Academic literature on the topic 'Private sector housing'

Hong Kong has a large public housing sector that shows strong resilience. Given the approximate half‐half public‐private housing divide in Hong Kong, officials, housing advocates and the general public envisage housing provision, problems and remedies within the ‘rigid’ framework of private and public housing. Social innovation examples of third sector housing as start-ups in ‘social housing’ have emerged in the early 21st century in Hong Kong, thereby forming a ‘new’ model in housing delivery amidst the public‐private binary housing market. This study focuses on the gap filled by third sector housing in Hong Kong through serving as a complement to the private and public housing sectors in meeting unsatisfied general housing needs and as a supplement to both sectors in catering for neglected specialist housing needs. The exact future trajectory of third sector housing development will highly depend on the synergy of different stakeholders in public, private and third sectors as well as the common citizens in its nurturance.

Purpose This study aims to show how hedonic methods can be used to compare the performance of the public and private sector housing markets in Costa Rica. Design/methodology/approach Hedonic price indexes are computed using the adjacent-period method. Average housing quality is measured by comparing hedonic and median price indexes. The relative performance of the public and private sector residential construction is compared by estimating separate hedonic models for each sector. A private sector price is then imputed for each house built in the public sector, and a public sector price is imputed for each house built in the private sector. Findings The real quality-adjusted price of private housing rose by 12 per cent between 2000 and 2013, whereas the price of private housing rose by 9 per cent. The average quality of private housing rose by 45 per cent, whereas that of public housing fell by 18 per cent. Nevertheless, the hedonic imputation analysis reveals that public housing could not be produced more cheaply in the private sector. Social implications The quality of public housing has declined over time. The hedonic analysis shows that the decline is not because of a lack of competition between construction firms in the public sector. An alternative demand side explanation is provided. Originality/value This study applies hedonic methods in novel ways to compare the relative performance of the public and private housing sectors in Costa Rica. The results shed new light on the effectiveness of public sector housing programs.

AbstractIn this article, the first of two, the recent developments and current situation in the private rented sector are examined. Four roles for the sector are identified: housing those who traditionally lived in the sector, housing the young and mobile, providing accommodation with employment and acting as a tenure of last resort for those unable to find accommodation in the majority tenures. The types of household to be found in each sub-sector are described and their reasons for being in the sector and what they obtain are analysed. Different types of landlord are identified and their reasons for letting examined. The problems encountered by tenants and landlords in each sub-sector are described, leading to the conclusion that the private rented sector urgently requires considered and effective attention from policy makers.

Rapid expansion of welfare state model and persistent processes of housing sector commodification are corroding the stable social security net and transforming the structure of housing sector at the same time. The growing private rent sector becomes a desirable option for those households which struggle to acquire housing in private housing sector. Lithuanian private rent sector is a peculiar case because the rent segment is poorly regulated and the practice of informal rent is widely spread. Even the general official framework of Lithuanian housing policy considers private rent sector an economic activity, but not the residential one – the rent is legally treated as just a contract between the renter and the tenant. The study aims at showcasing the situation of Lithuanian youth (18–35 yr.) who rent housing units privately, and their attitudes towards private rent sector. The analysis presents the differences in socio-demographic features and value orientations among young tenants and home-owners. The article describes several profiles of young tenants: they usually live in more compact housing units and are more likely to be single or cohabitate with a partner and without any children. Important feature of Lithuanian private rent sector is a quite short residential period, and the fact that the majority of young tenants have not declared or registered rented housing unit as their primary place of residency. Young tenants are more anxious about their liability to the renter, but not about their rights as the tenants. More than one quarter of young tenants participate in informal housing rent sector, only about half of young tenants have legal contracts with renters. All these features of the private sector allow concluding about the rent sector’s ambivalence or existence of various levels of residential security for young tenants.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.17.3.21958

Development of urban housing requires participation of various stakeholders, from the state, private sector, and community to the civil society organizations. Cognizant of that fact, this research sought to establish the measurement model for stakeholders’ participation in an urban housing development from the neo-liberal perspective. The study employed a quantitative approach, in which a structured questionnaire containing 25 indicator variables identified from literature was administered to a total of 214 respondents drawn from key institutions involved in housing development and planning in Lusaka, Zambia. Data collected were analyzed through exploratory factor analysis (EFA) as well as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), with goodness-of-fit based on a two-index strategy used in determining model acceptability. Results revealed that stakeholders’ participation is defined by seven variables, namely: private sector participation in the provision of affordable housing finance; private sector participation through construction of rent-to-buy housing; private sector participation through partnering in the provision of basic services; community participation in the develop of housing programs; the state facilitating access to affordable housing finance; the state stimulating private sector involvement in affordable housing provision; non-governmental organizations participation by coordinating the communities. The study outlines roles of various actors in housing development from a developing country’s perspective.

