Journal articles: 'Q Philosophy'

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Wu, Guohua. "Q -measures on Q κ λ." Archive for Mathematical Logic 42, no. 2 (February 1, 2003): 201–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00153-002-0153-z.

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Wölfl, Stefan. "Propositional Q-Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic 31, no. 5 (October 2002): 387–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1020163602542.

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Novirus, Cora. "Q." Multitudes 80, no. 3 (2020): 165. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mult.080.0165.

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Diem, William Matthew. "Prima Secundae, Q. 18 and De Malo, Q. 2." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 91, no. 3 (2017): 447–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2017525119.

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Krynicki, Michał, and Hans-Peter Tuschik. "An axiomatization of the logic with the rough quantifier." Journal of Symbolic Logic 56, no. 2 (June 1991): 608–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274702.

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We consider the language L(Q), where L is a countable first-order language and Q is an additional generalized quantifier. A weak model for L(Q) is a pair 〈, q〉 where is a first-order structure for L and q is a family of subsets of its universe. In case that q is the set of classes of some equivalence relation the weak model 〈, q〉 is called a partition model. The interpretation of Q in partition models was studied by Szczerba [3], who was inspired by Pawlak's paper [2]. The corresponding set of tautologies in L(Q) is called rough logic. In the following we will give a set of axioms of rough logic and prove its completeness. Rough logic is designed for creating partition models.The partition models are the weak models arising from equivalence relations. For the basic properties of the logic of weak models the reader is referred to Keisler's paper [1]. In a weak model 〈, q〉 the formulas of L(Q) are interpreted as usual with the additional clause for the quantifier Q: 〈, q〉 ⊨ Qx φ(x) iff there is some X ∊ q such that 〈, q〉 ⊨ φ(a) for all a ∊ X.In case X satisfies the right side of the above equivalence we say that X is contained in φ(x) or, equivalently, φ(x) contains X.

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Hart, Bradd, and Ziv Shami. "On the type-definability of the binding group in simple theories." Journal of Symbolic Logic 70, no. 2 (June 2005): 379–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1120224718.

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AbstractLet T be simple, work in Ceq over a boundedly closed set. Let p Є S(∅) be internal in a quasi-stably-embedded type-definable set Q (e.g., Q is definable or stably-embedded) and suppose (p, Q) is ACL-embedded in Q (see definitions below). Then Aut(p/Q) with its action on pc is type-definable in Ceq over ∅. In particular, if p Є S(∅) is internal in a stably-embedded type-definable set Q, and pc ⋃ Q is stably-embedded, then Aut(p/Q) is type-definable with its action on pc.

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Feldman, Norman. "The cylindric algebras of three-valued logic." Journal of Symbolic Logic 63, no. 4 (December 1998): 1201–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586647.

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In this paper we consider the three-valued logic used by Kleene [6] in the theory of partial recursive functions. This logic has three truth values: true (T), false (F), and undefined (U). One interpretation of U is as follows: Suppose we have two partially recursive predicates P(x) and Q(x) and we want to know the truth value of P(x) ∧ Q(x) for a particular x0. If x0 is in the domain of definition of both P and Q, then P(x0) ∧ Q(x0) is true if both P(x0) and Q(x0) are true, and false otherwise. But what if x0 is not in the domain of definition of P, but is in the domain of definition of Q? There are several choices, but the one chosen by Kleene is that if Q(X0) is false, then P(x0) ∧ Q(x0) is also false and if Q(X0) is true, then P(x0) ∧ Q(X0) is undefined.What arises is the question about knowledge of whether or not x0 is in the domain of definition of P. Is there an effective procedure to determine this? If not, then we can interpret U as being unknown. If there is an effective procedure, then our decision for the truth value for P(x) ∧ Q(x) is based on the knowledge that is not in the domain of definition of P. In this case, U can be interpreted as undefined. In either case, we base our truth value of P(x) ∧ Q(x) on the truth value of Q(X0).

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Farkas, Barnabás. "Hechler's Theorem for tall analytic P-ideals." Journal of Symbolic Logic 76, no. 2 (June 2011): 729–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1305810773.

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AbstractWe prove the following version of Hechler's classical theorem: For each partially ordered set (Q, ≤) with the property that every countable subset of Q has a strict upper bound in Q, there is a ccc forcing notion such that in the generic extension for each tall analytic P-ideal (coded in the ground model) a cofinal subset of is order isomorphic to (Q, ≤).

