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1

Moreh, Jacob. "Group behaviour and rationality." Social Science Information 27, no. 1 (March 1988): 99–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/053901888027001004.

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2

Ross, Don. "Group Doxastic Rationality Need Not Supervene on Individual Rationality." Southern Journal of Philosophy 44, S1 (March 2006): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00033.x.

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3

Hedden, Brian. "Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99, no. 3 (April 19, 2018): 581–604. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12486.

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4

Chu, Huah, and Ming-chang Kang. "Rationality of P-Group Actions." Journal of Algebra 237, no. 2 (March 2001): 673–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jabr.2000.8615.

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5

Baillon, Aurélien, Han Bleichrodt, Ning Liu, and Peter P. Wakker. "Group decision rules and group rationality under risk." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 52, no. 2 (April 2016): 99–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-016-9237-8.

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6

Grafstein, Robert. "Group Identity, Rationality and Electoral Mobilization." Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, no. 2 (April 1995): 181–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692895007002005.

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7

de Waal, Alex. "Group identity, rationality, and the state." Critical Review 11, no. 2 (March 1997): 279–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913819708443457.

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8

Kang, Ming-Chang. "Rationality problem of GL4 group actions." Advances in Mathematics 181, no. 2 (January 2004): 321–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0001-8708(03)00067-7.

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9

Richter, Reed. "Rationality, group choice and expected utility." Synthese 63, no. 2 (May 1985): 203–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00485367.

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10

Kordonskii, Vsevolod E. "Stable rationality of the group Spin10." Russian Mathematical Surveys 55, no. 1 (February 28, 2000): 178–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1070/rm2000v055n01abeh000257.

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11

List, Christian. "Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective." Episteme 2, no. 1 (June 2005): 25–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.25.

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In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members' individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group's aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group can meet two challenges: the ‘rationality challenge’ and the ‘knowledge challenge’. The rationality challenge arises when a group is required to endorse consistent beliefs or judgments; the knowledge challenge arises when the group's beliefs or judgments are required to track certain truths. My discussion seeks to identify those properties of an aggregation procedure that affect a group's success at meeting each of the two challenges.
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12

Sasaki, T., and S. C. Pratt. "Emergence of group rationality from irrational individuals." Behavioral Ecology 22, no. 2 (January 18, 2011): 276–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/arq198.

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13

Platonov, Vladimir P., and Vladimir I. Chernousov. "The rationality problem for semisimple group varieties." Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik (Crelles Journal) 1998, no. 504 (November 1, 1998): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/crll.1998.108.

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14

Gaus, Gerald. "CONSTRUCTIVIST AND ECOLOGICAL MODELING OF GROUP RATIONALITY." Episteme 9, no. 3 (September 2012): 245–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.14.

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AbstractThese brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: (i) its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; (ii) its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and (iii) its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group rationality with an ecological approach, inspired by social theorists such as F A. Hayek, Vernon L. Smith and Gerd Gigerenzer.
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15

Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard. "Group decision support systems implement Bayesian rationality." European Journal of Operational Research 47, no. 1 (July 1990): 29–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(90)90086-q.

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16

Basu, Kaushik. "Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher′s Waterfall." Games and Economic Behavior 7, no. 1 (July 1994): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1032.

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17

Goldman, Alvin I. "Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology." Episteme 1, no. 1 (June 2004): 11–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.1.11.

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Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition (Goldman 1999). This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. In making this choice, I am not blind to the allure of alternative approaches. In this paper I explain and motivate the knowledge-centered approach by contrasting it with a newly emerging alternative that has a definite appeal of its own. According to this alternative, the chief dimension of social epistemological interest would be rationality rather than knowledge.
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18

Geline, Michael. "Rationality of finite group representations and local subgroups." Journal of Algebra 533 (September 2019): 322–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jalgebra.2019.06.006.

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19

Tullberg, Jan. "Group egoism; investigating collective action and individual rationality." Journal of Socio-Economics 35, no. 6 (December 2006): 1014–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.022.

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20

Kitayama, Hidetaka. "The rationality problem for purely monomial group actions." Pacific Journal of Mathematics 253, no. 1 (November 28, 2011): 95–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.2140/pjm.2011.253.95.

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21

Lu, Stephen C. Y. "Collective rationality of group decisions in collaborative engineering." International Journal of Collaborative Engineering 1, no. 1/2 (2009): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijce.2009.027439.

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22

Myasnikov, A., and V. Roman’kov. "On Rationality of Verbal Subsets in a Group." Theory of Computing Systems 52, no. 4 (March 24, 2012): 587–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9394-3.

