Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Rawls'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Rawls.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Rawls.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Cormack, Anne Margaret. "Gambling against Rawls." Thesis, University of Greenwich, 2007. http://gala.gre.ac.uk/8543/.
Full textAbstract:
In A Theory of Justice (1971) John Rawls attempted to solve the problem of distributive justice by combining self-interest, ignorance and risk-aversion. He argued that if self-interested persons in a situation of uncertainty imposed by a veil of ignorance were choosing principles for the basic structure of society, then they would be risk-adverse and choose two principles – The Principle of Equal Liberty and the Difference Principle. Critics have argued against this risk-adverse element of Rawls’ theory but those critics as well as Rawls made certain presuppositions about risk-aversion, risk-taking and gambling. This thesis also examines the risk-aversion in Rawls’ theory but addresses the previous shortfall by exploring the issue of risk and gambling in two interrelated ways. It applies a Foucauldian approach to the history of risk and gambling in order to contextualise the current views and then investigates the contemporary meaning by drawing on research leading up to the UK Gambling Act 2005. Drawing on these findings it argues that not only might risk-taking occur in the original position but that different types of participants could show different degrees of risk-taking behaviour. By exploring the theoretical debates between essentialism and anti-essentialism, it further argues that it is unlikely that the veil of ignorance would be able to screen out those differences. It then employs theories of identity and difference in the work of Heidegger, Deleuze and Lyotard in an attempt to overcome that weakness in Rawls’ theory but finds that this may not be possible. After highlighting a connection between impartiality and gambling, it concludes, in contrast to Rawls, that risk-taking rather than risk-aversion lies at the heart of social justice. The implication of this reversal is that it may have an impact on policy-decisions in other areas of the justice system.
2
Jones, Clinton W. "Rawls, Liberalism, and Leisure." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/32206.
Full textAbstract:
There is a tension within liberalism between the ideal of equality on the one hand and the respect for freedom (in the form of non-interference) on the other. I shall try to show that in liberalism?s efforts to simultaneously realize its goals of freedom and equality it must ultimately settle for less than the ideal of each. Since Rawls? theory of justice is a liberal one, it suffers from this tension as well. However Rawls? theory has also been accused of forcing some members of society to subsidizing the choices of others. I shall argue that one of the more recent attempts to defend his theory, by Walter Schaller, against such accusations, falls short of its goals. I shall also argue that Rawls? suggestion, in Political Liberalism, that a principle guaranteeing a social minimum ?may easily precede? the principle guaranteeing the basic liberties, should be rejected because it does not provide adequate protection of the basic liberties, especially freedom of the person.Master of Arts
3
Guillarme, Bertrand. "Rawls et l'égalité démocratique /." Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1999. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb370421405.
Full text
4
Pilon, Almir José. "O direito em Rawls." Florianópolis, SC, 2003. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/86358.
Full textAbstract:
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Jurídicas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito.Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-21T06:08:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
Esta dissertação tem como finalidade verificar em que medida a teoria da justiça, constituída na obra de John Rawls apresenta elementos suficientes para uma compreensão do direito. Assim, o ponto-chave da pesquisa será o locus do direito na filosofia da justiça de Rawls, a fim de explicitar elementos próprios do direito que encontram-se implícitos na sua teoria da justiça e no liberalismo político, demonstrando que a filosofia da justiça, bem como o seu liberalismo político, tem implicações para o direito. Nessa perspectiva, esta dissertação busca uma interpretação do direito na obra de Rawls. Em especial nos textos de Uma Teoria da Justiça, O Liberalismo Político, O Direto dos Povos e Justiça e Democracia. Desta forma, busca-se em primeiro lugar compreender os conceitos básicos da teoria da justiça, bem como as suas interações. Num segundo momento, expõe-se o tema do liberalismo político, no qual se faz uma análise dos principais eixos da tese rawlsiana. Cabe ressaltar que já nestes capítulos são levantados alguns indícios da necessidade de um aparato jurídico. Por fim, busca-se compreender o direito dentro da teoria rawlsiana com uma exposição dos temas diretamente relacionados ao direito, a concepção de estado de direito e a necessidade de obediência às leis. Frente a tais análises, é possível destacar que a teoria da justiça como eqüidade, proposta por Rawls, contém elementos, ainda que implícitos, suficientes para uma compreensão do direito. Destaca-se, ainda, que a teoria da justiça de Rawls tem alguns elementos que configuram tanto uma filosofia quanto uma teoria do direito, pois é perceptível que a teoria da justiça necessita do direito como complemento para garantir a estabilidade de uma sociedade plural bem-ordenada, uma vez que o consenso sobreposto por si só não oferece essa garantia. Assim, conclui-se que Rawls apresenta uma relação de complementaridade entre a justiça e o direito, dessa forma, a justiça forneceria ao direito a sua legitimidade contida nos princípios de justiça e o direito forneceria à justiça a eficácia contida no poder de coagir.
5
Schmitt, Annette. "Bedingungen gerechten Handelns : Motivations- und handlungstheoretische Grundlagen liberaler Theorien /." Wiesbaden : VS, Verl. für Sozialwiss, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/bs/toc/501432205.pdf.
Full text
6
Lemaire, André. "L'enjeu de la rationalité dans la Théorie de la justice de John Rawls." Sherbrooke : Université de Sherbrooke, 2000.
Find full text
7
Alpinar, Zumrut. "Expansion Of Rawls'." Master's thesis, METU, 2009. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12610836/index.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis aims to contribute to Norman Daniels'expansion of Rawls'
theory of Justice as Fairness to health care by considering individual responsibility in maintaining and restoring health. The thesis also considers transplantation as a special case and develops a Rawlsian model for transplantation.
8
Robinson, Andrew. "John Rawls and oppressive discourse." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.415730.
Full text
9
Kim, Dokyun. "Gerechtigkeit und Verfassung : eine Rawlssche Deutung der bundesverfassungsgerichtlichen Formel "eine am Gerechtigkeitsgedanken orientierte Betrachtungsweise" /." Baden-Baden : Nomos-Verl.-Ges, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/389690775.pdf.
Full text
10
Montminy, Marc-André. "La justification du principe de liberté de John Rawls /." Trois-Rivières : Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2003. http://www.uqtr.ca/biblio/notice/tablemat/1756112TM.html.
Full text
11
Leblanc, Martin. "Le contrat social international de John Rawls : des peuples ou des individus." Thèse, Trois-Rivières : Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2003. http://www.uqtr.ca/biblio/notice/resume/17806225R.html.
Full text
12
Néron, Pierre-Yves. "Rawls et l'abandon du principe de différence à l'échelle internationale /." Trois-Rivières : Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2003. http://www.uqtr.ca/biblio/notice/resume/17986744R.html.
Full text
13
Liotti, Maria Cecilia. "Rawls' Kantian egalitarianism and its critics." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79961.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.
14
Weber, Eric Thomas. "Constructing justice : Rawls, Dewey, and education /." Available to subscribers only, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1459906771&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Full text
15
Powell, Brian Keith. "Rawls on stability, democracy, and justice." Full text, Acrobat Reader required, 2002. http://viva.lib.virginia.edu/etd/masters/ArtsSci/Philosophy/2002/Powell/thesis.pdf.