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Gottlob, Georg. "Relativized logspace and generalized quantifiers over finite ordered structures." Journal of Symbolic Logic 62, no. 2 (June 1997): 545–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275546.

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AbstractWe here examine the expressive power of first order logic with generalized quantifiers over finite ordered structures. In particular, we address the following problem: Given a family Q of generalized quantifiers expressing a complexity class C, what is the expressive power of first order logic FO(Q) extended by the quantifiers in Q? From previously studied examples, one would expect that FO(Q) captures LC, i.e., logarithmic space relativized to an oracle in C. We show that this is not always true. However, after studying the problem from a general point of view, we derive sufficient conditions on C such that FO(Q) captures LC. These conditions are fulfilled by a large number of relevant complexity classes, in particular, for example, by NP. As an application of this result, it follows that first order logic extended by Henkin quantifiers captures LNP. This answers a question raised by Blass and Gurevich [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 32, 1986]. Furthermore we show that for many families Q of generalized quantifiers (including the family of Henkin quantifiers), each FO(Q)-formula can be replaced by an equivalent FO(Q)-formula with only two occurrences of generalized quantifiers. This generalizes and extends an earlier normal-form result by I. A. Stewart [Fundamenta Inform, vol. 18, 1993].

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Neeman, Itay. "Hierarchies of forcing axioms II." Journal of Symbolic Logic 73, no. 2 (June 2008): 522–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1208359058.

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AbstractA truth for λ is a pair 〈Q, ψ〉 so that Q ⊆ Hλ, ψ is a first order formula with one free variable, and there exists B ⊆ Hλ+ such that (Hλ+; ∈, B) ⊨ ψ[Q]. A cardinal λ is , indescribable just in case that for every truth 〈Q, ψ〈 for λ, there exists < λ so that is a cardinal and 〈Q ∩ , ψ) is a truth for . More generally, an interval of cardinals [κ, λ] with κ ≤ λ is indescribable if for every truth 〈Q, ψ〈 for λ, there exists , and π: → Hλ so that is a cardinal, is a truth for , and π is elementary from () into (H; ∈, κ, Q) with id.We prove that the restriction of the proper forcing axiom to ϲ-linked posets requires a indescribable cardinal in L, and that the restriction of the proper forcing axiom to ϲ+-linked posets, in a proper forcing extension of a fine structural model, requires a indescribable 1-gap [κ, κ+]. These results show that the respective forward directions obtained in Hierarchies of Forcing Axioms I by Neeman and Schimmerling are optimal.

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Fraga Dantas, Danilo. "Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 21, no. 1 (November 16, 2017): 41–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p41.

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The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence phi is ideally negatively conceivable iff phi cannot be ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that if its premises are true, the negative zombie argument is neither conclusive (valid) nor a priori. First, I argue that the argument is sound iff there exists a finite ideal reasoner R for a logic x with the relevant properties which believes <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. A finite reasoner is a reasoner with finite memory and finite computational power. I argue that if x has the relevant properties and R is finite, then x must be nonmonotonic and R may only approach ideallity at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. For example, for q=`someone is conscious'. I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither conclusive nor a priori (the choice of q relies on empirical information).

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Landver, Avner. "Singular σ-dense trees." Journal of Symbolic Logic 57, no. 4 (December 1992): 1403–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275373.

