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Journal articles on the topic 'Religion and state – Turkey'
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1
Hazza, Thaer Najrs, and Anmar Mahmoud Khalaf. "Religion and state in Erdogan's mind." Tikrit Journal For Political Science 3, no. 12 (February 22, 2019): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v3i12.8.
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If there are events that confirm Samuel Huntington's argument about the clash of civilizations and Bernard Lewis's thesis on Islam, such as the establishment of the Islamic state in Iran, and the events of September 11, what all these people condone is that Islamist movements are not always an extension of fundamentalism In countries such as Turkey and Indonesia, social movements helped bring in democracy, after decades of authoritarian rule by secularist regimes backed by the army. Religious groups in these countries have participated in the transition to democracy. In Turkey, Islamist groups have fought the vessels in order to strengthen democracy, and in order to participate in the achievement of freedom of opinion and expression and the promotion of religious and human rights, and this is what he did Erdogan and his colleagues since they receive power in Turkey
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Albayrak, H. "Religious Pluralism and Religion-State Relations in Turkey." Religions 10, no. 1 (January 18, 2019): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10010061.
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In this article, I examine religion-state relations and religious pluralism in Turkey in terms of recent changes in the religious landscape. I propose that there is a growing trend in the religious sphere that has resulted in a proliferation of religions, sects and spiritual approaches in Turkey. I argue that although the religious market model might not be applicable to the Turkish religious sphere during the republican era until the 2000s due to the restrictions applied by the state’s authoritarian secularist policies, it is compatible with today’s changing society. Different religious groups as well as spiritual movements have used the democratization process of the 2000s in Turkey as an opportunity to proselytize various faiths and understandings of Islam, with both traditional and modernist forms. In this period, new religious movements have also appeared. Thus, the Turkish religious landscape has recently become much more complicated than it was two decades earlier. I plan for this descriptive work firstly to provide an insight into the history of religious pluralism and state policies in Turkey. Secondly, I will discuss the religious policies of the republican period and, thirdly, I will evaluate recent developments such as the increasing number of approaches in the religious sphere within the scope of the religious market model.
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Çağatay, Neşet. "The Development of Theological Studies in Turkey." Belleten 54, no. 209 (April 1, 1990): 355–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.37879/belleten.1990.355.
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By establishing firmly-based states in various places and regions the Turkish nation, has continued to exist uninterrupted since the 7th century B.C. up to the present day always looking for a religion befitting its both national and individual character. On the strength of this various Turkish clans and groups in different regions, have embraced religions such as Animism, Shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism etc. For example, Khazar (Caspian) Turks, who founded a state on the coast of the Caspian Sea, to which they gave their name, accepted Christianity in 508. Furthermore, Islam began to spread amongst them when the Arabs attacked the Caucasus at the end of the 7th century A.D. This state of which Balanjar was the capital accepted Judaism as the offical religion. The Gagauz Turks who live in Rumania today are Orthodox Chirtians. They conduct services in their church in Turkish. Turkish states of Turkestan, began accepting Islam as their official religion towards the end of the 10th century A.D. The first Turkish Muslim state (Which existed from 840-1212) was that of the Karahanlis. The Turkish people, who set up this state, which was also called Ilek Hanlar, became Muslims collectively at the end of the 10th century. (in 940 A.D.) Turkish states after this date were all Muslim.
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Ukenov, A. "Religion as an Instrument of Soft Power in International Relations." Al-Farabi 76, no. 4 (December 15, 2021): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2021.4/1999-5911.15.
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The article examines the cases of using religion as a “soft power” in the example of Russia and Turkey. Based on foreign policy strategies, each state forms its own discourse in the use of religions as “soft power”. The article substantiates the idea that world religions have the greatest potential in solving interstate issues, as carriers of a unique historical experience of spiritual and political globalization, as institutions of spiritual power that accumulate significant material and other resources, as well as as institutions of civil society that promote the values of freedom and humanism. The use of religion as «soft power» becomes another argument in criticizing the theories of secularism. The analysis of the discourse of religion as a “soft power” was made on the example of the foreign policy strategies of Russia and Turkey, taking into account their political authority in the international arena, as well as their perception as one of the centers of world religions.
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Majıev, G. "Features of Relations between the State and Religion: Principles and Development Trends." Iasaýı ýnıversıtetіnіń habarshysy 4, no. 118 (December 15, 2020): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.47526/2020/2664-0686.034.
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In this article analyzes aspects of religion and state relations in Iran and Turkey. In order to open relations between the state and religion, analyzed the features of the manifestation of religious elements in the power system of these countries, including the country's Constitution and legislation regulating the sphere of religion, the activities of religious parties and religious communities. In addition, special attention was paid to the geographical location of the two countries, ethnic and religious composition, and cultural history. Among Islamic countries, Iran and Turkey have a number of differences in religious and state relations compared to other Muslim countries. Therefore, it is important to focus on the models of these two countries when studying the world experience of relations between religion and the state in a comprehensive way. This is especially important for Kazakhstan, which is moving in a secular direction. In the structure of the state administration of Iran, the influence of the religious corps «Valiyat Faqih» is predominant. In Turkey, on the other hand, the religious administration of Dianet is subordinate to the presidential administration. In Iran, religious parties are politically active, while in Turkey, political parties are not allowed to use any religious elements. However, despite these features, both countries are recognized in the world as States that give priority to the Muslim religion. Since the article is aimed at uncovering the specifics of state-confessional relations in Iran and Turkey, structural and functional and comparative analysis methods have been used in the study.
