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Oliveira, Sandra Maria de. "A linguagem em Quine." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3551.
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Previous issue date: 2011The scope of the discussion about language is very broad. Thus, we have searched to provide elements that underlie the problem of this thesis, whose core focuses on developments concerning the approaches of behaviorism, empiricism and pragmatism, as well as key concepts in the quinean system in order to clarify his thought to support this research. In this context, the problem of this study is to search basis in Quine's theory of language to answer the question in relation to behavioral bias raised, namely, which philosophical idea permeates Quine‘s philosophical theory of language. This investigation has been guided from basic quinean texts, such as: From a Logical Point of View; Word and Object; Ontological Relativity and Other Essays; Pursuit of Truth; The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays; The Web of Belief; The Roots of Reference; Theories and Things. Regarding to Dewey, the study has grounded in the book Experience and Nature, in which he, incisively, show his concepts about language. Moreover, from the texts, it can be possible to answer the hypotheses and questions that have motivated this research, concerning language and its assumptions on Quine. Furthermore, we have presented relevant concepts to the issue of uncertainty and assumptions that have been discussed in Chapter 2. In the third, language and empiricism can show the world of experience that there is on Quine's philosophical system. Finally, in the final remarks, we conclude that, indeed, Quine's theory about language, learning and acquisition has a strong behaviorist nature, confirming the initial hypothesis.
A abrangência da discussão acerca da linguagem é ampla. Desse modo, buscamos trazer elementos que fundamentam a problemática desta tese, cujo núcleo concentra-se nos desdobramentos das abordagens concernentes ao behaviorismo, empirismo e pragmatismo, assim como conceitos-chave no sistema quineano, a fim de elucidar seu pensamento para sustentar esta investigação. Nesse contexto, o problema deste estudo consiste em buscar embasamento na teoria da linguagem de Quine para responder à questão em relação ao viés behaviorista levantado; a saber, que concepção filosófica permeia a teoria da linguagem em Quine. Esta investigação orienta-se a partir de textos fundamentais, como From a Logical Point of View; Word and Object: Ontological Relativity and other Essays; Pursuit of Truth; The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays; The Web of Belief; The Roots of Reference; Theories and Things, de Quine; quanto a Dewey baseamo-nos, sobretudo, em Experience and Nature, em que ele, de forma pontual, mostra seus conceitos acerca da linguagem. Além disso, a partir dos textos é possível responder às hipóteses e indagações que motivaram este trabalho, referentes à linguagem e seus pressupostos em Quine. Ademais, apresentamos conceitos pertinentes à questão da indeterminação e seus pressupostos que são discutidos no capítulo 2. No terceiro, linguagem e empirismo mostram o mundo da experiência que há no sistema filosófico de Quine. Por fim, nas considerações finais, concluímos que, realmente, a teoria de Quine a respeito da linguagem, seu aprendizado e aquisição apresentam um cunho behaviorista marcante, comprovando a hipótese inicial.
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Ahmed, Hasen Ali. "Quine on naturalised epistemology." Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2017. http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/2657.
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Edgar, Scott. "Quine on meaning and logic." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ57233.pdf.
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Moosavi, Karimi Seyed Masoud. "Carnap and Quine on Analyticity." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/22815.
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This dissertation examines the Carnap-Quine debate on analyticity with the objective of identifying exactly what is at stake. Close scrutiny of Quine’s criticism of the definitions of analyticity reveals that most of his objections are convincing only if they are considered in relation to the definitions of analyticity in natural language. Carnap, however, defines analyticity in artificial languages. The dissertation also shows that Carnap can meet the objections to his definitions by using a perspective based within his own philosophy. After examining the presumptions of each party to the debate, the dissertation concludes that the disagreement between Carnap and Quine on the notion of analyticity is rooted in their different approaches to empiricism and that there is nothing said by either philosopher which proves that one approach has ultimate advantages over the other. It is thus impossible to identify a winner in the Carnap-Quine debate on analyticity.
The process of arriving at this conclusion starts with a discussion in the first three chapters of Carnap’s philosophy followed by a critical and detailed discussion of his syntactical and semantical definitions of analyticity and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Chapter Four examines Quine’s objections to Carnap’s definitions of essential predication and shows that his objections do not undermine Carnap’s definitions of this notion in artificial languages. It also shows how vital providing a proper definition of essential predication in natural language is for Carnap’s philosophy and examines whether or not he is able to do so. Chapter Five analyzes Quine’s objections to Carnap’s definitions of logical truth and demonstrates that Carnap is able to respond to all of them when the discussion is situated within his philosophical system. Again, Quine’s objections to definitions of logical truth are meaningful only if they are considered in relation to natural language, which is not Carnap’s concern. The dissertation concludes by showing that both Carnap and Quine arrived at their conclusions with respect to the nature of logical sentences, based not on the arguments in their debate on analyticity, but on their philosophical considerations regarding the principle of empiricism: for Carnap, logical sentences are out of the realm of knowledge and independent of matters of fact whereas, for Quine, these are as empirical as other sentences. Nothing either says in their debate can convince the other to accept a different viewpoint.
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Lemaire, Jacques. "Psychologie et philosophie chez quine." Paris 4, 1987. http://www.theses.fr/1987PA040183.
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Devant l'echec de carnap et du positivisme logique, dans l'effort de traduction reductive des theories scientifiques en termes de donnees des sens a l'aide de la logique, quine propose aux sciences de la nature d'expliquer et de decrire leur propre emergence dans leurs propres termes c. A. D. A l'aide de leur methode d'observation externe et de leur ontologie (physicaliste) d'objets externes. Le bilan de cette naturalisation de l'epistemologie par l'externalisation propre a la methode des sciences naturelles selon quine, parait globalement negatif. Le behaviorisme, en tant que psychologie empirique seule conforme a la methode des sciences naturelles, ne peut mener a bien la genese factuelle de l'appareil de la reference objective et abstraite de la science, concu de maniere strictement extensionnelle. L'empirisme externalise, qu'est le behaviorisme, oblige quine a "speculer" sur les processus internes responsables de la construction progressive du langage puis de la science. Son antimentalisme interdit toute position d'entite interne consistante et mutile ainsi le propre realisme de quine. L'empirisme externalise conduit aussi quine a deduire a priori le contenu de la science a partir de sa methode, au lieu de mettre a profit tout le contenu effectif de la science - ce qui contrevient a son propre naturalisme. L'association de l'empirisme externalise avec le holisme, impose a quine par son extensionalisme, laisse empiriquement indeterminees les structures internes du discours scientifique. La caractere systematique de la science, son universalite et la clarte de son formalisme restent sous-determines c. A. D. Non effectivement reconstruits. L'empirisme externalise est de meme incapable de contenir dans les limites d'un pragmatisme lie a l'evolutionnisme le decisionnisme impose par le holisme. L'explication de la genese de la science par elle-meme dans des termes scientifiques stricts, comme ceux de l'externalisation et de l'extensionalisme, produit le paradoxe ruineux d'une sous-determination generalisee c. A. D. D'une perte de scientificite et d'un manque de rationalite contraire a la science elle-meme. Preuve est donc faite du caractere problematique de l'autonomie de la scienceIn front of the mitigated failure of carnap and of the logical positivism in the endeavour to translate scientific theories by reducing them to sense-data with the help of logic, quine suggests that the natural sciences describe and explain their own appearance in their own terms i. E. With the help of their method of observing extenally and their (physicalistic) ontology of external objects. About this naturalization of epistemology by means of the externalization special to the method of the natural sciences en quine's opinion, the final assessment proves rather negative. As an empirical psychology alone of its kind consonant with the method of the natural sciences, behaviorism is unable to manage efficiently the factual genesis of the scientific apparatus of objective and abstract reference in a solely extensional way. Quine is bound by the externalized empiricism, that is behaviorism, to "speculate" on the internal processes in charge of the progressive construction of language and then of science. This antimentalism prevents quine from positing worthwile internal entities and thus he cuts back his own realism. The externalized empiricism leads him as well to deduce a priori the content of science from its method, instead of taking advantage of the whole actual content of science - which contravenes his own naturalism. The internal structures of the scientific discourse remain empirically indetermined because of the blending of the externalized empiricism with holism which is forced on quine by his extensionalism the systematizing of science, its universality and the clarity of its formalism is left under-determined i. E. Not actually reconstructed. In the same way the externalized empiricism is unable to restrain the decisionism due to holism within the confines of a pragmatism bound to evolutionism. The scientific account of the genesis of science by itself in such austere scientific terms as externalization and extensionalism brings about the damning paradox of a widespread under-determination i. E. A lack of scientificity and a rationality gap contrary to science. That proves the uncertainty of the self-sufficiency of science
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Geuking, Wienand. "Erfahrung und Willkür bei Quine /." Sinzheim : Pro Universitate Verl, 1996. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb36991137g.