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Let be the least cardinal θ such that MAθ fails, (i.e. MA) implies that is regular. Models for regular with are easy to get (see [Ku1]). Fremlin and Miller proved that cof() > ω [Fr, 41C(d)]. The question of whether it is consistent that be singular was solved, in the affirmative, by Kunen [Ku1]. Kunen used a (θ, θ) strong gap in (ω)/Fin, whose splitting partial order is c.c.c. He showed that if cof(θ) = ω1, and P is a c.c.c. partial order of cardinality < θ that may destroy the strong gap, then there exists another c.c.c. partial order Q, which does not destroy the strong gap, and such that ⊩Q “P is not c.c.c”. One then gets Kunen's model by iterating c.c.c. partial orders of cardinality < θ, without destroying the strong (θ, θ) gap. It is unknown whether it is consistent to have ω1 < cof() < .Clearly, there exists a c.c.c. partial order Q with ∣Q∣ = , such that (Q) = (see (1.1)). A partial order P is σ-centered iff P is the union of countably many centered subsets, where a subset A ⊆ P is centered iff p ≤ q. Clearly, a σ-centered partial order is c.c.c. Bell and Szymański proved that (σ-centered) is regular (see [Be] or [Fr, 14C], and [Fr, 21K] or [vD, 3.1(e)]). This implies that if P is a σ-centered partial order, and is singular, then (P) > . In particular, if is singular, then Q is not σ-centered and all c.c.c. partial orders of cardinality < have a Baire number (1.1) strictly greater than . It was suggested in [Ku1] to try and use Q(T) (1.2), where T is a tree with no ω1-branches, to get models with singular . It is well known that when T is such a tree, the forcing Q(T) is c.c.c. [BMR], ∣Q(T)∣ = ∣T∣, and if T is not special, then n(Q(T)) ≤ ∣T∣.

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Hardway, Glenn A. "“Q” SWITCHING." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 122, no. 2 (December 16, 2006): 608–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1965.tb20241.x.

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Levine, J. "The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism versus Modal Autonomism." Philosophical Review 119, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 365–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2010-004.

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Shami, Ziv. "Coordinatisation by binding groups and unidimensionality in simple theories." Journal of Symbolic Logic 69, no. 4 (December 2004): 1221–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1102022220.

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Abstract.In a simple theory with elimination of finitary hyperimaginaries if tp(a) is real and analysable over a definable set Q, then there exists a finite sequence (ai \ i ≤ n*) ⊆ dcleq(a) with an* = a such that for every i ≤ n* if pi = tp(ai/{aj |j < i}) then Aut(pi / Q) is type-definable with its action on . A unidimensional simple theory eliminates the quantifier ∃∞ and either interprets (in Ceq) an infinite type-definable group or has the property that ACL(Q) = C for every infinite definable set Q.

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Kosilova, Elena. "The Relationship between Philosophy of Mathematics and Physics of Q. Meillassoux." Ideas and Ideals 12, no. 2-1 (June 15, 2020): 167–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2020-12.2.1-167-183.

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Omanadze, Roland Sh, and Andrea Sorbi. "A characterization of the δ20 hyperhyperimmune sets." Journal of Symbolic Logic 73, no. 4 (December 2008): 1407–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1230396928.

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AbstractLet A be an infinite set and let K be creative: we show that K ≤QA if and only if KA. (Here ≤Q denotes Q-reducibility, and is the subreducibility of ≤Q obtained by requesting that Q-reducibility be provided by a computable function f such that Wf(x) ∩ Wf(y) = ∅. if x ≠ y.) Using this result we prove that A is hyperhyperimmune if and only if no subset B of A is s-complete, i.e., there is no subset B of A such that ≤sB, where ≤s denotes s-reducibility, and denotes the complement of K.

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Carrier, L. S. "Out-Gunning Skepticism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 3 (September 1987): 655–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10716460.

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Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle (where ‘p’ stands for any empirical proposition):(1) If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after (1) is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation (1) might be dismissed simply on the grounds that A suffers from some physical or psychological disability that prevents him from drawing inferences from what he knows.Properly interpreted, (1) remains acceptable as long as the propositions substituted for p and q are such that it is at least logically possible for A to get evidence enough to make them known. Agreement on this point is itself enough to render Johnsen's own examples irrelevant. For instance, even though it may be physically impossible for A to get adequate evidence that in the constellation Andromeda there is a planet intermediate in size between Venus and Earth, the foregoing is still a fit substitution instance for q; but since such a q does not suffice to falsify the consequent of (1), it does nothing to generate any skeptical argument, either.

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Riis, Søren. "Count( $q$ ) versus the pigeon-hole principle." Archive for Mathematical Logic 36, no. 3 (April 1, 1997): 157–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001530050060.

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Egidi, Lavinia, and Giovanni Faglia. "Double-exponential inseparability of Robinson subsystem Q+." Journal of Symbolic Logic 76, no. 1 (March 2011): 94–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1294170991.

