Academic literature on the topic 'Privatisations – Congrès'

This article focuses on the political and institutional process by which the privatisation policy was approved in Argentina during the 1990s. It concentrates mainly on the relationships that the President maintained with Congress and the political parties sitting in it. By looking through the lens of the privatisation case-study, the article aims to analyse the institutional capacity of Argentine democratic presidents to enact policy reforms. The article shows that the Presidency's constitutional resources in combination with the President's strong base of partisan support permitted the adoption of the innovative privatisation policy at an institutional level. However, the article also explains that the political and institutional resources of the Presidency were not invariable and permanent. Rather, the approval of the privatisation policy shows that policy-making processes involve a dialogue between President and Congress, an institutional interchange that can serve either to enhance or to constrain the powers of the President. By showing that congressional intervention should not be underestimated, this article claims that the Argentine presidential regime is better characterised as one of limited centralism than as an example of hyper-presidentialism. The first characterisation not only acknowledges the complexity of the institutional relations, but also the fact that, given a situation of presidential centralism, institutional relations are variable and, most importantly, contingent upon political conditions.

It has been said repeatedly: the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) remains only a shadow of its former self, a typical case of state failure and collapse. Closer observation suggests a different image, however: not only has this country demonstrated “a remarkable propensity for resilience” (Englebert, 2003), its administration and regulatory frameworks – which in some domains have not changed since colonial times – have remained largely intact even during the latest period of war and political turmoil. In this article, we would like to explain these different “cross currents and contradictions” (Young, 2004) that emerged during the past Congolese war, addressing the question of whether processes of state erosion and political reconfiguration during this period should be described as a further “privatisation of the state”, as proposed by Hibou and others, or rather as a transformation or commodification of state sovereignty. The article is organized diachronically: it first discusses the Mobutu period (1965-1997), and then the war (1996-2003), to finally draw some conclusions from Congo’s long period of political “transition”.

Le thème des procédures familiales envisagé sous un angle comparatif est d?une complexité extrême dans la mesure où il implique à la fois le droit substantiel de la famille et le droit procédural, eux-mêmes intimement liés aux cultures et aux particularités des différents systèmes juridiques. A cela s?ajoute la spécificité du contentieux familial en raison de la nature propre de son objet, car l?état des personnes et les relations familiales ne revêtent pas seulement un intérêt social évident qui leur confère traditionnellement un caractère d?ordre public les soustrayant en tout ou en partie à la libre disposition des volontés. Ces relations et leurs crises ont aussi un caractère privé, humain et psychologique qui fait qu?on ne peut les traiter comme un contentieux ordinaire. En outre il s?agit moins dans ces cas de ?dire le droit? pour le passé, que de régler le mieux possible des situations de fait engageant l?avenir des individus et des familles dans l?intérêt général et particulier. Les modes de résolutions des conflits familiaux se situent donc à la croisée du privé et du public, au même titre que du droit substantiel et du droit processuel. Or, depuis plus de trente ans, et plus particulièrement dans les pays occidentaux, une évolution rapide se manifeste à la fois par une désaffection du mariage, une revendication d?autonomie individuelle et de privatisation des relations personnelles et familiales, une fragilisation croissante des couples, mariés ou non, et des familles. Depuis les années 70 tous les États ont donc modifié leur droit substantiel de manière plus ou moins radicale en matière de mariage, divorce, filiation, autorité parentale, tant sur le plan personnel que patrimonial, et ouvert le prétoire à une explosion de conflits et à une demande de justice à laquelle les tribunaux ne parviennent plus à faire face, le contentieux familial représentant en moyenne 50 à 60% du contentieux des juridictions civiles. Il en résulte une situation paradoxale entre une demande de plus de droits et moins de Droit, plus de justice et moins de procédure, plus de liberté et plus de protection, et une tension dans les choix politiques à adopter. Le droit judiciaire, en tant qu?auxiliaire du droit substantiel et serviteur de la justice est ici directement concerné et appelé non seulement à s?adapter à un contentieux différent de tous les autres, mais aussi à en atténuer si possible les effets négatifs et destructeurs. Mais ses structures traditionnelles sont plus lourdes et plus lentes à mouvoir que le droit du fond en raison de l?accumulation des strates législatives ou réglementaires relatives à l?organisation judiciaire et aux règles de compétence et de procédure, à l?insuffisance de moyens humains et matériels disponibles. Au risque d?aboutir à la désaffection de la justice et à la tentation de ?déjudiciarisation? des conflits familiaux au profit de leur ?privatisation? et de leur ?contractualisation?, sans autre forme de protection des parties les plus faibles.