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Pettersen, Bruno Batista. "A epistemologia naturalizada de Quine." Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1843/ARBZ-7KAJ4R.
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The subject of this dissertation is Willard Quines Naturalized Epistemology. In the first chapter, we investigate its origins within the tradition of empiricism. We examine David Humes naturalistic theory of belief and Rudolf Carnaps reductionistic agenda for the philosophy of science. Quines epistemology emerges from the criticism of those positions. The second chapter is a close examination of Quines classic paper "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969). We begin by a presentation of the criticism of the concept of "empirical meaning", and then show how this criticism leads Quine to his own version of an empiricist epistemology. His naturalized epistemology has two main tenets, both reformulated from the tradition: (1) naturalism - epistemology becomes a chapter of the natural sciences, such as psychology - and (2) a version of empiricism in which the verification of a sentence or a theory can only be made in a holistic mode. The third chapter is concerned with the criticisms of Quines project. We present four criticisms; two closer to Quine, by Jaegwon Kim and Donald Davidson, and two from a more distant point of view, by Laurence Bonjour and Barry Stroud. At the end of this chapter we suggest quinean responses to those criticisms.O objeto desta dissertação é a Epistemologia Naturalizada de Quine. No primeiro capítulo, nós investigamos sua origem dentro da tradição empirista. Examinamos a teoria naturalista de David Hume e a agenda reducionista para a filosofia da ciência de Rudolf Carnap. A epistemologia de Quine emerge da crítica destas posições. O segundo capítulo é um exame detalhado do clássico artigo Epistemologia Naturalizada (1969) de Quine. Nós começamos pela a apresentação da crítica de Quine do conceito de significado empírico, e então mostramos como esta crítica leva Quine a sua própria versão de uma epistemologia empirista. Sua epistemologia naturalizada tem dois pontos fundamentais, ambos reformulados a partir da tradição: (1) naturalismo a epistemologia se torna um capítulo das ciências naturais, tal como a psicologia e (2) uma versão do empirismo na qual a verificação de uma sentença ou uma teoria pode ser feita apenas de um modo holista. O terceiro capítulo tem como foco as críticas ao projeto de Quine. Nós apresentamos quatro críticas, duas próximas de Quine, por Jaegwon Kim e Donald Davidson, e duas de um ponto de vista mais distante, por Laurence Bonjour e Barry Stroud. No final deste capítulo, nós iremos sugerir respostas quineanas a estas críticas.
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Chan, King-man. "Quine on analyticity, translation and meaning /." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1993. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B13793809.
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陳景文 and King-man Chan. "Quine on analyticity, translation and meaning." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1993. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B3121115X.
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Trelles, Óscar. "Proposiciones vs. oraciones eternas en Quine." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112834.
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En el artículo primero se pone de manifiesto la necesidad de aclarar qué son los portadores de valores de verdad; luego se revisan las objeciones de Quine a la teoría de las proposiciones; y por último, a partir de la consideración de las oraciones tipo eternas de Quine se propone a las proposiciones como las portadoras de valores de verdad.
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Teixeira, Sandro Juarez. "Significado e referência em Quine e Kuhn." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFPR, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1884/30412.
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Resumo: O objetivo desta dissertação é compreender as relações que podem ser estabelecidas entre as teorias acerca da linguagem em dois autores, Willard V.O. Quine e Thomas S. Kuhn, principalmente em torno das questões significado e referência.O primeiro capítulo visa apresentar alguns elementos da tradição empirista que podem ser úteis à compreensão das ideias filosóficas de Willard Quine e Thomas Kuhn. Para a apresentação deste breve painel, dois autores foram escolhidos: David Hume e Rudolph Carnap.O segundo capítulo procura apresentar os desenvolvimentos filosóficos de Quine a partir de seu embate com o empirismo tradicional. O destaque foi dado à crítica de Quine ao mentalismo. Para Quine, uma vez que a referência é totalmente inescrutável somente o comportamento linguísitico deve ser parâmetro para o desenvolvimento de nossas teorias de linguagem.O terceiro capítulo dedica-se à apresentação das ideias de Thomas Kuhn a respeito da linguagem. A incomensurabilidade semântica é a principal idéia a ser apresentada. Nesse capítulo, se procurará mostrar como o projeto kuhniano se distancia do naturalismo quineano. Por fim, o capítulo quatro procura apresentar brevemente o embate entre o descritivismo semântico kuhniano e algumas ideias centrais das teorias causais diretas da referência. O ponto central do embate é a disputa pela defesa da fixidez ou não da referência.
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Svanberg, Hakim. "Quine and Wittgenstein : Similarities and Common Misconceptions." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377156.
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Quine and late Wittgenstein have often found themselves being compared for similarities and dissimilarities, we can attribute the allure of this subject to both philosophers being similar advocates of holism and epistemological relativity despite taking on different subject matters. Pieranna Garavaso attempted an inquiry of this type, where she compares Quine’s view on holism, relying mainly on “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, with Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Garavaso shows in her essay that there is a high level of correspondence between On Certainty and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” but ultimately concludes that despite any actual agreement between Quine and Wittgenstein, their views end up ultimately incompatible. I will argue that this is wrong; Quine’s conception of holism, and Wittgenstein’s conception of holism found in On Certainty are compatible, and even complementary. I will begin my text by giving a short presentation of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. I will then raise the similarities, and dissimilarities between the two texts before giving my final argument against the supposed conflict between them.
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Coen, Amanda. "Quine, Wittgenstein, and our knowledge of the world." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ60673.pdf.
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Fama, Melissa. "Naturalism and nonsense, quine and Wittgenstein on ethics." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ67813.pdf.
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Djaballah, Amar. "Vérité logique et ontologie chez W. V. Quine." Paris 1, 1985. http://www.theses.fr/1985PA01A033.