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AbstractIn this work a double exponential time inseparability result is proven for a finitely axiomatizable first order theory Q+. The theory, subset of Presburger theory of addition S+, is the additive fragment of Robinson system Q. We prove that every set that separates Q+ from the logically false sentences of addition is not recognizable by any Turing machine working in double exponential time. The lower bound is given both in the non-deterministic and in the linear alternating time models.The result implies also that any theory of addition that is consistent with Q+—in particular any theory contained in S+—is at least double exponential time difficult. Our inseparability result is an improvement on the known lower bounds for arithmetic theories.Our proof uses a refinement and adaptation of the technique that Fischer and Rabin used to prove the difficulty of S+. Our version of the technique can be applied to any incomplete finitely axiomatizable system in which all of the necessary properties of addition are provable.

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Bellot, P. "A new proof for Craig's theorem." Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, no. 2 (June 1985): 395–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274227.

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Craig's theorem is a result about the cardinality of a proper basis for the theory of combinators. Its proof given in [3] was shown to be incomplete by André Chauvin [2]. By using a different approach, we give a very short proof of this theorem. We use the notation of [1].Definition 1. A combinator Q is proper if there exists a natural number n such that for arbitrary variables x1,…,xn we have the following contraction rule:where C is a pure combination of the variables x1,…,xn. Q is to be understood as an abstract symbol, not as a combination of S and K's. Therefore Q comes with a contraction rule.Definition 2. A set (Q1,…, Qm} of combinators is a basis for combinatory logic if for every finite set {x1,…, xk} of variables and every pure combination C of these variables, there exists a pure combination Q of Q1,…, Qm such that Qx1 … xk ↠ C.Craig's Theorem. Every basis for combinatory logic containing only proper combinators contains at least two elements.Proof. Let {Q} be a singleton basis for combinatory logic, and let us show that we cannot have combinatory completeness. This is an easy consequence of the next two lemmas.Lemma 1. Q is a projection. That is, Qx1 … xn ↠ xj, for some j.Proof. Let I be a proper combination of Q such that Ix ↠ x for a variable x, and let M be a term such that Ix ↠ M → x and M → x is a nontrivial contraction.

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Cignoli, Roberto. "Free Q-distributive lattices." Studia Logica 56, no. 1-2 (1996): 23–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00370139.

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Bouscaren, E., and E. Hrushovski. "On one-based theories." Journal of Symbolic Logic 59, no. 2 (June 1994): 579–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275409.

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We know from [H1], [H2] that in a stable theory, given a nontrivial locally modular regular type q, one can define a group with generic domination equivalent to q, and that the dependence relation on q can be analyzed in terms of this group. In a stable one-based theory, every regular type is locally modular; hence, this result holds for every nontrivial regular type. We show here that, in fact, in a stable one-based theory, a similar type of construction can be done without the assumption of regularity. More precisely, we show that for any type q, the nontrivial part of q can be analyzed by generics of groups and that any nontrivial relation can be described by affine relations (Theorem A).This construction is then used to answer a question about homogeneity in pairs of models which is still open in the case of arbitrary stable theories (Theorem C).

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Newelski, Ludomir. "Scott analysis of pseudotypes." Journal of Symbolic Logic 58, no. 2 (June 1993): 648–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275225.

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Tent, Katrin. "A note on the model theory of generalized polygons." Journal of Symbolic Logic 65, no. 2 (June 2000): 692–702. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586562.

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AbstractUsing projectivity groups, we classify some polygons with strongly minimal point rows and show in particular that no infinite quadrangle can have sharply 2-transitive projectivity groups in which the point stabilizers are abelian. In fact, we characterize the finite orthogonal quadrangles Q(4,2). Q− (5.2) and Q(4,3) by this property. Finally we show that the sets of points, lines and flags of any ℵ1-categorical polygon have Morley degree 1.

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JOHNSON, MATTHEW P., and ROHIT PARIKH. "PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONALS ARE ALMOST MONOTONIC." Review of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 1 (June 2008): 73–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020308080106.

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One interpretation of the conditional If P then Q is as saying that the probability of Q given P is high. This is an interpretation suggested by Adams (1966) and pursued more recently by Edgington (1995). Of course, this probabilistic conditional is nonmonotonic, that is, if the probability of Q given P is high, and R implies P, it need not follow that the probability of Q given R is high. If we were confident of concluding Q from the fact that we knew P, and we have stronger information R, we can no longer be confident of Q. We show nonetheless that usually we would still be justified in concluding Q from R. In other words, probabilistic conditionals are mostly monotonic.

