Relevant bibliographies by topics / Rational Belief

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Rational Belief'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 9 March 2023
Last updated: 10 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Rational Belief"

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Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe. "Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria." Economic Theory 8, no. 3 (October 1996): 399–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01213503.

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Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe. "Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria." Economic Theory 8, no. 3 (October 1, 1996): 399–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050099.

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TSAKAS, ELIAS. "UNIVERSALLY RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES." International Game Theory Review 16, no. 01 (January 21, 2014): 1440003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914400039.

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In a recent paper, Tsakas [2013 Rational belief hierarchies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel probability measures that assign a rational probability to every Borel event. Then, he constructed the corresponding Harsanyi type space model that represents the rational belief hierarchies. As he showed, there are rational types that are associated with a non-rational probability measure over the product of the underlying space of uncertainty and the opponent's types. In this paper, we define the universally rational belief hierarchies, as those that do not exhibit this property. Then, we characterize them in terms of a natural restriction imposed directly on the belief hierarchies.
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Stowers, Deborah A., and Mark W. Durm. "Is Belief in a Just World Rational?" Psychological Reports 83, no. 2 (October 1998): 423–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1998.83.2.423.

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To estimate the relationship between the belief in a just world and irrational thinking, 62 undergraduates completed the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test and the Multidimensional Belief in a Just World Scale. It was hypothesized that belief in a just world precluded rational thinking. No significant correlations were found between scores on irrational beliefs and beliefs in a just world; however, post hoc tests indicated a significant relationship between age and scores on irrational belief in women, indicating that perhaps the older women were less prone to irrational beliefs.
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Bond, Frank W., and Windy Dryden. "HOW RATIONAL BELIEFS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AFFECT PEOPLE'S INFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION." Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 28, no. 1 (January 2000): 33–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352465800000047.

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Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) hypothesizes that the functionality of inferences is primarily affected by the preferential and demanding nature of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. It is then, secondarily, influenced by the functional and dysfunctional contents to which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, refer. This hypothesis was tested by asking 96 participants to imagine themselves holding one of four specific beliefs: a rational belief with a preference and a functional content, an irrational belief with a demand and a dysfunctional content, a rational belief with a functional content and no preference, and an irrational belief with a dysfunctional content and no demand. Participants imagined themselves holding their belief in an imaginary context, whilst rating the extent of their agreement to 14 functional and dysfunctional inferences. Contrary to REBT theory, results indicated that rational and irrational beliefs had the same magnitude of effect on the functionality of inferences, whether they referred to a preference/demand+contents, or only contents. The discussion maintains that preferences and demands may not constitute the principal mechanism through which rational and irrational beliefs affect the functionality of inferences. Instead, consistent with Beck's cognitive therapy, belief contents may constitute this primary mechanism.
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Tsakas, Elias. "Rational belief hierarchies." Journal of Mathematical Economics 51 (March 2014): 121–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.005.

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Bonardi, Paolo. "Rational belief and Dialetheism." Intercultural Pragmatics 18, no. 3 (June 1, 2021): 309–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2016.

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Abstract It is usually maintained that a subject with manifestly contradictory beliefs is irrational. How can we account, then, for the intuitive rationality of dialetheists, who believe that some manifest contradictions are true? My paper aims to answer this question. Its ultimate goal is to determine a characterization of (or rather a constraint for) rational belief approvable by both the theorists of Dialetheism and its opponents. In order to achieve this goal, a two-step strategy will be adopted. First, a characterization of rational belief applicable to non-dialetheist believers will be determined; this characterization will involve the semantic apparatus of Nathan Salmon’s Millian Russellianism but will get rid of the problematic and obscure notion of mode of presentation (guise in his own terminology), replacing it with a couple of novel devices, belief subsystems and cognitive coordination. Second, using ideas from Graham Priest, the leading proponent of Dialetheism, such a characterization will be modified, so as to devise a new one able to account for the intuitive rationality of both dialetheist and non-dialetheist believers.
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Frances, Bryan. "THE IRRATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF." Think 15, no. 42 (December 9, 2015): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000196.

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Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In my previous essay (THINK 40) I explained why they think so many religious beliefs are rational. In this essay I explain why they think those same beliefs are irrational.
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Schroeder, Mark. "RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT." Episteme 15, no. 3 (July 19, 2018): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.24.