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Oliveira, Cínthia Roso. "AVALIAÇÃO DA CRÍTICA DE BONJOUR À EPISTEMOLOGIA NATURALIZADA DE QUINE." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2009. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9074.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorThe project of naturalization of the epistemology proposed by Willard V. O. Quine it supplies a new way to do epistemology. Starting from that proposal, everything that is had to build knowledge on the world they are the sensitive evidences and the results obtained in the several scientific investigations, among them, the own empiric philosophical investigations. The naturalized epistemology doesn't intend to proceed of a privileged point of view in relation to the other sciences. For Quine that point of view is not possible, always originates from a world theory for since then, to reconstruct her revising and rejecting some beliefs. Starting from those conclusions of the quinean proposal it is noticed explicit rejection of the knowledge and justification a priori second which what would guarantee the beliefs ultimately on the world it would be a rational intuition given independently of the experience. Front to that, Laurence BonJour criticizes the project of naturalization of the epistemology proposed by Quine, because this proposal when not accepting a logic a priori would not be any reason to sustain, it would destroy yourself. This work tries to evaluate the critics of BonJour to the project of naturalization of the epistemology proposed by Quine. Intends to come a possible answer in the quinean project that there is not a logic a priori, but a naturalized reason developed starting from the experience that connects the sentences of the web.
O projeto de naturalização da epistemologia proposto por Willard V. O. Quine fornece uma nova maneira de fazer epistemologia. A partir dessa proposta, tudo o que se tem para construir conhecimentos sobre o mundo são as evidências sensíveis e os resultados obtidos nas diversas investigações científicas, entre elas, as próprias investigações filosóficas empíricas. A epistemologia naturalizada não pretende proceder de um ponto de vista privilegiado em relação às outras ciências. Para Quine esse ponto de vista não é possível, sempre se parte de uma teoria de mundo para a partir daí, reconstruí-la revisando e rejeitando algumas crenças. A partir dessas conclusões da proposta quineana percebe-se uma clara rejeição do conhecimento e justificação a priori segundo o qual o que garantiria as crenças sobre o mundo em última instância seria uma intuição racional dada independentemente da experiência. Frente a isso, Laurence BonJour critica o projeto de naturalização da epistemologia proposto por Quine, pois esta proposta ao não aceitar uma lógica a priori não teria nenhuma razão para se sustentar, seria auto-destrutiva. Este trabalho procura avaliar as críticas de BonJour ao projeto de naturalização da epistemologia proposto por Quine. Pretende-se apresentar uma possível resposta no projeto quineano de que não há uma lógica a priori, mas uma razão naturalizada desenvolvida a partir da experiência que conecta as sentenças da teia.
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Dolson, C. Daniel. "Toward A Lean Ontology: Quine, (Meta) Ontology, and Descriptions." Ohio : Ohio University, 2006. http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?ohiou1155833916.
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Lafrance, Jean-David. "L'aspect public de la signification chez Quine et Davidson." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2004. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=885679731&sid=9&Fmt=2&clientId=9268&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Sigouin, Tara-Lynne. "W.V. Quine & Ludwig Wittgenstein, two approaches to philosophy." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ58506.pdf.
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Hough, Gerard Michael. "A Quinean dilemma : Quine on reductive accounts of meaning." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.425590.
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Dias, Aline de Pinho. "O argumento de quine sobre a indeterminaÃÃo da traduÃÃo." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2003. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=2601.
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CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel SuperiorEsta dissertaÃÃo mostra a crÃtica de Quine à noÃÃo de significado. O trabalho inicia com a exposiÃÃo das teorias semÃnticas de Gotllob Frege e de Rudolf Carnap que, segundo Quine, sÃo insatisfatÃrias no esclarecimento da noÃÃo de significado. O passo seguinte serà a crÃtica de Quine a conceitos relacionados à noÃÃo de significado, a saber, analiticidade e sinonÃmia. O capÃtulo central serà uma exposiÃÃo minuciosa dos argumentos de Quine contra a noÃÃo clÃssica de significado, explorada na tese da indeterminaÃÃo da traduÃÃo, e a crÃtica à noÃÃo clÃssica de referÃncia. Em seguida, à exposta a tentativa de reconstruÃÃo da noÃÃo de significado feita por Hilary Putnam e sua crÃtica à Quine. Nas consideraÃÃes finais, sÃo apontadas algumas das conseqÃÃncias filosÃficas mais diretas resultantes da crÃtica de Quine à noÃÃo de significado.
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Dias, Aline de Pinho. "O argumento de quine sobre a indeterminação da tradução." www.teses.ufc.br, 2003. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/6467.
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DIAS, Aline de Pinho. O argumento de quine sobre a indeterminação da tradução. 2003. 116f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2003.Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T12:37:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2003-DIS-APDIAS.pdf: 484056 bytes, checksum: 208179c327b47041c1bb8abfcb283167 (MD5)
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Esta dissertação mostra a crítica de Quine à noção de significado. O trabalho inicia com a exposição das teorias semânticas de Gotllob Frege e de Rudolf Carnap que, segundo Quine, são insatisfatórias no esclarecimento da noção de significado. O passo seguinte será a crítica de Quine a conceitos relacionados à noção de significado, a saber, analiticidade e sinonímia. O capítulo central será uma exposição minuciosa dos argumentos de Quine contra a noção clássica de significado, explorada na tese da indeterminação da tradução, e a crítica à noção clássica de referência. Em seguida, é exposta a tentativa de reconstrução da noção de significado feita por Hilary Putnam e sua crítica à Quine. Nas considerações finais, são apontadas algumas das conseqüências filosóficas mais diretas resultantes da crítica de Quine à noção de significado.
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Clozel, Claire-Marie. "Signification et vérification essai sur la sémantique de Quine." Paris 1, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995PA010616.
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Le paradigme de la traduction radicale et les theses d'indetermination qui y sont associees sont sans doute la partie la plus celebre (sinon la mieux comprise) de l'oeuvre de quine. Il apparait toutefois a l'analyse que ce paradigme traduit mal les principaux resultats de la doctrine, a savoir : - le caractere holiste et holophrastique de la verification ; - la relativite de l'ontologie ; - et le role de la metaphore dans l'elaboration des hypotheses scientifiques et des concepts theoriques. Cette lacune semble essentiellement due a l'assimilation au sein de ce paradigme de deux processus distincts : celui de la verification d'une theorie, d'une part, et celui de la comprehension d'un langage, de l'autre. De cette assimilation decoulent la plupart des aspects paradoxaux de la doctrine quinienne : - confusion langage theorie ; - conception holophrastique de la signification empirique ; - privilege accorde a la logique propositionnelle ; - statut problematique des phrases observationnelles. Notre these est qu'il y a lieu au contraire de distinguer entre l'apprentissage (et la traduction) des langages naturels et l'elaboration et la verification des langages theoriques. Ce point de vue aboutit a une rehabilitation du role de la logique quantifiee des les premiers stades de l'apprentissage et permet du meme coup de leur appliquer la these de la relativite de l'ontologieThe paradigm of radical translation and the associated indetermination theses are probably the best known of quine's. Analysis reveals therefore that the paradigm badly express the more important results of the thesis, namely : - holism and holophraticism of the confirmation process ; - ontological relativity ; - and metaphor-based construction of scientific hypotheses and theoretical concepts. This difficulty seems to depend on the assimilation between two distinct processes : theoretical confirmation, for one, and linguistic understanding, for the second. Of that issue, most of the problems of the theory are consequences : - confusing language and theory ; - holophrastic point of view on empirical signification ; - privilege given to truth-functional logic ; - problematic status of observation sentences. Our thesis is that it is important, on the contrary, to distinguish between : - first, learning of natural languages ; - second, elaborating and confirming theoretical languages. From this point of view, we are allowed to give more place to quantified logic, even at the first stages of learning and to use the ontological relativity to explain these stages
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Nagase, Daniel Arvage. "Explicating logicality." Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-04012018-175215/.