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Beigel, Richard, William Gasarch, Martin Kummer, Georgia Martin, Timothy Mcnicholl, and Frank Stephan. "The complexity of ODDnA." Journal of Symbolic Logic 65, no. 1 (March 2000): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586523.

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AbstractFor a fixed set A. the number of queries to A needed in order to decide a set S is a measure of S's complexity. We consider the complexity of certain sets defined in terms of A:and, for m > 2,where #nA. (x1….. xn) = A(x1) + A(xn)(We identify with , where χA is the characteristic function of A.)If A is a nonrecursive semirecursive set or if A is a jump, we give tight bounds on the number of queries needed in order to decide ODDnA and MODmnA:• ODDnA can be decided with n parallel queries to A, but not with n − 1.• ODDnA can be decided with ⌈log(n + 1)⌉ sequential queries to A but not with ⌈log(n + 1)⌉ − 1.• MODmnA can be decided with ⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ parallel queries to A but not with ⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ − 1.• MODmnA can be decided with ⌈log(⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ + 1)⌉ sequential queries to A but not with ⌈log(⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ + 1)⌉ − 1.The lower bounds above hold for nonrecursive recursively enumerable sets A as well. (Interestingly, the lower bounds for recursively enumerable sets follow by a general result from the lower bounds for semirecursive sets.)In particular, every nonzero truth-table degree contains a set A such that ODDnA cannot be decided with n − 1 parallel queries to A. Since every truth-table degree also contains a set B such that ODDnB can be decided with one query to B, a set's query complexity depends more on its structure than on its degree.For a fixed set A,Q(n, A) = {S: S can be decided with n sequential queries to A}.Q∥ (n, A) = {S : S can be decided with n parallel queries to A}.We show that if A is semirecursive or recursively enumerable, but is not recursive, then these classes form non-collapsing hierarchies:• Q(0,A) ⊂ Q (1, A) ⊂ Q(2, A) ⊂ …Q∥ (0, A) ⊂ Q∥ (1, A) ⊂ Q∥ (2, A) ⊂ …The same is true if A is a jump.

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Newelski, Ludomir. "On atomic or saturated sets." Journal of Symbolic Logic 61, no. 1 (March 1996): 318–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275614.

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AbstractAssume T is stable, small and Φ(x) is a formula of L(T). We study the impact on T⌈Φ of naming finitely many elements of a model of T. We consider the cases of T⌈Φ which is ω-stable or superstable of finite rank. In these cases we prove that if T has countable models and Q = Φ(M) is countable and atomic or saturated, then any good type in S(Q) is τ-stable. If T⌈Φ is ω-stable and (bounded, 1-based or of finite rank) with , then we prove that every good p ∈ S(Q) is τ-stable for any countable Q. The proofs of these results lead to several new properties of small stable theories, particularly of types of finite weight in such theories.

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Wilson, Robin. "The philamath’s alphabet—Q." Mathematical Intelligencer 30, no. 2 (March 2008): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02985747.

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Erdélyi-Szabó, Miklós. "Decidability of Scott's model as an ordered ℚ-vectorspace." Journal of Symbolic Logic 62, no. 3 (September 1997): 917–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275579.

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AbstractLet L = 〈<, +, hq, 1〉q∈ℚ where ℚ is the set of rational numbers and hq is a one-place function symbol corresponding to multiplication by q. Then the L-theory of Scott's model for intuitionistic analysis is decidable.

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Matet, Pierre, and Janusz Pawlikowski. "Q-pointness, P-pointness and feebleness of ideals." Journal of Symbolic Logic 68, no. 1 (March 2003): 235–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1045861512.

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Pessoa Jr., Osvaldo. "The colored-brain thesis." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 84–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10.

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The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality wassociated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain S, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Sw)q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Sw)q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates. Keywords: Colored-brain thesis, qualitative physicalism, mind-brain identity thesis, qualia, panprotopsychism, sensorium.

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Newelski, Ludomir. "Flat Morley sequences." Journal of Symbolic Logic 64, no. 3 (September 1999): 1261–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586628.

