Academic literature on the topic 'Protest movements – Turkey'
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Journal articles on the topic "Protest movements – Turkey"
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Doğu, Burak. "Political Use of Twitter in Post-Gezi Environmental Protests." Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 12, no. 2 (September 13, 2019): 185–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18739865-01202007.
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Abstract Twitter has often been associated with recent social movements, particularly in the Middle East region. It was also used widely in Turkey during and after the nationwide Gezi protests of 2013. In this article, I study the political engagement practices on Twitter with a particular focus on the post-Gezi environmental protests, and reflect on how emergent protest ecologies are shaped through the participation of the diverse stakeholders. Based on an analysis of three environmental protests in Yirca, Iztuzu and Cerattepe, I highlight the role of Twitter as a political platform connecting players across protests. Findings indicate that Twitter plays a significant role in expanding protest networks and enabling the congregation of a wide variety of players, such as environmental movement organizations, media, political figures and activists who then help to sustain their resistance movements.
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Bal, Haluk Mert, and Lemi Baruh. "Sustainability and communication practices in grassroots movements in Turkey following Gezi Park Protests: Cases of Dogancilar Park Forum, Macka Park Forum and Validebag Volunteers." Journal of Alternative & Community Media 5, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 45–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/joacm_00074_1.
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Recent social movements, as exemplified by the informal organizations formed during and after the Occupy Movement in the United States and Gezi Park Protests in Turkey, are characterized by distrust towards institutional political bodies and hierarchical organizations (Boler et al. 2014). Also, the debate on the relationship between social movements and digital media technologies often highlights the opportunities that these technologies provide for ‘largely unfettered deliberation and coordination of action’ (Castells 2012). Scholars critical towards the concept argue that horizontal grassroots organizations may suffer from problems of continuity and formation of a durable movement (Calhoun 2013). This article aims to investigate the organizational characteristics and media practices of grassroots organizations that were established or mobilized following Gezi Park Protests, a nation-level social protest in Turkey. Drawing on participant observation of three grassroots social movement organizations in Istanbul ‐ Dogancilar Park Forum and Imrahor Garden; Macka Park Forum and Komsu Kapisi Association and Validebag Volunteers ‐ this analysis will aim to contextualize opportunities and obstacles associated with the horizontal structures of such movements. The article will particularly focus on the strategies that these organizations utilize to maintain the sustainability of the respective movements and approaches they employ in media and communication practices at a local level.
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Alper, Emin. "Reconsidering social movements in Turkey: The case of the 1968-71 protest cycle." New Perspectives on Turkey 43 (2010): 63–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s089663460000577x.
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AbstractThe years between 1968 and 1971 in Turkey were unprecedented in terms of rising social protests instigated by students, workers, peasants, teachers and white-collar workers. However, these social movements have received very limited scholarly attention, and the existing literature is marred by many flaws. The scarce literature has mainly provided an economic determinist framework for understanding the massive mobilizations of the period, by stressing the worsening economic conditions of the masses. However, these explanations cannot be verified by data. This article tries to provide an alternative, mainly political explanation for the protest cycle of 1968-71, relying on the “political process” model of social movement studies. It suggests that the change in the power balance of organized groups in politics, which was spearheaded by a prolonged elite conflict between the Kemalist bureaucracy and the political elite of the center-right, provided significant opportunities to under-represented groups to organize and raise their voices.
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Kreicberga, Zane. "POLITICAL ACTIVISM AS A FORM OF THEATRE." Culture Crossroads 8 (November 13, 2022): 146–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.55877/cc.vol8.172.
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Nowadays political activism can be considered as a form of theatre: its strategies and tactics often employ the means proposed by Brecht and other thinkers of the political theatre. However, there is a paradox if artistic activism is being practised exclusively in the artistic context, it can find itself in a deadlock. The article is dedicated to the phenomenon of artistic activism, exploring such examples as protest movements born in the UK “Reclaim the Streets” and “Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army”, “Nano-rallies” in Barnaul, Russia, the act of “The Standing Man” in Turkey, and the activities in media space by the American activist collective “The Yes Men”. The artists create the language and aesthetics of protest merging the borders of life, art and protest.
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Hasan, Ezhan. "Why Regimes Repress: The Factors that Lead to Censorship of Social Media." American Journal of Undergraduate Research 16, no. 3 (December 29, 2019): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.33697/ajur.2019.028.
