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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.
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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.
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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.
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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.
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Kas'yanova, Svetlana. Accounting in the restaurant and hotel business and tourism. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1171922.
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The textbook outlines the theoretical and applied aspects of the organization and accounting features, which allow assessing the effectiveness of its management with a proper degree of completeness and reliability. The latest legislative changes have been taken into account.
All the material is distributed on topics between theoretical, practical and seminar classes, as well as independent work of students in the form of discussions, presentations, situational tasks, test tasks.
The use of methodological materials will allow students to rationally allocate their time while studying the discipline, get a sufficiently adequate aggregate score and rating assessment and form professional skills.
Meets the requirements of the federal state educational standards of higher education of the latest generation.
The textbook contains a set of developments for the preparation of bachelors in the field of accounting that meet the requirements of the educational program in the field of training 38.03.01 "Economics".
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1968-, Arvesú Jorge, and Lopez Lagomasino Guillermo 1948-, eds. Recent advances in orthogonal polynomials, special functions, and their applications: 11th International Symposium on Orthogonal Polynomials, Special Functions, and Their Applications, August 29-September 2, 2011, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Leganes, Spain. Providence, R.I: American Mathematical Society, 2012.
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Jenkins, Jeffery A. APD and Rational Choice. Edited by Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697915.013.18.
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Rational choice and American political development (APD) both emerged as responses to (perceived) limitations with the dominant behavioral tradition. While their critiques were based on very different research traditions, similarities were also present; in particular, both rational choice and APD approaches focused on the importance ofinstitutionsfor studying political outcomes. Over time, rational choice and APD research has converged to a significant degree, as scholars in both traditions have increasingly been exposed to different theoretical and methodological perspectives and thus become consumers of each other’s work. This chapter documents how and why rational choice research has moved in an APD direction.
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Wedgwood, Ralph. The Value of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.001.0001.
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Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values. Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good. Specifically, rationality is a virtue, while irrationality is a vice. What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational.
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Wedgwood, Ralph. The Aim of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0010.
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It is proposed that rationality has an external goal—thinking as correctly as possible. (For example, perhaps believing as correctly as possible is being maximally confident of the truth, and choosing as correctly as possible is choosing something feasible and optimally choiceworthy.) If your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This idea is interpreted in probabilistic terms. There is a probability function, fixed by the mental states and events present in your mind, such that the degree to which your thinking is ‘good news’ about correctness is determined by how your thinking compares to alternative ways of thinking in terms of its expected degree of correctness according to that probability function. This proposal can explain the normativity of the requirements of rational coherence.
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Wagner, R. Harrison. Rationalism and Security. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.285.
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In 1969, the game theorist John Harsanyi wrote an article criticizing the two main postulates of the general theory of social behavior prevalent at the time: the functionalist approach to the explanation of social institutions and the conformist approach to the explanation of individual behavior. According to Harsanyi, functionalist and conformist theories overstated the degree of consensus in societies, could not account for change, and described observed behavior without explaining it. Harsanyi proposed an alternative approach provided by theories based on the concept of rational choice (rational behavior, or rational decision-making). His goal was to develop a hypothetico-deductive theory explaining (and possibly predicting) a large number of empirical facts from a few relatively simple theoretical assumptions or axioms. Among students of international politics, Harsanyi’s approach sparked a controversy about rationalism. However, some critics of rationalism do not distinguish clearly between the interest-based theories Harsanyi criticized and the rational choice methods he advocated, and some even confuse both with neoclassical economics. In order to understand the issues raised in the controversy about rationalism, it is helpful to look at interest-based theories of politics and their relation to neoclassical economics. Game theory has provided a useful framework for the intellectual agenda outlined by Harsanyi, especially in the area of international security.
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Kvanvig, Jonathan L. Understanding. Edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662241.013.31.
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Among our purely intellectual achievements are things like knowledge, understanding, and finding good reasons or evidence for some claims and against others. The drive to reduce and simplify then appears, asking which of these great epistemic goods is fundamental. Does knowledge come first, with good evidence being a derivative idea (maybe because your evidence is what you know)? Or does the evidence we get from experience or rational intuition dominate, with knowledge involving an especially laudatory amount or degree of such? Where do the great intellectual achievements of wisdom and understanding fit into the story? If understanding, for example, is the goal of enquiry rather than knowledge or rational opinion, the question arises of whether either of the two approaches can explain or accommodate such a central role. This chapter explores the relationships between these three central elements in a complete epistemology.