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The present study aims at analyzing the so-called Tarski proposal, a proposal about which objects should be considered as logical. My analysis has two parts: the first part, more historically oriented, compares Tarskis evolving methodology to Carnaps and Quines, in particular with the dierent conceptions of these latter two regarding that which they called explication. The second, more argumentative part, attempts to show that the most natural environment for this proposal is a platonic metaphysics of a neo-Fregean variety.O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar a assim chamada proposta de Tarski, a qual visa fornecer uma resposta à pergunta: quais objetos são lógicos? Nossa análise consiste em duas partes: uma primeira, mais histórica, compara a metodologia de Tarski àquela de Carnap e de Quine, se atentando principalmente às diferentes acepções que cada um deles atribui à noção de explicação (explication). A segunda parte, mais argumentativa, procura mostrar que um ambiente natural para essa proposta é uma metafísica platônica de franca inspiração neo-fregeana.
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Sigouin, Tara-Lynne. "W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein: Two approaches to philosophy." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9009.
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This dissertation explores the works of W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It provides a detailed and comprehensive discussion of their distinct conceptions of philosophy. It shows how Quine is involved in a scientific philosophy aimed at the discovery of truth and explanation. It also demonstrates how Wittgenstein's critical approach attempts to dissolve philosophical problems and theories. The main purpose of this work is to explain how a proper understanding of each philosopher's framework of study, is crucial to the understanding and criticism of their respective philosophical ideas. The only way to properly refute Quine's theories is to evaluate them in a scientific framework. Any other interpretation could change his intention and weaken his arguments. Similarly, the only way to refute Wittgenstein's claims is to interpret them in everyday language. However, this is not to say that either view can be refuted. It is simply to point out that any attempt to oppose Wittgenstein's claims from a scientific viewpoint, or Quine's from a non-scientific perspective, will be flawed since it is contrary to the way in which each view was conceived.
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Naidon, Karen Giovana Videla da Cunha. "ESTÍMULOS PROXIMAIS E DISTAIS: AS CRÍTICAS DE DAVIDSON A QUINE." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2012. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9113.
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Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e TecnológicoThere are approximate thirty years, started a debate among philosophers W. V. O. Quine and D. Davidson about where it should be located in the causal chain speaking- world, the element that determines the empirical meaning of observation sentences - henceforth will call this element of "stimulus." According to Quine, who supports what might be called the "proximal conception," such stimulus would be located on the sensory surface speaker, ie, in a position close to him in this causal chain - proximal stimulus -; Davidson, on the other hand, criticizes the proximal conception, because it would not be able to explain the public nature of language and he suggests Quine to abandon the proximal conception in favor of distal conception, sustained by himself, according to which such a stimulus would be located in own objects and events about which the sentences speak, ie, in a position farther from the speaker - distal stimulus. Despite the suggestion of Davidson, Quine insists until the end of his work in not officially sustain the distal conception, introducing, however, some modifications in its conception in order to escape the criticism proceeded by the author. Given this di-vergence between the two authors, this work aims to carry out the reconstruction and evaluation of this debate. It should be noted, first of all, that Quine is a philosopher very systematic and his theses are closely interconnected, so it is necessary a more general overview of his philosophy whenever one want to understand a particular problem that is inserted in it, otherwise prejudice the proper understanding of it. Therefore, this work will be divided into two main parts: the first one will be reserved for the attempt to situate the central problem that it will be examined in the wake of broader Quinean philosophy as a whole, while the second part will be devoted to the reconstruction of the debate. The conclusion reached is that the final formulation of the conception of Quine can be considered as satisfactory solution of many problems of the initial formulation of proximal conception since we follow the suggestion of Lars Bergström and understand that the meaning of a observation sentence must consist of a subject s dispositions to assent and dissent to sentence, instead of identifying the meaning with set of proximal stimuli that the speaker ties to sentence. Furthermore, though it may be possible to raise objections to the Quine s final solution, it may be considered more appropriate solution to the problems of proximal conception since compared to the suggestion made by Davidson, because the adoption of conception distal would not be satisfactory for Quine s philosophical purposes.
Há aproximados trinta anos, iniciou-se um debate entre os filósofos W. V. O. Quine e D. Davidson a respeito de onde deveria ser situado, na cadeia causal mundo-falante, o elemento que determina o significado empírico de frases de observação − doravante, chamar-se-á tal elemento de estímulo . De acordo com Quine, que sustenta o que se pode chamar de concepção proximal , tal estímulo estaria localizado na superfície sensorial do falante, ou seja, em posição próxima a este em referida cadeia causal − estímulo proximal −; Davidson, por outro lado, critica a concepção proximal, pelo fato de que a mesma não seria capaz de explicar a natureza pública da linguagem, e sugere a Quine seu abandono em prol da concepção distal, por ele próprio sustentada, conforme a qual tal estímulo estaria situado nos próprios objetos e eventos sobre os quais falam as frases, isto é, em posição maibs distante do falante − estímulo distal. A despeito da sugestão de Davidson, Quine insiste até o final de sua obra em não adotar oficialmente a concepção distal, introduzindo, contudo, algumas modificações em sua concepção a fim de escapar às críticas procedidas por aquele autor. Tendo em vista essa divergência entre os dois autores, a presente dissertação tem como objetivo proceder à reconstrução e avaliação desse debate. Há que se ressaltar, antes de tudo, que Quine é um filósofo muito sistemático e que suas teses estão intimamente conectadas entre si, de modo que se faz necessária uma visão mais geral de sua filosofia sempre que se deseja entender um problema específico que se encontra nela inserido, sob pena de prejudicar a adequada compreensão do mesmo. Por essa razão, este trabalho será dividido em duas partes principais: a primeira delas será reservada à tentativa de situar o problema central que será nele examinado no bojo mais amplo da filosofia quineana como um todo, enquanto a segunda parte será dedicada propriamente à reconstrução do debate. A conclusão a que se chega é que a formulação final da concepção de Quine pode ser considerada satisfatória como solução de muitos problemas da formulação inicial da concepção proximal desde se siga a sugestão de Lars Bergström e se entenda que o significado de uma frase de observação deve consistir nas disposições de um sujeito para assentir ou dissentir a ela, em vez de identificar o significado com o conjunto de estímulos proximais que o falante vincula a ela. Ademais, por mais que seja possível levantar objeções contra a solução final de Quine, ela pode ser considerada a saída mais adequada aos problemas da concepção proximal quando comparada à sugestão feita por Davidson, uma vez que a adoção da concepção distal não seria satisfatória para os propósitos filosóficos de Quine.
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Jónsson, Ólafur Páll. "Scepticism about meaning, an examination of quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/mq24595.pdf.
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Araújo, Marcus Renato Alves. "Holismo e testabilidade de teorias científicas: uma análise da tese Duhem-Quine." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2005. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/5930.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
This is a study on Duhem-Quine thesis. Its purpose was to investigate epistemological differences and affinities between the holistic positions of Willard Quine and Pierre Duhem. This analysis showed that two quite different interpretations of Duhem-Quine thesis are possible: a weak version, argued by Duhem, and a strong version, more radical, argued by Quine in his article Two dogmas of empiricism. The study of holism, in this perspective, highlighted the importance of this subject to the Philosophy of Science and Language and how this approach can shed light on important philosophical issues, such as the relationship between scientific observations and theories; the thesis of the empirical underdetermination of theories; the theory-ladenness of observation sentences; the theory choice process; the inscrutability of reference; the theory of linguistic learning; among others.
