Academic literature on the topic 'Provision of public goods'

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Journal articles on the topic "Provision of public goods"

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Tumlinson, Justin, and John Morgan. "Corporate Provision of Public Goods." Academy of Management Proceedings 2013, no. 1 (January 2013): 13507. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2013.13507abstract.

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Morgan, John, and Justin Tumlinson. "Corporate Provision of Public Goods." Management Science 65, no. 10 (October 2019): 4489–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3137.

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Candel-S�nchez, Francisco. "Dynamic provision of public goods." Economic Theory 23, no. 3 (March 1, 2004): 621–1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0384-1.

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Epple, Dennis, and Richard E. Romano. "Public Provision of Private Goods." Journal of Political Economy 104, no. 1 (February 1996): 57–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262017.

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Bagnoli, Mark, Shaul Ben-David, and Michael McKee. "Voluntary provision of public goods." Journal of Public Economics 47, no. 1 (February 1992): 85–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(92)90006-2.

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Mamardashvili, P., and D. Schmid. "Performance of Swiss dairy farms under provision of public goods." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 59, No. 7 (July 19, 2013): 300–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/148/2012-agricecon.

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Farmers provide not only agricultural products but also public goods and services. When analyzing farm performance, these different outputs should be modelled separately. In this study, we investigated Swiss dairy farms located in the plain, hill and mountainous regions for the period between 2003 and 2009. For the representation of production technology, we employed a parametric output distance function and modeled particular public goods and services as a separate output. The resulted elasticities of agricultural output coincided with the corresponding shares of this output. However, the elasticities of particular public goods and services were higher than the corresponding shares. This might be related to the fact that this output contains different kinds of direct payments, “production” of which does not require additional inputs or trade-off with other outputs. Our results showed that the level of pro ductivity in the plain region did not depend on the scale of production, but more on the improvement in the technical efficiency. However, in the hill and mountainous regions, there was potential for scale adjustments. Sample farms in these regions showed significant decreasing returns to scale, which suggests that the average farm in these subsamples could improve its productivity by scaling down its production. Our results might also be confirmation of decelerated structural change, since decreasing returns to scale might reflect an obstacle to growth. We found the wide range of the efficiency scores for Swiss farms, which indicates potentials for improvements. Among others, off-farm income as well as high level of ecological services showed significantly positive influence on the technical efficiency of Swiss farms in all three regions.  
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SLAVOV, SITA NATARAJ. "Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods." Journal of Public Economic Theory 16, no. 2 (August 15, 2013): 222–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12058.

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Grossman, Guy, Jan H. Pierskalla, and Emma Boswell Dean. "Government Fragmentation and Public Goods Provision." Journal of Politics 79, no. 3 (July 2017): 823–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/690305.

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Sager, Tore. "Dialogical Values in Public Goods Provision." Journal of Planning Education and Research 26, no. 4 (June 2007): 497–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0739456x07299949.

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MORITA, SHIGEO. "The Time-Consistent Public Goods Provision." Journal of Public Economic Theory 18, no. 6 (August 17, 2016): 923–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12209.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Provision of public goods"

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Cha, Inkyung. "Essays on the provision of public goods." Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/199.

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In Chapter 2, we present a model that allows us to study the effect of increased competition among charities for donations, and show that it will result in a lower provision of public goods. When charities get donations, they must pay two fundraising costs: a travel cost and an extra cost, a "premium" in our terminology. This premium arises from the extra time, effort, or incentives a charity must provide to garner a contribution from a donor who is solicited by other charities. Increased competition raises this premium, which leads to deadweight loss, so that revenue net of fundraising costs falls after a new firm enters into the market. A problem with public goods markets is asymmetric information between charities and donors, such that donors do not know which charities will cheat. In Chapter 3, we show that honest charities can get more donations than dishonest charities by investing in a capital stock. We study a two-period model under two assumptions, one where first-period investment does not affect the provision of public goods in the second period, and one where first-period investment does affect the provision of public goods in the second period. In the first case, we prove the existence of a separating equilibrium where honest charities make an investment and dishonest charities invest nothing. Thus, donors will donate more to charities that make investments, even if the investment is not used to produce public goods. In the second case, honest charities may invest the efficient amount, overinvest, or underinvest, depending on the donors' beliefs. In Chapter 4, we borrow parts of the models in the previous two chapters in order to see what effect the signaling cost has on the number of firms and average revenue. In our model, donor utility increases when they give to a charity that matches their ideology. We are interested in the long-run equilibrium, so unlike in Chapter 2, we assume there is free entry in the market. The two important results are that the number of firms decreases and average revenue increases if the required signaling cost increases.
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Martin, Steve. "Essays on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/36036.

