rituals in a Chinese Cultural Context: A Research Report." Journal of Cognition And Culture 15, no. 5 (November 11, 2015): 530–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342164.
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Is reasoning about religious ritual tethered to ordinary, nonreligious human reasoning about actions? E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley’s ritual form hypothesis (rfh) constitutes a cognitive approach to religious ritual – an explanatory theory that suggests people use ordinary human cognition to make specific predictions about ritual properties, relatively independent of cultural or religious particulars. Few studies assess the credibility ofrfhand further evidence is needed to generalize its predictions across cultures. Towards this end, we assessed culturally Chinese “special patient” rituals in Singapore. Our findings strongly supportrfhpredictions for special patient ritual repeatability, reversibility, sensory pageantry and emotionality.
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Cousar, Kayleigh A., Nate C. Carnes, and Sasha Y. Kimel. "Morality as Fuel for Violence? Disentangling the Role of Religion in Violent Conflict." Social Cognition 39, no. 1 (February 2021): 166–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.166.
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Past research finds contradictory evidence suggesting that religion both reduces and increases violent conflict. We argue that morality is an important hub mechanism that can help us understand this disputed relationship. Moreover, to reconcile this, as well as the factors underlying religion's impact on increased violence (i.e., belief versus practice), we draw on Virtuous Violence Theory and newly synthesize it with research on both moral cognition and social identity. We suggest that the combined effect of moral cognition and social identity may substantially increase violence beyond what either facilitates alone. We test our claims using multilevel analysis of data from the World Values Survey and find a nuanced effect of religion on people's beliefs about violence. Specifically, religious individuals were less likely to condone violence while religious countries were more likely to. This combination of theoretical and empirical work helps disentangle the interwoven nature of morality, religion, and violence.
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Darwish, Linda. "“When your heart is touched, it’s not a decision”." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 47, no. 1 (December 1, 2017): 45–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0008429817732327.
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This is a qualitative study of 17 Iranian Muslim converts to Christianity residing in Canada. The study asks how the sample narrativizes the meaning of religious conversion in their lives. Analysis reveals a six-fold thematic pattern, the underlying premise of which is the relationship between volition, cognition, and sensory experience (or religious emotion). There is a consensus among respondents that human knowledge is always limited, whatever the field of inquiry. In consequence, religious knowledge based on cognition alone proves to be an insufficient guide to matters of ultimate truth. It follows that conversion is frequently experienced and represented less as a rational choice than as a spontaneously gifted event in which cognition and volition are absorbed by what Azari and Birnbacher have so aptly expressed as a “[knowing] that feels like something.”
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Franks, Bradley. "The Nature of Unnaturalness in Religious Representations: Negation and Concept Combination." Journal of Cognition and Culture 3, no. 1 (2003): 41–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853703321598572.
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AbstractThe cognitive anthropological approach has provided a powerful means of beginning to understand religious representations. I suggest that two extant approaches, despite their general plausibility, may not accurately characterise the detailed nature of those representations. A major source of this inaccuracy lies in the characterisation of negation of ontological properties, which gives rise to broader questions about their ontological determinacy and counter-intuitiveness. I suggest that a more plausible account may be forthcoming by allowing a more complex approach to the representations, deriving from understanding their nature as concept combinations. Such an account also suggests an alternative approach to the role of deference in religious representations. In sum, the empirical and theoretical implications of a more fine-grained analysis of religious representations suggest a vindication of the cognitive anthropology approach to integrating culture and cognition.
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Peels, Rik. "The Effects of Sin upon Human Moral Cognition." Journal of Reformed Theology 4, no. 1 (2010): 42–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156973110x495621.
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AbstractThis article provides an elaborate defense of the thesis that we have no reason to think that sin has any direct effects upon our moral cognition. After a few methodological comments and conceptual distinctions, the author treats certain biblical passages on humans’ evil hearts, the function of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 2 and 3, Paul’s comments on the moral situation of the Gentiles in Romans 2, and Paul’s ideas on the Gentiles’ futility of mind as found in Ephesians 4. The most that can be concluded from these passages is that sin has not damaged human moral cognitive faculties to such an extent that they function insufficiently to hold people morally responsible. The author also argues that it is a consequence of sin that humans have knowledge by acquaintance of sin, and that it is only by divine revelation that humans recognize certain morally reprehensible acts, beliefs, and emotions as sinful. Finally, it is briefly argued that we have good reason to think that sin has certain indirect effects upon our moral cognition.