Journal articles on the topic 'Regionalism – South America'

This article analyzes the complex process that Latin American regionalism has experienced in the two decades of the 21st century and its current impasse. The first part of the paper discusses the era of post-hegemonic regionalism and its limitations. The second part contemplates the arrival of conservative governments and their impact on regionalist strategy, especially in South America. Finally, the response of the Latin American blocs to the Covid-19 pandemic is examined.

Abstract At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Brazil became a crucial player as the principal advocate of South American integration. To Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) was added the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), reaffirming regional policies around the idea of “South America.” Today, however, the withdrawal of Brazilian leadership along with the reversals and loss of focus in UNASUR and Mercosur have damaged the credibility of the region’s initiatives, as well as finding South America’s common voice. Despite this, this article argues that Brazil has not entirely disengaged from the region or abandoned the principle of regionalism. Recognition of Latin America’s distinctive history the authors to construct a model that incorporates complexity and disorder in which Brazil’s institutional political development will have significant repercussions for the future of the region.

The article presents an analysis of the recent dismantling of the Union of South-American Nations (UNASUR) under the governments of the liberal-conservative turn recently experienced in South America. Through the mobilization of excerpts from speeches by Heads of State in the region, it is possible to note that the allegedly “ideological” character of UNASUR is presented as the main justification for leaving the institution. Having that in mind, the main objective of the article is to interrogate narratives about the ‘ideological’ character of UNASUL. For that, the article presents a literature review on regionalism, pragmatism and ideology to challenge this narrative. It is argued, first, that pragmatism and ideology in regionalism are not dichotomous, but complementary concepts. Moreover, despite UNASUR’s ideological elements, the organization represents a series of alignments and pragmatic factors in its institutionalization and performance. Finally, it is argued that the proposals for “de-ideologization” and “pragmatic realignment” of the regionalism of the new rights in South America are, in fact, more ideological than pragmatic as they claim.

AbstractWhat explains the variation in how states collectively deal with public health challenges across different regions? We tackle this puzzle by comparing the regional health governance efforts pursued within the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). We show that Central America's health governance has been driven by external actors, whereas South America's was driven by states within the region, and remained insulated from external actors’ influence. We argue that the explanation for such variation lies in the interplay of state capacity and regional leadership. In Central America, weak state capacity combined with the absence of a regional leader willing to provide governance resources. This opened up space for external actors to contribute actively to regional health governance, complementing the governance of Central American governments. In South America, Brazil's regional leadership mobilised neighbouring states’ capacities by promoting a South-South cooperation agenda based on intra-regional exchanges among national health bureaucracies, which, however, proved vulnerable to intergovernmental conflicts. Through the comparison of Central and South America, the article bridges the gap between global health governance scholarship and comparative regionalism, providing new insights on the determinants and effects of regional health governance modes in the Global South.

Latin American regionalism is currently undergoing a profound crisis. Although the recent wave of regionalism of the early 21st century raised high expectations just a few years ago, it has suffered some important drawbacks since, as illustrated by the suspension of Venezuela from Mercosur in 2017 or the debacle of the Union of South American Nations in April 2018. Regional integration theories extrapolated from the European case struggle to account for the short cycles of integration dynamics in Latin America. Against this background, this article emphasizes two important aspects of Latin American regionalism that differentiate Latin America from other regions and explain some of the swift changes experienced over the last decades. First, because of the presidential nature of diplomacy in the region, integration relies more on the success of summits and joint declarations than on longer-term institutional diplomacy. Second, ideology is an essential factor of integration, as opposed to a vision of regionalism based primarily on material interests. Hence, the success and failure of regional integration are partly explained by the convergence of presidential ideologies among member states in a given organization. Based on an expert survey on the evolution of presidential ideology in 15 Latin American countries since the beginning of the 21st century and complemented by a structured discourse analysis, the article explores the importance of ideological coherence in the success – and lack thereof – of four regional organizations (the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur, the Andean Community and the Union of South American Nations). It also illustrates the salience of ideological arguments in presidential discourses on regional integration. These elements shed new light on the ideological factor in the current crisis of Latin American regionalism.

Particularly, beginning the 21st century the Political landscape saliently changed and shifted to debunk the notion of "the end of history" in South America. Several Latin American scholars including Bjorn Hettne, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Philippe De Lombaerde and the international organizations including United Nations for Latin American Economic Commission (UN ECLAC) have paid attention to the left-leaning governments which have eventually governed these states. In this vein, this study (as an initial step for the research proposal) attempts to understand the logic of (new) regionalism under globalism and particularly to contribute to its academic value. This study is mainly approaching the subject from a theoretical foundation in order to understand and then to apply the rationale of politically-oriented regional institutions.