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Majıev, G. "Features of Relations between the State and Religion: Principles and Development Trends." Iasaýı ýnıversıtetіnіń habarshysy 4, no. 118 (December 15, 2020): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.47526/2020/2664-0686.034.
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In this article analyzes aspects of religion and state relations in Iran and Turkey. In order to open relations between the state and religion, analyzed the features of the manifestation of religious elements in the power system of these countries, including the country's Constitution and legislation regulating the sphere of religion, the activities of religious parties and religious communities. In addition, special attention was paid to the geographical location of the two countries, ethnic and religious composition, and cultural history. Among Islamic countries, Iran and Turkey have a number of differences in religious and state relations compared to other Muslim countries. Therefore, it is important to focus on the models of these two countries when studying the world experience of relations between religion and the state in a comprehensive way. This is especially important for Kazakhstan, which is moving in a secular direction. In the structure of the state administration of Iran, the influence of the religious corps «Valiyat Faqih» is predominant. In Turkey, on the other hand, the religious administration of Dianet is subordinate to the presidential administration. In Iran, religious parties are politically active, while in Turkey, political parties are not allowed to use any religious elements. However, despite these features, both countries are recognized in the world as States that give priority to the Muslim religion. Since the article is aimed at uncovering the specifics of state-confessional relations in Iran and Turkey, structural and functional and comparative analysis methods have been used in the study.
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Cesari, Jocelyne. "Unexpected Convergences: Religious Nationalism in Israel and Turkey." Religions 9, no. 11 (October 30, 2018): 334. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel9110334.
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This article compares Israel and Turkey to demonstrate how religious nationalism can be analyzed by a combination of historical institutionalism and conceptual history of religious ideas and doctrines. Both cases exemplify how the building of the nation-state was associated with the exportation of the western concept of religion. The resulting association between national territory, state and religion can explain the existing politicization of religion.
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Yilmaz, Fadime, and András Máté-Tóth. "A Comparison of the state-favored religions in Turkey and Hungary." Religion and society in Central and Eastern Europe 15, no. 1 (December 29, 2022): 37–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.20413/rascee.2022.15.1.37-56.
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Is it possible to establish a radical separation between religion and politics in constitutionally secular states? Is religion a private or political matter? In many countries, religious people are becoming activists, involving politics, trying to change the policies based on their beliefs or get a share of the state power. Their claims sometimes fall within the democratic structure of the country, and sometimes outside of it. This paper provides insight into the relation between state and religion by focusing on the religious politics of two countries, Turkey and Hungary This study is, in essence, a crossregional and cross-religious comparative study, presenting the very first comparison of the state-religion relationships in the two countries. Ninian Smart’s concept of dimensions of religion will be used as a framework to extract a pattern for each country. These dimensions exist in social systems and reflect the cultural and social milieu in which people socialize and build their own beliefs. Our goal is to present and prove that the religious features of Turkey and Hungary are comparable and show similarities along each dimension of Smart. Exploratory qualitative analysis will be employed to collect and analyze qualitative data in order to generate new concepts and generalizations. The data will be collected from open sources, such as newspapers, statistics, and survey results in Hungary and Turkey, to find the answer to the research questions. The main results of our comparative analysis are, first, evidence for substantial similarities regarding the presence of religion in the public sphere in each Smartian dimension, although in countries that are very different in terms of religion. Second, our systematic and structured analysis provides a strong and impartial invitation for further comparative research from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. This study is going to provide data collected from open sources such as newspapers, statistics, survey results in Hungary and Turkey, in order to find the reply to these questions.
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Çalışkan, Esin. "Review: Alevis in Turkey." Kurdish Studies 3, no. 1 (May 1, 2015): 82–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ks.v3i1.393.
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This review analyses the recent contributions of Elise Massicard and Markus Dressler to Alevi studies. While Massicard employs methods of political sociology and transna-tional identity politics, Dressler is concerned with the intrinsic relation between the religious and the secular as well as the place of religion in nation-state building projects. Massicard argues that formulating Alevism is context and actor dependent and shaped simultaneously in its interaction with diverse actors, which she calls identity movement without an identity. The emphasis on the audience in defining Alevism might stem from the inadequacy of the universal language of religion to accommodate Alevi expression. Similarly, Dressler argues that the modern Alevi tradition was constructed at the intersection of Turkish nation building, modern religion discourse and Islamic apologetics and criticises the modernist discourse on religion such as the heterodoxy/orthodoxy binary for its insufficiency to capture the complexities of different contexts.
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Kuru, Ahmet T. "Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion." World Politics 59, no. 4 (July 2007): 568–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.0005.
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Why do secular states pursue substantially different policies toward religion? The United States, France, and Turkey are secular states that lack any official religion and have legal systems free from religious control. The French and Turkish states have banned students' headscarves in public schools, whereas the U.S. has allowed students to wear religious symbols and attire. Using the method of process tracing, the author argues that state policies toward religion are the result of ideological struggles. In France and Turkey the dominant ideology is “assertive secularism,” which aims to exclude religion from the public sphere, while in the U.S., it is “passive secularism,” which tolerates public visibility of religion. Whether assertive or passive secularism became dominant in a particular case was the result of the particular historical conditions during the secular state-building period, especially the presence or absence of an ancien regime based on a marriage of monarchy and hegemonic religion.
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Burak, Begüm. "Secularism and Rise of Sunni Islam in Turkey: The Otherisation of the Alevis." Malaysian Journal of International Relations 9, no. 1 (December 30, 2021): 105–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/mjir.vol9no1.6.