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Social media have made it easier to create mass political action. Prominent examples include the Arab Spring movements, which took place in regions where information was previously tightly controlled by authoritarian regimes. Fearing radical change, several regimes have repressed social media use, but not all authoritarian regimes have taken the same measures. Previous research suggests that regime leadership is motivated to ensure its own survival but also influenced by a strong independent media and the need for citizens to vent grievances. To understand the relationship of these factors to social media repression, this research conducts a comparative process-tracing case study of Iran, Turkey, and Venezuela from 2004 to 2017, using a hypothesis-testing approach. It concludes with discussion of the findings for the nature of regime response to the role of social media in protest. KEYWORDS: Internet; Media; Protest; Authoritarian; Iran; Turkey; Venezuela; Comparative; Case-Study
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Sharpe, Kenan Behzat. "Poetry, Rock ’n’ Roll, and Cinema in Turkey’s 1960s." Turkish Historical Review 12, no. 2-3 (December 27, 2021): 353–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18775462-bja10028.
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Abstract Using developments in poetry, music, and cinema as case studies, this article examines the relationship between left-wing politics and cultural production during the long 1960s in Turkey. Intellectual and artistic pursuits flourished alongside trade unionism, student activism, peasant organizing, guerrilla movements. This article explores the convergences between militants and artists, arguing for the centrality of culture in the social movements of the period. It focuses on three revealing debates: between the modernist İkinci Yeni poets and young socialist poets, between left-wing protest rockers and supporters of folk music, and between proponents of radical art film and those of cinematic “social realism”.
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Aytaç, S. Erdem, Luis Schiumerini, and Susan Stokes. "Protests and Repression in New Democracies." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 1 (March 2017): 62–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592716004138.
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Elected governments sometimes deal with protests by authorizing the police to use less-lethal tools of repression: water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and the like. When these tactics fail to end protests and instead spark larger, backlash movements, some governments reduce the level of violence but others increase it, causing widespread injuries and loss of life. We study three recent cases of governments in new democracies facing backlash movements. Their decision to scale up or scale back police repression reflected the governments’ levels of electoral security. Secure governments with relatively unmovable majorities behind them feel freer to apply harsh measures. Less secure governments, those with volatile electoral support, contemplate that their hold on power might weaken should they inflict very harsh treatment on protesters; they have strong incentives to back down. Our original survey research and interviews with civilian authorities, police officials, and protest organizers in Turkey, Brazil, and Ukraine allow us to evaluate this explanation as well as a number of rival accounts. Our findings imply that elected governments that rest on very stable bases of support may be tempted to deploy tactics more commonly associated with authoritarian politics.
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Holston, James. "Metropolitan rebellions and the politics of commoning the city." Anthropological Theory 19, no. 1 (February 27, 2019): 120–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1463499618812324.
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This article analyzes the remarkable wave of metropolitan rebellions that inaugurated the 21st century around the world (2000–2016). It argues that they fuel an emergent politics of city-making in which residents consider the city as a collective social and material product that they produce; in effect, a commons. It investigates this politics at the intersection of processes of city-making, city-occupying, and rights-claiming that generate movements for insurgent urban citizenships. It develops a critique of the so-called post-political in anthropological theory, analyzes recent urban uprisings in Brazil and Turkey, distinguishes between protest and insurgent movements, evaluates digital communication technologies as a new means to common the city, and suggests what urban citizenship brings to politics that the national does not.
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TUNÇ, Ferit. "ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSES OF POLITICAL ACTORS IN TURKEY REGARDING SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE NATIONAL PRESS." SOCIAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL 7, no. 29 (January 15, 2022): 184–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.31567/ssd.538.
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After the protest movements, which are described as the "Arab Spring", spread to Syria since the beginning of 2011, an important part of the Syrians, who had to leave their country with the civil war, took shelter in Turkey. Turkey has implemented an open door policy within the framework of humanitarian sensitivities in the face of this crisis. However, it did not remain indifferent to this influx for historical, religious and cultural reasons and tried to provide all necessary assistance from the very first moment.In the last ten years, the number of people who took refuge in Turkey has reached 4 million. This study focuses on the discourses of political actors in the national press regarding Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. In this context, the news with the keywords “Syria” and “Syrians” in the newspapers YeniŞafak, Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet throughout 2017, when intense discussions were experienced in all areas regarding Syrian refugees, was analyzed by Van Dijk's discourse analysis method. According to the main findings of the study, it is seen that the discourses of political actors related to Syrians under temporary protection are shaped within the framework of discussions on living together, cooperation, economic burden, national threat and citizenship. In this context, it is understood that there are critical differences in the discourses of political actors belonging to the government and opposition.