This article addresses the South American difficulties in the consolidation of regional security mechanisms, developing an analytical model called the “paradox of autonomy.” This model was developed through the application of inductive and deductive methodological criteria, based on the observation of recent historical reality, in order to attain generalizable lessons from a relevant case for South American international relations. Also using rational analytical approaches that allow their construction within the framework of rational action problems. From the observation on the emergence and performance of the South American Defense Council, it was identified that the allowing conditions for a novel mechanism of regional (collective) autonomy for security, paradoxically offered opportunities for the exercise of national (individual) autonomy. The article concludes that, although the conditions for the paradox of autonomy are difficult to overcome in cases of security regionalism initiatives, there are possibilities to do so. The key would be in less ambitious institutional designs that recognize the inherent difficulties for institutional regional security cooperation in South America.

Abstract In this article, I examine Latin American regionalism from the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to the emergence and development of the Pacific Alliance (PA) in the period 2005 to 2015. For most of the research, I use the main economic blocs in the region, Mercosur as well as the PA, as the units of analysis. The main findings are that since the FTAA’s collapse, integration processes have become more heterogeneous; that Mercosur and the PA contrast with one another in political-economic terms; that the Brazilian project of establishing a post-liberal/post-hegemonic regionalism in South America has not succeeded; and that regional demand for Brazilian products is at risk of shifting to other markets in the medium to long term, thus further undermining its aspirations towards regional leadership. All of this is evidence of a decentred economic regionalism – that is, a form of regionalism in which no single state is in central command, or has enough followers to assume leadership and establish a dominant conception of integration and regional cooperation. Other factors contributing to this decentralisation are the poor economic performance of Brazil and Mexico, and the US government’s changed attitude towards trade relations with Latin America. Despite this, I argue that Latin American countries do need to strengthen cooperation within and among these regional blocs, aimed at promoting their joint global competitiveness. This will require cooperation rather than coercion, and networks and connectivity rather than hierarchies.

East Asia is catching up with the rest of the world in establishing regional trade arrangements (RTAs). This region is responding to pressures from globalization, regionalism in the Americas and Europe, the rise of China and India, improved political relations in the region with the end of the Cold War, as well as market-driven trade and investment integration and the emergence of production networks. ASEAN formed the first RTA in 1992, and by the turn of the decade, ASEAN was signing or negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia–New Zealand, and the European Union. It also entered into bilateral FTAs with the United States and countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. ASEAN is also considering an East Asian FTA. Can ASEAN remain in the driver's seat of regional integration and be an effective hub? The FTA proliferation also has important consequences and effects for East Asia and the world trading system.

AbstractThe breakdown of the North-South, East-West governing principles, and the removal of superpower overlay have led to an increasingly decentralised system setting the stage for the so called new geography of trade and the reconfiguration of political – diplomatic strategies. Such strategies now include contestation, articulation, competitive liberalisation, ample inter-state coalition building such as the G-20, G-33, G-90 in the Doha Round and the proliferation of regional and wider ranging preferential arrangements. Regionalism is both policy and project. Agreements vary widely in motivation, form, coverage and content. It is very often the case that, as in multilateral institutions, one major actor sets the agenda at the regional level with the view not only of constructing and retaining power at that level but also of setting global precedents. New balancing or bandwagoning efforts vis-à-vis the local strong power are set in motion with fresh implications for the emerging global architecture. Regional alignments are thus constantly shaping and reshaping market relations. Intra-Latin American agreements (those not including the majors, the US and the EU) were motivated by the search for wider markets building up economies of scale amongst similar countries. Such agreements mostly focused on market liberalisation through diverse schedules of tariff reduction. The result has been the emergence of shallow regional agreements. Nonetheless, most have not been fully implemented, but they show a long term trend towards potential convergence, especially if the Community of South American Nations moves on. External pressures have also spurred agreements as defensive mechanisms. So we witness impulses to regionalism complementing and at times competing with older patterns and trends. This contribution focuses on the different avenues that Latin America is undertaking in terms of regional projects. It will assess the dynamics of intra- regional integration and the inter-action effects with varieties of North-South integration.