Full text
16
Quintanilha, Flávia Renata [UNESP]. "Aporias da justiça: entre Habermas e Rawls." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91610.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
Previous issue date: 2011-09-30Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:08:08Z : No. of bitstreams: 1
quintanilha_fr_me_mar.pdf: 319442 bytes, checksum: 549619955e9f9ae705f61d9cbf7bc06f (MD5)Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
Ao abordarmos o tema justiça e democracia, o fazemos com base em John Rawls e Jürgen Habermas, filósofos que figuram de maneira expressiva no debate contemporâneo sobre o tal tema. John Rawls entende que o problema da democracia atual está na dificuldade de acordo sobre como as instituições básicas da sociedade devem ser organizadas para se atingir o respeito à liberdade e à igualdade de seus cidadãos, em outras palavras, como é possível conciliar a liberdade e a igualdade de pessoas morais a fim de que se satisfaça equitativamente a cultura pública existente na democracia a qual eles pertencem. Para tanto, Rawls apresenta uma teoria de justiça, pautada em princípios básicos que irão instituir uma sociedade bem-ordenada, possibilitando que se atinja um sistema de cooperação equitativa entre seus cidadãos. Habermas que, em sua acepção de justiça, também tenta solucionar em certa medida os mesmos problemas apresentados pelo sistema capitalista, compartilha das ideias apresentadas pela teoria rawlsiana no que concerne a seus resultados essenciais, mas não se abstém de tecer considerações críticas acerca de pontos fundamentais da teoria de justiça de Rawls. Nossa dissertação tem como objetivo, diante da análise da concepção política de justiça atual, delinear o debate entre ambos e expor as possíveis aporias decorrentes desse debate
In broaching the issue of justice and democracy, we draw upon John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, philosophers appearing in an expressive way in the contemporary debate on these topics. John Rawls believes that the problem of democracy today lies in the difficulty in agreement on how the fundamental institutions of society should be organised in order to achieve respect for the freedom and equality of its citizens, in other words, how is it possible to reconcile the freedom and equality of moral people in order to equitably meet the existent public culture in the democracy to which they belong. Therefore, Rawls presents a theory of justice established on basic principles that will found a well-ordered society, thereby making it possible to achieve a system of equitable cooperation between its citizens. Habermas, who in his sense of justice also tries to resolve to some extent the same problems presented by the capitalist system, shares Rawls’s ideas when it comes to their essential results, but does not abstain from critical considerations about fundamental points of Rawls’s theory of justice. Through the analysis of the present political conception of justice, this dissertation aims at outlining the debate between both and expose the possible aporias arising from this discussion
17
Luo, Peilin, and 羅沛霖. "On John Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1990. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31209804.
Full text
18
Kirschbaum, Charles. ""John Rawls: justiça imparcial e seus limites"." Universidade de São Paulo, 2005. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-18062005-201639/.
Full textAbstract:
Uma Teoria da Justiça de John Rawls surgiu como uma proposta renovada para abordar a equidade das instituições. Uma característica que faz o conceito de Rawls distinto é a aplicação de sua teoria a um escopo restrito: instituições que constituem a estrutura básica da sociedade. Além disso, esse conceito de justiça deve ser imparcial em relação às concepções de Bem dos indivíduos. Essa dissertação explora as razões que levaram Rawls e seus seguidores a escolher essa abordagem e sugere possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria.A Theory of Justice of John Rawls emerges as a renewed proposition to approach the fairness of institutions. A distinctive characteristic of Rawls concept is the application of his theory towards a limited scope: institutions that constitute the basic structure of the society. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Rawls and his followers to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.
19
Fernandes, José Carlos Lopes. "A justiça como equidade segundo John Rawls." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2010. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5677.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
arquivototal.pdf: 277264 bytes, checksum: c3c42da6d7c0d0053ac3fa1b2ad94a44 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2010-05-18Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
This essay aims to examine the theoretical foundations of John Rawls in his book "A theory of Justice". Research is rooted in "part 1 Theory", on which we are discussing to extract the ideas of the concept of "justice as fairness", because this issue is a detailed theory in drawing up a new conception of Justice with the idealization of a fairer society. The correction of social injustice, can only come from the practice of a policy directed to fairness. According to John Rawls, justice becomes a political obligation to fair cooperation system, which is the society. Observing that the theory of Rawls develops according to an idea of an well orderly society. And this would be the one regulated by a conception of Justice, i.e. a fair system of cooperation, which is based on a public conception of justice. This way, citizens are equal with regard of having a minimum degree of moral faculties necessary to participate in social cooperation during all their life of plans. Thus, we demonstrated that the theory of "justice as fairness", proposed by Rawls, shows itself an innovative proposal to modern society, because it seeks for social integration and policy through a justification of norms and principles of justice.
A presente dissertação tem por objetivo examinar os fundamentos da teória de John Rawls no seu livro Uma teoria da justiça . A investigação está alicerçada na Primeira parte Teoria , sobre a qual nos debruçamos para extrair as idéias da concepção da justiça como equidade , pois, é nesta questão que se encontra uma teoria pormenorizada na elaboração de uma nova concepção de justiça com a idealização de uma sociedade mais justa. A correção das injustiças sociais, só pode advir da prática de uma política direcionada a equidade. De acordo com John Rawls, a justiça torna-se uma obrigação política ao sistema de cooperação justo, que é a sociedade. Observaremos que a teoria de Rawls se desenvolve segundo uma idéia de uma sociedade bem ordenada. E esta seria aquela regulada por uma concepção de justiça, ou seja, um sistema equitativo de cooperação, que se fundamenta numa concepção pública de justiça. Deste modo, os cidadãos são iguais tendo em conta terem um grau mínimo de faculdades morais necessárias para participarem na cooperação social durante todos os seus planos de vida. Assim, demonstramos que a teoria da justiça como equidade , proposta por Rawls, se mostra como uma proposta inovadora para a sociedade moderna, pois visa à integração social e política através de uma justificação de normas e princípios de justiça.
20
Machado, Elnora Maria Gondim. "John Rawls: construtivismo político e justificação coerentista." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3553.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:56:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
000422921-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 1181531 bytes, checksum: d6f56be999ffdf2c215e5f8af943becf (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2010This present study aims to demonstrate how the actual justification of Rawls’s theory is the kind of emerging coherentism, therefore, that which is possible without previous assumption of an agreement on specific social norms. Although Rawls does not mention in any of his manuscripts such stance, it is possible to find the aspect of the coherentism justification in his theory. This is due to the justification criteria found adjacent to the justice construction such as the fairness expressed by the following ideas: (1) only beliefs can justify other beliefs, and nothing further can contribute to a justification, (2) all justified beliefs depend on other beliefs for their justification. Thus, the justification for the Rawlsian theory can be considered as coherentism because, in general, the framework can be characterized as the concept that beliefs can only be justified by their relations with other beliefs within the same system and, therefore, as for Rawls, there is no basic or foundational belief, this would allow a coherentism justification to his theory. The Harvard professor presented this issue in his manuscripts that antagonized the moderated foundational style by (1) the wide reflective method, (2) to the non-foundational style translated by non-intuitionist and non-utilitarian aspect of his works, (3) the notion of original position, and (4) of his own theoretical approach in relation to the methodological and content aspects related to his constructivism.