This article presents some results of the study presented by the author in his General Report to the XVIth World Congress of the International Society for Labour Law and Social Security under the title of 'Industrial Relations, including Collective Disputes, in the Public Sector'. Following a historical overview of earlier studies (by Schregle, Bellace and Treu) looking at public sector industrial relations, attention is drawn to particular characteristics of this field of activity, and to the problem of how the modern 'public sector' phenomenon should now be defined. In the light of these observations, the author then reviews evidence of the dramatically changing face of public sector industrial relationships across the Globe, particularly in the wake of widespread 'privatisation' initiatives. The impact of such change upon the parties to public sector bargaining is then addressed, before some recent trends in the bargaining processes themselves are highlighted. After canvassing a variety of key issues touching industrial relations in the public sector on the threshold of a new Millennium, the author concludes with an assessment of emerging trends and offers some tentative comments on the future direction of public sector industrial relationships.

This paper argues that current trends in higher education entail a disincentive for universities to enrol students from poor backgrounds and the continuing reproduc- tion of a highly elitist system. The perception of success in the marketplace, shrink- ing allocations to education, and a discourse of efficiency and competitiveness have sidelined previous commitments to access, equity and genuine transformation. These developments follow a global market utopia which sees higher education as a com- modity, emphasising a new managerialism spurred on by ‘by market-driven notions of competition, privatisation and consumption that adopt corporate models of man- agement in order to reduce costs and maximise profits’ (Baatjes 2005:29). I draw our attention to the urgency of tasks necessary to prevent the further corporatisation of higher education institutions. Unfulfilled promises by the state and the enormity of tasks ahead can result in a temptation to despair on the part of those who perceive of a different higher education system. The inroads of neo-liberalism, of markets and individualism over social justice, community and solidarity, create new moral imperatives. It is ‘part of a more general re-working of education as a sphere of ethical practice – a commodification of education and values which allows us to systematically neglect the outcomes of policy and practices – a demoralisation of society’ (Ball 2003:25). In this situation, education degenerates into a lucrative market opportunity for capital. However, drawing on my keynote address to the 12th World Congress on Comparative Education in Havana, Cuba, I argue for the cultivation of hope in conjunction with the conviction that there is space for social action. I conclude by arguing that this is essential, since education for the commonweal is too important to be left in the hands of business, and the whims and vicissitudes of the market place.

Since the endorsement of a socialist market economy in 1992 in the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, self-financing and fee-charging principles have been widely adopted, and finally legitimized in China's higher education system. However, refonns in China's post secondary education, mainly privatization and tuition fee hikes, have produced some serious controversies and concerns among students, parents, and international education researchers. This article delves into the issues of post secondary education refonn in China and brings into attention problems that occur when policies are institutionalized in a centralized decentralization setting. Depuis l'adhesion a une economie de marche socialiste au 14e Congres national du Parti communiste chinois, les principes d'autofmance et de privatisation ont ete adoptes partout, et finalement legitime dans le systeme d'education tertiaire en Chine. Neanmoins, les refonnes dans le systeme d'etude post-secondaire chinois, surtout dans la privatisation et dans la hausse des frais de scolarite, ont provoque de serieuses controverses et des soucis chez les etudiants, parents, et chercheurs intemationaux sur l'enseignement. Cet article etudie les problemes de reforme au niveau post-secondaire en Chine et attire l'attention sur les problemes qui surviennent lorsque les politiques se font institutionnalisees dans un milieu de decentralisation centralisee.

