Relevant bibliographies by topics / Procurement corruption

Academic literature on the topic 'Procurement corruption'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Procurement corruption"

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Graycar, Adam. "Mapping corruption in procurement." Journal of Financial Crime 26, no. 1 (January 7, 2019): 162–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-06-2018-0063.

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Purpose This paper aims to focus on understanding and preventing corruption in procurement in public sector settings. Just as not all corruption is the same, not all procurement is the same. One purpose is to analyze different types of procurements: standard, customized, intangible and complex. Corruption in procurement undermines public administration, and the purpose of this paper is to identify different types of procurements and provide readers with a framework for analysis and subsequent intervention. Design/methodology/approach In all, 42 actual cases of public sector corruption in procurement are examined, and from these, an analytical matrix is developed. These cases are derived from the reports of the New South Wales (Australia) Independent Commission against Corruption. These cases represent all of the procurement cases that the ICAC has taken to a formal hearing in its 30 years of existence. Findings While fraud is a major feature of corruption in procurement, there are significant organizational facilitators, and a number of slippage points in organizations are identified. These include peer culture, lack of due process, temptation and managerial incompetence/willful disregard, and these are built into a matrix which can be used in different countries or settings by readers wishing to understand and prevent different types of corruption in procurement in their agencies. Originality/value This paper uses cases that have not previously been aggregated or analyzed and provides analytical tools for practitioners and academics.
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Toeba, Thato. "Corruption in Public Procurement in Lesotho." Law and Development Review 11, no. 2 (June 26, 2018): 397–431. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2018-0025.

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Abstract Public procurement refers to the acquisition of goods and services by government in order to facilitate the efficient operationalisation of the state machinery. Public procurement however extends beyond transactions to acquire commodities to “the relationship between the state and its suppliers, and between the state and the commodity transaction”. Global political hierarchies, with affluent democracies at the apex, play a dominant role in how states like Lesotho, with little political agency internationally buy and sell commodities and what terms and conditions attach to such transactions. This paper argues that the architecture of public procurement policy in Africa generally and Lesotho specifically is anchored in neoliberalism which emerged as the dominant economic theory globally after the end of World War II. Corruption which is critical in public procurement because of the huge quantities of commodities often being transacted and the volume of money involved in the procurement process. This creates substantial opportunities for public officials with the propensity to be corrupt because of the high profitability attached to these large procurements. According to the director of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO), public procurement in Lesotho is the most vulnerable area to corruption and public procurement cases form 99% of corruption cases handled by the DCEO in 2016. The paper argues that he most combative and dictatorial mechanism of the neoliberal approach to anti-corruption and public procurement policies in Lesotho is the lack of consideration for local contexts, particularly when such policies are adopted litereratim. The slow erosion of corruption, particularly in public procurement in Lesotho is testimony to the futility of neoliberal policies in the country. Officials often adopt neoliberal policies disingenuously and masquerade them as actual reform. Alternatively, policies are adopted to comply with foreign aid requisites or to guarantee Lesotho’s place in global trade. At close inspection, the public procurement legal regime reveals weaknesses which are antithetical to the enthusiastic anti-corruption narratives that the Lesotho government performs to appease donors. Political agents in Lesotho often condemn corruption and reiterate a commitment to corruption-free procurement processes, however, overt corruption that permeates all sectors in the country contradicts this narrative. This paper provides an appraisal of the Public Procurement Regulations of Lesotho as anchored in the neoliberal approach. It argues that the socio-political nuances in Lesotho are in fundamental conflict with the neoliberal theory, making legal enforcement of the regulations extremely difficult.
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Kartika, Desi. "The Impact of E-Procurement Implementation on Public Procurement’s Corruption Cases; Evidence from Indonesia and India." Jurnal Kajian Wilayah 11, no. 2 (March 17, 2022): 193. http://dx.doi.org/10.14203/jkw.v11i2.841.

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The huge spending on public procurement makes public procurement is very vulnerable to corruption. Many governments around the world have adopted Electronic Procurement (E-Procurement) to increase transparency, improve accountability, and reduce corruption with variable success. Government of Indonesia adopted E-Procurement in 2008, while Government of India introduced E-Procurement in 2012. Even though E-Procurement has been implemented for quite a long time in those two emerging countries, only limited research exist on the impact of E-Procurement in reducing procurement corruption. By using the combination between quantitative and qualitative methods, this study attempts to assess the extent to which the impact of E-Procurement implementation on procurement corruption cases in Indonesia and India. The findings suggest that Indonesian provinces with high capital expenditure ratio, are more vulnerable to corruption and implementation of E-Procurement was impactful on reducing the number of procurement corruption cases in such provinces. Meanwhile in India, the effect of E-Procurement was not impactful enough to reduce a notably large number of procurement corruption at the state governments because E-Procurement implementation at the state level in some degree was bothered by low competency and professionalization staff and also high political interference in state administrations. The study contributes to limited empirical research on the effect of E-Procurement on corruption.
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Preda, Ionel. "CORRUPTION: A PROBLEM IN ROMANIAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT." Business Excellence and Management 10, no. 2 (June 15, 2020): 63–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.24818/beman/2020.10.2-05.