O presente trabalho pretende demonstrar de que forma a justificação existente na teoria de Rawls é do tipo coerentista emergente, ou seja, aquela que é possível sem pressuposição antecedente de um acordo sobre normas sociais específicas. Embora Rawls não mencione em nenhum de seus textos tal postura, no entanto é possível constatar o aspecto da justificação coerentista em sua teoria. Isto porque os critérios de justificativas encontram-se subjacentes à construção da justiça como equidade expressa pelas seguintes idéias: (1) só as crenças podem justificar outras crenças, e nada, além disso, pode contribuir para uma justificação; (2) todas as crenças justificadas dependem de outras crenças para a sua justificação. Desta forma, a justificação para a teoria rawlsiana pode ser considerada como coerentista, porque, de uma maneira geral, o coerentismo pode ser caracterizado como a concepção segundo a qual as crenças só podem ser justificadas em suas relações com outras crenças dentro de um mesmo sistema e, portanto, como para Rawls, não há crença básica ou fundacional, isto permitirá à sua teoria uma justificação do tipo coerentista. O professor de Harvard apresentou este aspecto em suas obras que se contrapõe ao fundacionismo moderado através (1) do método reflexivo amplo; (2) do caráter não fundacionista traduzido pelo não-intuicionista e não-utilitarista das suas obras; (3) da noção de posição original; e (4) do seu próprio percurso teórico quanto aos aspectos metodológicos e de conteúdo relativos ao seu construtivismo.
21
Quintanilha, Flávia Renata. "Aporias da justiça : entre Habermas e Rawls /." Marília, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91610.
Full textAbstract:
Orientador: Clélia Aparecida MartinsBanca: Bianco Zalmora Garcia
Banca: Ricardo Monteagudo
Resumo: Ao abordarmos o tema justiça e democracia, o fazemos com base em John Rawls e Jürgen Habermas, filósofos que figuram de maneira expressiva no debate contemporâneo sobre o tal tema. John Rawls entende que o problema da democracia atual está na dificuldade de acordo sobre como as instituições básicas da sociedade devem ser organizadas para se atingir o respeito à liberdade e à igualdade de seus cidadãos, em outras palavras, como é possível conciliar a liberdade e a igualdade de pessoas morais a fim de que se satisfaça equitativamente a cultura pública existente na democracia a qual eles pertencem. Para tanto, Rawls apresenta uma teoria de justiça, pautada em princípios básicos que irão instituir uma sociedade bem-ordenada, possibilitando que se atinja um sistema de cooperação equitativa entre seus cidadãos. Habermas que, em sua acepção de justiça, também tenta solucionar em certa medida os mesmos problemas apresentados pelo sistema capitalista, compartilha das ideias apresentadas pela teoria rawlsiana no que concerne a seus resultados essenciais, mas não se abstém de tecer considerações críticas acerca de pontos fundamentais da teoria de justiça de Rawls. Nossa dissertação tem como objetivo, diante da análise da concepção política de justiça atual, delinear o debate entre ambos e expor as possíveis aporias decorrentes desse debate
Abstract: In broaching the issue of justice and democracy, we draw upon John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, philosophers appearing in an expressive way in the contemporary debate on these topics. John Rawls believes that the problem of democracy today lies in the difficulty in agreement on how the fundamental institutions of society should be organised in order to achieve respect for the freedom and equality of its citizens, in other words, how is it possible to reconcile the freedom and equality of moral people in order to equitably meet the existent public culture in the democracy to which they belong. Therefore, Rawls presents a theory of justice established on basic principles that will found a well-ordered society, thereby making it possible to achieve a system of equitable cooperation between its citizens. Habermas, who in his sense of justice also tries to resolve to some extent the same problems presented by the capitalist system, shares Rawls's ideas when it comes to their essential results, but does not abstain from critical considerations about fundamental points of Rawls's theory of justice. Through the analysis of the present political conception of justice, this dissertation aims at outlining the debate between both and expose the possible aporias arising from this discussion
Mestre
22
Kissinger, Deborah A. "Renegotiating the social contract Hobbes to Rawls." Thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2003. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=765033441&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1233173492&clientId=23440.
Full text
23
Schaub, Jörg. "Gerechtigkeit als Versöhnung John Rawls' politischer Liberalismus." Frankfurt, M. New York, NY Campus-Verl, 2006. http://d-nb.info/994387644/04.
Full text
24
Law, Pui-lam Patrick. "On John Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium /." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1990. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B12855984.
Full text
25
Sudarshan, Saranga. "Rawls, Dworkin and Inheritance in Liberal Democracy." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/13844.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis examines whether Rawls or Dworkin's theory of justice is better at justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. It sets out to argue that Dworkin's theory is better suited to guide a liberal democracy on justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance than Rawls's theory. This argument begins by proposing that the extant literature reflects a conflict between three intuitive judgements about what matters for the justice of restricting wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. As a result the successful theory will have fewer disadvantages and more advantages in its impartial justification for restricting wealth inheritance to the liberal, opportunity and luck intuition. This thesis examines Rawls and Dworkin's theories because both theorists propose views that aim to be impartial and justifiable in a liberal democratic society. They both aim to cater to the associated concerns of protecting individual liberty and guaranteeing social equality. I examine both theories on this aim in three metrics. First I consider their internal coherency. In doing so I examine the coherency of Rawls's principles when they aim to treat social class and wealth inheritance differently. I then explore the coherency of Dworkin's prescriptions with the expectations individuals have in a liberal democracy. The second metric I consider is the ability of either theory to cater to each of the three relevant intuitions. This involves examining the scope of Rawls and Dworkin's theories and their competency in satisfying the concerns of the luck intuition. Lastly I consider the impartiality of the theories as the third metric. As such, I consider how well Rawls and Dworkin give equal consideration to the associated concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition.
26
Gomes, Agusta Antônia. "A teoria da justiça de John Rawls." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2017. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/182728.
Full textAbstract:
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-16T03:21:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 349172.pdf: 1013142 bytes, checksum: 3257525cefabff3c68e4dcd4cf2cf6a2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017
Este trabalho tem como objetivo abordar algumas críticas à teoria da justiça de John Rawls. Nele será apresentada a Teoria da Justiça de Rawls e os dois princípios de justiça. Será analisado o respeito aos direitos fundamentais, especialmente o direito à liberdade e à igualdade, o princípio de igual oportunidade e o princípio da diferença. Após a análise dos fundamentos da teoria de Rawls, apresentaremos algumas considerações de Susan Okin e Martha Nussbaum sobre o liberalismo político. As considerações serão relativas a separação entre esfera pública e privada, além da inclusão ou não da família na estrutura básica da sociedade. A partir de críticas e considerações das autoras citadas, serão utilizados os princípios da justiça para falar sobre os direitos das mulheres. No caso das mulheres, considera-se que Rawls defende que a estrutura institucional da sociedade deve garantir as bases sociais para o auto-respeito, para que os indivíduos se valorizem e se reconheçam como dignos. Nesse sentido, serão analisados os princípios da liberdade, da igual oportunidade e da diferença, a fim de avaliar se eles conseguem responder às demandas feministas de autonomia e do auto-respeito.
