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Journal articles on the topic 'Rational Reasoning'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 6 February 2022

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1

Pauer-Studer, Herlinde. "RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND REASONING." Economics and Philosophy 30, no. 3 (September 22, 2014): 513–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267114000315.

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This critical note concerns John Broome's book Rationality through Reasoning (2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.

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2

Board, The Editorial. "Rationality: Reasoning, Intuition, Rational Sciences." Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 1 (2015): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bjp2015711.

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3

Evans, Jonathan St B. T. "Rational Analysis of Illogical Reasoning." Contemporary Psychology 44, no. 6 (December 1999): 461–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/002095.

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4

Smith III, John P. "Competent Reasoning With Rational Numbers." Cognition and Instruction 13, no. 1 (March 1995): 3–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s1532690xci1301_1.

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5

ALEXY, ROBERT. "Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse." Ratio Juris 5, no. 2 (July 1992): 143–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00121.x.

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6

Lee, Wooram. "Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes." European Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (March 23, 2018): 1343–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12342.

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7

Chung, Kevin C. "First Impression Followed by Rational Reasoning." Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery 135, no. 3 (March 2015): 931–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/prs.0000000000001050.

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8

Giordano, Laura, and Daniele Theseider Dupré. "Defeasible Reasoning in 𝒮ℛ𝒪ℰℒ: from Rational Entailment to Rational Closure." Fundamenta Informaticae 161, no. 1-2 (July 2, 2018): 135–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-2018-1698.

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9

Oaksford, Mike, and Nick Chater. "New Paradigms in the Psychology of Reasoning." Annual Review of Psychology 71, no. 1 (January 4, 2020): 305–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132.

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The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion and is typically modeled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical fallacies. It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be erroneous responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, in which people extrapolate beyond the data they are given and logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.

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10

Evans, Jonathan St B. T. "Does rational analysis stand up to rational analysis?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, no. 1 (February 2009): 88–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x09000338.

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AbstractI agree with Oaksford & Chater (O&C) that human beings resemble Bayesian reasoners much more closely than ones engaging standard logic. However, I have many problems with their “rational analysis” framework, which appears to be rooted in normative rather than ecological rationality. The authors also overstate everyday rationality and neglect to account for much relevant psychological work on reasoning.

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Khalil, Elias L. "Are stomachs rational?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, no. 1 (February 2009): 91–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x09000375.

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AbstractOaksford & Chater (O&C) would need to define rationality if they want to argue that stomachs are not rational. The question of rationality, anyhow, is orthogonal to the debate concerning whether humans use classical deductive logic or probabilistic reasoning.

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12

Bulling, Nils, Wojciech Jamroga, and Jürgen Dix. "Reasoning about temporal properties of rational play." Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 53, no. 1-4 (August 2008): 51–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-009-9110-4.

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13

Opfer, John E., and Vladimir Sloutsky. "On the design and function of rational arguments." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, no. 2 (March 29, 2011): 85–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10002943.

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AbstractIt is unclear how an argumentative environment would select for better reasoning given three general findings. First, argument rationality typically fails to persuade poor reasoners. Second, reasoned argumentation competes with more persuasive and less rational arguments for limited cognitive resources. Third, those poor at reasoning fail to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments. Reasoning, therefore, is poorly designed for argument.

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14

Cave, Peter. "Reeling and A-Reasoning: Surprise Examinations and Newcomb's Tale." Philosophy 79, no. 4 (October 2004): 609–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819104000476.

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Certain paradoxes set us reeling endlessly. In surprise examination paradoxes, pupils' reasonings lead them to reel between expecting an examination and expecting none. With Newcomb's puzzle, choosers reel between reasoning in favour of choosing just one box and choosing two. The paradoxes demand an answer to what it is rational to believe or do. Highlighting other reelings and puzzles, this paper shows that the paradoxes should come as no surprise. The paradoxes demand an end to our reasoning when the conditions they set ensure no end. They equivocate between, so to speak, reasoning in heaven and reasoning on earth; and, on the conditions set, not even an infinite god could reach a conclusion.

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Cyras, Kristijonas. "Rational versus Intuitive Outcomes of Reasoning with Preferences: Argumentation Perspective." Inteligencia Artificial 20, no. 59 (February 6, 2017): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.4114/intartif.vol20iss59pp40-81.