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Wildman, Wesley J. Anthropomorphism and Apophaticism. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815990.003.0002.
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To appreciate the risks and benefits of anthropomorphism, it is important (1) to appreciate the genius and limitations of human cognition, (2) to compare ultimacy models to see what difference anthropomorphic modeling techniques make, and (3) to entertain the possibility of an apophatic approach to ultimate reality that relativizes and relates ultimacy models. An apophatic approach to ultimate reality relativizes ultimacy models but also implies a disintegrating metric that serves to relate ultimacy models to one another. Degree of anthropomorphism is an important component of this disintegrating metric. Comparative analysis helps manifest internal complexity in the idea of anthropomorphism by distinguishing three relatively independent dimensions: Intentionality Attribution, Rational Practicality, and Narrative Comprehensibility. Educational efforts stabilized in cultural traditions can confer on people the desire and ability to resist one or more dimensions of the anthropomorphic default modes of cognition to some degree.
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Sprenger, Jan, and Stephan Hartmann. Bayesian Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199672110.001.0001.
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“Bayesian Philosophy of Science” addresses classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept—degrees of beliefs—in order to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. The basic idea is that the value of convincing evidence, good explanations, intertheoretic reduction, and so on, can all be captured by the effect it has on our degrees of belief. This idea is elaborated as a cycle of variations about the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities, and changing them by a particular rule (Bayesian Conditionalization). Partly, the book is committed to the Carnapian tradition of explicating essential concepts in scientific reasoning using Bayesian models (e.g., degree of confirmation, causal strength, explanatory power). Partly, it develops new solutions to old problems such as learning conditional evidence and updating on old evidence, and it models important argument schemes in science such as the No Alternatives Argument, the No Miracles Argument or Inference to the Best Explanation. Finally, it is explained how Bayesian inference in scientific applications—above all, statistics—can be squared with the demands of practitioners and how a subjective school of inference can make claims to scientific objectivity. The book integrates conceptual analysis, formal models, simulations, case studies and empirical findings in an attempt to lead the way for 21th century philosophy of science.
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Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. Action. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682706.003.0006.
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This chapter defends a connection between knowledge and practical reasoning, according to which one’s reasons for action constitute all and only that which one knows. A variety of intuitive objections to such principles are considered and rejected—a central theme is that objectors to knowledge norms often make tacit but substantive ethical assumptions about which reasons, if held, would justify which actions. Absent broader ethical theorizing, the proposed counterexamples are inconclusive. The chapter sketches possible approaches to such theories, and indicates reason for optimism about knowledge norms. It also considers the degree to which knowledge norms imply externalism about rational action, suggesting that many internalist intuitions and verdicts may be accommodated and explained by knowledge norms.
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Caie, Michael. A Problem for Credal Consequentialism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0009.
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Caie focuses on an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Caie argues that in a wide variety of cases this view says that all degreed beliefs are rational, or none are, or it issues no verdicts. This is, roughly, because an agent’s degrees of beliefs will often not encode the appropriate dependence hypotheses that are needed so that various beliefs have expected epistemic utility values. Caie thus argues the unintuitive verdicts of epistemic utility theory are not limited to the byzantine examples of epistemic trade-offs, but are much more widespread.
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Wildman, Wesley J. Subordinate-Deity Models of Ultimate Reality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815990.003.0004.
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Subordinate-deity models of ultimate reality affirm that God is Highest Being within an ultimate reality that is neither conceptually tractable nor religiously relevant. Subordinate-deity models ceded their dominance to agential-being models of ultimate reality by refusing to supply a comprehensive answer to the metaphysical problem of the One and the Many in the wake of the Axial-Age interest in that problem, but they have revived in the twentieth century due to post-colonial resistance to putatively comprehensive explanations. Subordinate-deity ultimacy models resist the Intentionality Attribution and Narrative Comprehensibility dimensions of anthropomorphism to some degree but continue to employ the Rational Practicality dimension of anthropomorphism, resulting in a strategy of judicious anthropomorphism. Variations, strengths, and weaknesses of the subordinate-deity class of ultimacy models are discussed.