Abstract : This work has the objective to present the feminist criticism to Rawls?s theory of justice. I will present the two principles of Justice and analyze the fundamental rights, especially the right to freedom and equality, the principle of equal opportunity and the principle of difference. After the analysis of the basic aspects of the theory of Rawls, I will present the considerations of Susan Okin and Martha Nussbaum on political liberalism. The considerations focuses on the separation between public and private spheres, in addition to the inclusion or not of the family in the basic structure of society. From reviews and considerations of the authors cited, I will try to use the principles of Justice to address women rights. In the case of women, Rawls argues that the institutional structure of society must ensure the social basis for self-respect, so that individuals are valued and recognized as worthy. In this sense, I will be analyzing the principles of freedom, equal opportunity and the difference principle, in order to assess whether they can meet the demands of feminist autonomy and self -respect.
27
MacArthur, Lori Kinder. "John Rawls, Feminism, and the Gendered Self." PDXScholar, 1995. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/5030.
Full textAbstract:
John Rawls's theory of justice, which he calls "justice as fairness," has proven to be most influential with regard to the course of contemporary political theory. In both of Rawls's books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, his aim was to present a theoretically-compelling defense of deontological liberalism, and to present a set of principles by which to fairly order a just society. While Rawls's project has attracted a fair number of proponents over the years, it has also been a popular target for liberal and nonliberal critics alike. A recurrent theme among these criticisms has been an objection with Rawls's conception of the self as presented in A Theory of Justice. This thesis will focus on feminists' criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons. In general, feminists contend that Rawlsian liberalism suffers a structural gender bias resulting from Rawls's conception of the self. Rawls's notion of the self, feminists argue, rests on male or masculine attributes. I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis that feminists' charges fail on two accounts. First, feminists do not present an accurate reading of Rawls's conception of persons in either A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. Second, in reviewing feminist approaches to gendering the self (which is integral to their critique), it will be shown that feminists are unable to gender the self in a theoretically defensible manner. Thus, feminists cannot make the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine concept. It follows from these twin defects that feminist contentions fail to prove that Rawls's theory is gender biased.
28
Seibert, Christoph. "Politische Ethik und Menschenbild : eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Theorieentwürfen von John Rawls und Michael Walzer /." Stuttgart : Kohlhammer, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/376524073.pdf.
Full text
29
Fransson, Rasmus. "Rawls, politiken och familjen : En kritisk diskussion av John Rawls rättviseuppfattning som filosofiskt ramverk för rättvisa familjeförhållanden och rättvis familjepolitik." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Filosofi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-38360.
Full textAbstract:
This essay aims to critically discuss John Rawls’ theory of “Justice as Fairness” with prime focus on Rawls’ view of the family and its role in a politically just society. Feminist critics, Susan Moller Okin and others, have suggested that Rawls’ theory fails to address issues of gender structured inequalities in society and within families. Starting from the question of what potential Rawls’ theory has as philosophical framework for just family conditions and family policy, and with support from Okin’s criticism and the critical comments presented by Charles W. Mills, concerning Rawls’ omission of issues of racial oppression, I argue that there are two particularly significant problems with Rawls’ theory when applied as basis for family policy aimed at promoting equal rights and opportunities for all individuals, men and women: (1) That Rawls fails with his intention, to free the conditions that the theory is derived from, from impact of actual political and social structures and (2) that Rawls fails to define the balance between the family’s (in this context) double roles; as an autonomous association and as a part of the society’s basic (political) structure. I also discuss an alternative interpretation of Rawls’ theory, which suggests that the theory benefits from a built-in flexibility in dealing with the private and public spheres of life and thereby manages both to promote diversity and autonomy and to oppose patriarchal hierarchies.
30
Chafe, Roger Eric. "An examination of Rawls' neutral justification of liberalism." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ54868.pdf.
Full text
31
Kauffmann, Clemens. "Strauss und Rawls : das philosophische Dilemma der Politik /." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2000. http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/317565842.pdf.
Full text
32
Welson, Ekiyor. "John Rawls' political liberalism : implications for Nigeria's democracy." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10036/3213.
Full textAbstract:
Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country has continuously been confronted with among other issues, the problem of a weak and unjust social structure resulting in widespread social injustice. It is at the root of most of the crises and social malaise of the Nigerian society and is made more serious by the problems associated with ethnicity and arbitrariness by the state and government. Part of the resultant effects of this weak structure include unjust public institutions and social, ethnic, religious and political crises due mainly to a lack of social cohesion, political integration and an unfair principle of distribution of income, resources, goods and burdens in the society. All attempted palliatives by different administrations have all failed and a very bitter 3-year civil war between 1967 and 1970 in which more than a million lives were lost was the first major manifestation of the problem in post colonial Nigeria. This condition of affairs not only makes political stability and development difficult but also stifles the natural ingenuity of the people to grow. And very serious poverty and underdevelopment of the people in addition to a complete absence of liberty and rights have become institutionalised. In reaction, some Nigerians have resorted to all sorts of immoral, illegal and criminal actions and conduct, including corruption, lawlessness, indiscipline, tribalism, nepotism, and ethnicism, etc. Others have joined the political class and accepted the status quo of injustice as justice and hold this to be the proper and easiest way to achieve their life goals. This has inadvertently led to a warped and distorted sense of justice in the society. This sense of justice sees nothing wrong with vices such as public and institutional injustice, crime, fraud, corruption etc and embraces them wholeheartedly. I propose in this research therefore, the analysis of the fundamental ideas and ideals of John Rawls’ political liberalism as contained in his Political Liberalism as a way of addressing these social-political challenges. In doing this, the merits and intentions of Rawls’ two principles of justice which centre on liberty, equality and differences are examined to deduce their level of coherence, relevance and utility to the Nigerian society. An argument will be made that these two principles represent the closest philosophical and sociological paradigm that have the core ideas and ideals necessary in addressing the twin problems of social injustice and political instability in a third world disordered society such as Nigeria.
33
Bradford, W. "Value and justice : property, economic theory and Rawls." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.596847.
Full textAbstract:
The thesis examines a particular contention made by John Rawls with regard to his account of the derivation of the principles of justice. In both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism Rawls maintains that the specification of property rights over the means of production is not part of the question of justice, but should rather reflect the customs and traditions of particular societies. It is argued in the thesis that this position cannot be maintained within the context of Rawls's overall argument. In particular, it is contended that Rawls's position on this reflects his uncritical reliance on Koopmans's Three Essays on the State of Economic Science (in which institutional detail such as the specification of property rights over the means of production is explicitly characterised as irrelevant) as a statement of the 'laws' of economics presumed known to those in the Original Position. The assumptions made by Rawls in constructing his argument, particularly his account of the circumstances of justice, are shown to reflect the strong, and in the context of Rawls's account, damaging assumptions underlying Koopmans's theoretical framework. These include the exclusion of preferences over work and the assumption that efficiency is unrelated to property rights specifications. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that these problems reflect a deeper issue: the theory of value upon which economic theories rest. The works of Luigi Pasinetti are employed to show the importance, for Rawls, of the distinction between theories based on exchange and those based on production. The latter are more suited to Rawls's project, and an example of them, Pasinetti's 'natural' system, is shown to be more suitable than Koopmans's framework as an account of economic theory in the Original Position.
34
Logan, Benjamin A. "SELF-RESPECT AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS." UKnowledge, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/10.