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ABSTRACTIn this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.
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Coleman, Jules L. "Rational Choice and Rational Cognition." Legal Theory 3, no. 2 (June 1997): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325200000720.

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There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms of desires and beliefs. I intend to perform some action because I believe that it will (is likely to) produce an outcome that I desire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Rational Belief"

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Gillies, Anthony S. "Rational belief change." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/290412.

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We must change our beliefs, and change them in particular ways, in response to new information. But not all changes are created equal: some are rational changes, some not. The Problem of Epistemic Change is the problem of specifying the rational constraints on how the epistemic state of an agent ought to change in the face of new information. This dissertation is about the philosophical and logical investigation of rational belief change. I start by arguing that the familiar foundations---coherence distinction from static epistemology does not adequately carve up the logical space of theories of epistemic change. It is better to think of theories as being loosely ordered along a continuum from more to less foundational. The ordering, however, is "clumpy" in the sense that there are large regions in the ordering which remain unexplored. I then present and develop GDEC which is a new foundations model of belief revision that fills a gap in this ordering of theories of epistemic change. The key insight in GDEC is that belief that...is ambiguous between the attitudes of accept that...and expect that... GDEC respects the difference and how it matters for epistemic change. I show that GDEC is a genuine competitor to the AGM theory of belief revision in the sense that the two approaches are incompatible. The remainder of the dissertation is devoted to exploring the logical dynamics of GDEC and the models I develop here which extend it by applying them to a series of richer epistemic environments. I show how puzzles and paradoxes which confound other theories of belief revision are solved in a unified way by GDEC and its extensions. In particular, I give solutions to Moore's Paradox, Fuhrmann's Impossibility Theorem, the Reduction Problem of Epistemic Conditionals, and the Gardenfors Impossibility Theorem.
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Mealand, David L. "Philosophy of rational belief." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/30501.

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SHINOHARA, Hisato, and 尚人 篠原. "小学生の対人関係ビリーフに関する研究 : 対人関係ビリーフ尺度（小学生版）の開発." 名古屋大学大学院教育発達科学研究科, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/19519.

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Hensler, Philipp A. "The Belief System and Behavior of Financial Advisors After a Market Disruption." Case Western Reserve University Doctor of Management / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=casedm1568710731430581.

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Zenker, Frank. "Ceteris paribus in conservative belief revision on the role of minimal change in rational theory development." Frankfurt, M. Berlin Bern Bruxelles New York, NY Oxford Wien Lang, 2007. http://d-nb.info/99413729X/04.

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Faraj, Khaled A. M. "Rational belief and probability : a critical evaluation and development of the philosophy of M. B. al-Sadr." Thesis, University of Sunderland, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.432358.

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GALLASSI, GINEVRA. "Essays on Monetary Policy, Stock Market and Heterogeneous Expectations." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/241075.