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Even though the relevance of corruption is very high in all fields of activity, the specialized literature in the field of public procurement has paid very little or even no attention to this crucial phenomenon. The field of public procurement presents a high risk of corruption, the evidence being the large number of high-level corruption cases in several Member States of the European Union. The study presents the specialized literature related to corruption in public procurement in the European Union and United States of America, analyzes the level of corruption in public procurement in Romania, the causes that generate corruption and the main measures to combat it. The article also presents the results of a survey realized among the purchasers from Romania which addresses the main elements of corruption in the field of public procurement. The survey analyzes issues related to corruption in public procurement in Romania, such as: level of corruption, control over corruption, frequency of occurrence of corruption acts, procurement procedures most prone to corruption, characteristics of the procurement procedures that favors the occurrence of corruption, most widespread way of manifesting corruption, most important consequence of corruption, percentage of increasing contract costs due to corruption, most effective anti-corruption measure.
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Burguet, Roberto, and Yeon-Koo Che. "Competitive Procurement with Corruption." RAND Journal of Economics 35, no. 1 (2004): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1593729.

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Burguet, Roberto. "Procurement Design with Corruption." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9, no. 2 (May 1, 2017): 315–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150105.

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I investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the cases of both fixed and variable (with the size of misrepresentation) bribes, and also uncertainty about the bribe amount. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractors. I also present models of bribe negotiations whose reduced form coincide with the model analyzed in the paper, and discuss implementation and the effect of competition. (JEL D73, D82, D86, H57, L15)
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Schultz, Jessica, and Tina Søreide. "Corruption in emergency procurement." Disasters 32, no. 4 (October 24, 2008): 516–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2008.01053.x.

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Williams-Elegbe, Sope. "Systemic corruption and public procurement in developing countries: are there any solutions?" Journal of Public Procurement 18, no. 2 (June 4, 2018): 131–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jopp-06-2018-009.

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Purpose Corruption affects development and quality of life of citizens in affected countries. The increase in anti-corruption measures globally reflects a consensus that corruption is pervasive and costly. Public procurement is one area in which corruption manifests because of the sums of money involved; the asymmetry of information; and the bureaucratic nature of decision-making, which presents opportunities for abuse. In developing countries, procurement corruption is rife because of institutional weaknesses, lack of enforced accountability mechanisms and culture of silence in relation to public sector malfeasance. Design/methodology/approach This paper examines procurement corruption in countries with systemic corruption, using Nigeria as a case study, to determine how to reduce public procurement corruption. Findings The paper will highlight prevalent corrupt schemes in public procurement in Nigeria, examine the reasons for the failure of state anti-corruption institutions and analyze the kinds of initiatives that reduced procurement corruption and increased accountability in other countries and the utility of adopting such mechanisms in the Nigerian context.
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Volkova, Margarita Andreevna. "Anti-corruption remedies within the system of corruption prevention in the sphere of state (municipal) procurement." Национальная безопасность / nota bene, no. 4 (April 2020): 66–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0668.2020.4.33833.

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  The subject of this research is the norms of international and Russian legislation on the state (municipal) procurement, countering corruption, as well as scientific works dedicated to corruption prevention and anti-corruption remedies. The goal consists on examination of fundamentals of application of anti-corruption measures in the sphere of state (municipal) procurement. Analysis is conducted on the existing within scientific literature approaches towards development of anti-corruption remedies, as well as on theoretical grounds of criminological theory of security measures. Characteristics is given to anti-corruption measures in the sphere of state (municipal) procurement. The scientific novelty consists in examination of the characteristics of anti-corruption measures in the sphere of state (municipal) procurement, which have not previously been the subject of research. The author analyzes the theoretical framework for application of security measures overall and anti-corruption measures in particular; as well as the goals, content, subjects and classifications of anti-corruption measures in the sphere of state (municipal) procurement. Examples of such measures established in current anti-corruption legislation with regards to state (municipal) procurement are provided. The conclusion is formulates that anti-corruption measures within the system of corruption prevention in the indicated sphere require further research. Therefore, it seems reasonable to advance criminological theory of security measures and anti-corruption remedies. Moreover, systematization of knowledge on such measures is essential for future improvement of lawmaking and law enforcement activities in the sphere of state (municipal) procurement.  
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Delmana, Lati Praja. "PENGARUH PENERAPAN GOOD GOVERNANCE DALAM E-PURCASHING TERHADAP PENCEGAHAN KORUPSI." Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan Widya Praja 45, no. 1 (May 31, 2019): 47–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.33701/jipwp.v45i1.241.

