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Books on the topic 'Rational actions'

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Published: 21 September 2024

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1

Walsh, Mike. Nursing rituals, research and rational actions. Oxford: Heinemann Nursing, 1989.

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2

Pauline, Ford, ed. Nursing rituals: Research and rational actions. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1989.

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3

Dryden, Windy. Rational emotive behavioural counselling in action. 3rd ed. London: Sage Publications, 2004.

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4

Dryden, Windy. Rational emotive behavioural counselling in action. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999.

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5

Dryden, Windy. Rational emotive behavioural counselling in action. 3rd ed. London: Sage Publications, 2004.

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6

Heath, Joseph. Communicative action and rational choice. Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 2003.

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7

Carlo, Jaeger, ed. Risk, uncertainty, and rational action. London: Earthscan, 2001.

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8

Coval, S. C. Agency in action: The practical rational agency machine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1992.

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9

Heimer, Carol Anne. Reactive risk and rational action: Managing moral hazard in insurance contracts. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

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10

1938-, Kennedy I. R., ed. Rational environmental management of agrochemicals: Risk assessment, monitoring, and remedial action. Washington, D.C: American Chemical Society, 2007.

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11

Gagnon, Brigitte. Projets et coope ration au coeur de nos actions. Montre al: Chenelie re e ducation, 2005.

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12

Polinsky, A. Mitchell. A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

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13

Commission of the European Communities. Directorate-General Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation of Research., ed. Libraries programme: Rationale and background to the community action : general information. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993.

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14

1946-, Monroe Kristen R., and Downs Anthony, eds. The Economic approach to politics: A critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991.

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15

Tenenbaum, Sergio. Rational Powers in Action. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851486.001.0001.

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Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. For example, one cannot simply write a book through an instantaneous choice to do so; over time, one must execute a variety of actions to realize one’s goal of writing a book, where one may do a better or worse job of attaining that goal, and what counts as succeeding at it is not fully determined in advance. Even to explain the rational governance of much less ambitious actions like making dinner, this book argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. This book puts forward a theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action.
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16

Olfert, C. M. M. Rational Action and Fitting Oneself to the World. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190281007.003.0004.

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In Chapter 4, I argue that a proper understanding of practical truth improves our understanding of the goal of practical reasoning: acting well. It does so, first, by improving our understanding of what it means for rational motives, including wishes (boulêseis) and decisions (prohaireseis), to be “rational.” I argue that these are “rational” motives in that they express a concern for practical truth. Second, my account of practical truth transforms our understanding of rational action itself. I argue that when we act on our rational motives, these actions have a striking and under-appreciated feature: they are attempts to fit ourselves to the world. Just as a concern for truth expressed in thought involves trying to fit our thoughts to the way the world is, a concern for truth expressed in motivation and action involves trying to fit ourselves and our actions to what is good in the world.
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17

Thomas, William. Rational Action. The MIT Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9997.001.0001.

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18

Harrison, T. R. Rational Action. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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19

Brownstein, Michael. Reflection, Responsibility, and Fractured Selves. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190633721.003.0005.

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The preceding chapter established that paradigmatic spontaneous actions can be “ours” in the sense that they reflect upon us as agents. But a number of questions remain about the relationship between the implicit mind and the self. First, what exactly is the relationship between cares and action, such that actions can “reflect upon” cares? Second, when an action reflects upon what one cares about, is one thereby responsible for that action? In other words, are we responsible for the spontaneous actions in which our implicit attitudes are implicated? Third, do implicit attitudes reflect who we are, really truly deep down? This chapter attempts to answer these questions and to answer concerns about the roles of intentions to act, self-awareness, and rational judgments in assessing attributability for implicit attitudes.
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20

Owens, David. Deliberation and the First Person. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713234.003.0004.

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Following Descartes, philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular, they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first-person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. This chapter agrees that we have this reflective control over our own actions and that this form of practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness, but denies that anything like this is true of belief. The chapter endorses Williams’ claims that the first-person concept is indispensible only to practical reasoning.
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21

Korsgaard, Christine M. What’s Different about Being Human? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198753858.003.0003.

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This chapter defends the traditional view that what is unique about humans is rationality, a form of cognition involving normative self-government. Rational beings are conscious of the grounds or potential reasons for our beliefs and actions, able to evaluate those reasons, and capable of being moved accordingly. The chapter explains how rationality is distinguished from intelligence, and how this difference makes human action different from animal action. It traces the connection between being rational in this sense and having a normative or evaluative conception of the self, a practical identity, and argues that animals do not conceive of themselves normatively. Finally, it relates these distinctive properties of human beings to Feuerbach and Marx’s idea that human beings are characterized by “species-being,” a kind of identification with our species as such, and also to the special forms of knowledge and action involved in science and ethics.
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22

Bruce, Steve. Action Rational and Irrational. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198786580.003.0009.

