Academic literature on the topic 'Régulations marchés numériques'
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Journal articles on the topic "Régulations marchés numériques"
Benghozi, Pierre-Jean. "De la manufacture à l’infrastructure : des conséquences pour la régulation." Annales des Mines - Enjeux numériques 27, no. 3 (September 27, 2024): 26–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ennu.027.0026.
Full textEl OUBANI, Ahmed, and Mostafa LEKHAL. "Conception d’un modèle microscopique adapté aux marchés financiers émergents." Journal of Academic Finance 13, no. 1 (June 30, 2022): 17–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v13i1.514.
Full textFourmentraux, Jean-Paul. "« Oeuvres frontières » de l’art numérique." Anthropologie et Sociétés 35, no. 1-2 (November 2, 2011): 187–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1006386ar.
Full textLe Texier, Thomas, and Ludovic Ragni. "Concurrence 'hybride' , innovation et régulation : un modèle de duopole." La Revue Internationale des Économistes de Langue Française 5, no. 1 (June 30, 2020): 222–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/rielf.2020.1.10.
Full textPerrot, Anne. "Plateformes numériques, régulation et droit de la concurrence." Questions internationales 109, no. 5 (September 14, 2021): 85–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/quin.109.0085.
Full textIsaac, Henri. "L’irrésistible montée en puissance des super-plateformes numériques." Questions internationales 109, no. 5 (September 14, 2021): 29–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/quin.109.0029.
Full textBarreau, Catherine. "Le marché unique numérique et la régulation des données personnelles." Annales des Mines - Réalités industrielles Août 2016, no. 3 (2016): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rindu1.163.0037.
Full textTaïar, Djilali. "Le rôle des autorités françaises de régulation dans la réduction de l’empreinte environnementale du numérique." 3, no. 3 (March 21, 2024). http://dx.doi.org/10.56078/amplitude-droit.628.
Full textAwesso, Dessanin Ewèdew Thierry. "De la régulation à l’autorégulation de l’empreinte environnementale du numérique." 3, no. 3 (March 21, 2024). http://dx.doi.org/10.56078/amplitude-droit.633.
Full textLarue, Louis. "Focus 26 - janvier 2021." Regards économiques, January 28, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14428/regardseco/2021.01.28.01.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Régulations marchés numériques"
Mouton, Jeanne. "Trois essais en économie du droit." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Côte d'Azur, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024COAZ0012.
Full textThis dissertation consists of three essays that fall under the broad banner of competition law and economics. Each essay answers a research question under different angles of economics of litigation studying unilateral conducts from a dominant player causing competitive damage. The three chapters deal with the compensation, prevention and remediation of that damage and combines methods from data analysis, econometrics, and game theory. The first essay studies the determinants of a successful private enforcement action following abuse of dominance position. The second essay studies anti-steering clauses in digital markets under the framework of a digital sector specific regulation. The third essay starts from a commitment decision from the EU Commission imposing remedies on a digital platform to study the effectiveness and auditability of remedies imposed on a ranking algorithm. Overall, this dissertation aims to demonstrate the benefits as well as the hurdles of private enforcement, the Digital Markets Act, and imposing remedies in complementing the traditional competition law public enforcement of unilateral conducts, specifically in digital markets
Malardé, Vincent. "Économie collaborative et régulation des plateformes numériques." Thesis, Rennes 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019REN1G006.
Full textFacilitated by peer-to-peer platforms, the sharing economy has become part of the French way of life. Airbnb, Blablacar, Leboncoin... these platforms are now well known in France. This thesis aims to provide more elements, both theoretical and empirical, to inform the current debates around these platforms. This thesis work begins by using survey data to measure the importance of the use of collaborative platforms in France, and to establish the socio-economic characteristics of users. Then this thesis focuses on the dynamics of developing a collaborative platform,through the example of the French home-to-work ride-sharing platform, iDVROOM. The objective is to study the complementary role of network effects, spatial effects and community effects on the development of the platform. The rest of this thesis focuses on the competition between the short-term rental platform Airbnb and the hotel industry in Paris. The effect of the density of hosts on the collaborative platform on the price charged by an hotel is the subject of a firstempirical study, before being modeled in a theoretical way to discuss the possible effects of a set of alternative regulations of the platform’s activity. Finally, competition between two platforms is analysed when they have the possibility of implementing tariff discrimination strategies designed to encourage supplier exclusivity. The conclusion develops the implications of these results forpolicy makers, platforms and academic research
Megali, Théophile. "Régulations réclamées : Enquête sur le marché de la publicité en ligne et son autorégulation." Thesis, Université Paris sciences et lettres, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020UPSLD004.
Full textIn 25 years of existence, online advertising has emerged and developed in a significant manner, becoming the main growth lever for the advertising market. The functioning of this market is characterized by a strong complexity, an ubiquitous technical layer and the presence of a duopoly with a competitive fringe. This thesis analyses the way various organizations built a form of industry self-regulation to solve failures and organize this very market. Through an introductory chapter and three empirical case studies, this contribution to the literature on industry self-regulation explores the way private norms of a technical nature have been implemented on the online advertising market. These three contributions study three different situations: the rise of online ad-blocking, issues related to the quality of databases for targeting purposes and the establishment of an addressable advertising offer on television. In these three situations, the organizations leading these initiatives constitute arenas where norms are negotiated and where the participation of actors is a matter of strategy
Thebaudin, Guillaume. "Regulation of Digital Platforms : Essays in Industrial Organization." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023IPPAT021.