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State-religion relationship is one of the elements which shape state-society relationship, and this relationship determines the quality of democracy. Alevi citizens in Turkey have been suffering from unequal treatment in terms of state attitude towards their religious freedom and education. Turkey has a sui generis secularisation background which is identified as not having equal distance to all belief systems. Turkish style secularism represents an understanding which has alienated the Alevi citizens and seen them as the “others”. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established to introduce and promote a specific understanding of religion, namely Sunni Islam. In this study, the concept of “otherness” in the constitution of Turkish national identity will be employed as an analytical tool in exploring how state-religion relationship in Turkey has been an important factor producing inequalities between citizens leading to discrimination towards the Alevi identity. In this regard, the role of the Directorate of Religious Affairs will also be discussed while focusing on the rise of Sunni Islam.
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Tezcür, Güneş Murat. "Catholic and Muslim Human Rights Activism in Violent Internal Conflicts." Politics and Religion 8, no. 1 (December 19, 2014): 111–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048314000790.
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AbstractWhen do religious organizations develop human rights platforms during violent internal conflicts? This article offers the first comparative study to address this question and focuses on religious organizations in El Salvador, Peru, Turkey, and Indonesia. It identifies two causal factors to explain variation in religious human rights activism in these four countries: (1) transnational religious ideas and linkages, and (2) the nature of the state-religion relationship. First, Vatican II and Liberation theology significantly contributed to the rise of religious human rights activism in El Salvador and Peru. Similar transitional linkages were absent in Turkey and Indonesia. Next, the more conflictual nature of the state-religion relationship in El Salvador explains why the Salvadorian Church pursued a more determined human rights agenda than its Peruvian counterpart. A similarly conflictual state-religion relationship contributed to the presence of Islamic human rights activism in Turkey, and a less conflictual relationship prevented its emergence in Indonesia.
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CANDAN, Rabia Beyza. "The relation between modern state and religion and Turkey practice." European Journal of Research on Education 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2014): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.15527/ejre.201426256.
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Warhola, J. W., and E. B. Bezci. "Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent Developments in Laiklik." Journal of Church and State 52, no. 3 (June 1, 2010): 427–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csq052.
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Akşit, Bahattin, and Elif Ekin Akşit. "Shifting Conceptions of Science, Religion, Society and State in Turkey." Middle East Critique 19, no. 1 (January 2010): 71–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19436141003594625.
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Hazır, Agah. "Narratives on religion-state relations in Turkey: continuities and discontinuities." Turkish Studies 21, no. 4 (October 30, 2019): 557–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2019.1685881.
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Ahmad, Refat Sayed. "Religion and the state in Turkey and Iran: a comparative overview†." Contemporary Arab Affairs 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 36–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2014.880281.
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The question of the relationship between religion and the state in the Islamic world is as old as Islam itself. The experiences of Turkey and Iran during the past 30 years qualify among the most instructive applications of the relationship. In these two cases, the interaction between the systems of governance, on the one hand, and the Islamic cultural and legislative heritage, on the other, represents a common factor, whereas they differ in terms of the doctrinal reference on which each of these experiences is based. They also differ in perspective, application mechanisms and their relations with the West. The present research can be encapsulated, in broad outline, under five main headlines which raise questions more than provide answers: (1) the historical background of the relationship between religion and the state in the Turkish and Iranian models; (2) the effect of the ascent of revolutionary Islam in Iran, after the revolution of 1979, on the problematic of state–religion relations; (3) from ‘well-being’ to ‘justice and development’: limitations and prospects of a historical compromise between religion, secularism and the state; (4) points of controversy and commonalities in the Turkish and Iranian experiences from the 1980s to the end of 2012; and (5) looking into the relationship of each of these two models with the Arab Spring revolutions: are they determinants of these revolutions or investing in their development?
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Muhyiddin, Ahmad Shofi. "Sekularisme Ataturk: “Madaniyah” atau “Lā Dῑniyah”? (Tipologi Sekularisme Ataturk )." POLITEA 2, no. 2 (October 12, 2019): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/politea.v2i2.5772.
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<p class="06IsiAbstrak"><span lang="EN-GB">This article outlines the question whether Ataturk's secularism has the dimension of abolition of religion (lā dῑniyah) as assumed by many people or has the dimension of state domination over religion which is an expression of nationalism? This is because most classical Islamic political thinkers view that the relationship between religion and state is an organic unity, which cannot be separated from one another. The institutional form for the organic relationship arises in the form of a khilafah. These conditions describe the relationship between politics or power and religion as a symbiotic relationship that is mutually beneficial. As Europeans entered the Middle East, modern thoughts in the region also entered, one of which was kemalism. It was with this understanding that Ataturk in Turkey shocked the Islamic political world by displacing the already weak Ottoman Caliphate. The ideology of kemalism is caused by Ataturk actually a nationalist who admires the west, who wants the progress of Islam, therefore, according to him, it needs to be renewed in matters of religion to suit the Turkish soil. Thus, the practice of secularism in Turkey, broadly, belongs to the category of semi-secular practice, or typology of differential secularism, or "madaniyah". Because Ataturk places religion under state power, not abolishing or even destroying religion</span></p>
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Vural, Hasan Sayim. "Two Generations of Debate on Freedom of Religion in Turkey." Religion and Human Rights 8, no. 3 (2013): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18710328-12341258.
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Abstract Within the debate on freedom of religion in Turkey, we can identify two distinct generations, both of which are alive with an oscillating degree of vibrancy. The first generation of debate has evolved around the question on the proper place of Islam in the secular nation-state; while the second one has encompassed the plural concerns of protecting the rights and freedoms, pertaining to religion or belief, of a diverse multitude, under the rule of law. The first generation of debate resulted in a dual deadlock: Freedom to religion versus freedom from religion. The second generation is informed by a pluralisation of parties and concerns. The first generation has produced well-established results in jurisprudence, where the effect of the second generation is far from being significant. Yet, as this paper will explain in conclusion, we have good reasons to expect the second generation to prevail over the first one.
