Relevant bibliographies by topics / Regulation-Competition

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Regulation-Competition'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 23 September 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Regulation-Competition"

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Məzahir qızıCahangirli, Gülarə. "UNFAIR COMPETITION REGULATION IN AZERBAIJAN." SCIENTIFIC WORK 52, no. 03 (February 28, 2020): 63–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/aem/2007-2020/52/63-66.

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Herwig, Alexia. "Competition, Not Regulation – or Regulated Competition?" European Journal of Risk Regulation 6, no. 3 (September 2015): 405–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1867299x00004852.

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GATT Article III:4 aims at equal treatment in respect of competitive opportunities of imports and competing domestic products by preventing protectionism. A key question is whether regulations with heavier burdens on imported products than on domestic products and a valid regulatory purpose are consistent with Article III:4. Inquiry into regulatory purpose under Article III:4 would allow by-passing Article XX whose list of regulatory objectives is a closed one and which puts the burden of proof on the defending WTO member. In EC-Seal Products, the Appellate Body has rejected any role for the regulatory purpose inquiry under Article III:4. This article shows why a purely empirical definition of likeness and less favourable treatment as disparate impact cannot logically lead to a finding of a violation of Article III:4. It then argues that regulatory purpose continues to play a role under Article III:4 because of the centrality of the notion of competition. It proposes to frame that competition as perfect competition. It shows that the adoption of perfect competition as the evaluative benchmark for all of Article III:4 makes better legal sense than starting from imperfect competition for the likeness analysis and perfect competition for the less favourable treatment standard, as is proposed in the literature. It also shows that even in case where imperfect competition is used as the sole benchmark for both parts of Article III:4, an assessment of how regulation interacts with competition continues to play some role.
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Yeung, K. "Privatizing competition regulation." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 581–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/18.4.581.

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Fleming, Anne. "Anti-Competition Regulation." Business History Review 93, no. 4 (2019): 701–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007680519001223.

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Looking across the long twentieth century, this article tracks the rise and fall of one form of anti-competition regulation: the certificate of public convenience. Designed to curb “destructive competition” in certain industries, such as transportation and banking, certificate laws prevented firms from entering those industries unless they could convince regulators that they would satisfy an unmet public demand for goods or services. This history highlights how lawmakers used similar techniques in governing infrastructure and finance—two fields that are not often studied together. It also shows that state regulation both prefigured legal change at the federal level and then lagged behind it, suggesting that different dynamics have been in play at each level of governance in devising competition policy over the last century.
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Luft, Harold S. "Competition and Regulation." Medical Care 23, no. 5 (May 1985): 383–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005650-198505000-00005.

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Pavlov, Kostiantyn. "COMPETITION IN REGIONAL HOUSING MARKETS AND ITS GOVERNMENT REGULATION." INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NEW ECONOMICS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW 2, no. 2 (September 1, 2018): 159–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.31264/2545-093x-2018-2(2)-159-168.

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Javed, Mian Muhammad. "Regulation, Competition, and Information." Pakistan Development Review 41, no. 4II (December 1, 2002): 911–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v41i4iipp.911-913.

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You know it is very hard after the Governor, State Bank, to make a presentation but I will try to do it in a very mundane way. You know the Regulatory Bodies specially in the Economic Sector in recent times. There has been a sort of resurgence, leaving aside the regulation of the financial sector, which has been doing very well. Our old memory of regulation is not so pleasant. Long ago, there used to be a transport Authority which used to dole out “Route Permits” as political favours, and there was you know fixation of Bus Fares not always based on economic considerations but based on arbitrariness. But luckily we have learnt a lot. First, we learnt that it is good to deregulate and I think the primary purpose of the present resurgence is to deregulate. You have a regulatory body to deregulate. Secondly as the finance Minister said yesterday himself that this is a new paradigm. The regulation now has a major ingredient of a development role and in Pakistan with the combination of licencing as necessary part of regulation, you are very effective in that role and it also genuinely provides an opportunity for a one window type of operation where you give a permission and you facilitate the type approvals and then you help them dealing with the local agencies. Although you have brief period for evaluation but the preliminary perception is that they are fairing better than our Industrial Development Corporations which were given the role to promote the Private Sector.
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Marin-Tobar, L. "COMPETITION REGULATION IN ECUADOR." Journal of Competition Law and Economics 9, no. 3 (June 13, 2013): 755–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht009.

