Dissertations / Theses: 'Psychology and philosophy'

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Loebel, Micheal Peter. "The philosophical foundations of Abraham Maslow's psychology some implications for third force psychology." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/4777.

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Molinaro, Matthew P. "Queer Time, Epistemology, and Psychology." Miami University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=muhonors1303413630.

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Akbar, Shawn Raja. "Musical understanding: studies in philosophy and phenomenological psychology." Diss., University of Iowa, 2012. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/2432.

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The central undertaking of this project is to initiate a phenomenological theory of musical experience. The core views expressed are that musical rhythm is the most fundamental, and the only essential, component of the musical experience, and that the essence of musical experience lies in attending to rhythm as communicative of a sense of time. In the introduction I set out the general phenomenon of musical understanding and argue for the relevance of phenomenological description of basic musical experience for the theory of musical understanding. I continue this work by considering Jerrold Levinson's concatenationist view, and indicate the need for a more adequate characterization of basic musical experience. I then discuss Roger Scruton's attempt to distinguish musical from nonmusical hearing in terms of metaphorical perception and acousmatic listening and conclude that neither provides an essential characteristic of musical hearing. I present the theory and method of phenomenology and trace out what I take to be phenomenologically adequate theories of sound and auditory experience. The heart of the work explores the notion of musical time along with the nature of the experience of rhythm and meter. The first part of the final chapter contains an historical and critical overview of philosophical accounts of the connection between music and the emotions, and the related issue of whether music possesses any "content" beyond sounds and their melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic organization. The second part considers attempts to pursue a theoretical analogy between music and language.

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Rowe, M. W. "Philosophy, psychology, criticism : A defence of traditional aesthetics." Thesis, University of York, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.377287.

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Lau, Yen-fong. "Belief in semantics and psychology." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11688.

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Mulhall, S. J. "Wittgenstein on aspect-perception and the philosophy of psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.234315.

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Fenton, William P. "On the Philosophy and Psychology of Reasoning and Rationality." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1574636850795921.

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McEachrane, Michael. "For sentimental reasons : investigations in the philosophy of psychology /." Åbo : Åbo akademi, 2006. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb41198214t.

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Schmidt, Erik Wolfgang Stocker Michael. "Beyond comparison: incomparability and the psychology of choice." Related Electronic Resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.

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Hobbs, Angela. "Homeric role models and the Platonic psychology." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.292786.

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Kaye, Lawrence Jeffrey. "Three studies in naturalized philosophical psychology." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14137.

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Lyons, Jack Coady. "Epistemological consequences of a faculty psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289041.

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Traditional epistemology has devoted much attention to the distinctions between perception and inference and between basic and non-basic beliefs. Hot, I develop a different and more general distinction, between what I call "privileged" and "nonprivileged" beliefs; privileged beliefs are justifiable by means of an otherwise substandard argument while nonprivileged beliefs require support by a generally adequate argument for their justification I argue that even coherentists are tacitly committed to this distinction (although they may deny the existence of basic beliefs) and that one of the chief problems for simple reliabilist theories is that they imply that all beliefs are privileged. Any adequate epistemology has to count some beliefs as privileged and some as nonprivileged, and I suggest a way to modify reliabilist theories to accommodate this result. The privileged/nonprivileged belief distinction suggests a framework theory about the structure of epistemic justification, a theory which improves on foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in certain respects. Yet it raises the question of which beliefs are privileged and which are nonprivileged. I argue that whether or not a belief is privileged is determined by the etiology of that belief, and in particular, by the intrinsic nature and the etiology of the psychological faculty that produced that belief. A belief, therefore, is privileged if and only if it is the output of a certain kind of cognitive faculty, or system. Consequently, the beliefs produced by these faculties are such that it is possible to be justified in holding them even in the absence of a generally adequate argument. This does not mean that all the outputs of all such faculties are justified, for such beliefs might still require (and lack) inferential support or be subject to non-inferential requirements, like reliability And of course, all such beliefs are potentially subject to defeat from other justified beliefs. The kind of cognitive faculties I have in mind includes, but is not restricted to, "modules", in Jerry Fodor's sense. The etiological, faculty-oriented view defended hat argues for distinctive, versions of externalism and naturalism in epistemology and holds some promise of illuminating certain traditional epistemological problems.

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Owens, David John. "The autonomy of psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.670342.

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Holt, Jason. "Blindsight, an essay in the philosophy of psychology and mind." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0012/NQ40264.pdf.

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Woodrow, Jonathan. "The social psychology of digital photography : a process philosophy approach." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2004. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7724.

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This thesis addresses the nature of the image and its relationship to human perception and memory. Traditionally psychology approaches the relationship between the image and the human in a representationalist register, in which the world represents itself through images to the subjective observer. The thesis questions these assumptions about the representational relationship between the world, the mind and the image through a study of people using digital photographic technologies. It argues that digital images exist as a complex network of technology and activity that manage their incessant movement, production, consumption, convertibility, connectedness and fragility. The digital image exposes the complex nature of the image as more than a simple representation. If this is the case, then human involvement with images as networks occurs in terms of our inclusion in the network rather than as a subjective observer positioned outside of the world. Henri Bergson proposes that we see the image in terms of a distinction between time and space rather than as an intermediary between a subject and the object. The implications of this for the way in which we think about the interaction between people and technology and the nature of perception and memory are explored through some data examples from three settings. These are; amateur photographers using digital technology; families looking through their stocks of digital images and remembering past events together and finally, displays of family member's histories and identities on the internet.