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Uysal, Mete Sefa, Yasemin Gülsüm Acar, Jose-Manuel Sabucedo, and Huseyin Cakal. "‘To participate or not participate, that’s the question’: The role of moral obligation and different risk perceptions on collective action." Journal of Social and Political Psychology 10, no. 2 (August 26, 2022): 445–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.7207.
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The current research investigates whether moral obligation and perceived close vs. distant risks of high vs. moderate risk collective actions are associated with willingness to participate in collective action in the case of Turkey. Two studies were conducted: one with re-placed university students after the July 15, 2016 coup d'état attempt (high-risk context; N₁ = 258) and one with climate strikes (moderate risk context; N₂ = 162). The findings showed that moral obligation predicts collective action in both studies, however, the strength of this relationship is contingent on the level of subjective likelihood of protest risk in the high-risk collective action (Study 1), but not in the moderate-risk collective action (Study 2). Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 by showing that higher perceived climate crisis risks (e.g., extinction of many species, destroying the vast majority of vital resources; distant risk), but not risks of protest (e.g., being arrested, blacklisted; close risk) predicts higher willingness to participate in collective action. We discussed the role of moral obligation and different risk perceptions (e.g., distant, close, moderate, high) on climate movements and collective action of marginalized groups in repressive political contexts.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Protest movements – Turkey"
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Yanmaz, Selen. ""TheRevolution will not be Televised, It will be Tweeted”: Digital Technology, Affective Resistance and Turkey's Gezi Protests." Thesis, Boston College, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107653.
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Thesis advisor: Stephen J. PfohlThe Gezi Park protests, which started in May 2013 in Istanbul, rapidly turned into a movement for democracy across the country. Through in-depth interviews with protestors in Turkey, observation and content analysis, my research examines the role digital technologies played in the protests. These technologies, especially social networking tools, were used by protestors to construct personalized frameworks and forms of action. I show that this process depended on the individuals’ interpretations of their current political and cultural context, their alternative frameworks of reality. By expressing these frameworks individuals, first and foremost, challenged the politico-cultural adjustment of the society by various powerful actors. Moreover, as individuals got together in protest, alternative frameworks of reality interacted, leading to the emergence of empathy and dialogue among the protestors for long-term movement success. Digital technologies provided the necessary alternative sources for news and other information for the reconstruction of these frameworks. Moreover, they became the primary space for the production and circulation of jokes in various forms, as protestors used humor and creativity as central strategies to voice their dissent. Affective and humorous creations challenged the discipline of the political authority, hacked its presentations of reality and contributed to the formation of a carnivalesque society, where empathy and dialogue were maintained through collective effervescence
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Sociology
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Gunes, C. "From Protest to Resistance and Beyond : The Contemporary Kurdish National Movement in Turkey." Thesis, University of Essex, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.520049.
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Demirhisar, Deniz Günce. "Les acteurs contestataires en Turquie (2007-2014). Mémoire, marginalité, utopie." Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0082.
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La thèse étudie le régime de subjectivité des acteurs contestataires en Turquie afin d'interroger la nature des mouvements contemporains et les particularités de l'engagement à gauche. L'enquête qualitative qui débute avec les mobilisations consécutives à l'assassinat de Hrant Dink en 2007, se termine à la première commémoration du mouvement Gezi en 2014. Les données recueillies par entretiens et par observation auprès de plusieurs générations de militants et d'activistes sont analysées sous le prisme de la subjectivation et de la désubjectivation. Quels sont les effets des émotions, de la mémoire collective et des horizons d'attente sur la capacité d'agir des acteurs contestataires ? La première partie met en lumière la diversité des modalités d'action telles que les mobilisations de choc moral, les initiatives intellectuelles, les stratégies électorales, un festival de musique anti-guerre issu du mouvement altermondialiste. Les mobilisations qui rassemblent les générations révolutionnaires et les jeunes activistes relèvent des logiques globales de l'action collective. Les revendications de démocratie s'expriment à la fois par la transition de l'horizon révolutionnaire vers un paradigme des droits humains, et par des pratiques préfiguratives. La seconde partie examine la dialectique entre la mémoire et l'utopie dans l'imaginaire politique des acteurs. L'analyse des manifestations culturelles et politiques variées de la mémoire d'une gauche fragmentée, montre à la fois les permanences et les mutations dans les valeurs, les symboles, les habitus et le répertoire d'action. Tandis que le régime de subjectivité marqué par la défaite se transforme avec les représentations de soi comme victime de violence, les jeunes générations contribuent à l'élaboration d'une mémoire communicative. La lutte pour la démocratie se révèle aussi comme une lutte mémorielle afin de construire des récits partageables au niveau de la mémoire sociale. Conjuguée à une