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Armstrong, Mark, and David E. M. Sappington. "Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization." Journal of Economic Literature 44, no. 2 (May 1, 2006): 325–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.44.2.325.

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In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.
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Davis, Kevin. "Competition and Financial Regulation." Australian Economic Review 48, no. 2 (May 27, 2015): 180–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.12109.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Regulation-Competition"

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Tassano, Velaochaga Hebert Eduardo. "Competition and utility regulation." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116247.

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With the entry into force of the Constitution of Peru of 1993, the economic model of social market economy, which was accompanied by an institutional reform, creating four (4) regulators of utilities and one (1) competition agency, was established. The economic model of social market economy, guarantees free competition in the market as a general rule, establishing a regulatory framework for public services that before the reform, were managed directly by the State. Thus, in this paper we will learn how to set up the Peruvian institutional framework and what are the main similarities and differences between competition and regulation, for which we will detail the functions of the competition agency and regulatory bodies as well as interaction between the two.
Con la entrada en vigencia de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993, se estableció el modelo económico de economía social de mercado. Como parte del mismo, se realizaron una serie de reformas institucionales del Estado, creándose cuatro organismos reguladores de los servicios públicos y una agencia de competencia. El modelo económico de economía social de mercado garantiza la libre competencia en el mercado como regla general, estableciendo un marco regulatorio para los servicios públicos que, antes de la reforma, eran gestionados directamente por el Estado. Así, en el presente trabajo podremos conocer cómo se ha establecido el marco institucional peruano y cuáles son las principales similitudes y diferencias de la competencia y la regulación, para lo que detallaremos las funciones de la agencia de competencia y la de los organismos reguladores, así como la interacción que existe entre ambos.
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Enhan, Li. "Competition and regulation in telecommunications industry." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/400246.

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La industria de las telecomunicaciones ha sido considerada durante mucho tiempo como un monopolio natural y regulado. Sin embargo, con el desarrollo de la tecnología y los cambios de perspectiva en las teorías económicas, poco queda de la caracterización como monopolio natural en este sector. La moderna industria de las telecomunicaciones presenta las notas de efecto de red, dinamismo, convergencia y mutabilidad. El mercado de las telecomunicaciones requiere tanto desregulación como liberalización para mejorar la eficiencia, la innovación y, por último, para incrementar la protección del consumidor. La experiencia desreguladora de los Estados Unidos y de la Unión Europea constituye un buen ejemplo para los países que están en proceso de abrir el mercado de telecomunicaciones, como sucede en China. Igualmente, la implementación de un Derecho de la competencia como el de la UE debería ser el modelo para la reforma de la industria de las telecomunicaciones en China. Por una parte, el Derecho de la competencia debe aplicarse para controlar los comportamientos anticoncurrenciales en el sector chino de las telecomunicaciones y debe crearse una agencia reguladora específica para el sector que garantice un acceso leal al mercado y una estructura equilibrada. Por otra parte, al resolver los conflictos entre la normativa de la competencia y la ordenación del sector, debe otorgarse preferencia a la primera sobre la segunda al inicio del proceso liberalizador.
Telecommunications industry had been seen as natural monopoly industry and regulated for a long time. However, with the development of technologies and the change of the view of economy theories, this industry remains little feature of natural monopoly. And modern telecommunications industry exhibits the characteristics of network effect, dynamic, convergence and sensitivities. Telecom market requires both deregulation and liberalization to improve the efficiency, innovation, and ultimately to enhance consumer welfare. The experience of deregulation in the United States and the European Union can be taken as a good example for the countries who are in the progress of opening the telecom market, such as China. Especially, the implementation of the EU competition law will provide the enlightenment for reform of telecommunications industry in China. On one hand, competition law should be applied to adjust the anti-competitive behaviors in Chinese telecom industry and independent sector-specific regulatory agency should be established to ensure fair market access and balanced market structure. On the other hand, in dealing with the conflicts between competition law and sector-specific regulation, at the beginning of liberalization, competition law should be taken precedence over the regulatory policy.
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Gaggero, Alberto A. "Emprical Essays on Competition and Regulation." Thesis, University of Essex, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.504833.