Full textAbstract:
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls names two conditions as necessary and sufficient for an agent to have self-respect. I argue that Rawls’s two conditions constitute an inadequate understanding of self-respect. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that self-respect requires moral desert, and that self-respect is a distinct concept from self-esteem.
35
Silva, Hudson Marcelo da. "Os direitos fundamentais na doutrina de John Rawls." [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278625.
Full textAbstract:
Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de MoraesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T10:34:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_HudsonMarceloda_M.pdf: 1305428 bytes, checksum: 85d842430a1cbd2e45c585a5cb54c898 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007
Resumo: A questão dos direitos fundamentais ocupa um lugar de destaque na obra de John Rawls. O filósofo estadunidense empreendeu grande esforço para explicar as liberdades fundamentais e sua prioridade por entender que as doutrinas tradicionais, especialmente o utilitarismo, não são capazes de assegurar os direitos fundamentais aos cidadãos vistos como pessoas livres e iguais. Segundo o autor, os direitos fundamentais devem ser garantidos a todos os cidadãos indistintamente, pois são vistos como bens necessários para o desenvolvimento das duas capacidades morais da pessoa, quais sejam: a de ter uma concepção de bem e um senso de justiça. Apesar de Rawls conferir prioridade aos direitos fundamentais, ele aceita que tais direitos podem sofrer restrições. Tais restrições serão aceitas quando surgirem conflitos entre as diversas liberdades, com o objetivo de proteger o sistema global de liberdades. Serão também aceitas quando forem necessárias para promover as mudanças sociais necessárias para que todos os cidadãos possam efetivamente gozar das liberdades. Após revisar sua teoria, Rawls passou a defender explicitamente a necessidade de garantir aos indivíduos as condições materiais básicas necessárias para o efetivo exercício dos direitos fundamentais. Este estudo pretende analisar a questão da prioridade das liberdades fundamentais e também a sua relação com a questão da soberania popular.
Abstract: The question of the basic rights occupies a place of prominence in the workmanship of John Rawls. The american philosopher undertook great effort to explain the basic freedoms and its priority for understanding that the traditional doctrines, especially the Utilitarianism, aren?t capable to assure the basic rights to the seen citizens as free and equal persons. According to author, the basic rights must indistinctly be guaranteed to all the citizens, therefore they are seen as necessary goods for the development of the two moral capacities of the person, which are: a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. Although Rawls to confer priority to the basic rights, he accepted it that such rights can suffer restrictions. Such restrictions will be accepted when to appear conflicts between the diverse freedoms, with the objective to protect the global system of freedoms. They will be also accepted when they will be necessary to promote social changes necessaries so that all the citizens can effectively enjoy of the freedoms. After to revise his theory, Rawls started to defend explicit the necessity to guarantee to the individuals the necessary basic material conditions for the effective basic right of action. This study intends to also analyze the question of the priority of the basic freedoms and its relation with the question of the popular sovereignty.
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
36
Bombassaro, Alessandra Isabel. "A concepção de pessoa ético-política em Rawls." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UCS, 2013. https://repositorio.ucs.br/handle/11338/790.
Full textAbstract:
O objetivo deste trabalho é pesquisar a relevância da concepção política de pessoa na
estrutura do pensamento de Rawls. Cientes de que, nos séculos XX e XXI, John Rawls (1921-
2002) alcança uma significativa importância na área da filosofia política, o foco principal
desta investigação é analisar o modo como a concepção de pessoa contribui, efetivamente,
para a defesa da posição original e dos dois princípios de justiça, possibilitando, assim, a
defesa dos direitos humanos na perspectiva da organização de uma sociedade bem ordenada
sob a proteção da liberdade e da igualdade. Sendo a filosofia política um campo de especial
indagação, a elaboração desta pesquisa pretende oferecer uma razoável leitura dos livros de
Rawls a partir da perspectiva da relevância do conceito pessoa para sua teoria da justiça. Todo
o sucessivo desenvolvimento da concepção de pessoa, de acordo com Rawls, pressupõe o
fundamental direito de subsistência, o qual todas as pessoas clamam como direito natural.
Rawls emprega este princípio geral como um alicerce para compreender o que são a liberdade
e a democracia. Através deste estudo pretende-se demonstrar que a intensificação crescente
da cooperação entre as pessoas foi um suporte principal com que Rawls influenciou a
sociedade civil, assim como o processo de estabelecer um novo tema para a filosofia política.Submitted by Marcelo Teixeira (mvteixeira@ucs.br) on 2014-07-10T11:29:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Alessandra Bombassaro.pdf: 816101 bytes, checksum: 8fa89b448bc56b9d831bbf8c52636586 (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-10T11:29:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Alessandra Bombassaro.pdf: 816101 bytes, checksum: 8fa89b448bc56b9d831bbf8c52636586 (MD5)
The objective of this work is to research the relevance of the concept of ethical-political person in the structure of Rawls’s thought. In the XX century, John Rawls (1921-2002) has a significant importance for the political philosophy. The main subject of this investigation is to comprehend the way how the conception of people contributes effectively for the defense of original position and the justice principles, making in the possible to defend the human rights in the perspective on the organization from a well-ordered society under the protection of liberty and equality. So construed, political philosophy is a special field of inquiry. This investigation intends to provide a plausible reading of John Rawls’ books from the perspective that the most important political objective was the concept of “person”. Any successive development of the person conception, Rawls argues, presupposes the fundamental right to subsistence, which all persons clain as a natural right. Rawls employs this general principle as a basis to understand what freedom and democracy are. The increasing intensification of cooperation among persons was one of the main support tha Rawls influenced the civil society, and the reflections to the process of establishing a new subject for the political philosophy.
37
Lima, Gilberto Karoly. "Justiça e direito de propriedade em John Rawls." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/2500.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:48:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
000391245-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 151982 bytes, checksum: 67651c991f2d60e65ff19275a25a73aa (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2007Constitutional right of property as well as its social function are analyzed in the light of John Rawls’ politic perspective. We compare the constitutional fatherland text with the doctrine created by the American writer. A property, considered as a primary property, is the right of freedom and equality. Rawls believes that freedom is a principle that cannot be negotiated and that the principle of differences is a mechanism that is used to make the right of property works. A political alternative to solve the conflicts of the right, politics, values and constitutional obligations, mainly the ones originated by freedom and equality demands, related to the right of property, are searched in this context. Thus, we compared John Rawls’ doctrine with the Federal Constitution. The Political Fatherland Letter disciplines the right of property as well as its social functions as principles related to the politics that promotes the human being’s dignity and citizenship. We analyze the theory in a broader sense, and our main goal is to look for equality in an effective way. In order to have a Justice with equality, there must be a deal that considers the veil of ignorance — the parts do not know any abilities, capabilities and benefits. The central idea of this pact is to make the citizens free of their personal interests, ideologies, abilities and so forth. There must be a pact that considers the veil of ignorance in its original position in order to get the most of equality. The veil of ignorance is originated by a rational criterion. The principles of justice are chosen, considering a rational criterion (the first is freedom and the second is the difference that is divided in two as well: the same equality of opportunities and the benefits that less privileged people have at most when there is a social and economical inequality). Property is analyzed as the right of freedom or the right of equality. Considering the right of freedom, it is essential to the citizen’s personality, self-respect and self-stem. Taking into account the second principle, the focus is the establishment of the fundamental rights that promote citizenship. In an efficient way, we demonstrated that Constitution establishes the right of property, its social function, freedom and equality among other political and social values. To establish citizenship and human being’s dignity with the support of a doctrine of justice, property functions when it fulfills the citizens freedom in an efficient way. Thus, as an alternative, the extra-fiscal policy is an example that is presented in the Constitution which is based on moral principles: the fair and the right that might solve the conflicts originated by the broader doctrine. The property is not taxed to collect economical resources, but to give citizen social benefits; to society development and also to extinguish poverty, considering the principles of Justice. The objective of the comparison between Federal Constitution and Raws’ doctrine is to conciliate the right of property and its social function, stimulating a new type of social cooperative politics among free, equal and fair citizens that focus equality, but who also preserve the right of politics and economic freedom.
