Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Religion and politics – European Union countries'

Although the evolution of a unified Europe has been unsteady, the immigration policies of member states have nonetheless become increasingly harmonized in recent years. This harmonization has not been without its controversies, however, and is characterized by two inter-linked political disputes that have shaped the progress achieved thus far. The first dispute area is the exclusion of Europe's legally-resident third country nationals (TCNs) from the privileges of intra-EU free movement, contrary to the inclusionist arguments of the European Commission and Parliament. The second dispute area is the political struggle between advocates of intergovernmental decision-making structures, which are not subject to EU law or institutional control, and the advocates of full (supranational) EU competence over policy. Two hypotheses are contrasted to examine these disputes: (1) the "Fortress Europe" hypothesis, which foresees the continuation of exclusionism and intergovernmentalism; and (2) the "spillover" hypothesis, which predicts the inclusion of TCNs through the EU's central institutions eventually winning full competence over policy. It is concluded that although exclusionism continues to hold the upper hand, recent victories for supranationalism have confirmed the optimism of the spillover hypothesis.

This study focuses on the protection and promotion of human rights in the context of the external relations of the European Union (EU). It sets out to examine, in particular, the position of human rights within the framework of EU foreign policy. While questions of human rights sparked a wide-ranging academic debate and resulted in enhanced levels of public scrutiny over the last decade, the research presented in this dissertation attempts to fill a significant gap in scholarly attention. It does so by offering a critique of the theoretical approaches towards, and the practical manifestations of human rights promotion initiatives in the context of EU policy interaction with countries in Asia. Evidence from previous work, included as part of this dissertation, suggests that the incremental growth of human rights competencies and agendas within the EU's legal and political systems was reflected in a number of areas of concrete EU external activity, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Development Policy, relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries and the EU's New Asia Strategy. This dissertation attempts to demonstrate how, in the context of a Constructivist perspective within International Relations Theory in general, and EU-Asia relations in particular, the EU can be conceptualised as a value-guided, 'ethical' polity, grounded in a constitutional framework of Treaties. As a result of this, the Union introdued a more pronounced human rights dimension to its dialogue with Asia. The evidence indicates that, in respect of its Asian partners, the EU implemented human rights strategies in a number or formats and with varying degrees of success. The study scrutinises, in particular, the Commission's 'strategy papers' on Asia and the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM). In addition to findings analysed in previous work, this study demonstrates that the resulting debates about 'rights' and 'values' can be related to wider discourses derived from normative theory and surrounding issues of culture and identity. In the Asia-EU dialogue, arguments over human rights contain the potential to be both an enabling dynamic for, and an inhibiting agent of, a more intensive EU-Asia political and cultural dialogue. The study places a particular emphasis on EU human rights promotion policies towards the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Indonesia and Burma (The Union of Myanmar). It identifies and appraises three distinct EU policy approaches ranging from incentives based and coordinated measures to a more coercive and punitive diplomatic arsenal.

This study develops a model of macroeconomic and political determinants of public support for European integration. The research is conducted on pooled cross-sectional time-series data from five European Union member states between 1978 and 1994. The method used in this analysis is a Generalized Least Squares - Autoregressive Moving Average approach. The factors hypothesized to determine a macroeconomic explanation of public support for integration are inflation, unemployment, and economic growth. The effect of the major economic reform in the 1980s, the Single European Act, is hypothesized to act as a positive permanent intervention. The other determinants of public support are the temporary interventions of European Parliament elections and the permanent intervention of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. These are hypothesized to exert a negative effect. In a fully specified model all variables except economic growth and European Parliament elections demonstrate statistical significance at the 0.10 level or better.

Defence date: 21 November 2022
Examining Board: Prof. Ellen Immergut (EUI, Supervisor); Prof. Anton Hemerijck (EUI); Prof. Christoffer Green-Pedersen (Aarhus University); Prof. Evelyne Hübscher (Central European University)
This dissertation investigates how public opinion and government partisanship affect social policy. It brings an innovative perspective that links the idea of democratic representation to debates about the welfare state. The general claim made here is that social policy is a function of public and government preferences. This claim hinges on two critical premises. The first relates to the general mechanisms that underlie government representation. Politicians have electoral incentives to align their actions with what citizens want. They may respond to public opinion indirectly by updating their party agendas, which can serve as the basis for social policy decisions in case they get elected. They may also respond directly by introducing welfare reforms that react to shifts in public opinion during their mandates. The second premise concerns how citizens and politicians structure their preferences over welfare. These preferences fall alongside two dimensions. First, general attitudes about how much should the state intervene in the economy to reduce inequality and promote economic well-being (how much policy). Second, the specific preferences about which social programmes should get better funding (what kind of policy). The empirical analysis is split into three empirical chapters. Each explores different aspects of government representation in Western European welfare states. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) asks how governments shape social policy when facing severe pressures to decrease spending. It argues that governments strategically reduce spending on programmes that offer less visible and indirect benefits, as they are less likely to trigger an electoral backlash. The experience of the Great Recession is consistent with this claim. Countries that faced the most challenging financial constraints cut down social investment and services. Except for Greece, they all preserved consumption schemes. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) explores how public opinion affects government spending priorities in different welfare programmes. It expects government responsiveness to depend on public mood for more or less government activity and the most salient social issues at the time. Empirical evidence from old-age, healthcare and education issue-policy areas supports these claims. Higher policy mood and issue saliency is positively associated with increasing spending efforts. Public opinion does not appear to affect unemployment policies. vii The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) examines how party preferences affect spending priorities in unemployment programmes. It claims that preferences on economic intervention in the economy and welfare recalibration affect different components of unemployment policy. Evidence from the past 20 years bodes well with these expectations. The generosity of compensatory schemes depends on economic preferences. The left invests more than the right. The funding of active labour-market policies depends on both preference dimensions. Among conventional parties, their funding follows the same patterns as compensatory schemes. Among recalibration parties, parties across the economic spectrum present comparable spending patterns.

Defence date: 10 December 2007
Examining Board: Prof. Adrienne Héritier (EUI, Florence) ; Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH, Zürich) ; Prof. Andy Smith (IEP, Bordeaux) ; Prof. Helen Wallace (EUI/RSCAS, Florence)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
This project investigates a ubiquitous yet under-studied phenomenon in national, European and global politics: delegated preparation, defined as those negotiations through which civil servants or experts "pre-cook" political choice in multi-level decision-processes. While examples are legion-reaching from legislative drafting in national ministries to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) in the European Union (EU)- the project focuses on preparation in complex international negotiations, and chooses EU Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) as empirical case. Claiming that a look beyond the tip of the "decision-iceberg" will gain us deeper insights into how and by whom Europe has been constitutionalised, I tackle two wider questions: 1) What is preparation and what can it do? and 2) Under what conditions will preparation be effective? Linked to an understanding of international negotiation as a "thick" social process, I argue, first, that the key to preparatory effectiveness lies in a particular set of collective resources as a necessary condition, and in consensual preagreement as both necessary and sufficient. Second, with effective pre-decision-making thus hinging upon successful delegated arguing, a set of scope conditions favourable to persuasion are singled out. These include 1) a familiar, iterative and insulated social context as a pre-condition for the non-distortive use of arguments; 2) an issue's complexity as facilitating the resonance of expertise and novel ideas; and 3) a macronorm's constitutional-systemic nature as favouring factual arguments linked to the international system. The hypotheses are tested on the "Group of Government Representatives" (GoR), with units of observation chosen from the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs according to variation of issue complexity and constitutional-systemic nature. Process-tracing of five issues: the communitarisation of free movement, the integration of Schengen and the institutionalisation of flexibility (Amsterdam), as well as Commission reform and Council votes (Nice) confirms that delegated preparation plays a key role even in the "bastion of high politics" that is EU reform. Yet, empirical evidence shows that persuasion is less prominent than expected, and uncovers alternative mechanisms behind effective preparation,in particular accommodation, depoliticisation and systemic compensation.