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McCahery, Joseph. "Regulatory competition, economic regulation, and law." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1997. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/34750/.

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One often meets the view that economic regulation should be understood in terms of Pareto efficiency. Economic theories of law have traditionally focused on concepts such as market failure, efficiency, and inefficiency. Proponents assume that under the conditions of perfect competition, rational economic actors will enact courses of action that tend to induce Pareto outcomes. The idea of perfect competition means that markets which are competitive will induce efficient outcomes. The perfect competition approach has focused on the conception of market failure as the foundation for designing regulatory policy. Until recently, lawyers overwhelmingly relied upon a model of economic contract, developed over the last two decades in law and economics, as a normative structure to guide efficient decision-making.
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Du, Toit Roscar. "Regulation of competition in a global economy." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0022/MQ50929.pdf.

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Zamorano-Ford, Jorge. "Essays on environmental regulation under imperfect competition." Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01E057.

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Cette thèse couvre deux sujets : le dessin des permis à polluer et la gestion des déchets. Le premier chapitre analyse la mise en œuvre des permis à polluer. Le chapitre se concentre sur les impacts de la distribution liés à la sévérité de l’allocation gratuite basée sur la production courante quand deux secteurs sont couverts par le marché des permis et le plafond reste constant. Un nouveau type d’augmentation des profits dans les secteurs qui ne sont pas exposés à la concurrence internationale a été démontré théoriquement. Le deuxième chapitre traite la question de la différenciation de l’allocation des permis dans les différentes régions, liée à la possibilité des entreprises à délocaliser. Les conditions dans lesquelles le bien-être décroît avec la délocalisation sont déterminées. Dans ce cas, des distributions gratuites de permis peuvent être utilisées pour éviter la délocalisation des entreprises. Le troisième chapitre compare l’efficacité des programmes de la responsabilité élargie du producteur (REP) avec l’efficacité d’une ex-ante taxe. La taxe permet plus de flexibilité ex-ante quant aux conditions du marché, mais la REP permet plus d’adaptation ex-post aux réalisations des coûts. Ainsi, l’efficacité relative de la REP augmente avec l’incertitude des coûts et la compétitivité du marché
This thesis covers two subjects. One is the design of pollution permits and the other is the waste management. The first chapter analyses the implementation of pollution permits. It focuses on the distributional impacts linked with the stringency of output-based allocation,when two sectors are covered by the market for permits and the total cap is held constant. Theoretically demonstrated is a new type of profit increase in sectors that are not exposed to international competition. The second chapter addresses the issue of differentiating permit allocation across areas, this being linked to the possibility of firms to relocate. The conditions under which welfare decreases with relocation are determined. In such a case, free allowances may be used to prevent firms from relocating. The third chapter compares the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) programs and the efficiency of an ex-ante tax. The tax allows more ex-ante flexibility regarding market conditions, but the EPR allows more ex-post adaption to cost realizations. As a result, the relative efficiency of the EPR increases with uncertainty of the costs and competitiveness of the market
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Chen, Pin-Yi. "Resource competition in CRISPR-mediated gene regulation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127156.

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Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, May, 2020
Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, May, 2020
Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-79).
CRISPR-mediated gene regulation is known for its ability to control multiple targets simultaneously due to its modular nature: the same dCas9 effector can target different genes simply by changing the associated gRNA. However, multiplexing requires the sharing of limited amounts of dCas9 protein among multiple gRNAs, leading to resource competition. In turn, competition between gRNAs for the same resource may hamper network function. In this thesis, we develop a general model that takes into account the sharing of limited amounts of dCas9 protein for arbitrary CRISPR-mediated gene repression networks. We demonstrate that, as a result of resource competition, hidden interactions appear, which modifies the intended network regulations. As a case study, we analyze the effects of these hidden interactions on repression cascades. In particular, we illustrate that perfect adaptation to resource fluctuations can be achieved for certain network topology. Then, we analyze the stability properties of uncertain systems that are affected by resource competition via contraction analysis. Finally, we perform a combined analytical and experimental study on a two gRNA parallel network to demonstrate the resource competition effect.
by Pin-Yi Chen.
S.M.
S.M.
S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering
S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Tziatzias, Georgios. "Essays on banking competition, regulation and stability." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2017. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/111143/.