réflexion sur la fonction de l'utopie pour la capacité d'agir, la mémoire fait partie des outils de la grille d'analyse déployée pour étudier le mouvement Gezi de juin 2013. L'occupation du Parc Gezi révèle plusieurs caractéristiques concomitantes des mouvements contemporains, avec sa configuration affective, les dynamiques intergénérationnelles, la resymbolisation de l'espace, et la transgression des frontières symboliques de l'altérité. L'occupation du Parc Gezi est analysée comme la performance publique de l'utopie. La création de tels espaces d'expérience et de subjectivation ne présagent pas pour autant de la traduction en politique des mouvements. La marginalité et la condition minoritaire de la gauche constituent à la fois une ressource et une limite. La thèse propose une sociologie de la marginalité en contexte conservateur et autoritaire, et par là-même, la démonstration de la créativité de l'agir et de ses limites. En somme, les mouvements contemporains en Turquie comportent à la fois des composantes de mouvement social, de mouvement éthique et de mouvement d'expérience. Ils contestent les cadres historiques de l'altérité et du nationalisme par l'incarnation des pratiques démocratiques, et en créant un monde symbolique et axiologique alternatif aux orientations culturelles dominantesThe dissertation focuses on the regime of subjectivity of the actors of contestation in Turkey, in order to question the nature of the contemporary movements and the particularities of left-wing commitment. The fieldwork, that begins with the mobilizations following the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007, ends at the first commemoration of the Gezi movement in 2014. Qualitative data collected through interviews and observation from different generations of militants and activists are analyzed through the lens of subjectivization and desubjectivization. What are the effects of emotions, collective memory and future horizons on agency ? The first part of the dissertation sheds light on the diversity of modalities of action such as moral shock mobilizations, initiatives of intellectuals, electoral strategies, an anti-war music festival from the anti-globalization movement. The mobilizations that bring together the revolutionary generations and the younger activists are part of the global logic of collective action. The claims of democracy are expressed both by the transition from the revolutionary horizon to a paradigm of human rights, and by prefigurative practices. The second part examines dialectics between memory and utopia in the political imaginary of actors. The analysis of the various cultural and political manifestations of the collective memory of a fragmented left shows both permanence and mutations in values, symbols, habitus and repertoire of action. While the regime of subjectivity marked by defeat is transformed with self-representations as victims of violence, the younger generations participate to the elaboration of a communicative memory. The struggle for democracy reveals itself as a memory struggle to build shareable narratives at the level of social memory. Combined with a reflection on the function of utopia for agency, memory is part of the analytical tools deployed to study the Gezi movement of June 2013. The occupation of Gezi Park displays several concomitant characteristics of contemporary movements, with its emotional configuration, the intergenerational dynamics, the resymbolisation of the space, and the transgression of the symbolic boundaries of alterity. The occupation of Gezi Park is analyzed as the public performance of utopia. The creation of such spaces of experience and subjectivization does not presage the translation into politics of movements. The marginality and the minority condition of the left can be both a resource and a limit. The dissertation proposes a sociology of marginality in a conservative and authoritarian context, and thus the demonstration of the creativity of action and its limits. In sum, contemporary movements in Turkey have both components of social movement, ethical movement and experience movement. They challenge the historical frameworks of alterity and nationalism by incarnating democratic practices and they create a symbolic and axiological world that is alternative to the dominant cultural orientations
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Karatas, Sibel Esra. "Local Reactions To A National Road Project: The Case Of Black Sea Coastal Road Project, Turkey." Master's thesis, METU, 2006. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12608076/index.pdf.
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The main purpose of this study is to understand the mobilization dynamics and impacts of the environmental opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project in Turkey. The study is original in the sense that for the first time an opposition movement against a national road project was realized in Turkey. The Black Sea Coastal Road Project is one of the main infrastructure investments in Turkey. It covers a large geographical area, Eastern Black Sea Region, and some districts/provinces in the region formed an opposition movement against the project which objected to sea-filling method and destruction of coasts.
The fieldwork of the study was conducted in seven districts/provinces of Eastern Black Sea Region. They were investigated in terms of their mobilization dynamics, tactics and the outcomes of the opposition movement. The main analysis is based on an evaluative approach and qualitative research. The fieldwork of the study was conducted in the periods of March 16, 2002 to March 24, 2002 and April 13, 2006 to April 20, 2006. In-depth-interviews and focus groups with local activists are used as data collection techniques. The seven cases-regions displayed some differences in their opposition movement in terms of the mobilization, tactics and the outcome. In the districts, most crucial for mobilization were the political party affiliation and the economic opportunity structures. The project being a part of governmental policy and the perception by the public, living in the region that the road is needed strongly affected dynamics, tactics and outcomes of the movement.