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Reasoning with preference information is a common human activity. As modelling human reasoning is one of the main objectives of AI, reasoning with preferences is an important topic in various fields of AI, such as Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR). Argumentation is one particular branch of KR that concerns, among other tasks, modelling common-sense reasoning with preferences. A key issue there, is the lack of consensus on how to deal with preferences. Witnessing this is a multitude of proposals on how to formalise reasoning with preferences in argumentative terms. As a commonality, however, formalisms of argumentation with preferences tend to fulfil various criteria of `"rational" reasoning, notwithstanding the fact that human reasoning is often not `"rational", yet seemingly `"intuitive". In this paper, we study how several formalisms of argumentation with preferences model human intuition behind a particular common-sense reasoning problem. More specifically, we present a common-sense scenario of reasoning with rules and preferences, complemented with a survey of decisions made by human respondents that indicates an "intuitive" solution, and analyse how this problem is tackled in argumentation. We conclude that most approaches to argumentation with preferences afford a ``"rational" solution to the problem, and discuss one recent formalism that yields the "intuitive" solution instead. We argue that our results call for advancements in the area of argumentation with preferences in particular, as well as for further studies of reasoning with preferences in AI at large.

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16

Jehiel, Philippe, and Larry Samuelson. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, no. 4 (November 1, 2012): 1927–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs031.

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Abstract We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, but do not recognize how this play varies across histories. Concentrating on 2 × 2 games, we provide a characterization of equilibrium payoffs, establishing a payoff bound for the rational long-run player that can be strictly larger than the familiar “Stackelberg” bound. We also provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior, showing that play begins with either a reputation-building or a reputation-spending stage (depending on parameters), followed by a reputation-manipulation stage.

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17

Fisch, Menachem. "The Talmudist Enlightenment: Talmudic Judaism’s Confrontational Rational Theology." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v12i2.3310.

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Robert Brandom's "The Pragmatist Enlightenment" describes the advent of American pragmatism as signaling a sea-change in our understanding of human reason away from the top-down Euclidian models of reasoning, warrant and knowledge inspired by the physical sciences, toward the far more bottom-up, narrative, inherently fallible and dialogical forms of reasoning of the life and human sciences. It is against this backdrop that Talmudic Judaism emerges not only as an early anticipation of the pragmatist enlightenment, but as going a substantial and radical step beyond it, that in the context of religious commitment and reasoning, is unprecedented.

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18

Duc, H. "Reasoning about rational, but not logically omniscient, agents." Journal of Logic and Computation 7, no. 5 (October 1, 1997): 633–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/7.5.633.

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19

Gudjonsson, Gisli. "The reasoning criminal. Rational choice perspectives on offending." Behaviour Research and Therapy 26, no. 3 (1988): 287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(88)90023-x.

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20

Furbach, Ulrich, Claudia Schon, Frieder Stolzenburg, Karl-Heinz Weis, and Claus-Peter Wirth. "The RatioLog Project: Rational Extensions of Logical Reasoning." KI - Künstliche Intelligenz 29, no. 3 (June 5, 2015): 271–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13218-015-0377-9.

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21

Arfiyanti, Mega Pandu, Gandes Retno Rahayu, and Eti Nurwening Sholikhah. "EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING METHODS IMPROVES RATIONAL PRESCRIBING SKILL IN MEDICAL STUDENTS." Jurnal Pendidikan Kedokteran Indonesia: The Indonesian Journal of Medical Education 10, no. 2 (June 21, 2021): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jpki.56906.

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Background: Rational prescribing is an important skill for medical doctors. Many graduates still feel insufficiently prepared to make rational prescribing and fail to demonstrate the related clinical reasoning after graduation. For these reasons, it is important to improve the medical student teaching of rational prescribing. The aim of this study is proving the effectiveness of experiential learning methods to improve rational prescribing skills of medical students.Methods: This study used a one-group pretest-posttest design. Rational prescribing courses use experiential learning methods for 6 year medical students. Every student provided evaluation of rational prescribing and clinical reasoning through pretest and posttest, and we analyzed the results by paired t test.Results: The change in the rational prescribing skill of the students is significant between pretest and posttest. However, in the hypertension case the scores are not significant between pretest and posttest. Also, the scores of clinical reasoning based on drug interaction and evidence based methods are not significant in the hypertension and otitis media cases.Conclusions: Experiential learning methods can enhance rational prescribing skill in medical students but the students were still not able to choose appropriate medications based on drug interaction and evidence based approach.

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22

Schroeder, Mark. "RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT." Episteme 15, no. 3 (July 19, 2018): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.24.

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ABSTRACTIn this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.

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23

Browne, Katharine. "WHY SHOULD WE TEAM REASON?" Economics and Philosophy 34, no. 2 (February 6, 2018): 185–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267117000347.