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The turbulent period of the last decade has highlighted the importance of the financial sector and the need for a flexible set of regulations and due diligence in order to have a healthy, sustainable and prosperous financial system. It has also given rise to important questions about the effect of current regulation and competition policies on the bank’s behaviour, economic growth and financial stability. This thesis has attempted to answer these questions, firstly, by analysing the effect of capital requirements on the UK banks’ choice for risk and capital and found evidence that they consider them as complements. This is making the policymaker’s decision more complicating as the end result of the bank’s stability cannot easily be determined because of that co-movement. Secondly, this thesis supports the existence of the bank capital channel for the case of the UK commercial banks. The focus is on the composition of their loan portfolio and capital growth following a change in capital requirements. I find evidence of structural change in the bank’s loan and capital management approach during and after the financial crisis, with the banks become significantly more responsive to capital requirements changes compared to the period before the crisis. Thirdly, the competition-fragility is documented for advanced Western economies when using concentration and market power as proxies for competition, while the competition-stability is present when using the Boone indicator which a measure of firm efficiency. Lastly, a strong regulatory framework becomes more beneficial for less competitive markets.
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Carrasco, Blanc Humberto Rolando. "Regulation as a mechanism to encourage competition in the Chilean telecommunications market : towards the concept of emulated competition." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25851.

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This thesis proposes to determine the role of regulation that promotes competition in the telecommunications market in Chile. Regulation has been used in the telecommunications sector at different points in time to fulfil various market needs. Before liberalisation of the telecommunications market, regulation established the parameters of the state-owned telecommunications company. Later, regulations specified the rights and duties of the incumbent. Hypothetically, a higher degree of regulation is necessary to develop new markets, and once progress has been made, a lesser degree of rules is required. This heavier regulation has been called 'regulation for competition', ‘regulatory competition law’ or 'synthetic competition'. Instead, this research proposes the concept of ‘emulated competition’, which is useful to clarify the role of regulation as a mechanism to promote competition. To build the concept of ‘emulated competition’, the thesis reviews the relationship between sectoral regulation and competition law from a theoretical viewpoint. Subsequently, the thesis carries out a comparative analysis between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) regarding the treatment of certain abuse of dominance cases, particularly with regard to ‘margin squeeze’. To study the Chilean model, the research reviews the constitutional framework of economic regulation and competition law, examining the evolution of pro-competition regulatory tools since the beginning of privatisation. Furthermore, the thesis analyses the case law and regulation issued by the Chilean competition authority in the same period. The analysed topic allows a review of how emulated competition operates in Chile. To sum up, competition law alone is not the best way to introduce competition in the telecommunications market. Therefore, sector-specific regulation has been used to promote competition. In some jurisdictions, it works together with competition law, such as in the EU and Chile. In others, they are incompatible, such as the US. Emulated competition rules could have a higher impact on competition law when they are complements. The research also proposes a model for considering non-economic objectives in competition law matters, and it is a breakthrough in the debate of how to incorporate them in such situations. Finally, the emulated competition concept provides a systematic way of dealing with the intended and unintended effects of pro-competition regulatory tools. The concept itself summarises the contribution to the literature.
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Nystedt, Jens. "Competition, regulation and integration in international financial markets." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-539.