Purpose Low income urban housing in Kenya is underdeveloped as a result of uninnovative financing, hence the many slums and informal settlements in the country, hence the need for enhanced participation of the private sector through application of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which has been cited as one of the possible solutions. The purpose of this study was to investigate and make predictions of the need for enhanced role of private sector in developing low income urban housing in Kenya through PPPs. Design/methodology/approach Delphi method of research was used to forecast the enhanced role of private sector through PPPs in the development of low income urban housing in Kenya. Three rounds Delphi iterations using three panels of housing financiers (30 in number), housing developers (28 in number) and housing practitioners (30 in number) were used. Data was collected through questionnaires throughout the three rounds, where the first round was exploratory in nature, the second round built on answers from round one, while round three was based on answers from round two, after which the mean and standard deviation values were calculated to show the level of consensus. Findings Results showed that PPPs is one of the plausible ways through which low income urban housing in Kenya can be developed to address its shortage. Private sector in PPP transaction brings innovative technology, finance and efficiency, while government brings its assets such as land and other regulations long term contracts. Research limitations/implications The research was focussed on the Nairobi city county area in analysing the need for enhanced role of the private parties. It focussed on a panel of Housing practitioners-officers in the State Department for housing and Nairobi city county; housing financiers and housing developers, without interviewing the beneficiaries of the method. Practical implications It was, therefore, found out that PPPs models are applicable in developing low income urban housing because the country has the enabling environment for its effective application going forward. The implication of this study is that low income urban housing can be developed through the model. Social implications The slums and informal settlements will have adequate, affordable and quality housing being introduced within their neighbourhoods, which reduces political and societal animosities. Originality/value This research has benefited from published literature on PPPs and original research on PPPs.

Social rental housing projects have emerged since 2016 to cover the housing demand of low-income groups, but these projects need high cost that beyond the financial capacity of some governments. Therefore, the World Bank reports in 2014 and 2018 pointed to the importance of including the private sector in low-income housing projects as a real estate developer instead of the state. The contribution of private sector and his successful experience in this field help in reducing the government spending towards these projects and achieving high quality in their implementation. For these reasons, many countries at international level involved the private sector in construction of social housing units in exchange for a set of incentives, which vary widely from one country to another. These incentives are classified into two main groups, the first one is financial and administrative incentives such as providing free land or selling it at low price, besides taxes and financing facilities as applied in Brazil, China, Singapore and Thailand. The second group is new incentives which called Land use incentives such as land use kind, percentage of land exploitation, proposed density and land use regulation in the housing project as applied in the United States, Japan and France because the previous financing incentives are not enough to achieve an appropriate profit for investors.At the local level, the private sector participated in many low-income housing projects such as Youth Housing, National Housing and social housing projects during the period from 1996 until now. In which the Egyptian government provided him some incentives like low price land, payment facilities, tax cuts and allocation part of land for his investment projects in exchange for building number of housing units with an area of (63 m2) for low-income groups. On the other hand, real estate companies retreated from participation in these projects because the incentives are unsatisfactory to them, which made the state played again the role of real estate developer to fill the gap in housing demand by using insufficient government budget.As a result of that, the Egyptian government is trying nowadays to re-engage the private sector again in future social housing projects by studying all submitted proposals from private sector in 2016, the World Bank in 2018 and the views of some institutions such as ministry of investment, ministry of housing and the Social Housing Fund in 2019 around the new incentives, especially after the state decided to withdraw from real estate development and leave it to the private sector by the year 2020. Hence, this paper tries to introduce the new incentives for private sector to participate again in social housing projects. The formulation of these incentives comes from revision the international experiences and reports as well as evaluating the applying of old incentives in one case study of participation housing projects (Degla Gardens project to find an integrated vision for suitable incentives in Egyptian reality that achieve the goals of all development parties ( the government-private sector-population).

The masters by research project was titled Inn Housing: The Delights of the Private Sector. It was a space for exploring my practice with the development of a conceptual piece about the shifting condition of the community housing produced in inner cities. The research aim was to develop an argument that inquired into the productive meaning of the application of glass walls on the city's housing façades; being these elements that represented a mode of living unknown to my experience and that challenged the way I perceive the relation between the interior intimate and private space of the house with the public city. A confrontation with a different proposal of housing that gave me enough room to speculate about a significant change that may influence the treatment of the private-intimate space of the housing with the public realm. Since the importance acquired by the glass surface seems to encourage (or put emphasis) on the visual experience by way these hermetic façades visually link the interior space of the house with the exterior, exposing views of either one side or the other of the glass skin. Thus the central research questions raised by this research were: what might be the conception that has shaped this housing where the interior appears connected to the exterior through the glass façade? And significantly, does the visual relation with the glass potentially influences individual behaviour and therefore constitutes different modes for dwelling? The method involved in the development of my argument was primary based on a theoretical framework in conjunction with a practice: the construction of visual material that respond to the stimuli generated by the readings. Whereas the selection of theory and readings was based on the obvious need for material that could help me understand and develop certain aspects of my research, images were used to explore my own thinking responses in states of uncertainty, as these offer me a more clear access to my own thinking material once are projected outside my mind.