Defence date: 17 September 2007
Examining Board: Prof. Morten Kelstrup, (University of Copenhagen) ; Prof. Peter Mair, (European University Institute) ; Prof. Gianfranco Pasquino, (University of Bologna) ; Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter, (EUI Professional Fellow)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
no abstract available

In representative democracy the chain of political legitimacy runs from voters to governments through votes cast at elections. In order for representation to occur, political parties must offer distinct policy platforms that citizens consider in their vote choices. This thesis examines whether citizens are adequately represented within the European Union. It finds that although representation on left-right issues occurs, it does not occur for European integration preferences. Over the course its history, European integration has changed from being primarily an economic issue to a social issue. This separation from the primary axis of political competition has increased the need for representation on EU issues directly. Political parties have polarised over European integration providing increased choice, but voters have not engaged with the issue. Examining how voters process party signals about policy positions shows that very few are affected by signals on the EU. Accounting for voters' cognitive biases suggests that the influence of EU issues in European Parliament elections has been overestimated and is non-existent in most member-states. As direct democracy might offer an alternative to inadequate representation this thesis examines why referendums have been held on the EU but finds that they are largely driven by governments' desire to contain the threat of EU issues at national elections, further undermining representation. However, as a result of institutional differences between national and European Parliament elections rather than the emergence of the EU as an electoral issue, the size of party systems at European Parliament elections has grown considerably over successive elections in many member-states, a change that has fed into national party systems. Although representation on EU issues is inadequate, the expansion of European party systems and the redrawing of the lines of political competition offers some hope that representation on EU issues might improve in the future.

Defence date: 2 July 2019
Examining Board: Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute (Supervisor); Professor Elias Dinas, European University Institute; Professor Liesbet Hooghe, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Professor Kai Arzheimer, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Does European integration contribute to the rise of the radical right? This dissertation offers three empirical contributions that aid understanding the interplay between political integration within the European Union (EU) and the surge of the populist radical right across Europe. The first account studies the impact that the European Parliament (EP) elections have for the national fortune of the populist right. The findings of a country fixed-effects model leveraging variation in the European electoral cycle demonstrate that EP elections foster the domestic prospects of the radical right when national and EP elections are close in time. The second study demonstrates that the populist radical right cannot use the EP elections as a platform to socialise the most impressionable voters. The results of a regression discontinuity analysis highlight that the EP contest does not instil partisan ties to the political antagonists of the European idea. The third study shows that anti-European integration sentiments that existed prior to accession to the EU cast a long shadow in the present by contributing to the success of contemporary populist right actors. Relying on an original dataset entailing data on all EU accession referenda on the level of municipalities and exploiting variation within regions, the study demonstrates that those localities that were most hostile to the European project before even becoming part of the Union, today, vote in the largest numbers for the radical right. In synthesis, the dissertation approaches the relationship between two major current transformations of social reality: European integration and the surge of the radical right. The results highlight that contention around the issue of European integration provides a fertile ground for the populist radical right, helping to activate nationalistic and EU-hostile sentiments among parts of the European public.

This thesis examines the relation between subnational autonomies, that is to say regional and local authorities and the norms they create, and European Union law. The existence of local and regional autonomies within the various Member States of the EU is a factual truth. We know that they exist and co-exist with other levels of public authority, themselves generating norms. Yet, on its surface European Union law does not devise any substantive understanding of such autonomies. This stands in stark contrast to the relation between the Member States and the EU, which is governed by a complex catalogue of Treaty rules. As a consequence of European integration, however, subnational autonomies and EU law do interact, so that the latter cannot simply ignore the existence of the former. This thesis sets out to determine the contours of their mutual relation through an analysis of EU procedural and substantive law. It uncovers that the relation between subnational autonomies and EU law is multifarious and diverges depending on whether we look at the surface of EU law, that is to say the Treaties, or whether we look below its surface, at the Court of Justice's rich case law or soft law instruments of the Commission. I map this conclusion through a modelling approach, relying on what I term the 'Insider Model' and the 'Outsider Model' respectively. These models underline that, in some areas of EU law, SNAs are seen to be outsiders to the project of European integration whereas other areas recognise SNAs and especially their norms to be the insiders of that project. The coexistence of both models forces us intellectually to rearrange things. It challenges our 'constitutional imagination'. The key to understanding the coexistence of both models can be found in the evolution of EU law itself. While the Outsider Model remains attached to the public international law origins of the EU Treaties, the Insider Model captures the reality that not only States and citizens, but also SNAs, are integrated into the EU legal order.

Defence date: 12 June 2019
Examining Board: Prof. Alexander Trechsel, University of Lucerne (Supervisor); Prof. Giovanni Sartor, European University Institute; Prof. Luigi Curini, University of Milan; Prof. Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, Lund University
A Public Sphere and a demos are intrinsic key elements of any democratic society. The literature has pointed out that social media platforms can play an important role in developing direct interactions between users and creating a sense of community. Can Twitter contribute to the emergence of a transnational networked European Public Sphere and European demos? This thesis examines the contribution of the European Political Twittersphere to this question. I divide the question into three articles. In each I use a different theoretical framework and methodological approach to two datasets of two issue publics (the Schengen agreement and the transatlantic trade partnership, TTIP) collected through the public Twitter Streaming API from August 2016 to April 2017. In the first article I explore the actor level of the networks created from the Twitter data. I investigate whether these Twitter networks constitute networked publics where non-elite actors receive attention and play an important role by the number of mentions and retweets. In the second article I explore the question of the constitution of European transnational networks. To do so, I geolocate the accounts involved in the two networks to identify the type of interactions the users establish, whether national or transnational. In the third article I analyse the content of these networks by extracting what sentiments the users express for the topics, and whether they see themselves and the topics as national or European. The three articles capture three features of the European Political Twittersphere. First, the results indicate the presence of transnational European networks. Second, built from the bottom-up where non-elite actors receive most of the attention. And third, composed of a multilingual demoi where the users see themselves and the topics as European. However, although these mapped Twitter networks contribute to some extent to transnational interaction and a sense of community, the deliberative quality of these networks is low.

Three models are developed to analyze the state level conditions fostering the rise of far right parties in the European Union in the last two decades. The political background of these parties is examined. This study offers a definition for far right parties, which combines several previous attempts. The research has focused on the effects of the number of the parties, immigration, and unemployment on support for the far right in Europe. Empirical tests, using a random effects model of fifty elections in eight nations, suggest that there are political, social, and economic conditions that are conducive to electoral success. Specifically, increases in the number of "effective" parties favor the far right, while electoral thresholds serve to dampen support. Immigration proves to be a significant variable. Surprisingly, changes in crime and unemployment rates have a negative effect on support for the far right. Suggestions for future research are offered.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005.
Thesis Advisor(s): Donald Abenheim, Hans-Eberhardt Peters. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-98). Also available online.

Patterns of domestic political contestation in international affairs often see the centre aligned against both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. This is observable in a range of issues, from democracy promotion, intervention, international law, European integration, free trade, globalization and the creation of international regimes. Why centre-periphery ideological competition occurs is an interesting puzzle, given the challenge it offers to the idea that partisanship is an inherently left-right phenomenon. Yet the role of the political centre in foreign policy has not been subjected to systematic analysis. This thesis studies the nature and effects of the foreign policy position of the political centre. It argues that the centre is distinguished from left and right by its embrace of distinct elements of liberal ideology. The liberal view of international politics differs in thee important respects from its socialist and conservative competitors: It is particular, rather than pluralist, when it comes to questions of sovereignty and international legitimacy; it views interdependence, rather than independence, as a natural and desirable condition of the international; and it views deterrence, rather than diplomacy, as the best means of achieving security. To test the validity of this thesis I discuss the role of ideology in explaining variation in relations between four Euratlantic states (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) and the United States during the Cold War. This is a hard case given the intensity of global threat at the time. The thesis tests the claim that the strength of Euratlantic-American relations is a function of the relative influence of the political centre at the time. To do this it outlines a mixed-methods research design that combines in-depth case studies with a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic-US relations. The results from both elements confirm the validity of the theoretical proposition.

On May 1st 2004, Poland entered the European Union (EU), introducing new variables into the domestic politics of the Polish Republic. Since gaining its independence from Soviet control in 1989, Poland’s political landscape can be described as a dynamic and ever changing force towards democratic maturation. With the accession of Poland to the EU, questions of European integration and Europeanization have arisen, most specifically with how these two processes effect and shape the behaviors of domestic political actors. With Poland entering its second decade of EU membership, this study attempts to explain how, and if, further European integration has had any effect on the Europeanization of political parties in Poland. Building upon the work of various scholars, most notably Aleks Szczerbiak, this study examines the years 2009-2014, and examines Poland’s political parties through Robert Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization.