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Cases of corruption in Indonesia, especially in the sector of government procurement of goods and services, continue to increase every year. The government has reduce the rate of corruption in the procurement through electronic procurement. But the reality of corruption is still increasing. The authors are interested in building a conceptual framework for good governance and incorporating elements of local culture in electronic procurement to reduce corruption. The principle of good governance in electronic procurement can prevent corruption by applying the principles of participation, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, strategic objectives, accountability and local cultural values. The purpose of this research is to get a clear and measurable conceptual framework in reducing corruption in government procurement of goods and services. This research method is to use literature review with content analysis. The results of this study are that corruption can be reduced by using electronic procurement if it uses the principles of good governance and there are controlling variables, namely internal supervision, law enforcement and improvement of facilities, infrastructure, leadership commitment and improvement of human resources to carry out electronic procurement according to the rules.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Procurement corruption"

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ZANELLA, MARCO. "Scripting Corruption in Public Procurement: The Italian Case." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/1318.

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La corruzione negli appalti pubblici ha sempre destato particolare interesse. Nondimeno, un’attenta analisi della letteratura di settore dimostra come scarsa attenzione sia stata dedicata allo studio delle scelte strategiche adottate da corrotti e corruttori nel mentre decidono come pagare la tangente, come identificare il partner dell’accordo corruttivo, come contattarlo, come gestire le trattative, come raggiungere i propri obiettivi e come proteggersi da inadempimenti e tradimenti. Questa tesi si propone di studiare tali strategie, applicando per la prima volta in questo settore una particolare metodologia detta della script analysis, al fine di rispondere alle seguenti domande: come avvengono gli accordi corruttivi nel settore degli appalti pubblici? Quali sono le tattiche e i modi operandi adottati da corrotti e corruttori? Quali sono i “passaggi” necessari per la conclusione di accordi corruttivi? Come possono essere spiegati? Quali sono gli elementi che “facilitano” i protagonisti del pactum sceleris? Dopo aver passato in rassegna la letteratura (capitolo 1) ed illustrato la metodologia adottata (capitolo 2), la tesi risponde alle domande della ricerca, individuando i singoli passaggi dell’accordo corruttivo, soffermandosi sulle procedure adottate (capitolo 3) fino a circoscrivere e commentare gli elementi facilitatori (capitolo 4) nell’incontro tra domanda e offerta di utilitas.
Despite the growing concern over corruption in public procurement, there is little knowledge regarding the corruption-commission process. Scant attention has been paid to the event-decisions of corrupt agents in order to explore how an agent decides to pay, how he identifies his partner, how he contacts him, how he negotiates with him, how he manages to achieve his goal, and how he protects himself against “lemons”. The aim of this thesis is to understand the corruption-commission process by using crime script analysis to delve into the event-decisions of corrupt agents. Therefore, within the Italian context, this thesis seeks to answer the following research questions: how do corrupt deals in public procurement take place? What are the tactics, dynamics and the modi operandi of corrupt agents? What are the steps of corruption-commission in the specific area of public procurement? How can these steps be explained? What are the facilitators of corruption-commission? After the relevant literature has been reviewed (Chapter 1) and the methodology has been discussed (chapter 2), the results of the research are presented in chapters 3 and 4, where the procedural aspects and the procedural requirements of the crime are presented and discussed. Some concluding remarks close the thesis.
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Shabbir, Aqsa. "Corruption in infrastructure procurement : a study based on procurement of infrastructure projects in Pakistan." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/corruption-in-infrastructure-procurement--a-study-based-on-procurement-of-infrastructure-projects-in-pakistan(90318909-f748-4428-a7da-e8a60f6210d7).html.