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Il presente lavoro si propone di studiare la relazione che intercorre tra la politica monetaria, il prezzo delle azioni e le aspettative eterogenee. Come Bernanke e Gertler (1999) prima di noi, l’obiettivo è quello di dare una risposta alla seguente domanda: nelle loro decisioni di politica monetaria le banche centrali devono rispondere anche alle fluttuazioni dei prezzi sul mercato azionario? Nel primo capitolo il modello utilizzato è un perpetual youth à la Blanchard (1985) e Yaari (1965) che viene ripreso da Nisticò (2012), al quale facciamo riferimento nel presente lavoro. Questo tipo di modello fa in modo che le fluttuazioni nei prezzi delle azioni abbiano un effetto significativo sull’andamento del consumo aggregato e di conseguenza sull’equilibrio: si crea, così, un nuovo canale di trasmissione denominato canale della ricchezza finanziaria. La formazione delle aspettative riprende Brock and Hommes (1997) e De Grauwe (2011). Gli agenti hanno una razionalità limitata, per fare previsioni utilizzano semplici euristiche e si basano su uno specifico meccanismo di adeguatezza per valutare le prestazioni passate. Attraverso questo meccanismo, l’andamento delle variabili economiche `e strettamente correlato con le aspettative degli individui. Inoltre, la presenza di aspettative eterogenee fa s`ı che il trade-off tra inflazione e output gap, tipico dei modelli con aspettative razionali, svanisca. Infine, il modello dimostra come, contrariamente a quanto suggerito da Bernanke e Gertler (1999), le banche centrali dovrebbero rispondere alle fluttuazioni del mercato azionario. Tuttavia, affinché questo tipo di politica monetaria sia efficace, tale reazione deve essere moderata. Nel secondo capitolo, utilizziamo un diverso tipo di aspettative: mentre il modello di base segue sempre la struttura del perpetual youth di Nisticò (2012), le aspettative si basano sulla teoria dei Rational Beliefs di Kurz (1994, 1997). La configurazione del modello fa sì che le fluttuazioni dei prezzi dei titoli abbiano un impatto sull’economia reale attraverso due canali distinti: il canale della ricchezza finanziaria e quello delle aspettative. I risultati sono stati ottenuti applicando sia la teoria dei Rational Beliefs, sia la teoria di Rational Expectations. Diversamente da quanto raccomandato da Bernanke and Gertler (1999), i risultati mostrano che le politiche di stabilizzazione dell’output gap e dell’inflazione, condotte dalle banche centrali, possono trarre beneficio dall’inclusione di una risposta alle fluttuazioni sul mercato azionario. Inoltre, quando assumiamo aspettative eterogenee, tutti i risultati presentano volatilità più alte rispetto al caso di Rational Expectations e le risposte agli shock mostrano magnitudini maggiori dovute all’effetto amplificatore dell’andamento delle aspettative. Ad esempio, un grande ottimismo tra gli individui ha un effetto positivo sull’inflazione e sull’output gap e può produrre bolle sul mercato azionario. Tale entusiasmo può essere però ridotto attraverso una politica monetaria maggiormente “aggressiva”.
This dissertation investigates the relationship among heterogeneous expectations, stock prices and monetary policy. In particular, we attempt to answer the question on whether or not central banks should respond to stock prices other than to inflation and output gap. The first chapter presents a perpetual youth model à la Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) following Nisticò (2012). This type of model generates a financial wealth channel through which stock prices fluctuations affect the dynamics of the aggregate consumption, and thus the equilibrium solution. We model expectations as in Brock and Hommes (1997) and De Grauwe (2011). Agents are boundedly rational, they adopt simple rules to make forecasts and evaluate their past performances using a fitness measure. The model generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism due to the correlation among beliefs. Moreover, the presence of this heterogeneity removes the classic trade-off between output gap and inflation typical of Rational Expectations models. We also show that, contrary to the Bernanke and Gertler’s (1999) prescription, central banks should respond to stock prices fluctuations. However, to be beneficial, this “leaning against the wind” strategy in the stock market has to be moderate. In the second chapter, we adopt the same baseline model of the first part. We build on Nisticò (2012) and allow for the inclusion of diverse beliefs following the Rational Beliefs theory by Kurz (1997). With respect to the previous work, beliefs are modeled at a micro-level and enter in the equilibrium solution. Although agents do not observe the true dynamics of the economy, they are still rational in the sense that their beliefs are compatible with the observable empirical distribution of past data. In this framework, stock prices fluctuations affect real economy through two different channels: the financial wealth channel and the expectational channel. We simulate the model under both Rational Expectations and Rational Beliefs. Contrary to Bernanke and Gertler’s (1999) prescription, we find that a mild “leaning against the wind” strategy in the stock market is beneficial for both output gap and inflation stabilization. Moreover, all results under Rational Beliefs exhibit a higher volatility and the magnitude of responses to shock is amplified by beliefs dynamics. Widespread optimism boosts inflation as well as output gap and can generate a bubble in stock prices. However, the effect on the real economy of such exuberance might be reduced by a more “aggressive” policy.
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Auxier, John Wheeler. "A prelude to matching: Locus of control and belief in divine intervention among members of Alcoholics Anonymous and Rational Recovery." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186703.