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Chapter I - Derivative Market Competition: OTC Markets Versus Organized Derivative Exchanges  Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States have again raised the issue of a ''level regulatory and supervisory playing field'' and the degree of competition globally between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and organized derivative exchange (ODE) markets. This chapter models some important aspects of how an ODE market interrelates with the OTC markets. It analyzes various ways in which an ODE market can respond to competition from the OTC markets and considers whether ODE markets would actually benefit from a more level playing field. Among other factors, such as different transaction costs, different abilities to mitigate credit risk play a significant role in determining the degree of competition between the two types of markets. This implies that a potentially important service ODE markets can provide OTC market participants is to extend clearing services to them. Such services would allow the OTC markets to focus more on providing less competitive contracts/innovations and instead customize their contracts to specific investors’ risk preferences and needs.  Chapter II – Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation Efforts at crisis resolution that succeed in reducing potential inefficiencies and instability in the international financial system are in the interest of both the private and the public sector. Unlike in the domestic context, in the international context, in the absence of clearly established rules of the game, the approaches adopted toward crisis resolution, and the extent to which they are interpreted by market participants as setting a precedent, can have profound implications for the nature and structure of international capital flows. The key conclusion of this chapter is that recent experiences with payment suspensions and bond restructurings are limited as guides to determining the future success or failures of these initiatives, as the private sector most likely has adapted in order to minimize any unwanted public sector involvement. Chapter III - European Equity Market Integration: Cyclical or Structural? Reviewing the empirical evidence of equity market integration in the European Union, the chapter finds a significant increase in the importance of global sector factors for a number of industries. Unlike most past studies, which only covered developments during the bull market of the late nineties, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the degree of Euroland equity market integration has declined gradually following the bursting of the TMT bubble. This seems to suggest that the findings of previous studies that Euroland equity markets were nearly fully financially integrated is worth revisiting. There are, however, several good reasons to believe that the structural factors driving European equity market integration have yet to play themselves out fully. Institutional investors both outside the Euroland area and within have substantial untapped capacity to take on Euroland exposures and invest additionally in Euroland equities.
Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004
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Books on the topic "Regulation-Competition"

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Crew, Michael A., ed. Regulation Under Increasing Competition. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1.

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1946-, Baldassarri Mario, and Lambertini Luca, eds. Antitrust, regulation, and competition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan in association with Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI, Rome, 2003.

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A, Crew Michael, ed. Regulation under increasing competition. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.

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Kirchhoff, Herb. Local competition and regulation: 1994. 3rd ed. Alexandria, VA (1101 King St. Suite 444, Alexandria 22314): Telecom Pub. Group, 1994.

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Armstrong, Mark. Price discrimination, competition and regulation. Oxford: OxfordUniversity, Institute of Economics and Statistics, 1992.

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Bolt, Wilko. Banking competition, risk, and regulation. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, European Dept., 2004.

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Fraja, Giovanni De. Competition, regulation and managerial incentives. London: Centre forEconomic Policy Research, 1994.

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W, Furchtgott-Roth Harold, ed. Cable TV: Regulation or competition? Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1996.

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Bolt, W. Banking competition, risk, and regulation. Amsterdam: De Nederlandsche Bank, 2001.

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Sidak, J. Gregory, Christoph Engel, and Günter Knieps, eds. Competition and Regulation in Telecommunications. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0640-8.

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Book chapters on the topic "Regulation-Competition"

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Mitchell, Tara, and Francis O’Toole. "Regulation, ‘Nudging’ and Competition." In The Economy of Ireland, 116–42. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-61107-9_5.

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Crew, Michael A., and Paul R. Kleindorfer. "Regulatory Governance and Competitive Entry." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 1–16. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_1.

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Beard, T. Randolph, David L. Kaserman, and John W. Mayo. "Monopoly Leveraging, Path Dependency, and the Case for a Local Competition Threshold for RBOC Entry into Interlata Toll." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 17–44. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_2.

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Salinger, Michael A. "Lowering Prices with Tougher Regulation: Forward-Looking Costs, Depreciation, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 45–61. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_3.

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Crew, Michael A., and Paul R. Kleindorfer. "Stranded Assets in Network Industries in Transition." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 63–78. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_4.

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Brennan, Timothy J. "Comparing “Stranded Cost” Arguments in Telecommunications and Electricity." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 79–94. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_5.

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Loxley, Colin J. "An Economic Analysis of the Stranded Cost Issue Facing Electric Utilities and Policymakers Today." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 95–104. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_6.

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Norsworthy, John R., and Diana H. Tsai. "Performance Measurement for Price-Cap Regulation of Telecommunications." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 105–36. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_7.

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Kang, Yoonyoung, and Menahem Spiegel. "Computable General Equilibrium Models and Electricity CO2 Emissions." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 137–53. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_8.

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Patrick, Robert H., and Frank A. Wolak. "Customer Response to Real-Time Prices in the England and Wales Electricity Market: Implications for Demand-Side Bidding and Pricing Options Design Under Competition." In Regulation Under Increasing Competition, 155–82. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_9.

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Conference papers on the topic "Regulation-Competition"

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Vodanović, Darija. "TEMPORARY REGULATION OF COMPETITION AND CORONAVIRUS." In International Jean Monnet Module Conference of EU and Comparative Competition Law Issues "Competition Law (in Pandemic Times): Challenges and Reforms. Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.25234/eclic/18833.