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Tatari, Eren. "Populism and Secularism in Turkey." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v23i2.438.
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This article analyzes the impact of two key components of Kemalist ideology, populism and secularism, on the policymaking process of modern Turkey by utilizing historical institutionalism and the political-cultural approach. The Headscarf Ban Policy, which has been implemented discretionarily since 1981 and intensively since 1997, provides an illustrative case study of the broader debates over freedom of religion, secularism, and democracy, and helps to uncover the influence of populism and secularism, as well as the interaction between these two principles. The analysis reveals the principle of populism, which has been much overlooked in the literature, as a key determinant of state-centric reforms as well as a method of legitimizing the undemocratic version of secularism advocated by the state.
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Tatari, Eren. "Populism and Secularism in Turkey." American Journal of Islam and Society 23, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v23i2.438.
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This article analyzes the impact of two key components of Kemalist ideology, populism and secularism, on the policymaking process of modern Turkey by utilizing historical institutionalism and the political-cultural approach. The Headscarf Ban Policy, which has been implemented discretionarily since 1981 and intensively since 1997, provides an illustrative case study of the broader debates over freedom of religion, secularism, and democracy, and helps to uncover the influence of populism and secularism, as well as the interaction between these two principles. The analysis reveals the principle of populism, which has been much overlooked in the literature, as a key determinant of state-centric reforms as well as a method of legitimizing the undemocratic version of secularism advocated by the state.
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Wilcox, C. "Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey." Journal of Church and State 51, no. 4 (September 1, 2009): 704–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csq019.
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Finke, R. "Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey." Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 39, no. 2 (March 1, 2010): 177–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094306110361589bb.
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Jamal, Amal. "Democratizing state–religion relations: a comparative study of Turkey, Egypt and Israel." Democratization 16, no. 6 (November 6, 2009): 1143–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340903271779.
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Kaya, Serdar. "Secularism and state policies toward religion: the United States, France, and Turkey." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10, no. 4 (December 2010): 491–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2010.529997.
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Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. "The Ambivalence of Turkish Soft Power in Southeast Europe." Border Crossing 10, no. 2 (July 16, 2020): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/bc.v10i2.1050.
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With the instrumentalisation of Islam via the state apparatuses in foreign policy, Sunni Islam has become both an instrument and a purpose of the repressive Justice and Development Party and Turkey has started to be one of the front runners of countries who are increasingly competing for using Islam as a foreign policy tool. This relatively new role of Turkey has created various diverging ideas among the host countries where Turkey is active. While some countries are rather content with Turkey’s religiously fueled policies and humanitarian aid, and define Turkey as one of the most influential actors which can use religion as a soft power tool, others refuse to define Turkey’s policies within the boundaries of religious soft power due to its extra-territorial authoritarian practices and instrumentalisation of religion for these. Under these circumstances, this study defines Turkey’s religious soft power as an ambivalent one and scrutinises the reasons behind this ambiguity via exploring some country cases from Southeast Europe.
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Weller, Paul. "'Human Rights', 'Religion' and the 'Secular': Variant Configurations of Religion(s), State(s) and Society(ies)." Religion & Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2006): 17–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187103206777493438.
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AbstractDiscussions about the relationship between 'religion' and 'human rights' often focus on the problems that arise from 'religion'. Within a European historical perspective this is understandable since one of the most important aspects of the historical development of the 'human rights' tradition in the Europe has been the struggle for the right not to believe.However, the concept of the 'secular' is also not unproblematic. Thus this article explores the contested relationship between 'human rights' and 'religion' by bringing into focus also the relatively hidden factor of the 'secular'. This is done by exploring the forms of secularity exemplified in the traditions and approaches that are found in the USA, France, Turkey, the Netherlands and India. Finally, reference is made to traditional Islamic models for integrating cultural and religious plurality, before concluding with some discussion of the thought of Marc Luyckx in relation to the future of Europe.
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Kazarian, Nicolas. "Interfaith Dialogue and Today’s Orthodoxy, from Confrontation to Dialogue." Review of Ecumenical Studies Sibiu 13, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 51–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ress-2021-0005.
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Abstract Orthodoxy has a long experience of cohabitation with other religions and Christian denominations. However, this experience has not always been a peaceful and easy one, especially when molded by the rise of nationalism during the second half of the 19th century and global geopolitical forces throughout the 20th century. A series of historical events, from Russia to the Middle East, from the Balkans to Central Europe, have shaped the Orthodox relationship to religious pluralism, redefining the religious landscape through movement of populations and migrations. These many conflicts and historical events have proved the multifaceted reality of Orthodoxy, from its role as a state religion, such as in Greece, and a majority religion, such as in Russia, to a minority religion with limited rights, such as in Turkey, or, more generally speaking, in the Middle East. It is in this very complex context that interfaith relations unfold, too often in a very violent and traumatic way.
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Aminullah, Muhammad Soleh. "AGAMA DAN POLITIK: Studi Pemikiran Soekarno tentang Relasi Agama dan Negara." Jurnal Sosiologi Agama 14, no. 1 (June 1, 2020): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/jsa.2020.141-03.