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Wolff, Nancy. A General Model of Harm in Correctional Settings. Edited by John Wooldredge and Paula Smith. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199948154.013.33.
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The literature on inmate “harm” and inmate victimization within prison settings is reviewed with emphasis on the prevalence, predictors, and consequences associated with inmate misconduct, physical victimization, and sexual victimization in prison. The degree of overlap between “offenders” and “victims” is also discussed. The relevance of considering both inmate and facility characteristics for a more comprehensive understanding of both violent and property victimization is underscored. The potential impact of victimization on inmates’ feelings of safety is also covered. Strategies for preventing victimization and their limitations (e.g., protective custody, administrative segregation, disciplinary custody, prison transfers) are reviewed. A dyadic model of harm is developed that draws on routine activities theory and rational choice theory, to more clearly and systematically predict the effects of harm- and victim-propensity attributes of incarcerated people and correctional facilities on levels of harm.
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Wildman, Wesley J. Agential-Being Models of Ultimate Reality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815990.003.0003.
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Agential-being models of ultimate reality affirm that ultimate reality is an aware, agential being. The Central Result of the scientific study of religion—that human beings will spontaneously create anthropomorphic supernatural agents to believe in, and to make religious use of, whether or not those agents actually exist—erodes the plausibility of any belief in supernatural agents, without proving such beliefs false, so it imposes a heavy burden on proponents of agential-being theism to show that the agential-being God hypothesis is plausible in light of all relevant information, and convincingly superior to competitor views. Agential-being ultimacy models resist the Rational Practicality and Narrative Comprehensibility dimensions of anthropomorphism to some degree but continue to employ the Intentionality Attribution dimension of anthropomorphism, resulting in a strategy of judicious anthropomorphism. Variations, strengths, and weaknesses of the agential-being class of ultimacy models are discussed.
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Domski, Mary. Laws of Nature and the Divine Order of Things. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746775.003.0003.
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This chapter examines the different ways in which Descartes and Newton balance their claim that laws of nature are true of the natural world with their commitment to our human inability to fully comprehend God’s creation of nature. For both Descartes and Newton, there is a qualified notion of truth at play. Descartes’s laws of nature are true insofar as they capture God’s maintenance of nature only so far as we can understand. Nonetheless, they are afforded the highest degree of certainty and necessity that we can attain. Newton’s laws of motion are true insofar as they accurately describe the motions we witness in the sensible world. However, this truth is not based on mere inductive certainty; this chapter argues it is a truth that is characterized by rational certainty and thus closer to Descartes’s notion than we might expect from Newton’s ‘empirical’ method.
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Kacprzak, Agnieszka. Rhetoric and Roman Law. Edited by Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198728689.013.16.
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This chapter surveys the methods of constructing rational arguments taught in the schools of rhetoric and their impact on juridical argumentation. It surveys: the place of rhetoric in legal education; the basic tools of rhetorical invention, i.e. rhetorical syllogism and induction, general schemes of inference on which singular arguments depended (topoi), and types of questions on which court debates could concentrate (status); the difficulties one is likely to encounter when trying to identify traces of rhetorical teaching in legal sources. It is the contention of this chapter that such attempts are hardly successful, since rhetorical theory codifies, classifies, and to a lesser degree analyses types of argumentation people intuitively use, rather than create them. The mere fact that a jurist applied some pattern of reasoning as described in rhetorical handbooks is insufficient evidence to conclude either that he had some sort of rhetorical education or that he knew rhetorical theory.
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Goligorsky, Michael S., Julien Maizel, Radovan Vasko, May M. Rabadi, and Brian B. Ratliff. Pathophysiology of acute kidney injury. Edited by Norbert Lameire. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199592548.003.0221.