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The purpose of the study was to explore the relationship between locus of control orientation, belief in divine intervention and successful affiliation with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Rational Recovery (RR). "Successful affiliation" was defined in the study by the following criteria. First, a history of problem drinking as measured by a score of 12 or above on the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST). Second, at least three (3) months of continuous sobriety. Third, substantial involvement in AA or RR as measured by Reinert's (1992) Alcoholics Anonymous Involvement Scale (AAIS), or Auxier's (1994) Rational Recovery Involvement Scale (RRIS). Fifty-seven (57) subjects met the above criteria as successful AA or RR members for the study (AA n = 34, RR n = 23). Successful AA affiliates were then compared with successful RR affiliates on a locus of control measure, (the Rotter I-E Scale) and on a measure of belief in divine intervention, the Auxier (1994) Divine Intervention Scale (DIS). As hypothesized, the results of the locus of control measure showed that successful AA members were significantly more external in orientation than successful RR members (p < .016). Also as hypothesized, the results of the Divine Intervention Scale showed that successful AA members had significantly stronger beliefs in divine intervention than their RR counterparts (p < .001). These findings were interpreted using the framework of Leon Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). It was suggested that AA's drop-out phenomena may be a reflection of cognitive dissonance processes. Individuals with a low belief in divine intervention and an internal locus of control may be expected to drop out of AA due to cognitive dissonance effects. A third hypothesis of the study predicted that external locus of control and strong beliefs in divine intervention would positively correlate. This prediction was not supported. This finding suggests that the impulse towards external locus of control in successful AA members has its source in non-spiritual aspects of AA's philosophy of recovery. It was concluded that locus of control and belief in divine intervention show promise as treatment matching criteria and further research using these dimensions as predictors of successful affiliation is warranted.
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Ngangoue, Kathleen Maryse. "Decision-Making in Markets." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/18653.

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Diese Dissertation erforscht, auf welchen unterschiedlichen Wegen Informationsverarbeitung Investitionsentscheidungen beeinflusst. Auf der Basis kontrollierter Laborexperimente wird untersucht, wie Entscheidungen mit der Art der Information sowie mit dem Entscheidungskontext variieren. Im ersten Kapitel legt ein Experiment die Schwierigkeit mit hypothetischem Denken bzw. mit dem Lernen aus hypothetischen Ereignissen offen. Im Kapitel Zwei untersucht ein anderes Experiment, wie Informationsverarbeitung die Reaktionen der Investoren auf Ambiguität verändert, denn ein eindeutiges, optimales Lernverhalten gibt es unter Ambiguität nicht. Das letzte Kapitel stellt anhand desselben Experiments die Unabhängigkeit zwischen dem Lernprozess und den Risikopräferenzen in Frage.
This dissertation investigates various channels through which information processing affects investment decisions. Controlled laboratory experiments allow for studying how subjects’ decisions vary with the type of information and the decision-context. The experiment in the first chapter discloses the difficulty with contingent reasoning, i.e. learning from hypothetical events. A different experiment in Chapter Two analyzes how information processing changes investors’ reactions to ambiguity—an environment with multiple rational learning rules. Using the same experiment, the last chapter questions the independence between belief updating and risk preferences.
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Tang, Antony Shui Sum, and n/a. "A rationale-based model for architecture design reasoning." Swinburne University of Technology, 2007. http://adt.lib.swin.edu.au./public/adt-VSWT20070319.100952.