O presente trabalho tem por objeto a tese Duhem-Quine. O que procuramos, durante o desenvolvimento da nossa dissertação, foi investigar as diferenças e afinidades epistemológicas existentes entre as posições holistas de Willard Quine e Pierre Duhem. Ao longo desse estudo, por meio da análise da obra destes dois autores, buscamos mostrar que se pode ter duas interpretações bastante diferentes da tese Duhem-Quine: uma fraca, defendida por Duhem, e uma forte, mais radical, defendida por Quine em seu artigo Dois dogmas do empirismo. Ao investigar o holismo, nessa perspectiva, tentamos destacar a importância desse tema no âmbito da Filosofia da Ciência e da Linguagem e de que forma esta abordagem pode lançar luz sobre importantes problemas filosóficos, tais como a relação entre observações e teorias científicas, a tese da subdeterminação empírica de teorias, a impregnação teórica dos enunciados observacionais, o processo de escolha de teorias, a inescrutabilidade da referência, a teoria do aprendizado linguístico, entre outros.
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Geelen, Jeremy N. "Quine versus Kripke on the Metaphysics of Modality: An Examination and Defence of Quine's Position." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/20002.
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The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical commitments informing W.V. Quine’s rejection of alethic modality and to advance a Quinean response to Saul Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics. The novelty of this thesis consists in it being the first detailed explanation of how Quine’s arguments against modality are situated within his system and informed by his epistemological and ontological views and the first adequate study of the epistemological and metaphysical criticisms Quine would advance against Kripke’s defence of modality.
The Quinean response to Kripke presented here is guided by four tenets that Quine takes to be central to the current scientific worldview and which he consequently adopts as the guiding methodological constraints of his own project: empiricism, regimentation, physicalism and simplicity. I explain how Quine’s referential opacity and mathematician-cyclist arguments against modality hang together with the rest of his philosophical project; and I show that while these arguments may seem unpersuasive and easily refuted by Kripke when taken in isolation, they are quite powerful when understood within the context of Quine’s entire system and seen in light of his guiding methodological constraints.
By the end of this thesis, it will be clear why Quine remains unconvinced by Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics and how his response to Kripke is grounded in his deepest methodological constraints. He ultimately rejects Kripke’s arguments because they conflict with the tenets he takes to be the deepest commitments of the scientific worldview. Quine’s arguments against modality must be understood within the context of his philosophical system as a whole and are best seen not as arguments to be met by Kripke on Kripke’s terms but as illustrations of why, from the standpoint of Quine’s project and the standards it adheres to (the standards of science, as Quine understands it), modality is a flawed and unnecessary addition to reconstructed scientific theory. While there may well be reasons for rejecting Quine’s views about modality – and even reasons that would compel Quine, on his own terms, to reject his views – I argue that Kripke does not provide them.
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Alavinia, Sohrab. "Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth : a comparative study." Thesis, Swansea University, 1997. https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42790.
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Understanding the intellectual competition facing a philosopher gives a clearer sense of the depth of his work. This thesis is concerned with the reactions of Wittgenstein and Quine to Russell's foundationalism in epistemology. In particular it is concerned with the foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein's conception of language is the deep source of his philosophy of mathematics. That is why the study of the Wittgensteinian account of mathematical truth goes beyond the limits of reflection on mathematics and extends to the philosophy of language and logic. The claim is that contrary to the framework of thought of both Russell and Quine, there is no language / reality dichotomy. Russell's search for indubitable foundations of knowledge and in particular his attempt to establish the foundations of mathematics in logic is misguided. The very supposition that mathematics needs foundations is an illusion. It is an attempt to transcend the bounds of sense. The epistemological riddles faced by Russell and Quine disappear in the later Wittgensteinian understanding of the matter. They collapse into logical insights. Following modern debates in epistemology, Russell is looking for a proof of the 'external world'. This traditional line of thought continues in Quine's notion of 'The myth of physical objects'. Though Quine's naturalized epistemology is a reaction against foundationalism, the dichotomy in question, still remains. This is finally disposed of, by Wittgenstein's later conception of language. To complete the layout of the discussions; it is demonstrated that the idea of the alleged dichotomy lies behind the arguments of Einstein, Hilbert and all of the logical positivists. Instead of pursuing the source of necessity of a pr/or/propositions in the world or in the mind, we may explore the function of such propositions. Once their role has been properly grasped, the very disturbing epistemological riddles disappear. The absolute certainty of the propositions of logic and mathematics resides in the role that they play in our practice of inference and calculation. According to Russell's account in Principia Mathematica it is a fundamental law of logic that the proposition 'Q' follows from the proposition 'P & (P -- Q)'. But what does this 'following' consist in? There is nothing in reality that provides a foundation for this inference. Logical and mathematical propositions define the techniques of inference and calculation. There is no foundation for our techniques that could justify them from the point of view of a non-participant in the practice. That is why it makes no sense to doubt logical or mathematical propositions. Russell's total loss of the 'objective world' is the inevitable outcome of his understanding of the problem. His scepticism concerning the ordinary empirical judgements is against the mastery of a technique in the practice of describing the world. Without that technique, we would be unable to think or to use language. Our certainty concerning these judgements is a practical certainty that shows how the expressions of our language are used. The function of these judgements makes the question of establishing their ground out of place.
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Oliveira, Debora Fontoura de. "A CONCEPÇÃO BEHAVIORISTA DA LINGUAGEM DE W. V. O. QUINE: EXPOSIÇÃO E DEFESA." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2009. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9075.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorTo present dissertation it is the result of an investigation on the conception behaviorist of the language of Quine, tends as pretension your exposition and defense, alleging your permanence in elapsing of all the quinean works. The importance of this work is due to the fact that many critics were made Quine with regard to your linguistic perspective. Among the critics, what promotes contusing objections, it is Noam Chomsky. This alleges that Quine suffers from inconsistency and incoherence when proposing your language conception, and he still affirms that Quine abandons the behaviorism in your last works in favor of a mentalism. To accomplish the defense of Quine front to the accusations of Chomsky it was had as reference Roger Gibson, which elaborated a defense of the position of Quine, that however it was not very clear. This way, in this dissertation it is made an analysis not only of the critics of Chomsky, but also of the defense of Gibson in the search of offering a better explanation of the conception of Quine. It is sustained that the program behaviorist quinean is presented mainly in Word and Object, published in 1960, but it stays until your last publications. In these some are observed explanations and amplifications than it was already presented in 1960, but non incoherences. The sustentation of your conception is found in your rejection to the semantics traditional mentalist that accepts intension concepts as mental entities when correlating words with ideas. Quine defends that the linguistic meaning is a property of the behavior and, for this reason, not meeting differentiates comportamental, it is not possible to allege semantic difference. Quine assumes, then, that a perspective behaviorist is necessary for the study of the acquisition of the language, even if it is not enough. Besides, the defense of a behaviorism is not only important for your semantic aspect, but also epistemological, because Quine defends that the only possible road to understand the relationship between theory and world is, if before, the subject psychogenetic of "as it is acquired the language" it is answered. Starting from that, the conception behaviorist ends up assuming a central paper in the philosophy of Quine and, for the which, a lot of subjects are answered.