Studies showed that the private sector positively influences the country’s economic growth. The Nigerian Government housing policies and programmes tailored towards homeownership may not have favoured the private sector. The COVID-19 crisis might have compounded the issue. There are scarce studies concerning private sector income earners’ (PSIE) homeownership in the COVID-19 era. Therefore, the paper investigated the perceived early negative impacts of COVID-19 on PSIE and proffered measures to improve homeownership across Nigerian cities. Given the unexplored dimension of the issue, a qualitative research method was employed via virtual interviews. Thirty semi-structured virtual interviews were conducted with knowledgeable participants across Nigeria. Each geo-political zone was represented, and saturation was achieved. The researchers collated the data and thematically analysed them. Findings show that housing policies and programmes are pro-public sector homeownership. Also, it reveals that the private sector businesses are worse hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings will offer a rich insight into the influence of COVID-19 on PSIE and contribute towards informing key stakeholders, especially government, to revamp housing policies and programmes towards private sector homeownership in Nigeria’s cities.

Esta investigación se enmarca en el tema de estudio de la Tesis de Maestría (UNC,FAUD), “Implementación y gestión conjunta de acciones públicas y privadas en la solución habitacional destinada a un sector de la clase obrera industrial”; que se desarrolla como consecuencia de la limitada capacidad de las entidades públicas para brindar soluciones efectivas a la demanda creciente de vivienda de la población y en la que se constata la necesidad de proveer nuevas alternativas de gestión política con agentes extra estatales. Debido a los altos costos del suelo urbano y construcción, normalmente, la población de estables recursos económicos, pero sin capacidad de ahorro para solventar el costo de la vivienda propia, queda excluida como potencial candidato de proyectos urbanos. El objetivo es exponer una estrategia para que un sector de la clase media baja habite proyectos de vivienda insertos en la trama urbana a partir de una política de concertación pública-privada. This research is part of the Master Thesis theme (UNC,FAUD), “Implementation and combined management of public and private acts for the housing solution destined for an industrial workers sector”; that is developed as a consequence to the limited ability of the public institutions, to provide effective solutions to the housing demands of the people/citizens, and which confirms the requirement of new political management alternatives involving extra-State agents. Usually, due to the high costs of the urban land and the construction, the people that have stable economic incomes, but don’t have saving potential to cover the cost of home ownership, are excluded from being possible residents of urban projects. The aim of this work is to present a strategy to allow the middle-low social class sector to inhabit housing projects that are inserted in the urban area, through public- private agreement policy.