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The main purpose of this research project is to bridge the existing knowledgegap in the empirical identification and understanding of the most frequentcorrupt actions and the causes behind during procurement of infrastructureprojects in Pakistan, in addition to exploring the ways to enhance institutionalbasedtrust between the participants of the procurement process. Consequentlythe study aims to provide a conceptual framework to control corruption ininfrastructure procurement while proposing the institutional trust-buildingmechanisms. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are utilised in thisstudy to achieve this research aim. Quantitative research data is collected usinga questionnaire survey. A total of 450 questionnaires were sent to variouspeople engaged in procurement of infrastructure projects in Pakistan. Theresponse rate was 36.7% (n=165). The questionnaire comprises of two mainquestions; one is about the most frequent corrupt actions in traditional andPublic Private Partnership (PPP) infrastructure procurement processes whileother question asks about the perceived institutional trust-building mechanismsin context of infrastructure procurement market in Pakistan. Various appropriatestatistical methods, including Mean Ranking and ANOVA were utilised toanalyse the collected data. The questionnaire survey was followed by 15 indepth semi-structured interviews with a variety of stakeholders. Theseinterviews provided information on various causes of corruption and reasons asto why people do not for example report a known incident of corruption. A traditional content analysis approach was used to analyse the data collectedusing interviews. From the analysis a cyclical framework of corruption controlemerged, and this is outlined within the thesis. The goal of this framework is tofacilitate procurement stakeholders (individuals, groups, or organisations), toimprove their anti-corruption plans from project to project. This research studyhas filled the knowledge gap through identifying the top twenty potentialcorrupt practices in traditional and PPP infrastructure procurement processes inPakistan and explored the causes behind their occurrence. The study alsorecommends the solutions to mitigate this problem throughout the life cycle ofprocurement process. In addition, the study proposes the institutional trustbuildingmechanisms in the context of infrastructure procurement market inPakistan to cater for the likely loss in trust due to perceived level of corruptionin this sector. The study has also introduced a conceptual framework to controlcorruption in infrastructure procurement process in general and particularly inPakistan. The framework does not intend to introduce new alternatives butinstead builds on existing practices so that users can more easily adapt to theimprovement. The findings of this research are believed to be useful for allpractitioners who are either considering or currently involved in infrastructureprocurement process in Pakistan and trying to avoid or minimise the influenceof corruption.
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Williams-Elegbe, Sope. "Fighting corruption in procurement : a comparative analysis of disqualification measures." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/13254/.

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Corruption has firmly taken centre stage in the development agenda of international organisations, developed and developing countries. One area in which corruption manifests is in public procurement and as a result, states have adopted various measures to prevent and curb corruption in public procurement. One such mechanism for dealing with procurement corruption is to disqualify corrupt suppliers from bidding on or otherwise obtaining government contracts. The disqualification of corrupt suppliers raises several issues, many of which are examined in this thesis. Implementing a disqualification mechanism in public procurement raises serious practical and conceptual difficulties, which are not always considered by legislative provisions on disqualification. Some of the problems that may arise from the use of disqualifications include determining whether a conviction for corruption ought to be a pre-requisite to disqualification, bearing in mind that corruption thrives in secret, resulting in a dearth of convictions. Another issue is determining how to balance the tension between granting adequate procedural safeguards to a supplier in disqualification proceedings and not delaying the procurement process. A further issue is determining the scope of the disqualification in the sense of determining whether it applies to firms, natural persons, subcontractors, subsidiaries or other persons related to the corrupt firm and whether disqualification will lead to the termination of existing contracts. These issues and the others considered by this thesis illustrate the limits to the efficacy of the disqualification mechanism in fighting procurement corruption. The thesis compares and contrasts the legal, practical and institutional approaches to the implementation of the disqualification mechanism in the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Republic of South Africa and the World Bank. The thesis examines how these jurisdictions have implemented a disqualification mechanism and whether their approaches may be regarded as appropriate.
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Ekwo, Grace. "Corruption risk factors : an analysis of public procurement in Nigeria." Thesis, Northumbria University, 2013. http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/14787/.

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Nigeria has consistently ranked 6th amongst oil-producing nations of the world but despite the enormous revenues from the sale of petroleum resources in the past five decades, the country has made little advance in terms of infrastructure, quality of life and the human development index. This has been attributed to endemic levels of corruption through misappropriation of public funds for private use, most of which have been associated with public procurement. The public procurement process in Nigeria has long been associated with corruption which involves misappropriation of public funds for private use. For example, the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index reports for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 indicate that much of public sector corruption in Nigeria is associated with the public procurement process. Between 2010 and 2012, Nigeria’s position on the corruption perception index of 183 countries surveyed by the TI, declined by 9 places to 143, an indication that current initiatives aimed at solving the problem have not been effective. Efforts at improving the practice of public procurement in Nigeria and developing it into a reputable profession cannot be successful without considering the more fundamental question of the factors that may have made corruption in the process resistant to efforts aimed at curbing it. It is this gap that this study hopes to address in order to promote transparency in the process of public procurement in Nigeria. A total of 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted across four organisations. Findings from the interviews were further subjected to verification discussions at two other organisations. Drawing from the case study analysis; greed, lack of inbuilt checks and wide discretionary powers of procurement officers under the direction of management emerged as possible risk factors motivating corruption in the public procurement process thus offering an explanation of the vulnerability of the process to corruption. Building upon the theoretical debates, public procurement-related corruption in Nigeria is contextualised in a framework which proposes a corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list for the management of public procurement in Nigeria to achieve verifiable transparency and accountability.
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MILANI, RICCARDO. "MULTI-LEVEL CORRUPTION RISK INDICATORS IN THE ITALIAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/57129.