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This paper examines the basic state relating to religion and the state. Which of these reforms emerged as a different response between Islamic nationalist groups and secular nationalist groups. Islamic nationalist groups ask for a state based on religion. While secular functionalist groups believe that in the basic formulation of the state, religion must be separated from the state. The first opinion (Islamic nationalists) is based that the majority of Indonesia’s population is Muslim, and conversely the second group holds that Indonesia is a plural state consisting of various groups by wanting Pancasila as the basis of the state. This paper uses descriptive literature study method, meaning that materials are collected from various literatures in order to collect data relating to religious and state relations according to Sukarno. So that it can be understood that the separation of religion and state in Sukarno’s view there are at least three main points. Besides that, Sukarno’s thoughts were also inspired by Kemal Attatur from Turkey and Ali Abdurraziq and other reformers. The separation of religion and state is done for the sake of national unity, bearing in mind that the Indonesian nation is a plural nation. The separation of religion and state in question will not rule out the teachings of Islam, and the building of nationalism in question is not chauvinism, but nationalism which makes Indonesian people become servants of God who live in the spirit and soul of religion.
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Ozturk, Ahmet Erdi. "Turkey and Saudi Arabia Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Power, State Identity and Religion." Border Crossing 12, no. 2 (October 31, 2022): 85–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/bc.v12i2.2423.
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During the first two decades of the Twenty-First century, we have begun — and will continue to — experience a new dimension in the political roles of power, state identity and religion in different ways. One can read this situation as the concentration of these notions at the core of global politics implemented by political leaders who have been transforming their countries appearances and perceptions worldwide. Furthermore, we will also be experiencing an increase in the intersectionality between domestic and foreign policy that are covered by power, state identity and religion. Within this framework, Muslim majority countries in the Middle East, which are underdeveloped in terms of liberal democracy, have been engaging in a global struggle over state identity and power that stretches from different part of the world, and this has been affecting both the regional dynamics and beyond via global Muslim diasporas. Among many different examples two of these countries have become quite visible: Turkey, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Saudi Arabia with its crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. The two countries have long been in a problematic relation and this has been intensified after Saudi agents murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the kingdom's Istanbul consulate in 2018. But, how did their relations come to this point and how do power, state identity and religion play different roles? To answer this question, this article argues that not directly religion, but also international power struggles and differences between state identities could play different roles into the relations between states, but the positions of the states could not be stable and can be changeable according to their interests.
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Makin, Al. "Tanggalkan Khalifah di Bumi Ini: Membaca Narasi Sukarno Tentang Sekularisme Turki." Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 16, no. 2 (December 7, 2016): 313. http://dx.doi.org/10.21154/al-tahrir.v16i2.554.
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Abstract: This article attempts to observe Sukarno’s article about the separation between religion and state” published in Panji Islam in 1940. Sukarno’s thought is still relevant to discuss up to now in Indonesian because some conservative and radical groups of Muslim have given the louder voices to the government demanding the system of caliphate state and rejecting free democracy by intimidation which ironically seemed to be given to these groups to rise. More than fifty years ago, Sukarno clearly argued that caliphate system of leadership in Muslim society was no longer relevant and even outdated. Sukarno took the case of Turkey, through which he hailed Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s efforts in abolishing the outdated Ottoman caliphate in order to build the modern democracy of Turkey, which was able to address more real challenges facing Muslim society. Sukarno explained clearly that the separation of religion and state in Muslim society was needed to make the survival of both religion and state. He also presented history of Turkey in his argument that caliphate system of governing was not pure Islamic one, as it was an evolution of older system of government from the ancient Greco-Byzantium, in which religion played a vital role to legitimate the power of some emperors. Let alone, the history of Turkey had witnessed the weakening caliphate system of Ottoman in which religion and politics mingled so that Turkey was not able to control the vast Islamic territory, which ultimately its population rebelled the empire. Sukarno's reading and rhetoric in narrating Turkey was unique as he contextualized the Turkish history into Indonesian situation in the pre-independent period. Sukarno’s interpretation of Islam, history, and politics could serve as a foundation for those who sought the nature of religion and state relation and reminded those who recalled caliphate system during the reform era. Indeed, caliphate system has no place today in Indonesia as relentlessly told by Sukarno more than fifty years ago.الملخص: حاول هذا المقال إعادة القراءة لمقال كتبه سوكارنو في صحيفة " لواء الإسلام" سنة 1940م تحت العنوان " لما فصلت تركيا بين الدين والدولة ". ولا يزال هذا المقال يواكب السياق الإندونيسي بما فيها من ظاهرة الأصولية والمحافظة على التراث، ومن مطالباتها إقامة الخلافة والرد على الديموقراطية الحرّة. ردّ سوكارنو منذ بضع وخمسين سنة نظام الخلافة القديمة. رأى سوكارنو هذا في قضية مصطفى كمال أتترك الذي قضى على الخلافة وأقام الديموقراطية في تركيا، وقال " إن فصل الدين عن الدولة " أمر لازم لتقدّم كلّ منهما. و بالاضافة ذكر تاريخ الخلافة أنها كنظام تمزيجي –كنظام الدولة- بقيم من اليونان والروم حيث أن الدين أداة لشرعية القوة السياسية لهؤلاء الامبراطور . يظهر من هذا، أن حجة سوكارنو عن الإسلام والتاريخ والسياسة يمكن أن تكون أسسا لمن أراد معرفة الارتباط بين الدين والدولة. Abstrak: Artikel ini membaca kembali tulisan Sukarno yang berjudul “Apa Sebab Turki Memisah Agama Dan Negara” terbit di Panji Islam, 1940, yang tetap relevan dalam konteks Indonesia yang saat ini menyaksikan penguatan radikalisasi dan konservatisme, diantara tuntutannya adalah penegakan khalifah dan penolakan demokrasi bebas. Lebih dari lima puluh tahun yang lalu Sukarno menolak sistem khalifah yang kuno. Sukarno melihat ini dalam kasus Turki dengan Mustafa Kemal Ataturk yang membubarkan khalifah dan menegakkan demokrasi di sana. Bagi Sukarno pemisahan agama dan negara merupakan keniscayaan untuk kemajuan keduanya. Sukarno juga menghadirkan sejarah khalifah bahwa itu hasil dari perpaduan dengan Yunani-Romawi dimana agama bermanfaat untuk legitimasi kekuasaan para kaisar. Di sini ditunjukkan bahwa argument Sukarno tentang Islam, sejarah dan politik bisa menjadi fondasi bagi yang ingin mengetahui relasi agama dan negara.