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Large systems often have a long life-span and their system and software architecture design comprise many intricately related elements. The verification and maintenance of these architecture designs require an understanding of how and why the system are constructed. Design rationale is the reasoning behind a design and it provides an explanation of the design. However, the reasoning is often undocumented or unstructured in practice. This causes difficulties in the understanding of the original design, and makes it hard to detect inconsistencies, omissions and conflicts without any explanations to the intricacies of the design. Research into design rationale in the past has focused on argumentation-based design deliberations. Argumentation-based design rationale models provide an explicit representation of design rationale. However, these methods are ineffective in communicating design reasoning in practice because they do not support tracing to design elements and requirements in an effective manner. In this thesis, we firstly report a survey of practising architects to understand their perception of the value of design rationale and how they use and document this knowledge. From the survey, we have discovered that practitioners recognize the importance of documenting design rationale and frequently use them to reason about their design choices. However, they have indicated certain barriers to the use and documentation of design rationale. The results have indicated that there is no systematic approach to using and capturing design rationale in current architecture design practice. Using these findings, we address the issues of representing and applying architecture design rationale. We have constructed a rationale-based architecture model to represent design rationale, design objects and their relationships, which we call Architecture Rationale and Element Linkage (AREL). AREL captures both qualitative and quantitative rationale for architecture design. Quantitative rationale uses costs, benefits and risks to justify architecture decisions. Qualitative rationale documents the issues, arguments, alternatives and tradeoffs of a design decision. With the quantitative and qualitative rationale, the AREL model provides reasoning support to explain why architecture elements exist and what assumptions and constraints they depend on. Using a causal relationship in the AREL model, architecture decisions and architecture elements are linked together to explain the reasoning of the architecture design. Architecture Rationalisation Method (ARM) is a methodology that makes use of AREL to facilitate architecture design. ARM uses cost, benefit and risk as fundamental elements to rank and compare alternative solutions in the decision making process. Using the AREL model, we have proposed traceability and probabilistic techniques based on Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) to support architecture understanding and maintenance. These techniques can help to carry out change impact analysis and rootcause analysis. The traceability techniques comprise of forward, backward and evolution tracings. Architects can trace the architecture design to discover the change impacts by analysing the qualitative reasons and the relationships in the architecture design. We have integrated BBN to AREL to provide an additional method where probability is used to evaluate and reason about the change impacts in the architecture design. This integration provides quantifiable support to AREL to perform predictive, diagnostic and combined reasoning. In order to align closely with industry practices, we have chosen to represent the rationale-based architecture model in UML. In a case study, the AREL model is applied retrospectively to a real-life bank payment systems to demonstrate its features and applications. Practising architects who are experts in the electronic payment system domain have been invited to evaluate the case study. They have found that AREL is useful in helping them understand the system architecture when they compared AREL with traditional design specifications. They have commented that AREL can be useful to support the verification and maintenance of the architecture because architects do not need to reconstruct or second-guess the design reasoning. We have implemented an AREL tool-set that is comprised of commercially available and custom-developed programs. It enables the capture of architecture design and its design rationale using a commercially available UML tool. It checks the well-formedness of an AREL model. It integrates a commercially available BBN tool to reason about the architecture design and to estimate its change impacts.
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Books on the topic "Rational Belief"

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Kyburg, Henry E. Probability and the logic of rational belief. Ann Arbor: UMI Books on Demand, 1996.

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Kurz, Mordecai. Coordination and correlation in Markov rational belief equilibria. Rome: Banca d'Italia, 1996.

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Ellery, Eells, Skyrms Brian, and Adams Ernest W. 1926-, eds. Probability and conditionals: Belief revision and rational decision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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Dufwenberg, Martin. On rationality and belief formation in games. [Uppsala]: Dept. of Economics, Uppsala University, 1995.

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Bartholomew, David J. Uncertain belief: Is it rational to be a Christian? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

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Christensen, David Phiroze. Putting logic in its place: Formal constraints on rational belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.

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What happens after Pascal's wager: Living faith and rational belief. Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2009.

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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.

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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.

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Nathan, Amos. Principles of probability dynamics: The theory of rational revisions of degrees of belief. Jerusalem: A. Nathan, 1997.

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Book chapters on the topic "Rational Belief"

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Frances, Bryan. "Rational Belief in God." In An Agnostic Defends God, 15–27. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73331-5_2.

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Badham, Paul. "Rational Theistic Belief without Proofs." In A John Hick Reader, 49–67. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230379800_4.

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Aliseda, Atocha. "Belief as Habit." In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 143–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45920-2_9.

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Swinburne, Richard. "Many Kinds of Rational Theistic Belief." In The Rationality of Theism, 21–38. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9289-5_2.

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Westlund, David. "Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents." In Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science, 213–24. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_9.

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Arló-Costa, Horacio, and Arthur Paul Pedersen. "Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change." In Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science, 163–212. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_8.

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Sá, Samy, and João Alcântara. "Preference Handling for Belief-Based Rational Decisions." In Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, 518–23. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40564-8_51.

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Přenosil, Adam. "Contradictory Information as a Basis for Rational Belief." In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 151–65. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_11.

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Audi, Robert. "Belief." In Rational Belief, 47–68. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0004.

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Audi, Robert. "Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe." In Rational Belief, 11–26. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0002.