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Questo studio sviluppa un originale indicatore di rischio corruzione negli appalti pubblici Italiani e stima la correlazione tra le caratteristiche delle aziende aggiudicatarie e l’indicatore di rischio corruzione precedentemente stimato. L’indicatore di rischio corruzione è costruito a partire dai residui statistici di una procedura semi-parametrica a due stadi. Nella prima fase, i contratti dei lavori pubblici sono comparati per identificare l’inefficienza relativa di ciascun lavoro pubblico sulla base di due variabili predefinite – costi aggiuntivi e ritardi nella fase di esecuzione del contratto – attraverso una tecnica di valutazione delle performance (DEA). Nella seconda fase, l’indicatore di inefficienza generato nella prima fase è spiegato attraverso l’uso di determinanti di inefficienza, escludendo il fattore della corruzione che è trattato separatamente. Nella terza fase, i residui di stima sono trasformati in nuovi punteggi di rischio corruzione a livello di contratto pubblico. I risultati suggeriscono che: (1) le stazioni appaltanti ad elevato rischio corruzione si trovano maggiormente nel Lazio, in Lombardia e in Toscana; (2) le aziende aggiudicatarie ad alto rischio corruzione risiedono maggiormente nel Centro Italia (Abruzzo, Umbria e Lazio) e nel Sud Italia (Campania e Basilicata). Successivamente, l’esercizio di valutazione del rischio corruzione è mirato all'identificazione delle caratteristiche aziendali associate ad un rischio elevato di corruzione. I risultati suggeriscono che le aziende che si aggiudicano contratti ad alto rischio di corruzione sono più orientati alla ricerca del profitto, detengono meno debiti e necessitano mediamente di maggior tempo per pagare i loro clienti. Infine, queste aziende hanno maggiori probabilità di avere legami legali e/o finanziari con giurisdizioni off-shore e paradisi fiscali.
This study develops an original corruption risk indicator at the Italian procurement level and estimates the correlation between the profile of contract suppliers and the corruption risk indicator in question. This corruption risk indicator relies on a residual approach following a two-stage, semi-parametric procedure. First, public work contracts are benchmarked to investigate the relative efficiency of each public work execution based on two predefined variables – cost overrun and time delay – using a data envelopment analysis (DEA). Second, DEA efficiency scores are regressed on environmental and contract-level determinants of inefficiency – excluding corruption which is treated separately. Third, the estimate residuals provide estimates of the potential risk of corruption at the contract level. The aggregated results from an updated Italian public procurement dataset suggest that: (1) the risk of corruption associated with contracting authorities prevails in larger urban areas, especially in Lazio, Tuscany and Lombardy; (2) the risk of corruption in relation to the location of firms is higher in central regions (Abruzzo, Umbria and Lazio) and southern regions (Campania and Basilicata). Then, a risk-based assessment exercise is performed to profile suppliers. The corruption risk indicator is regressed on suppliers’ financial and ownership data to identify patterns among firms winning risky contracts. Suppliers associated with high levels of corruption risk in public contracting are more profit-seeking, hold low levels of debts and on average need more days to pay their customers. Finally, suppliers involved in public work contracts at high risk of corruption are more likely to have legal and/or financial connections with off-shore jurisdictions and tax havens which might use financial and corporate secrecy to attract illicit financial flows.
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Bayley, Ruth. "Why did they do it? Understanding corruption in public sector procurement." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2022. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/235728/1/Ruth%2BBayley%2BThesis%281%29.pdf.

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The study analysed explanations of corruption in public procurement processes, using qualitative thematic content analysis, based on five discipline-based theories about corruption. The analysis revealed considerable complexity, with no single theory able to comprehensively explain the phenomenon of corruption, and all five theories offering valuable insights into how and why corruption arose. These findings are important because an organisation’s approach to corruption prevention and treatment is usually driven by its view about causes of corruption. Public sector organisations could therefore benefit from adopting corruption prevention and treatment programs based on broader theoretical perspectives.
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Centeno, García Gerardo. "Fraud in Mexico's Government Procurement Sector." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39101.

