Journal articles: 'Rational Belief'

1

Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe. "Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria." Economic Theory 8, no. 3 (October 1996): 399–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01213503.

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Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe. "Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria." Economic Theory 8, no. 3 (October 1, 1996): 399–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050099.

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TSAKAS, ELIAS. "UNIVERSALLY RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES." International Game Theory Review 16, no. 01 (January 21, 2014): 1440003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914400039.

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In a recent paper, Tsakas [2013 Rational belief hierarchies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel probability measures that assign a rational probability to every Borel event. Then, he constructed the corresponding Harsanyi type space model that represents the rational belief hierarchies. As he showed, there are rational types that are associated with a non-rational probability measure over the product of the underlying space of uncertainty and the opponent's types. In this paper, we define the universally rational belief hierarchies, as those that do not exhibit this property. Then, we characterize them in terms of a natural restriction imposed directly on the belief hierarchies.

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Stowers, Deborah A., and Mark W. Durm. "Is Belief in a Just World Rational?" Psychological Reports 83, no. 2 (October 1998): 423–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1998.83.2.423.

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To estimate the relationship between the belief in a just world and irrational thinking, 62 undergraduates completed the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test and the Multidimensional Belief in a Just World Scale. It was hypothesized that belief in a just world precluded rational thinking. No significant correlations were found between scores on irrational beliefs and beliefs in a just world; however, post hoc tests indicated a significant relationship between age and scores on irrational belief in women, indicating that perhaps the older women were less prone to irrational beliefs.

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Bond, Frank W., and Windy Dryden. "HOW RATIONAL BELIEFS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AFFECT PEOPLE'S INFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION." Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 28, no. 1 (January 2000): 33–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352465800000047.

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Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) hypothesizes that the functionality of inferences is primarily affected by the preferential and demanding nature of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. It is then, secondarily, influenced by the functional and dysfunctional contents to which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, refer. This hypothesis was tested by asking 96 participants to imagine themselves holding one of four specific beliefs: a rational belief with a preference and a functional content, an irrational belief with a demand and a dysfunctional content, a rational belief with a functional content and no preference, and an irrational belief with a dysfunctional content and no demand. Participants imagined themselves holding their belief in an imaginary context, whilst rating the extent of their agreement to 14 functional and dysfunctional inferences. Contrary to REBT theory, results indicated that rational and irrational beliefs had the same magnitude of effect on the functionality of inferences, whether they referred to a preference/demand+contents, or only contents. The discussion maintains that preferences and demands may not constitute the principal mechanism through which rational and irrational beliefs affect the functionality of inferences. Instead, consistent with Beck's cognitive therapy, belief contents may constitute this primary mechanism.

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Tsakas, Elias. "Rational belief hierarchies." Journal of Mathematical Economics 51 (March 2014): 121–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.005.

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Bonardi, Paolo. "Rational belief and Dialetheism." Intercultural Pragmatics 18, no. 3 (June 1, 2021): 309–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2016.

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Abstract It is usually maintained that a subject with manifestly contradictory beliefs is irrational. How can we account, then, for the intuitive rationality of dialetheists, who believe that some manifest contradictions are true? My paper aims to answer this question. Its ultimate goal is to determine a characterization of (or rather a constraint for) rational belief approvable by both the theorists of Dialetheism and its opponents. In order to achieve this goal, a two-step strategy will be adopted. First, a characterization of rational belief applicable to non-dialetheist believers will be determined; this characterization will involve the semantic apparatus of Nathan Salmon’s Millian Russellianism but will get rid of the problematic and obscure notion of mode of presentation (guise in his own terminology), replacing it with a couple of novel devices, belief subsystems and cognitive coordination. Second, using ideas from Graham Priest, the leading proponent of Dialetheism, such a characterization will be modified, so as to devise a new one able to account for the intuitive rationality of both dialetheist and non-dialetheist believers.