The dissertation is about the impact of the European Union (EU) on the foreign policy of a candidate in the pre-accession period. More specifically, the research analyses the factors and processes that intervene between the EU power to generate change in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish national compliance with the EU conditions between 1997 and 2005 by way of analysing three cases: Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus issue, Greek-Turkish bilateral problems in the Aegean Sea; and Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis the launch of the ESDP. Main question the research addresses is “why does a candidate choose to comply (or fail to comply) with the EU conditions in foreign policy?” In other words: “How (through what mechanisms) does the EU generate compliance with the EU conditions in foreign policy?” The dissertation approaches these questions through the perspective of the Europeanization literature and its conditionality school drawing on the Rational Choice Institutionalism. In accordance with this rationalist account, main argument the doctoral research intends to prove is that “the EU’s adaptational pressure on Turkey (operationalized as a function of clear/attainable membership perspective and credible conditionality policy) is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for domestic compliance in foreign policy if the cost of compliance is high for the target government. In this respect, domestic actors’ strategic calculation is the ultimate determinant of the compliance degrees at the domestic level. In order to prove this core hypothesis, the research used theory testing process-tracing, longitudinal comparison of cases, counter-factual reasoning and the use of a control case. The evidence for testing the argument comes from the measurement of conditionality (measured as the linkage between a given foreign policy condition and membership-related reward) and domestic compliance (measured as foreign policy output ranging from rhetorical to behavioural change) through the content analysis of primary documents. This analysis is complemented with 33 semi-structured elite interviews. The dissertation by proving that the EU’s transformative power in foreign policy works through the cost and benefit calculation of the ruling party and by elaborating on the conditions under which the EU can interfere with this rational calculus (hence modify the opportunity structure for the target government), advances our understanding of the EU’s transformative power and contributes to the Accession Europeanization literature in general. Furthermore, the study provides additional empirical as well as theoretical in-depth case knowledge to the available literature on the Europeanization of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This research addresses the conflictualization dynamics induced by the politicization of religion at the supranational level. It tests the Union’s institutional capacity to routinize dissension, temper animosities, and reconcile divergences in the light of religiously-loaded, issue-specific controversies. So-called “morality issues” such as abortion or human embryonic stem cell research emerged onto the EU agenda at the end of the 1990s. The main sites of bioethical contention correspond to the European Parliament and Commission arenas, where political, social, and religious entrepreneurs have been pursuing ideological interests of either liberal or conservative nature. We developed an interpretative approach to their discourses and perceptions through the qualitative content analysis of semi-structured interviews and online documentary sources. A key task consisted in determining whether one observes the routinization of bioethical conflicts by European institutions (“business-as-usual” scenario) or whether the said conflicts are remaining extrinsic to the Brussels political game (“culture wars” scenario). In other words, is the emergence of new stakes – morality issues – prompting the emergence of new divisions and repertoires of action? We put to the test the normal course of EU politics in the light of (1) the structuration of morality divides along religious, political, and national frontlines; and (2) the materialization of morality antagonisms through discursive, bureaucratic, and mobilization weapons. Overall, the “polarization” and “political style” variables showed that the supranational debates on abortion and hESCR do not fully alter the logics of supranational governance; in return, the EU polity is not closed to the crystallization of politicized modes of dissent expression. The hypothesis of an intermediary scenario oscillating between policy-seeking and position-taking perspectives is thus confirmed. On the one hand, issue-specific alliances characterized by internal multifold diversities do play the institutional rules of the European political game in their quest for ideological influence on the decision-making process. On the other hand, limited supranational competences on religiously-loaded issues constrain conflicting factions’ leeway to a symbolic use of morality causes and beliefs as instrumental devices worth of credit-claiming and identity-posturing.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis has investigated the effect of political influence, religious denomination, and level of equality regarding same-sex marriage legislation among the 28 member states of the European Union (EU). Furthermore, prior research has been related to the topics: same-sex marriage cases within the EU court, religious influence on approval of homosexuality, Conservative, Liberal, and Social democratic ideas regarding same-sex marriage and research about Feminism and equality. It has used a quantitative, comparative, and causal analysis to test the six hypotheses by using Cox Regression. The thesis has concluded that religious influence had a negativeeffect on the same-sex marriage legislation, disregarding denomination, and the level of social cohesion and equality had a positive effect on the legislation. Additionally, the result has shown that among the member states of the EU, the phenomenon of same-sex marriage was not a politically polarised, but that there were rather possible other variables not included in the analysis that could explain why half of the member states have legislated same-sex marriage. However, the predicted hazard rate of no legislation has increased and if the trend would continue there could possibly be a consensus among the members of the EU in the future.

Enlargement of the European Union (EU) coupled with immigration and rising transnational flows of people has led to increased contact between different cultures, religions, ethnic groups and diverse languages. Historically, the reproduction of ethnic and racial bigotry from generation to generation has marred the European landscape. Cognisant of this, the EU is committed to the development of intercultural competences and the promotion of intercultural dialogue, involving not only public authorities but also civil society. As part of a strategy to build a cohesive integrated ‘social Europe’, the EU launched the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (EYID) at Ljubijana in Slovenia on January 8. Beneath the carapace of ‘Unity in Diversity’, the aim of EYID is to promote a better understanding of Europe’s complex cultural environment in an effort to move beyond ‘mere tolerance’. In recent years, however, increasing tensions involving Europe’s Muslim population have been exacerbated by their visible difference, youth riots, terrorism and the current global discourse of “clash”. Considering that Europe’s largest ethnic minority is Muslim, any attempt to foster tolerance through intercultural dialogue could be severely limited by Europe’s ability to sustain a meaningful dialogue with Islam. Thus, this thesis focuses specifically on dialogue with Islam in contemporary Europe. Its aim is to contribute to the present discussion concerning the perceived need for policy makers and citizens to redefine the space/identity allocated to Europe’s Muslim population. Beginning with a brief history of Muslim immigration to Europe this dissertation then analyses the marginalisation of these immigrants by the development of institutionalised inequalities. Pursuant to this is an examination of the scholarly debate surrounding the phenomenon of a nascent ‘European identity’ and its compatibility, to an equally embryonic ‘Euro-Muslim identity’. Using EYID as a tool, this treatise then examines the themes reflected in academic discourse, which emerged from the EU level debates in relation to the acceptance of Europe’s minorities. As Europe attempts to rethink a broader identity by accepting that immigrants are no longer sojourners but a necessary part of Europe’s future, this thesis asks, how meaningful was the EYID to the discourse between Europe’s Muslims and European leaders, policy makers, and civil society?

Since 2009, the European Union has faced the worst economic crisis of its history. Due to the devastating impact of the Eurozone crisis on their economies, European countries realized the need to deepen the integration. Without a fiscal union, the Monetary Union would always be prone to economic crises. However, the efforts to reinforce the Union’s economy have been hampered by the UK due to its obsession with national sovereignty and lack of European ideals. In opposing further integration, the UK officials have started to speak out about the probability of leaving the EU. The purpose of this paper is to present benefits and challenges of Britain’s EU membership and to assess the consequences of leaving the Union both for the UK and for the EU. This study utilizes Power Transition theory to analyze British impact on European integration. With the perspective of this theory, the UK is defined as a dissatisfied partner. By applying the conflict– cooperation model of Brian Efird, Jacek Kugler and Gaspare Genna, the effect of the UK’s dissatisfaction is empirically portrayed. The empirical findings of the conflict– integration model clearly show that Britain’s dissatisfaction has a negative impact on European integration and jeopardizes the future of the Union. Power Transitions analysis indicates that the UK would become an insignificant actor in the international system and lose the opportunity for the Union’s leadership if it leaves the EU. On the other hand, although Britain’s departure would be a significant loss in terms of capability, economic coherence is more important for the EU. Without enough commitment for the Union, increasing the level of integration with the UK would raise the probability of conflict with the integration process in the future.

“What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?” These were two of the central questions put by the Laeken Declaration, adopted by the European Council in December 2001. The Declaration offered the beginning of an answer, pointing out the direction for future policy developments, and for the institutional reform underpinning them: “The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs…A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework.” At the same time, the Laeken Declaration pointed out some more specific questions concerning the institutional innovations required to enhance the coherence of European foreign policy and to reinforce the synergy between the High Representative for CFSP and the relevant Commissioners within the RELEX family. With a view to a better distribution of competences between the EU and Member States, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, the text mentioned the development of a European foreign and defence policy first, and referred more particularly to the scope for updating the ‘Petersberg’ tasks of crisis management, a policy domain that would take a pivotal place in the consolidation of ESDP and CFSP at large. This Declaration marks the beginning of the process of regime reform that covers the last three years of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union. This evolution, and the innovations that it has brought about in institutional and normative terms, are the subjects of this thesis.