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This thesis analyzes the problem of corruption in the Mexican government procurement system, aiming to provide a mix of legal and policy solutions to combat and prevent it. Comparing the policies and laws that make up the regulatory framework of public procurement in Canada and Mexico, this study seeks to extract the best practices that can improve the Mexican system. This text illuminates how the weaknesses within Mexico’s procurement system has provoked the current exploitation of alternative procurement methods (known as “adjudicación directa” and “invitación a cuando menos tres personas”) to embezzle public resources through fictitious contract awards. Although we have seen a tendency towards including requirements for “transparency” and “accountability” into Mexican procurement law, this on its own is insufficient to combat corruption. Consequently, I argue that procurement units have to enhance these transparency policies by disclosing the rationale behind every procurement and contract award prior to the disbursement of the resources; having competition as the maximum principle to fulfill while doing so. This will allow auditing bodies (and Mexican citizens) to scrutinize the rationale behind these disbursements. The Public Function Secretary could oversee this process to validate the legality and the social benefit justifications claimed by the procurement units prior to utilizing alternative procurement methods.
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Pustan, Daniel. "Government favoritism in public procurement : Evidence from Romania." Thesis, KTH, Industriell ekonomi och organisation (Inst.), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-273310.

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In Romania, the consideration that politicians use their influence to control the public procurement market is axiomatic. It is no surprise that the country ranks high in perceptionbased surveys or the low participation of firms on the procurement market. The more difficult task is to demonstrate the existence of restrictions to procurement contracts in order to benefit preferred companies. That is, to measure the extent to which the market is captured by favored companies. Employing data on all public procurement contracts in Romania for the period 2009 – 2015, this paper examines government favoritism in public procurement exerted by political parties. Using a dynamic panel data approach (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2019), the companies are classified based on their winning pattern with respect to government change. Favoritism is observed if winning companies within the government period are also associated with a higher risk of corruption measured by two alternative approaches. The findings confirm that procurement market is captured in a low to moderate proportion (24%) and that the market display patterns of systematic favoritism. This may signal certain progress registered by Romania to combat political corruption. Arguably, the insensitivity of perception indicators with respect to this progress is, at least partly, due to media coverage of the on-going corruption investigations related to the past.
I Rumänien, finns det en allmän uppfattning om att politiker använder sitt inflytande för att kontrollera den offentliga upphandlingsmarknaden. Det är ingen överraskning att landet rankas högt i perceptionsbaserade undersökningar rörande korruption eller att företags deltagande inom upphandlingsmarknaden är lågt. Ett svårare uppdrag är dock att påvisa och bevisa förekomsten av begränsningar kring upphandlingskontrakt med syfte att gynna vissa företag. Med andra ord så föreligger en utmaning att, genom mätning, påvisa i vilken utsträckning marknaden inkluderar favoriserade företag kontra hur den exkluderar övriga företag. Med hjälp av uppgifter om samtliga kontrakt gällande offentlig upphandling i Rumänien under åren 2009 – 2015, undersöker denna avhandling regeringens och dess politiska partiers favorisering. Företagen i upphandlingarna klassificeras med hjälp av dynamiskpaneldata (Dávid-Barrett och Fazekas 2019), baserat på des vinnande mönster kopplat till regeringsbyte. Favorisering kan observeras om vinnande företag inom regeringsperioden även är förknippade med en högre risk för korruption som mätts genom två alternativa metoder. Resultaten bekräftar att upphandlingsmarknaden fångas i en låg till måttlig andel (24%) av favoriserade företag och att marknaden visar mönster av systematisk favorisering. Resultaten kan dock signalera om visst framsteg som Rumänien har uppnått för att bekämpa politisk korruption. Det kan argumenteras att perceptionsbaserade indikatorer fångade inte upp dessa framsteg, åtminstone delvis, på grund av mediatäckningen av pågående korruptionsutredningar i Rumänien relaterade till det förflutna.
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Fazekas, Mihály. "Prometheus unbound : quality of government and institutionalised grand corruption in public procurement." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/245455.