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The model of human action as resting on rational choices between alternative opportunities for maximizing our utility has been borrowed from liberal economics by social scientists keen to refute the conventional explanation of secularization. This chapter considers whether we can treat religion as a commodity that people buy more or less of according to individual rational choice. It argues that religion differs from soap powder both extrinsically (because we cannot readily compare its costs or benefits) and in terms of its social roots: in most societies switching religion threatens social bonds far more than does changing car brands. Finally, it advances an important general principle: that we should be very reluctant to impute to other people motives that we would not impute to ourselves.
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23

Rational Emotive Behavioural Counselling in Action. SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 2004.

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24

Rational Emotive Behavioural Counselling in Action. SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 2004.

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25

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. Action. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682706.003.0006.

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This chapter defends a connection between knowledge and practical reasoning, according to which one’s reasons for action constitute all and only that which one knows. A variety of intuitive objections to such principles are considered and rejected—a central theme is that objectors to knowledge norms often make tacit but substantive ethical assumptions about which reasons, if held, would justify which actions. Absent broader ethical theorizing, the proposed counterexamples are inconclusive. The chapter sketches possible approaches to such theories, and indicates reason for optimism about knowledge norms. It also considers the degree to which knowledge norms imply externalism about rational action, suggesting that many internalist intuitions and verdicts may be accommodated and explained by knowledge norms.
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26

Renn, Ortwin, Eugene A. Rosa, Thomas Webler, and Carlo C. Jaeger. Risk, Uncertainty and Rational Action. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

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27

Jaeger, Carlo C. Risk, Uncertainty and Rational Action. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315071817.

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28

Heath, Joseph. Communicative Action and Rational Choice. The MIT Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1955.001.0001.

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29

Rational-emotive counselling in action. London: Sage Publications, 1990.

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30

Renn, Ortwin, Eugene A. Rosa, Thomas Webler, and Carlo C. Jaeger. Risk, Uncertainty and Rational Action. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

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31

Risk, Uncertainty and Rational Action. Routledge, 2013.

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32

Irwin, Terence. Ethics Through History. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199603701.001.0001.

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This book is a selective discussion of the tradition in moral philosophy that runs from Socrates to the present. The main themes: (1) Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics take different positions in debates the relation between morality (including right action and the character of virtuous agents) and the human good. Aquinas’ version of an Aristotelian view identifies the human good with the fulfilment of human nature and capacities in a just society. These facts about the human good can be discovered by rational reflexion on human nature and human needs. (2) These views both about the content of ethics and about the sources of ethical knowledge are questioned by Scotus and later writers on natural law. Voluntarists take the principles of natural law and moral right to be the products of will; naturalists take them to be discovered by reason. (3) The dispute about will and reason is the source of the long dispute between sentimentalists (Hutcheson, Hume) and rationalists (Butler, Price, Reid) about whether moral judgment has a non-rational or a rational basis. Kant tries to resolve this dispute. (4) These arguments lead to further discussion about what makes morally right actions right. Sentimentalists, followed by Mill and Sidgwick and by later utilitarians, argue that actions are right in so far as they maximize pleasure. Others, including the rationalists, Kant, Ross, and Rawls, argue that moral principles are not subordinate to utility.
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33

Hicks, Amelia. Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0008.

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Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision maker’s moral uncertainty. But this chapter argues that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one’s moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. It first provides positive motivation for the view that one’s moral beliefs can affect what it is rational for one to choose. It then addresses the problem of value comparison, according to which one cannot determine the expected moral value of one’s actions. The chapter argues that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty.
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34

Russell, Paul. Practical Reason and Motivational Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0007.

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This chapter takes up a crucial debate between Christine Korsgaard and Bernard Williams on the subject of practical reason. Korsgaard argues that if reason can itself identify substantive ends for our actions, independent of our existing desires, then there is no genuine or distinct motivational problem about how reasons can move (rational) agents to action. In criticism of this, it is argued that when we sever the link between reasons and desires we encounter a problem about whether the internalism requirement holds for pure practical reasons. If Kantian ethical theory is to find some way to explain motivation, as it concerns pure practical reason, it needs to say more about this problem. Certainly it cannot evade it on the basis of the internalist assumption that pure practical reasons must be capable of motivating rational persons. Any assumption of this kind simply begs the question against the motivational skeptic.
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35

WNeenan, Dryden M., Michael Neenan, and Windy Dryden. Rational Emotive Behavioural Counselling in Action. SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 2004.