AbstractTackling germs, negotiating norms, and securing access to medicines are persistent challenges that disproportionally affect developing countries' participation in global health governance. Furthermore, over the last two decades, the excessive focus on global pandemics and security in global health diplomacy, rendered peripheral diseases that usually strike the poor and vulnerable, creating situations of marginalisation and inequality across societies. However, as the importance of regions and regionalism increases in global politics, and integration ambitions and initiatives extend beyond trade and investment to embrace welfare policy, there are new opportunities to explore whether and how regional commitments affect health equity and access to medicine in developing nations. What, if any, are the possibilities for meso-level institutions to provide leadership and direction in support of alternative practices of global (health) governance? Can regional polities become international advocacy actors in support of global justice goals? This article addresses these questions by analysing regional health diplomacy in South America. The article argues that regional organisations can become sites for collective action and pivotal actors in the advocacy of rights (to health) enabling diplomatic and strategic options to member state and nonstate actors, and playing a role as deal-broker in international organisations by engaging in new forms of regional health diplomacy.

A segunda década do século XXI apresentou um cenário de fragilidades socioeconômicas com sucessivas crises políticas, ampliando a vulnerabilidade externa e a incapacidade estatal de planejamento na América do Sul. No plano regional, constata-se a proeminência da fragmentação, do regionalismo aberto e da retomada de projetos hemisféricos e/ou tratados de livre-comércio. O presente artigo possui o objetivo de ensejar o debate da integração sul-americana na década de 2020, a partir das experiências políticas deste início de século. Utilizando o método qualitativo da análise de documentos oficiais do embrionário Foro para o Progresso e Integração da América do Sul (PROSUL), a hipótese central é de que este novo bloco consiste numa tentativa de substituir o modelo prévio de integração autônoma por uma integração conservadora alinhada aos interesses liberais e estadunidenses. Por conseguinte, conclui-se que a América do Sul vem sendo afligida por um processo de desintegração regional.Palavras-chave: integração regional; América do Sul; PROSUL.ABSTRACTIn the second decade of the 21st century, South America presented socioeconomic fragilities with successive political crises, increasing the external vulnerability and the state's incapacity for planning. At the regional level, it was verified the prominence of fragmentation, open regionalism and the resurgence of hemispheric projects and free trade agreements. This article aims to promote the debate on South American integration in the 2020 decade, based on the political experiences of the beginning of this century. By Using the qualitative method of analyzing official documents of The Fórum para o Progresso e Integração da América do Sul (PROSUL), this article presents as its central hypothesis that this new block consists in an attempt to replace the previous model of autonomous integration with a conservative integration aligned to liberal and American interests. Consequently, this research concludes that there is a process of regional disintegration affecting South America in the last years.Keywords: regional integration; South America; PROSUL. Recebido em: 02 abr. 2021 | Aceito em: 05 out. 2021.

This paper analyzes the regional integration process in South America and discusses the main difficulties and obstacles until 2016. During the 2000s, with the so-called Pink Tide, there was the rise of several left-wing and center-left governments in the region, which were dedicated to formalizing regional integration initiatives to project South America as a center of power on the international scene. However, these initiatives were not homogeneous in their ideological aspects, generating some contrasts between them. Also, with the decline of the left-wing and center-left governments in the region between 2011 and 2016, the initiatives gradually weakened, causing a setback to regional integration in the subcontinent.

Abstract The administration of President Michel Temer (2016-2018) led to significant changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America as opposed to the country’s goals that had remained in place for over a decade. This article addresses the question of how and why these changes unfolded under Temer’s government. Anchored in an analytical framework of Public Policy Analysis, we develop two main arguments. Firstly, we claim that the changes in foreign policy towards South America represented a paradigmatic transition from a post-liberal strategy to the restoration of the logic of open regionalism. Secondly, we argue that this change resulted from the coupling of the three dimensions of the political process: problem recognition, policy alternatives, and politics. The primary cause of such change was the political dispute in the public arena between business groups and party leadership.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

Abstract The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to investigate the increased interest in health as an important dimension of the foreign policy and diplomatic concerns together with the emergence of a new framework for regional health integration and regional health diplomacy. Second, it seeks to understand the role and practices of new regional blocs in the field of health and whether they are conducting to the emergence of new strategies for addressing health regional policies in South America. The regional policy process relates to health as a right. Thus, some practices and processes in social policy are setting new standards for political and social cohesion in the construction of new regionalism. Health crosses national, regional, and global agendas in a multi-directional fashion, rather than via one-way, top-down policy transfer. A special feature of Unasur is upholding regional health sovereignty despite the unique fact that member countries retain national autonomy. Unasur has projected foreign policy that promotes social values in ways that seem innovative. Experience as Unasur shows that regional organisms can become a game changer in global diplomacy and an influential actor in the international agenda.