It has been said repeatedly: the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) remains only a shadow of its former self, a typical case of state failure and collapse. Closer observation suggests a different image, however: not only has this country demonstrated “a remarkable propensity for resilience” (Englebert, 2003), its administration and regulatory frameworks – which in some domains have not changed since colonial times – have remained largely intact even during the latest period of war and political turmoil. In this article, we would like to explain these different “cross currents and contradictions” (Young, 2004) that emerged during the past Congolese war, addressing the question of whether processes of state erosion and political reconfiguration during this period should be described as a further “privatisation of the state”, as proposed by Hibou and others, or rather as a transformation or commodification of state sovereignty. The article is organized diachronically: it first discusses the Mobutu period (1965-1997), and then the war (1996-2003), to finally draw some conclusions from Congo’s long period of political “transition”. Key words: Congo, conflict, non-state regulation, Armed groups

The private higher education system has been facing many challenges in the history of its development, which was harshly handled by the different points of view of political regimes. The system in the general higher education system in all over the world has slowly and weakly improved. Until the 80s of the 20th century, the system revived and obviously developed thanks to the increasing educating demand although many countries were facing financial difficulties to support it. In Vietnam, the private higher education system appeared by 1975 in the south, but this model and the its regulations had been forgotten until the beginning of the 90s of 20th century. This research is evaluating the present higher education system in different aspects that are the international definition of private higher education, brief history and the development of the system in Republic of France as an example, privatization forms and finance for the system, and suggestions to define policies for the system in Vietnam. Keywords Model, Private Higher Education, Privatization References [1] Altbach, Philip et T. Umakoshi (éd.) (2004), Asian Universities – Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Challenge s; John Hopkins Press. [2] Ball, J.S et Youdell,D. (2007), Higher privatisation in public education, Education International 5th World Congress July 2007. [3] Banque Mondiale (2009), Statistiques de la Banque Mondiale, consulté le 15 juillet 2009, http:// go.worldbank.org/RQBDCTUXW0. [4] Blöndal S., S. Field et N. Girouard (2002), Investment In Human Capital Through Post-Compulsory Education and Training: Selected Efficiency And Equity Aspects, Département des affaires économiques de l’OCDE, document de travail No 333. [5] Cave, M., M. Kogan et R. Smith (1990), Output and Performance Measurement in Government. The State of the Art (Jessica Kinsgley, Londres). [6] Geiger, R. (1986), Private Sectors in Higher Education, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press. [7] OECD (2011), L’enseignement supérieur à l’horizon 2030- Volume 2: Mondalisation, La recherché et l’innovation dans l’enseignement, Éditon OCDE. [8] Hofstadter, R. (1996), Academic Freedom in the Age of College, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. [9] L. Benedetto (2008), Options et tandances dans le financement des uni versités en Europe, Critique internationale, 2008/2 (n039)- CAIRN.INFO. [10] Levy, D.C. (1986), Higher Education and the State in Latin America: Private Challenges to Public Dominance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. [11] Levy, D.C. (2002), « Unanticipated Development: Perspectives on Private Higher Education’s Emerging Roles », PROPHE (Program for Research on Private Higher Education) Working Paper #1. [12] Levy, D.C. (1986), Higher Education and the State in Latin America: Private Challenges to Public Dominance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. [13] Levy, D.C. (2006), « An Introductory Global Overview : The Private Fit to Salient Higher Education Tendencies », PROPHE Working Paper #7. [14] Middleton, Roger (1997), Government Versus the Market: The Growth of the Public Sector, Economic Management and British Economic Performance, Edward Elgar, Aldershot. [15] Neave, G. (2000), « Universities’ Responsibilities to Society: An Historical Exploration of an Enduring Issue », in Neave (éd.), The Universities’ Responsibilities to Society – International Perspectives, Pergamon/Elsevier, Londres, pp. 1-28. [16] Neave, G. (2000), « Universities’ Responsibilities to Society: An Historical Exploration of an Enduring Issue », in Neave (éd.), The Universities’ Responsibilities to Society – International Perspectives, Pergamon/Elsevier, Londres, pp. 1-28. [17] Neave, G. (2001), « The European Dimension in Higher Education: An Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues », in J. Huisman, P. Maassen et G. Neave (éd.) Higher Education and the Nation State; Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 13-73. [18] Neave, G. (2001), « The European Dimension in Higher Education: An Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues », in J. Huisman, P. Maassen et G. Neave (éd.) Higher Education and the Nation State; Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 13-73. [19] R. Fazal (2016), Privatisation de l’éducation: tendances et conséquences, UNESCO/Paris, octobre2016. [20] ROUSSEL Isabelle (2015), L’enseignement supérieur privé: propositions pour un nouveau mode de relations avec l’État, Rapport N05 2015-047, Juin 2015 - Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche. [21] Savas (2000), Privatisation and Public – Private Partnerships, academia.edu [22] Shils, E. et Roberts, J. (2004), « The Diffusion of European Models Outside Europe », in W. Rüegg (éd.), A History of the University in Europe, Vol. III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [23] Thelin, J.R. (2004), A History of American Higher Education, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. [24] Teixeira, P., D. Dill, B. Jongbloed et A. Amaral (éd.) (2004), The Rising Strength of Markets in Higher Education, Kluwer, Dordrecht. [25] Teichler, U. (1988), Changing Patterns of the Higher Education System: The Experience of Three Decades, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Londres. [26] Tilak, J.B.G.(2009), Higher education: a public good or a commodity for trade?, Springer International Publishing AG. Part of Springer Nature. [27] Van Vught, F. (éd) (1989), Governmental Strategies and Innovations in Higher Education, Jessica Kingsley, Londres. [28] UNESCO/OCDE (2006), Education Trends in Perspective – Analysis of the World Education Indicators, Institut de Statistique de l’UNESCO, OCDE, World Education Indicators Programme. [29] Wells, P.J., J. Sadlak et L. Vlăsceanu (éd) (2007), The Rising Role and Relevance of Private Higher Education in Europe; UNESCO – CEPES, Bucarest. [30] Wittrock, B. et W. Peter (1996), « Social Science and the Building of the Early Welfare State: Toward a Comparison of Statist and Non-Statist Western Societies », in Dietrich Rueschemeyer et Theda Skocpol (éd.) States, Social Knowledge and the Origins of Modern Social Policies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. [32] Wittrock, B. (1993), « The Modern University: the Three Transformations », in Rothblatt and Wittrock (éd.), The European and American University since 1800 – Historical and Sociological Essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 303-62.