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Frances, Bryan. "THE IRRATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF." Think 15, no. 42 (December 9, 2015): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000196.

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Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In my previous essay (THINK 40) I explained why they think so many religious beliefs are rational. In this essay I explain why they think those same beliefs are irrational.

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Schroeder, Mark. "RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT." Episteme 15, no. 3 (July 19, 2018): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.24.

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ABSTRACTIn this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.

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Coleman, Jules L. "Rational Choice and Rational Cognition." Legal Theory 3, no. 2 (June 1997): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325200000720.

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There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms of desires and beliefs. I intend to perform some action because I believe that it will (is likely to) produce an outcome that I desire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”

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11

Macintosh, J. J. "Belief-In Revisited: A Reply To Williams." Religious Studies 30, no. 4 (December 1994): 487–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023131.

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In ‘Belief-In and Belief in God’ (Religious Studies, 28, 1992), J. N. Williams suggests that belief in God cannot be rational unless one has rational beliefs that God exists. While agreeing with his conclusion (though not with his statement of it), I disagree at almost every step with his method of arriving at it. In particular I suggest that Williams goes astray concerning the dual aspect of belief in, the nature of performatives, the arousal of belief states, and the correct account of belief in God.

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Wedgwood, Ralph. "Scepticism and Rational Belief." Philosophical Quarterly 40, no. 158 (January 1990): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219966.

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Leonard, Nick. "Belief and rational indeterminacy." Synthese 199, no. 5-6 (December 2021): 13523–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03386-z.

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14

WEINTRAUB, RUTH. "Fallibilism and Rational Belief." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no. 2 (June 1, 1993): 251–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.2.251.

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15

Kurz, Mordecai. "On rational belief equilibria." Economic Theory 4, no. 6 (November 1994): 859–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01213816.

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16

SWINBURNE, RICHARD. "Swinburne and Plantinga on internal rationality." Religious Studies 37, no. 3 (September 2001): 357–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412501215716.

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Plantinga defines S's belief as ‘privately rational if and only if it is probable on S's evidence’, and ‘publicly rational if and only if it is probable with respect to public evidence’, and he claims that ‘it is an immediate consequence of these definitions that all my basic beliefs are privately rational’. I made it explicitly clear in my review that on my account of a person's evidence (quoted and used by Plantinga) as ‘the content of his basic beliefs (weighted by his degree of confidence in them)’, that is not the case. I emphasize ‘weighted by his degree of confidence in them’. I wrote explicitly: ‘for more or less any belief, however convinced you are of it initially, other evidence of which you are equally convinced could rend it overall improbable’. Put technically, in probabilistic terms, basic beliefs come to us with different degrees of prior probability varying with our degree of confidence in them, but a belief with a high prior probability can in the light of other beliefs of our current set have a lower posterior probability. If you continue to hold on to a basic belief when its probability on the total evidence is below half, that belief is not privately rational.

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Frances, Bryan. "THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS." Think 14, no. 40 (2015): 109–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000044.

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Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In this essay I explain why they think religious belief is rational. In a sequel essay I explain why they think the very same beliefs are irrational.

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18

Mathiesen, Kay. "The Epistemic Features of Group Belief." Episteme 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 161–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161.

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ABSTRACTRecently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational.

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19

Sapp, Stephen G. "NON-RATIONALITY IN BELIEF SETS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 29, no. 4 (January 1, 2001): 337–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2001.29.4.337.

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Although much research supports the proposition contained within the theory of expectations that a causal relationship exists between beliefs and attitudes, little is known about the extent to which logical consistency exists among beliefs about objects in relation to beliefs about reasonable substitutes for them, and the effect of this potential inconsistency on estimates of the belief-attitude relationship. This study tested the logical consistency of 364 Japanese consumers' expressions of beliefs and attitudes regarding eating beef produced by three different countries. The results, which demonstrate significant inconsistency — or non-rationality — in belief sets, are discussed with respect to their implications for estimating belief-attitude relationships.