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36

Rethinking rational choice theory: A companion on rational and moral action. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

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37

Jonge, Jan de. Rethinking Rational Choice Theory: A Companion on Rational and Moral Action. Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

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38

Jonge, Jan de. Rethinking Rational Choice Theory: A Companion on Rational and Moral Action. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

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39

Jonge, Jan de. Rethinking Rational Choice Theory: A Companion on Rational and Moral Action. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

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40

Staffel, Julia. Unsettled Thoughts. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833710.001.0001.

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How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? What makes their degrees of belief rational, and how should they reason about uncertain matters? Recent research in epistemology has attempted to answer these questions by developing formal models of ideally rational credences. However, we know from psychological research that ideal rationality is unattainable for human thinkers. This raises the question of how rational ideals can apply to human thinkers. A popular reply is that the more a thinker’s imperfectly rational credences approximate compliance with norms of ideal rationality, the better. But what exactly does this mean? Why is it better to be less irrational, if we can’t ever be completely rational? And what does being closer to ideally rational amount to? If ideal models of rationality are supposed to help us understand the rationality of human, imperfect thinkers, we need answers to these questions. Unsettled Thoughts offers these answers: we can explain why it’s better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate, and better at guiding our actions. Moreover, the way in which approximating ideal rationality is beneficial can be made formally precise by using a variety of distance measures that track the benefits of being more rational.
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41

Cullity, Garrett. Weighing Reasons. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.19.

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What is involved in weighing normative reasons against each other? One attractive answer is the following Simple Picture: a fact is a reason for action when it counts in its favor; this relation comes in different strengths or weights; the weights of the reasons for and against an action can be summed; the reasons for performing the action are sufficient when no other action is more strongly supported, overall; the reasons are decisive when it is most strongly supported; one ought to perform the action there is most reason to perform; rational deliberation is weighing reasons correctly; and acting rationally is doing what one has sufficient reasons to do. This chapter examines the adequacy of this picture, concluding that while in some respects it needs modification or correction, in others the jury is out.
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42

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Decision. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0009.

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If linguistic vagueness is more fundamental than propositional vagueness, it is natural to think that vague propositions won’t play a substantive role in decision theory. On a linguistic picture, what it is rational for an agent to do is completely determined by their attitudes towards precise propositions. This is vacuously true if all propositions are precise, but it also seems like a natural idea if, like the expressivist discussed in Chapter 8, a distinction is drawn between metaphysically ‘first-rate’ precise propositions and metaphysically ‘second-rate’ vague propositions. This chapter considers how to formulate decision theory in a setting where there are vague propositions, and discusses ways in which vague beliefs, desires, and actions can have concrete impacts on practical deliberation and action.
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43

Comesaña, Juan. Being Rational and Being Right. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198847717.001.0001.

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This book defends a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. The starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, it argues for a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, “Experientialism,” differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. The book argues that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. The discussion is embedded in a Bayesian framework, and the book also examines the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña’s own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.
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44

Campbell, P. G., and S. Coval. Agency in Action: The Practical Rational Agency Machine. Springer London, Limited, 2012.

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45

Campbell, P. G., and S. Coval. Agency in Action: The Practical Rational Agency Machine. Springer, 2012.

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46

Zürich, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, ed. Rational action and social networks in ecological economics. 1999.

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47

Walter, André. PRAXEOLOGIE GEGEN RATIONAL ACTION THEORY. ÜBER DIE AKTUALITÄT DER KRITIK BOURDIEUS AM RATIONAL CHOICE. GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2008.

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48

Laver, Michael John. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. Sage Publications Ltd, 1997.

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49

Laver, Michael John. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 1997.

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50

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. The Forest of Reasons. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825067.003.0005.

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As business decisions and actions spill over into society in ways that arouse our concern, it is useful to explore how philosophy might offer an alternative perspective to consequentialism. This chapter reviews the conventional approach and the risks of “maximizing.” It submits that the narrowly consequential approach provides us with practical reasons for action but neglects normative or moral reasoning. Reasons for doing might be based on rational choice, but reasons for being (existential reasons) and feeling (sentimental reasons) are guided by moral choice. That these last two may not be “commensurable” does not make them less important. Treating everything as tradable with everything else may be bad for the soul and society. We have moral reasons to feel and to be certain ways, as well as to do certain things. It is time to pay greater heed to Jim March’s long-standing challenge to consequentialist decision theories.
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