La política de vivienda en México, implementada en el año 2002, otorgó un apoyo pleno a la iniciativa privada para participar en la producción de la vivienda social. La primera acción que el gobierno federal realizó fue la institución de la Comisión Nacional para el Fomento a la Vivienda, CONAFOVI (hoy CONAVI), órgano descentralizado de la Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, SEDESOL, creado por el Presidente de la República en el año 2001. Esta Comisión tiene como responsabilidad diseñar, promover, dirigir y coordinar la política nacional de vivienda. Aún cuando atiende a los diversos niveles, desde vivienda residencial hasta interés social, incide particularmente en esta última, vista ahora como un producto inmobiliario de muy alta rentabilidad, cuyo financiamiento está asegurado por los programas subsidiarios del gobierno, y es promovida, además, por el mismo sector público por considerarse un importante generador de actividad económica e impulsor del desarrollo del sector, creando un círculo virtuoso que inminentemente impacta los aspectos sociales y culturales aún en tiempos de recesión. Si bien la producción de vivienda social se vio estimulada en todo el país, fue en la frontera norte, particularmente en Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, donde el eco de este programa tuvo mayor magnitud. En ella se produjo la mayor producción de vivienda económica en cuatro ocasiones consecutivas, de 2004 a 2007, a nivel a nivel nacional. Ciudad Juárez es una de las 52 zonas metropolitanas de México, el principal polo de desarrollo del Estado en donde se asienta el 40.52% de la población de la entidad y la sexta ciudad en el país en cuanto a tamaño de habitantes se refiere. Aproximadamente el 82% de la PEA tiene ingresos iguales o menores a 4 salarios mínimos, lo cual la hace potencialmente beneficiaria de créditos de vivienda económica. Este hecho puede tener diversas lecturas, sin embargo, la que ahora merece nuestra atención es el impacto que este fenómeno ha tenido en el suelo de uso habitacional y la participación que han tenido el sector público y el privado en su ocupación durante el periodo 2001 a 2006, así como la presión inmobiliaria que se ha ejercido y derivado en la ampliación del fundo legal del municipio sin estar esto considerado en el Plan de Desarrollo del Municipio de Juárez. Los diferentes porcentajes de participación en la producción de vivienda social del sector público y privado con su proyección en la utilización de suelo, la ubicación de los conjuntos habitacionales desarrollados así como el número de acciones de vivienda realizadas de acuerdo a sus diversos tipos: social, media y residencial, al sumarse constituyen un importante segmento de la panorámica que habrá de llevarnos a conocer el impacto que la política nacional de vivienda ha tenido en la ciudad que ha sido su mejor receptora, y por tanto, su mejor ejemplificación. A siete años de distancia, tenemos una ciudad segregada, desarticulada y con grandes superficies vacías a su interior. El crecimiento disperso y la cuestionable “demanda de vivienda” han producido un paisaje en donde los barrios consolidados lucen abandonados. A la par, un alto porcentaje de viviendas emplazadas en los nuevos fraccionamientos ni siquiera han sido habitadas ante la falta de accesibilidad a equipamiento y servicios urbanos. El aval de las políticas públicas para adquirir una segunda vivienda, aún de interés social, ha hecho que éstas de incorporen al mercado de vivienda en renta pese a que ello se contrapone a su carácter social. En síntesis, tenemos que el apoyo incondicional a la producción de vivienda social sin visualizar sus efectos colaterales, han sido la piedra angular para la expansión irracional de las ciudades mexicanas. Mexico's housing policy, created in the year 2002, gave the private sector whole support to participate in the production of social housing. The first action of the federal government was creating the National Commission for Housing Support, (CONAFOVI, later CONAVI), a decentralized organization of the Secretary of Social Development, SEDESOL, created by the President on 2001. This Commission has the responsibility to design, promote, direct and coordinate the national housing policy, which despite supporting different housing levels, from high income to social housing, now seen this last one as a highly profitable real state product, whose credit is insured by the government's subsidies. The social housing is promoted by the public sector itself since its considered an important source of economic activity even while in times of a recession and to economic development is granted and being a support for the sector development, creating a virtuous circle which imminently impacts on social and cultural aspects. Though social housing development was stimulated in the whole country, it was in the northern border, particularly in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, where the echoes of this program had a greater magnitude; so much that it is responsible for the biggest production of economical housing on four consecutive years, from 2004 to 2007, in the whole country. Ciudad Juarez is the main pole of development in the state, where 40.52% of the state's population resides and proximately 82% of the PEA has an income equal or less than four minimal wages, which makes it a potentially beneficiary of economic housing credits. This fact can have several different readings, nevertheless the one now deserves our attention is the impact this phenomenon has had in the residential land use and the participation that the public and private sector have had in its occupation during the 2001 to 2006 period, as well as the real state pressure that has been exerted and is responsible for increasing the city limits without taking into account the Municipal Development Plan of Juarez. The different percentages of participation in the production of social housing by the public and private sectors with their projection in the land use, the location of developed housing sectors and the number of housing actions that have taken place according to their diverse levels: social, middle and high income, when added constitute an important segment of the panorama that will take us to know the impact that the national housing policy has had in the city, which has been its main receptor, thus, its best example. Seven years in time, we have a city that suffers from segregation, disarticulation and with a great amount of inner empty spaces. Disperse growth and the questionable "housing demand" have produced a scenery in which consolidated neighborhoods look abandoned; along side, a high percentage of built homes in the new neighborhoods have not been inhabited because of the lack of equipment and urban services. The ability to acquire a second house, even if it is social level, has caused them to be incorporated to the rental market even though this contradicts their social character. In conclusion, we have found that unconditional support to the production of social housing without foreseeing its collateral effects has been a key factor for the irrational expansion in Mexican cities.

Housing Finance system has provided funds to households and organizations for buying their homes and premises. There are different type of housing finance systems which are applied by different countries. Housing finance systems can be more efficient, if private sector and public sector work together and harmoniously. Housing Finance system has made considerable progress in Turkey in the last 20 years. Before housing finance system was developed in Turkey, people could have bought houses by combining their retirement allowances and savings. Another method for financing their house, people could have borrowed from relatives or close friends along with their own savings. The Mass Housing Law (Law No: 2985) entered into force in 1984.The main target of the law, to find a solution of the housing problem in Turkey. Law also determines the tasks of the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ). After 2000’s Turkish Banks began to extend long term housing loans, but there was not mortgage system. Due to inadequate saving and income levels, it was not easy to use banking finance system for the low and middle income groups. In 2007, new legal regulations come into force, which is called Mortgage Law, for improving legal framework for borrowers and lenders in the primary markets and also made regulations for integrating primary mortgage market to the capital markets. In our paper, the finance methods and improvements in the housing finance in Turkey have been analyzed evaluating legal regulations and also the methods which is used by banks and other related institutions.