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20

Augenblick, Ned, and Matthew Rabin. "Belief Movement, Uncertainty Reduction, and Rational Updating*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 136, no. 2 (February 3, 2021): 933–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa043.

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Abstract When a Bayesian learns new information and changes her beliefs, she must on average become concomitantly more certain about the state of the world. Consequently, it is rare for a Bayesian to frequently shift beliefs substantially while remaining relatively uncertain, or, conversely, become very confident with relatively little belief movement. We formalize this intuition by developing specific measures of movement and uncertainty reduction given a Bayesian’s changing beliefs over time, showing that these measures are equal in expectation and creating consequent statistical tests for Bayesianess. We then show connections between these two core concepts and four common psychological biases, suggesting that the test might be particularly good at detecting these biases. We provide support for this conclusion by simulating the performance of our test and other martingale tests. Finally, we apply our test to data sets of individual, algorithmic, and market beliefs.

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21

Norman, Andrew. "UNDERSTANDING BASIC BELIEF: AN EVIDENTIALIST REPLY TO ALVIN PLANTINGA." Think 16, no. 47 (2017): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175617000215.

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Alvin Plantinga dealt a significant blow to the ‘sufficient evidence’ standard of rational accountability when he showed that many beliefs are, as he puts it, ‘properly basic’ – rationally permissible despite appearing to lack an evidential basis. Why, Plantinga asks, can't belief in God be considered properly basic? In this article, I provide a workable account of proper basicality, thereby repairing a long-standing problem with evidentialism. This deepens our understanding of what it means to be rationally responsible, and allows a definitive answer to the theological question: God-belief, it turns out, cannot be considered properly basic.

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Schwind, Nicolas, Sébastien Konieczny, and Ramón Pino Pérez. "On Paraconsistent Belief Revision in LP." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, no. 5 (June 28, 2022): 5879–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20532.

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Belief revision aims at incorporating, in a rational way, a new piece of information into the beliefs of an agent. Most works in belief revision suppose a classical logic setting, where the beliefs of the agent are consistent. Moreover, the consistency postulate states that the result of the revision should be consistent if the new piece of information is consistent. But in real applications it may easily happen that (some parts of) the beliefs of the agent are not consistent. In this case then it seems reasonable to use paraconsistent logics to derive sensible conclusions from these inconsistent beliefs. However, in this context, the standard belief revision postulates trivialize the revision process. In this work we discuss how to adapt these postulates when the underlying logic is Priest's LP logic, in order to model a rational change, while being a conservative extension of AGM/KM belief revision. This implies, in particular, to adequately adapt the notion of expansion. We provide a representation theorem and some examples of belief revision operators in this setting.

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Moss, Sarah. "Full Belief and Loose Speech." Philosophical Review 128, no. 3 (July 1, 2019): 255–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7537270.

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This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge.

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Rakonjac, Stevan. "Plantinga on warrant and acceptability of Christian Belief." Theoria, Beograd 63, no. 2 (2020): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2002103r.

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Alvin Plantinga wants to answer the following question: Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable? We will present the answer John Locke gives, based on his evidentialism, to the aforementioned question, as well as Plantinga?s critique of Locke?s evidentialist approach. Plantinga thinks that the question ?Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable?? is best understood as meaning ?Is Christian belief warranted??. We will analyze Plantinga?s argument for the claim that Christian belief probably has warrant if it is true, which implies that we first have to show that Christian belief (probably) is false in order to show that it (probably) has no warrant. But than that means that we have to show that Christian belief is false in order to show that it is unacceptable, making it very hard, if not impossible, to show that Christian belief is unacceptable. We will then present one objection to Plantinga?s argument, ?the Great Pumpkin Objection?. Relying on Linda Zagzebski?s analysis, we will claim that the Great Pupmpkin objection shows that Plantinga?s notion of ?warrant? does not adequately capture the meaning of the relevant notion of ?intellectual or rational acceptability? of beliefs, and that, hence, his conclusion about warrant of Christian belief are not necessary relevant for the claims about intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief. We will also analyze a solution given by Kyle Scott. He thinks that if we have, in addition to Plantinga?s argument showing that Christian belief is warranted if true, favouring evidence in support of Christian belief, which he thinks we obviously have, than Christian belief is acceptable. We will point out that Scott does not elaborate what makes adequate favouring evidence in support of some belief, and we will calim that adequate understanding of favouring evidence will, in some respects, be very similar to Locke?s evidentialism. If so, than Scott proposal will reintroduce some elements of Locke?s evidentialism, and the question of whether there is favouring evidence in support of Christian belief will not have an obvious and easy answer.