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Griffiths, Cara Veronica. "Moral Psychology, Dual-Process Theory, and Psychopathology." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1564526866237073.

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Maibom, Heidi Lene. "Philosophical foundations of the Theory Theory of folk psychology." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.343900.

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Reuter, Shane. "The Abstract/Concrete Paradox in Moral Psychology." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/120.

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The epistemology of intuitions has become popular recently with philosophers’ increasing use of experimental methods to study intuitions. Philosophers have focused on the reliability of intuitions, as empirical studies seem to suggest that conflicting intuitions are common. One set of studies, concerning what Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) calls the abstract/concrete paradox, suggests that conflicting intuitions are common and, hence, that mistaken intuitions are common. As Goldman (2007) notes, if mistaken intuitions are sufficiently prevalent, then we might have reason to think intuitions are unreliable. I argue that mistaken intuitions are not common, since studies concerning the abstract/concrete paradox have unknowingly studied several distinct phenomena instead of the abstract/concrete paradox and, hence, that they present merely apparently conflicting intuitions. I then discuss the import of empirical studies for debates about reliability, noting that those studies can inform us about the unreliability of intuitions but we are still unclear about the conditions for reliability.

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Lavin, Michael. "Understanding limits: Morality, ethics, and law in psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/284605.

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Work by Sales and Lavin has suggested that it is possible to improve the moral and ethical thinking of psychologists. In particular, moral and ethical thinking by psychologists could be improved if psychologists learned to use defensible moral metrics. The usefulness of formal training in ethics and morality, with the implicit condemnation of the moral metrics that might be taught in such training, has been challenged by writers such as Justice Holmes. He has alleged that professionals learn how to behave in their professional roles by practicing them. A variety of problems are noted with Holmes' view. Further, psychologists cannot rely on expert advice from Institutional Review Boards or Ethics Committees, even if they wished to do so. Institutional Review Boards, and by implication Ethics Committees, have serious deficiencies. However, psychologists can make considerable progress in their moral and ethical thinking, if they distinguish ethics from morality and also notice the similarities between moral thinking and scientific thinking and theorizing. A controversy over the recovered-memory therapy is employed to illustrate some of these distinctions and similarities. The argument continues by developing two moral metrics. The first begins with ethics and culminates in moral appraisal. The second makes moral appraisal an earlier step than ethical appraisal. With these metrics described, it is then noted that a popular metric in psychology, that of Koocher and Keith-Spiegel, is inadequate. It is then shown that the two moral metrics earlier described are reasonably believed to be adequate. The adequacy of one of them is directly illustrated with an example involving the question of whether persons with serious mental illnesses should be allowed to enter into contracts that would relax the criteria for their involuntary hospitalization and treatment. It is concluded that teachable, intellectually defensible moral metrics are possible, and that their use would improve the moral and ethical thinking of psychologists.

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Cowley, Joshua D. "Inferential-role semantics: A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/280685.

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Concepts are not sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. This fact has caused trouble for both psychologists and philosophers. The resultant psychological theories of concepts, which are primarily aimed at the functional role of concepts, are very specific but this specificity is at the expense of excluding some types of concepts. The resultant philosophical theories of concepts, which are primarily aimed at the content of concepts, are general but this generality is at the expense of understanding the role concepts play in the mind. My dissertation proposes a bridge between psychological and philosophical theories of concepts. This bridge has two parts: The first part is a general model of the functional role of concepts which is philosophically rigorous but can house existing psychological theories of concepts. The second part is a theory of the (narrow) content of concepts, which is informed by the mass of psychological evidence, but is general enough to encompass all concepts. The key in both parts is the role that concepts play in inference. I argue for the inferential model of concepts, which claims that the functional role of a concept is its inferential role. I also argue for inferential-role semantics which claims that the (narrow) content of a concept is determined by its inferential role. The overlooked advantage of this inferentialist position is the ability to draw on an account of reasoning to solve problems in developing a theory of concepts. My dissertation can then be seen as unifying philosophical and psychological work on concepts with philosophical and psychological work on reasoning. This is most obviously seen in the final chapter which offers an account of compositionality for inferential-role semantics.

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Hetherington, Ross. "The roles of moral psychology in the philosophy of John Rawls." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2012. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3567/.

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This thesis explicates and critically considers the various roles played by moral psychology within the work of John Rawls throughout his career. In the second half of the 20th Century, Rawls’s development of a sophisticated theory of justice in the social contract tradition played a significant part in reviving the study of normative political philosophy in the western world. Rawls argued that any theory of justice must be closely integrated with our best contemporary understanding of human psychology. Moral psychology is hence widely recognised to play an important role in Rawls’s overall theory. But the precise role played has not been adequately examined. In this thesis, I identify six roles which moral psychology plays within the structure of Rawls’s theory. Moral psychology must defend the idea that the model for a just society which Rawls proposes is realisable and stable (role #1). Moral psychology is also employed to explain how persons now have acquired what sense of justice they have (role #2). By showing that Rawls’s just society can be realised and is stable, moral psychology is then subsequently used in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice – first by showing that such a society is not futile (role #3), and second by showing that the society is comparatively more stable than leading rivals (role #4). The account of the psychological capacities of the moral person is used to place the limit on the scope of justice (role #5). And moral psychological facts are also likely to be, in some sense, constitutive of the nature of morality for Rawls (role #6). These roles are discussed throughout various chapters. What alterations occur to the overall place of moral psychology following Rawls’s later embrace of political liberalism is also discussed. The overall aim of the thesis is to produce an accurate exegesis on these matters, and in doing so indicate just how important moral psychology is within Rawls’s theory, but also to indicate, clearly and starkly, just how much more psychological and sociological investigation needs to be done in if the theory is to be substantiated, given Rawls’s own criteria.

