Academic literature on the topic 'Public debt. Political uncertainty. Sovereign default'

Abstract Lienau’s book on ‘Rethinking Sovereign Debt’ delves into international finance to shed light on its background rules, overarching ideologies and interacting actors, disentangling the social norm of sovereign debt continuity and its institutional foundations. What a formalistic legal reasoning would interpret as a self-contained bilateral contract is then situated in historical time and social space populated by a variety of actors (debtors and creditors), co-existing legal regimes and evolving principles of reference. Her focus on odious debt highlights situations where debt continuity is challenged by major events in the sovereign borrower status (such as major political regime change, corruption and human rights abuse) which challenge debt legitimacy. This comment expands on her thoughtful analysis by linking debt continuity to the borrowing sovereign entity as a going concern. Sovereign borrowing makes lenders involved with this ongoing entity through time and circumstances. Ongoing sovereign debt management is featured by both debt securities market trading and the refinancing mechanism. In turn, refinancing involves public finances with their public benefit missions, central banking and the monetary base management. In this context, socially responsible lending and borrowing may be facilitated by acknowledging the bonding relationship between the borrowing sovereign entity and its creditors, including when default occurs.

The subject matter of this paper are specific causes of sovereign debt default of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1932. In the first part of the paper, time series of public debt, with the subcategories of domestic and foreign public debt, for the period from 1929 to 1939, were constructed on the basis of data from Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the League of Nations. In the second part of the paper, the sustainability of public debt of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia has been measured with help of relevant macroeconomic indicators: public debt-to-GDP ratio and debt service-to-public revenue ratio. In the third part of the paper, decomposition of public debt data has been made with respect to the methodology used in Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This decomposition has shown that public debt accumulation had to do little if anything with the Great Depression and was to a large extent caused by political, economic and financial consequences of the Great War.

This article analyses the factors that seem to play an important role in determining the cost of sovereign debt. Specifically, we evaluate to what extent transparency, the level of corruption, citizens’ trust in politicians and credit ratings affect interest rates. For that purpose, we create a transparency index matching the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/World Bank Budgeting Database items with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Best Practices for Budget Transparency sections. We also check our assumptions with the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index and with a non-linear transformation of our index. Furthermore, we use several control variables for a sample of 103 countries in the year 2008. Our results show that better fiscal transparency, political trust and credit ratings are connected with a lower cost of sovereign debt. Finally, as expected, higher corruption, budget deficits, current account deficits and unemployment make sovereign interest rates increase. Points for practitioners The key implications for professionals working in public management and administration are twofold. First, despite the criticism raised by credit ratings, it is clear that poorer ratings are connected with higher financing costs for governments. Therefore, governments should enhance those indicators that impact the credit rating of their sovereign debt. Second, governments should seek to be more transparent, since transparency reduces uncertainty about the degree of cheating, improves decision-making and therefore decreases the cost of debt. Transparency reduces information asymmetries between governments and financial markets, which, in turn, diminishes the spread requested by investors.

Much empirical research has been carried out to test the presence of contagion in European sovereign debt crisis since the beginning of 2010. In this paper I will consider contagion as a change in the transmission mechanism of shock, illustrating co-movement among the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) markets of seven European countries and the UK from November 2008 up until June 2013. By examining daily pricing data of the five-year sovereign CDS contracts of these countries, I found a large increase in the volatility in the period of crisis, and hence a correlation test is invalid, but parametric method with GARCH residual time series and quantile regression approach are applicable. The first test modelling time series’ residuals by GARCH formula shows no contagion. In the second method, slope equality tests analyse the stability in linear relationship among markets across quantile and find no evidence of contagion. This final result of no contagion during the debt crisis suggests that the reason of the sovereign risk’s propagation is the conventional interdependence among countries, not the greatness of the shock.

Abstract Many previous studies have documented the procyclicality of fertility to business cycles or labour market indicators in Western countries. However, part of the recent fertility decline witnessed since the Great Recession has been left unexplained by traditional measures. The present study advances the notion that birth postponement might have accelerated in response to rising uncertainty, which fuelled negative expectations and declining levels of confidence about the future. To provide empirical support for the causal effect of perceived uncertainty on birth rates, we focus on Italy’s sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012 as a natural experiment. Perceived uncertainty is measured using Google trends for the term ‘spread’—which acted as somewhat of a barometer for the crisis both in the media and everyday conversations—to capture the general public’s degree of concern about the stability of Italian public finances. A regression discontinuity in time identifies the effect of perceived uncertainty on birth rates in Italy as a drop between 1.5% and 5%, depending on model specification.