The Convention on the future of Europe, set up by the Laeken Declaration, represented an important stage in the pan-European debate on the objectives, values, means and decision-making tools of CFSP. The US-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003 marked a new ‘critical juncture’ in the development of the conceptual and institutional bases of CFSP. As it was the case in the past, following major policy failures in the course of the Balkan wars, Member States sought to mend the rift that divided them in the run up to the Iraq war. In so doing, Member States agreed on a significant degree of institutional reform in the context of the Convention and of the subsequent Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). The creation of the new position of a double-hatted Foreign Minister, as well as the envisaged rationalisation and consolidation of the instruments at his/her disposal, including a new European External Action Service (EAS), is a primary achievement in this perspective. On the defence side, a new formula of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ among willing and able Member States has been included in the Treaty Establishing the European Constitution (Constitutional Treaty), with a view to them undertaking more binding commitments in the field of defence, and fulfilling more demanding missions. Right at the time when the Iraq crisis was sending shockwaves across the political and institutional structures of the Union, and of CFSP in particular, the first ESDP civilian mission were launched, soon followed by small military operations. The unprecedented deployment of civilian and military personnel under EU flag in as many as 13 missions between 2002 and 2005 could be achieved thanks to the development of a new layer of policy-makign and crisis-management bodies in Brussels. The launch of successive ESDP operations turned out to be a powerful catalyst for the further expansion and consolidation of this bureaucratic framework and of the conceptual dimension of CFSP/ESDP. Most importantly, these and other dimensions of institutional and operational progress should be set in a new, overarching normative and political framework provided by the European Security Strategy (ESS).

Needless to say, institutional innovations are stalled following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda of May/June 2005. With a view to the evolution of the CFSP regime, however, I argue in this thesis that the institutional reforms envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty are largely consistent with the unfolding normative and bureaucratic features of the regime. As illustrated in the course of my research, the institutional, bureaucratic and normative dimensions of the regime appear to strengthen one another, thereby fostering regime deepening. From this standpoint, therefore, the stalemate of institutional reform does slow down the reform of the international regime of CFSP but does not seem to alter the direction of its evolution and entail its stagnation, or even dismantling. On the contrary, I maintain that the dynamics of regime change that I detect will lead to stronger, endogenous and exogenous demands for institutional reform, whose shapes and priorities are to a large extent already included in the Constitutional treaty. This vantage point paves the way to identifying the trends underlying the evolution of the regime, but does not lead to endorsing a teleological reading of regime reform. As made clear in what follows, CFSP largely remains a matter of international cooperation with a strong (although not exclusive) inter-governmental component. As such, this international regime could still suffer serious, and potentially irreversible, blows, were some EU Member States to openly depart from its normative coordinates and dismiss its institutional or bureaucratic instances. While this scenario cannot be ruled out, I argue in this thesis that this does not seem the way forward. The institutional and normative indicators that I detect and review point consistently towards a ‘deepening’ of the regime, and closer cooperation among Member States. In other words, it is not a matter of excluding the possibility of disruptions in the evolution of the CFSP regime, but to improve the understanding of regime dynamics so as to draw a distinction between long-term trends and conjunctural crises that, so far, have not undermined the incremental consolidation of CFSP/ESDP.

Central to this research is the analysis of the institutional and normative features of the CFSP regime at EU level. The focus lies on the (increasing) difference that institutions and norms make to inter-governmental policy-making under CFSP, in the inter-play with national actors. The purpose of my research is therefore threefold. First, I investigate the functioning and development of the bureaucratic structures underpinning the CFSP regime, since their establishment in 2000/2001 up to 2005. This theoretically informed review will allow me to highlight the distinctive procedural and normative features of CFSP policy-making and, subsequently, to assess their influence on the successive stages of reform. Second, I track and interpret the unprecedented processes by which innovations have been introduced (or envisaged) at the institutional and normative level of the regime, with a focus on the Convention on the future of Europe and on the drafting of the European Security Strategy. Third, I assess the institutional and normative output of this dense stage of reform, with respect both to the ‘internal’ coherence and the deepening of the regime, and to the ‘external’ projection of the EU as an international actor in the making.

On the whole, I assume that a significant, multidimensional transition of the CFSP regime is underway. The bureaucratic framework enabling inter-governmental cooperation encourages patterned behaviour, which progressively generates shared norms and standards of appropriateness, affecting the definition of national interests. In terms of decision-making, debate and deliberation increasingly complement negotiation within Brussels-based CFSP bodies. Looking at the direction of institutional and policy evolution, the logic of ‘sharing’ tasks, decisions and resources across different (European and national) levels of governance prevails, thereby strengthening the relevance of ‘path-dependency’ and of the ‘ratchet effect’ in enhancing inter-governmental cooperation as well as regime reform.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in extreme right Western European parties. Well-established parties such as the National Front (FN) in France, Vlaams Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) in Belgium, and Lega Nord in Italy have been scrutinized. However, extreme right parties that have just recently begun to experience electoral successes such as the British National Party (BNP) have received less evaluation and discussion in the literature. Therefore, this study examines the BNP's electoral fortunes in the European elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009. I explore the support for the BNP using the traditional variables of unemployment, education, income, and immigration. In addition to these variables, I examine how support for other parties present in Great Britain, such as the right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the center-right Conservative Party affects electoral support for the BNP. I find that support for other right-wing parties in Great Britain do exert an influence on BNP electoral fortunes (the UKIP a positive one, and the Conservative Party a negative one). I also find a strong negative link between BNP support and education and a weak positive one between BNP support and unemployment. However, income and immigration rates appear to have no effect on voter support for the BNP.
ID: 030646218; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 62-71).
M.A.
Masters
Political Science
Sciences
Political Science; International Studies Track

Partant du constat de la constitution de la promotion de la démocratie comme enjeu des relations internationales et de politique étrangère, la présente recherche s’interroge sur les politiques menées en la matière par l’Union européenne dans le cadre des relations avec ses voisins méditerranéens, particulièrement le Maroc et la Tunisie. L’analyse se concentre sur l’Instrument européen pour la démocratie et les droits de l’homme, sur la période 2007-2012.

L’objectif est de comprendre et d’expliquer les pratiques des différents groupes d’acteurs impliqués dans ces politiques, au sein de la Commission (DG Relex/SEAE, DG Devco, délégations) et du Parlement (sous-commission DROI).

La position défendue est la suivante :les pratiques européennes de promotion de la démocratie au Maroc et en Tunisie sont fonction de l’identité des groupes institutionnels qui les mettent en œuvre. Pour chaque groupe institutionnel, peuvent être mis en évidence des normes, intérêts et ressources qui contribuent à défendre et renforcer l’identité institutionnelle. Dès lors, des pratiques qui peuvent paraître incohérentes au premier abord (pourquoi agir au Maroc et pas en Tunisie ?pourquoi créer l’IEDDH et, parallèlement, évincer l’objectif de promotion de la démocratie de la coopération bilatérale avec la Tunisie ?) prennent tout leur sens lorsqu’on parvient à restituer la fonction sociale qu’elles assurent.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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Thèse qui propose d'analyser le processus de construction de la politique spatiale européenne. La question au coeur de la recherche est de comprendre pourquoi, alors qu’il fut initialement décidé de ne pas s’en remettre au cadre offert pas la Communauté pour européaniser les efforts naissants de coopération spatiale, put-on assister, à la fin des années 1980, à une implication grandissante de la Communauté européenne, qui se traduisit progressivement par une nouvelle européanisation du spatial ?La thèse défendue est que, loin de résulter uniquement de la confrontation et du choc des intérêts portés par les différents Etats, la politique spatiale européenne a été progressivement construite au travers d’un parcours historique dans lequel ont été impliqués différents espaces sociaux régis par des référentiels et des normes qui leur sont propres.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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This study analyses the possible impact of the European Union (EU) on the development of the relations between business interest groups and the government in Turkey, more precisely on the interventions of the business interest groups in domestic policy-making. Hence it deals with the links between the progress of the relationship between Turkey and the EU and the development of domestic interest group activity in Turkey.

The progress of Turkey’s relations with the EU enhanced the visibility of the Turkish Peak Business Organizations (PBOs) in representing Turkish business interests in Brussels. Moreover, the evolution of the activities of the PBOs, provides a broader understanding of the developments of the general characteristics of the relations between the government and business interest groups in Turkey. Hence the investigation focuses on the major Turkish PBOs.

We examine the relations of Turkish PBOs with the EU, essentially, on the basis of the observation of their transnational actions within the EU as well as their participation in financial and technical assistance programmes of the EU and in the joint institutional structures of the association regime between Turkey and the EU. By analysing these two dimensions we assess the repercussions of the socialization of the Turkish PBOs on their strategies of action in dealing with European Affairs, on discourses they adopted regarding domestic policy-making and on their organizational structure and policy agenda.

We elaborate our topic with reference to the Europeanization concept, which covers the examination of the consequences of the European governance on national systems. Through the Europeanization concept we observe the correlation between the progress of the Turkey-EU relations and the ongoing process of change in the patterns of interventions of the Turkish business interest groups in domestic policy-making.