In the heady expansion of capital’s productive capacity during the post-war period, E.P. Thompson wondered optimistically at potentials accruing to humanity by accelerating automation. He asked, “If we are to have enlarged leisure, in an automated future, the problem is not ‘how are men going to be able to consume all these additional time-units of leisure?’ but ‘what will be the capacity for experience of the men who have this undirected time to live?’” (Thompson 36). Indeed, linear and economistic variants of Marxian materialism have long emphasised that the socialisation of production by the use of machinery will eventually free us from work. At the very least, the underemployment produced by the automation of pivotal labour roles is supposed to create a political subject capable of agitating successfully against bourgeois and capitalist hegemony. But contrary to these prognostications, the worker of 2019 is caught up in a process of generalising work far beyond what is considered necessary by tradition, or at least the convention of what David Harvey calls “embedded liberalism” (11). As Anne Helen Peterson wrote in a recent Buzzfeed article,even the trends millennials have popularized — like athleisure — speak to our self-optimization. Yoga pants might look sloppy to your mom, but they’re efficient: you can transition seamlessly from an exercise class to a Skype meeting to child pickup. We use Fresh Direct and Amazon because the time they save allows us to do more work. (Peterson)For the work-martyr, activity in its broadest Aristotelian sense is evaluated by and subordinated to the question of efficiency and productivity. Occupations of time that were once considered external to “work” as matters of “life” (to use Kathi Weeks’s vocabulary) are reconceived as waste when not deployed in the service of value-generation (Weeks 15).The point here, then, is to provide some answers for why the decrease in socially-necessary labour time in an age of automation has not coincided with the Thompsonian expansion of free time. The current dilemma of the neoliberal “work-martyr” is traceable to the political responses generated by crises in production during the depression and the stagflationary disaccumulation of the 1960s-70s, and the major victory in the “battle for ideas” was the transformation of the political subject into human capital. This “intensely constructed and governed” suite of possible values is tasked, according to Wendy Brown, “with improving and leveraging its competitive positioning and with enhancing its (monetary and nonmonetary) portfolio value across all of its endeavours and ventures” (Brown 10). Connecting the creation of this subject in relation to personal or free time is important partly because of time’s longstanding importance to philosophies of subjectivity. But more to the point, the focus on time is important because it serves to demonstrate the economic foundations of the incursion of capitalist governance into the most private domains of existence. Against the criticism of Marx’s ‘abstract’ theory of value, one can see that the laws of capitalist accumulation make their mark in all parts of contemporary human being, including temporality. By tracing the emergence of afterwork as the unpaid continuation of the accumulation of value, one can show how each subject increasingly ‘lives’ capital. This marks a turning point in political economy. When work spills over a temporal limit, its relationship to reproduction is finally blurred to the point of indistinction. What this means for value-creation in 2019 is something in urgent need of critique.State ReproductionAccording to the Marxian theory, labour’s minimum cost is abstractly determined by the price of the labourer’s necessities. Once they have produced enough objects of value to cover these costs, the rest of their work is surplus value in the hands of the capitalist. The capitalist’s aim, then, is to extend the overall working-day for as long beyond the minimum as possible. Theoretically, the full 24 hours of the day may be used. The rise of machine production in the 19th century allowed the owners to make this theory a reality. The only thing that governed the extension of work-time was the physical minimum of labour-power’s reproduction (Marx 161). But this was on the provision that all the labourer’s “free” time was to be spent regrouping their energies. Anything in excess of this was a privilege: time wasted that could have been spent in the factory. “If the labourer consumes his disposable time for himself”, says Marx, “he robs the capitalist” (162).This began to change with the socialisation of the work process and the increase in technical proficiency that labour demanded in early 20th-century industry. With the changes in the sophistication of the manufacture process, the labourer came to be factored in the production process less as an “appendage of the machine” and more as a collection of decisive skills. Fordism based itself around the recognition that capital itself was “dependent on a family-based reproduction” (Weeks 27). In Ford’s America, the sense that work’s intensity might supplant losses in the working day propelled owners of production to recognise the economic need of ensuring a robust culture of social reproduction. In capital’s original New Deal, Ford provided an increase in wages (the Five Dollar Day) in exchange for a rise in productivity (Dalla Costa v). To preserve the increased rhythm of industrial production required more than a robust wage, however. It required “the formation of a physically efficient and psychologically disciplined working class” (Dalla Costa 2). Companies began to hire sociologists