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ATAK, Kivanc. "Police, protest and democracy in Turkey : from Gazi to Gezi." Doctoral thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/29637.
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Defence date: 18 December 2013Examining Board: Professor Donatella della Porta, European University Institute (Supervisor) Professor László Bruszt, European University Institute Professor John D. McCarthy, Penn State University Professor Ziya Onis, Koc University.
DF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
This thesis is about the police and the control of public protests in Turkey. Despite its centrality to state power, the police have never become a mainstream subject of political sociology. Particularly on a stage where governments perform state power in the face of societal dissent, the police are not bit players but lead actors who demystify curiously about the political foundations of a regime. My dissertation focuses on contemporary manifestations of protest policing in a geography where democratization incorporated previously discredited actors into the political centre while the strong hand of the state advanced in modern technologies of law enforcement. I specifically interrogate how the transformation of the police after 1980 and more precisely since the end of the 1990s reflects on the policing of public protests, and how this transformation resonates with the patterns of protest in the country. I am also empirically interested in the application of this process on contentious gatherings of different origin; namely on labour, student, and pro-Kurdish protests. Throughout the thesis, I argue that the empowerment of the police in Turkey translated into the interactive dynamics with protester groups. While the police's differential strategies resonate with divergent protest strategies, the political fabrication of "threats" is a means to justify police empowerment through increased para-militarization and legal instruments. In order to address my research question, I resort to methodological pluralism, and use multiple sources. The descriptively quantitative data on the protest events provide me with preliminary yet illustrative information, which I substantiate with the analysis of official and unofficial documents, semi-structured interviews, archival and visual material in qualitative fashion. I further benefit from secondary literature to yield a comparative knowledge on the subject.
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ORAL, Didem. "Peace movements in militaristic societies : Israel and Turkey as unidentical twins." Doctoral thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/54704.
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Defence date: 17 May 2018Examining Board: Prof. Donatella della Porta, EUI (Supervisor- Scuola Normale Superiore); Prof. Olivier Roy, EUI; Prof. Klaus Eder, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; Prof. Joel S. Migdal, University of Washington
This qualitative research studies different characteristics of peace movement groups and organizations in militaristic societies by using the most similar system design to compare Israel and Turkey. It attempts to explore the dynamic interaction of political opportunity structures (POS), mobilizing structures and framing through different time periods. The two countries are similar in many types of POS like having a militaristic society, ethnic division and being involved in armed conflicts. If Israel and Turkey have similar POS, does it mean that they also have similar characteristics of peace movements? With my research, I found out that in the two countries mobilizing structures and frames vary consistently. This can be explained through the fact that the development of mobilizing structures and frames is affected by other types of POS, in which Israel and Turkey differ: citizenship rights and foundational principles. These types of POS that vary between the two countries also explain the variance of peace movement groups’ and organizations’ characteristics. This study covers the period from 2000 (the Second Intifada) in Israel and from 2002 in Turkey (when AKP came to power) until Summer 2014. The research is conducted using interviews during fieldworks in Istanbul, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem between June 2012 and September 2014. This research is based on sixty-seven intensive interviews with thirty-seven peace movement groups and organizations; such as human rights organizations, anti-NATO groups, political organizations and groups supporting conscientious objectors. It includes mobilization during turning points like Operation Protective Edge (2014) and Gezi Protests (2013). It builds on the theories of political, as well as discursive opportunity structures, and citizenship studies, which are important to analyze how framing works through mobilizing structures in militaristic societies. To my knowledge, there is no previous research which deals extensively, and exclusively, with this topic, therefore my research is the first attempt to categorize and label these groups. The originality of this research depends on its empirical data as well as on its conceptual framework. Considering the recent mobilization in Israel, Turkey and the surrounding regions, this research is a very timely project. Besides that, it also contributes to the theoretical as well as methodological understanding of social movements, and peace movements in particular.
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DRAEGE, Jonas Bergan. "The aftermath of Turkey's Gezi protests : how political parties respond to social movements." Doctoral thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/47926.