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In the intricate maze of proposed mechanisms, modifiers, modulators, and sensitizers for acute kidney injury (AKI) and diverse causes inducing it, this chapter focuses on several common and undisputable strands which do exist.Structurally, the loss of the brush border, desquamation of tubular epithelial cells, and obstruction of the tubular lumen are commonly observed, albeit to various degrees. These morphologic hallmarks of AKI are accompanied by functional defects, most consistently reflected in the decreased glomerular filtration rate and variable degree of reduction in renal blood flow, accompanied by changes in the microcirculation. Although all renal resident cells participate in AKI, the brunt falls on the epithelial and endothelial cells, the fact that underlies the development of tubular epithelial and vascular compromise.This chapter further summarizes the involvement of several cell organelles in AKI: mitochondrial involvement in perturbed energy metabolism, lysosomal involvement in degradation of misfolded proteins and damaged organelles, and peroxisomal involvement in the regulation of oxidative stress and metabolism, all of which become defective. Common molecular pathways are engaged in cellular stress response and their roles in cell death or survival. The diverse families of nephrotoxic medications and the respective mechanisms they induce AKI are discussed. The mechanisms of action of some nephrotoxins are analysed, and also of the preventive therapies of ischaemic or pharmacologic pre-conditioning.An emerging concept of the systemic inflammatory response triggered by AKI, which can potentially aggravate the local injury or tend to facilitate the repair of the kidney, is presented. Rational therapeutic strategies should be based on these well-established pathophysiological hallmarks of AKI.
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Staffel, Julia. Unsettled Thoughts. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833710.001.0001.
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How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? What makes their degrees of belief rational, and how should they reason about uncertain matters? Recent research in epistemology has attempted to answer these questions by developing formal models of ideally rational credences. However, we know from psychological research that ideal rationality is unattainable for human thinkers. This raises the question of how rational ideals can apply to human thinkers. A popular reply is that the more a thinker’s imperfectly rational credences approximate compliance with norms of ideal rationality, the better. But what exactly does this mean? Why is it better to be less irrational, if we can’t ever be completely rational? And what does being closer to ideally rational amount to? If ideal models of rationality are supposed to help us understand the rationality of human, imperfect thinkers, we need answers to these questions. Unsettled Thoughts offers these answers: we can explain why it’s better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate, and better at guiding our actions. Moreover, the way in which approximating ideal rationality is beneficial can be made formally precise by using a variety of distance measures that track the benefits of being more rational.
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Pula, Besnik, and Yannis A. Stivachtis. Historical Sociology and International Relations: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Large-Scale Historical Change and Global Order. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.90.
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Historical Sociology (HS) is a subfield of sociology studying the structures and processes that have shaped important features of the modern world, including the development of the rational bureaucratic state, the emergence of capitalism, international institutions and trade, transnational forces, revolutions, and warfare. HS differs from other approaches in sociology given its distinction between routine social activities and transformative moments that fundamentally reshape social structures and institutions. Within international relations, the relevance of history in the field’s study has been highly disputed. In fact, mainstream international relations (IR)—Neorealism and Liberalism—has downplayed the importance of history. Nevertheless, World History (WH) and HS have exercised a significant degree of influence over certain theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. The history of HS can be traced back to the Enlightenment period and the belief that it was possible to improve the human condition by unmaking and remaking human institutions. HS was then taken up by a second wave of historical sociologists who were asking questions about political power and the state, paving the way for greater engagement between IR and sociology. Third wave HS, meanwhile, emerged from a questioning of received theoretical paradigms, and was thus characterized by theoretical and methodological revisions, but only minor and incremental changes to the research agenda of second wave Historical Sociology.
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Puranam, Phanish. Behavioral foundations. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199672363.003.0002.
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The diversity of behaviors that human beings exhibit makes it challenging to know what behavioral assumptions to make when building theories about organizations. Fortunately for us, organizational contexts are, to varying degrees, designed. I argue that this introduces a powerful set of levers—sorting, framing and structuring—that can help reduce this diversity of behavioral possibilities to a tractable yet plausible few. In the resulting account of behavior, alternatives need not be given, their consequences need not be known, and the utilities attached to consequences need not be stable. This chapter offers a simplified framework to understand a variety of forms of rational and non-rational individual behavior as special cases.