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23

Hoshi, Akinari, Hidetaka Kitayama, and Aiichi Yamasaki. "Rationality problem of three-dimensional monomial group actions." Journal of Algebra 341, no. 1 (September 2011): 45–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jalgebra.2011.06.004.

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24

Revsbech, Rasmus, Erik Lykke Mortensen, Gareth Owen, Julie Nordgaard, Lennart Jansson, Ditte Sæbye, Trine Flensborg-Madsen, and Josef Parnas. "Exploring rationality in schizophrenia." BJPsych Open 1, no. 1 (June 2015): 98–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjpo.bp.115.000224.

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BackgroundEmpirical studies of rationality (syllogisms) in patients with schizophrenia have obtained different results. One study found that patients reason more logically if the syllogism is presented through an unusual content.AimsTo explore syllogism-based rationality in schizophrenia.MethodThirty-eight first-admitted patients with schizophrenia and 38 healthy controls solved 29 syllogisms that varied in presentation content (ordinary v. unusual) and validity (valid v. invalid). Statistical tests were made of unadjusted and adjusted group differences in models adjusting for intelligence and neuropsychological test performance.ResultsControls outperformed patients on all syllogism types, but the difference between the two groups was only significant for valid syllogisms presented with unusual content. However, when adjusting for intelligence and neuropsychological test performance, all group differences became non-significant.ConclusionsWhen taking intelligence and neuropsychological performance into account, patients with schizophrenia and controls perform similarly on syllogism tests of rationality.
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25

Stefanov, Anguel, and Dimiter Ginev. "One dimension of the scientific type of rationality (a reflection upon the theory of group rationality)." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16, no. 2 (June 1985): 101–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(85)90009-3.

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26

Curşeu, Petru Lucian, Rob J. G. Jansen, and Maryse M. H. Chappin. "Decision Rules and Group Rationality: Cognitive Gain or Standstill?" PLoS ONE 8, no. 2 (February 22, 2013): e56454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0056454.

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27

Bornstein, Gary. "Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collective Interests." Personality and Social Psychology Review 7, no. 2 (May 2003): 129–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0702_129-145.

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Intergroup conflicts generally involve conflicts of interests within the competing groups as well. This article outlines a taxonomy of games, called team games, which incorporates the intragroup and intergroup levels of conflict. Its aims are to provide a coherent framework for analyzing the prototypical problems of cooperation and competition that arise within and between groups, and to review an extensive research program that has used this framework to study individual and group behavior in the laboratory. Depending on the game's payoff structure, contradictions or conflicts are created among the rational choices at the individual, group, and collective levels—a generalization of the contradiction between individual and collective rationality occurring in the traditional mixed-motive games. These contradictions are studied so as to identify the theoretical and behavioral conditions that determine which level of rationality prevails.
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28

Cettolin, E., P. S. Dalton, W. J. Kop, and W. Zhang. "Cortisol meets GARP: the effect of stress on economic rationality." Experimental Economics 23, no. 2 (September 11, 2019): 554–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09624-z.

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Abstract Rationality is a fundamental pillar of Economics. It is however unclear if this assumption holds when decisions are made under stress. To answer this question, we design two laboratory experiments where we exogenously induce physiological stress in participants and test the consistency of their choices with economic rationality. In both experiments we induce stress with the Cold Pressor test and measure economic rationality by the consistency of participants’ choices with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). In the first experiment, participants delay the decision-making task for 20 min until the cortisol level peaks. We find significant differences in cortisol levels between the stressed group and the placebo group which, however, do not affect the consistency of choices with GARP. In a second experiment, we study the immediate effect of the stressor on rationality. Overall, results from the second experiment confirm that rationality is not impaired by the stressor. If anything, we observe that compared to the placebo group, participants are more consistent with rationality immediately after the stressor. Our findings provide strong empirical support for the robustness of the economic rationality assumption under physiological stress.
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29

Levy, Jason. "Rationality and Orbit Closures." Canadian Mathematical Bulletin 46, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 204–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.4153/cmb-2003-021-6.

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AbstractSuppose we are given a finite-dimensional vector space V equipped with an F-rational action of a linearly algebraic group G, with F a characteristic zero field. We conjecture the following: to each vector v ∈ V(F) there corresponds a canonical G(F)-orbit of semisimple vectors of V. In the case of the adjoint action, this orbit is the G(F)-orbit of the semisimple part of v, so this conjecture can be considered a generalization of the Jordan decomposition. We prove some cases of the conjecture.
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30

Kudinov, Aleksander S. "SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies, no. 2 (2020): 20–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2020-2-20-33.