Doctorat en sciences politiques
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Cette thèse de doctorat s’articule autour d’une question dont l’apparente simplicité masque une réelle complexité :Comment le Conseil européen est-il devenu une institution ?En effet, alors qu’il existait déjà depuis plusieurs décennies, le Conseil européen n’a été formellement considéré comme une institution européenne que depuis l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, le 1er décembre 2009. Ce constat juridique attire l’attention sur les raisons de cette consécration tardive, mais soulève de nombreuses questions aussi bien pour ce qui concerne les institutions dans l’Union européenne (UE) que pour l’ordre politique européen dont elles font partie.

Le dépassement du seul critère juridique et la prise en compte du temps long remettent clairement en question l’idée que le Conseil européen ne soit devenu une institution qu’avec le traité de Lisbonne et interrogent, entre autres, sur ce que signifie « être une institution » dans l’UE. Plusieurs questions de pouvoir fondamentales sont soulevées :Comment les institutions sont-elles crées et développées dans l’UE ?Le Conseil européen est-il une institution « supranationale intergouvernementale » ?L’ordre politique européen est-il un ordre politique autonome ?

Le développement de la recherche a procédé en 3 phases, pour lesquels les répertoires de codification juridique, politique et symbolique ont servi de grille d’analyse. En premier lieu, le temps de l’instituant, temps court posant les bases du temps long dans lequel se développe l’institutionnalisation, a été étudié. Il correspond au moment de l’incursion directe et explicite des Etats dans la sphère européenne. Puis, les évolutions et trajectoires respectives des différents processus de codification du Conseil européen ont été examinées, tout au long de son existence dans l’ordre politique européen. Enfin, l’omniprésence de l’interaction national-européen a conduit à observer les processus suivis par les « sous-institutions » du Conseil européen, dans la mesure où ils permettent d’expliquer son institutionnalisation dans l’ordre politique européen. Le couple franco-allemand et la présidence du Conseil européen ont ainsi fait l’objet de processus d’institutionnalisation propres, mais intrinsèquement liés à ceux suivis par le Conseil européen, et ont servis à déterminer les interactions entre les ordres politiques nationaux et l’ordre politique européen.

Cette recherche a notamment mis en évidence le fait que l’institutionnalisation du Conseil européen a principalement été réalisée sur le plan politique (au travers des actions des acteurs, des rôles qu’ils ont façonné et investi, de la stabilité qu’ils ont instauré par la répétition de pratiques, de convergences de vues facilitées par la pression du groupe, ou encore du respect de l’échelon national par la dimension supranationale), en étant partiellement soutenue sur le plan symbolique, tandis que le droit n’a très longtemps fait que suivre ces processus et n’est vraiment intervenu que pour reconnaître l’existant ou dresser un état des lieux du consensus en vigueur au moment où les circonstances appelaient des reconfigurations substantielles.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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Alors qu’une riche littérature se concentre sur l’euroscepticisme au sein des arènes politiques nationales, les oppositions à l’Europe au niveau supranational restent largement négligées. Afin de contribuer à combler cette lacune, cette recherche s’interroge sur la façon dont les députés eurosceptiques conçoivent et exercent leur mandat représentatif au sein du PE. Fondée sur l’approche motivationnelle des rôles, il s’agit, d’une part, d’appréhender les rôles joués par les eurosceptiques au sein de l’assemblée et, d’autre part, d’expliquer l’hétérogénéité des rôles endossés par ces élus. Mobilisant une pluralité de données, cette recherche repose sur une méthodologie mixte, combinant méthodes qualitative et quantitative ainsi qu’approches inductive et déductive. L’analyse s’articule autour de deux séquences. La première propose une typologie d’idéaux-types de rôles permettant de rendre compte des pratiques et conceptions du mandat développées par les parlementaires eurosceptiques. La seconde explique la variation des rôles au sein de cette typologie et teste l’hypothèse selon laquelle le rôle dépend d’une combinaison de facteurs institutionnels et individuels. L’étude démontre que les eurosceptiques peuvent endosser quatre rôles, correspondant à une stratégie de défection ou de prise de parole, et que le rôle qu’ils jouent dépend à la fois des règles régissant le fonctionnement du PE et de leurs préférences relatives à l’intégration et à l’architecture institutionnelle de l’UE. Ce faisant, la recherche constitue une réflexion sur deux enjeux très distincts. Premièrement, alors que l’on assiste, dans de nombreux pays européens, à l’émergence de revendications d’acteurs contestant les structures institutionnelles en place, cette thèse permet de contribuer à l’étude, encore restreinte, de l’opposition antisystème au sein d’institutions parlementaires, le PE servant ici de laboratoire privilégié pour l’étude des stratégies de ces acteurs antisystème. Deuxièmement, à l’instar des travaux de sociologie de l’intégration européenne, cette recherche repose sur le postulat qu’analyser de façon microscopique un groupe restreint d’acteurs permet de s’interroger, de façon différente, sur le déficit démocratique et de légitimité du régime européen, en déplaçant la focale du niveau institutionnel au niveau individuel. Il s’agit alors d’appréhender les défis de légitimation de l’UE en se concentrant sur les acteurs hostiles à la construction européenne. Une analyse de leurs pratiques concrètes au sein de l’assemblée représentative permet de dégager des pistes de réflexion quant à leur capacité de légitimation du régime politique.

While an abundant literature focuses on Euroscepticism in the national political arenas, oppositions to Europe at the supranational level remain largely under-studied. In order to contribute to fill this gap, this research examines how Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) conceive and carry out their representative mandate in the European Parliament (EP). Inspired by the motivational approach of role theory, the study aims first at understanding the roles played by Eurosceptics within the assembly and second at explaining the heterogeneity of the roles played by these actors. Using a plurality of data, this research is based on mix-methods, combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies as well as inductive and deductive approaches. The analysis proceeds in two steps. The first proposes a typology of ideal-types of roles that allows understanding the ways Eurosceptics conceive and carry out their parliamentary mandate. The second explains the variation between the roles and tests the hypothesis that the role played by an actor depend on the combination of institutional and individual factors. The study demonstrates that Eurosceptics may assume four roles, corresponding to an exit or voice strategy, and that the role they play depends both on the EP’s rules and MEP’s preferences concerning European integration and the EU’s institutional design. The research contributes to on-going debates on two very different issues. First, while we witness in many European countries, the emergence of anti-system actors, this thesis can contribute to the study of the anti-systemic opposition within parliamentary institutions, the EP being here a special laboratory for the study of the strategies of anti-system actors. Second, like recent studies focusing on the sociology of European integration, this research is based on the premise that analysing a small group of actors allows to question in a different way, the democratic and legitimacy deficit of the EU, moving the focal from the institutional to the individual level. The aim is then to understand the challenges of legitimacy of the EU by focusing on actors hostile to the European project. An analysis of their actual practices in the EP allows us to reflect on their ability to legitimize the political system.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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The EU’s notable transformation over the past five decades is obviously an event of modern state concepts. However, the EU’s matter of concern has placed too much emphasis on economic and trade issues, while its capability and power have achieved remarkable growth with far-reaching ramifications in both economic and political affairs. This also means that studies of the EU foreign policy have hardly reached North East Asia because of geographical limit between them, the EU’s weak institutional capacity and vestige of the Cold War. Therefore the EU and the Korean Peninsula did not have chance to build a critical relationship. This time could be defined as ‘standstill’ between Europe and the Korean Peninsula or ‘quiet diplomacy’. 1993 marked a turning-point in relations between the EU and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, European countries have launched the Maastricht Treaty since they had signed in 1992. The Treaty implies the EU’s more strengthened international role in the political and economic area in accordance with its increased capability and reinforced power. Secondly, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 and then the Korean Peninsula was compelled to face a political crisis. Since the EU took unofficial Humanitarian Aids for North Korea in 1994-1995, KEDO and the EU in 1997 agreed to the terms and conditions of the accession to KEDO of its nuclear regulatory body. This was the first challenge of the EU political engagement of the Korean Peninsula question. In the context, this research seeks to answer the question of “What are the EU priorities in its strategy for Korean Peninsula?” that includes broadly the EU’s regional strategy for North East Asia in line with its foreign policy agenda. To tell the conclusion, the EU’s intervention to North Korea was firstly encouraged in dimension of economic interests through vitalization of international trade after the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. The EU considered that Asian nuclear market is an important factor in order to build nuclear technical standard as well as to obtain commercial interests although the European nuclear firms did not obtain chance enough to construct for North Korea nuclear facilities construction. The EU’s political incentives for political change-seeking in North East Asia must also be considered. Actually, the EU diplomatically opened the door of Pyongyang and led the isolated regime to a channel that communicates with international community although the EU did not take a seat at Six-Party Talks to engage itself in the Korean Peninsula question. As a result, the EU could increase the image of a ‘peaceful mediator’ or an ‘honest blocker’ in the term of ‘reputation’ through engagement continued for the Korean Peninsula Crisis. The EU’s foreign policy has been partly successful in context that Europe succeeds in promoting its existence as a global actor. Therefore, its foreign policy would gradually be reinforced to bolster the EU’s credibility and influence in the Korean Peninsula. The EU’s role is surely reduced in the Korean Peninsula issues with the termination of the KEDO project. However, the EU’s role is expected to be performed in different ways under its confidence and capability. The EU’s next engagement depends on where its new incentives will be, and then its question will be how to realize them in accordance with its institutional conditions and actual capacity.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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The EU’s Trade Relations with China (1975-2008):

A Linkage Power at Work?