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Peppin, John, Joseph V. Pergolizzi, Robert B. Raffa, and Steven L. Wright, eds. The Benzodiazepines Crisis. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780197517277.001.0001.
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When properly prescribed, benzodiazepines and related “Z” drugs, are usually safe and effective. However, some patients experience lack of efficacy, severe adverse effects, and/or protracted withdrawal symptoms. Unfortunately, there is no reliable way to predict outcome prior to treatment. Use has dramatically expanded, to the point where some experts suggest a disconnect with actual medical need. With increased and longer prescribing there has been a corresponding increase in the “down-side” of these drugs. Benzodiazepines, as all drugs, produce some degree of normal physiologic tolerance and physical dependence. But for some patients withdrawal can result in a bewildering array of symptoms, that can persist for protracted time periods, difficult to understand and live with. Although there is currently no clear mechanistic explanation, some potentials include alterations of receptor number, promoters of receptor protein synthesis or degradation, absorption, distribution, metabolism, and elimination, GABAA-receptor function or subtype-distribution, or involvement of peripheral benzodiazepine binding/receptor sites. This book attempts to bring benzodiazepine use under a more rational paradigm and reduce the incidence of side-effects and drug–drug interactions (DDI). It is the first devoted to take on this responsibility. Use, overuse/misuse, side-effects, DDI, physiology, and withdrawal are reviewed by expert clinicians and basic scientists in-depth. The book challenges the medical community to take seriously the use of this class of drug and to ameliorate prescribing behavior. The case is made for limiting initiation and duration (2–4 weeks) of use, and careful, supported discontinuation. We laud and suggest increased research into this class of drug and it’s “down-side.”
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Wedgwood, Ralph. Rationality as a Virtue. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0007.
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A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics—especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, it expresses the concept of a kind of virtue, that has the central features that are ascribed to virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Like other virtues, rationality comes in degrees. Just as Aristotle distinguished ‘just acts’ from acts that ‘manifest the virtue of justice’, we can distinguish the ‘abstract rationality’ from the manifestation of rational dispositions; this is the best account of the distinction between ‘propositional’ and ‘doxastic justification’. This approach also helps us to understand the relations between ‘rationality’ and ‘rational requirements’, and to answer further objections to the thesis that ‘rationality’ is a normative concept that are based on the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
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Legaspi, Michael C. Piety and Wisdom in Socrates. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190885120.003.0005.
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For Socrates, wisdom begins with the recognition of a moral order that identifies human flourishing with the life of virtue. The virtuous individual lives in harmony with a world governed by divine benevolence and characterized by justice. Because virtue is found in people in varying degrees, the social order is not necessarily ordered to wisdom and is, at times, inimical to it. Social life is the venue for a pursuit of wisdom in which rational discourse—as opposed to power and manipulation—structures a search for the good. Rational discourse, however, also reveals human moral and intellectual limitations, such that any claim to know what is good must be held tentatively and kept open to revision. In the face of human ignorance and hostility, loyalty to the good is sustained by piety, or reverence for the good, and by integrity, the refusal to give up one’s own just life.
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Penhallurick, Rob. Teaching Diversity and Change in the History of English. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190611040.003.0024.
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Teaching the history of the English language (HEL) leads one naturally to talking about its geographical and social diversity—its dialects and varieties and their features. This chapter will address the role of diversity and change within the History of English, focusing especially on regional dialects, and providing specific examples of written and audio resources that can be used in the HEL classroom. In particular, it refers to an introductory undergraduate course on Studying the English Language developed and taught by the author, explaining its rationale, exemplifying its content, and discussing how it can feed into subsequent courses and topics of a degree programme.
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Zimmerman, Aaron Z. Alternative Measures and Taxonomies. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0002.
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Those advancing formal models of rational choice, action, and judgment tend to follow F. Ramsey (1931) in defining degrees of belief in terms of a person’s willingness to risk money, happiness, and other “good stuff” on the truth of a sentence or proposition. The dominant paradigm in cognitive psychology—introduced by D. Kahneman (2011) and colleagues—distinguishes “two systems” of cognition, and some theorists—e.g. K. Frankish (2004)—have tried to define “belief” in terms of these two systems. L.J. Cohen (1992) defines “belief” phenomenologically, in terms of feelings of conviction. The pragmatic conception of belief differs from all of these approaches, and is superior to the “two systems” analysis.