Este artigo abordará o relacionamento do empresariado industrial, representado pelas entidades Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) e a Federação das Indústria do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp), com a integração regional durante os governos do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Através da análise documental, argumentou-se que os governos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva foram marcados por uma convergência entre os interesses do empresariado industrial e a orientação do executivo federal acerca da política externa brasileira (PEB), com sua ênfase na América do Sul. Em que pese a mesma orientação sobre a PEB, nos governos Dilma Rousseff houve uma mudança de postura do empresariado industrial em relação à integração regional e a defesa, por parte das duas entidades, de um reposicionamento da política externa a partir de uma menor ênfase na integração sul-americana e na política de orientação sul-sul.Palavras-chave: Integração regional. Política Externa. Mercosul. Abstract:This piece addresses the relationship between the manufacturing business community, mainly represented by the Federation of Manufacturers of the State of São Paulo and the National Confederation of Manufacturers, and regional integration with South America during the years the Workers' Party assumed office. Through documentary analysis, this research argues that the years when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Workers' Party) was in office represented a convergence between the interests of the manufacturing business community and the Brazilian foreign policy, which had its focus on South America at the time. While Dilma Rousseff (Workers' Party) was the incumbent president and the foreign policy still had the same core, the manufacturing business community had shifted its interests and was no longer very supportive of a South American integration nor of a close relation between Brazil and other Southern American countries.Keywords: Regional Integration. Foreign Policy. Mercosul. Recebido em 15 jun. 2022 | Aceito em 20 out. 2022.

The evolution of regionalism in Latin America has historically been greatly influenced by changes in governments and their ideological programs. In this article, looking at the courses of the administrations of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Ivan Duque in Colombia, Sebastian Piñera (second term, 2018-2022) in Chile, Mario Abdo Benítez in Paraguay, it is proposed to examine transformations in integration against the backdrop of increased influence of right-wing forces in regional alignments in the mid-2010s to the early 2020s. Analyzing foreign policy steps, rhetoric, content of conceptual documents, the authors focus on the peculiarities of the national views of various right forces on integration initiatives. The paper concentrates on the decline of Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), creation of Forum for the Progress and Integration of South America (PROSUR) and Lima Group, activities of the Pacific Alliance and Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in the context of the demand for flexible and pragmatic integration “without politicization.” The authors come to several conclusions which show ambiguity of the right turn impact on the integration landscape in Latin America. First, although the rise of liberal-conservative forces has reformatted philosophy, key ideas of integration, participation in multilateral groups remains important for governments that seek to solve pressing problems and expand their own reputational and political capital with its help. Second, despite the fluidity of electoral dynamics, which may soon put an end to the dominance of the right, they have raised a number of issues of long-term relevance in the context of the future path of integration associations in the region. The contribution of the work is explained by its appeal to the very factor of ideology in the development of Latin American integration, detailed analysis of specific country experiences and new conclusions based on it.

Regional integration in Latin America has experienced different periods of politicization. The most recent goes back to the 2000s and is related to the domestic political changes resulting from the so-called ‘left turn’ which sought alternative economic and development policies to neoliberalism as the state regained centrality. These transformations led to a broad process of politicization of regionalism which changed the terms of the debate surrounding whether regional integration and free trade are the only way for these countries to integrate regionally and internationally. Analyses have thus underscored the postliberal character of this phase of regionalism as reflected in the greater weight of social and political agendas at the expense of economic and trade issues. The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) was no exception to this trend. However, in 2010 the bloc rather surprisingly agreed to relaunch negotiations with the European Union (EU). Why did MERCOSUR decide to resume these negotiations—stalled since 2004—in a context of high politicization of regional integration? This article argues that internal politicization did not lead to a paralysis of the international agenda. Moreover, internal politicization, coupled with external pressures and the demand for group-to-group negotiations by the EU, drove and supported the conduct of international negotiations. In so doing, this article also contests the idea that after the 2000s, MERCOSUR moved inexorably towards a postliberal model, thus rejecting any trade component. Findings suggest that these accounts may have overemphasized change and underestimated continuities in regional integration dynamics as the case of the external agenda shows.