to investigate how workers spent their spare time (Dalla Costa 8). They led the charge in a what we might call the first “anthropological revolution” of the American 20th century, whereby the improved wage of the worker was underpinned by the economisation of their reproduction. This was enabled by the cheapening of social necessities (and thus a reduction in socially-necessary labour time) in profound connection to the development of household economy on the backs of unpaid female labour (Weeks 25).This arrangement between capital and labour persisted until 1929. When the inevitable crisis came, however, wages faltered, and many workers joined the ranks of the unemployed. Unable to afford even the basics of their own reproduction, the working-class looked to the state. They created political and social pressure through marches, demonstrations, attacks on shops and the looting of supply trucks (Dalla Costa 40). The state held out against them, but the crisis in production eventually reached such a point of intensity that the government was forced to intervene. Hoover instituted the Emergency Relief Act and Financial Reconstruction Corporation in 1932. This was expanded the following year by FDR’s New Deal, transforming Emergency Relief into a federal institution and creating the Civil Works Association to stimulate the job market (Dalla Costa 63). The security of the working class was decisively linked to the state through the wage guarantees, welfare measures and even the legal guarantee of collective bargaining.For the most part, the state’s intervention in social reproduction took the pressure off industry by ensuring that the workforce would remain able to handle its burdens and that the unemployed would remain employable. It guaranteed a minimum wage for the employed to ensure that demand didn’t collapse, and provided care outside the workforce to women, children and the elderly.Once the state took responsibility for reproduction, however, it immediately became interested in how free time could be made efficient and cost effective. Abroad, they noted the example of European statist and corporativist approaches. Roosevelt sent a delegation to Europe to study the various measures taken by fascist and United Front governments to curb the effects of economic crisis (Dogliani 247). Among these was Mussolini’s OND (Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro) which sought to accumulate the free time of workers to the ends of production. Part of this required the responsibilisation of the broader community not only for regeneration of labour-power but the formation of a truly fascist political subject.FDR’s social reform program was able to reproduce this at home by following the example of workers’ community organisation during the depression years. Throughout the early ‘30s, self-help cooperatives, complete with “their own systems of payment in goods or currency” emerged among the unemployed (Dalla Costa 61). Black markets in consumer goods and informal labour structures developed in all major cities (Dalla Costa 34). Subsistence goods were self-produced in a cottage industry of unpaid domestic labour by both men and women (Dalla Costa 71). The paragon of self-reproducing communities was urbanised black Americans, whose internal solidarity had saved lives throughout the depression. The state took notice of these informal economies of production and reproduction, and started to incorporate the possibility of community engineering into their national plan. Roosevelt convened the Civilian Conservation Corps to absorb underemployed elements of the American workforce and recover consumer demand through direct state sponsorship (wages) (Dogliani, 247). The Committee of Industrial Organisation was transformed into a “congress” linking workers directly to the state (Dalla Costa 74). Minium wages were secured in the supreme court in 1937, then hiked in 1938 (78). In all, the state emerged at this time as a truly corporativist entity- the guarantor of employment and of class stability. From Social Reproduction to Human Capital InvestmentSo how do we get from New Deal social engineering to yoga pants? The answer is deceptively simple. The state transformed social reproduction into a necessary part of the production process. But this also meant that it was instrumentalised. The state only had to fund its workforce’s reproduction so long as this guaranteed productivity. After the war, this was maintained by a form of “embedded liberalism” which sought to provide full employment, economic growth and welfare for its citizens while anchoring the international economy in the Dollar’s gold-value. However, by providing stable increases in “relative value” (wages), this form of state investment incentivised capital flight and its spectacular consequent: deindustrialisation. The “embedded liberalism” of the state-capital-labour compromise began to breakdown with a new crisis of accumulation (Harvey 11-12). The relocation of production to non-union states and decolonised globally-southern sites of hyper-exploitation led to an ‘urban crisis’ in the job market. But as capitalist expansion carried on abroad, inflation kept dangerous pace with the rate of unemployment. This “stagflation” put irresistible pressure on the post-war order. The Bretton-Woods policy of maintaining fixed interest rates while pinning the dollar to gold was abandoned in 1971 and exchange rates were floated all over the world (Harvey 12). The spectre of a new crisis loomed, but one which couldn’t be resolved by the simple state sponsorship of production and reproduction.While many solutions were offered in place of this, one political vision