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Competition law as one of the foundations of a market economy whose main purpose is to ensure an equal position of entrepreneurs in the market, regardless of the size, market power and other features of the implied system of state aid both at central and local and regional level. The aim and purpose of this research is a clear and tentative way of pointing out the importance of competition in relation to coronavirus. In order to achieve this goal, the paper seeks to provide scientifically based answers to a number of current issues, starting from detention from the definitions of competition and coronavirus. In addition to the above, it is necessary to consider how this disease affected entrepreneurship, which had positive and negative consequences. In addition, it is important to note that it has left a significant impact on our mental health. The main results of the research point to the fact that the coronavirus as a global, economic and health crisis suddenly caught us all overnight and as such changed our lives. In addition to greatly affecting the economy, there is also a blow to the company. In case of suspicion of infection, the obligation to call a doctor, ie a territorially competent epidemiologist, and the obligation to go to an outpatient clinic are determined as a preventive measure. In this paper, qualitative research in correlation with quantitative research was used. Starting from the fact that quantitative research is based on the description of individual conditions, ie the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships, the paper in a representative way seeks to simplify the concept of competition as the driving force of a market economy that entails many benefits consumer choice, innovation. In addition, considering the coronavirus from a quantitative point of view, it is manifested in how the coronavirus as a new strain of virus, discovered in humans, 'stirred' the whole world as such forced people to care about their health and the health of our loved ones. Also, an obligation to adhere to epidemiological measures to prevent the spread of coronavirus infection has been introduced. Qualitative research, as a term used to describe research that focuses on the way individuals and groups view and understand the world, also has a significant impact on this work, primarily because it considers how the pandemic affected the health of people interacting with each other.
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GRAY, PHILIP, DIETER HELM, and ANDREW POWELL. "COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION IN BRITISH ELECTRICITY GENERATION." In Proceedings of the British Institute of Energy Economics Conference. PUBLISHED BY IMPERIAL COLLEGE PRESS AND DISTRIBUTED BY WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING CO., 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9781848161030_0015.

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Abramov, S. G. "Legal Regulation Of Commodity, Financial Markets And Competition." In Proceedings of the II International Scientific Conference GCPMED 2019 - "Global Challenges and Prospects of the Modern Economic Development". European Publisher, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2020.03.149.

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"STATE REGULATION OF COMPETITION IN THE BANKING MARKET." In Russian science: actual researches and developments. Samara State University of Economics, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.46554/russian.science-2020.03-2-109/113.

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Clastres, Cedric, and Laurent David. "Capacity release, asymmetric regulation and competition in energy markets." In 2011 European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2011.5953101.

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Littlechild, S. C. "Privatization, competition and regulation in the British Electricity Industry." In APSCOM 2000 - 5th International Conference on Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management. IEE, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/cp:20000358.

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Penov, Radoslav, and Todor Marinov. "STUDYING SELF-REGULATION AMONG KARATE COMPETITORS." In INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS “APPLIED SPORTS SCIENCES”. Scientific Publishing House NSA Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.37393/icass2022/68.

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ABSTRACT The efficiency of Karate athletes’ actions in competitions depends on the condition of their pre-trained psychological, physical and technical, and tactical readiness. The psychological readiness is in the lead of this process as it determines the activities and the abilities for practical realization of specific motions and actions that lead to achieving an advantage over the opponent. Self-regulation is of great importance in this process since it relates to the ability of the Karate athlete to manage their actions during a competition based on the basis of their operational optimization of athletes’ mental readiness. This is the core assumption used in the study, as it relates to studying the self-regulation of Karate competitors. To achieve the objectives of the study, we used a Self Regulation Questionnaire, which allows to determine self-regulation through assessing the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive regulation. The results show that the studied karate athletes have high levels of self-regulation, with some variations according to the level of qualification and their realization in sports. In comparison with the self-regulation among team-sports competitors, karate athletes display much-better abilities to manage their behaviors, emotions, and thinking. The results of the study provide an idea of the ability of the test participants to effectively realize their technical and tactical actions in a competition. In the pre-competition period, it is necessary to pay attention to the Karate athletes who have lower levels of self-regulation.
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Ye Wang and Linlin Zhu. "Model of government regulation about the competition of telecommunications standards." In 2nd International Conference on Computer and Automation Engineering (ICCAE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccae.2010.5451788.