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Lewis, David M. Iron Age II Israel. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769941.003.0010.
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This chapter draws on the evidence of archaeology and the Hebrew Bible to explore the phenomenon of slavery in Israel and Judah during the monarchical period. The first part of the chapter comprises a detailed legal analysis of the so-called ‘slave laws’ of the Torah. The rationale behind these laws was to prevent members of the Israelite ethnic group from falling into slavery; they aim to transform the enslaved Israelite into an indentured servant with various rights, including the right not to be sold. The second half of the chapter surveys the Hebrew Bible and shows how elites in Israel and Judah probably depended to a significant degree on slave labour for the cultivation of their estates.
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Becker, Lawrence C. Stoic Virtue. Edited by Nancy E. Snow. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199385195.013.6.
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The Stoics notoriously held that virtue was the perfection of human-scale rational agency; that such perfection was rare but humanly possible; that it was both necessary and sufficient for happiness; that it was, in fact, the only unqualified good for human beings; and that it was an all-or-nothing achievement—there were no intermediate degrees of virtue. The mere recital of that list of Stoic doctrines has often been enough to disqualify Stoicism as a viable form of virtue ethics. This chapter, however, describes Stoic ethics as a systematic and attractive alternative to Aristotelian ethics. The implicit suggestion is that the usual caricatures of Stoicism can be erased, and that contemporary virtue ethics can benefit from working in the Stoic tradition—particularly with its naturalistic account of moral development.
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Moss, Sarah. The case for probabilistic contents. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0001.
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This chapter develops and defends the thesis that we can believe probabilistic contents. Probabilistic contents are not merely propositions about probabilities; rather, they are sets of probability spaces over propositions. For example, you have .6 credence that Jones smokes just in case you believe a certain set of probability spaces, namely those that assign .6 probability to Jones smoking. A central question of this chapter is why we should think that credences are beliefs in probabilistic contents, as opposed to attitudes of degreed belief in propositions. The answer is that the contents of belief are the objects that play various theoretical roles, such as explaining rational action, grounding relations of disagreement between subjects, and grounding relations of consistency and entailment between beliefs—and probabilistic contents do in fact play each of these roles.
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Ekelund, Robert B., John D. Jackson, and Robert D. Tollison. Markets, Culture, and American Art. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190657895.003.0001.
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Chapter 1 introduces the rationale for studying and analyzing the economic aspects of American art as a “category” of art genres and, more generally, it places the market for art in the context of trade for all goods and services. Art, like all traded goods, possesses credence characteristics, but they are present to a significant degree since the requisite assurance of authenticity is often difficult to determine. The chapter also explains why American art can be segmented for study apart from a “homogeneous” art category and also as two markets—one prior to art produced before 1950, and another that has come to be called contemporary American art. Chapter 1 previews the remainder of the book in which both semi-technical issues, such as artistic productivity, auction estimates, and investments, and narrative issues, including art crime, fakes, art marketing “death effects,” and contemporary art bubbles, are dissected from an economic perspective.
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Castledine, Jacqueline. Progressive Feminisms. University of Illinois Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/illinois/9780252037269.003.0003.
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This chapter talks about how Progressive women faced a number of challenges as they headed out on the campaign trail in 1948. Not only did Women for Wallace activists have to contend with Cold War politics, including debates about the role of Communists in the Progressive Party (PP), they also had to negotiate the competing rationales members claimed for women's political engagement. The feminisms that took root in the PP were most often shaped by debates about the grounds on which Progressive women should demand their right to political participation. Divisions within the Congress of American Women and Women for Wallace organizations were determined by the degree to which members relied upon notions of “difference” between men and women to claim their rights.
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Schellenberg, Susanna. Justification, Luminosity, and Credences. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827702.003.0009.