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The article discusses the compatibility of particular rational actions at the individual level with the rationality as such at the collective one. The issue arises in decision-making collisions by several individuals, when the results of a possible rational choice of an individual are restricted by interactions with other actors. Such cases of interaction are found in the economic theory, political science, sociology, management and other areas of science related to a person and a group of people. The article examines the social dilemmas that are obvious when all individuals in a social group behave as «rational maximizers of utility» what makes it difficult to come to mutual agreement and coordinate their actions. In respect to the «tragedy of the common» dilemma, the author discusses ways of overcoming the incompatibility for individual and collective rationality within the framework of a new institutional policy, as a new direction of science in the public resources management.
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31

Navarro, Gabriel, and Joan Tent. "Rationality and Sylow 2-subgroups." Proceedings of the Edinburgh Mathematical Society 53, no. 3 (August 12, 2010): 787–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0013091509000868.

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AbstractLet G be a finite group. If G has a cyclic Sylow 2-subgroup, then G has the same number of irreducible rational-valued characters as of rational conjugacy classes. These numbers need not be the same even if G has Klein Sylow 2-subgroups and a normal 2-complement.
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32

Du, Yuan Wei, Wan Chun Duan, and Chen Han. "Group Decision Making Model under Risk Based on Bounded Rationality." Advanced Materials Research 452-453 (January 2012): 533–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/scientific5/amr.452-453.533.

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33

Du, Yuan Wei, Wan Chun Duan, and Chen Han. "Group Decision Making Model under Risk Based on Bounded Rationality." Advanced Materials Research 452-453 (January 2012): 533–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.452-453.533.

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To overcome the shortcomings in traditional approaches such as bad satisfaction, bad effectiveness and so on, three key bounded rationality assumptions are proposed firstly, i.e., risky preference is invariable, decision cost is existing, and group cognitive ability is only unbounded rational. After that, an efficient prospect deriving model is presented by data envelopment analysis with assurance region to derive efficient alternatives from inadequate decision information. The presented model is able to reflect the subjective risky preferences of group members and derive efficient alternatives under the premise of existing acquisition costs, and thus it can make the satisfactory and effective decision.
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Curşeu, Petru Lucian, Oleh Krehel, Joep H. M. Evers, and Adrian Muntean. "Cognitive Distance, Absorptive Capacity and Group Rationality: A Simulation Study." PLoS ONE 9, no. 10 (October 14, 2014): e109359. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0109359.

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35

Lim, Wooyoung, Alexander Matros, and Theodore L. Turocy. "Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: Experimental evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 99 (March 2014): 155–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010.

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36

Sarkar, Husain. "The task of group rationality: The subjectivist's view—Part I." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28, no. 2 (June 1997): 267–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0039-3681(96)00025-8.

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Sarkar, Husain. "The task of group rationality: The subjectivist's view—Part II." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28, no. 3 (September 1997): 497–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0039-3681(96)00026-x.

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38

Robertson, Scott P., Sara Douglas, Misa Maruyama, and Bryan Semaan. "Political discourse on social networking sites: Sentiment, in-group/out-group orientation and rationality." Information Polity 18, no. 2 (May 28, 2013): 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/ip-130303.

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39

Sandler, Todd, and Khusrav Gaibulloev. "Terrorism: Rationality, Externalities, and Policy." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 30, no. 1 (April 1, 2012): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569212x15664519360452.

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Abstract This article provides a selective overview of the economic study of terrorism. After defining key terms - terrorists’ rationality, domestic and transnational terrorism, and counterterrorism measures, we present two models of terrorists’ behavior. The first model depicts a choice-theoretic model of how terrorist groups allocate their resources among attack modes or target types. The second model is a strategic analysis involving the terrorist group and a targeted government. Extensions to these base models are then discussed. The latter part of the article investigates the dilemma that terrorism poses to liberal democracies. We conclude by examining myriad externalities associated with counterterrorism measures.
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40

Kopec, Matthew. "WE OUGHT TO AGREE: A CONSEQUENCE OF REPAIRING GOLDMAN'S GROUP SCORING RULE." Episteme 9, no. 2 (June 2012): 101–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.3.