European sovereign debt crisis is the period that because of low interest rates, government and private debt increased substantially and also financial crisis transform private debt to high sovereign debt. In this period, low interest rates made government borrowing cost cheap and so sovereign debt increased considerably. In same period, private sector consumption and debt rose and this induced the housing bubbles. The expansionary fiscal policy against the effects of global financial crisis and bail-outs given to banks which are problematic made the sovereign debt highest and debt burden unsustainable for some countries. European sovereign debt crisis affect the world globally with the financial and economic links. Countries implemented fiscal and monetary policies against the recession and unemployment. In this respect, it is worthwhile researching the European sovereign debt crisis which is multifaceted and complex and offering suggestions for Turkey. Turkey must maintain the strong fiscal position and increased country resilience against crisis. And Turkey must also maintain banking regulation and supervision which are intended to steady financial sector. The aim of this paper is analyzing the development of European sovereign debt crisis and its effects; and also emphasizing the actions Turkey can take and offering suggestions for Turkey.

This POSTnote looks at the quality of housing in the private rented sector and explains the effects that housing conditions can have on health. It also looks at interventions to improve housing quality in the private rented sector and at the challenges to implementing them.

Recognizing the widespread concern that disruptions created by technology have not yet benefited middle- and low-income households, this study explores the potential of PropTech to positively impact the housing challenges in the region, with a particular focus on the poor or vulnerable populations. This study reveals several emerging trends that offer insight to those thinking about digital transformation in the housing and real estate sector for Latin America and the Caribbean and serve as the foundation for more research. PropTech startups are defined broadly as fast-growing actors that are developing technology-based business models for housing real estate markets. This includes companies operating on most phases of the housing value chain, from the housing units supply side (land, construction, access to services, and home improvement) to the demand side (financing, renting, buying, selling, and commercializing units). PropTech startups mainly address two key issues in the traditional real estate market: lack of transparency and processes inefficiencies. Reducing costs and making information available equalizes the markets playing field. The opportunity for PropTech startups to develop business models that cover lower income brackets is still largely unexplored. Currently, profitable businesses are mostly serving high-income bracket groups. Thus, large-scale solutions that would make investing in the low-income segment profitable remain an opportunity for PropTech companies to target. Also, opportunities remain for startups to explore housing solutions that strengthen adaptation to climate change and curb harmful environmental impact through technology innovations through retrofitting efforts or the repurposing of existing units. The report pays special attention to the different links in the value chain and highlights success stories that are having an impact on the current housing market, resulting in a snapshot of scalable, private-sector-led solutions currently deployed to solve pressing housing problems in the region.

Asia has experienced widespread transformation and growth, accompanied by increased demographic pressure, greater intensification of agricultural production, industrialization, and urbanization. This economic growth has been very resource- and carbon-intensive, while climate change has triggered or exacerbated behaviors and defense mechanisms that have come at the expense of the natural environment. Therefore, we examine and compare three Asian Development Bank (ADB) projects in two member countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation: one in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and two in Mongolia that relate to sustainable green development and use innovative financial mechanisms, and behavior-changing nudges. We provide comparative analyses and aim to demonstrate effective, innovative, and sustainable green finance and green transformation approaches in these two countries to address these pressures. The ADB–PRC loan for the Anhui Huangshan Xin’an River Ecological Protection and Green Development project aims to help Huangshan municipality reduce water pollution in the Xin’an River Basin, which is part of the Yangtze River Economic Belt. The project is piloting innovative green financing mechanisms to reduce rural pollution and complement the ongoing interprovincial eco-compensation scheme while supporting green agroecological businesses through two interventions: the Green Investment Fund and the Green Incentive Mechanism. In Mongolia, ADB and the Government of Mongolia have developed two large-scale transformative projects using integrated design and innovative green financing mechanisms to leverage private sector investment: (i) Aimags and Soums Green Regional Development Investment Program, which aims to promote green urban–rural linkages, green agribusiness development, natural capital, rangeland regeneration, and soil carbon sequestration through the (ii) Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and Resilient Urban Renewal Project, which aims to transform Ulaanbaatar’s vulnerable and substandard peri-urban areas into low-carbon, resilient eco-districts that provide access to green affordable housing.