The article reviews main principles and imperatives of the foreign policy provided by actual left-wing governments in Latin America. In a big number of countries in the region, politicians with leftist views have recently come to power. Among them there are the presidents of Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Chile and Colombia. The scale of the new “Pink tide” suggests analogies to the “Left turn” that took place in the beginning of the 21st century. However, accents in the current agenda vary and nuances make the difference. The analysis of narrative and political practice of the left leaders shows that traditional commitment to the principles of anti-Americanism and anti-neoliberalism stay relevant. Idea of multipolarity and search for an alternative to US hegemony remain key issues to the international positioning of Latin American states. At the same time, they no longer intend to question liberal international order and global economic conditions. Problem of human rights and combat climate change are getting more important for Latin American countries. A special kind of vision on these global concerns can contribute to their diplomatic ambitions and increase their international status. The challenge of balancing between the two global powers, US and China, push to strengthen ties with the non-region states that belong to the “Global south”. Another attribute of the modern regional configuration is lack of an apparent locomotive in the current South American integration system. Too explicit dissimilarities in the strategies of left-wing governments do not give reasons for the emergence of a strong collective platform. The ideology of regionalism that appealed to the great united motherland, is being replaced today by a new configuration where the former interconnectivity between Latin American left regimes is not displayed and mini-lateral cooperation matters. Their realignment and new alliances will be fundamental to the regional balance.

A projeção brasileira sobre a América do Sul foi destaque desde sua redemocratização, ocorrida na década de 1980. Ainda assim, seu comportamento não pode ser considerado hegemônico em seu sentido realista, exercido pelo poder duro. Nem liberal, já que optou pela multiplicidade de iniciativas, de baixa grau de institucionalização. Propomos a aplicação do conceito gramsciano de hegemonia para analisar se o Brasil exerce a sua na América do Sul por meio de um ativismo nos processos de integração regional. Para isto, utilizamos o método qualitativo com um estudo de caso único típico para desenvolver uma ilustração preliminar de teoria, baseado em uma revisão bibliográfica da história da política externa Brasileira (fontes primárias e secundárias). Esta análise nos leva a argumentar que há dubiedade na atuação brasileira regional, já que optou por não aprofundar o grau de institucionalização das organizações regionais e por não exercer poder coercitivo durante crises regionais. Ainda que o comportamento brasileiro não representa um caso típico de hegemonia, tendo os achados pouca validade externa para além deste caso, há evidências sua atuação em diversos arranjos regionais como líder e construtor de consensos é uma forma de exercer hegemonia (gramsciana) na região.

The past decade has witnessed a resurgence of regionalism in world politics. Old regionalist organizations have been revived, new organizations formed, and regionalism and the call for strengthened regionalist arrangements have been central to many of the debates about the nature of the post-Cold War international order. The number, scope and diversity of regionalist schemes have grown significantly since the last major ‘regionalist wave’ in the 1960s. Writing towards the end of this earlier regionalist wave, Joseph Nye could point to two major classes of regionalist activity: on the one hand, micro-economic organizations involving formal economic integration and characterized by formal institutional structures; and on the other, macro-regional political organizations concerned with controlling conflict. Today, in the political field, regional dinosaurs such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have re-emerged. They have been joined both by a large number of aspiring micro-regional bodies (such as the Visegrad Pact and the Pentagonale in central Europe; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle East; ECOWAS and possibly a revived Southern African Development Community (SADC, formerly SADCC) led by post-apartheid South Africa in Africa), and by loosely institutionalized meso-regional security groupings such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) and more recently the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the economic field, micro-regional schemes for economic cooperation or integration (such as the Southern Cone Common Market, Mercosur, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market (CACM) and CARICOM in the Americas; the attempts to expand economic integration within ASEAN; and the proliferation of free trade areas throughout the developing world) stand together with arguments for macro-economic or ‘bloc regionalism’ built around the triad of an expanded European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and some further development of Asia-Pacific regionalism. The relationship between these regional schemes and between regional and broader global initiatives is central to the politics of contemporary regionalism.

The shifting of global political-economy since early 1990s has been followed by the expansion of regional economy cooperation forum establishment, such as: NAFTA (North America Free Trade Area), EFTA (European Free Trade Area) and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Indonesia, together with the other South East Asia countries who join ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia), is also actively involved in engaging regional economy cooperation forums, such as: ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN-India FTA, ASEAN-Jepang Economic Partnership, ASEAN Regional Economi Partnership (ARCEP). The establishment of those economic regionalism is apparently a strategy in responding economical globalization. Indonesia’s involvement in those regional economy cooperations has increased its national commitment, both in going through economical liberization as well as in building its national economy competitiveness. This research describes Indonesian political challanges in responding the dynamic changes of that global economy.

A remarkable proliferation in the number of non-financial emerging multinational enterprises (NFEMNEs) and their share in the aggregate outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), along with the complexity of their FDI activities, has been witnessed over the past decades. Consequently, considerable interest has been generated within and among countries regarding the implications of these relatively new significant emerging global players for a range of economic and policy issues. In order to understand the gaps in knowledge pertaining to their identities, activities and impacts, this article employs the results of our 2015 emerging markets global players (EMGP) reports to make logical and informed insinuations about the structure and profile of NFEMNEs originating from China, Brazil and South Africa, the largest emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Africa. We also synthesise and compare the outcomes of the 2015 EMGP reports of these OFDI home countries. We find the existence of a pattern in the ranked top NFEMNEs, from each country, in terms of industry sectors, regionalism and national bias. Furthermore, we establish that the respective NFEMNEs participated in international markets to pursue larger markets, natural resources and strategic assets and were not crowded out of their domestic markets by inward FDI.