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Clemons, Eric K., Robert J. Kauffman, and Thomas A. Weber. "Introduction to Information Economics, Competition, Regulation, Law, and Society Minitrack." In 2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2014.501.

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Qing-hua, Huang, Zhou Zhi-bo, and Lan Cao-ming. "VAT competition among China's provincial governments and the regulation suggestions." In 2011 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2011.6070124.

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Reports on the topic "Regulation-Competition"

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Danzon, Patricia, and Nuno Pereira. Vaccine Supply: Effects Of Regulation And Competition. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17205.

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Mansur, Erin. Prices vs. Quantities: Environmental Regulation and Imperfect Competition. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13510.

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Fowlie, Meredith. Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14421.

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Atal, Juan Pablo, José Ignacio Cuesta, and Morten Sæthre. Quality Regulation and Competition: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30325.

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Quick, Katherine. The French Economy: An Examination of Competition and Regulation. Portland State University Library, January 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/honors.124.

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Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli, and Amanda Starc. Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18089.

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Aitken, Murray, Ernst Berndt, Barry Bosworth, Iain Cockburn, Richard Frank, Michael Kleinrock, and Bradley Shapiro. The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and Market Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19487.

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Alviarez, Vanessa, Keith Head, and Thierry Mayer. Global Giants and Local Stars: How Changes in Brand Ownership Affect Competition. Inter-American Development Bank, June 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003333.

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We assess the consequences for consumers in 76 countries of multinational acquisitions in beer and spirits. Outcomes depend on how changes in ownership affect markups versus efficiency. We find that owner fixed effects contribute very little to the performance of brands. On average, foreign ownership tends to raise costs and lower appeal. Using the estimated model, we simulate the consequences of counter-factual national merger regulation. The US beer price index would have been 4-7% higher without divestitures. Up to 30% savings could have been obtained in Latin America by emulating the pro-competition policies of the US and EU.
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Willis, Craig. ECMI Minorities Blog. Could a new level of digitalisation offer minority language media outlets a strategy to attract a wider audience? European Centre for Minority Issues, October 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.53779/smpx1996.

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Minority language media (MLM) faced significant disruption resulting from the digitalisation processes which brought in increased competition and challenged traditional business models. With a new wave of technological advancements in auto-translation, however, there may be opportunities to grow audience within different speaker groups. This blogpost considers the model of Scottish Gaelic broadcaster BBC Alba, which is sustained by a two-pronged strategy of content for speakers and non-speakers, concluding that other outlets, including newspapers, could utilise auto-translation tools to grow their audience as readership habits evolve. Caution is also expressed towards the possibility of majority-language first practices creeping in out of convenience, serving as a reminder that regulation and public funding must ensure that minority language content is continuously produced, and that the current wave of digitalisation is advantageous for MLM.
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Ozano, Kim, Andrew Roby, and Jacob Tompkins. Learning Journey on Water Security: UK Water Offer. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2022.026.

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The overarching goals for the UK in relation to global water security are to; tackle and reverse growing water insecurity and its consequences caused by depletion and degradation of natural water sources; and address poor water management and increasing demand. To do this, the UK has a well-developed water ‘offer’ that together can help reach the goal of global water security. This note details some of that water offer: UK water leadership: The UK developed the concept of modern sanitation and water supply, with an early example being the Victorian Bazalgette London sewer; Ownership and regulation: The UK has four models of ownership: government department in Northern Ireland, GoCo in Scotland, Mutual in Wales, and private companies in England. But the common thread is strong and clear, regulation to deliver the right outcomes for society; Competition and markets: The UK set up the world’s first water retail markets for business customers, delivering savings and environmental benefits. Similar market mechanisms are being developed for sewage sludge, which will help drive circular economy solutions; Innovation: The UK has a huge number of water tech start-ups and most water companies have labs and pilot schemes to support these fledgling companies. At the same time, the English regulator, Ofwat, has established a huge innovation fund, which along with the Scottish Hydro Nation initiative has made the UK the best place in the world for water innovation and tech.
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