Recent books and articles have analyzed the causes of the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-09. Yet little attention has been paid to the quality of leadership in organizations that were at the epicentre of the storm, were victims of it, avoided it or even prospered from it. In the summer of 2009 a multi-disciplinary group of Ivey faculty decided to look at the leadership dimensions of the recent financial and economic crisis. We started by writing a working paper that laid out our preliminary views. We then engaged more than 300 business, public sector and not-for-profit leaders in small and large groups, as individuals and collectives, to get their reaction to this paper and, more generally, to discuss te role that organizational leadership played before, during and after the crisis. We examined leadership not just in the financial sector but also in many other public and private sector organizations that were affected by the crisis. In a sense, we were putting leadership on trial. Our aim in doing this was not to identify and assign blame. Rather, we examined leadership during this critical period in recent history to learn what we could, and use the learning to improve practice in leadership today and the development of next generation leaders. As we analyzed the role of leadership in this crisis we were faced with one major question: "Would better leadership have made a difference?" Our answer is unequivocal: "Yes!" We recognize that many people could argue it is unfair to criticize leaders whose decisions were based on their knowledge of the situation at the time and which only eventually, with the aid of 20/20 hindsight proved bad. We respect this view but we disagree with it. Some business and public sector leaders predicted better than others the bursting of the housing bubble and financial markets turmoil, positioned their organizations to avoid problems, and coped with them skillfully. Their organizations were not badly damaged by the crisis and some even prospered. Some governments and regulatory agencies' control and monitoring systems were superior to those in the U.S., the U.K., Ireland, Spain, Iceland and other countries that had to bail out their banks and other industries. Our evidence supports the conclusion that these companies, these agencies, these governments and these countries had better leadership. Good leadership mattered then and good leadership will matter in the future. We are presenting our conclusions about what good leadership involves in the form of a public statement of principles - a manifesto that addresses what good leaders do, who they are, and how they can be developed in organizations.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

Exploring the public–private partnership (PPP) environment in Kazakhstan, this report assesses the country’s progress in creating better conditions for PPPs, to increase its infrastructure funding and improve service delivery. Consolidating data from leading financial and legal experts, this detailed review includes more than 500 qualitative and quantitative indicators profiling Kazakhstan's national PPP landscape, covers eight infrastructure sectors, and includes local government projects. As the COVID-19 pandemic has driven social infrastructure to the forefront of policy and planning, this edition also focuses on healthcare, education, and affordable housing.

The Colombian financial system has not suffered major structural disruptions during these months of deep economic contraction and has continued to carry out its basic functions as usual, thus facilitating the economy's response to extreme conditions. This is the result of the soundness of financial institutions at the beginning of the crisis, which was reflected in high liquidity and capital adequacy indicators as well as in the timely response of various authorities. Banco de la República lowered its policy interest rates 250 points to 1.75%, the lowest level since the creation of the new independent bank in 1991, and provided ample temporary and permanent liquidity in both pesos and foreign currency. The Office of the Financial Superintendent of Colombia, in turn, adopted prudential measures to facilitate changes in the conditions for loans in effect and temporary rules for rating and loan-loss provisions. Finally, the national government expanded the transfers as well as the guaranteed credit programs for the economy. The supply of real credit (i.e. discounting inflation) in the economy is 4% higher today than it was 12 months ago with especially marked growth in the housing (5.6%) and commercial (4.7%) loan portfolios (2.3% in consumer and -0.1% in microloans), but there have been significant changes over time. During the first few months of the quarantine, firms increased their demands for liquidity sharply while consumers reduced theirs. Since then, the growth of credit to firms has tended to slow down, while consumer and housing credit has grown. The financial system has responded satisfactorily to the changes in the respective demands of each group or sector and loans may grow at high rates in 2021 if GDP grows at rates close to 4.6% as the technical staff at the Bank expects; but the forecasts are highly uncertain. After the strict quarantine implemented by authorities in Colombia, the turmoil seen in March and early April, which was evident in the sudden reddening of macroeconomic variables on the risk heatmap in Graph A,[1] and the drop in crude oil and coal prices (note the high volatility registered in market risk for the region on Graph A) the local financial markets stabilized relatively quickly. Banco de la República’s credible and sustained policy response played a decisive role in this stabilization in terms of liquidity provision through a sharp expansion of repo operations (and changes in amounts, terms, counterparties, and eligible instruments), the purchases of public and private debt, and the reduction in bank reserve requirements. In this respect, there is now abundant aggregate liquidity and significant improvements in the liquidity position of investment funds. In this context, the main vulnerability factor for financial stability in the short term is still the high degree of uncertainty surrounding loan quality. First, the future trajectory of the number of people infected and deceased by the virus and the possible need for additional health measures is uncertain. For that reason, there is also uncertainty about the path for economic recovery in the short and medium term. Second, the degree to which the current shock will be reflected in loan quality once the risk materializes in banks’ financial statements is uncertain. For the time being, the credit risk heatmap (Graph B) indicates that non-performing and risky loans have not shown major deterioration, but past experience indicates that periods of sharp economic slowdown eventually tend to coincide with rises in non-performing loans: the calculations included in this report suggest that the impact of the recession on credit quality could be significant in the short term. This is particularly worrying since the profitability of credit establishments has been declining in recent months, and this could affect their ability to provide credit to the real sector of the economy. In order to adopt a forward-looking approach to this vulnerability, this Report presents several stress tests that evaluate the resilience of the liquidity and capital adequacy of credit institutions and investment funds in the event of a hypothetical scenario that seeks to simulate an extreme version of current macroeconomic conditions. The results suggest that even though there could be strong impacts on the credit institutions’ volume of credit and profitability under such scenarios, aggregate indicators of total and core capital adequacy will probably remain at levels that are above the regulatory limits over the horizon of a year. At the same time, the exercises highlight the high capacity of the system's liquidity to face adverse scenarios. In compliance with its constitutional objectives and in coordination with the financial system's security network, Banco de la República will continue to closely monitor the outlook for financial stability at this juncture and will make the decisions that are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the economy, facilitate the flow of sufficient credit and liquidity resources, and further the smooth operation of the payment systems. Juan José Echavarría Governor