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Powell, Russell. "Evolving Views of Islamic Law in Turkey." Journal of Law and Religion 28, no. 2 (January 2013): 467–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0748081400000114.
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The tradition of Kemalist secularism (laiklik) in Turkey is often cited to distinguish Turkey as an exceptional case among predominantly Muslim countries. While it is true that the Turkish Constitution, laws, and legal opinions approach the relationship between the state and religion very differently than those of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or even Indonesia, it would be wrong to underestimate the role that religion plays in the formation of Turkish legal norms, including citizen understanding of those norms. There is a wealth of literature describing the nature of Turkish secularism and its evolution. A number of both quantitative and qualitative studies inquire about the preference forShari'aamong Turkish voters. The typical question asks whether respondents favor the establishment of aShari'astate. Over the past fifteen years, these surveys have received response rates ranging between five and twenty-five percent in favor of such a state. However, these results are extremely problematic, because they do not provide any context or meaning for “the establishment of aShari'astate,” either for those who favor it or for those who oppose it. This study begins to unpack the range of possible meanings attributed toShari'awithin Turkey, both among voters and among intellectuals, as a framework for future empirical studies and as a basis for deeper understandings of the role of Islam within Turkish law and politics.
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Korkut, Umut. "Women, Religion, and the State in Contemporary Turkey. By Chiara Maritato." Journal of Church and State 64, no. 1 (December 7, 2021): 153–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csab082.
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Kizilabdullah, Yildiz. "An Islamic Worldview from Turkey: Religion in a Modern, Secular and Democratic State." Religious Education 115, no. 2 (September 13, 2019): 215–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2019.1659688.
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Fauzan, Pepen Irpan, and Ahmad Khoirul Fata. "Model Penerapan Syariah dalam Negara Modern (Studi Kasus Arab Saudi, Iran, Turki, dan Indonesia)." Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam 12, no. 1 (June 22, 2018): 51–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v12i1.1328.
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Modernization of politics in islamic world causes hard dynamics in the relation betwen religion (sharī’ah) with state or politics. This paper tries to discuss the historical background of that discussion, and tries to show the models of sharī ’ah implementation in the context of modern state. The result of this study is that there are three models of sharī ’ah implementation in modern Islamic world: integration betwen religion (Islam) and state as in Saudi Arabia and Islamic Republic of Iran. In this model sharī ah formally becomes the positive law. The second model is secular state. In this model religion (and sharī’ah) separated from the state. The best example for this model is Republic of Turkey. And the last is symbiosis-intersectional model as Republic of Indonesia. This model is the middle position betwen both of them. The difference of the models are caused by the diversity of socio-historical-economic-political background of these states.
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Hassan, Mona. "WOMEN PREACHING FOR THE SECULAR STATE: OFFICIAL FEMALE PREACHERS (BAYAN VAIZLER) IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (July 26, 2011): 451–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000614.
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AbstractNearly one-third of Turkey's official preaching workforce are women. Their numbers have risen considerably over the past two decades, fueled by an unforeseen feminization of higher religious education as well as the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ attempts to redress its historical gender imbalances. Created in the early Turkish Republic, the Directorate is also historically embedded in (re)defining the appropriate domains and formations of religion, and the female preachers it now employs navigate people's potent fears rooted in memories of this fraught past. In the various neighborhoods of Istanbul, these preachers attempt to overcome conservative Muslims’ cautious ambivalence toward the interpretative and disciplinary powers of a secular state as well as assertive secularists’ discomfort and suspicion over increasingly visible manifestations of religiosity. Thus, the activities of state-sponsored female preachers are inescapably intertwined with the contestation of religious domains and authority in the secular Republic of Turkey and demonstrate an intricate interplay between the politics of religion, gender, and secularism in contemporary Turkish society.
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Lerner, Hanna. "Permissive Constitutions, Democracy, and Religious Freedom in India, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey." World Politics 65, no. 4 (October 2013): 609–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887113000208.
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The article addresses the question of what role formal constitutions play in mitigating intense conflicts over the religious character of the state. In contrast to common views in constitutional and political scholarship, it demonstrates that the ideal of liberal constitutionalism is not compatible with the political reality and types of conflicts that characterize religiously divided societies. Analyzing four processes of constitution drafting in which issues of religious law and religious identity were at the heart of the debate—India, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey—it argues that under deep disagreement over the state's religious character, the drafters adopt either a permissive or a restrictive constitutional approach. While the former implies strategies of constitutional ambiguity, ambivalence, and avoidance in order to allow the political system greater flexibility in future decision making on religion-state relations, the latter approach uses repressive constitutional constraints designed to limit the range of possibilities available to future decision makers. The article further explores the long-term consequences of the two approaches and argues that (1) permissive constitutional arrangements, more than restrictive arrangements, are likely to promote the democratic functioning of future governments; and that (2) permissive constitutional arrangements may facilitate greater freedom of religion, but they are also likely to lead to greater restrictions on freedom from religion, compared with restrictive constitutions.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Ismail Albayrak. "Instrumentalization of Religious Conspiracy Theories in Politics of Victimhood: Narrative of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs." Religions 12, no. 10 (October 8, 2021): 841. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12100841.