A presente dissertação é o resultado de uma investigação sobre a concepção behaviorista da linguagem de Quine, tendo como pretensão a sua exposição e defesa, alegando a sua permanência no decorrer de todos os trabalhos quineanos. A importância deste trabalho se deve ao fato de que muitas críticas foram feitas a Quine com respeito a sua perspectiva linguística. Dentre os críticos, o que promove objeções contundentes, é Noam Chomsky. Este alega que Quine sofre de inconsistência e incoerência ao propor sua concepção de linguagem, e ainda afirma que Quine abandona o behaviorismo nos seus últimos trabalhos em favor de um mentalismo. Para realizar a defesa de Quine frente às acusações de Chomsky teve-se como referência Roger Gibson, o qual elaborou uma defesa da posição de Quine, que, entretanto, não ficou muito clara. Desta forma, nesta dissertação é feita uma análise não só das críticas de Chomsky, mas também da defesa de Gibson na tentativa de se apresentar um melhor esclarecimento da concepção de Quine. Sustenta-se que o programa behaviorista quineano é apresentado principalmente em Word and Object, publicado em 1960, mas permanece até suas últimas publicações. Nestas são observados alguns esclarecimentos e ampliações do que já era apresentado em 1960, mas não incoerências. A sustentação da sua concepção é encontrada na sua rejeição à semântica mentalista tradicional que aceita conceitos intensionais como entidades mentais ao correlacionar palavras com ideias. Quine defende que o significado linguístico é uma propriedade do comportamento e, por esta razão, não se encontrando diferença comportamental, não é possível alegar diferença semântica. Quine assume, então, que uma perspectiva behaviorista é necessária para o estudo da aquisição da linguagem, mesmo que não seja suficiente. Além disso, a defesa de um behaviorismo não é importante somente pelo seu aspecto semântico, mas também epistemológico, visto que Quine defende que a única via possível para entender a relação entre teoria e mundo é, se antes, a questão psicogenética de como é adquirida a linguagem é respondida. A partir disso, a concepção behaviorista acaba assumindo um papel central na filosofia de Quine e, pela qual, muitas questões são respondidas.
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Hébert, Daniel. "Le pragmatisme de Quine a la lumière de la problématique de l'analyticité." Mémoire, Université de Sherbrooke, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/11143/11483.
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Nous présenterons, dans ce mémoire de maîtrise, le pragmatisme de Quine dans ses rapports avec la problématique de l'analyticité des énoncés. Trois raisons ont motivé le choix d'un tel sujet. D'abord, l'influence de la pensée de Quine dans les milieux intellectuels contemporains: nul ne peut ignorer l'influence qu'exerce présentement ce philosophe sur nous tous qui nous intéressons à la philosophie en tant que système de pensée incarné et circonstancié dans l'espace et dans le temps. Ensuite, son pragmatisme nous apparaît comme une synthèse magistrale des rôles joués par le sensible, le rationnel et la philosophie spéculative (la métaphysique) dans la construction et la justification des images du monde propre à la science empirique. C'est une réflexion amorcée depuis deux siècles sur la problématique de l'analyticité qui culmine, a notre avis, dans le pragmatisme de Quine. Et finalement, la troisième raison est notre intérêt personnel pour les questions qui chevauchent les intérêts des philosophes et ceux des scientifiques.
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Quintanilla, Pablo. "El compromiso esencialista de la lógica modal. Estudio de Quine y Kripke." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113014.
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Ketland, Jeffrey John. "The mathematicization of nature." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1999. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2241/.
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This thesis defends the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical realism and introduces a new indispensability argument for a substantial conception of truth. Chapters 1 and 2 formulate the main components of the Quine-Putnam argument, namely that virtually all scientific laws quantify over mathematical entities and thus logically presuppose the existence thereof. Chapter 2 contains a detailed discussion of the logical structure of some scientific theories that incorporate or apply mathematics. Chapter 3 then reconstructs the central assumptions of Quine's argument, concluding (provocatively) that "science entails platonism". Chapter 4 contains a brief discussion of some major theories of truth, including deflationary views (redundancy, disquotation). Chapter 5 introduces a new argument against such deflationary views, based on certain logical properties of truth theories. Chapter 6 contains a further discussion of mathematical truth. In particular, non-standard conceptions of mathematical truth such as "if-thenism" and "hermeneuticism". Chapter 7 introduces the programmes of reconstrual and reconstruction proposed by recent nominalism. Chapters 8 discusses modal nominalism, concluding that modalism is implausible as an interpretation of mathematics (if taken seriously, it suffers from exactly those epistemological problems allegedly suffered by realism). Chapter 9 discusses Field's deflationism, whose central motivating idea is that mathematics is (pace Quine and Putnam) dispensable in applications. This turns on a conservativeness claim which, as Shapiro pointed out in 1983, must be incorrect (using Godel's Theorems). I conclude in Chapter 10 that nominalistic views of mathematics and deflationist views of truth are both inadequate to the overall explanatory needs of science.
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Bürger, Andreas. "Das Verhältnis von sinnlicher Wahrnehmung und begrifflichem Wissen in Positionen gegenwärtiger Philosophie /." Berlin : Pro Business, 2008. http://d-nb.info/990141055/04.
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Mlika, Hamdi. "Le platonisme de Quine et sa critique dans la philosophie contemporaine des mathématiques." Paris 4, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA040057.
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J'essaie dans cette recherche de mettre au clair les traits spécifiques du platonisme holistique de Quine, et pointer vers les questions sur lesquelles il reste ouvert aux objections de l'antiplatonisme. Je présente le platonisme de Quine comme étant appuyé par quatre types d'arguments qui sont des arguments réalistes au sens du réalisme philosophique : les arguments d'indispensabilité, les arguments métascientifiques, les arguments logiques et les arguments ontologiques. Par opposition à ce platonisme, Field, Hellman, et Chihara acceptent le dilemme dit de Benacerraf, et cherchent à donner des réponses aux problèmes qu'il soulève en mettant directement en doute l'image platoniste en philosophie des mathématiques. En guise de conclusion, j'essaie d'organiser les diverses questions sur lesquelles, tour à tour, le platonisme pragmatique de Quine et ses critiques sont sujets à des difficultés importantes.
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Sinclair, Nathan. "Empiricism and Philosophy." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/6021.
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Though Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction is widely disputed, one of the major effects of his argument has been to popularise the belief that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy. This thesis begins by distinguishing reductive from holistic empiricism, showing why reductive empiricism is false, refuting the major objections to holistic empiricism and stating the limits on human knowledge it implies. Quine's arguments (and some arguments that have been mistakenly attributed to him) from holism against the analytic-synthetic are considered, and while many of them are found wanting one good argument is presented. Holism does not, however, imply that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy, and indeed implies that the distinction between scientific and philosophical disputes is perfectly sharp. The grounds upon which philosophical disputes may be resolved are then sought for and deliniated.
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Sinclair, Nathan. "Empiricism and Philosophy." University of Sydney, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/6021.
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Doctor of Philosophy(PhD)Though Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction is widely disputed, one of the major effects of his argument has been to popularise the belief that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy. This thesis begins by distinguishing reductive from holistic empiricism, showing why reductive empiricism is false, refuting the major objections to holistic empiricism and stating the limits on human knowledge it implies. Quine's arguments (and some arguments that have been mistakenly attributed to him) from holism against the analytic-synthetic are considered, and while many of them are found wanting one good argument is presented. Holism does not, however, imply that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy, and indeed implies that the distinction between scientific and philosophical disputes is perfectly sharp. The grounds upon which philosophical disputes may be resolved are then sought for and deliniated.