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AbstractInKnowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman presents a framework to quantify the epistemic effects that various policies, procedures, and behaviors can have on a group of agents. In this essay, I show that the framework requires some modifications when applied to agents with credences. The required modifications carry with them an interesting consequence, namely, that any group whose members disagree can become more accurate by forming a consensus through averaging their credences. I sketch a way that this result can be used to show that individual norms of rationality and group norms of rationality can dictate conflicting behaviors for the members of some groups. I conclude by discussing how some of the assumptions used to generate the consensus result might be loosened.
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Setiawan, Budi, Renatalia Fika, Mevy Trisna, and Nurhida Yanti. "Evaluation of the Rationality of OTC (Over The Counter) Drug Self-Medication in Patients in Pasaman Barat District Pharmacy." Science Midwifery 10, no. 5 (December 13, 2022): 4168–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.35335/midwifery.v10i5.1023.

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Self-medication is simply a person's attempt to treat symptoms of illness or disease without consulting a doctor first. Self-medication also means treating all complaints about oneself with medicines purchased directly at pharmacies or drug stores on their initiative without a doctor's prescription. OTC (Over The Counter) drugs are medicines that can be purchased without a prescription, namely over-the-counter and limited over-the-counter drugs, including fever-reducing drugs, pain relievers and inflammation relievers, cough medicines, cold medicines, ulcer medicines, diarrhea medicines, and skin medicines. The use of drugs in self-medication is carried out correctly to ensure the accuracy, rationality, and safety of drug use in self-medication. This study aimed to determine the demographic data characteristics of self-medication patients, the rationality of self-medication, and the influence of patient demographic data characteristics on rationality in OTC (Over Counter) drug self-medication patients. This study used a cross-sectional method. As many as 100 respondents aged 18-60 who self-medicated OTC (Over Counter) drugs at the West Pasaman District Pharmacy were involved in this study. Data collection was carried out using a questionnaire. Data were analyzed using Statistical Product And Servicer Solution (SPSS) 23. The results of this study showed that the majority of respondents who self-medicated OTC (Over Counter) drugs were 58% women, 63% of the age group 18-60 years, the last education group was low ( SD, SMP, SMA) by 77% and the non-PNS/non-private employee group is 82%. Respondents who used self-medication rationally were quite large, namely 86%. The factor that influences self-medication is age. While gender, education, and occupation do not affect self-medication
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42

Scavia, Federico. "Retract Rationality and Algebraic Tori." Canadian Mathematical Bulletin 63, no. 1 (July 18, 2019): 173–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.4153/s0008439519000079.

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AbstractFor any prime number $p$ and field $k$, we characterize the $p$-retract rationality of an algebraic $k$-torus in terms of its character lattice. We show that a $k$-torus is retract rational if and only if it is $p$-retract rational for every prime $p$, and that the Noether problem for retract rationality for a group of multiplicative type $G$ has an affirmative answer for $G$ if and only if the Noether problem for $p$-retract rationality for $G$ has a positive answer for all $p$. For every finite set of primes $S$ we give examples of tori that are $p$-retract rational if and only if $p\notin S$.
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43

Reimer, Torsten, and Ulrich Hoffrage. "The Ecological Rationality of Simple Group Heuristics: Effects of Group Member Strategies on Decision Accuracy." Theory and Decision 60, no. 4 (June 2006): 403–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-4750-2.

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44

Rozmainsky, Ivan V., and Yulia I. Pashentseva. "The economic analysis of rationality in the tradition of Harvey Leibenstein." Economics of Contemporary Russia, no. 4 (January 8, 2020): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.33293/1609-1442-2019-4(87)-21-38.

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The paper is devoted to the economic analysis of rationality in the tradition of Harvey Leibenstein: the authors perceive rationality as “calculatedness” when making decisions, while the degree of this “calculatedness” is interpreted as a variable. Thus, this approach does not correspond to the generally accepted neoclassical interpretation of rationality, according to which rationality is both full and constant. The authors believe that such a neoclassical approach makes too stringent requirements for the abilities of people. In real life, people do not behave like calculating machines. The paper discusses various factors limiting the degree of rationality of individuals. One group of factors is associated with external information constraints such as the complexity and extensiveness of information, as well as the uncertainty of the future. Another group of factors is related to informal institutions. In particular, the paper states that the system of planned socialism contributes to less rationality than the system of market capitalism. Thus, in the post-socialist countries, including contemporary Russia, one should not expect a high degree of rationality of the behavior of economic entities. The paper mentions, in particular, the factors of rationality caused by informal institutions, such as the propensity to calculate, the propensity to be independent when making decisions and the propensity to set goals. The authors also believe that people who live on their own are usually more rational than people who share a common household with someone else. This assumption is verified econometrically based on data on young urban residents collected by the authors. It turned out that the behavior of people included in this database, in general, corresponds to what the authors believed.
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45

Biswas, Indranil, Tomás L. Gómez, and Vicente Muñoz. "Rationality and Brauer group of a moduli space of framed bundles." Tbilisi Mathematical Journal 4 (2011): 29–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.32513/tbilisi/1528768866.