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While victimhood has been studied from very different perspectives, the question how secular nation states have instrumentalised religion for the politics of victimhood has not been studied. This paper addresses this gap in the literature on victimhood by analysing the empirical case of Turkey. As is well known, the constitutionally secular Turkish state, first under the rule of the Kemalists and now Erdoganists, has been using the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to propagate the state ideology to the faithful. This paper shows that the Turkish state has recently been using Islam to construct and disseminate a religious victimhood narrative, mainly based on conspiracy theories via the Diyanet’s Friday sermons. To do this, the article investigates the texts, such as the sermons produced by the Diyanet that are read verbatim, in every mosque in Turkey during Friday prayers that are attended by more than half of the adult male population. The paper contributes to the victimhood literature by showing how religion, i.e., Islam, has been instrumentalised by a secular state in the construction of an Islamist populist and civilisationist victimhood narrative. Further studies are needed to see if and to what extent the Islamist victimhood narrative of the Turkish state has been impactful on the mosque-goers in the country.
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Sulkowski, Mariusz. "Secular Republic and the Old Order – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Turkish identity." Review of Nationalities 9, no. 1 (December 1, 2019): 177–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pn-2019-0014.
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AbstractMustafa Kemal Atatürk continues to stand firm as a major symbol of the Turkish republicanism, though there is little doubt that Turkey today undergoes deep transformation in the sphere of the relations between politics and religion. As Bernard Lewis explains, the Ottoman Turks identified with Islam so profoundly that they in fact submerged their identity in Islam. It is, therefore, only right and proper to inquire and pursue the theoretical foundations and origins of the Turkish laicism. Although Turkey constitutes a rare example of a Muslim country where laicism was instituted by its own authorities and not imposed on the country by the Western colonial powers, still, it is beyond doubt that the very idea of laicism is of the European origin and that it drew its inspirations from the range of ideas of the French Enlightment. It is the perspective that enables to understand fully the scope and depth of the reforms implemented in Turkey; it also elucidates the contemporary attempts to overcome the secularism and enforce the political re-Islamization of the state. The contemporary question on the place of religion in the political community is at the same time a question on the identity of Turkey.
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Laurence, Jonathan. "The 21st-century impact of European Muslim minorities on ‘Official Islam’ in the Muslim-majority world." Philosophy & Social Criticism 40, no. 4-5 (March 18, 2014): 449–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453714526404.
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The article argues that the growth of religious service provision directed at the Muslim diaspora in Europe has led to greater professionalization and pluralism within the Islam state in Muslim countries. Contemporary Muslim governments have claimed a monopoly over public prayer and religious education and have heavily invested in a network of infrastructure and services – the Islam state. The recent breakthrough of Islamist parties into governments in Turkey and across North Africa poses a challenge to the continued ‘civilian control’ over religion. What will become of the enormous Islamic Affairs ministries that Islamist parties have inherited – the hundreds of thousands of public servants of state Islam across the region, the tens of thousands of mosques and thousands of religious schools? Liberals demand the abolition of the Islam state because it violates the separation of religion and state; Islamists detest it for its repressive qualities. Despite progressive liberalization, governments in the past decade have not sought disestablishment, and have instead increased the resources and policing of state-run religion. I draw on the experience of Muslim governments in the competitive field of state–Islam relations in European countries to explain the modest beginnings of reform of the official religion apparatus in Muslim-majority countries.
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Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. "An alternative reading of religion and authoritarianism: the new logic between religion and state in the AKP’s New Turkey." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 79–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1576370.
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Nathwani, Niraj. "Islamic Headscarves and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Relevant Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights." Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25, no. 2 (June 2007): 221–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016934410702500204.
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This article will first present two cases at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Dahlab vs Switzerland and Leyla Sahin vs Turkey and then comment on these two decisions focusing on the following issues: State neutrality; negative freedom of religion; right to education; gender discrimination; discriminatory statements; religious discrimination; political extremism. This article will argue that the reasoning of the ECtHR in the cases Dahlab vs Switzerland and Leyla Sahin v Turkey is questionable and at odds with important principles developed in the established case law of the Court.
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Uysal, Gönenç. "Secularism as a field of class struggle: State, religion, and class relations in Turkey." Journal of Historical Sociology 32, no. 3 (August 30, 2019): 331–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/johs.12245.
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Willoughby, Jay. "The Awakening of Muslim Democracy." American Journal of Islam and Society 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 153–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v32i2.985.
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Jocelyn Cesari (senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkly Center; director,Islam in World Politics program), teaches contemporary Islam at theHarvard Divinity School and directs its Gerogetown-based interfaculty“Islam in the West” program. On March 3 at the IIIT headquarters in Herndon,VA, she elaborated on the topics discussed in her latest book: The Awakeningof Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (CambridgeUniversity Press: 2014). She explained that this book was based on threeyears of research on state-Islam relations in Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan,and Tunisia.She began her talk by saying that she was interested in “broadening outthe concept of political Islam,” which had existed before the now well-knownmovements and parties in the Muslim world. The key moment in this regardwas the building of nation-states in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq (under SaddamHussein), and Pakistan. She pointed out how the West was enthusiasticabout Arab Spring, which brought both men and women into the streets withoutsigns proclaiming “Islam” in a “bizarre” manner of protest.She maintained that political Islam cannot be limited only to secularismand the state, for the former, especially in Europe, is supposed to engenderthe decline of religiosity, the movement of religion to the private sphere, andthe separation of religion and state. But all of this is unique to the West becauseIndia, the oft-proclaimed world’s “largest democracy,” is officially secular despiteits pervasive Hinduism. She wondered why the West cannot see Islamin the same way. And, moreover, why does the last century of the very westernapproaches of secularization and modernization have to determine what ...