(Summary)

The central aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the EU’s power, in particular in its external trade relations/negotiations. Our hypothesis is that the EU is a distinctive kind of linkage power, defined as an actor relying on linkage as a crucial modus operandi in its external relations. We explored how, to what extent and in which distinctive ways the EU is such a linkage power.

Our analysis was based on three logically interrelated concepts – power resources, linkage and linkage power. Linkage refers to a leveraging strategy, with an aim of packaging relevant power resources, so as to increase leverage in bargaining, or more generally attain a policy objective. I identified seven types of linkages that the EU used: political-economic issue linkage, economic-economic issue linkage, conditionality, contextual linkage, linkage with a third party, cognitive linkage and synergistic linkage. Linkage can hardly work without proper power resources. The latter, as Dahl (1970) defined, refers to all the resources-opportunities, acts, objects etc – that an actor can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another. So, linkage is a bridge between power resources and impacts – meaning affecting or changing the behaviour of another party. By putting linkage and power together, we created a new term – “linkage power”, referring to a power based on linkages. The EU, the US, China or any other power can all be such labelled, though these actors may diverge in power resources, linkage strategies and the variables affecting linkage effectiveness. When applying such an analytical framework to the EU, we gave particular attention to the implications of the EU’s sui generis nature on its linkage power.

Our case study is the EU’s trade relations with China (1975-2008), which were punctuated by two critical historical junctures – the Tian’anmen Square Incident in 1989 and the EU-China Textile Crisis in 2005. In 1975, The EEC’s successful strategy by linking political issues (Europe-China balancing the Soviet Union and recognising China’s sovereignty over Taiwan) with economic issues (signing the EEC-China Trade Agreement) played a crucial role in securing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EEC and China. Different types of linkages were then applied to the EEC’s negotiations with Beijing on the 1978 Trade Agreement and the 1979 textile agreement, which effectively prompted the Chinese side to agree to the EU’s terms.

Immediately after the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Incident, the EC imposed economic sanctions with an aim of coercing China to accept Western world’s human rights conditions. This linkage did not last long or pay off due to divergent political and economic interests among the Member States and the EC’s institutional handicaps (foreign policy competence was largely in the hands of Member States, collective foreign policy action was non-binding), and soon de-linked.

Having realised that confrontational approach did not work well, the EC/EU and its Member States started to change their China policies in 1993-95. The period of 1993-2004 witnessed the EC/EU’s power through partnership. The strategic partnership was seen as a complex of different pairs of issue linkages, ranging from political-strategic issues to economic and human rights issues. The partnership, once established, had fostered new linkages and consolidated old ones. China’s WTO accession was seen as a once-in-a-century opportunity for the EU to exercise linkage through conditionality, so as to extract market access concessions from the Chinese side. Moreover, by linking with China could the European Commission garnered international support for advancing the Galileo project within the Union and ward off some of the US pressure in 2003.

The Year 2005 was singled out since an unprecedented trade row on textiles broke out, confronting the EU against China’s export prowess resulting from globalisation and China’s WTO accession. Linkages were used as a predominant strategy to help the EU to persuade and press the Chinese side firstly accept voluntary export restrictions and then share the burden of allowing the blocked textiles in European ports to be released. In 2006-08, the trade deficit problem emerged, coupled with a series political spats between Europe (France and Germany) and Beijing on the Tibet issue. As the EU-China honeymoon was over, the Commission toughened its approach towards China. Although linkage was again used to redress the trade deficit, its effects were not satisfactory, as the EU power resources were eroded.

Our conclusions are (1) linkage is a crucial modus operandi in the EU’s internal bargain and its external relations with China; (2) Linkage was generally effective vis-à-vis China, but with variations, either over time or across different linkage types; (3) The EU is a sui generis linkage power, resulting from its institutional characteristics and heterogeneity of interests among the Commission and Member States. We find that the EU’s increased institutionalisation (both regional and bilateral) and competences generally facilitated its use of linkage strategies. The EU’s sui generis structure and its internal interest divergences have mixed implications on its linkage effectiveness. On one hand, the EU’s linkage power was weakened accordingly. But on the other, the Commission could tactically make use of some Member State government’s row with Beijing and advance its own economic agenda (such as the EU-China High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue, HED). Moreover, our research also confirmed Andrew Moravcsik’s argument that issue linkage is more easily made within an issue-area than across issue-areas. But we differ from him on the reason behind that. We find that this was largely attributable to the EU’s pillar structure and competence divisions.

The theoretical contributions include: (1) Linkage power provides a distinctive prism to look into the EU’s concrete strategies in internal bargains, and external commercial negotiations. Linkage serves as a crucial strategy for the EU to handle its relations with a far-abroad country like China, including establishing diplomatic relations, negotiating trade deals, forging strategic partnerships and holding high-level dialogue. (2) Giving some insights to the EU’s actorness. We find that the EU, though institutionally not a unitary actor, was somehow able to present its power to the extent like a sovereign state on some occasions using linkage strategies. (3) Contributing to the understanding of the EU’s means to spread its governance model. We find that the EU’s norm-setting goals have often been achieved through non-normative ways – such as interest exchange and trade-off, and other deliberate ways of persuasion and even coercion, mainly based on linkage. (4) Shedding light on the interactions between the Commission and the Member State governments and on the Commission’s autonomy in external trade relations.

Two future directions of research have been identified: (1) comparative studies: the EU’s linkage practices vis-à-vis the US, Russia and middle powers, or other actors’ linkage strategies vis-à-vis China; (2) post-Lisbon linkage strategies used by the EU.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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The text deals with the relation between religion and politics, in particular, with the conceptualization of religious identity in the discipline of International Relations from the position of postmodern approaches. The main goal is to examine whether and how feasible, useful, and usual is to work with the religious (and inseparable cultural) dimension of identity. The author claims that the concept of religious identity well reveals an important link between the religious and the political and represents a useful analytical tool. A categorisation and a model of identity are introduced and applied. The application is twofold, the categories are used in the academic discourse analysis and then once again it is used for the case of European identity in interactions of the EU and the RCC. Finally, the concept of the religious actor is discussed on this empirical basis and also the political construction of the religious, in general, is debated.

On the basis of case studies of 19th and early 20th century Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, I address the question of how and when incumbent right elites reformed electoral systems under a rising political threat from the left. Some states adopted proportional representation (PR) earlier than others. Why did different states adopt PR at different times? One important factor was the existing electoral system before the adoption of PR. This has been missed in academic research since most scholars have assumed that the electoral system in place before the adoption of PR in most Western European states was single-member plurality (SMP). I show that the system in place prior to PR in most Western European states was not SMP but a two-round system (TRS). TRS effects are still poorly understood by political scientists. I argue that both PR and TRS were used as safeguards by the parties on the right against an electoral threat from the left, which originated from the expansion of suffrage. PR was used as a last resort after other safeguards had been exhausted. I state that in the presence of a strong left threat, countries with TRS could wait longer to implement PR than countries with SMP in place. Under TRS, the adoption of PR was considerably delayed since electoral coordination between parties could be applied more effectively than under SMP systems. This was largely due to the increase of information and time after the first round of TRS elections, which was used by right parties to coordinate votes around the most promising candidate before the second round. First round results under TRS were used as an "electoral opinion poll". Based on these results, the right could react more effectively than the left in order to improve outcomes in round two.