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Conference papers on the topic "Rational Belief"

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Caticha, Ariel, Paul M. Goggans, and Chun-Yong Chan. "Quantifying Rational Belief." In BAYESIAN INFERENCE AND MAXIMUM ENTROPY METHODS IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING: The 29th International Workshop on Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering. AIP, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3275647.

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Casini, Giovanni, Thomas Meyer, and Ivan Varzinczak. "Rational Defeasible Belief Change." In 17th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2020}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2020/22.

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We present a formal framework for modelling belief change within a nonmonotonic reasoning system. Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning are two areas that are formally closely related, with recent attention being paid towards the analysis of belief change within a non-monotonic environment. In this paper we consider the classical AGM belief change operators, contraction and revision, applied to a defeasible setting in the style of Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor. The investigation leads us to the consideration of the problem of iterated change, generalising the classical work of Darwiche and Pearl. We characterise a family of operators for iterated revision, followed by an analogous characterisation of operators for iterated contraction. We start considering belief change operators aimed at preserving logical consistency, and then characterise analogous operators aimed at the preservation of coherence—an important notion within the field of logic-based ontologies.
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Liu, Daxin, and Gerhard Lakemeyer. "Reasoning about Beliefs and Meta-Beliefs by Regression in an Expressive Probabilistic Action Logic." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/269.

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In a recent paper Belle and Lakemeyer proposed the logic DS, a probabilistic extension of a modal variant of the situation calculus with a model of belief based on weighted possible worlds. Among other things, they were able to precisely capture the beliefs of a probabilistic knowledge base in terms of the concept of only-believing. While intuitively appealing, the logic has a number of shortcomings. Perhaps the most severe is the limited expressiveness in that degrees of belief are restricted to constant rational numbers, which makes it impossible to express arbitrary belief distributions. In this paper we will address this and other shortcomings by extending the language and modifying the semantics of belief and only-believing. Among other things, we will show that belief retains many but not all of the properties of DS. Moreover, it turns out that only-believing arbitrary sentences, including those mentioning belief, is uniquely satisfiable in our logic. For an interesting class of knowledge bases we also show how reasoning about beliefs and meta-beliefs after performing noisy actions and sensing can be reduced to reasoning about the initial beliefs of an agent using a form of regression.
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Schwind, Nicolas, Sebastien Konieczny, Jean-Marie Lagniez, and Pierre Marquis. "On Computational Aspects of Iterated Belief Change." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/245.

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Iterated belief change aims to determine how the belief state of a rational agent evolves given a sequence of change formulae. Several families of iterated belief change operators (revision operators, improvement operators) have been pointed out so far, and characterized from an axiomatic point of view. This paper focuses on the inference problem for iterated belief change, when belief states are represented as a special kind of stratified belief bases. The computational complexity of the inference problem is identified and shown to be identical for all revision operators satisfying Darwiche and Pearl's (R*1-R*6) postulates. In addition, some complexity bounds for the inference problem are provided for the family of soft improvement operators. We also show that a revised belief state can be computed in a reasonable time for large-sized instances using SAT-based algorithms, and we report empirical results showing the feasibility of iterated belief change for bases of significant sizes.
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Konieczny, Sébastien, Pierre Marquis, and Srdjan Vesic. "Rational Inference Relations from Maximal Consistent Subsets Selection." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/242.

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When one wants to draw non-trivial inferences from an inconsistent belief base, a very natural approach is to take advantage of the maximal consistent subsets of the base. But few inference relations from maximal consistent subsets exist. In this paper we point out new such relations based on selection of some of the maximal consistent subsets, leading thus to inference relations with a stronger inferential power. The selection process must obey some principles to ensure that it leads to an inference relation which is rational. We define a general class of monotonic selection relations for comparing maximal consistent sets. And we show that it corresponds to the class of rational inference relations.
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Mata Diaz, Amilcar, and Ramon Pino Perez. "Impossibility in Belief Merging (Extended Abstract)." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/799.