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Defence date: 05 September 2017Examining Board: Professor Donatella Della Porta, Scuola Normale Superiore (EUI Supervisor); Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute; Professor Ali Çarkoğlu, Koç University; Professor Katrin Uba, Uppsala University
This thesis explores how Turkey's political parties responded to the Gezi Park protests in 2012. I assess how four political parties framed the protests, whether the latter were accompanied by changes in the parties' platforms and priorities, and whether politicians in office adjusted practical policies to accommodate protest demands. In this research I draw on original data of parliamentary interventions, budget allocations, semi-structured interviews, and secondary sources, to answer these questions. The Gezi protests received a great deal of attention from politicians, especially from the two opposition parties closest to the protests, the CHP and the BDP. However, both parties responded to the demands that aligned best with their pre-existing agendas, and with different loci of attention. The protests were also met with practical concessions on a few specific demands. Yet these policy responses were narrowly targeted at the object and symbol of the initial protests rather than at their underlying grievances. Consequently, I argue that the responses from the CHP and the BDP were supportive, but limited. There was a policy response, but it did not go very deep. There was a platform response, but it framed the demands in the direction of pre-existing platforms. There was an organisational response and a response in terms of electoral strategies, but many of these were symbolic, and not accompanied by major changes in party platforms. In this sense, it may be useful to talk about the institutional response to the Gezi protest as a creative process for these two political parties. When party representatives spoke about the protests, they highlighted those issues where their party already had ownership. Furthermore, while the BDP supported several of the protesters’ demands, the CHP was more supportive of the protest actors themselves. I use this finding to suggest an extension of the concept of the protest paradigm in the social movement literature. Until now the protest paradigm has mainly been used to describe how antagonists of protests delegitimize protests, whereas I suggest that it is also is a possible strategy for supportive actors. This novel use of the protest paradigm is a main contribution of this thesis. More generally, the thesis combines the literature on social movement outcomes and party politics, and contributes to an expansion of studies of social movement outcomes to cases outside the area of Western liberal democracies.
Chapter 6 ‘Party changes following the Gezi protests' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as an article 'Social movements within organisations : occupy parties in Italy and Turkey' (2016) in the journal ‘South European society and politics’
Books on the topic "Protest movements – Turkey"
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Alessandrini, Anthony C., and Nazan Üstündağ. "Resistance everywhere": The Gezi protests and dissident visions of Turkey. [S.l.]: Tadween Publishing, 2013.
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The making of a protest movement in Turkey: #occupygezi. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
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The Kurdish national movement in Turkey: From protest to resistance. New York: Routledge, 2011.
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Markar, Esayan, ed. Dünyayı "durduran" altmış gün: Meydan, darbe, demokrasi. 4th ed. İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2013.
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Challenging neoliberalism at Turkey's Gezi Park: From private discontent to collective class action. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
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Affairs, United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European. Where is Turkey headed?: Gezi Park, Taksim Square, and the future of the Turkish model : hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, July 31, 2013. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014.
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From environmentalism to transenvironmentalism: The ethnography of an urban protest in modern Istanbul. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009.
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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. Turkey at a crossroads: What do the Gezi Park protests mean for democracy in the region?: hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, June 26, 2013. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013.
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AKP'nin Suriye yenilgisi ve Esad. Ankara: NotaBene Yayınları, 2014.
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Türkiye'nin uzun on yılı: Demokrat Parti iktidarı ve 27 Mayıs darbesi. Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2011.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Protest movements – Turkey"
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Özkırımlı, Umut. "Introduction." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_1.
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Sofos, Spyros A. "In Lieu of Conclusion: Rallying for Gezi, or Metaphors of Aporia and Empowerment." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 134–41. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_10.
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Özel, Soli. "A Moment of Elation: The Gezi Protests/Resistance and the Fading of the AKP Project." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 7–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_2.
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Iğsız, Aslı. "Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests: Authoritarianism in Flux, Law and Neoliberaiism." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 25–49. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_3.
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Tuğal, Cihan. "Gülenism: The Middle Way or Official Ideology?" In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 50–64. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_4.
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Bakıner, Onur. "Can the “Spirit of Gezi” Transform Progressive Politics in Turkey?" In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 65–76. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_5.
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Ferguson, Michael. "White Turks, Black Turks and Negroes: The Politics of Polarization." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 77–88. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_6.
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Gambetti, Zeynep. "Occupy Gezi as Politics of the Body." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 89–102. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_7.
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Yıldız, Emrah. "Cruising Politics: Sexuality, Solidarity and Modularity after Gezi." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 103–20. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_8.
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Harmanşah, Ömür. "Urban Utopias and How They Fell Apart: The Political Ecology of Gezi Parkı." In The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey, 121–33. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137413789_9.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Protest movements – Turkey"
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Gurbuz, Mustafa. "PERFORMING MORAL OPPOSITION: MUSINGS ON THE STRATEGY AND IDENTITY IN THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/hzit2119.