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Heper, Metin. "The State, Political Party and Society in post-1983 Turkey." Government and Opposition 25, no. 3 (July 1, 1990): 321–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1990.tb00587.x.
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IN TERMS OF THE HISTORICAL CATEGORIES FORMULATED BY S. N. Eisentadt, the origins of the Ottoman-Turkish polity were imperial-bureaucratic rather than imperial-feudal or patrimonial. The regime was not patrimonial because the centre had its own distinctive normative system; the values of the centre were just a pale reflection of those of the periphery. The regime was not imperial-feudal for the centre did not have to face civil societal groups able to challenge it and impinge upon it. The members of the periphery could not develop horizontal loyalties; instead they competed among themselves for a limited number of privileges such as tax-farming rights or quotas for import or export which the centre granted. The Ottoman-Turkish peripheral elements did not develo into an aristocracy or a bourgeoisie with political influence. Consequently, the efforts towards modernization initiated during the nineteenth century took on a particular twist. Modernization meant Westernization, which in turn was perceived from the perspective of Enlightenment tradition. Informed by a ‘cast-iron theory’ of Islam ,the state's salvation was seen to lie in substituting reason for religion as the basis of public policy-making. The military and the bureaucratic elites came to see themselves primarily as the guardians of raison d'état.
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Mohamed Adil, Mohamed Azam. "The Federal Constitution: Is Malaysia a Secular State?" ICR Journal 6, no. 1 (January 15, 2015): 121–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.52282/icr.v6i1.362.
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The discussion on whether Malaysia is an Islamic or secular state has been a much hotly debated topic recently. In the government’s written answer to a question raised by Oscar Ling Chai Yew (DAP-Sibu) at Dewan Rakyat on 16 June 2014, Jamil Khir, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department re-asserted that Malaysia is an Islamic state. This view was supported by Tun Mahathir Mohamad arguing that in an Islamic state like Malaysia, justice applies to all, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This was re-affirmed by Amin Mulia, the Dewan Rakyat’s Speaker that Malaysia is an Islamic state simply because Islam is the only religion stated in the Federal Constitution. Unlike Turkey and India where the word “secular” is clearly provided in their respective Constitutions, such provision is not found in the Federal Constitution.
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Korkut, Umut, and Yusuf Sarfati. "The pious dissidence in Turkey: Contesting religious neoliberal governmentality under the AKP." Politics 40, no. 4 (January 27, 2020): 413–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395719896285.
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Turkey under the AKP governments constitutes an exemplary case for understanding how centralized religion, authoritarianism, and economic logic of neoliberalism interrelate. AKP uses state-guided religion to legitimize its neoliberal economic policies and create docile, economized citizens. This article specifically focuses on how pious Muslims resist AKP’s religious neoliberalism by focusing on actions and deliberations of Labor and Justice Platform members. Our discussion, which consists of face-to-face interviews with the members of this social movement, delineates the group’s justice-oriented, egalitarian, and pluralist orientation of Islam and depicts their dialogues with power – embodied in AKP’s domination of Islamic discourse in Turkey. We discuss how group members reinterpret religious concepts such as kader (fate), kısmet (destiny), and sabır (patience) that the AKP uses as micro-discursive mechanisms to create economically compliant citizens. We also discuss the specific frames of resistance they develop in order to break out from the resilience and adaptation that AKP has embedded in its narratives of economy and work. These frames include a sharp criticism of market Islam, a challenge to political Islam and dissent against state Islam. Theoretically, the article refers to neoliberal governmentality and explores its contestation – an understudied concept in Foucauldian studies.
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Fox, Jonathan. "The Secular-Religious Competition Perspective in Comparative Perspective." Politics and Religion 12, no. 3 (June 17, 2019): 524–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s175504831900018x.
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AbstractPolitical secularism is defined as “an ideology or set of beliefs advocating that religion ought to be separate from all or some aspects of politics or public life (or both).” In the secular–religious competition perspective, I argue that political secularists compete with religious political actors to influence government policy around the world. Yet this competition is complicated by many factors. The contributions to this symposium demonstrate that this is the case in their examination of secular–religious tensions and state–religion relations in Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Tunisia. These cases show that government religion policy evolves over time and is deeply influenced by secular–religious competition but that this competition is a complex one involving many other factors and influences.
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Wilson, Brett. "Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic." American Journal of Islam and Society 30, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 115–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v30i2.1137.
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Much has been written about religion and secularism in Turkey over the pastdecades, but detailed histories of the late Ottoman and modern Turkish ulemahave been few and far between. Therefore, this recent book by Amit Bein isa welcome and a much needed contribution to the literature on the Turkishulema and to the literature on religion in modern Turkey in general. It chartsthe vicissitudes of the ulema during a period of dramatic change from the latenineteenth century until roughly 1960. Bein shows the multiple challengesthe ulema faced during successive rounds of political and social reform andthe various approaches that they took in response. The diversity of opinionand political orientation within the ulema corps are on full display – from themost ardent nationalist figures, who supported state reforms in all respects, tothe staunchest enemies of the republican regime. This book conveys a nuancedunderstanding of who the Turkish ulema were and how they navigated theempire-to-republic transition ...
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Kösebalaban, Hasan. "Secularism and state policies toward religion: the United States, France, and Turkey. Ahmet T. Kuru." Contemporary Islam 7, no. 2 (March 8, 2011): 229–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11562-011-0155-x.
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