The constitution of the European visa regime has deservingly received much scholarly attention. It has been analyzed as part of the policy toolkit that displaces migration control away from the edges of the territory of Europe. Nevertheless, the street-level implementation of this European policy in national consulates remains understudied. This dissertation sheds ethnographic light on Schengen visa policy implementation that is conceptualized as bordering policy. By delivering Schengen visas, state and nonstate organizations achieve the filtering work of borders; this dissertation therefore investigates the day-to-day bordering of Europe abroad and using a comparative approach and focusing on from the theoretical perspective of street-level policy implementation. The analysis builds on a comparative case study: it focuses on the visa sections of the consulates of two old immigration countries, Belgium and France, and one new immigration country, Italy, which implement visa policy in a same third country, i.e. Morocco. This study highlights cross-national differences of visa policy day-to-day implementation that are due to shifting historical backgrounds, national sense-making of visa policy, and distinct organizational conditions. However, the comparative research design and the inductive epistemological approach deployed have revealed processes of transfer at the implementation level, which result in transnational policy-making from below. Informal interactions between actors constitute a ‘community of practice’ based on the desire to share local and practical knowledge rather than expert knowledge in order to address problems linked to day-to-day implementation.

La construction d’un régime européen de visas représente un domaine de recherche important. Ceci a été analysé comme un des instruments politiques qui déplacent le contrôle migratoire au delà des limites du territoire européen. Cependant, la mise en œuvre dans les consulats nationaux reste très peu étudiée. Cette thèse analyse la mise en œuvre de la politique du visa Schengen conceptualisée comme politique des frontières. Par la délivrance du visa Schengen, organisations étatiques et non-étatiques réalisent le travail de filtrage des frontières. Cette thèse investigue la construction quotidienne de la frontière européenne à l’étranger en privilégiant la perspective théorique de la mise en œuvre des politiques publiques. L’analyse s’appuie sur un cas d’étude comparé. Elle se concentre sur les services visas des consulats de deux anciens pays d’immigration, la France et la Belgique, et un nouveau pays d’immigration, l’Italie, qui mettent en œuvre la politique du visa dans un même État tiers :le Maroc. Cette étude met en évidence des différences nationales importantes qui sont dues aux différents passés historiques, à l’attribution d’un sens national à la politique du visa, aux conditions organisationnelles distinctes. Toutefois, la méthodologie comparative et l’approche épistémologique inductive choisis ont permis de mettre en exergue des processus de transferts au niveau de la mise en œuvre qui constituent l’action publique transnationale par le bas. Les interactions informelles entre les acteurs constituent une ‘communauté de pratiques’ basé sur le désir de partager un savoir pratique et local qui sert à adresser des problèmes liés à la mise en œuvre au quotidien.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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Defence date: 20 October 2017
Examining Board: Prof. François Foret, Université Libre Bruxelles; Prof. Jan-Werner Mueller, Princeton University; Prof. Olivier Roy, European University Institute (supervisor); Prof. Joseph Weiler, European University Institute/New York University
The objective of this dissertation is to shed further light on the nature of European integration by examining the relationship between religion and politics throughout the whole process. The thesis aims at answering the following research question: which forms of secularism have underpinned the process of European integration. Secularism is understood in the thesis as a public settlement between politics and religion (i.e. we can speak of secularism, if religious and political sphere are conceptually distinct). A historical perspective allows the author to identify and examine the following junctures with respect to the relationship between religion and politics in the process: the Christian-democratic foundation of European Communities, the question of Turkish accession, the search for the “Soul of Europe” during Jacques Delors’ presidency at the European Commission, the debate on the Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe, and last but not least: the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty with its art. 17 obliging European institutions to maintain dialogue with religious organisations. Dissertation’s findings indicate that three forms of secularism, rooted in the European intellectual and political history, might be identified in the discourse and practice of European integration: 1) Christian-democratic secularism – Christianity transformed by personalist thought is regarded as a cultural and symbolic basis of European integration; 2) Laicist secularism - religion seen as a challenge to the democratic political order; 3) Agnostic secularism – understood as an attempt to depoliticize religion, to delegate it to other bodies, e.g. Member States or international organizations. The author argues that the last concept, liberal in its nature, has been most successful throughout the whole process.

First made available online 4 June 2015.
Defence date: 25 February 2008
Examining Board: Professor Friedrich Kratochwil, European University Institute (Supervisor) Professor Ole Wæver, University of Copenhagen (External Supervisor) Professor Michael Merlingen, Central European University Professor Pascal Vennesson, European University Institute
This thesis enquires into the making of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from the perspective of the actors endorsing and contesting the policy. By identifying the political milieu of the policy, it seeks to problematise the established depiction of ESDP and delineate the framing involved in designing and implementing the policy. I thus advance the argument about the all-pervading character of the political and I stipulate the value of micropolitical analysis for unpacking broad political arrangements. In order to trace security practices enacted through the policy, I explore in depth two instances of ESDP operations and a case of strengthening the UNIFIL forces to Lebanon via an EU initiative. I conclude that the ESDP has proven transformative both within the EU internal system of governance and vis-à-vis the EU’s international positioning. The former involves the rise of domestic politics engendered by the interplay of institutional identities and conceptions of achieving EU security. The latter exposes the shift in the international role assignments wherein the EU becomes a deputy of the US and a saviour of the UN’s reputation.

Defence date: 8 January 2015
Examining Board: Professor Pepper Culpepper, European University Institute (Supervisor); Professor E. Scott Adler, University of Colorado, Boulder (External Supervisor); Professor Stefano Bartolini, European University Institute; Professor Peter John, University College London.
Who sets lawmakers' priorities? The aim of the thesis is to provide a convincing theoretical argument able to identify what are the policy problems that demand lawmakers' attention, but also to test this empirically for France, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom between 1980 and 2008. This research shows how accounting for the way in which lawmakers deal with competing policy problems integrate two major accounts of the way in which governments set their priorities: party mandate approaches and public policy approaches. The thesis does so by suggesting that given their double role of representatives and administrators, lawmakers have to deliver policies consistent both with electoral and non-electoral mandates. In this framework, parties’ promises, administrative commitments, and the priorities of the public originate policy problems that compete for lawmakers' attention to enter the policy agenda. Compared to classic party mandate approaches, this research does not conceive parties as being the key actors of the game or the major agenda-setters. Compared to public policy approaches, the study does not dismiss the role of parties. The theory argues that a problem-solving approach is key to account for lawmakers' priorities and for the way in which lawmakers select policy problems that need to be addressed in the policy agenda. In this framework, different policy problems demand lawmakers' attention and problems-solving scholars have illustrated that the types of issues that need to be addressed are different in "nature". Existing accounts of the composition of policy agendas distinguish between problems ranging from "compulsory" to "discretionary" concerns (Walker 1977; Adler and Wilkerson 2012) where the former derive from "periodically recurring demands " and the latter from "chosen problems" (Walker 1977:425). Building on these contributions, the theoretical model of the dissertation discusses the "nature" of different policy problems by identifying some 'ideal types' that originate from the double functions that lawmakers shall perform in contemporary democracies as "representatives" of voters' interests and as "responsible" administrators (Mair 2009). In this sense, the dissertation contends that different policy problems emerge from the electoral promises of the governing parties, from commitments related to the responsibility of being in office, and from the 'external world', and that the balance between them determines the composition of the policy agenda. 13 There are four propositions of this study to existing knowledge in the field of policy agendas. The first is that the content of the policy agenda is stable across countries with different institutional settings. Lawmakers' priorities are no less stable in institutional systems that are more 'open' to accommodating policy problems brought by the electoral promises of the parties. At the same time stability persists even when elections approach, questioning the long-lasting assumption that lawmakers may manipulate policies to their will in order to assure re-election. The second is that policy problems brought by the electoral promises of the governing parties impact lawmakers’ priorities, but this is only half of an old story. The results show that the policy problems originating from the electoral promises of the opposition influence the content of the policy agenda confirming that the agenda-setting power of parties is not limited to those who are in office. The third proposition is a theoretical effort and empirical contribution to conceptualise and measure "policy commitments". Studies of public policy have stressed the importance of inherited commitments in everyday law making (Rose 1994; Adler and Wilkerson 2012) since some decisions take longer than a legislature to be realised. Classic analyses have emphasised the importance of budgetary constraints on policy agendas, but the thesis suggests that there is also another striking case of policy commitments for European polities: EU integration, since decisions on EU affairs and delegation of powers taken from previous governments are hard (if not impossible) to reverse by their successors. In this sense, EU decisions are inherited by all governments, and they add complexity to the problem-solving capacity of Member States because they produce extra policy problems that require lawmakers' attention. For lawmakers respecting legally binding EU decisions, this is a way to avoid "reckless and illegal decision making" (Mair 2009). The results highlight that when reflecting on the divisions of competences between the Union and its Member States (MSs), policy commitments derived from the EU directives are concentrated on a narrow set of policy areas. The results show that in most fields where commitments are higher, the agenda-setting power of parties’ electoral promises is weakened. Finally, this research suggests that policy problems originating from the agenda of the public (as approximated by media coverage) are another explanatory factor of policy priorities, but in a very narrow set of policy areas. Media effects appear to be limited to policy areas with the special characteristics of newsworthiness and sensationalism (Soroka 2002) that contribute to boost their policy appeal. In addition, the findings highlight that the agenda-setting power of the media is mediated by the interaction with the electoral promises of the opposition, probably as a result of a blame avoidance game to discredit incumbents. 14 Chapter 1 introduces the concepts of policy agenda and policy problem before summarising existing accounts of the content of policy agendas. Two theoretical traditions are identified. The first one is the "partisan account" highlighting the importance of partisan preferences for lawmakers' priorities. The second is made up of the "public policy accounts" proposing incrementalist and agenda-setting approaches to representatives' priorities. Chapter 2 sets up the theoretical framework that will be tested in this research. Drawing upon theories of "representative and responsible" government (Mair 2009) the research provides an encompassing model of how different policy problems compete for attention in order to enter the agendas of lawmakers. The thesis highlights that different agenda-setters have to be considered as creating policy problems: the electoral promises of the governing parties, the demands addressed to lawmakers by the EU agenda, and the issues that are important for the public as reported by the media. Starting from existing typologies of problems that must be addressed in the policy agenda (Walker 1977; Adler and Wilkerson 2012), the research roughly distinguishes between discretionary and compulsory policy problems, discussing how the three agenda-setters considered in this study fit into those ideal types, as well as the incentives for lawmakers to prioritise one over the other. Chapter 3 presents the data, models and methods that are used to test the theoretical framework. The dissertation relies on data from the Comparative Agendas Project modelled in the form of time series cross sectional models. Chapter 4 introduces the empirical investigation of the content of the policy agenda. It focuses on stability and change in lawmakers' priorities, to understand the extent to which priorities change (or remain the same) across elections. Chapter 5 moves a step further and will assess the connection between policy problems brought by parties' electoral promises and the content of the policy agenda. Chapter 6 will account for one of the most debated sources of policy problems among public policy scholars: policy commitments. This chapter will test the agenda-setting power of policy commitments deriving from the content of the EU directives on lawmakers' priorities and proposing an "EU acquiescence index" to shed light on the 'overlaps' between EU and domestic policy agendas. Finally, Chapter 7 aims at analysing the connection between lawmakers' priorities and media coverage (in terms of print and, where appropriate, audio media) and each of the two relevant types of policy problems competing for lawmakers' attention identified in the previous chapters. In sum the thesis offers a theory of the composition of policy agendas grounded in a problem-solving understanding of politics, and an empirical assessment of its validity. In this sense the study is about how policy problems originating from the dual role of lawmakers in 15 contemporary democracies (representation and administration) affect everyday policy making. More precisely the thesis considers the impact of different agenda venues (parties, EU commitments, and the media) on the way in which lawmakers deliver policies.