Full textAbstract:
This paper investigates the Gülen movement’s repertoires of action in order to determine how it differs from traditional Islamic revivalist movements and from the so-called ‘New Social Movements’ in the Western world. Two propositions lead the discussion: First, unlike many Islamic revivalist movements, the Gülen movement shaped its identity against the perceived threat of a trio of enemies, as Nursi named them a century ago – ignorance, disunity, and poverty. This perception of the opposition is crucial to understanding the apolitical mind-set of the Gülen movement’s fol- lowers. Second, unlike the confrontational New Social Movements, the Gülen movement has engaged in ‘moral opposition’, in which the movement’s actors seek to empathise with the adversary by creating (what Bakhtin calls) ‘dialogic’ relationships. ‘Moral opposition’ has enabled the movement to be more alert strategically as well as more productive tactically in solving the everyday practical problems of Muslims in Turkey. A striking example of this ‘moral opposition’ was witnessed in the Merve Kavakci incident in 1999, when the move- ment tried to build bridges between the secular and Islamist camps, while criticising and educating both parties during the post-February 28 period in Turkey. In this way the Gülen movement’s performance of opposition can contribute new theoretical and practical tools for our understanding of social movements. 104 | P a g e Recent works on social movements have criticized the longstanding tradition of classify- ing social movement types as “strategy-oriented” versus “identity-oriented” (Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Rucht 1988) and “identity logic of action” versus “instrumentalist logic of ac- tion” (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995) by regarding identities as a key element of a move- ment’s strategic and tactical repertoire (see Bernstein 1997, 2002; Gamson 1997; Polletta 1998a; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Bifurcation of identity ver- sus strategy suggests the idea that some movements target the state and the economy, thus, they are “instrumental” and “strategy-oriented”; whereas some other movements so-called “identity movements” challenge the dominant cultural patterns and codes and are considered “expressive” in content and “identity-oriented.” New social movement theorists argue that identity movements try to gain recognition and respect by employing expressive strategies wherein the movement itself becomes the message (Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1989, 1996). Criticizing these dualisms, some scholars have shown the possibility of different social movement behaviour under different contextual factors (e.g. Bernstein 1997; Katzenstein 1998). In contrast to new social movement theory, this work on the Gülen movement indi- cates that identity movements are not always expressive in content and do not always follow an identity-oriented approach; instead, identity movements can synchronically be strategic as well as expressive. In her article on strategies and identities in Black Protest movements during the 1960s, Polletta (1994) criticizes the dominant theories of social movements, which a priori assume challengers’ unified common interests. Similarly, Jenkins (1983: 549) refers to the same problem in the literature by stating that “collective interests are assumed to be relatively unproblematic and to exist prior to mobilization.” By the same token, Taylor and Whittier (1992: 104) criticize the longstanding lack of explanation “how structural inequality gets translated into subjective discontent.” The dominant social movement theory approaches such as resource mobilization and political process regard these problems as trivial because of their assumption that identities and framing processes can be the basis for interests and further collective action but cannot change the final social movement outcome. Therefore, for the proponents of the mainstream theories, identities of actors are formed in evolutionary processes wherein social movements consciously frame their goals and produce relevant dis- courses; yet, these questions are not essential to explain why collective behaviour occurs (see McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). This reductionist view of movement culture has been criticized by a various number of scholars (e.g. Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Polletta 1997, 1999a, 1999b; Eyerman 2002). In fact, the debate over the emphases (interests vis-à-vis identities) is a reflection of the dissent between American and European sociological traditions. As Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 27) note, the American sociologists focused on “the instrumentality of movement strategy formation, that is, on how movement organizations went about trying to achieve their goals,” whereas the European scholars concerned with the identity formation processes that try to explain “how movements produced new historical identities for society.” Although the social movement theorists had recognized the deficiencies within each approach, the attempts to synthesize these two traditions in the literature failed to address the empirical problems and methodological difficulties. While criticizing the mainstream American collective behaviour approaches that treat the collective identities as given, many leading European scholars fell into a similar trap by a 105 | P a g e priori assuming that the collective identities are socio-historical products rather than cog- nitive processes (see, for instance, Touraine 1981). New Social Movement (NSM) theory, which is an offshoot of European tradition, has lately been involved in the debate over “cog- nitive praxis” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), “signs” (Melucci 1996), “identity as strategy” (Bernstein 1997), protest as “art” (Jasper 1997), “moral performance” (Eyerman 2006), and “storytelling” (Polletta 2006). In general, these new formulations attempt to bring mental structures of social actors and symbolic nature of social action back in the study of collec- tive behaviour. The mental structures of the actors should be considered seriously because they have a potential to change the social movement behaviours, tactics, strategies, timing, alliances and outcomes. The most important failure, I think, in the dominant SM approaches lies behind the fact that they hinder the possibility of the construction of divergent collective identities under the same structures (cf. Polletta 1994: 91). This study investigates on how the Gülen movement differed from other Islamic social move- ments under the same structural factors that were realized by the organized opposition against Islamic activism after the soft coup in 1997. Two propositions shall lead my discussion here: First, unlike many Islamic revivalist movements, the Gülen movement shaped its identity against perceived threat of the triple enemies, what Nursi defined a century ago: ignorance, disunity, and poverty. This perception of the opposition is crucial to grasp non-political men- tal structures of the Gülen movement followers. Second, unlike the confrontational nature of the new social movements, the Gülen movement engaged in a “moral opposition,” in which the movement actors try to empathize with the enemy by creating “dialogic” relationships.