O Direito constitucional de propriedade e a sua função social são analisados na ótica política de John Rawls. Compara-se o texto constitucional pátrio com a doutrina do filósofo norte-americano. A propriedade, considerada como um bem primário, é um direito de liberdade e de igualdade. A liberdade trata-se de um princípio inegociável para o autor norte-americano, que identifica, no princípio da diferença, um mecanismo para concretizar e satisfazer Direito de propriedade. Neste contexto, busca-se uma alternativa política para solucionar conflitos de direitos de políticas, de valores e de deveres constitucionais, principalmente decorrentes das demandas de liberdade e igualdade relacionadas ao direito de propriedade. Com esta intenção, comparar-se a doutrina de John Rawls com a Constituição Federal. A carta política Pátria disciplina tanto o direito de propriedade e a função social como princípios relacionados às políticas para promover a dignidade da pessoa humana e a cidadania. Analisa-se a teoria de forma geral e o desafio é buscar a eqüidade de forma efetiva. Para uma justiça com eqüidade, no entendimento de Rawls, é necessário que haja um pacto com uso ao recurso do véu da ignorância, em que as partes desconheçam habilidades, capacidades e benefícios. A idéia deste pacto, conforme analisado neste estudo, é desvincular os cidadãos de interesses pessoais, ideologias, habilidades, etc. É necessário um pacto que leve em conta o recurso do véu da ignorância na posição original para atingir o máximo a igualdade. O véu da ignorância se dá por um critério de racionalidade. Com isso, escolhem-se os princípios da justiça (o primeiro princípio da liberdade e o segundo da diferença, sendo que o segundo subdivide-se ainda em dois: igualdade eqüitativa de oportunidades e os menos favorecidos sendo beneficiados ao máximo na ocorrência de desigualdades socioeconômicas).A propriedade é analisada como direito de liberdade ou como Direito de igualdade, sendo que, pelo direito de liberdade, é tida como essencial à personalidade, ao auto-respeito e à auto-estima do cidadão. Pelo segundo princípio, objetiva-se a concretização de Direitos essenciais à promoção da cidadania. De forma eficaz, demonstra-se que a Constituição preceitua o Direito de propriedade, a função social, a liberdade e a igualdade, entre outros valores políticos e sociais. Para efetivar a cidadania e a dignidade da pessoa humana com o apoio de uma doutrina de justiça, a propriedade atinge à sua função ao atender eficazmente à liberdade do cidadão. Como alternativa, a política extrafiscal é um exemplo citado e previsto na Constituição que, com base nas faculdades morais do justo e do bem, supera os conflitos provocados por doutrinas abrangentes. A propriedade é tributada não para arrecadar recursos financeiros, mas para atender aos anseios sociais, ao desenvolvimento e à erradicação da pobreza com base nos princípios da Justiça. A comparação da Constituição Federal com a Doutrina de Rawls tem por objetivo conciliar o Direito de propriedade com a função social estimulando uma nova política de cooperação social entre cidadãos livres, iguais e justos que primam pela igualdade sem desconsiderar os Direitos de liberdade políticos e econômicos.
38
Guillarme, Bertrand. "Rawls : la justification contractualiste de la démocratie libérale." Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995IEPP0004.
Full text
39
Mbonda, Ernest-Marie. "Justice et droits de l'homme chez John Rawls." Paris 4, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA040079.
Full textAbstract:
Cette étude est une exploration analytique et critique de la théorie de John Rawls à partir du problème de la fonction des droits de l'homme dans cette théorie. Son premier objectif est de montrer qu'une théorie du droit ou de la justice ne peut être éthiquement valide que si elle prend pour critère l'idée régulatrice de l'inviolabilité des droits humains. Cette hypothèse s'appuie sur une confrontation entre le rawlsisme et les théories dominantes de la justice telles l'utilitarisme, le libéralisme, l'égalitarisme et le communautarisme, où il apparait que la supériorité de la théorie de Rawls tient à une compréhension plus complète et plus équilibrée de la notion des droits de l'homme. Le second objectif du travail prolonge le premier en soutenant, contre Rawls, que si la force de sa théorie réside dans la fonction qu'y exerce l'idée des droits de l'homme, la démarche procédurale/contractualiste/constructiviste mise en place pour les légitimer ne constitue pas la poutre maitresse de son argumentation. Cette démarche est présupposée par une fondation éthique. Transcendantale implicite. De cette inversion de l'ordre des raisons dans la construction rawlsienne, on déduit que sa théorie, à moins de renoncer totalement à ce qui en constitue la force, ne peut revendiquer un statut de neutralité. Le pluralisme axiologique qui fonde cette revendication n'est pas aussi radical que semble le supposer Rawls, car une fondation objective et universaliste s'inscrit dans l'ordre non seulement du souhaitable, mais aussi du possible.
40
O'Connell, Luke Patrick. "Public reason vs. rhetoric John Rawls and Aristotle /." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004. http://www.tren.com.
Full text
41
Rodrigues, Rodrigo Cândido. "Pluralismo e não-razoabilidade no liberalismo de Rawls." Florianópolis, SC, 2007. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/90040.
Full textAbstract:
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-graduação em FilosofiaMade available in DSpace on 2012-10-23T05:27:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 245598.pdf: 741765 bytes, checksum: 1bba362ade8ecdc85fa95c30edbf3773 (MD5)
Embora presente, principalmente em O Liberalismo Político, a não-razoabilidade não é problematizada de forma direta e autônoma por Rawls. Com efeito, é significativo que o autor limite-se a fazer alguns comentários sobre o problema, atribuindo ao mesmo um caráter de inevitabilidade fática do mundo político. O construtivismo teórico intentado por ele precisa restringir sua abordagem ao denominado fato do pluralismo razoável, deslocando o fato do pluralismo como tal como um resíduo teórico, se bem que pretensamente controlado e reduzido a uma influência sócio-política limitada. Aliás, em minha interpretação, para Rawls sua teoria será tanto mais forte quanto menos ameaça o âmbito de não-razoabilidade representar à estabilidade democrática no plano não-ideal. Entretanto, no que diz respeito aos conceitos de autonomia política e legitimidade no uso do poder político para uma eventual "contenção" desse espectro de não-razoabilidade, a justiça como eqüidade de Rawls não nos parece ter muito a dizer. Although attended, specially in The Political Liberalism, the non-reasonableness is not properly developed by Rawls, in a straight and autonomous manner. It is effectively meaningful that the author was limited to make few comments on the problem, wich has been justified as an unavoidable reality in the politics world. The theoretical constructivism attempted by him needs to restrict its approach to the denominated fact of the reasonable pluralism, turning the fact of pluralism as such into a theoretical residue, even being controlled and reduced to a limited social and politic influence. When it comes to my interpretation, Rawls theory might get stronger the more it keeps away from putting the non-reasonableness in a position to represent the democratic stability for the non-ideal plane. However, looking upon the concepts of political autonomy and legitimacy over the political power uses for an eventual contention of the non-reasonableness, Rawls's justice as fairness offers not much to say.