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Schellekens, Anna Elisabeth. "A reasonable objectivism for aesthetic judgments : towards an aesthetic psychology." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2003. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/1056/.

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This doctoral thesis is an examination of the possibility of ascribing objectivity to aesthetic judgements. The aesthetic is viewed in terms of its being a certain kind of relation between the mind and the world; a clear understanding of aesthetic judgements will therefore be capable of telling us something important about both subjects and objects, and the ties between them. In view of this, one of the over-riding aims of this thesis is the promotion of an ‘aesthetic psychology’, a philosophical approach, that is to say, which emphasises the importance of the psychological processes involved in the making of aesthetic judgements. One of the aims of this thesis is to develop a revisionary account of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in the domain of value. This revision will undertake to dismantle some of the assumptions implicit in a metaphysical framework which traditionally ascribes objectivity only to judgements about facts, and not to judgements about values and other concerns such as norms and emotions. Further, the thesis examines the intricate ways in which aesthetic properties, the focus of aesthetic judgements, depend on the (emotional and other) responses of the subjects of experience. The particular role played by first-hand experience in the making of aesthetic judgements is among the things critically investigated in the interests of reaching a clearer understanding of the manner in which aesthetic judgements may be objective in the sense of being justifiable. Eventually, a defence is outlined of the view that aesthetic judgements can be supported by good reasons, but not in the same way as ordinary cognitive judgements. Finally, I outline the main tenets of a proposed ‘reasonable objectivism’ for aesthetic judgements, an objectivism grounded on justifying reasons.

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Tester, Steven. "Kant's metaphysics of mind and rational psychology." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17029.

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Die Dissertation diskutiert die kantische Metaphysik des Geistes anhand der in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und den aus dem Nachlass veröffentlichten Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik geleisteten Auseinandersetzung mit der rationalen Psychologie seiner Vorgänger, insbesondere Baumgarten und Wolff. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass Kant die Meinungen seiner Vorgänger nicht uneingeschränkt zurückweist, sondern die Vorstellung der Seele als Substanz in seine Diskussion der Personalität, mentaler Kräfte, der Möglichkeit einer Körper-Seele Interaktion sowie der Willensfreiheit teilweise beibehält. Ein Verdienst dieser Interpretation ist es, die Kontinuität zwischen Kants vorkritischer Position und seiner kritischen Philosophie aufzuzeigen. Darüber hinaus soll aber auch auf eine wichtige Funktion der kantischen Metaphysik des Geistes für seine praktische Philosophie hingewiesen werden.
This dissertation considers Kant’s discussions of the metaphysics of mind in his critical encounter with the rational psychology of Baumgarten, Wolff, and others in the Critique of Pure Reason and his lectures on metaphysics. In contrast with prevailing interpretations, I argue that Kant does not offer a straightforward rejection of his predecessors but that he retains some commitments to the substantial view of the self and modifies others within the framework of transcendental idealism to provide accounts of the nature of personhood, mental powers, the possibility of mind-body interaction, and the possibility of freedom of the will. This interpretation of Kant reveals continuity between Kant’s pre-critical and critical positions on the metaphysics of mind and points forward to a role for aspects of Kant’s metaphysics of mind in his practical philosophy.

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Hall, David John. "Facets of judgment : towards a reflexive political psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2257e7b2-eee0-493e-bd39-eeba4e2c60cd.

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The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories.

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Kwok, Hang-wah Yvonne, and 郭亨華. "William James' psychological philosophy." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2002. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29798462.

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(Uncorrected OCR) Abstract of thesis entitled 'William James' Psychological Philosophy' submitted by Kwok Hang Wah Yvonne for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in November 2002 The aim of this thesis is to suggest a way to better understand William James' philosophy by recognising its relation with his evolutionary psychology. In order to clarify James' version of 'evolutionary psychology', I will present it in contrast to Herbert Spencer's biological psychology. In Chapter Two, I will discuss how Spencer establishes his development hypothesis and how he understands the mind as a biological product being modified by environmental changes. In Chapter Three, I will interpret James' argument against Spencer's ideas that the mind operates passively, and that Spencer has overlooked the subjective factors in mental development. Through the discussion, we can understand the main difference between James' and Spencer's evolutionary psychologies. The fourth chapter will focus on James' psychology of the active mind. I will offer a more detailed explanatory account of James' views of three important mental functions, namely 'discrimination', 'association' and 'conception', as well as how they operate to construct experiences. In the last chapter, I will interpret one of the topics in James' philosophical discussions, so as to illustrate his psychological view in his philosophy. The discussion will show James' views of the different i roles of perception and conception in life, and his evolutionary concern of the functional use of concepts for experience. I will then explain how these views are related to James' argument against rationalism and his position in his radical empiricism. Through these discussions, I hope to shed light on the connection between James' evolutionary psychology and his philosophical ideas, which ultimately offers a better understanding to James' philosophy. ii
abstract
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Philosophy
Master
Master of Philosophy

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Hamilton, Christopher Francis. "The problem of meaning in modernity : an essay in moral psychology." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336281.