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Kuru, Ahmet T. "CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY: THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND THE AK PARTY." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/mmwz7057.
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The debate between secularists and Islamic groups, a conspicuous feature of Turkish politics for decades, changed in the late 1990s when the political discourse of mainstream Islamic groups embraced secularism. The establishment elite advocate the existing French model of an ‘assertive secularism’, meaning that, in the public domain, the state supports only the ex- pression of a secular worldview, and formally excludes religion and religious symbols from that domain. The pro-Islamic conservatives, on the other hand, favour the American model of ‘passive secularism’, in which the state permits the expression of religion in the public do- main. In short, what Turkey has witnessed over the last decade is no longer a tussle between secularism and Islamism, but between two brands of secularism. Two actors have played crucial roles in this transformation: the Gülen movement and the Justice and Development (AK) Party. Recently the Gülen movement became an international actor and a defendant of passive secularism. Similarly, although the AK Party was originated from an Islamist Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, it is now a keen supporter of Turkey’s membership to the European Union and defends (passive) secularist, democratic regime. This paper analyses the transformation of these important social and political actors with regard to certain structural conditions, as well as the interactions between them.In April 2007, the international media covered Turkey for the protest meetings of more than a million people in three major cities, the military intervention to politics, and the abortive presidential election. According to several journalists and columnists, Turkey was experienc- ing another phase of the ongoing tension between the secularists and Islamists. Some major Turkish newspapers, such as Hürriyet, were asserting that the secularists finally achieved to bring together millions of opponents of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma (Justice and Development) (AK) Party. In addition to their dominance in military and judicial bureauc- racy, the secularists appeared to be maintaining the support of the majority of the people. The parliamentary elections that took place few months later, in July, revealed that the main- stream Turkish media’s presentation was misleading and the so-called secularists’ aspira- tions were unrealistic. The AK Party received 47 percent of the national votes, an unusual ratio for a multiparty system where there were 14 contesting parties. The main opposition, Cumhuriyet Halk (Republican People’s) Party (CHP), only received 21 percent of the votes, despite its alliance with the other leftist party. Both the national and international media’s misleading presentation of Turkish politics was not confined by the preferences of the vot- ers. Moreover, the media was primarily misleading with its use of the terms “Islamists” and “secularists.” What Turkey has witnessed for the last decade has not been a struggle between secularism and Islamism; but it has been a conflict between two types of secularism. As I elaborated else- where, the AK Party is not an Islamist party. It defends a particular understanding of secular- ism that differs from that of the CHP. Although several leaders of the AK Party historically belonged to an Islamist -Milli Görüş (National Outlook)- movement, they later experienced an ideational transformation and embraced a certain type of secularism that tolerates public visibility of religion. This transformation was not an isolated event, but part of a larger expe- rience that several other Islamic groups took part in. I argue that the AKP leaders’ interaction with the Gülen movement, in this regard, played an important role in the formation of the party’s new perspective toward secularism. In another article, I analyzed the transformation of the AK Party and Gülen movement with certain external (globalization process) and internal (the February 28 coup) conditions. In this essay, I will focus on the interaction between these two entities to explore their changing perspectives. I will first discuss the two different types of secularism that the Kemalists and conservatives defend in Turkey. Then, I will briefly summarize diverse discourses of the Milli Görüş and Gülen movements. Finally, I will examine the exchanges between the Gülen movement and the AK Party with regard to their rethinking of Islamism and secularism.