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This PhD thesis looks at one of the most crucial determinants of state formation, quality of institutions, and social equality: institutionalised grand corruption. Institutionalised grand corruption denotes the particularistic allocation of public resources, that is violating prior explicit rules in order to benefit a closed network while denying access to all others. Emphasizing access to power and public resources deviates from traditional definitions of corruption resting on individual wrongdoing and abuse of power. The thesis makes use of large amounts of administrative data describing public procurement tenders on transaction level and links it to data on company ownership, financial accounts, and political office of company owners. By using data mining techniques it breaks away from standard, and arguably deficient, measures of quality of institutions and corruption. It proposes a complex ‘blueprint’ for measuring institutionalized grand corruption in the allocation of public resources and applies its key elements to three Central and Eastern European countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. It is emphasized that these cases are only ‘pilot’ measurements, the blueprint is applicable to practically every high and middle income country, data is typically going back in time for 6-8 years. Using such a novel indicator set allows for an unprecedented detail of analysis. Results highlight the role played by European Union Structural and Cohesion Funds in increasing the prevalence of institutionalised grand corruption. This is due to at least two factors, first, they provide additional public resources available for corrupt rent extraction; second, they change the motivations for and controls of corruption. In Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, the first effect increases the value of particularistic resource allocation by up to 1.21% of GDP, while the second effect decreases it by up to 0.03% of GDP. The latter effect is entirely driven by Slovakia; in Czech Republic and Hungary even this effect increases particularism.
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Kilaz, Ilker, and Kadir Hayri. "Improving the transparency/anti-corruption efforts in defense procurement: recommendations from global practices." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10632.

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MBA Professional Report
The purpose of this MBA Project is to explore the risks of corruption throughout the defense procurement cycle, and provide an overview of existing anti-corruption conventions and tools. This report includes background information and corruption focused analysis about defense offset agreements and single-source selection methods. The findings related to these corruption risks are supported with the analysis of three informative defense procurement cases. Additionally, the effectiveness of anti-corruption conventions is evaluated through ten countries' score changes in major corruption indices. Finally, several recommendations are offered to improve the integrity, transparency, and accountability of defense purchases.
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Books on the topic "Procurement corruption"

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Georgieva, Irena. Using Transparency Against Corruption in Public Procurement. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51304-1.

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International, Transparency, ed. Handbook for curbing corruption in public procurement. [Berlin, Germany]: Transparency International, 2006.

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Pashev, Konstantin. Corruption in public procurement: Risks and reform policies. Sofia: Center for the study of democracy, 2006.

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Vlach, Jiří. Public procurement in relation to corruption and transparency. Bratislava: Centre for Economic Development, Transparency International Slovakia, 2001.

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Ombudsman, Rwanda Office of. Report of the dialogue on corruption in procurement. Kigali]: Office of the Ombudsman, 2013.

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Pashev, Konstantin. Corruption in public procurement: Risks and reform policies. Sofia: Center for the study of democracy, 2006.

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Zambia, Transparency International, ed. Report on government procurement systems. Zambia]: Transparency International, Zambia, 2003.

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Botswana. Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, ed. Guidelines for fighting corruption in procurement, contract, and asset disposal. Gaborone: Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, 2009.

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Dorasamy, Nirmala, and Omololu Fagbadebo, eds. Public Procurement, Corruption and the Crisis of Governance in Africa. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63857-3.

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U.S. Dept. of Defense. Coordination of remedies for fraud and corruption related to procurement activities. [Washington, D.C.]: Dept. of Defense, 1985.

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Book chapters on the topic "Procurement corruption"

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Goldsmith, Andrew, Mark Halsey, and Andrew Groves. "Procurement, Kickbacks and Fiddles." In Tackling Correctional Corruption, 113–27. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-49007-0_7.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Risk indicators of corruption." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 109–39. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-5.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Contemporary overview of corruption in infrastructure procurement process." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 1–32. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-1.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Investigating the susceptibility of building projects’ procurement process to corruption in developed and developing regions." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 33–66. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-2.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Empirical assessment of the forms of corruption in infrastructure project procurement." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 67–87. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-3.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Experts’ perspectives on corruption causal factors in infrastructure procurement." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 88–108. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-4.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Examining the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies and associated barriers." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 140–62. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-6.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Learning from a successful model." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 163–83. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-7.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Framework development: Extirpating corruption in urban infrastructure projects." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 184–99. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-8.

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Owusu, Emmanuel Kingsford, and Albert P. C. Chan. "Conclusions and recommendations." In Corruption in Infrastructure Procurement, 200–210. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003036975-9.

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Conference papers on the topic "Procurement corruption"

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Xuexin, Liu. "Notice of Retraction: Government procurement game and procurement corruption." In 2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icebeg.2011.5886847.

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Volkova, A. S. "Corruption in the public procurement system." In ТЕНДЕНЦИИ РАЗВИТИЯ НАУКИ И ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ. НИЦ «Л-Журнал», 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18411/lj-02-2019-72.