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Hutto, Daniel Douglas. "The presence of mind : an investigation and defense of commonsense psychology." Thesis, University of York, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336077.

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Gray, Richard. "Synaesthesia : an essay in philosophical psychology." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1723.

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We are sometimes led to a different picture of things when something unexpected occurs which needs explaining. The aim of this thesis is to examine a series of related issues in the philosophy of mind in the light of the unusual condition known to psychologists as ‘synaesthesia’. Although the emphasis will be on the philosophical issues a view of synaesthesia itself will also emerge. Synaesthesia is a distinct type of cross-modal association: stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers an additional phenomenal character of experience associated with a second sensory modality in the absence of any direct stimulation of the second modality. Chapter 1 introduces synaesthesia to a philosophical audience by outlining the early history of synaesthesia studies, by summarising contemporary research and by indicating areas of philosophical interest to be considered in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 uses synaesthesia to examine one important philosophical model of the mind, Fodor’s modularity hypothesis, and, in turn, investigates the nature of synaesthesia in the light of that model. Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as belonging to a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The most common form of synaesthesia possesses Fodor’s nine specified properties of modularity, and hence it should be understood in terms of an extra cognitive module, and thus as belonging to the abovementioned psychological natural kind. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. A breakdown in modularity would also explain the apparent presence of the nine specified properties in synaesthesia. I discuss the two concepts of function which underlie the respective theories, defending the breakdown thesis, arguing, in any case, that properties deriving from evolutionary history should also be used to decide between the two theses and thus ultimately membership of a psychological natural kind such as Fodor suggests. The argument is then used to respond to two challenges to the notion of a psychological natural kind. Chapter 3 focuses on the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience. Externalists about the phenomenal character of experience tend to argue that the character of perceptual experience is to be explained either by the properties objects present to percipients, or by the properties objects are represented by percipients as having. Some internalists argue that there is a need to postulate hrther properties of the individual - in other words, qualia - to account for the individuation of the character of perceptual experience. The existence of additional phenomenal characters of experience in synaesthesia, which cannot directly be explained by reference to features of objects, suggests the existence of extra qualia and thus the presence of qualia in normal perception. The aim of this chapter is to meet the challenge presented by synaesthesia and the extra quaZia argument, and contrariwise, use synaesthesia as a way of fbrther clarifjmg the merits of the respective externalist positions. In the previous chapters the locution of ‘coloured hearing’ will have been adopted. Occasionally the process underlying synaesthesia is described as one of ‘hearing colours’. Chapter 4 rejects the latter usage. In so doing it focuses on the place of synaesthesia vis-a-vis normal perceptual processes. Considerations from previous chapters are further developed in order to shed light both on the metaphysical individuation of perceptual modalities and on how we know the distinctive perceptual modalities. Given the actual content of our concepts of perceptual modalities, it is argued that the actual world is one in which even synaesthetes are unable to hear colours. Consideration is given as to whether there is a possible world in which people could hear colours. The justification of the usage of ‘coloured-hearing’ then leads to a discussion of the relative importance of the individuating conditions of modes of perception. The thesis focuses largely on coloured hearing. What merits the preceding considerations have might be supported if they can be generalised. Chapter 5 goes a small way in that direction.

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Chiesa, Mecca. "Radical behaviourism and the philosophy of science." Thesis, Cardiff University, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.292994.

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Colvin, Kim Charisse. "The dream poet's pen| A matter of archetypal psychology." Thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3630047.

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Poet David Ray imagines, "The poem is the altar for the dream" (1998, p. 176). This dissertation focuses on amplifying dreams with poetry from a collective perspective through the lens of archetypal psychology. The research was a collaborative effort of oneiric poetics nested in a dream group focused on engaging psychopoesis in relationship to archetypal value in dream images portraying the collective psyche and current cultural surround.

Hermeneutic phenomenology addressed the two central research questions: What are the dynamics that serve meaning making, or the transformation of meaning, when poetry is used to amplify dreams? How does this work develop further when engaged by a dream group aimed at collective meaning making? Phenomenological analysis described the essence of the lived experience of the co-researchers' engagement with writing dream poetry, moving from raw dream text through archetypal amplifications and associations in the group setting, culminating in dream poetry. Hermeneutics examined the shifting horizons of imaginal awareness that emerged from the intersubjective field of the dream group and how these horizons, infused with archetypal sensitivity, altered the co-researchers' subsequent relationship to the dream's images when creating dream poetry.

The research revealed the importance of a tripartite approach to dream work that is aware of the literal, psychological, and archetypal dynamics of meaning making. Thirteen dynamics that serve meaning making emerged from this tripartite analysis. Key among these are: conservation of the dream image view shed; building a relationship with and expressing interest in the image; liberation of the imaginal ego; relativizing the day-world ego; archetypal empathy; expanded awareness through commonality of archetypal dream themes; cultural awareness through a group dialogic regarding collective dream themes; and archetypal themes condensed in dream poetry.