42
Esmaeili, Farzaneh. "The Difference Principle in Rawls: Pragmatic or Infertile?" UNF Digital Commons, 2015. https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/607.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis attempts to provide a coherent view of the idea of ‘justice as fairness’ and, in particular, the ‘difference principle’ expressed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The main focus of the thesis is the difference principle and its limits. Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ is based on the thought experiment of the ‘original position’ in which people, considered as free and equal, deliberate under an imagined ‘veil of ignorance,’ i.e. not knowing which social roles or status they would occupy in their society. Rawls then argues that in the original position people come up with two major principles of justice, understood as principles that would be acceptable to people treated as free and equal. The second principle entails the so-called ‘difference principle,’ according to which the inequalities of, say, wealth and authority are just and fair only if they lead to compensating benefits for everybody and particularly the least advantaged. The thesis proceeds, then, by probing whether compared with other theories, , including a discussion of Dahl’s theory of democracy, Rawls’s difference principle could be a proper answer to one of the main questions of social justice. The questions is: how the economic fortune in a society should be distributed among citizens. However, despite Rawls’s aim to develop the difference principle as a practical normative theory, it fails to give us a pragmatic answer. The reason is: the statement of the difference principle fails to take into account one crucial point: to wit, the matter of time. The thesis develops two empirical economic scenarios to illustrate that there is a trade-off between the interests of the poor in short and long period of time. However, this important issue is not considered and discussed by Rawls which makes the theory inapplicable.
43
Jeker, Martin. "Der Stellenwert des Mehrheitsprinzips in John Rawls' liberaler Gerechtigkeitstheorie." St. Gallen, 2004. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/99625766001/$FILE/99625766001.pdf.
Full text
44
Drolet, Michael. "Individu, société, État chez Rawls : la question des libertés." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5301.
Full text
45
Hakamali, Zameer. "Understanding Rawls, a study of John Rawls's Political Liberalism." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2002. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/MQ65623.pdf.
Full text
46
Maffettone, Pietro. "The coherence and defensibility of Rawls' law of peoples." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2013. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/705/.
Full textAbstract:
In the last three decades, liberal political philosophy has been increasingly concerned with the nature and extent of the moral responsibilities of members of different political communities to each other. John Rawls contributed to this debate in his final book, The Law of Peoples (LOP). There, Rawls refused to extend his account of domestic distributive justice to international politics and argued that some non-liberal (yet decent) peoples can be members in good standing of the international community. Many of Rawls’ critics maintain that this evidences a double standard, and accuse LOP of being an incoherent extension of Rawls’ political philosophy to global politics. In this thesis I show that the opposite is true. I start by underlining the main discontinuities between Rawls’ accounts of domestic and international justice. I then show that these discontinuities can be explained by tracing the evolution of the idea of public justification in Rawls’ work. Rawls’ two theories of justice are the application of the same idea – public justification – in different political contexts. While the first three chapters are dedicated to the elaboration of this distinctive interpretation of LOP, the final two chapters address Rawls’ accounts of international economic assistance and international toleration. The thesis surveys a number of critical arguments against Rawls’ elaboration of his duty of assistance and his understanding of toleration based on reasonableness. It finds them all wanting, and strikingly off the mark: all seem premised on the idea that a just world is a substantively liberal-egalitarian one. Thus, Rawls’ critics fail both to properly attend to our limited abilities to change the global political landscape (not to mention the risks associated with such attempts) and to understand the implications of any sustainable account of toleration.
47
Odedoyin, Bayo Aderemi. "Practical reason in Rawls' liberalism : abstract, not gender-biased." Thesis, University of Essex, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336885.
Full text
48
Trindade, Ubiratan. "Justiça distributiva: uma leitura da obra de John Rawls." Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos, 2008. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/2031.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
Previous issue date: 17Milton Valente
Uma distribuição de renda mais justa tem sido debatida como forma de viabilizar as sociedades democráticas com características liberais. O problema a ser examinado nesta investigação é justamente as possibilidades que têm os governos chamados liberais, de promoverem reformas que resultem em tais possibilidades. Neste sentido, nós estaremos dando enfoque à obra Uma teoria da justiça do filósofo norte-americano John Rawls. Inserida na tradição contratualista, elabora uma proposta de justiça como eqüidade, colocando-se como uma alternativa à doutrina utilitarista. Governos democráticos, conforme Rawls, devem ser garantidores de políticas públicas que tenham como conseqüência uma firme justiça distributiva. Esses governos devem ser plurais, e conflitos de ordem filosófica, moral ou religiosa não devem impedir um acordo razoável como forma de viabilizar a estrutura básica da sociedade. Utilizando-se de um artifício racional, em que os acordos celebrados são válidos para todos, Rawls cria o artifício da posição ori
A fairer income distribution has been debated as a way of making viable the democratic societies with liberal characteristics. The problem to be examined in this investigation is exatly the possibilities that the governments called liberal have, promoting reforms that result in such possibilities. In this way, we will be giving focus on the work A theory of justice from the American philosopher Jhon Rawls. Inserted in the contractualist traditions, it elaborates a justice as fairness, placing itself as an alternative to the utilitarian doctrine. The democratic governments, according to Rawls, must ensure that public politics have a consistent distributive justice as a consequence. These governments must be plural, and conflits of philosophical, moral or religious order must not prevent a reasonable agreement as a way of making viable a basic structure of the society. Using a rational artifice in which the agreementes are valid for everyone, Rawls creates the artifice of original position. In this situation th
49
Trindade, Ubiratan. "Conceito de pessoa em John Rawls: críticas e perspectivas." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2016. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/6041.