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Abstract:Team reasoning is thought to be descriptively and normatively superior to the classical individualistic theory of rational choice primarily because it can recommend coordination on Hi in the Hi-Lo game and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma-type situations. However, left unanswered is whether it is rational for individuals to become team members, leaving a gap between reasons for individuals and reasons for team members. In what follows, I take up Susan Hurley's attempt to show that it is rational for an individual to become a team member. I argue that her account fails to show that becoming a team member is necessary to gain the advantages of coordination in Hi-Lo games or cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma-type situations, and that individuals will often fare better reasoning as individual agents than as members of a team. I argue further that there is a more general problem for team reasoning, specifically that the conditions needed to make it rational for a team member to employ team reasoning make becoming a team member unnecessary.

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24

Valaris, Markos. "Reasoning and Deducing." Mind 128, no. 511 (August 9, 2018): 861–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy025.

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Abstract What exactly is reasoning? While debate on this question is ongoing, most philosophers seem to agree on at least the following: reasoning is a mental process operating on contents, which consists in adopting or revising some of your attitudes in light of others. In this paper, I argue that this characterisation is mistaken: there is no single mental phenomenon that satisfies both of these conditions. Instead, I characterise two distinct mental phenomena, which I call ‘deducing’, on the one hand, and ‘reasoning’ or ‘inference’ on the other, to play each of these roles. Recognising this division of labour is essential to developing a better understanding of our rational economy.

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25

Newstead, Stephen E. "What is an ecologically rational heuristic?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23, no. 5 (October 2000): 759–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00433443.

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The notion of ecological rationality, although plausible, does not readily lead to testable predictions. This is illustrated with respect to heuristics in syllogistic reasoning. Several possible heuristics have been proposed but ecological rationality does not appear to offer a sensible rationale for choosing between these.

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26

GIORDANO, LAURA, and DANIELE THESEIDER DUPRÉ. "ASP for minimal entailment in a rational extension of SROEL." Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 16, no. 5-6 (September 2016): 738–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1471068416000399.

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AbstractIn this paper we exploit Answer Set Programming (ASP) for reasoning in a rational extensionSROEL(⊓,×)RTof the low complexity description logicSROEL(⊓, ×), which underlies the OWL EL ontology language. In the extended language, a typicality operatorTis allowed to define conceptsT(C) (typicalC's) under a rational semantics. It has been proven that instance checking under rational entailment has a polynomial complexity. To strengthen rational entailment, in this paper we consider a minimal model semantics. We show that, for arbitrarySROEL(⊓,×)RTknowledge bases, instance checking under minimal entailment is ΠP2-complete. Relying on a Small Model result, where models correspond to answer sets of a suitable ASP encoding, we exploit Answer Set Preferences (and, in particular, theasprinframework) for reasoning under minimal entailment.

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27

Hahn, Ulrike. "Why rational norms are indispensable." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, no. 5 (October 2011): 257–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000641.

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AbstractNormative theories provide essential tools for understanding behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.

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28

Plummer, Patrick, Melissa DeWolf, Miriam Bassok, Peter C. Gordon, and Keith J. Holyoak. "Reasoning strategies with rational numbers revealed by eye tracking." Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 79, no. 5 (March 29, 2017): 1426–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13414-017-1312-y.

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29

Weydert, Emil. "System JLZ – rational default reasoning by minimal ranking constructions." Journal of Applied Logic 1, no. 3-4 (June 2003): 273–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1570-8683(03)00016-8.

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30

Berger, C. E. H., and D. Meuwly. "Logically correct concluding and rational reasoning in evidence evaluation." Science & Justice 50, no. 1 (March 2010): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2009.11.032.

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31

Petit, Jean-Claude. "Reasoning by analogy: rational foundation of natural analogue studies." Applied Geochemistry 7 (January 1992): 9–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0883-2927(09)80059-0.

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32

Amdisen, Lars Kristian. "An architecture for hydroinformatic systems based on rational reasoning." Journal of Hydraulic Research 32, sup1 (January 1994): 183–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00221689409498810.

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33

Eberbach, Eugene. "Approximate reasoning in the algebra of bounded rational agents." International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 49, no. 2 (October 2008): 316–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2006.09.014.

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34

Maynes, Jeffrey. "Steering into the Skid: On the Norms of Critical Thinking." Informal Logic 37, no. 2 (June 3, 2017): 114–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v37i2.4818.