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Chapter 1.---Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) compete in mission statements. Opportunities for impact vary across issues---NGOs with broader missions expect to execute higher-impact projects but provide less precision to donors as to the types of projects that will be funded. I develop the first model in which competing NGOs strategically design their mission statements. Scope of the mission is a strategic complement. Competition leads NGOs to design inefficiently narrow missions while free entry leads to a socially excessive number of NGOs in operation. With low barriers to entry NGOs' missions overlap, each addressing issues that are not the preferred issue for any of its donors, and leading to greater expected impact at the periphery of its mission. Chapter 2.---In many settings firms rely on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to certify pro-social attributes embodied in their products. I develop a model of competition between NGOs in the provision of labeling services. Competition between a fixed number of NGOs features a race-to-the-top in labeling standards, but entry of NGOs offering new labels pushes standards down. Competition between NGOs often results in a socially-excessive number of labels, with each label excessively stringent. Compared to a setting in which firms can credibly communicate the social attributes of their products, labels demand greater pro-social behavior than desired by firms, although with proliferation of the number of labels this discrepancy disappears. In contrast to existing models, firms may engage in excessive corporate social responsibility when they rely on NGOs as certifying intermediaries. Chapter 3.---The intrinsic motivation of a firm's management for engaging in pro-social behavior is an important determinant of a firm's social conduct. I provide the first model in which firms run by morally-motivated managers engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a competitive setting. CSR induced by moral management crowds out a competitor's strategic CSR, increasing profitability and leading shareholders to strategically delegate moral managers. Firms run by moral managers can engage in a socially-excessive amount of CSR, and shareholders appoint such managers if and only if moral management is sufficiently effective at crowding out a competitor's strategic CSR.
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Bierbrauer, Felix. "Essays on public goods provision and income taxation." [S.l. : s.n.], 2006. http://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/madoc/volltexte/2006/1305.

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She, Chih-Min. "Three essays on public choice and the provision of public goods." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3162260.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2004.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0271. Adviser: Gerhard Glomm. Title from dissertation home page (viewed Oct. 12, 2006).
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Montén, Anna. "The provision of local public goods and demographic change." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-88933.

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The main contribution of this thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the influence of changes in the population structure on local communities, in particular with respect to the provision of publicly provided goods. The focus is placed on the consequences of two of the major processes of demographic change, namely aging and shrinking. The three main chapters of this contribution consider the effects at the local level from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The first model focuses on the influence of population aging on the provision of local publicly provided goods, when the young population may relocate. When aging advances, gerontocracies and social planners substitute publicly provided goods aimed at the mobile young for publicly provided goods for the elderly. However, due to fiscal competition, gerontocracies will provide even more of the publicly provided good for the young than the social planner. The second model considers in a two-period setting, the interaction of a shrinking population when the investments made by the previous generation are long lived. The laissez-faire and welfare maximizing outcomes are computed for two cases; first with no costs of upkeep and second for the case when costs of upkeep accrue. A comparison of the solutions shows that public provision for the first generation is inefficiently low in laissez-faire when there are no costs of upkeep. However, if costs of upkeep accrue, the laissez-faire outcome for the intergenerational publicly provided good may be too high. Chapter four contains an empirical analysis. In a two-stage analysis the efficiency of the provision of child care services in municipalities is evaluated in the German State of Saxony. First, the results of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) show substantial efficiency differences; the median municipality is up to 28% inefficient. In a second stage bootstrapped truncated regression, determinants of the inefficiency are identified. Explanatory variables such as an uncompensated mayor or a larger share of over 65-year-olds significantly increase inefficiency.
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Cestau, Dario. "Essays on the Provision and Funding of Public Goods." Research Showcase @ CMU, 2014. http://repository.cmu.edu/dissertations/347.