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AbstractAssume T is a small superstable theory. We introduce the notion of a flat Morley sequence, which is a counterpart of the notion of an infinite Morley sequence in a type p, in case when p is a complete type over a finite set of parameters. We show that for any flat Morley sequence Q there is a model M of T which is τ-atomic over {Q}. When additionally T has few countable models and is 1-based, we prove that within M there is an infinite Morley sequence I, with I ⊂ dcl(Q), such that M is prime over I.

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Hrubeš, Pavel. "Theories very close to PA where Kreisel's Conjecture is false." Journal of Symbolic Logic 72, no. 1 (March 2007): 123–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1174668388.

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AbstractWe give four examples of theories in which Kreisel's Conjecture is false: (1) the theory PA(-) obtained by adding a function symbol minus, ‘—’, to the language of PA, and the axiom ∀x∀y∀z (x − y = z) ≡ (x = y + z ∨ (x < y ∧ z = 0)); (2) the theory L of integers; (3) the theory PA(q) obtained by adding a function symbol q (of arity ≥ 1) to PA, assuming nothing about q; (4) the theory PA(N) containing a unary predicate N(x) meaning ‘x is a natural number’. In Section 6 we suggest a counterexample to the so called Sharpened Kreisel's Conjecture.

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NEIRYNCK, Frans. "The Divorce Saying in Q 16:18." Louvain Studies 20, no. 2 (November 1, 1995): 201–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ls.20.2.542305.

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Slors, Marc. "Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory." Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 4 (April 2001): 186. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2678477.

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van de Graaff, Jan, Hanz D. Niemeyer, and Jan van Overeem. "Beach nourishment, philosophy and coastal protection policy." Coastal Engineering 16, no. 1 (January 1991): 3–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-3839(91)90050-q.

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Alfeld, Christopher P. "Non-branching degrees in the Medvedev lattice of Π10 classes." Journal of Symbolic Logic 72, no. 1 (March 2007): 81–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1174668385.

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AbstractA class is the set of paths through a computable tree. Given classes P and Q, P is Medvedev reducible to Q, P ≤MQ, if there is a computably continuous functional mapping Q into P. We look at the lattice formed by subclasses of 2ω under this reduction. It is known that the degree of a splitting class of c.e. sets is non-branching. We further characterize non-branching degrees, providing two additional properties which guarantee non-branching: inseparable and hyperinseparable. Our main result is to show that non-branching iff inseparable if hyperinseparable if homogeneous and that all unstated implications do not hold. We also show that inseparable and not hyperinseparable degrees are downward dense.

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Simpson, Stephen G. "Mass Problems and Randomness." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11, no. 1 (March 2005): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1107959497.

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AbstractA mass problem is a set of Turing oracles. If P and Q are mass problems, we say that P is weakly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P. We say that P is strongly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P via a fixed Turing functional. The weak degrees and strong degrees are the equivalence classes of mass problems under weak and strong reducibility, respectively. We focus on the countable distributive lattices ω and s of weak and strong degrees of mass problems given by nonempty subsets of 2ω. Using an abstract Gödel/Rosser incompleteness property, we characterize the subsets of 2ω whose associated mass problems are of top degree in ω and s, respectively Let R be the set of Turing oracles which are random in the sense of Martin-Löf, and let r be the weak degree of R. We show that r is a natural intermediate degree within ω. Namely, we characterize r as the unique largest weak degree of a subset of 2ω of positive measure. Within ω we show that r is meet irreducible, does not join to 1, and is incomparable with all weak degrees of nonempty thin perfect subsets of 2ω. In addition, we present other natural examples of intermediate degrees in ω. We relate these examples to reverse mathematics, computational complexity, and Gentzen-style proof theory.

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Kiymaz, Tufan. "What Gary Couldn’t Imagine." Journal of Philosophical Research 44 (2019): 293–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191029146.

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In this paper, I propose and defend an antiphysicalist argument, namely, the imagination argument, which draws inspiration from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, or rather its misinterpretation by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland. They interpret the knowledge argument to be about the ability to imagine a novel experience, which Jackson explicitly denies. The imagination argument is the following. Let Q be a visual phenomenal quality that is imaginable based on one’s phenomenal experience. (1) It is not possible to imagine Q solely based on complete physical knowledge. (2) If it is not possible to imagine Q solely based on complete physical knowledge, then physicalism is false. (3) Therefore, physicalism is false. Even though objections have been raised to this argument in the literature, there is, as far as I know, no explicit defense of it. I argue that the imagination argument is more plausible than the knowledge argument in some respects and less plausible in others. All things considered, it is at least as interesting and serious a challenge to physicalism as the knowledge argument is.