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Cognitive bias presents as a pressing challenge to critical thinking education. While many have focused on how to eliminate or mitigate cognitive bias, others have argued that these biases are better understood as result from adaptive reasoning heuristics which are, in the right conditions, rational modes of reasoning about the world. This approach presents a new challenge to critical thinking education: if these heuristics are rational under the right conditions, does teaching critical thinking undermine student abilities to reason effectively in real life reasoning scenarios? I argue that this challenge calls for a reconception of the goals of critical thinking education to focus on how rational ideals are best achieved or approximated in human reasoners. Critical thinking educators should focus on developing the metacognitive skill to recognize when different cognitive strategies (including the heuristics) should be used.

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35

Ivy, Jessica T., Sarah B. Bush, and Barbara J. Dougherty. "Stacking the Deck: Reversibility and Reasoning." Mathematics Teacher: Learning and Teaching PK-12 113, no. 1 (January 2020): 65–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/mtlt.2019.0027.

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To promote reversibility and strengthen number sense, we created an engaging and novel rational number exploration, which promoted flexible and reflective thinking. A class of fifth-grade students took an active role in a collaborative learning task, discussed their strategies, revisited the task, and reflected on their self-constructed generalizations.

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36

Ragulienė, Loreta, and Violeta Šlekienė. "DEMONSTRATION TASKS OF ELECTRICAL CURENT PROPERTIES AND THEIR RATIONAL SENSE." GAMTAMOKSLINIS UGDYMAS / NATURAL SCIENCE EDUCATION 8, no. 2 (June 25, 2011): 40–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.48127/gu-nse/11.8.40a.

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This article reveals the importance of demonstration tasks in physics teaching in sec-ondary schools. The demonstration tasks of electrical current in the gas and their logical anal-ysis is presented and analyzed. Reasoning schemes for giving a logical sense to these physics demo tasks are developed. The proposed reasoning schemes reach to activate students' think-ing, understanding the demonstrations during the observed physical phenomena, i.e. help stu-dents to: understand the nature of the demo task, determine cause - effect relationships and dependencies, compare conditions and findings, summarize the results, do conclusions. Such using of demonstration tasks is useful to both of teacher and pupil: teacher controls the con-tent of teaching and a learning of pupils, pupils - are focused to self-activities, encouraged to think, analyze, summarize and do conclusions. Key words: physics teaching, demonstration task, reasoning schemes.

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37

Tchantouridze, Lasha. "Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making." Canadian Journal of Political Science 38, no. 1 (March 2005): 256–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423905380103.

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Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, Alex Mintz, ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 175Heuristic method uses formal reasoning that is based on experience, often because there is no precise and/or relevant algorithm available. Heuristic reasoning is guided by trial and error. It is convincing without being rigorous. Heuristic method is basically a rule of thumb or other simplifications that allow drawing conclusions without being certain.

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38

Dietrich, Franz, Antonios Staras, and Robert Sugden. "A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning." Journal of Philosophy 116, no. 11 (2019): 585–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161138.

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John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioral economics.

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39

Akrom, Muhamad, Triyanto Triyanto, and Farida Nurhasanah. "Students’ Mathematical Reasoning Ability Viewed from Personality Type Rational and Idealist." International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding 7, no. 11 (December 2, 2020): 132. http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v7i11.2149.

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This finds out about pursuits to (1) describe the mathematical reasoning ability of high school students as viewed from the rational and idealist personality types; (2) knowing the causes of students' errors in answering questions. This type of research is qualitative research. The subjects of this research were eleventh-grade students of high school 1 Wanasaba East Lombok. Determination of the concern using purposive sampling. Data collection methods used personality tests and mathematical reasoning exams on trigonometric material. The outcomes of this study indicate that both rational and idealist personality types are capable of substantiating and equally incapable of making logical conclusions. Students with rational and idealist personality types do not meet the indicators of making logical conclusions because the subject is wrong in giving argument formulation because they do not master the concept of arbitrary cosine triangle rule. Students with the rational personality type can perform calculations based on certain rules or formulas, while students with the idealist personality type are unable. This is because the idealist personality kind students use the wrong formula in the problem-solving process. After all, the situation does not understand the concept of arbitrary sine and cosine triangle rules. The idealist personality type student can predict the answer and the solution process, while the rational personality type is unable. This is because students with the rational personality type answer not to the desired answer to the question. After all, they do not understand the query from the question.

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40

Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. "Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58 (May 2006): 157–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246106058085.

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I want to focus on some of the limits of decision theory that are of interest to the philosophical concern with practical reasoning and rational choice. These limits should also be of interest to the social-scientists’ concern with Rational Choice.