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The first essay studies how political parties’ choice of public good provision and tax funding affect the risk of default to public debt investors. Past research has largely ignored the effects that political parties have on default risk of state governments. The objective of this paper is to address this policy question using data from Credit Default Swap contracts (CDS), and poll data from state gubernatorial elections. The findings of the paper suggest that state Republican governors have a significant positive effect on CDS spreads. On average, Republican governors reduce credit spreads by around six percent, more than half of CDS standard deviation during election race. Prospects of a Republican administration are good news for debtholders. The positive effect of Republican candidates is larger when: candidates signed the ``Taxpayer Protection Pledge'', Democrats control the state houses and for highly contested gubernatorial elections. The second essay studies profiling and affirmative action in the access to gifted programs, a common public good provided by school districts. For decades, colleges and universities have struggled to increase participation of minority and disadvantaged students. Urban school districts confront a parallel challenge; minority and disadvantaged students are underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. We analyze optimal school district policy and develop an econometric framework providing a unified treatment of affirmative action and profiling. Implementing the model for a central-city district, we find profiling by race and income, affirmative action for low-income students, and no affirmative action with respect race. Counterfactual analysis reveals that these policies achieve 80\% of African American enrollment that would be could be attained by race-based affirmative action. The third essay studies a new alternative mean of funding for States and local authorities called Build America Bonds (BAB). BABs were issued by municipalities for twenty months as part of the 2009 fiscal package. Unlike traditional tax-exempt municipals, BABs are taxable to the holder, but the Treasury rebates 35% of the coupon to the issuer. The stated purpose was to provide municipalities access to a more liquid market including foreign, tax-exempt, and tax-deferred investors. We find BABs do not exhibit greater liquidity than traditional municipals. BABs are more underpriced initially, particularly for interdealer trades. BABs also show a substitution from underwriter fees toward more underpricing, suggesting the underpricing is a strategic response to the tax subsidy.
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Abbasian, Ezatollah. "Taxation and the provision of private and public goods." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.249073.

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Sene, Omar. "Social capital, trust and provision of local public goods." Thesis, Paris 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA010050.

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Le but principal de la présente thèse est d'étudier le rôle du capital social dans la capacité des communautés locales à entreprendre une action collective et à produire des biens publics locaux par eux-mêmes. Nous étendons la portée des études existantes dans les pays en développement. L'analyse est effectuée en utilisant deux approches distinctes. La première approche utilise un mélange original d'enquêtes et de données expérimentales sur la confiance de quatre villages au Sénégal pour évaluer la capacité de la confiance de prévoir la participation à la fourniture de biens publics locaux. Les résultats montrent que la confiance, tel que mesurée par les questions de l'enquête, a une faible pouvoir prédictif, alors que les résultats d'une mesure expérimentale de confiance sont bien meilleurs prédicteurs de la production de biens publics. La seconde approche consiste à enquêter sur l'impact causal de la confiance dans la qualité des biens publics produits au niveau du district en Afrique. Nous utilisons les données Afro-baromètre pour tester le rôle du capital social et les divisions ethniques dans l'accès aux soins de santé de base et à une scolarisation. Nous contournons les problèmes de la causalité inverse entre la confiance et la qualité des biens publics, et de variables omises en raison de tri ethnique endogène par l'utilisation de données historiques sur les modes de fonctionnement des groupes ethniques en Afrique sub-saharienne. Les résultats que notre mesure de confiance locale (utilisé comme indicateur de capital social) a impact causal sur la qualité de la santé et de la qualité des écoles en Afrique
The main purpose of the present dissertation is to study the role of social capital in the capacity of local communities to undertake collective action and to produce local public goods by themselves We extend the scope of existing studies encompass in developing countries. The analysis is carried out using two distinct approaches. The first approach uses an original mixture of survey and experimental data on trust from four villages in Senegal to assess the capacity of trust to predict participation in provision of local public good. The results show that trust, as measured by survey questions, has poor predictive power, while the results from a simple experimental measure of trust are much better predictors of public-goods production. The second approach consists in investigating the causal impact of trust in the quality of public goods produced at district level in Africa. We use Afro-barometer data to test the role of social capital and ethnic divisions in determining access to basic health care and schooling. We skirt any reverse-causality problems between trust and the quality of public goods, and omitted-variable bias due to endogenous ethnic sorting, by the use of historical data on the settlement patterns of ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our measure of local trust (used as an indicator of social capital) is shown to have a causal impact access on quality of health and quality of schools in Africa
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Feng, Colin G. "Voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence and theoretical analysis /." The Ohio State University, 1995. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1272296199.