Full textAbstract:
Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2017-02-14T14:42:16Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
Ubiratan Trindade_.pdf: 1470459 bytes, checksum: d2baa4890ad9b56c9fa1fc0dbb80b4c1 (MD5)Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-14T14:42:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ubiratan Trindade_.pdf: 1470459 bytes, checksum: d2baa4890ad9b56c9fa1fc0dbb80b4c1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-08
Milton Valente
Um dos objetivos desta investigação é apresentar ao leitor o debate entre comunitaristas (holistas) e liberais individualistas (atomistas), esclarecendo os pressupostos defendidos por ambos no que diz respeito às suas visões de pessoa e sociedade. Partindo da reflexão dos elementos centrais da teoria de Rawls, nas obras A Theory of Justice (1971) e Political Liberalism (1993), nós avaliamos a plausibilidade e o grau de sustentação de sua doutrina frente aos seus mais destacados críticos no campo do comunitarismo, entre os quais, Michael Sandel e Charles Taylor, destacando suas principais objeções à obra de Rawls, mais precisamente à concepção moral de pessoa na posição original. Mostramos que a teoria da justiça como equidade é compatível com as exigências ontológicas e epistemológicas das sociedades complexas contemporâneas, afirmando que o agente moral submetido a uma situação de escolha na posição original possui a noção de senso de justiça e empatia em relação aos demais membros da sociedade. A partir da crítica feita à Rawls pelos comunitaristas, procedemos na defesa de seus pressupostos fundamentais, ou seja, na plausibilidade da complementaridade entre uma concepção deontológica e teleológica de sociedade, na qual o justo e o bem podem ser complementares, como forma de superação dos conflitos políticos proporcionando então, a pretendida estabilidade e unidade das instituições sociais. Destacamos, ainda, a importância da noção de pessoa no modelo de representação oferecido por Rawls e conhecido como “posição original” mostrando que o modelo neocontratualista de Rawls não corresponde a uma concepção abstrata ou atomizada de pessoa. O objetivo central dessa tese foi responder se nossas escolhas do que é certo ou errado se dão a partir de uma concepção naturalizada de pessoa (conhecimento inato) ou de uma concepção política de pessoa (cultural), ou, até mesmo, da complementariedade de ambas. Se confirmada a hipótese da complementariedade entre as duas concepções, estaremos aptos a dar uma resposta às críticas endereçadas a Rawls por parte dos comunitaristas, mostrando que sua teoria não é abstrata ou atomista. A partir dessas considerações, analisamos na obra Elements of Moral Cognition, de John Mikhail, sua interpretação do equilíbrio reflexivo rawlsiano e a concepção naturalizada de pessoa, que afirma que os seres humanos possuem um conhecimento inato de uma variedade de regras, conceitos e princípios morais ou até mesmo jurídicos. Na obra Why Political Liberalism? de Paul Weithman, trabalhamos uma concepção política de pessoa, dando destaque para a reformulação da teoria de Rawls a partir da obra Political Liberalism (1993) mostrando a distinção entre o conceito moral de pessoa em A Theory of Justice (1971) e em Political Liberalism (1993).
One of the objectives of this research is to present to the reader the debate between communitarians (holists) and individualistic liberals (atomists), enlightening the assumptions defended by both regarding to their visions of person and society. From the reflection of the central elements of Rawls' theory in The Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993), we assessed the plausibility and sustainability of his doctrine towards his most prominent critics in the communitarianism area, among them, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, highlighting their main objections to Rawls's work, more precisely to the moral conception of person in the original position. We showed that the theory of justice as equity is compatible with the ontological and epistemological demands of contemporary complex societies, asserting that the moral agent when submitted to a situation of choice in the original position owns the sense of justice notion and empathy towards the other members of the society. Based on the criticism on Rawls by the communitarians, we proceeded on the defense of his fundamental assumptions, it means, in the plausibility of the complementarity between a deontological and teleological conception of society, in which the just and the good can be complementary, as a way of overcoming political conflicts, and thus providing the desired stability and unity of social institutions. We also emphasize the importance of the notion of person in the model of representation offered by Rawls and known as "original position" showing that Rawls's neocontractualist model does not correspond to an abstract or atomized conception of person. The main objective of this dissertation was to answer whether our choices of what is right or wrong come from a naturalized conception of person (innate knowledge) or from a political conception of (cultural) person, or even from the complementarity of both. If the hypothesis of complementarity between the two conceptions is confirmed, we will be able to answer those criticisms addressed to Rawls by the communitarians, showing that his theory is not abstract or atomistic. From these considerations, we analyzed the work Elements of Moral Cognition written by John Mikhail, his own interpretation of the rawlsian reflexive equilibrium and the naturalized conception of person, which states that human beings have an innate knowledge of a variety of rules, concepts, and moral principles or even legal ones. In the book Why Political Liberalism? by Paul Weithman, we worked on a political conception of person, highlighting the reformulation of Rawls's theory based on the work political Liberalism (1993), showing the distinction between the moral concept of person in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993).
50
JordÃo, Marco AurÃlio de Medeiros. "A Guerra Justa no Liberalismo PolÃtico de John Rawls." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2008. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=19963.
Full textAbstract:
FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgicoEsse trabalho tem como objetivo estudar o conceito de guerra justa, a partir de uma anÃlise da filosofia polÃtica internacional do filÃsofo americano John Rawls. Tomaremos como base à obra Direito dos Povos (2001), e retomaremos alguns conceitos bÃsicos das demais obras, em especial Uma Teoria da JustiÃa (1971) e Liberalismo PolÃtico (1993). O nosso objetivo nessa dissertaÃÃo à examinar duas questÃes, a saber: I) Segundo os princÃpios de justiÃa do direito internacional de Rawls, se pode justificar uma intervenÃÃo militar? II) Existem casos em que fazer uma guerra à moralmente legitimo? Partiremos do conceito geral de guerra e apresentaremos o pensamento de quatro autores paradigmÃticos que abordaram esse tema, sÃo eles: Voltaire e sua visÃo humanitÃria de bases Iluministas; Kant e seu projeto de paz perpÃtua; Clausewitz e a guerra como caso excepcional da polÃtica; e Carl Schmitt e o conceito do polÃtico e o binÃmio amigo â inimigo. Os conceitos que abordaremos em Rawls sÃo: a) o de liberalismo polÃtico e a idÃia de pluralismo e tolerÃncia a eles atrelados; b) A concepÃÃo de liberalismo abrangente e o porque esse se diferencia do seu liberalismo polÃtico; c) A idÃia de posiÃÃo original, noÃÃo essencial para entender como se darà à sociedade dos povos e por que a guerra sà à justa quando travada por essa sociedade especÃfica. Finalmente, investigaremos essas perguntas a partir da retomada que Rawls faz de dois conceitos, a saber, Jus ad Bellum, isto Ã, justiÃa do guerrear, e do Jus in Bello, que em uma traduÃÃo imediata significa justiÃa no guerrear, ou seja, qual o comportamento moral que o soldado deve adotar em luta.
This work intends to study the concept of just war from an analysis of the political international philosophy of the American philosopher John Rawls. We will take like base the work Law of People (2001), and will retake some basic concepts of too many works, in special A Theory of the Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993). Our objective in this dissertation is to examine two questions: I) How the principle of justice of the international right of Rawls, justify a military intervention? II) Are there cases in which to do a war it is morally legitimize? Our star point is from the general concept of war and will present the thought of four authors paradigmatic what boarded this subject, and they are: Voltaire and his humane vision of bases Illuminists; Kant and his project of perpetual peace; Clausewitz and the war as exceptional case of the politics; Carl Schmitt and the concept of political and binomial friend â enemy. The concepts what we will board in Rawls are: a)the concept of political liberalism and the idea of pluralism and tolerance what they are harnessed to him; b) The conception of traditional liberalism and the difference of his political liberalism; c) The idea of original position, essential notion to understand why the war is just when is only made of âsociety of the peopleâ. Finally, we will investigate the questions from the recovering that Rawls does from the concept of Jus ad Bellum, what in an immediate translation is it Justice of the war, and therefore, answers which motives of going away to war. And Jus in Bello, whose translation would be a justice in waging war, in other words, which moral behaviour what the soldier must adopt in struggle.