Abstract Both Brazil and Venezuela structured their foreign policy agendas in the early 21st century on the projection of their respective leadership in regional schemes such as UNASUR and ALBA, respectively, following an intermediate hegemonic strategy. The loss of dynamism of these post-hegemonic initiatives problematizes the relationship between regional governance and the role of regional powers. ALBA is a scheme contingent on the political cycle and political voluntarism intrinsic in Venezuela’s leadership. The bloc has lost members and relevance in recent years. As for UNASUR, most of its member states have withdrawn from the bloc and it is currently not operating. In short, post-hegemonic proposals lose dynamism and support once the leadership that promoted them weakens. A certain ‘hegemonic stability theory’ contextualized to South America with regard to the leadership of Brazil and Venezuela in recent years seems to be fulfilled: the decline in power of these countries helps to account for political reversals and changes in regional governance.

Globalization is viewed not only as the objective, but also as the subjective process, the current version of which requires adjustments since it is characterized by the increasing inequalities and instability, causing conflicts worldwide, pushing regional groups towards confrontations. Globalization is to be directed for achieving the equitable levels of development across the globe for which it is suggested to establish the situational governing board as the common platform for collaboration between the regional blocs for global economy regulation. The notions of the regional state and the global/planetary state are introduced. The interdependence between regionalization and globalization is thoroughly analysed, which results is the explanation of the logic behind the process of the multipolar world formation as opposed to the unipolar one. The main points are illustrated by the facts from the EU integration history, WTO practice, the calculated indicators of the major thirteen regional integration groupings covering Europe, Asia, North, South America, Africa, two transregional organizations Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, as well as the USA, Developed economies of Europe, China. The contribution to the study of regionalism as the boosting phenomenon shaping the development of the world allowed to conclude that regionalization is critical for the sustainable future of the world.

El artículo analiza el desarrollo de una comunidad de seguridad en América del Sur y el impacto que tuvo sobre ella la pandemia provocada por el coronavirus. A partir de un enfoque constructivista, en la primera parte del trabajo se explica cómo la crisis del regionalismo, la dificultad para definir amenazas comunes y la erosión de la identidad colectiva atentaron contra la maduración de la comunidad de seguridad sudamericana. Sobre este escenario, se argumenta que la crisis sanitaria originada por la COVID-19 dio lugar a un movimiento de resecuritización que profundizó el retroceso de la comunidad y se manifestó en tres indicadores: 1) la proliferación de discursos que identifican a los vecinos como una amenaza a la seguridad y la salud; 2) la fortificación de las fronteras; 3) el incremento de la militarización de la seguridad ciudadana y otras esferas de la arena pública. Como conclusión, se sostiene que ese tipo de prácticas y discursos da lugar a un tipo de comunidad política parecida a una sociedad anárquica, en la que los Estados se identifican más como rivales que como amigos. Abstract The article analyzes the development of a security community in South America and the impact that the coronavirus pandemic had on it. By using a constructivist methodology, the paper analyzes how the crisis of regionalism, the difficulty in defining common threats and the erosion of a collective identity hampered the maturation of the community. In this context, it is argued that the health crisis caused by COVID-19 gave rise to a securitization process that deepened the process of dismantling that community and was reflected in three indicators: 1) the proliferation of discourses that identify neighbors as a threat to safety and health; 2) a fortification of the borders; 3) an increase in the militarization of citizen security and other spheres of the public arena. It is concluded that this type of practice and discourse gives rise to a type of political community similar to an anarchic society, where states identify themselves as rivals rather than friends.