Defence date: 11 April 2018
Examining Board: Prof. Rainer Bauböck, European University Institute (Supervisor); Prof. Maurizio Ferrera, University of Milan; Prof. Andrew Geddes, European University Institute; Prof. Liesbet Hooghe, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Over the last forty years, regions in Europe have acquired an increasingly important role in the provision of rights that were traditionally used by states to define the boundaries of national citizenship. Despite this trend, there are still few comparative examinations of what citizenship means for subnational actors, how these affect the provision of rights, and what the consequences of this process are for internal solidarity, the democratic process, and ultimately the constitutional integrity of modern states. These are important questions at a time when ideas about membership and rights within multilevel polities are vigorously contested in courts, legislative chambers, and election booths. Instances of these contestations are the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision on the legality of subsequent referendums on Catalan secession in 2014 and 2017; the ongoing standoff between the state of California and the American federal government over who ought to regulate the rights of undocumented immigrants; and the Scottish and UK referendums on independence and exit from the European Union, respectively. This dissertation sets out to explain under what conditions, how, and with what kind of consequences some regions are more inclusionary than others in their approach to what citizenship entails and to whom it applies. This is what I refer to as the politics of regional citizenship. The empirical analysis focuses on subnational variations in the realisation of the right to health care for undocumented immigrants in three multilevel states where regional governments have some control over health care and, within these, on pairs of regions that have been governed by either left- or right-wing parties and coalitions: Lombardy (Italy, conservative government from 1995), Tuscany (Italy, progressive government from 1970), Andalusia (Spain, progressive government from 1980), Madrid (Spain conservative government from 1995), Vaud (Switzerland, progressive government from 2002) and Zürich (Switzerland, conservative government from 1991). Evidence is collected via the analysis of over 31 legislative documents and 62 interviews with policy-makers, health care professionals, and members of NGOs. The comparison shows that the interaction of political ideologies at different territorial levels leads to the emergence of contested ideas about citizenship through the use that regional governments make of the distinct traditions of regional protection of vulnerable individuals like minor children, the disabled, and the homeless. The comparison also shows that the structure of the territorial system of the state plays an important role in determining the direction of the politics of regional citizenship. The value assigned to territorial pluralism within a country, in particular, determines whether regional citizenship is developed against the state, as a strategy to manifest dissent and mark the difference—as is the case in Spain and, to some extent, in Italy—or, instead, together with the state, as an expression of multilevel differentiation—as in Switzerland. Importantly, however, regional citizenship does never develop in complete isolation from the state because it always represents an attempt to weaken or reinforce the policies of the central government.

Defence date: 5 December 2013
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute/ Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (Supervisor); Professor Bruno de Witte, European University Institute/Maastricht University; Professor Marlene Wind, University of Copenhagen; Professor Alec Stone Sweet, Yale University.
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
This research aims to present a comprehensive analysis of the political and institutional processes that are at work in the judicial application of EU law on a national level. As a main novelty, the research intends to go beyond judicial behaviour models that focus predominantly on explaining the use of preliminary references. One could namely suggest that the way national courts participate in the preliminary reference procedure is not sufficient to assess the available modes for the judicial integration of Europe. Accordingly, the study considers the impact of political institutional and attitudinal factors affecting the judicial enforcement of EU law. This is done by posing new questions, for instance, the relevance of national judges’ preferences towards EU legal order and institutions, as well as by evaluating and reviewing the impact of political and legal institutions on their behaviour and its consequences for policy areas. First of all, the analysis confirms the influence of judges’ evaluation of EU institutions and their national counterparts on their self-perception as EU judges and, subsequently, in the application of EU law. Secondly, the study shows how national institutions, like governments and national high courts, play a prominent role in shaping national courts’ incentives for the application of EU law, as they may use their institutional power to circumvent judges’ decisions. Finally, it reviews the strategic use of European instruments such as the CJEU precedent and its doctrines (e.g. supremacy) to overcome domestic threats when applying EU law. To conclude, the study tries to expand the explanatory power of the middle range accounts of the role national courts played, by integrating the analytical strength of the legalist/ intergovernmentalist theories into neo-functionalism.

Defence date: 20 April 2007
Examining board: Prof. Michael Keating, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Prof. Peter Mair, European University Institute ; Prof. Charlie Jeffery, University of Edinburgh ; Prof. Simona Piattoni, Università degli Studi di Trento
European integration has upset many assumptions regarding the distribution of power, functions and authority across and within states. Scholars have bewailed or rejoiced the ‘emptying’ of the state – the erosion of its competences by supranational integration and decentralisation. However, there are few examinations of how substate actors have responded to state and European structural change, and none that have analysed how substate political parties have sought to enhance regional powers and influence during a period in which state boundaries have become permeable. This research fills this lacuna by exploring how substate parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia have pursued territorial strategies to secure autonomy and capacity in Europe since 1979. The choice of comparing dissimilar regions enables us to explore the uneven effects of European integration in different places, and to examine why some parties have used Europe to advance their territorial projects whilst others have not. Territorial strategies – which include demands for constitutional recognition as well as policy capacity – differ across territories and party systems, owing to a variety of local and statewide factors. They also change over time in response to perceived opportunities for action in Europe. For instance, from 1988-95 the possibilities of a Europe of the Regions led to a convergence of territorial demands, causing nationalist parties to moderate claims to independence and pro-centralist parties to support greater substate autonomy. However, the closing of opportunities for regions from the late 1990s caused some parties to revert back to previous – or more Eurosceptical – positions, or to trade-off autonomy for more access to the state. This indicates that substate party support for European integration is often tactical, whilst pressures for autonomy are motivated by the perception of policy benefits to be obtained, with or without Europe.