Macroeconomic summary Several factors contributed to an increase in projected inflation on the forecast horizon, keeping it above the target rate. These included inflation in December that surpassed expectations (5.62%), indexation to higher inflation rates for various baskets in the consumer price index (CPI), a significant real increase in the legal minimum wage, persistent external and domestic inflationary supply shocks, and heightened exchange rate pressures. The CPI for foods was affected by the persistence of external and domestic supply shocks and was the most significant contributor to unexpectedly high inflation in the fourth quarter. Price adjustments for fuels and certain utilities can explain the acceleration in inflation for regulated items, which was more significant than anticipated. Prices in the CPI for goods excluding food and regulated items also rose more than expected. This was partly due to a smaller effect on prices from the national government’s VAT-free day than anticipated by the technical staff and more persistent external pressures, including via peso depreciation. By contrast, the CPI for services excluding food and regulated items accelerated less than expected, partly reflecting strong competition in the communications sector. This was the only major CPI basket for which prices increased below the target inflation rate. The technical staff revised its inflation forecast upward in response to certain external shocks (prices, costs, and depreciation) and domestic shocks (e.g., on meat products) that were stronger and more persistent than anticipated in the previous report. Observed inflation and a real increase in the legal minimum wage also exceeded expectations, which would boost inflation by affecting price indexation, labor costs, and inflation expectations. The technical staff now expects year-end headline inflation of 4.3% in 2022 and 3.4% in 2023; core inflation is projected to be 4.5% and 3.6%, respectively. These forecasts consider the lapse of certain price relief measures associated with the COVID-19 health emergency, which would contribute to temporarily keeping inflation above the target on the forecast horizon. It is important to note that these estimates continue to contain a significant degree of uncertainty, mainly related to the development of external and domestic supply shocks and their ultimate effects on prices. Other contributing factors include high price volatility and measurement uncertainty related to the extension of Colombia’s health emergency and tax relief measures (such as the VAT-free days) associated with the Social Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Social). The as-yet uncertain magnitude of the effects of a recent real increase in the legal minimum wage (that was high by historical standards) and high observed and expected inflation, are additional factors weighing on the overall uncertainty of the estimates in this report. The size of excess productive capacity remaining in the economy and the degree to which it is closing are also uncertain, as the evolution of the pandemic continues to represent a significant forecast risk. margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. The technical staff revised its GDP growth projection for 2022 from 4.7% to 4.3% (Graph 1.3). This revision accounts for the likelihood that a larger portion of the recent positive dynamic in private consumption would be transitory than previously expected. This estimate also contemplates less dynamic investment behavior than forecast in the previous report amid less favorable financial conditions and a highly uncertain investment environment. Third-quarter GDP growth (12.9%), which was similar to projections from the October report, and the fourth-quarter growth forecast (8.7%) reflect a positive consumption trend, which has been revised upward. This dynamic has been driven by both public and private spending. Investment growth, meanwhile, has been weaker than forecast. Available fourth-quarter data suggest that consumption spending for the period would have exceeded estimates from October, thanks to three consecutive months that included VAT-free days, a relatively low COVID-19 caseload, and mobility indicators similar to their pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, the most recently available figures on new housing developments and machinery and equipment imports suggest that investment, while continuing to rise, is growing at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. The trade deficit is expected to have widened, as imports would have grown at a high level and outpaced exports. Given the above, the technical staff now expects fourth-quarter economic growth of 8.7%, with overall growth for 2021 of 9.9%. Several factors should continue to contribute to output recovery in 2022, though some of these may be less significant than previously forecast. International financial conditions are expected to be less favorable, though external demand should continue to recover and terms of trade continue to increase amid higher projected oil prices. Lower unemployment rates and subsequent positive effects on household income, despite increased inflation, would also boost output recovery, as would progress in the national vaccination campaign. The technical staff expects that the conditions that have favored recent high levels of consumption would be, in large part, transitory. Consumption spending is expected to grow at a slower rate in 2022. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) would continue to recover, approaching its pre-pandemic level, though at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. This would be due to lower observed GFCF levels and the potential impact of political and fiscal uncertainty. Meanwhile, the policy interest rate would be less expansionary as the process of monetary policy normalization continues. Given the above, growth in 2022 is forecast to decelerate to 4.3% (previously 4.7%). In 2023, that figure (3.1%) is projected to converge to levels closer to the potential growth rate. In this case, excess productive capacity would be expected to tighten at a similar rate as projected in the previous report. The trade deficit would tighten more than previously projected on the forecast horizon, due to expectations of an improved export dynamic and moderation in imports. The growth forecast for 2022 considers a low basis of comparison from the first half of 2021. However, there remain significant downside risks to this forecast. The current projection does not, for example, account for any additional effects on economic activity resulting from further waves of COVID-19. High private consumption levels, which have already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. External demand for Colombian goods and services should continue to recover amid significant global inflation pressures, high oil prices, and less favorable international financial conditions than those estimated in October. Economic activity among Colombia’s major trade partners recovered in 2021 amid countries reopening and ample international liquidity. However, that growth has been somewhat restricted by global supply chain disruptions and new outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff has revised its growth forecast for Colombia’s main trade partners from 6.3% to 6.9% for 2021, and from 3.4% to 3.3% for 2022; trade partner economies are expected to grow 2.6% in 2023. Colombia’s annual terms of trade increased in 2021, largely on higher oil, coffee, and coal prices. This improvement came despite increased prices for goods and services imports. The expected oil price trajectory has been revised upward, partly to supply restrictions and lagging investment in the sector that would offset reduced growth forecasts in some major economies. Elevated freight and raw materials costs and supply chain disruptions continue to affect global goods production, and have led to increases in global prices. Coupled with the recovery in global demand, this has put upward pressure on external inflation. Several emerging market economies have continued to normalize monetary policy in this context. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve has anticipated an end to its asset buying program. U.S. inflation in December (7.0%) was again surprisingly high and market average inflation forecasts for 2022 have increased. The Fed is expected to increase its policy rate during the first quarter of 2022, with quarterly increases anticipated over the rest of the year. For its part, Colombia’s sovereign risk premium has increased and is forecast to remain on a higher path, to levels above the 15-year-average, on the forecast horizon. This would be partly due to the effects of a less expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia. Given the above, international financial conditions are projected to be less favorable than anticipated in the October report. The increase in Colombia’s external financing costs could be more significant if upward pressures on inflation in the United States persist and monetary policy is normalized more quickly than contemplated in this report. As detailed in Section 2.3, uncertainty surrounding international financial conditions continues to be unusually high. Along with other considerations, recent concerns over the potential effects of new COVID-19 variants, the persistence of global supply chain disruptions, energy crises in certain countries, growing geopolitical tensions, and a more significant deceleration in China are all factors underlying this uncertainty. The changing macroeconomic environment toward greater inflation and unanchoring risks on inflation expectations imply a reduction in the space available for monetary policy stimulus. Recovery in domestic demand and a reduction in excess productive capacity have come in line with the technical staff’s expectations from the October report. Some upside risks to inflation have materialized, while medium-term inflation expectations have increased and are above the 3% target. Monetary policy remains expansionary. Significant global inflationary pressures and the unexpected increase in the CPI in December point to more persistent effects from recent supply shocks. Core inflation is trending upward, but remains below the 3% target. Headline and core inflation projections have increased on the forecast horizon and are above the target rate through the end of 2023. Meanwhile, the expected dynamism of domestic demand would be in line with low levels of excess productive capacity. An accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia and the increased likelihood of a faster normalization of monetary policy in the United States would put upward pressure on sovereign risk perceptions in a more persistent manner, with implications for the exchange rate and the natural rate of interest. Persistent disruptions to international supply chains, a high real increase in the legal minimum wage, and the indexation of various baskets in the CPI to higher inflation rates could affect price expectations and push inflation above the target more persistently. These factors suggest that the space to maintain monetary stimulus has continued to diminish, though monetary policy remains expansionary. 1.2 Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s board of directors (BDBR) in its meetings in December 2021 and January 2022 voted to continue normalizing monetary policy. The BDBR voted by a majority in these two meetings to increase the benchmark interest rate by 50 and 100 basis points, respectively, bringing the policy rate to 4.0%.