The research reimagined the conversation between depth psychology, poetics, and dreaming beyond the personal or day-world ego's interpretations. This dissertation attends to the dream poet's pen and, by doing so, revivifies the imaginal ego, rejuvenates the poetic basis of mind, and refreshes psychopoesis as meaning-making agents in depth psychology. In a valuable move for archetypal psychology, this dissertation enlists these three precious premises in service of the sensus communis.

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Arico, Adam J. "The New Folk Psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/293642.

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How do we recognize that someone is thinking that the train is running late, desiring another cookie, or intending to make coffee? What is the cognitive process by which we come to attribute to another individual the belief, for instance, that Barack Obama is President? For the past few decades, philosophers working on Folk Psychology--i.e., those involved in the study of how people typically form judgments about others’ mental states--have focused largely on questions involving everyday attributions of mentality in terms of intentional states, like beliefs and desires. What I dub ‘the New Folk Psychology’ expands on this tradition to include everyday attributions of phenomenal consciousness (i.e., feelings and experiences). How, that is, do we come to recognize something as being capable of and having phenomenal states, like feeling happy or experience pleasure? The project is organized around three core topics. The first component attempts to identify the process underlying everyday attributions of consciousness. This task is carried out with an eye towards addressing issues in the current folk psychology of consciousness debate, such as whether ordinary psychology incorporates something like the philosopher’s distinction between intentionality and phenomenology. My work (Arico 2010, Arico, et al. 2011) advocates a model of mind-attribution called the Agency Model. According to this model, whenever we represent an entity as having certain properties (for example, facial features), we automatically categorize that thing as an AGENT. This AGENT-categorization then activates a cascade of behavioral dispositions, including the disposition to attribute both intentionality and phenomenology. The second component concerns ways that the process underlying everyday attributions of consciousness might be related to psychological process involved in moral perception. My work to date has focused largely on the question of how it is that we come to see an entity as a moral being, as something that deserves moral consideration and/or is subject to moral evaluation. I argue that existing accounts of such moral perception are based on problematic experimental data (Arico, forthcoming). I then propose an amended Agency Model (Arico, under review), according to which seeing an entity as a moral being--like attributing it consciousness--is a consequence of categorizing that thing as an AGENT. I then utilize this cognitive picture in an attempt to explain the enduring normative ethical debate over which kind of mental capacity most fundamentally grounds moral standing.

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JOHNSON, GREGORY S. "ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROBIOLOGY: LEVELS IN THE COGNITIVE AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1178290821.

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Hannan, Barbara Ellen. "Between reduction and elimination: Finding the place of commonsense propositional attitude psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184713.

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The commonsense practice of explaining and predicting behavior by reference to propositional attitude states such as beliefs and desires has recently come under attack. It is said that such belief/desire psychology is a folk theory, vulnerable to being shown false, and replaceable by a neuroscientific or computational theory. I argue herein that this eliminativist attack on commonsense propositional attitude psychology (CPA psychology) is poorly motivated, and I present positive arguments to the effect that CPA psychology constitutes an independently legitimate descriptive and explanatory practice or theory. I argue that even if CPA psychology and its embedded propositional attitude notions should prove irreducible to anything stateable in the language of physical or computational theory, this is not by itself any reason for thinking that CPA psychology is illegitimate or ought to be eliminated. In addition to arguing against eliminativism, I explicate and evaluate two non-reductionist alternatives to eliminativism: the "intentional stance" theory of Daniel C. Dennett, and the property dualism of Donald Davidson and Stephen Schiffer. I argue that the latter gives a better account than the former of how propositional attitude states can enter into true causal explanations of action. Taking mental properties to supervene upon physically-realized computational properties of organisms, I argue, secures a non-superfluous explanatory role for mental properties. One problem for such a supervenience thesis is the "wide" individuation of propositional content properties. I discuss this problem and conclude that it presents no insurmountable obstacle to taking content to play a role in causal explanation. The upshot of the dissertation is that propositional attitudes as explanatory notions can neither be reduced nor eliminated; we must count propositional attitude states as legitimate explanatory constructs despite the "open texture" of propositional attitude properties. I close the dissertation with a discussion of Hilary Putnam's arguments for conclusions remarkably similar to my own.

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Nicolaus, Georg. "The understanding of the person in C.G. Jung's psychology and N. Berdyaev's philosophy." Thesis, University of Essex, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.486577.

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This thesis attempts a hermeneutic, historical-comparative study of the understanding of the person in Jung's psychology and Berdyaev's philosophy. Its focus- although it is not theological in the strict sense of the term- is on the Christian understanding of the person as imago dei, not on the current psychological co~cept of personality. The , person as imago dei is interpreted as corresponding to the Self in Jungian psychology. The thesis identifies in the concept of personality a point of convergence between the psychological and philosophical-anthropological point of view, based on the hypothesis that personality, if it exists, is as much a psychological as a spiritual reality. It sees the inevitable transgression of Jung's psychology into the fields of philosophy and theology (which in Berdyaev's case coalesce into 'theosophy') as a consequence of his attempt to develop a holistic view of psychic process centred in the concept of the person.