singled out the state’s intervention into reproduction as the cause of the crisis. The ‘neoliberal’ political revolution began at the level of individual groups of capitalist agitants seeking governmental influence in a crusade against communism. It was given its first run on the historical pitch in Chile as part of the CIA-sponsored Pinochet revanchism, and then imported to NYC to deal with the worsening urban crisis of the 1970s. Instead of focusing on production (which required state intervention to proceed without crisis), neoliberal theory promulgated a turn to monetisation and financialisation. The rule of the New York banks after they forced the City into near-bankruptcy in 1975 prescribed total austerity in order to make good on its debts. The government was forced by capital itself to withdraw from investment in the reproduction of its citizens and workers. This was generalised to a federal policy as Reagan sought to address the decades-long deficit during the early years of his presidential term. Facilitating the global flow of finance and the hegemony of supranational institutions like the IMF, the domestic labour force now became beholden to an international minimum of socially-necessary labour time. At the level of domestic labour, the reduction of labour’s possible cost to this minimum had dramatic consequences. International competition allowed the physical limitations of labour to, once again, vanish from sight. Removed from the discourse of reproduction rights, the capitalist edifice was able to focus on changing the ratio of socially necessary labour to surplus. The mechanism that enabled them to do so was competition among the workforce. With the opening of the world market, capital no longer had to worry about the maintenance of domestic demand.But competition was not sufficient to pull off so grand a feat. What was required was a broader “battle of ideas”; the second anthropological revolution of the American century. The protections that workers had relied upon since the Fordist compromise and the corporativist solution eroded as the new “class-power” of the bourgeoisie levelled neoliberal assaults against associated labour (Harvey 23). While unions were gradually disempowered to fight the inevitable tide of deindustrialisation and capital flight, individual workers were coddled by a stream of neoliberal propaganda promising “Freedom” to those who would leave the stifling atmosphere of collective association. The success of this double enervation crippled union power, and the capitalist could rely increasingly on internal workplace wage stratification to regulate labour at an enterprise level (Dalla Costa 25). Incentive structures transformed labour rights into privileges; imagining old entitlements as concessions from above. In the last thirty years, the foundation of worker protections at large has, according to Brown, become illegible (Brown 38).Time and ValueThe reduction of time needed to produce has not coincided with an expansion of free time. The neoliberal anthropological revolution has wormed its way into the depth of the individual subject’s temporalising through a dual assault on labour conditions and propaganda. The privatisation of reproduction means that its necessary minimum is once again the subject of class struggle. Time spent unproductively outside the workplace now not only robs the capitalist, but the worker. If an activity isn’t a means to increase one’s “experience” (the vector of employability), it is time poorly spent. The likelihood of being hired for a job, in professional industries especially, is dependent on your ability to outperform others not only in your talents and skills, but in your own exploitability. Brown points out that the groups traditionally defined by the “middle strata … works more hours for less pay, fewer benefits, less security, and less promise of retirement or upward mobility than at any time in the past century” (Brown 28-29).This is what is meant by the transformation of workers into ‘human capital’. As far as the worker is concerned, the capitalist no longer purchases their labour-power: they purchase the sum of their experiences and behaviours. A competitive market has emerged for these personality markers. As a piece of human capital, one must expend one’s time not only in reproduction, but the production of their own surplus value. Going to a play adds culture points to your brand; speaking a second language gives you a competitive edge; a robust Instagram following is the difference between getting or missing out on a job. For Jess Whyte, this means that the market is now able to govern in place of the state. It exercises a command over people’s lives in and out of the workplace “which many an old tyrannical state would have envied” (Whyte 20).There is a question here of change and continuity. A survey of the 20th century shows that the reduction of ‘socially necessary labour time’ does not necessarily mean a reduction in time spent at work. In fact, the minimum around which capitalist production circulates is not worktime but wages. It is only at the political level that the working class prevented capital from pursuing this minimum. With the political victory of neoliberalism as a “restoration of class power” to the bourgeoisie, however, this minimum becomes a factor at the heart of all negotiations between capital and labour. The individual labourer lying at the heart of the productive process is reduced to his most naked form: human capital. This capital must spend all its time productively for its own benefit. Mundane tasks are avoidable, as stipulated by the piece of human capital sometimes known as Anne Helen Peterson, if they “wouldn’t make my job easier or my work better”. People are never really after-work under neoliberalism; their spare time is structurally adjusted into auxiliary labour. Competition has achieved what the state could never have dreamed of: a total governance of spare hours. This governance unites journalists tweeting from bed with Amazon workers living where they work, not to mention early-career academics working over a weekend to publish an article in an online journal that is not even paying them. These are all ways in which the privatisation of social reproduction transforms afterwork into unpaid overtime.ReferencesBrown, Wendy. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books, 2015.Dalla Costa, Maria. Family, Welfare, and the State: Between Progressivism and the New Deal. Brooklyn: Common Notions, 2015.Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005.Engels, Friedrich, and Karl Marx. The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. R.C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 1978.Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. Vol. 1 and 2. Trans. E. Aveling and E. Untermann. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2013.Peterson, Anne Helen. “How Millennials Became the Burnout Generation.” Buzzfeed. 10 Oct. 2019 <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/annehelenpetersen/millennials-burnout-generation-debt-work>.Postone, Moishe. Time, Labour and Social Domination. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993.Thompson, E.P. “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” In Stanley Aronowitz and Michael J. Roberts, eds., Class: The Anthology. Hoboken: Wiley, 2018.Wang, Jackie. Carceral Capitalism. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2018.Weeks, Kathi. The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries. Durham: Duke UP, 2011.Whyte, Jessica. “The Invisible Hand of Friedrich Hayek: Submission and Spontaneous Order.” Political Theory (2017): 1-29.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The assignment examines the policy positions of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) on restructuring and privatisation. The assignment's theoretical point of departure is found in the work of Levitsky and Way (1998). Levitsky and Way (1998) examines the alliance between a political party and its labour ally in the context of neo-liberal economic reform. The context is usually a political party that has come to power with the aid of a powerful trade union federation. The authors are interested in establishing if the party-union alliance would be sustained if the political party embarks on drastic economic reforms that have the potential to undermine trade union federations. The two cases that are investigated are Poland and Argentina, because in both these cases, a political party has been swept into power with the aid of a powerful trade union federation. Against the background of neo-liberal economic reforms, both trade union federations initially supported the economic reforms. In the medium and long term however, labour defected from the alliance in Poland, whereas the alliance was sustained in Argentina despite the enormous costs to workers. Levitsky and Way (1998) then posit a number of material and institutional factors that explain both the initial convergence and the later divergence between the two test cases. The factors that are included in this framework are social linkages, party strength, leadership overlap, union competition and the degree of autonomy from either party leadership or the rank-and-file. These factors are hypothesised to explain the policy positions and behaviour of the trade union federation. It is this theoretical framework, which will be tested to establish if the framework permits enough conceptual leverage to explain the past and present policy positions of COSATU on privatisation. These factors have been given prominence because of its actual bearing on the status of the alliance relationship. The present study will therefore be using these factors of the framework, and barring one exception, it will be conceptualised in the same way. The second component of the study is to use the South African National Opinion Leader Survey of 1997/98 to study the actual attitudes and opinions of COSATU leaders on a range of privatisation issues. The survey is going to be used to determine if there is any degree of continuity between formal congress resolutions and the attitudes of COSATU leaders in the survey. This is also an indirect way of verifying the ideological loyalty of leaders to the official positions of the trade union federation. The second question returns to the alliance relationship by examining differences, if any between COSATU and ANC leaders on privatisation related issues. Factor analysis is used to build two indexes, namely a "privatisation index" and a "gear index." An interesting finding from the data is the relatively greater policy cohesion amongst COSATU leaders. These results permit speculations that do not necessarily indicate an imminent breaking up of the alliance, but rather continued discussions with possibly various policy compromises by COSATU and the ANC.