El artículo abarca las modalidades de penetración de empresas y mercancías chinas en los mercados populares regionales y evidencia las articulaciones, vínculos y circuitos globales que se van cristalizando en estos procesos. El tipo de relacionamiento entre China y los mercados populares regionales parece poner en cuestión conceptos como el “Consenso de Beijing” o la “Cooperación Sur- Sur” e inducirnos a reflexionar en nociones y vínculos de lo global de otra índole

In the history of the American Arts and Crafts Movement, New Orleans's Newcomb College Pottery (founded in 1894) is often singled out as distinctive by virtue of its genesis as an experimental educational venture, all the more remarkable for emerging out of a small women's college located in the Deep South. Scholarship on NCP frequently rehearses the regionalist character of its diverse handicrafts and its adherence to the central tenets of Arts and Crafts. This article explores how Newcomb College Pottery was neither so strictly regionalist nor so pure an embodiment of the Arts and Crafts spirit as is often averred. Situating Newcomb College Pottery within contemporary cultural debates concerning the formation of a “New South,” I demonstrate how the architects and advocates of Newcomb, inspired by the 1884 Cotton Centennial, sought to craft a largely aspirational identity that marketed NCP as a model industry that heralded commercial and cultural development in the region. It was only later, I argue, as the Pottery developed from an educational experiment into a widely known and respected handicraft enterprise, that it embraced the anti-industrial rhetoric that animated the broader Arts and Crafts movement and adopted the more sentimental form of regionalism that traded on romantic evocations of the Old South, in repudiation of the socially and economically progressive energies that gave it birth.

Revolusi Amerika Selatan secara massif pada awal abad 19, berdampak terhadap terbentuknya negara independen dan proses dekolonisasi oleh Kekaisaran Spanyol dan Portugal. Gaungan unifikasi atas dasar persamaan kultural dan linguistik berusaha diimplementasikan di wilayah ini secara terus-menerus, tetapi nyatanya proses integrasi regional ini selalu menemui kegagalan. Lemahnya proses industrialisasi, terbatasnya konsolidasi kedaulatan, serta banyaknya konflik internal turut serta berkontribusi dalam gagalnya usaha ini. Permasalahan ini terus berlanjut secara periodik hingga pada masa pembentukan regionalisme global pasca PD2. Disaat integrasi regional telah berhasil terbentuk di Afrika dan Eropa semisalnya, Amerika Selatan belum juga berhasil menegakkan suatu institusi regionalisme yang terpadu dan berdaya kompetisi tinggi di pasar dunia. Dari implikasi tersebut, karya ilmiah ini akan mencari interkoneksi antara pengaruh geopolitik kawasan dengan pembentukan institusi domestik untuk menemukan akar permasalahan gagalnya pembentukan regionalisme di Amerika Selatan, faktor historis semenjak dekolonisasi hingga gelombang revolusi sosialis abad 21 didalam dinamika Amerika Selatan akan digunakan sebagai fondasi analisis karya ilmiah ini. Kemudian, paradigma konstruktivis akan digunakan sebagai pengampu, disertai teori dan konsep regionalisme praktis oleh pakar Hubungan Internasional Jeffrey Checkel

Este trabalho busca descrever as relações existentes entre regionalismos e migrações internacionais na América do Sul, mediante a análise da Comunidade Andina (CAN), do Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul) e da União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul). Estes processos, que incluem entre seus propósitos o tratamento das migrações internacionais, redefiniram seus objetivos ou incorporaram este fenômeno no marco do regionalismo pós-liberal ou pós-hegemônico. Aqui, fatores como a maior politização da cooperação regional, o “giro à esquerda” dos principais países da região, a emergência de novas narrativas a favor dos direitos dos migrantes e uma maior participação de atores não estatais tiveram um papel essencial. Como resultado, foram criadas normativas regionais sobre migrações internacionais com a perspectiva dos direitos humanos e projetos de cidadania regional. Concluímos com algumas reflexões sobre as mudanças recentes no cenário político regional e o retorno do regionalismo aberto com ênfase na economia e no comércio.

Over the last two decades, natural resource governance has become an increasingly important element of South American regionalism as commodities became a central driver for regional development strategies. Yet, due to socio-environmental impacts and dissatisfaction with decision-making processes, it is also frequently contested. This article focuses on one particularly prominent contestation with transboundary and regional repercussions, the case of the pulp mill conflict which escalated between Argentina and Uruguay in the 2000s. Using the concepts of regionness and politics of scale, it examines in which ways the pulp mill conflict affected regional cohesion and seeks to understand why it evolved in this way. This shows that the way national governments address socio-environmental conflicts is an important additional obstacle to regional cohesion which has received little attention in studies of South American regionalism so far.