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O'Donnell, Neal. "Sexuality, cakras, and "raising consciousness": Synthesising a Western psychology and an Eastern philosophy." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/10888.

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Bibliography: leaves 210-218.
The hypothesis for this dissertation is that (a) there is an increasing call for something called 'raising consciousness', and (b) sexuality and spirituality are integral to the process. It is, however, argued that sexuality in it's relationship with consciousness is incompletely considered in the mainstream of academic and lay discourse; and seems to not be accorded a positive position in the problematic landscape of human affairs. In this investigation, sex, gender, sexpression (the link between the previous two), sexuality, and spirituality are shown to be generally confused and in need of differentiation, and re-integration into a coherent unit.

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Starks, Shannon. "Objective Science of Biased Philosophy: Does Naturalism Play a Dogmatic Role in Psychology?" BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/4189.

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Students and consumers of psychological science are routinely taught that the scientific approach used in psychological research facilitates its providing the most accurate information about human behavior. Because this approach to knowledge acquisition is supposed to be based on objective evidence and systematic reasoning rather than the biased interpretation of other approaches, these other approaches are often marginalized as being inferior. Critics of these claims assert that psychological science is subject to biases just as other approaches are and that the philosophy of naturalism not only pervades, but is also hidden and largely unquestioned in mainstream psychology. This study examines this claim, beginning with a dialectical contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic cultures to concretize practical features of naturalism and non-naturalism. It then uses those features to frame an in-depth analysis of introductory psychology textbooks where a compendium of the important settled principles and findings of all major sub-areas of the discipline should be found. Results show that naturalistic features are to be found throughout all the sub-areas of psychology and that non-naturalistic features are absent or marginalized in the texts.

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Ho, Hui-yu. "Evolutionary Explanations In Psychology: A Paradigm For Integrating Psychology With Science." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Psychology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/1435.

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Evolutionary psychology has recently developed out of dissatisfaction with the Standard Social Science Model utilised by mainstream psychology. This model focuses on culture and reason as the underlying cause of human behaviour and proposes that the mind is a 'general purpose learning device' (Siegert & Ward, 2002). Here the mind is seen as a blank slate at birth, which is subsequently influenced by experience, environment and culture. Biological variables are minimised or ignored. However it seems that all human behaviour cannot fully be explained by the focus on nurture in the Standard Social Science Model; sexual jealousy, parental investment, and mating preferences are examples which are not fully explained by learning or environmental experience. On the other hand, evolutionary psychology, founded on the principles of cognitive science and evolutionary biology, argues that a person's nature is the primary cause of their behaviour, with the influences of nurture being of lesser importance. According to these principles, evolutionary psychology has been very successful in providing explanations, for example in the areas of human mate selection and parental investment. However evolutionary psychology has received criticism on a number of counts, including its supposed reductionism, and, its reliance on 'just so' stories which are untestable, hypothesised scenarios which look to the past in order to explain the evolution of human behavioural features. With the above mentioned matters as background, this thesis investigated whether evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm for integrating psychology with science, and if so, how it accomplishes this. In investigating this, conceptions of science, psychology, and evolutionary theory, in particular evolutionary psychology, were examined. More specifically, issues addresses included why evolutionary psychology is dissatisfied with the SSSM, the notion of the mind as blank slate, the nature-nurture paradigm, and the mind as a general purpose learning device. Two aspects of evolutionary theory are described, natural and sexual selection, in terms of their importance to evolutionary psychology. The main arguments of evolutionary psychology as a discipline are outlined, looking at its aims, and the ways in which it combines the disciplines of evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology toward a new integrative model for studying human behaviour. A case study demonstrates how evolutionary psychology offers a useful explanation of mate selection. This thesis then turns to the philosophy of science, setting out the differences between Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos' theories, and focusing on the latter's theory as a model of scientific philosophy which could be useful for evolutionary psychology, including discussing how this could be best achieved. This thesis then sets out various criticisms of evolutionary psychology, including the critique of domain-specific modularity, the focus on the Pleistocene period as problematic, the over-reliance on natural selection, just-so stories, the reductionism of evolutionary psychology, and that it is politically conservative. This thesis concludes that the attempt of evolutionary psychology to combine cognitive science and evolutionary theory has been successful in showing how the integration of psychology into the sciences is not only possible but inevitable.

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Short, Brandon D. "The Depths of the Cartesian Split| A Hidden Myth in Modern Psychology." Thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10822143.

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Cartesian dualism is analyzed as a psychological image, instead of as a philosophical proposition. This is done by first arguing that elements of existing commentary are indicative of a psychological complex, acting unconsciously, in contemporary academic communities. As a hermeneutic study, these elements are then further interpreted through a Jungian lens, specifically cultural complex theory. Myth is used to highlight and identify the deep psychological structures that are active in what I am calling the Cartesian Split complex. In this new context, possible origins are explored in cultural history, as well as its purpose, with potential lessons offered for a wide range of academic fields, including depth psychology. Specifically, there is a call to refine terminology used for consciousness, as well as for the overall mind-body dichotomy. Also, a new approach is offered for the history of consciousness. Most importantly, a diagnosis is given concerning the present nature of consciousness, and a potential remedy is offered, in the form of a new reading of the original texts. Such a new reading, however, depends on a new perspective, that which is constructed by the present study.