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Brandt, Richard B. "The Concept of Rational Belief." Monist 68, no. 1 (1985): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist198568117.

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Schurz, Gerhard. "Impossibility Results for Rational Belief." Noûs 53, no. 1 (August 4, 2017): 134–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12214.

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JANZEN, GREG. "Is God's belief requirement rational?" Religious Studies 47, no. 4 (August 13, 2010): 465–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000429.

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AbstractThis paper sketches an evidential atheological argument that can be answered only if one of the central tenets of some theistic traditions is rejected, namely, that (propositional) belief in God is a necessary condition for salvation. The basic structure of the argument is as follows. Under theism, God is essentially omniscient, but no one can be both omniscient and irrational. So, if there is reason to hold that God is irrational, then it would follow that God doesn't exist. And there is reason to hold that God is irrational. To wit, God both hides and, according to some theistic traditions, requires belief. But it is irrational for God both to hide and require belief; therefore, God is irrational. Since a crucial – and controversial – premise in the argument is that it is irrational for God both to hide and require belief, a large part of the paper is devoted to defending that premise.

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Doyle, Jon. "Constructive belief and rational representation." Computational Intelligence 5, no. 1 (January 1989): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8640.1989.tb00311.x.

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29

Yuan, Yongfeng, and Shier Ju. "Rational evaluation in belief revision." Synthese 192, no. 7 (July 2015): 2311–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0802-5.

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30

Rott, Hans. "Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief." Logos & Episteme 10, no. 4 (2019): 395–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910436.

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An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational belief. ‘Stability’ is an ambiguous term that has an internally conditional structure.

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31

Hill, Brian. "CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING." Economics and Philosophy 35, no. 02 (October 30, 2018): 223–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267118000214.

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Abstract:The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.

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32

Stone, Anna. "Rational Thinking and Belief in Psychic Abilities." Psychological Reports 118, no. 1 (February 2016): 74–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0033294115625261.

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Previous research has shown that lay believers in psychic abilities are more prone to intuitive thinking, less inclined to rational thinking, and have an external locus of control, compared to non-believers. Psychic practitioners, however, may have different characteristics. Psychic practitioners ( n = 31; M age = 42.7 yr., SD = 13.1), lay believers ( n = 33; M age = 33.0 yr., SD = 10.3), and non-believers ( n = 31; M age = 34.4 yr., SD = 15.4) completed questionnaires measuring thinking styles, locus of control, and psychic belief. Comparisons of lay believers with non-believers confirmed previous observations: believers had a higher propensity for intuitive thinking, lower propensity for rational thinking, and more external locus of control. In contrast, practitioners were equivalent to non-believers in rational thinking and had the highest internal locus of control. This highlights the importance of considering level of involvement with psychic practice in understanding the thinking styles of believers. Results suggested that practitioners may have rationalized their beliefs and constructed a coherent model of psychic phenomena that satisfies a propensity for rational thinking within a community of belief.

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Sulaimanovna, Kalandarova Gavhar. "RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL FACTORS OF BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY." European International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Management Studies 02, no. 10 (October 1, 2022): 76–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.55640/eijmrms-02-10-13.