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Janssen, F. M. "How to commit to an individual : logic, objects and ontology." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4527.
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In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.
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Laugier, Sandra. "L'apprentissage de l'obvie. Le point de vue logique dans la philosophie de w. V. Quine." Paris 4, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1989PA040106.
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La question du statut de la logique chez quine parait d'emblee paradoxale: la logique est a la fois ce qui pour quine n'est jamais mis en question, comme le montrent les exemples de la traduction radicale et de l'apprentissage linguistique, et une discipline affirmee comme revisable au meme titre que les autres sciences. Comment concilier le point de vue logique et le point de vue epistemologique, expliquer que la logique soit a la fois obvie et revisable? c'est en analysant l'apprentissage de la logique comme integration a une communaute linguistique, et le modele qu'il constitut pour l'evolution de notre scheme conceptuel, que l'on peut repondre a cette question, qui est au centre du systeme philosophique de quineThe question of the place of logic in quine's philosophy seems a highly paradoxical one: standard logic is never criticized nor questioned in quine's work - as is shown by its role in the case of radical translation and language learning - but is claimed to be revisable just as the other sciences are. How can the logical point of view and the epistemological one be conciliated? how can logic at the same time be obvious and revisable? only by a careful exmination of our ways of learning logic with language, and of the ways logic offers a model for the learning and evolution of our conceptual scheme, can that question, central to quine's whole philosophical system, be answered
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Hönig, Kathrin. ""Im Spiegel der Bedeutung" : eine Studie über die Begründbarkeit des Relativismus /." Würzburg Königshausen und Neumann, 2006. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2710040&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Sanches, Aline de Paula [UNESP]. "Emprego do método de Quine-Mccluskey estendido para gerar circuito mínimo com estruturas ESOP (XOR-XNOR)." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/151311.
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Com a disseminação de dispositivos eletrônicos cada vez menores e o advento de novas tecnologias. A busca por métodos de minimização de funções booleanas tem sido a base para eletrônica digital. Neste trabalho apresenta-se a implementação da primeira fase do método Quine-McCluskey Estendido que utiliza-se de estruturas AND-XOR-XNOR para a geração de implicantes primos. O objetivo do trabalho foi comprovar que, na maioria das vezes, a implementação de uma função Booleana utilizando expressões AND-XOR-XNOR requerem menor quantidade de termos produtos, quando comparado com implementação com expressões AND-OR. A fase de cobertura dos mintermos em ambos os métodos foi formulada como um problema de programação linear inteira 0 e 1 que através do programa Lp_solve obteve a solução de menor custo. Na comparação da eficiência dos métodos foram analisados os custos dos circuitos mínimos gerados, a quantidade de memória utilizada e o tempo de execução. Com os resultados obtidos pode-se concluir que, para a maioria dos casos executados, o método Quine-McCluskey Estendido gera uma solução de menor custo. No entanto, com relação ao desempenho computacional (tempo de execução e memória), o método Quine-McCluskey Estendido apresentou-se inferior se comparado ao Quine-McCluskey.
With the dissemination of smaller and smaller electronic devices and the advent of new technologies. The search for methods of minimizing Boolean function has been the basis for digital electronics. This work presents the implementation of the first phase of the Extended Quine-McCluskey method, which uses AND-XOR-XNOR structures to generate prime implicants. The goal of this work is to prove that, in most cases, the implementation of a Boolean function using the expressions AND-XOR-XNOR requires fewer product terms than the implementation with AND-OR expressions does. The stage of mini terms covering in both methods was formulated with the 0-1 integer linear programming problem, which obtained lower cost through the Lp_Solve program. While comparing the efficiency of these methods we analised: the costs of the minimum circuits generated, the amount of memory that has been used and the runtime. With the obtained results it is possible to conclude that, for most of the executed cases, the Extended Quine-McCluskey method generates a solution of lower cost. On the other hand, with regards to the computational performance (runtime and memory), the Extended Quine-McCluskey method has shown itself inferior when compared to the Quine-McCluskey method.
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Sanches, Aline de Paula. "Emprego do método de Quine-Mccluskey estendido para gerar circuito mínimo com estruturas ESOP (XOR-XNOR) /." Ilha Solteira, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/151311.
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Orientador: Alexandre César Rodrigues da SilvaResumo: Com a disseminação de dispositivos eletrônicos cada vez menores e o advento de novas tecnologias. A busca por métodos de minimização de funções booleanas tem sido a base para eletrônica digital. Neste trabalho apresenta-se a implementação da primeira fase do método Quine-McCluskey Estendido que utiliza-se de estruturas AND-XOR-XNOR para a geração de implicantes primos. O objetivo do trabalho foi comprovar que, na maioria das vezes, a implementação de uma função Booleana utilizando expressões AND-XOR-XNOR requerem menor quantidade de termos produtos, quando comparado com implementação com expressões AND-OR. A fase de cobertura dos mintermos em ambos os métodos foi formulada como um problema de programação linear inteira 0 e 1 que através do programa Lp_solve obteve a solução de menor custo. Na comparação da eficiência dos métodos foram analisados os custos dos circuitos mínimos gerados, a quantidade de memória utilizada e o tempo de execução. Com os resultados obtidos pode-se concluir que, para a maioria dos casos executados, o método Quine-McCluskey Estendido gera uma solução de menor custo. No entanto, com relação ao desempenho computacional (tempo de execução e memória), o método Quine-McCluskey Estendido apresentou-se inferior se comparado ao Quine-McCluskey.
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Lett, François. "Ce pouvoir qu'on dit fondamental : le rôle de l'imagination dans la culture selon Kant et Quine." Mémoire, Université de Sherbrooke, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/11143/7879.
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Ávila, Ignacio. "La cruzada de Fodor y Lepore contra el holismo de Quine. Protesta de un comprador inconforme." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113242.
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The Crusade of Fodor and Lepore against Quine’s Holism. Protest of an Shopper Dissatisfied”. In this paper I discuss Fodor and Lepore’s arguments against Quinean semantic holism. I argue that Fodor and Lepore do not examine the more conclusive Quinean arguments in favor of this thesis. Then I point out that they misunderstand the Quinean articulation between epistemological holism, verificationism and semantic holism. Lastly, I suggest that the attack of Fodor and Lepore to Quine’s semantic holism tacitly presupposes a certain non epistemic atomism.En este ensayo discuto los argumentos de Fodor y Lepore contra el holismo semántico de Quine. Sostengo que Fodor y Lepore no examinan los argumentos quineanos más concluyentes a favor de dicha tesis. Luego señalo que ellos malinterpretan la articulación quineana entre el holismo epistemológico, el verificacionismo y el holismo semántico. Por último, señalo que el ataque de Fodor y Lepore al holismo semántico de Quine presupone tácitamente un cierto atomismo no epistémico.
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Fernández, de Castro Max. "La solution de Quine au problème de l'acceptation d'une ontologie abstraite dans le cadre de l'empirisme." Paris 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA010636.