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Lawton, Christopher. "Rational argument in moral philosophy : some implications of Gordon Baker's therapeutic conception of philosophy." Thesis, Edge Hill University, 2015. http://repository.edgehill.ac.uk/7777/.

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This work is an investigation into philosophical method and rational argument in moral philosophy. It makes an original contribution to human understanding, by taking some of the tools and techniques that Gordon Baker identifies in the later work of Wittgenstein, and using them as a way of fending for oneself in an area of philosophy that neither Baker, nor Wittgenstein, wrote on. More specifically, a discussion of some different aspects of the contemporary literature on Dancy’s (2004) moral particularism is used as a vehicle for illustrating how Baker’s therapeutic conception of philosophy offers alternative possibilities for how we can do philosophy, and what counts as rational argument in moral philosophy. I maintain that, by considering some indicative ways in which Baker’s therapeutic approach to philosophy can dissolve, rather than solve, the kinds of perplexities found in the existing literature on Dancy’s (2004) moral particularism, we can liberate ourselves from the traditional/theoretical view of how we ought to do philosophy, and an understanding of rational argument in moral philosophy, to which we need not be committed.

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Ridley, Timothy J. "A Psychology of Complementarity| Toward a Synochi of Psyche and Physis." Thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10790614.

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This hermeneutic research attempts to address the mind and body problem using complementarity from quantum physics and dual aspect monism from philosophy. Quantum mechanics and dual-aspect monism offer ways to explain complex phenomena that include aspects that are seemingly contradictory. In quantum physics, wave–particle complementarity describes how an atom is both a particle and a wave. In dual-aspect monism, the underlying domain of the universe is neither physical nor mental, but these are both aspects of the ontology. Applying these ideas from quantum mechanics and dual-aspect monism to the existing paradigms within psychology provides different perspectives on the mind-body problem. To begin the process of applying these theories, the physis is imagined to be a particle and the psyche is imagined to be a wave. Complementarity is then used to explore the psyche and the physis. Psyche and physis are also surveyed using dual aspect monism. As the psyche and physis are explored as two different aspects of one ontology, this research attempts to examine how this would manifest within our existence, and what the theories would mean for the splits within the field of psychology. This research found that the frame used to approach psychology (psyche or physis) impacts the results, and trying to approach psychology without using one aspect or the other is difficult to symbolize, and or practice. For depth psychology, this research has shown that retreating entirely to the imaginal or the unconscious may be an unbalanced approach. Keywords: psychology, quantum physics, complementarity, dual-aspect monism

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O'Brien, Keith Stanley Edward Michael. "A metabletic study of the male/female process in psychology." Thesis, Rhodes University, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002073.

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The motivation to explore the subject matter of this thesis arises from two interlinked processes: (1) the experience of the power and pervasiveness of a "basic split" experienced in therapy in the unity of the individual, (2) the tendency in the unitary discipline psychology for theorists to adopt views which are polar opposites. In trying to understand these phenomena one has to explore the basic paradox of being which has fascinated thinkers and mystics down through the ages, the paradox of the One and the many, and thus the phenomenon of change. This paradox is explored in mythology, in the "philosophia perennis" and as encountered in high-energy sub-atomic physics. Out of this emerges the awareness of Being as One but as embodying a dynamic polar process, the first of whose manifestations is the male and the female process (or Yin/Yang in Chinese). The male/female process is defined and explored and it is shown that the female process has been progressively ignored and largely repressed in the West. I demonstrate this process in a metabletic (hermeneutical phenomenological) study of Greek sacred architecture. Metabletics as defined by its originator, J.H. van den Berg, is "the theory of change" or a psychology of history. It is thus a particularly suitable method of analysing the cultural-historical process of the repression of the female process in Western society. The emergence of the male process as predominant in the West is explored hermeneutically through the emergence of the individual and the suppression of the old unity centred in the Mother Goddess, and the receding of the Father God to the heavens. The choice by the great Greek philosophers of the male process is particularly important because of their emphasis on the Logico-Mathematical Sequential (L.M.S.) mode of knowing and perception at the expense of the female process, Intuitive-Creative Holistic (I.C.H.) mode.The dominance of the male process in the West is traced from the aboriginal female-process state through neolithic village culture to the rise of the first cities. Processes studied are the rise of kingship, war, private property and the splitting of labour. The roots of anomie and alienation are described. The emergence of god as powerful ruler and lawgiver is shown. The splitting of the male/female process leads to the splitting of the individual from him/herself, from others, from the world and from the divine. This is traced in the mystery religions, in religious dualism, in the rise of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and Gnosticism. The split and its effects are demonstrated in Western science and psychology. The necessity and possibility of integration in science and in psychology is demonstrated through the integration of our process of knowing and perceiving which is used as a model for the integration of psychology. The effects of the male/female split on the individual in Western society are shown. The split in our society leads to anomie and alienation, which produce "socioses". These affect the child born into the society and lead to a "Parent/Child" split. The possibility of healing the split in the individual, between people, between humankind and the world and in re-establishing our unity in the One is illustrated. The unity of the One is experienced through the dynamic polar interaction of the male/female process.

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Blore, Erick John. "The educational philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, an analysis and application of his Calvinistic psychology." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2007. http://www.tren.com.

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Carter, Jason W. "First principles in Aristotle's psychology : the science of soul in De Anima 1." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5321c889-bce7-4e4f-a3f8-860b286c3380.