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In the article, the author compares the factors of "rationality" and "irrationality" of belief and knowledge. Sociological theoretical-methodological concepts are explained directly with the data of the research results. Also, attention is paid to the transformation of belief and knowledge in the society to the information society.

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34

Robb, Harold B., and Ricks Warren. "Irrational Belief Tests: New Insights, New Directions." Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 4, no. 3 (January 1990): 303–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-8391.4.3.303.

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Critical appraisals of the RET model have been accompanied by closer scrutiny of measures designed to assess irrational beliefs. Problems with content and discriminant validity (Smith, 1982), and inclusion of items which describe feelings or behaviors rather than beliefs (Ramanaiah, Heerboth, & Schill, 1987) compromise previous research testing the RET model. The present study further examines six measures of irrational beliefs: The Idea Inventory, Irrational Beliefs Test, Rational Behavior Inventory, Belief Scale, the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, and the Attitudes and Belief Scale-II. Our findings support and extend previous criticisms of irrational belief inventories and suggest recommendations for improvement.

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Coffman, E. J., and Matt Deaton. "Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief." Res Philosophica 90, no. 2 (2013): 147–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.3.

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Douven, Igor. "The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability." Philosophical Review 128, no. 3 (July 1, 2019): 371–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7537387.

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37

Luper-Foy, Steven. "The Reliabilist Theory of Rational Belief." Monist 68, no. 2 (1985): 203–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist198568219.

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38

Davis, Stephen T. "Is Belief in the Resurrection Rational?" Philo 2, no. 1 (1999): 51–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philo1999216.

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39

Bonanno, Giacomo. "Rational choice and AGM belief revision." Artificial Intelligence 173, no. 12-13 (August 2009): 1194–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.05.001.

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40

Shaw, James R. "De se belief and rational choice." Synthese 190, no. 3 (December 15, 2011): 491–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0044-0.

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41

Cooper, Myra J., Gillian Todd, and Hannah Turner. "The Effects of Using Imagery to Modify Core Emotional Beliefs in Bulimia Nervosa: An Experimental Pilot Study." Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 21, no. 2 (June 2007): 117–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/088983907780851577.

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Imagery modification was administered in a pilot study to patients with bulimia nervosa. The aim was to change patients’ emotionally held negative self-beliefs. Negative self-beliefs were identified and belief ratings obtained. A single session imagery intervention, focused on an early memory associated with these beliefs, was then conducted with the experimental group, while a control group received a control intervention. Significant changes were found in the experimental group, compared to the control group, in belief ratings for emotionally held negative self-belief ratings. Emotional (and rational) self-belief change was associated with mood and behavior change, including decreased urge to binge. The implications and limitations of the study are discussed.

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42

Liu, Qingmin. "Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets." American Economic Review 110, no. 8 (August 1, 2020): 2625–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181186.

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We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A central idea is to formulate off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations and on-path beliefs in the absence of such deviations. A matching-belief configuration is stable if the matching is individually rational with respect to the system of on-path beliefs and is not blocked with respect to the system of off-path beliefs. The formulation provides a language for assessing matching outcomes with respect to their supporting beliefs and opens the door to further belief-based refinements. The main refinement analyzed in the paper requires the Bayesian consistency of on-path and off-path beliefs with prior beliefs. We define concepts of Bayesian efficiency, the rational expectations competitive equilibrium, and the core. Their contrast with pairwise stability manifests the role of information asymmetry in matching formation. (JEL C78, D40, D82, D83)

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Schumacher, Heiner, and Heidi Christina Thysen. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations." Theoretical Economics 17, no. 1 (2022): 371–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te4231.

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We study a principal‐agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is nonexploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of the informativeness principle: The optimal contract conditions on an additional variable only if it is informative about the action according to the agent's subjective model. We further characterize when misspecifications affect the optimal contract. One implication of this characterization is that the scope for belief biases depends on the agent's job, for example, her position in the hierarchy.