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Apinunmahakul, Amornrat. "Three essays on the private provision of pure public goods." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/NQ66117.pdf.

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Books on the topic "Provision of public goods"

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Fang, Hanming. Optimal provision of multiple excludable public goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.

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Munro, A. The optimal public provision of private goods. Stirling: University of Stirling, 1988.

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Anand, P. B. Financing the provision of global public goods. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2002.

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Epple, Dennis N. Collective choice and voluntary provision of public goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.

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Mendez, Ruben P. The provision and financing of universal public goods. London: Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1993.

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Burger, Nicholas E. Voluntary public goods provision, coalition formation, and uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.

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Burger, Nicholas E. Voluntary public goods provision, coalition formation, and uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.

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Vicary, Simon. Factor endowments and the private provision of public goods. Hull: University of Hull, Department of Economics, 1997.

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Vicary, Simon. Joint production and the private provision of public goods. Hull: University of Hull, Department of Economics, 1996.

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Anderson, Simon P. Market provision of public goods: The case of broadcasting. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.

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Book chapters on the topic "Provision of public goods"

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Bilodeau, Marc. "Public Goods Provision Institutions." In International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 135–55. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2188-0_6.

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Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gächter, Manfred Milinski, and Bettina Rockenbach. "Institutions Fostering Public Goods Provision." In The Selten School of Behavioral Economics, 167–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13983-3_11.

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Saich, Tony. "Welfare Provision, 1949–1979." In Providing Public Goods in Transitional China, 23–42. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230615434_2.

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Yeung, David W. K., and Leon A. Petrosyan. "Applications in Cooperative Public Goods Provision." In Theory and Decision Library C, 321–69. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_12.

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Nuppenau, Ernst-August, and Ousmane Badiane. "Modeling Public Goods Provision in Agriculture." In Agricultural Markets Beyond Liberalization, 279–97. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4523-1_14.

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Sommerrock, Katharina. "The Challenge of Public Goods Provision." In Social Entrepreneurship Business Models, 75–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230298033_5.

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Gersbach, Hans. "Democratic Provision of Divisible Public Goods." In Redesigning Democracy, 157–79. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53405-3_8.

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Shibata, Hirofumi, and Aiko Shibata. "Rent Redistribution through Provision of Public Goods." In Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development, 268–84. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09370-0_18.

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Lal, Deepak. "Private Provision of Public Goods and Services." In Privatization at the End of the Century, 329–61. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60825-4_15.

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Nath, Shyam, and Yeti Nisha Madhoo. "Public Goods Provision and Local Fiscal Domain." In Vanishing Borders of Urban Local Finance, 29–47. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5300-2_2.

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Conference papers on the topic "Provision of public goods"

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Zou, Yang. "Public goods provision and revenue distribution." In 2011 2nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/aimsec.2011.6010944.

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Kang, Zi Yang. "Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467566.

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Sun, Jun, and Yan-yan Gao. "Ethnic diversity and public goods provision in China." In 2012 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2012.6414445.

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"Analysis of Joint Provision of Public Goods in Online Communities." In 2009 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2009.71.

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Zhengxin, Zhang. "Impact of Perceived Income Inequality on Private Provision of Public Goods." In 2020 2nd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.201128.017.

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Naghizadeh, Parinaz, and Mingyan Liu. "Provision of non-excludable public goods on networks: From equilibrium to centrality measures." In 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2015.7446986.

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VILKĖ, Rita, Lina PAREIGIENĖ, and Aldona STALGIENĖ. "CHALLENGES AND INCENTIVES FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: AN AGRARIAN DISCOURSE." In Rural Development 2015. Aleksandras Stulginskis University, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.15544/rd.2015.120.