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Montminy, Martin. "Knowledge despite falsehood." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 3-4 (August 2014): 463–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.982354.

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I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S’s false belief that p is not essential to S’s cognition. S’s knowledge is instead due to S’s belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.

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Atkins, Philip, and Ian Nance. "A Problem for the Closure Argument." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4, no. 1 (2014): 36–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03021102.

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Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic’s argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient. Interestingly, perhaps, each of these has been proposed as the correct classification of Moore’s proof of an external world.

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McNicholl, Timothy H. "On the commutativity of jumps." Journal of Symbolic Logic 65, no. 4 (December 2000): 1725–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2695072.

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AbstractWe study the following classes:● Q* (r1A1…..rkAk) which is defined to be the collection of all sets that can be computed by a Turing machine that on any input makes a total of ri, queries to Ai, for all i ∈ {1..… k}.● Q(r1A1…..rkAk) which is defined like Q* (r1A1….. rkAk) except that queries to Ai, must be made before queries to Ai+1 for all i ∈ {1….. k – 1}.● QC(r1A1….. rkAk) which is defined like Q{r1A1….. rkAk) except that the Turing machine must halt even if given incorrect answers to some of its queries.We show that if A1 ….. Ak are jumps that are not too close together, then all three of these classes are identical and are not changed if we permute (r1…..rkAk). This extends a result of Beigel's [1]. Since the second class is not affected by permutations, we say that these sets commute with each other. We also show that jumps that are too close together may not commute. We also characterize the commutative sequences of sets obtained by iterating the jump operation through an ordinal notation.

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Hella, Lauri, and Kerkko Luosto. "The Beth-closure of ℒ(Qα) is not finitely generated." Journal of Symbolic Logic 57, no. 2 (June 1992): 442–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275278.

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AbstractWe prove that if ℵα is uncountable and regular, then the Beth-closure of ℒωω(Qα) is not a sublogic of ℒαω(Qn), where Qn is the class of all n-ary generalized quantifiers. In particular, B(ℒωω(Qα)) is not a sublogic of any finitely generated logic; i.e., there does not exist a finite set Q of Lindström quantifiers such that B(ℒωω(Qα)) ≤ ℒωω(Q).

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Tatum, W. Jeffrey. "Q. Cicero, Commentariolum Petitionis 33." Classical Quarterly 52, no. 1 (July 2002): 394–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/52.1.394.

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Weisberg, Josh. "The zombie's cogito: Meditations on type-Q materialism." Philosophical Psychology 24, no. 5 (June 17, 2011): 585–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.562646.

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Sitthiwirattham, Thanin, Ghulam Murtaza, Muhammad Aamir Ali, Sotiris K. Ntouyas, Muhammad Adeel, and Jarunee Soontharanon. "On Some New Trapezoidal Type Inequalities for Twice (p, q) Differentiable Convex Functions in Post-Quantum Calculus." Symmetry 13, no. 9 (September 1, 2021): 1605. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym13091605.

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Quantum information theory, an interdisciplinary field that includes computer science, information theory, philosophy, cryptography, and symmetry, has various applications for quantum calculus. Inequalities has a strong association with convex and symmetric convex functions. In this study, first we establish a p,q-integral identity involving the second p,q-derivative and then we used this result to prove some new trapezoidal type inequalities for twice p,q-differentiable convex functions. It is also shown that the newly established results are the refinements of some existing results in the field of integral inequalities. Analytic inequalities of this nature and especially the techniques involved have applications in various areas in which symmetry plays a prominent role.

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Carcopino, Xavier, Didier Raoult, Florence Bretelle, Léon Boubli, and Andreas Stein. "Q Fever during Pregnancy." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1166, no. 1 (May 2009): 79–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04519.x.

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MARRIE, THOMAS J. "Q Fever in Octogenarians." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 590, no. 1 Rickettsiolog (June 1990): 266–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1990.tb42230.x.

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Koubek, V., and J. Sichler. "On relative universality and Q-universality." Studia Logica 78, no. 1-2 (November 2004): 279–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-005-0291-5.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Q Philosophy'

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