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Le but de cette thèse est d'exposer et d'analyser la façon dont William V. O. Quine résout le problème de l'acceptation d'une ontologie abstraite dans le cadre de l'empirisme. Le premier chapitre esquisse la solution de Rudolf Carnap a ce problème, surtout à son epoque syntaxique, ainsi que les critiques que Quine lui a adressé, spécialement concernant la distinction analytique-synthétique. Les arguments de Quine montrent le caractère artificiel de cette distinction, son manque de pertinence épistémologique et le besoin de traiter le problème ontologique sous une nouvelle lumière. Le deuxième chapitre traite du critère ontologique et de la conception de Quine de la notion d'objet abstrait. Une des justifications du critère ontologique est la fidélité avec laquelle l'enregimentement conserve un noyau de notre langage ou la réferentialité est la plus explicite et transparente possible. Afin de le montrer, nous suivons Quine dans sa reconstruction rationnelle de la manière selon laquelle l'enfant et l'espèce sont parvenus à la maitrise de l'appareil référentiel de notre langue. Nous montrons comment cette explication ontogénétique permet concilier le "platonisme" de Quine avec sa bphilosophie empiriste. Le troisième chapitre expose les arguments de Quine contre l'utilisation d'une ontologie intensionnelle dans la science. Le paradoxe de la logique modale est étudié et les essais de le résoudre sont divisés en deux grands groupes. Les trois preuves de la thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction fournies par Quine sont analysées. Elles montrent la vraisemblance de la thèse sans arriver à la démontrer.
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Ross, Ryan D. "In Defense of Radical Empiricism." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1429029776.
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Wagner, Henri. "Logique et paroissial : sur un problème fondamental de la conception de la logique de W. V. Quine." Thesis, Bordeaux 3, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BOR30059.
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Cette étude constitue une interprétation de la philosophie de la logique de W. V. Quine à l’aune de ce que nous considérons comme étant un problème fondamental qui la gouverne et dont on peut considérer qu’elle en constitue une réponse. Ce problème a trait à la compatibilité entre logique et paroissial. Il admet la formulation condensée suivante : soit il y a un sens à dire que la logique est paroissiale, mais alors le paroissial se trouve être une restriction et est en droit éliminable ; soit le paroissial n’est pas une restriction et est inéliminable, mais alors il n’y a aucun sens à dire que la logique est paroissiale. Le problème se nourrit de ce que la qualification de la logique comme paroissiale fait l’objet d’une revendication explicite et délibérée par Quine, i.e. n’est ni de l’ordre d’une concession, ni de l’ordre d’un moment argumentatif dialectiquement résorbable. En d’autres termes, Quine revendique et cherche à se donner les moyens de revendiquer ce contre quoi une conception « universaliste » de la logique comme celle de Frege lutte, ordonnée qu’elle est à un présupposé ou une prémisse anti-paroissialiste d’unicité de la logique. Affirmer que Quine cherche à se donner les moyens de revendiquer la paroissialité de la logique, c’est dire qu’il prit tout à fait au sérieux les arguments anti-psychologistes de Frege contre toute conception paroissiale de la logique. Plus généralement,cette étude et la lecture de la conception quinienne de la logique que nous y proposons sont organisées par le principe d’une lecture frégéenne de Quine : si nous voulons comprendre ce que signifie de dire que la logique est paroissiale chez Quine, alors il faut revenir à Frege, que ce soit par la manière dont Quine s’y oppose ou par la manière dont il s’approprie certains thèmes et principes fondamentaux de la conception frégéenne de la logique. Cette étude consiste alors à mettre au jour et à examiner les raisons et les modalités de la revendication par Quine d’une paroissialité de la logique. Tout en étant ordonnés au traitement du problème de l’incompatibilité apparente du paroissial et de la logique, les cinq chapitres qui la composent parcourent successivement la critique de « Truth by Convention » du projet syntaxique de Carnap et de son principe de tolérance (chapitre 1), la philosophie de la notation logique de Quine (chapitre 2), le point de vue anthropologique en matière de logique que Quine fait sien (chapitre 3), le critère d’engagement ontologique (chapitre 4) et, enfin, la définition substitutionnelle de la vérité logique (chapitre 5)This study is an interpretation of W.V. Quine’s philosophy of logic taken as an answer to what we consider to be a fundamental problem. This problem has to do with the compatibility between logic and parochial. It can be briefly expressed in the following manner: either that there is sense in saying that logic is parochial, but the parochial therefore happens to be a restriction and could be eliminated, or that the parochial is not a restriction and could not be eliminated, but that there is thus no sense in saying that logic is parochial. The problem is fueled by the fact that Quine explicitly and deliberately claims logic to be parochial. Such a qualification is neither a concession nor an argumentative moment that could be dialectically reduced. In other words, what Quine claims – and is seeking means to claim – is precisely that which a “universalist” conception of logic like Frege’s challenges, since it assumes an anti-parochial premise concerning the uniqueness of logic. Quine seeks means to claim the parochiality of logic in the sense that he seriously considered Frege’s anti-psychologist arguments against all parochial conceptions of logic. More generally, this study – and the understanding of Quine's conception of logic that it promotes – follows the principle of a Fregean reading of Quine: if one wants to understand what it means to say that logic is parochial in Quine, one has to go back to Frege, either through Quine’s opposition to him or through his appropriation of certain themes and fundamental principles of the Fregean conception of logic. Connected to the problem of the apparent incompatibility of logic and the parochial, the five chapters contained within this study successively explore the criticism of Carnap’s syntaxical project and of its principle of tolerance found in “Truth by Convention” (chapter 1); Quine’s philosophy of logical notation (chapter 2); the anthropological point of view in logic that Quine makes his own (chapter 3); the criterion of ontological commitment (chapter 4) and the substitutional definition of logical truth (chapter 5)
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Hou, Richard Wei Tzu. "Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism." University of Sydney, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1131.
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Doctor of PhilosophyMany criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.
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Aguilera, Retamal Gonzalo Luis. "Comunicación, significado y referencia: contra los dogmas quineanos." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2012. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/113145.
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Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en FilosofíaLa presente tesina realiza en su marco teórico una breve introducción a las ideas del Círculo de Viena sobre el significado, para a continuación presentar el ataque frontal a las bases del positivismo lógico llevado a cabo por Quine, cuyo original sistema filosófico involucra sostener tesis filosóficas de carácter abarcador, dejándolas en un sector indefinido entre lo semántico, lo epistemológico y lo metafísico. Por lo anterior, la estructura de la exposición del sistema quineano se hará desde “fuera” hacia “adentro”, es decir, yendo del ataque hacia Carnap y el Círculo, pasando por sus tesis del compromiso ontológico, el holismo semántico, la indeterminación de la traducción, la relatividad ontológica y la indeterminación de la referencia, para luego ir hacia las presuposiciones empíricas tácitas que hacen su sistema creíble, o sea, la reificación como punto de continuidad entre el lenguaje natural y la teoría científica, junto con su concepción de un significado estimulativo compatible con el conjunto de sus proposiciones filosóficas. Una vez en el interior del sistema se atacará la noción de “reificación quineana” que involucra que el mundo es concebido desde nuestra niñez como un conjunto no ordenado de experiencia siendo ordenado recién con la adquisición de un lenguaje cualquiera, cosa incompatible con lo que la investigación en psicología del desarrollo ha descubierto. Finalmente, considerando que lo que muestran los experimentos hechos en niños prelingüísticos es una prueba suficiente de la falta de plausibilidad del edificio quineano, entonces se intentará hacer una reconstrucción sobre las soluciones que se han formulado históricamente a los problemas del “significado”, la “referencia” y la “comunicación”, lo que implicará inmediatamente una propuesta sobre las nociones conceptuales que debe contener una teoría más completa cuyo objeto sean los lenguajes naturales.