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This thesis analyses the method, purpose, and results of Aristotle's treatment of a select number of Presocratic and Platonic theses about the soul within the context of De Anima 1. Contrary to a prevalent interpretation of De Anima 1 which sees Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors' psychological views as dialectical, I argue that Aristotle treats his predecessors as having offered potentially viable hypotheses about the nature of the soul, and that these hypotheses are treated as attempts to explain the soul's basic powers. I further show that, in order to test the explanatory limits of these theories, Aristotle uses a version of the scientific method of inquiry advertised in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, which consists in setting out the basic psychological phenomena which psychology should explain, and then testing the extent to which his predecessors' definitions of the soul are able to accomplish this task. This thesis argues that, by demonstrating where his predecessors' first principles fall short, Aristotle is able to make theoretical progress towards establishing his own 'hylomorphic' first principle of soul, that soul is the 'first fulfilment of a natural instrumental body', and towards the idea that soul operates in the body of living beings as a formal, final, and efficient cause.

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RENFRO, MARL K. "TEMPERAMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1022853045.

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De, Wet Daniel Rudolph. "Emmanuel Levinas and the practice of psychology." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/2741.

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Thesis (MA (Psychology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005.
Psychology as a human science is rendered desperate by the human vacuum in its own contents. This paper argues that by adopting the methods and techniques of the natural sciences, psychology and psychotherapy not only transform the patient or client into an a-historical and a-social entity, but also propose an utopian view of reality and lose the inherent moral character of the psychotherapeutic endeavour. It seems as if the Post-Modern theoretical and psychotherapeutic alternatives do not offer a solution that solves the above mentioned problems. This paper aims to introduce the work of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, as a stimulus providing a different starting point in the search for solutions to the mentioned problems. Such an approach seeks to understand the radically ethical character of the therapeutic meeting by recognising the fundamental responsibility of the therapist, not to “totalise” (that is to reduce) otherness (the not me) into sameness (the for me) by assigning differences into pre-established characteristics, properties and categories. Only by recognising the otherness of the client in the “face-to-face meeting” and reacting to the call of the other can psychotherapy be ethical and render justice to historical and social situatedness of the other facing us in therapy. Some of the implications that the ethical challenge of Levinas holds for psychology will be explored. This includes the implications for the therapeutic meeting, psychological ethics, and the possibility of a “Levinasanian psychology”.

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Williams, Scott Matthew. "Henry of Ghent on the Trinity : metaphysics and philosophical psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669961.

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Klein, Alexander Mugar. "The rise of empiricism William James, Thomas Hill Green, and the struggle over psychology /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2007. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3274251.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2007.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 2976. Adviser: Elisabeth A. Lloyd. Title from dissertation home page (viewed Mar. 28, 2008).

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Morey, Matthew Wynne. "Healing through compassionate awareness| A comparison of american vipassana practice and existential-humanistic psychology." Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3560925.

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This dissertation compares the integrated vipassana movement of North America and the school of psychology. The comparison examines both healing practices and ontological paradigms. The integrated vipassanā movement in the United States is defined by that element of vipassanā teachings that blends Theravāda Buddhist practices with American cultural mores as promoted and disseminated by Insight Meditation Society and Spirit Rock Meditation Center. Existential-humanistic psychology is here represented by the teachings of Rollo May, James Bugental, and Irvin Yalom. This inquiry seeks to apprehend the nature and efficacy of compassionate and caring present-moment attention in the context of two distinct ontological orientations. The analysis begins with each tradition's description of humanity's most fundamental flaw: dukkha and angst. The examination of these maladies of life is followed by a comparison of these traditions' respective portrayals of health and harmony: Buddhist liberation as compared with existential freedom. This study then examines and compares the way in which these traditions employ the blended healing practices of compassion and present-moment awareness. The findings include the observation that the Theravāda concept of no-self and the existential notion of the groundlessness of being provide for two distinct kinds of healing: one promotes a grace born of skillfully encouraging a depth of surrender of self, and the other speaks to creating an authentic world for oneself. This dissertation finds that the two traditions offer practices and orientations that may be used complementarily.

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Friesen, Andrew. "Holistic sport psychology: Incorporating the holistic growth of the athlete within a consultant's professional philosophy." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/27684.

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The present qualitative study aimed to explore the integration of holistic athlete development into sport psychology service delivery. Using the framework of professional philosophy from Poczwardowski, Sherman, and Ravizza (2004), five holistic sport psychology consultants were interviewed about their service delivery. Five athletes were also interviewed about their experiences working with these consultants. Deductive and inductive content analyses (Patton, 2002) were used to examine the data collected. Results offer three perspectives as to the meaning of holistic sport psychology: (a) Managing environmental effects from non-sport domains to the athlete's performance; (b) developing the individual beyond the athlete; and (c) recognizing the dynamic relationship between an athlete's mental, emotional, physiological states, and their behaviour. Themes from the consultants' beliefs, values, theoretical paradigms to behaviour change, models of practice, roles, operating standards, intervention goals, and intervention techniques and methods are also presented and discussed within the context of various service delivery topics.

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Stubbs, Elsina. "Wihelm von Humboldt's philosophy of language : its sources and its influence." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.300843.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Psychology and philosophy'

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