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Chapter 8 discusses the repercussions of capacitism for the justification of beliefs, the credences we should assign to perceptual beliefs, and the luminosity of mental states. In light of this discussion, the chapter explores the consequences of capacitism for various familiar problem cases: speckled hens, identical twins, brains in vats, new evil demon scenarios, matrixes, and Swampman. I show why perceptual capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in perception and their employment in relevant hallucinations and illusions is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by employing such capacities. I show, moreover, why capacitism is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. Finally, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence in light of an externalist view of perceptual content.
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James A, Green. Part II The Criteria for the Operation of the Persistent Objector Rule, 4 The Persistence Criterion. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198704218.003.0005.
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This chapter examines the persistent objector rule's ‘persistence’ requirement. The chapter argues that given the usual name for the rule, a requirement of persistent objection is referenced across the literature as being a key criterion for the rule's operation. More importantly, it can also be identified in state practice. The chapter first confirms that a single objection, or a small number of objections, will not be sufficient to gain exemption to an emerging norm of customary international law. It also considers the underlying rationale for the persistence requirement. The voluntarist understanding of international law cannot provide an adequate explanation for the need for persistence. Finally, the chapter engages with the tricky question of how persistent objection must be before a state can gain exempt status. The view is taken that there is no exact answer to this question; the necessary degree of persistence is context-specific, based on a range of factors (including extra-legal ones).
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Williams, J. Robert G. The Metaphysics of Representation. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850205.001.0001.
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What is representation? How do the more primitive aspects of our world come together to generate it? How do different kinds of representation relate to one another? This book identifies the metaphysical foundations for representational facts. The story told is in three parts. The most primitive layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of sensation/perception and intention/action, which are the two most basic modes in which an individual and the world interact. It is argued that we can understand how this kind of representation can exist in a fundamentally physical world so long as we have an independent, illuminating grip on functions and causation. The second layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of (degrees of) belief and desire, whose representational content goes far beyond the immediate perceptable and manipulable environment. It is argued that the correct belief/desire interpretation of an agent is the one which makes their action-guiding states, given their perceptual evidence, most rational. The final layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of words and sentences, human artefacts with representational content. It is argued that one can give an illuminating account of the conditions under which a compositional interpretation of a public language like English is correct by appeal to patterns emerging from the attitudes conventionally expressed by sentences. The three-layer metaphysics of representation resolves long-standing underdetermination puzzles, predicts and explains patterns in the way that concepts denote, and articulates a delicate interactive relationship between the foundations of language and thought.
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Marginean, Alexandra. Language and Symbols in Contemporary Fiction. Editura Universitara, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5682/9786062812263.
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The method of analysis is, as usual in what I write, a mélange. I have resorted to identity studies, cultural studies, visual studies, iconology, space and city studies, interculturalism, as well as gender or minority studies. Also, psychology or sociology cannot be missing from an interest that is, primarily, in human identity and culture. This blended approach is the one I consider the most suitable, because I have always been of the opinion that the logic of the tools is, and/or should be, dictated by the elements that are present in the object of the study. It is those that point to certain kits, not the other way around. I have never established for my extensive researches one kit or another as a definite instrument set in stone when I have looked at a cultural product, as I feel that I would be implicitly bent towards partiality of interpretation, to a limited viewing angle. I believe it is important to allow the cultural object to speak, to have its own voice as it were, and only then see what avenues of analysis it opens and favors – I use here the verb “favors”, as the search for the ingredients of a work of art is also a question of ration, not only presence, i.e. we identify what is preponderant, where the scales tip more, towards what recurrent aspects. For the sake of the faithfulness and open mindedness owed to the object of my glance, I find it difficult to limit myself to only one theoretical approach, especially in a world in which boundaries have been, are, and will be questioned to an incredibly high degree. And I refer here chiefly to cultural boundaries, but not only to these.
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The Cook not mad, or, Rational cookery: Being a collection of original and selected receipts, embracing not only the art of curing various kinds of meats and vegetables for future use, but of cooking, in its general acceptation, to the taste, habits, and degrees of luxury prevalent with the Canadian public, to which are added, directions for preparing comforts for the sick room, together with sundry miscellaneous kinds of information of importance to housekeepers in general, nearly all tested by experience. Kingston, U.C. [Ont.]: J. Macfarlane, 1993.
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