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die werkstuk ondersoek die beleidsposisie van die Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) oor herstrukturering en privatisering in Suid Afrika. Die werkstuk se teoretiese uitgangspunt word in die werk van Levitsky en Way gevind (1998). Hierdie skrywers ondersoek die alliansie tussen 'n politieke party en sy arbeidsvennoot in die konteks van neo-liberale ekonomiese hervorming. Die konteks is 'n politieke party wat aan bewind gekom het met die steun van 'n kragtige vakbondfederasie. Die skrywers wil vas stel of die party-vakbond-alliansie sal voortgaan wanneer die politieke party drastiese ekonomiese hervorming aanpak wat die potensiaal het om vakbond federasies te ondermyn. Twee gevalle, naamlik Pole en Argentinië word ondersoek. In albei gevalle het die regerende politieke party aan bewind gekom met die hulp van die vakbond federasie. Teen hierdie agtergrond van neo-liberale hervorming het albei vakbond federasies in Pole en Argentinië aanvanklik die proses gesteun. Gedurende hierdie tydperk het vakbonde in Pole weggebreek van die alliansie, terwyl die alliansie in Argentinië ten spyte van die groot koste vir die werkers voortgesit was. Levitsky en Way (1998) verskaf 'n aantal materiële en institusionele faktore wat die aanvanklike samevloeiing en die latere uiteenvloeiing in hul twee voorbeelde kan verduidelik. Die faktore wat in die ontleding gebruik word is sosiale verbindinge, partysterkte, leierskap oorvleueling, vakbond kompetisie en outonomie van of party leierskap en gewone werkers. Volgens die skrywers se hipotese sal hierdie faktore die beleidsposisies van die vakbond federasie verklaar. Dit is hierdie teoretiese raamwerk wat in die studie gebruik word. Daar word gepoog om vas te stel of hierdie raamwerk genoegsame konseptuele reikwydte het om COSATU se privatiserings beleid te verduidelik. Die tweede komponent van die studie is die gebruik van die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Menings Opname van 1997/98. Dit word gebruik om die houdings en die opinies van COSATU leiers oor n breë spektrum van privatiserings kwessies te ondersoek. Die doel is om vas te stel of daar enige graad van kontinuïteit tussen formele kongres resolusies en houdings van COSATU leiers bestaan. Dit is ook 'n manier om die "ideologiese getrouheid" van COSATU leiers te verifieer. Tweedens word daar teruggekeer na die alliansie verhouding deur die verskille tussen ANC en COSATU leiers betreffende privatiserings verwante kwessies te ondersoek. Faktor ontleding word gebruik om twee indekse te bou, naamlik 'n "Privatiserings indeks" en 'n "Gear-indeks". Interessante bevindinge wat dui op 'n groter beleidskohesie by Cosatu-meningsvormers as by ANC-meningsvormers kom na vore. Na aanleiding van bogenoemde model word daar gespekuleer dat hierdie meningspatrone nie noodwendig op 'n uiteenval van die alliansie dui nie, maar eerder op voortgesette gesprekke met verskeie beleidskompromisse by Cosatu sowel as die ANC-leierskap.

Concentration of power market revolutionary changes within the relatively narrow time frame of the last decade will continue for at least another decade. Too many dynamic factors have been seen in the research & development of new power generation technology as well as commercial realisation. Too many impulses have been also seen in the independent power market arena. New legislation framework, new financing tools, deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation trends have become typical with many emerging-economy countries but also with countries having highly developed infrastructure supported by stabilised legislation & political system. Under such circumstances natural gas (NG) has been preferred both by private developers as well as state developers. From the same reason also gas turbines (GT) based technologies have become highly competitive option in the new capacity demand saturation. GT technologies will retain their dominant position also in the future. However, this needn’t inevitably mean that also NG must retain the first choice for the whole period of next generation. NG market may become saturated in middle-range horizon, approximately about 2010–2015. Huge reserves of coal together with appropriate coal-based technologies like IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle) or PFBC (Pressurised Fluidised Bed Combustion) will cause subsequent decline from NG towards other fossil fuel commodities. Reasons for such scenario are given in our analysis.

The electricity supply industry is being restructured all over the world. Privatisation, with the emergence of Independent Power Projects (IPPs), especially in developing countries, and liberalisation of the power generation market are changing decision-making processes in a radical way. New challenges of deregulation and customer demands, and economic instabilities in south-east Asia, oblige electric utilities to face a double jeopardy: least-cost planning and least-risk investments. Consumers are encouraged to save energy and emission reduction policies are implemented to promote utilisation of high efficiency, clean power production technologies. The aim of this paper is to introduce the concept of life cycle risk management and Decision Support System (DSS) for open and combined cycle schemes, highlighting the market potential for Flexible Mid-size Gas Turbines (FMGT) in mid-merit applications. The DSS that has been developed at Cranfield University includes: plant simulation program, providing design and off-design performance, maintenance planning, component degradation, and load-following models. In addition several economic techniques based upon engineering finance and project accounting make power plant economic appraisals possible. The DSS also provides a Monte Carlo risk analysis in order to deal with technical and economic uncertainties in a very effective way. Case studies will stress several parameters that planners have to carefully assess when making decision in the context of the coming millennium, bringing all sorts of new challenges and areas of uncertainty that will be discussed in the paper.