Motivation: SCDS contracts, based on treasury bonds, are used to assess credit risk. Observation of changes in these instruments provides information on the current economic situation of individual countries. By correlating them with the economic assessment of individual countries, SCDS indicate the risk level of bankruptcy of a given country and thus play an informative role on the global financial market. Aim: The objective of the study is to investigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the level of credit risk in Poland. This aim will be achieved by determining the level and the dynamics of changes of SCDS spreads, and by identifying the determinants of changes in the level of SCDS spreads before and after the pandemic. The study hypothesises that as a result of the supply and demand shocks caused by the outbreak of the Covid-19, the level of Polish SCDS spreads increased due to macroeconomic factors. Results: The results of the study confirmed that due to the panic, Poland’s credit risk increased dynamically in the first stage of the Covid-19. However, over time, the level of credit risk in Poland decreased. Nevertheless, the reduction in Poland’s credit risk is accompanied by an increase in public debt, with a simultaneous deterioration in macroeconomic indicators. This evidence suggests that SCDS spreads are not capable of reflecting the foundations of the economy during uncertainty. The results of this study indicate that the fundamental determinants of credit risk changes occurred before and during the pandemic. However, the results showed that the magnitude of their impact on credit risk is different. Multiple linear regression analysis also showed that during the Covid-19, macroeconomic factors showed a significantly higher degree of correlation with credit risk compared to non-economic factors directly related to the effects of the pandemic.

AbstractTo complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.

Abstract To complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.

The European economy is just recovering after the crisis and is facing numerous problems that prevent the transition to a sustainable economic growth. Among the most significant problems are massive fiscal deficits and public debt. This imposes the risks of default and can cause a collapse of national economies’ encouragement programs. Large-scale foreign trade imbalances threaten the already shaky stability of the global monetary and financial system. Huge amounts of speculative capital contribute to the formation of price bubbles in the domestic and international stock and commodity markets. It is obvious that these difficulties are systemic by their nature. In order to overcome them the leading European states have to undertake decisive and concerted measures for the restructuring of the existing economic order. An understanding of the respective need is currently declared at the highest political level, including the European Central Bank and G20. In practice, however, the efforts so far are concentrated mainly on the soft and cautious reform of the regulation of financial markets in the countries of the Eurozone. Implementation of the steps to create a more reliable and secure European financial and economic architecture is restrained by dramatic differences in the interests of the leading countries. According to most analysts, efforts to overcome this are likely to fail in the coming years. The failure to address fundamental problems of the financial crisis increases the uncertainty of the development of the European economy and creates the preconditions for new crisis situations.

The current COVID-19 pandemic highlighted something that was already known for decades: modern governments need to master the art of equilibristics – they need to offer public value in all governance arenas while battling increasing levels of uncertainty and change. Looking back at the last decade, unpredictable change has been the norm rather than the exception (whether it is at political level – Arab Spring (2011), 2016 US elections, Brexit (2016) – social – Occupy Wall Street movement (2011), EU migrant-refugee crisis (2016), Black Lives Matter, #Metoo movement – or economic – the economic crisis of 2008, which prompted the sovereign debt crisis in multiple EU countries, China replacing the US as the largest economy) the environment in which governments operate in has never seen such a particular type of dynamic. The COVID-19 pandemic can be seen almost as an organic culmination of this dynamic, a perfect storm, highlighting the essence of the new environment in which governments operate: highly complex, unpredictable, and interdependent – in one word turbulent. The point is not to discuss the nature of these changes or whether they match perfectly the definition of a black swan event, but rather to raise an important question: how should governments (and society as a whole) react and adapt to such challenges? Are the current institutional structures and patterns of governing able to deal with this turbulence? From a governance perspective, two major concepts stand out as a potential framework of dealing with such situations: adaptive governance (Hatfield-Dodds, 2007) and turbulent governance (Ansell, Trondal and Øgård, 2017).

This thesis is composed by two articles. In the first paper, co-authored with Roberto Pancrazi, we study the relationship between sovereign debt and political frictions. We model political frictions as a disagreement among parties about distribution of resources. When analyzing a small-open economy framework we find two important results. First, when considering standard utility function (CRRA with risk aversion parameter greater or equal to one) political frictions induce saving (not borrowing) incentives. Second, when introducing retrospective voting, for which electoral outcomes are affected by recent economic performance, we find that more severe political frictions indeed lead to stronger borrowing incentives. Then, we use the theoretical predictions of our model to structurally estimate the country-specific degree of retrospective voting using data on debt, quality of institutions, and election probability in 56 emerging and transition economies. We find that retrospective voting is strongly related to corruption indices. In the second paper I study the effect of political frictions in a model where repayment of sovereign debt is not enforceable. Sovereign default models that study how income fluctuations and the level of debt affect default risk when sovereign debt is non contingent, are successful in explaining business cycle in emerging economies by matching the stylized facts of main economic aggregates in normal and default periods but they fail in reproducing jointly the large levels of debt and spread observed in the data. I introduce political uncertainty in the standard default model of Arellano (2008): the incumbent has an exogenous probability of not being reappointed in the next period, but in the case she decides to default, there is a larger probability of losing power. Calibrating political uncertainty on Argentinian polls data, the model generates realistic levels of debt to gdp and spread without affecting the performance on the other business cycle statistics.

The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. This book unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? The book provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. It takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. The book vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece's short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, the book paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. It shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.