A partir da análise da dimensão da infraestrutura na política dos governos Lula (2003-2010) para a América do Sul, o objetivo do artigo é apontar a correlação entre a política regional e a projeção do modelo de desenvolvimento adotado, o neodesenvolvimentismo. O ativismo político, a construção de uma agenda multilateral através da conformação de instituições regionais, como a Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Regional Sul-Americana (IIRSA) e o Conselho Sul-Americano de Infraestrutura e Planejamento (COSIPLAN), e as políticas nacionais de incentivo à exportação, orientadas ao setor da construção civil, impulsionaram os financiamentos das obras pelo Brasil no nível regional. Defende-se que o tema da infraestrutura permite observar a projeção de interesses privados brasileiros na política regional do país. Abstract: Within the analysis of the infrastructure dimension for the brazilian foreign policies during Lula's government (2003-2010) towards South America (2003-2010), this article aims to point out the correlation between the regional policy and the projection of the development model adopted, the neo-developmentalism. The political activism, the construction of a multilateral agenda through the creation of regional institutions, such as the South-American Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA) and the South-American Infrastructure and Planning Council (COSIPLAN), and the national export incentive policies towards the construction sector, leveraged the brazilian financing at the regional level. It is argued that the infrastructure dimension allowed the projection of the brazilian private interests in its regional policy. Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy. Infrastructure Integration. South American Integration. Recebido em: fevereiro/2020. Aprovado em: agosto/2020.

AbstractThis article examines the pros and cons of the "new regionalism," with the negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) taken as a landmark. It summarizes the main features of the "new regionalism" and reviews some of the challenges and opportunities opened by North-South preferential trade agreements (a category that includes many of the new vintage of such agreements). The article also evaluates the record of the FTAA negotiations, emphasizing recent trends and prospects, especially the foundations of the current stalemate.

Regional integration is discussing cooperation among states in a region and the influence of external states or organizations. The cooperation among regions is known as inter-regionalism. As a leader in regional integration, European Union (EU) has been cooperating with the other regions since their name was European Economic Community. Firstly, Europe established relations in the form of political dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN and Asian countries. For this occasion, the EU established Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). Subsequently, the EU created external relations with African, Caribbean, & Pacific (ACP), South American, etc. This research elaborates on the relation of the EU with the West African region. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the regional institution chosen by the EU to engage in the relationship. Some scholars acknowledged that ECOWAS is one of the most organized institutions in the African Region. Asymmetric relation between EU and ECOWAS denotes the relation of The North and The South countries. By analyzing the inter-regionalism framework, this paper exercises a liberal institutional perspective as the main paradigm. The results found that inter-regionalism could reinforce strong institutions in both regions.

Until recently, only economically developed West-oriented states launched integration initiatives encompassing the entire Asia-Pacific region. However, over the last few years Beijing proposed several such initiatives embracing territories from America to Africa. The paper discusses the changes in Chinese views towards the leadership in modern world. Recent events in Syria, Ukraine, South China Sea and East China Sea made it clear that the world becomes more polycentric, with Russia and China resistant to external interference in the territories of their vital interests. The latest trends in East Asian and Asia-Pacific regionalism are singled out. China and USA have been the main rivals in initiating and supporting competing integration models. China has demonstrated unprecedented activity and launched several integration projects of trans-regional (Asia-Pacific and Eurasia) and on regional levels (East Asia). However, despite its growing geopolitical and economic aspirations, Beijing is not frontally challenging Washington-led system of intergovernmental agreements and financial institutions in Asia. Instead, Beijing is forming an alternative pro-Chinese model of integration without US participation (or with their secondary role) thus trying to gradually transform the Asia-Pacific to post-American hegemony model. President Xi Jinping put forward a concept of “Asia-Pacific Dream”. It incorporates formation of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “New Maritime Silk Road” that will link the economies of Asia, Europe and Africa. By proposing these large scale infrastructure projects and two new regional financial institutions (Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank), the Chinese leadership renewed its global and regional politics, attempting to create a Eurasian “economic corridor” which could serve not only its regional and global interests, but for the common good of whole Asia and the world. Obviously, “New Silk Roads” strategy faces geopolitical and other challenges; yet, even it partial realization would make China a leader of the continental part of Eurasia. In terms of global and regional governance these trends can be strengthened through coordinated policy of Moscow and Beijing towards including these projects into the agenda of non-Western intergovernmental institutions, such as BRICS, SCO, Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and others. Moreover, strategic cooperation with Russia is one of the principal factors to secure the success of China’s integration plans in the Asia-Pacific and especially in Eurasia. For its part, Moscow should deepen interaction and effectively utilize the resources of “rising” China to support Russia’s interests in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific. It is necessary for Moscow to coordinate efforts with Central Asian states and China to elaborate co-development plans for infrastructural initiatives put forward by the SCO, EEU and the “Silk Road Economic Belt”. At the same time, Moscow should increasingly encourage Chinese investment into the Russian Far East. Acknowledgements. This article has been prepared in the framework of contract with the RF Ministry of Education and Science “Formation of the New International Order in the Asia-Pacific and National Interests of Russia”, project № 1430.