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With the aim of studying social properties of belief merging and having a better understanding of impossibility, we extend in three ways the framework of logic-based merging introduced by Konieczny and Pino Perez. First, at the level of representation of the information, we pass from belief bases to complex epistemic states. Second, the profiles are represented as functions of finite societies to the set of epistemic states (a sort of vectors) and not as multisets of epistemic states. Third, we extend the set of rational postulates in order to consider the epistemic versions of the classical postulates of social choice theory: standard domain, Pareto property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and absence of dictator. These epistemic versions of social postulates are given, essentially, in terms of the finite propositional logic. We state some representation theorems for these operators. These extensions and representation theorems allow us to establish an epistemic and very general version of Arrow's impossibility theorem. One of the interesting features of our result, is that it holds for different representations of epistemic states; for instance conditionals, ordinal conditional functions and, of course, total preorders.
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Zheng, Tao, Haitong Wu, Hao Wen Lin, and Jeng-Shyang Pan. "Application of Belief Learning Model Based Socio-rational Secret Sharing Scheme on Cloud Storage." In 2012 Sixth International Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computing (ICGEC). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icgec.2012.63.

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Wang, Chung-Hsuan, and Jo-Han Lu. "Improved Belief-Propagation Decoding with Virtual Channel Outputs for LDPC Convolutional Codes with Rational Parity-Check Matrices." In 2021 IEEE VTS 17th Asia Pacific Wireless Communications Symposium (APWCS). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/apwcs50173.2021.9548754.

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Ribeiro, Jandson S., and Matthias Thimm. "Consolidation via Tacit Culpability Measures: Between Explicit and Implicit Degrees of Culpability." In 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2021}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2021/50.

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Restoring consistency of a knowledge base, known as consolidation, should preserve as much information as possible of the original knowledge base. On the one hand, the field of belief change captures this principle of minimal change via rationality postulates. On the other hand, within the field of inconsistency measurement, culpability measures have been developed to assess how much a formula participates in making a knowledge base inconsistent. We look at culpability measures as a tool to disclose epistemic preference relations and build rational consolidation functions. We introduce tacit culpability measures that consider semantic counterparts between conflicting formulae, and we define a special class of these culpability measures based on a fixed-point characterisation: the stable tacit culpability measures. We show that the stable tacit culpability measures yield rational consolidation functions and that these are also the only culpability measures that yield rational consolidation functions.
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Heyninck, Jesse, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, and Thomas Meyer. "Lexicographic Entailment, Syntax Splitting and the Drowning Problem." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/369.

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Lexicographic inference is a well-known and popular approach to reasoning with non-monotonic conditionals. It is a logic of very high-quality, as it extends rational closure and avoids the so-called drowning problem. It seems, however, this high quality comes at a cost, as reasoning on the basis of lexicographic inference is of high computational complexity. In this paper, we show that lexicographic inference satisfies syntax splitting, which means that we can restrict our attention to parts of the belief base that share atoms with a given query, thus seriously restricting the computational costs for many concrete queries. Furthermore, we make some observations on the relationship between c-representations and lexicographic inference, and reflect on the relation between syntax splitting and the drowning problem.
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Reports on the topic "Rational Belief"

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Lehmann, Bruce. The Role of Beliefs in Inference for Rational Expectations Models. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11758.

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Guidolin, Massimo. Pessimistic Beliefs under Rational Learning: Quantitative Implications for the Equity Premium Puzzle. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2005.005.

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Drury, J., S. Arias, T. Au-Yeung, D. Barr, L. Bell, T. Butler, H. Carter, et al. Public behaviour in response to perceived hostile threats: an evidence base and guide for practitioners and policymakers. University of Sussex, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.20919/vjvt7448.