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Makarov, I. N. "Zones of corruption risks in public procurement." In ТЕНДЕНЦИИ РАЗВИТИЯ НАУКИ И ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ. НИЦ «Л-Журнал», 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.18411/lj-11-2018-70.

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Sianturi, Ronald Hasudungan, and Ahmad Feri Tanjung. "Beneficial Owner Identification for Preventing Conflicts of Interest in Indonesia Government Procurement." In International Conference on Anti-Corruption and Integrity. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0009401501580166.

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Iswanto, Dedy, Rifaid Rifaid, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Sadar Sadar. "After E-Procurement: Is There Still Corruption in the Procurement of Goods and Services?" In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Social, Science, and Technology, ICSST 2021, 25 November 2021, Tangerang, Indonesia. EAI, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.25-11-2021.2318805.

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Kartavykh, K. E. "Corruption risks in the public procurement system of Russia." In Наука России: Цели и задачи. НИЦ «Л-Журнал», 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18411/sr-10-02-2019-03.

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Bagdasaryan, Diana Gagikovna. "PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION AND OTHER ABUSES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT." In РОССИЙСКАЯ НАУКА: АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ И РАЗРАБОТКИ. Самара: Самарский государственный экономический университет, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.46554/russian.science-2021.02-2-194/197.

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Parsons, Danny, David Stern, and Roger Stern. "Using public procurement datasets for teaching and learning." In Teaching Statistics in a Data Rich World. International Association for Statistical Education, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.52041/srap.17708.

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As part of the African Data Initiative, this poster focusses on the procurement menu of R- Instat, a tailored product of R-Instat designed specifically to analyse datasets on public procurement. The menu, initially tailored around an online-available dataset of World Bank funded public procurement tenders awarded across 171 countries, implements a new, objective methodology for measuring corruption risks. By specifying recognised procurement variables in their dataset, such as number of bidders, users can allow R-Instat to suggest appropriate analyses of their data. Experience using this data in a hands-on workshop for mathematical science MSc students in Tanzania demonstrated the educational value of this tool. The menu has also been used to teach Public Procurement Management Masters students in Italy about corruption risks methodology using European procurement datasets. There is a growing movement towards more data becoming open, with initiatives such as the Open Contracting Partnership. Open data has exciting consequences for training statisticians and public procurement students. However, being able to fully take advantage of the open data movement requires tools that enable users to easily carry out appropriate analyses. Trainings using R-Instat have shown this has the potential to fill this gap. Future development of the procurement menu to support more varied datasets could make it easier for trainers to incorporate more real- world data into courses.
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Hafidz, Jawade. "Corruption Eradication in the Government’s Goods and/or Service Procurement." In Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Law and Local Wisdom in Tourism (ICBLT 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icblt-18.2018.26.

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Rabuzin, Kornelije, and Nikola Modrušan. "Prediction of Public Procurement Corruption Indices using Machine Learning Methods." In 11th International Conference on Knowledge Management and Information Systems. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0008353603330340.

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Reports on the topic "Procurement corruption"

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Branstetter, Jeffrey. Darleen Druyun: An Evolving Case Study in Corruption, Power, and Procurement. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada436580.

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Decarolis, Francesco, Raymond Fisman, Paolo Pinotti, and Silvia Vannutelli. Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28209.

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De Michele, Roberto, and Juan Cruz Vieyra. From Fishing to Catching: Developing Actionable Red Flags in Public Procurement to Prevent and Control Corruption. Inter-American Development Bank, December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004595.

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How can entities responsible for public procurement more reliably detect collusion and other irregular behavior? Most of the existing red flag tools are based on ex post analysis of public procurement data and are not integrated into national procurement systems. This does not allow them to identify irregularities in a timely manner, negatively affecting the efficiency and transparency of public spending. This document describes the red flags solution implemented in Paraguay, which contributes to solving these problems. It combines rule-based and machine learning algorithms to provide public officials with accurate, real-time information to reliably detect irregularities in the procurement process, without reducing efficiency.
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Estache, Antonio, Renaud Foucart, and Tomás Serebrisky. When can lotteries improve public procurement processes? Inter-American Development Bank, November 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004522.

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We study the potential benefits of adding a lottery component to cut the main risks associated with standard negotiated and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first negotiate with a small number of bidders to assess their eligibility and, next, rely on a lottery to award the contract reduces corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a “third-price lottery” in which the two highest bidders are selected with equal probability and the project is contracted at a price corresponding to the third highest bid can reduce limited liability, renegotiation, bid rigging and collusion risks.
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