Full textThis thesis addresses issues related to market power in digital markets. It aims at improving the understanding of digital platforms' governance decisions and their resulting market outcomes.The first chapter theoretically explores the effect of interoperability on competition between two ad-financed platforms, allowing for endogenous multi-homing of consumers. Interoperability emerges in equilibrium if the value of multi-homers relative to single-homers is sufficiently low for advertisers. This equilibrium level of interoperability is however misaligned with social welfare maximization. In markets dominated by one platform, mandating interoperability between the asymmetric platforms is not always socially optimal.The second chapter empirically investigates the issue of self-preferencing on hybrid platforms, using web-scraped data from the Amazon marketplace. It appears that Amazon makes the visibility of offers of third-party suppliers in the "buybox" dependent on prices on competing marketplaces. Amazon's own offers are however visible regardless of their competitiveness. Furthermore, the absence of seller recommendations makes recommendations to related products more effective and Amazon tends to steer consumers in these situations more often to products it sells itself. Overall, this illustrates how self-preferencing can appear in subtle forms.The last chapter theoretically examines the incentives of hybrid platforms to invest in screening tools to detect and delist illegal third-party products. Whereas platforms engage in screening to the extent that it accommodates entry, more vertically integrated platforms tend to screen less due to the business-stealing effect it induces. Additionally, platforms conducting screening charge higher commission fees to sellers. This strategic complementarity can lead to a negative relationship between platforms' degree of vertical integration and the level of commission fees.These three chapters highlight the complex nature of digital markets and the need for regulatory intervention to be carefully calibrated
Dubus, Antoine. "Strategic information and competition in digital markets." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019SACLT037.
Full textMy PhD focuses on how information sellers use consumer information to shape competition on product markets. The three chapters develop theoretical models where the interactions between data brokers specialized in collecting and selling information, firms competing on a product market, and consumers behaving strategically regarding the price they pay and their concern for privacy. Namely we study first the strategies of data brokers selling information to competing firms allowing them to price discriminate consumers. We show that data brokers do not sell all information about consumers but keep a share of unidentified consumers instead. We focus then on competition and mergers between data brokers, and we show that competition affects the uses of information in several directions. Competing data brokers collect less information than monopolists, but sell more consumer data. We show that consumers benefit from competition between data brokers regarding the price they pay on the product market, but the effects on their privacy are two fold. Finally we consider the reactions of consumers who can hide from data brokers and pay a homogeneous price. We show that in order to moderate consumers' willingness to hide, data brokers will identify more consumers on the product market and thus increase competition between firms. Thus the possibility to hide positively affects consumers on the price they pay, as competition is increased, but as more consumers are identified, their privacy concern increases. Overall, this study answers some key questions on the mechanisms of information collection, and uses by data brokers, how they affect competition on the product market, and how consumers react to it when they are concerned both by the price they pay and by their privacy
Allouard, Hugo. "Three essays in digital economics : privacy, regulation & labor markets." Electronic Thesis or Diss., université Paris-Saclay, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024UPASI005.
Full textCertainly! Here is the revised paragraph with corrected grammar:This thesis studies the economic and behavioral implications of digitization. Chapter 1 investigates the privacy sensitivity of consumers in the mobile app market, accounting for the quality enhancement resulting from the use of user data. The findings indicate that not accounting for the consumer benefit of sharing personal information leads to an underestimation of privacy sensitivity. As a result, the sensitivity to data collection is higher than commonly reported in the literature. Furthermore, I show that privacy sensitivity increases over time, but with persistent heterogeneity across countries. Chapter 2 examines the implications of non-discrimination in data collection policies across markets, which is prevalent in the mobile app industry. By estimating a structural model of demand and supply and simulating counterfactual scenarios, I demonstrate that a regulation enforcing discrimination in data collection across countries would increase consumer surplus and privacy in Europe, but with opposite effects in the US. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of the boom in on-demand food delivery platforms on crime, leveraging the temporal and geographic disparities in their introduction in France. Our staggered difference-in-differences approach reveals that the arrival of a delivery platform in an employment area leads to a significant reduction in drug-related crimes. These results indicate that the gig economy fosters employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, youth, and minority groups, facilitating their engagement in lawful economic activities
Book chapters on the topic "Régulations marchés numériques"
Ermoshina, Ksenia, Benjamin Loveluck, and Francesca Musiani. "Chapitre 2. Surveillance et censure des infrastructures Internet en Russie : marchés, régulation et boîtes noires." In Genèse d’un autoritarisme numérique, 51–71. Presses des Mines, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.pressesmines.9073.
Full textHennion, Sylvie. "Annuaire français de relations internationales." In Annuaire français de relations internationales, 587–602. Éditions Panthéon-Assas, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/epas.ferna.2024.01.0587.
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