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41

Cyras, Kristijonas. "Rational versus Intuitive Outcomes of Reasoning with Preferences: Argumentation Perspective." INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL 20, no. 59 (2017): 70–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.4114/intartif.vol20iss59pp70-81.

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42

Gergely, György, and Gergely Csibra. "Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7, no. 7 (July 2003): 287–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00128-1.

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43

Ortiz, Charles L. "A commonsense language for reasoning about causation and rational action." Artificial Intelligence 111, no. 1-2 (July 1999): 73–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(99)00041-7.

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44

Hilton, Denis J. "The social context of reasoning: Conversational inference and rational judgment." Psychological Bulletin 118, no. 2 (1995): 248–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.118.2.248.

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45

Lovegrove, Austin. "Book Review: The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending." Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 21, no. 4 (December 1988): 284–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000486588802100418.

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46

Eichhorn, Christian. "Dissertation Abstract: Qualitative Rational Reasoning with Finite Conditional Knowledge Bases." KI - Künstliche Intelligenz 33, no. 1 (December 17, 2018): 93–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13218-018-00569-8.

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47

Arslan, Turan, and C. Jotin Khisty. "A rational reasoning method from fuzzy perceptions in route choice." Fuzzy Sets and Systems 150, no. 3 (March 2005): 419–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2004.03.021.

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48

Svoboda, Toby. "The Role of Reasoning in Pragmatic Morality." Contemporary Pragmatism 18, no. 1 (May 27, 2021): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10004.

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Abstract Charles Sanders Peirce offers a number of arguments against the rational application of theory to morality, suggesting instead that morality should be grounded in instinct. Peirce maintains that we currently lack the scientific knowledge that would justify a rational structuring of morality. This being the case, philosophically generated moralities cannot be otherwise than dogmatic and dangerous. In this paper, I contend that Peirce’s critique of what I call “dogmatic-philosophical morality” should be taken very seriously, but I also claim that the purely instinctive morality Peirce endorses is liable to a danger of its own, namely fanaticism. Indeed, Peirce himself recognizes this danger. As an alternative, I sketch a form of “pragmatic morality” that attempts to sidestep the dogmatism of philosophical morality and the fanaticism of instinctive morality. This form of morality avoids philosophical dogmatism by treating extant instincts as the postulates and materials with which it works. It avoids instinctive fanaticism by allowing a role to reason. By exhibiting fallibilism, revisability, pluralism, and meliorism, this type of reasoning can avoid the dogmatism of the philosophical kind of morality Peirce critiques.

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Kaur, Manpreet, and Suninder Tung. "Cognitive Reasoning Processes and Identity Achievement: Mediating Role of Identity Processing Styles." Pakistan Journal of Psychological Research 34, no. 3 (October 18, 2019): 457–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.33824/pjpr.2019.34.3.25.

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The present study aimed to investigate the direct as well as indirect effect (through identity processing styles) of cognitive reasoning processes (rational-experiential processing systems) on identity achievement. In this model, identity processing styles serve as a catalyst for cognitive reasoning and identity achievement. For this purpose, a sample of 250 boys and 250 girls with age ranging from 15-20 years (M = 17.62; SD = 1.85) was taken. Identity Style Inventory-3 (Berzonsky, 1992), Rational Experiential Inventory-Adolescents (Marks et al., 2008), and Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity (Bennion & Adams, 1986) were administered on the sample. The mediating role of identity processing styles in the relationship of cognitive reasoning and identity achievement was investigated. The results of Multiple Hierarchical Regression analyses revealed that the relation between rational processing system and identity achievement was partially mediated by informational identity processing style. In addition, the relationship between experiential processing system and identity achievement was completely mediated by two identity processing styles-informational and normative. The current study findings were considered in terms of socio-cognitive model of formation of identity.

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SMITH, STEVEN G. "The roar of the lion, the taste of the salt: on really religious reasons." Religious Studies 48, no. 4 (February 27, 2012): 479–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412512000017.

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AbstractSome of the most significant religious appeals can be taken as reasons of a distinctively religious kind. But many popular ways of interpreting religious reasoning pose obstacles to appreciating religious reasons as such. To avoid binding the concept of religious reason to an intellectual programme that requires a disjunction between the religious and the rational or that dissolves all tension between religious claims and general rational standards of validity and normativity, religious reasons can be defined for purposes of liberal study by their challenging yet rationally appreciable transvalid claims and transnormative implications. Examples from the book of Amos and the Chandogya Upanishad are discussed.

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