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Background: Public behaviour and the new hostile threats • Civil contingencies planning and preparedness for hostile threats requires accurate and up to date knowledge about how the public might behave in relation to such incidents. Inaccurate understandings of public behaviour can lead to dangerous and counterproductive practices and policies. • There is consistent evidence across both hostile threats and other kinds of emergencies and disasters that significant numbers of those affected give each other support, cooperate, and otherwise interact socially within the incident itself. • In emergency incidents, competition among those affected occurs in only limited situations, and loss of behavioural control is rare. • Spontaneous cooperation among the public in emergency incidents, based on either social capital or emergent social identity, is a crucial part of civil contingencies planning. • There has been relatively little research on public behaviour in response to the new hostile threats of the past ten years, however. • The programme of work summarized in this briefing document came about in response to a wave of false alarm flight incidents in the 2010s, linked to the new hostile threats (i.e., marauding terrorist attacks). • By using a combination of archive data for incidents in Great Britain 2010-2019, interviews, video data analysis, and controlled experiments using virtual reality technology, we were able to examine experiences, measure behaviour, and test hypotheses about underlying psychological mechanisms in both false alarms and public interventions against a hostile threat. Re-visiting the relationship between false alarms and crowd disasters • The Bethnal Green tube disaster of 1943, in which 173 people died, has historically been used to suggest that (mis)perceived hostile threats can lead to uncontrolled ‘stampedes’. • Re-analysis of witness statements suggests that public fears of Germany bombs were realistic rather than unreasonable, and that flight behaviour was socially structured rather than uncontrolled. • Evidence for a causal link between the flight of the crowd and the fatal crowd collapse is weak at best. • Altogether, the analysis suggests the importance of examining people’s beliefs about context to understand when they might interpret ambiguous signals as a hostile threat, and that. Tthe concepts of norms and relationships offer better ways to explain such incidents than ‘mass panic’. Why false alarms occur • The wider context of terrorist threat provides a framing for the public’s perception of signals as evidence of hostile threats. In particular, the magnitude of recent psychologically relevant terrorist attacks predicts likelihood of false alarm flight incidents. • False alarms in Great Britain are more likely to occur in those towns and cities that have seen genuine terrorist incidents. • False alarms in Great Britain are more likely to occur in the types of location where terrorist attacks happen, such as shopping areass, transport hubs, and other crowded places. • The urgent or flight behaviour of other people (including the emergency services) influences public perceptions that there is a hostile threat, particularly in situations of greater ambiguity, and particularly when these other people are ingroup. • High profile tweets suggesting a hostile threat, including from the police, have been associated with the size and scale of false alarm responses. • In most cases, it is a combination of factors – context, others’ behaviour, communications – that leads people to flee. A false alarm tends not to be sudden or impulsive, and often follows an initial phase of discounting threat – as with many genuine emergencies. 2.4 How the public behave in false alarm flight incidents • Even in those false alarm incidents where there is urgent flight, there are also other behaviours than running, including ignoring the ‘threat’, and walking away. • Injuries occur but recorded injuries are relatively uncommon. • Hiding is a common behaviour. In our evidence, this was facilitated by orders from police and offers from people staff in shops and other premises. • Supportive behaviours are common, including informational and emotional support. • Members of the public often cooperate with the emergency services and comply with their orders but also question instructions when the rationale is unclear. • Pushing, trampling and other competitive behaviour can occur,s but only in restricted situations and briefly. • At the Oxford Street Black Friday 2017 false alarm, rather than an overall sense of unity across the crowd, camaraderie existed only in pockets. This was likely due to the lack of a sense of common fate or reference point across the incident; the fragmented experience would have hindered the development of a shared social identity across the crowd. • Large and high profile false alarm incidents may be associated with significant levels of distress and even humiliation among those members of the public affected, both at the time and in the aftermath, as the rest of society reflects and comments on the incident. Public behaviour in response to visible marauding attackers • Spontaneous, coordinated public responses to marauding bladed attacks have been observed on a number of occasions. • Close examination of marauding bladed attacks suggests that members of the public engage in a wide variety of behaviours, not just flight. • Members of the public responding to marauding bladed attacks adopt a variety of complementary roles. These, that may include defending, communicating, first aid, recruiting others, marshalling, negotiating, risk assessment, and evidence gathering. Recommendations for practitioners and policymakers • Embed the psychology of public behaviour in emergencies in your training and guidance. • Continue to inform the public and promote public awareness where there is an increased threat. • Build long-term relations with the public to achieve trust and influence in emergency preparedness. • Use a unifying language and supportive forms of communication to enhance unity both within the crowd and between the crowd and the authorities. • Authorities and responders should take a reflexive approach to their responses to possible hostile threats, by reflecting upon how their actions might be perceived by the public and impact (positively and negatively) upon public behaviour. • To give emotional support, prioritize informative and actionable risk and crisis communication over emotional reassurances. • Provide first aid kits in transport infrastructures to enable some members of the public more effectively to act as zero responders.
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