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46

Mykkänen, J. "Inside Rationality: The Division of Labour in a Parliamentary Party Group." Journal of Legislative Studies 7, no. 3 (September 2001): 92–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714003880.

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47

MICHAILOV, IVO MICHAILOV. "THE RATIONALITY PROBLEM FOR THREE- AND FOUR-DIMENSIONAL PERMUTATIONAL GROUP ACTIONS." International Journal of Algebra and Computation 21, no. 08 (December 2011): 1317–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218196711006583.

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Assume that K is a field, containing the full group of 4th roots of unity μ4, and char K ≠2, 3. Let G be a finite non-abelian subgroup of GL n(K) for n = 3 or n = 4. The group G induces an action on K(x1,…,xn), the rational function field of n variables over K. Consider groups represented by matrices such that in each row and column there is exactly one element from μ4 and all other elements are 0. With the aid of GAP [3] we find that there are precisely 230 such non-abelian groups in SL 4(K) and 33 in GL 3(K), up to conjugacy. We show that the fixed subfield K(x1,…,xn)G is rational (i.e. purely transcendental) over K for every such group G. We also give a positive answer to the Noether's problem for several families of groups of order m = 2a ⋅ 3b, where a ≥ 2 and b = 0, 1.
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48

Parisa, Nita, Dwi Tantri Marylin, and Theodorus. "Evaluation of Rationality in Prescribing Metformin (Biguanide Group) at Dr. Mohammad Hoesin General Hospital Palembang." Bioscientia Medicina : Journal of Biomedicine and Translational Research 6, no. 3 (January 31, 2022): 1530–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.37275/bsm.v6i3.471.

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Backgrounds. It is very important to evaluate and assess the rationality of the use of antidiabetic drugs, especially the biguanide (metformin) group to maintain the quality and quality of diabetes mellitus drug administration so that the target of diabetes mellitus control can be optimized. This study aims to evaluate the rationality of prescribing metformin oral antidiabetic at Dr. Mohammad Hoesin General Hospital Palembang. Methods. The research design is a descriptive study using secondary data from medical records in the medical records section of Dr. Moh Hoesin Hospital Palembang. The object of research is all medical records of patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus who used metformin at RSMH Palembang in the period July 1st, 2019-July 31st, 2020, with complete medical record data and without serious comorbidities. The rationality for using metformin that was assessed in this study was the frequency of use, drug dose, route of administration, duration of administration, and drug interactions. The frequency of drug use is assessed by how many times the drug is taken in one day. Results. The most age group of patients who received a prescription for metformin were 51-60 years old and 61-70 years old with a total of 17 patients (35.4%). The majority of patients were female as much as 60.4%. Drug interactions with metformin are still quite common, although the majority are synergistic and potentiating interactions. There are still 2 cases or 4.2 percent who experience antagonistic interactions. Conclusion. The rationality for using metformin in patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus is based on the criteria for the right dose (100%), the right frequency of drug administration (100%), the right time for giving the drug (100%), the right way of giving the drug (100%), and the right drug interaction. (95.8%).
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49

Jones, M. E. "Screening for HIV: Ratios, Risks and Rationality." Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 24, no. 2 (April 1996): 191–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0310057x9602400211.

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Abstract:
Screening patients or heathcare workers for Human Immunodeficiency Virus is unlikely to be cost-effective if the benefit is seen only as the prevention of infection of one group by the other within the healthcare institution. Overwhelmingly, the benefit of screening comes from interrupting the chains of infection within the ongoing epidemic in the population at large.
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50

Endo, Shizuo. "The rationality problem for norm one tori." Nagoya Mathematical Journal 202 (June 2011): 83–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0027763000010266.

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Abstract:
AbstractWe consider the problem of whether the norm one torus defined by a finite separable field extensionK/kis stably (or retract) rational overk. This has already been solved for the case whereK/kis a Galois extension. In this paper, we solve the problem for the case whereK/kis a non-Galois extension such that the Galois group of the Galois closure ofK/kis nilpotent or metacyclic.
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