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Ferreira, M. Jamie. "Religion's ‘Foundation in Reason’: The Common Sense of Hume's Natural History." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 4 (December 1994): 565–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1994.10717385.

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David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.

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JACKSON, ELIZABETH. "Belief, credence, and faith." Religious Studies 55, no. 02 (July 2, 2018): 153–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000446.

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AbstractIn this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.

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Boyle, Matthew. "Active Belief." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (2009): 119–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2009.10717646.

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The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a proposition, does not act upon himself; nor does he bring about an effect.- Hampshire (1965, 100)A point of persistent controversy in recent philosophical discussions of belief concerns whether we can exercise some sort of agential control over what we believe. On the one hand, the idea that we have some kind of discretion over what we believe has appealed to philosophers working in several areas. This idea has been invoked, for instance, to characterize the basic difference between rational and non-rational cognition, to account for our epistemic responsibility for what we believe, and to explain how we are able, normally, to say what we presently believe without relying on self-observation or inference. On the other hand, most contemporary philosophers agree that, in one significant sense, what we believe is not up to us: we cannot simply believe “at will,” and, although what we wish were so can influence what we believe to be so, this influence hardly amounts to a form of control or agency.

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KUMAR, DEEPAK, and S. C. SHAPIRO. "THE OK BDI ARCHITECTURE." International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools 03, no. 03 (September 1994): 349–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218213094000182.

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The design of a belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture is presented. The architecture is defined using a unified object-based knowledge representation formalism, called the OK formalism, and a unified reasoning and acting module, called the OK rational engine. Together they form the OK BDI architecture for modeling rational agents endowed with beliefs, desires, and intentions.

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Williamson, Timothy. "AMBIGUOUS RATIONALITY." Episteme 14, no. 3 (September 2017): 263–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.24.

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ABSTRACTThe paper distinguishes a content-oriented conception of rational belief, which concerns support relations between the proposition believed and one's evidence, from a disposition-oriented conception of rational belief, which concerns whether someone generally disposed to conform their belief to their evidence would believe the given proposition in the given circumstances. Neither type of rationality entails the other. It is argued that conflating the two ways of thinking about rational belief has had damaging effects in epistemology.

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Stump, Eleonore. "Faith and Goodness." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 25 (March 1989): 167–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00011317.

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Recent work on the subject of faith has tended to focus on the epistemology of religious belief, considering such issues as whether beliefs held in faith are rational and how they may be justified. Richard Swinburne, for example, has developed an intricate explanation of the relationship between the propositions of faith and the evidence for them. Alvin Plantinga, on the other hand, has maintained that belief in God may be properly basic, that is, that a belief that God exists can be part of the foundation of a rational noetic structure. This sort of work has been useful in drawing attention to significant issues in the epistemology of religion, but these approaches to faith seem to me also to deepen some long-standing perplexities about traditional Christian views of faith.

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Chen, Xiaohong, Lars Peter Hansen, and Peter G. Hansen. "Robust identification of investor beliefs." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 52 (December 14, 2020): 33130–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2019910117.

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This paper develops a method informed by data and models to recover information about investor beliefs. Our approach uses information embedded in forward-looking asset prices in conjunction with asset pricing models. We step back from presuming rational expectations and entertain potential belief distortions bounded by a statistical measure of discrepancy. Additionally, our method allows for the direct use of sparse survey evidence to make these bounds more informative. Within our framework, market-implied beliefs may differ from those implied by rational expectations due to behavioral/psychological biases of investors, ambiguity aversion, or omitted permanent components to valuation. Formally, we represent evidence about investor beliefs using a nonlinear expectation function deduced using model-implied moment conditions and bounds on statistical divergence. We illustrate our method with a prototypical example from macrofinance using asset market data to infer belief restrictions for macroeconomic growth rates.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Rational Belief'

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