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Crisis of recent decade had proved many times the interconnectivity and interdependency among all actors, sectors and areas of concern throughout the globalized value chains. Today sustainable development strategies are under reconstruction by global governance bodies together with stakeholders from around the world, concerning the main issue of durable future. Agriculture as main provider of public goods, recently had experienced pressure from public society and entered the debates for an essential review of the underlying support principles, based on multifunctionality, which hardly meet the goals of sustainable development. Recently some evidence appeared that the gap between multifunctionality and sustainability might be closed with help of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The paper aims to disclose the challenges and incentives which accelerated the origination of CSR concept and related discussions in an agrarian discourse through the provision of public goods. Systemic analysis and synthesis of theoretical insights of foreign and local scientific literature and the methods of induction and deduction were applied to investigate the theoretical aspect and characteristics of CSR and public goods in agrarian discourse. Theoretical research results propose that the concept of CSR does provide a basis for further analysis and discussion concerning the role of agriculture as a subject of government support from a broader systems perspective, which means a shift in paradigms, emphasized by movement from the sectoral policy and agricultural support to a more inclusive place-based development.
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MIKUŠOVÁ, Beáta, Nikoleta JAKUŠ, and Marián HOLÚBEK. "Voluntary cooperation of citizens in the community model of public service delivery." In Current Trends in Public Sector Research. Brno: Masaryk University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cz.muni.p210-9646-2020-9.

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Most of the developed countries have implemented new principles of public sector reform – new approaches to the management of the public sector. A major feature of the new public management (NPM) is the introduction of market type mechanisms (MTM) to the running of public service organizations: the marketization of the public service. The marketization of public services aims at a continuous increase in public expenditure efficiency, continual improvements in public services quality, the implementation of the professional management tools in the public sector, and last but not least, charge for public services. Price of public services in mainstream economics theory is connected with preference revelation problem. Economic models explain the relationship between consumer behavior (revealed preferences) and the value of public goods, and thus determine the value of the goods themselves. The aim of the paper is to determine the success of the community model of public service delivery based on the demonstrated preferences of individuals in the consumption of public services / public goods. The direct way of determining the preferences of individuals was used in this paper (willigness to pay and willigness to accept). These preferences will be identified based on the crowdfunding campaign as an example of community model of public goods provision by using survey experiment method. The willingness of individuals to pay is dependent on the individual's relationship with the organisation, the organisation's employees, or sympathise with those for whom the collection is, for whom the project is designed.
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MILANDRU, Marius. "THE IMPORTANCE OF GOODS AND SERVICES REQUISITION PROCESS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST." In SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN THE AIR FORCE. Publishing House of “Henri Coanda” Air Force Academy, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19062/2247-3173.2021.22.3.

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Preparing the national economy and territory for defence is an important component in ensuring national security and, in the current geopolitical and military context, it is carried out in peacetime and involves the capitalization of human, material and financial resources in order to ensure the continuity of socio-economic processes and to satisfy the need for defence resources when a state of mobilisation or war is established. Thus, defence forces must be have a full range of resources at their disposal, depending on their specific needs, so that when a crisis, threat or aggression against the state arises, they should be able to carry out their specific missions. Based on the need to make resources available to national defence institutions in extreme situations that endanger the integrity or proper functioning of the State, one of the ways of ensuring the provision of resources is the requisition of goods and services in the public interest.
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Cai, Dongdong, and Qian Li. "Research on the relevance of the provision of local public goods and fiscal decentralization in China." In 2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icebeg.2011.5882668.

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Reports on the topic "Provision of public goods"

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Fang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13797.

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Epple, Dennis, and Richard Romano. Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7802.

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Burger, Nicholas, and Charles Kolstad. Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15543.

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Ballard, Charles, and Don Fullerton. Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3506.

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Heal, Geoffrey. Empathy and the Efficient Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29255.

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Anderson, Simon, and Stephen Coate. Market Provision of Public Goods: The Case of Broadcasting. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7513.

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Costello, Christopher, and Matthew Kotchen. Policy Instrument Choice with Coasean Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28130.

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Munshi, Kaivan, and Mark Rosenzweig. Insiders and Outsiders: Local Ethnic Politics and Public Goods Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21720.

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King, Mervyn. A Pigovian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1681.

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Jacobsen, Mark, Jacob LaRiviere, and Michael Price. Public Goods Provision in the Presence of Heterogeneous Green Preferences. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20266.

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